Scripture even states quite directly that knowledge is something
distinct from the knowing subject, viz. in the passage 'For there is not
known any intermission of the knowing of the knower' (Bri. Up. IV, 3,
30).--It has been said that in passages such as 'he who abiding in
knowledge' (Bri. Up. III, 7, 22); 'Knowledge performs the sacrifice'
(Taitt. Up. II, 5, 1); 'having knowledge for its nature, absolutely free
from stain,'Scripture speaks of the Self as being mere knowledge (not a
knower). This point the next Sûtra elucidates.
29. But (the Self) is designated as that because it has that quality
(viz. knowledge) for its essential quality; as in the case of the
intelligent (prâjña) Self.
The 'but' discards the objection. Because that quality, viz. the quality
of knowledge, is the essential quality, therefore the Self is, in the
passages quoted, designated as knowledge. For knowledge constitutes the
essential quality of the Self. Similarly, the intelligent highest Self
is occasionally called 'Bliss,' because bliss is its essential quality.
Compare 'If that bliss existed not in the ether' (Taitt. Up. II, 7, 1);
'He perceived that bliss is Brahman' (Taitt. Up. III, 6, 1). That bliss
is the essential attribute of Brahman is proved by texts such as 'That
is one bliss of Brahman'; 'He who knows the bliss of Brahman is afraid
of nothing' (Taitt. Up. II, 4, 1).--Or else the analogous case to which
the Sûtra refers may be that of the intelligent Brahman being designated
by the term 'knowledge,' in texts such as 'Truth, knowledge, the
Infinite is Brahman' (Taitt. Up. II, 1). That knowledge is the essential
quality of Brahman is known from passages such as 'together with the
intelligent Brahman' (Taitt. Up. II, 1, 1); 'He who is all-knowing' (Mu.
Up. I, 1, 9).
30. And there is no objection, since (the quality of knowledge) exists
wherever the Self is; this being observed.
Since knowledge is an attribute which is met with wherever a Self is,
there is no objection to the Self being designated by that attribute.
Similarly we observe that special kinds of cows, as e.g. hornless ones,
are designated by the term 'cow,' since the quality of possessing the
generic character of cows is met with everywhere in connexion with the
essential character of such animals with mutilated horns; since in fact
that quality contributes to define their essential character. The 'and'
of the Sûtra is meant to suggest a further argument, viz. that to apply
to the Self the term 'knowledge' is suitable for that reason also that
like knowledge the Self is self-illuminated. The objection that
knowledge or consciousness cannot be an attribute inseparably connected
with the essential nature of the Self as there is no consciousness in
deep sleep and similar states is taken up in the next Sûtra.
31. Since there may be manifestation of that which exists; as in the
case of virile power and so on.
The 'but' is meant to set the raised objection aside. The case may be
that while consciousness is present also in deep sleep, and so on, it is
manifested in the waking state only; whence there would be no objection
to viewing consciousness as an essential attribute of the Self. 'As in
the case of virile power and the like.' Special substances such as the
virile element are indeed present in the male child already, but then
are not manifest, while later on they manifest themselves with advancing
youth; but all the same the possession of those substances is essential
to the male being, not merely adventitious. For to be made up of seven
elementary substances (viz. blood, humour, flesh, fat, marrow, bone, and
semen) is an essential, property of the body. That even in deep sleep
and similar states the 'I' shines forth we have explained above.
Consciousness is always there, but only in the waking state and in
dreams it is observed to relate itself to objects. And that to be a
subject of cognition, and so on, are essential attributes of the Self,
we have also proved before. The conclusion, therefore, is that to be a
knowing subject is the essential character of the Self. And that Self is
of atomic size. The text 'when he has departed there is no
consciousness' (samjñâ; Bri. Up. II, 4, 12) does not declare that the
released Self has no consciousness; but only that in the case of that
Self there is absent that knowledge (experience) of birth, death, and so
on, which in the Samsâra state is caused by the connexion of the Self
with the elements--as described in the preceding passage, 'that great
being having risen from out these elements again perishes after them.'
For the text as to the absence of samjñâ after death must be interpreted
in harmony with other texts describing the condition of the released
soul, such as 'the seeing one does not see death nor illness nor pain;
the seeing one sees everything and obtains everything everywhere' (Ch.
Up. VII, 25, 2); 'not remembering that body into which he was born--
seeing these pleasures with the mind he rejoices' (VIII, 12, 3; 5).
The Sûtras now proceed to refute the doctrine of the Self being (not a
knower) but mere knowledge, and being omnipresent.
32. There would result permanent consciousness or non-consciousness, or
else limitative restriction to either.
On the other view, i.e. on the view of the Self being omnipresent and
mere knowledge, it would follow either that consciousness and also non-
consciousness would permanently take place together everywhere; or else
that there would be definite permanent restriction to either of the two,
i.e. either permanent consciousness or permanent non-consciousness.--If
the omnipresent Self, consisting of mere knowledge only, were the cause
of all that actual consciousness and non-consciousness on the part of
Selfs which takes place in the world, it might be conceived either as
the cause of both--i.e. consciousness and non-consciousness--and this
would mean that there is everywhere and at all times simultaneous
consciousness and non-consciousness. If, on the other hand, it were the
cause of consciousness only, there would never and nowhere be
unconsciousness of anything; and if it were the cause of non-
consciousness only, there would never and nowhere be consciousness of
anything. On our view, on the other hand, the actually perceived
distribution of consciousness and non-consciousness explains itself,
since we hold the Self to abide within bodies only, so that naturally
consciousness takes place there only, not anywhere else.--The view,
finally (held by the Vaiseshikas), of the consciousness of the Self
depending on its organs (mind, senses, &c.; while the omnipresent Self
is, apart from those organs, non-sentient, jada), results in the same
difficulties as the view criticised above; for as all the Selfs are
omnipresent they are in permanent conjunction with all organs; and
moreover it would follow that the adrishtas (due to the actions of the
different bodies) could not thus be held apart (but would cling to all
Selfs, each of which is in contact with all bodies).