The 'but' indicates the setting aside of the primâ facie view raised. Of
all effected things, the _Mahat_, and so on, the highest Person himself,
in so far as embodied in the immediately preceding substance, is the
direct cause.--How is this known?--'From the inferential mark supplied
by the reflection of them.' By 'reflection' the Sûtra means the resolve
expressed in the recurring phrase, 'May I be many'; 'That fire thought,
may I be many'; 'That water thought, may I be many' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 3;
4). As these texts declare that there was thought in the form of a
resolve of self-multiplication--which thought can belong to a Self only,
we conclude that also the Mahat, the ahankâra, the Ether, and so on,
accomplish the sending forth of their respective effects only after
similar thought, and such thought can belong only to the highest Brahman
embodied in the Mahat, ahankâra, and so on. That the highest Brahman is
embodied in all beings and constitutes their Self, is directly stated in
the antaryâmin-brâhmana, 'He who abiding in the earth; abiding in water;
abiding in fire,' &c. &c. (Bri. Up. III, 7, 3 ff.); and likewise in the
Subâla-Up, 'Whose body is the earth,' &c. &c., up to 'Whose body is the
Unevolved.' The Pûrvapakshin had maintained that the creation, from
Brahman, of breath, and so on, which is declared in texts such as 'From
him are born breath, mind,' &c., may be understood as a mediate creation.
This point is taken up by the next Sûtra.
15. But the order of succession (which is stated) in reverse order (of
the true one) is possible, (only if the origination of all effects is)
thence (i.e. from Brahman).
The 'but' has an asseverative sense. The direct origination from Brahman
of all effects--which in passages such as the one quoted by the
Pûrvapakshin is stated in a form the reverse of the (true) order of
origination according to which the Unevolved, the Mahat, the ahankâra,
Ether, and so on, succeed each other--is possible only on the
supposition of the origination of each effect being really from Brahman
itself in the form of a special causal substance. To understand the
causality of Brahman as a merely mediate one would be to contradict all
those statements of immediate origination. Texts such as the one quoted
thus confirm the conclusion that everything originates from Brahman
directly.
16. If it be said that knowledge and mind (which are mentioned) between
(breath and the elements) (are stated) in order of succession, owing to
an inferential mark of this; we say, not so, on account of non-
difference.
'Knowledge' in the Sûtra denotes the means of knowledge, i.e. the sense-
organs.--An objection is raised against the conclusion arrived at under
the preceding Sûtra. We cannot, the opponent says, admit the conclusion
that the passage from the Mundka Up. 'from him is born breath, mind,' &c.,
declares the immediate origination from Brahman of all things, and that
hence the passage confirms the view, first suggested by the inferential
mark of 'thought' (see above, Sû. 14), that everything springs from
Brahman direct. For the purport of the text is to state a certain order
of succession, and we hence conclude that all the beings mentioned were
successively created. In the second half of the text we recognise the
series of ether, air, fire, &c., which is known to us from other texts,
and from the fact of their being exhibited in one and the same text we
conclude that knowledge and mind--which are mentioned between breath on
the one side and the elements on the other--must be viewed as created in
that order. The text therefore in no way confirms the direct origination
of everything from Brahman. To this the Sûtra replies, 'Not so, on
account of non-difference.' The first words of the text 'from him is
born' connect themselves equally with breath, and knowledge, and mind,
and the scries of elements beginning with ether; and the meaning of the
whole therefore is to declare that all the entities spring directly from
Brahman, not to teach the order of succession in which they are produced.
It moreover cannot have the purport of teaching a certain order of
succession, because the order stated contradicts the order established
by other scriptural passages; such as the one beginning 'the earth is
merged in water,' and ending 'darkness becomes one.' We hence hold to
the conclusion that all effects originate from Brahman only, in so far
as embodied in the Unevolved, and so on, and that the terms 'fire' and
so on denote Brahman, which is the Self of all those substances.--But to
interpret all these words as denoting Brahman is to set aside their
special denotative power as established by etymology!--To this objection
the next Sûtra replies.
17. But that which abides in the things movable and immovable, i.e. the
terms denoting those things, are non-secondary (i.e. of primary
denotative power, viz. with regard to Brahman); since (their denotative
power) is effected by the being of that (i.e. Brahman).
The 'but' sets aside the objection raised. (The primâ facie view here is
as follows.) As Brahman, which has all things for its modes, is not the
object of Perception and the other means of knowledge which give rise to
the apprehension of the things only which are Brahman's modes, and as
hence, previously to the study of the Vedânta-texts, the idea of that to
which the modes belong (i.e. of Brahman) does not arise, and as the
knowledge of all words finally denoting Brahman depends on the existence
of the idea of that to which the modes belong (i. e. Brahman); all the
individual words are used in worldly language only separately to denote
special things. In other words, as the terms 'fire' and so on have
denotative power with regard to particular things only, their denotative
power with regard to Brahman is secondary, indirect only.--Of this view
the Sûtra disposes by saying 'that which abides in the moving and the
non-moving,' &c. The meaning is--the terms which abide in, i.e. are
connected with, the different moving and non-moving things, and hence
denote those things, possess with regard to Brahman a denotative power
which is not 'bhâkta,' i.e. secondary or figurative, but primary and
direct. 'Why so?' Because the denotative power of all words is dependent
on the being of Brahman. For this we know from the scriptural passage
which tells how names and forms were evolved by Brahman.--Here
terminates the adhikarana of 'fire.'
18. Not the Self, on account of scriptural statement, and on account of
the eternity (which results) from them.
The Sûtras so far have stated that this entire world, from Ether
downwards, originates from the highest Brahman. It now becomes a matter
for discussion whether the individual soul also originates in the same
way or not.--It does so originate, the Pûrvapakshin maintains. For on
this assumption only the scriptural statement as to the cognition of all
things through the cognition of one thing holds good, and moreover
Scripture declares that before creation everything was one. Moreover,
there are texts directly stating that the soul also was produced in the
same way as Ether and other created things.
'Prajâpati sent forth all creatures'; 'All these creatures have their
root in the True, they abide in the True, they rest on the True' (Ch. Up.
VI, 8, 6); 'From whence these beings are produced' (Taitt. Up. III, 1,
1). As these passages declare the origination of the world inclusive of
sentient beings, we conclude that the souls also originate. Nor must
this be objected to on the ground than from the fact that Brahman is
eternal, and the other fact that texts such as 'That art them' teach the
soul to be of the nature of Brahman, it follows that the soul also is
eternal. For if we reasoned in this style we should have to admit also
that the Ether and the other elements are eternal, since texts such as
'in that all this has its Self' and 'all this indeed is Brahman
'intimate them also to be of the nature of Brahman. Hence the individual
soul also originates no less than Ether and the rest.--To this the Sûtra
replies, 'Not the Self, on account of scriptural statement.' The Self is
not produced, since certain texts directly deny its origination; cp.
'the intelligent one is not born nor does he die' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 18);
'There are two unborn ones, one intelligent and strong, the other non-
intelligent and weak' (Svet. Up. I, 9). And the eternity of the soul is
learned from the same texts, cp. 'There is one eternal thinker,' &c. (Ka.
Up. II,5, 13); 'Unborn, eternal, everlasting is that ancient one; he is
not killed though the body is killed' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 18).--For these
reasons the soul is not produced.
But how then about the declaration that through the cognition of one
thing everything is known?-There is no difficulty here, since the soul
also is an effect, and since effect and cause are non-different.--But
this implies that the soul is an originated thing just like Ether and so
on!--Not so, we reply. By a thing being an effect we mean its being due
to a substance passing over into some other state; and from this point
of view the soul also is an effect. There is, however, the difference,
that the 'other condition' which is represented by the soul is of a
different kind from that which constitutes non-sentient things, such as
Ether and so on. The 'otherness' on which the soul depends consists in
the contraction and expansion of intelligence; while the change on which
the origination of Ether and so on depends is a change of essential
nature. And change of the latter kind is what we deny of the soul. We
have shown that there are three entities of distinct nature, viz.
objects of fruition, enjoying subjects, and a Ruler; that origination
and so on which are characteristic of the objects do not belong to the
subjects, and that the latter are eternal; that the characteristic
qualities of the objects and likewise those of the subjects--viz.
liability to pain and suffering--do not belong to the Ruler; that the
latter is eternal, free from all imperfections, omniscient, immediately
realising all his purposes, the Lord of the lords of the organs, the
highest Lord of all; and that sentient and non-sentient beings in all
their states constitute the body of the Lord while he constitutes their
Self. While Brahman thus has for its modes (prakâra) the sentient and
non-sentient beings in which it ever is embodied, during certain periods
those beings abide in so subtle a condition as to be incapable of
receiving designations different from that of Brahman itself; Brahman
then is said to be in its causal state. When, on the other hand, its
body is constituted by all those beings in their gross state, when they
have separate, distinct names and forms, Brahman is said to be in its
effected condition. When, now, Brahman passes over from the causal state
into the effected state, the aggregate of non-sentient things which in
the causal state were destitute of name and form undergoes an essential
change of nature--implying the possession of distinct names and so on--
so as to become fit to constitute objects of fruition for sentient
beings; the change, on the other hand, which the sentient beings (the
souls) undergo on that occasion is nothing more than a certain expansion
of intelligence (or consciousness), capacitating them to experience the
different rewards or punishments for their previous deeds. The ruling
element of the world, i.e. the Lord, finally, who has the sentient and
non-sentient beings for his modes, undergoes a change in so far as he is,
at alternating periods, embodied in all those beings in their
alternating states. The two modes, and he to whom the modes belong, thus
undergo a common change in so far as in the case of all of them the
causal condition passes over into a different condition.
It is with reference to this change undergone by one substance in
passing over into a different state that the Chandogya says that through
the knowledge of one thing everything is known, and illustrates this by
the case of the lump of clay (knowing which we know all things made of
clay). Texts such as 'Prajâpati sent forth the creatures,' which declare
the origination of the soul, really mean only to state that the souls
are by turns associated with or dissociated from bodies--the effect of
which is that their intelligence is either contracted or expanded. Texts
again which deny the origination of the soul and affirm its permanency
('He is not born and does not die,' &c.) mean to say that the soul does
not, like the non-sentient element of creation, undergo changes of
essential nature. And finally there are texts the purport of which it is
to declare the absence of change of essential nature as well as of
alternate expansion and contraction of intelligence--cp. 'That is the
great unborn Self, undecaying, undying, immortal, Brahman' (Bri. Up. IV,
4, 25); 'the eternal thinker,' &c. (Ka. Up. II, 5, 13); such texts have
for their subject the highest Lord.--All this also explains how Brahman,
which is at all times differentiated by the sentient and non-sentient
beings that constitute its body, can be said to be one only previous to
creation; the statement is possible because at that time the
differentiation of names and forms did not exist. That that which makes
the difference between plurality and unity is the presence or absence of
differentiation through names and forms, is distinctly declared in the
text, 'Now all this was undifferentiated. It became differentiated by
form and name' (Bri. Up. I, 4, 7).--Those also who hold that the
individual soul is due to Nescience; and those who hold it to be due to
a real limiting adjunct (upâdhi); and those who hold that Brahman, whose
essential nature is mere Being, assumes by itself the threefold form of
enjoying subjects, objects of enjoyment, and supreme Ruler; can all of
them explain the unity which Scripture predicates of Brahman in the
pralaya state, only on the basis of the absence of differentiation by
names and forms; for according to them also (there is no absolute unity
at any time, but) either the potentiality of Nescience, or the
potentiality of the limiting adjunct, or the potentialities of enjoying
subjects, objects of enjoyment, and supreme Ruler persist in the pralaya
condition also. And, moreover, it is proved by the two Sûtras, II, 1, 33;
35, that the distinction of the several individual souls and the stream
of their works are eternal.
There is, however, the following difference between those several views.
The first-mentioned view implies that Brahman itself is under the
illusive influence of beginningless Avidyâ. According to the second view,
the effect of the real and beginningless limiting adjunct is that
Brahman itself is in the state of bondage; for there is no other entity
but Brahman and the adjunct. According to the third view, Brahman itself
assumes different forms, and itself experiences the various unpleasant
consequences of deeds. Nor would it avail to say that that part of
Brahman which is the Ruler is not an experiencing subject; for as
Brahman is all-knowing it recognises the enjoying subject as non-
different from itself, and thus is itself an enjoying subject.--
According to our view, on the other hand, Brahman, which has for its
body all sentient and non-sentient beings, whether in their subtle or
their gross state, is always--in its effected as well as in its causal
condition free from all shadow of imperfection, and a limitless ocean as
it were of all exalted qualities. All imperfections, and suffering, and
all change belong not to Brahman, but only to the sentient and non-
sentient beings which are its modes. This view removes all difficulties.--
Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the Self.'