The origination of the jîva is, moreover, distinctly controverted in the
books of the Bhâgavatas also. Thus in the Parama-samhitâ 'The nature of
Prakriti consists therein that she is non-sentient, for the sake of
another, eternal, ever-changing, comprising within herself the three
gunas and constituting the sphere of action and experience for all
agents. With her the soul (purusha) is connected in the way of
inseparable association; that soul is known to be truly without
beginning and without end.' And as all Samhitas make similar statements
as to the eternity of the soul, the Pañkarâtra doctrine manifestly
controverts the view of the essential nature of the jiva being something
that originates. How it is possible that in the Veda as well as in
common life the soul is spoken of as being born, dying, &c., will be
explained under Sû. II, 3, 17. The conclusion, therefore, is that the
Bhâgavata system also denies the origination of the soul, and that hence
the objections raised on this ground against its authoritativeness are
without any force. Another objection is raised by some. Sândilya, they
argue, is said to have promulgated the Pañkarâtra doctrine because he
did not find a sure basis for the highest welfare of man in the Veda and
its auxiliary disciplines, and this implies that the Pañkarâtra is
opposed to the Veda.--his objection, we reply, springs from nothing else
but the mere unreasoning faith of men who do not possess the faintest
knowledge of the teachings of the Veda, and have never considered the
hosts of arguments which confirm that teaching. When the Veda says,
'Morning after morning those speak untruth who make the Agnihotra
offering before sunrise,' it is understood that the censure there passed
on the offering before sunrise is really meant to glorify the offering
after sunrise. We meet with a similar case in the 'bhûma-vidyâ' (Ch. Up.
VII, 2). There at the beginning Nârada says, 'I know the Rig-veda, the
Yajur-veda, the Sâma-veda, the Âtharvana as the fourth, the Itihâsa-
purâna as the fifth,' and so on, enumerating all the various branches of
knowledge, and finally summing up 'with all this I know the mantras only,
I do not know the Self.' Now this declaration of the knowledge of the
Self not being attainable through any branch of knowledge except the
knowledge of the Bhûman evidently has no other purpose but to glorify
this latter knowledge, which is about to be expounded. Or else Nârada's
words refer to the fact that from the Veda and its auxiliary disciplines
he had not obtained the knowledge of the highest Reality. Analogous to
this is the case of Sândilya's alleged objection to the Veda. That the
Bhâgavata doctrine is meant to facilitate the understanding of the sense
of the Veda which by itself is difficult of comprehension, is declared
in the Paramasamhita,'I have read the Vedas at length, together with all
the various auxiliary branches of knowledge. But in all these I cannot
see a clear indication, raised above all doubt, of the way to
blessedness, whereby I might reach perfection'; and 'The wise Lord Hari,
animated by kindness for those devoted to him, extracted the essential
meaning of all the Vedânta-texts and condensed it in an easy form.' The
incontrovertible fact then is as follows. The Lord who is known from the
Vedânta-texts, i.e. Vâsudeva, called there the highest Brahman--who is
antagonistic to all evil, whose nature is of uniform excellence, who is
an ocean, as it were, of unlimited exalted qualities, such as infinite
intelligence, bliss, and so on, all whose purposes come true--perceiving
that those devoted to him, according as they are differently placed in
the four castes and the four stages of life, are intent on the different
ends of life, viz. religious observances, wealth, pleasure, and final
release; and recognising that the Vedas--which teach the truth about his
own nature, his glorious manifestations, the means of rendering him
propitious and the fruits of such endeavour--are difficult to fathom by
all beings other than himself, whether gods or men, since those Vedas
are divided into Rik, Yajus, Sâman, and Atharvan; and being animated by
infinite pity, tenderness, and magnanimity; with a view to enable his
devotees to grasp the true meaning of the Vedas, himself composed the
Pañkarâtra-sâstra. The author of the Sûtras (Vyâsa)--who first composed
the Sûtras, the purport of which it is to set forth the arguments
establishing the Vedânta doctrine, and then the Bhârata-samhitâ (i.e.
the Mahâbhârata) in a hundred thousand slokas in order to support
thereby the teaching of the Veda--himself says in the chapter called
Mokshadharma, which treats of knowledge, 'If a householder, or a
Brahmakârin, or a hermit, or a mendicant wishes to achieve success, what
deity should he worship?' and so on; explains then at great length the
Pañkarâtra system, and then says, 'From the lengthy Bhârata story,
comprising one hundred thousand slokas, this body of doctrine has been
extracted, with the churning-staff of mind, as butter is churned from
curds--as butter from milk, as the Brahmana from men, as the Âranyaka
from the Vedas, as Amrita from medicinal herbs.--This great Upanishad,
consistent with the four Vedas, in harmony with Sânkhya and Yoga, was
called by him by the name of Pañkarâtra. This is excellent, this is
Brahman, this is supremely beneficial. Fully agreeing with the Rik, the
Yajus, the Sâman, and the Atharvân-giras, this doctrine will be truly
authoritative.' The terms Sânkhya and Yoga here denote the concentrated
application of knowledge and of works. As has been said, 'By the
application of knowledge on the part of the Sânkhya, and of works on the
part of the Yogins.' And in the Bhîshmaparvan we read, 'By Brahmanas,
Kshattriyas, Vaisyas and Sûdras, Mâdhava is to be honoured, served and
worshipped--he who was proclaimed by Sankarshana in agreement with the
Sâtvata law.'--How then could these utterances of Bâdarâyana, the
foremost among all those who understand the teaching of the Veda, be
reconciled with the view that in the Sûtras he maintains the non-
authoritativeness of the Sâtvata doctrine, the purport of which is to
teach the worship of, and meditation on, Vâsudeva, who is none other
than the highest Brahman known from the Vedânta-texts?
But other passages in the Mahâbhârata, such as 'There is the Sânkhya,
the Yoga, the Pañkarâtra, the Vedas, and the Pasupata doctrine; do all
these rest on one and the same basis, or on different ones?' and so on,
declare that the Sânkhya and other doctrines also are worthy of regard,
while yet in the Sârîraka Sûtras those very same doctrines are formally
refuted. Why, therefore, should not the same hold good in the case of
the Bhâgavata doctrine?--Not so, we reply. In the Mahâbhârata also
Bâdarayana applies to the Sânkhya and other doctrines the same style of
reasoning as in the Sûtras. The question, asked in the passage quoted,
means 'Do the Sânkhya, the Yoga, the Pasupata, and the Pañkarâtra set
forth one and the same reality, or different ones? If the former, what
is that reality? If the latter, they convey contradictory doctrines, and,
as reality is not something which may be optionally assumed to be either
such or such, one of those doctrines only can be acknowledged as
authoritative, and the question then arises which is to be so
acknowledged?'--The answer to the question is given in the passage
beginning, 'Know, O royal Sage, all those different views. The
promulgator of the Sânkhya is Kapila,' &c. Here the human origin of the
Sânkhya, Yoga, and Pâsupata is established on the ground of their having
been produced by Kapila, Hiranyagarbha, and Pasupati. Next the clause
'Aparântatamas is said to be the teacher of the Vedas' intimates the non-
human character of the Vedas; and finally the clause 'Of the whole
Pañkarâtra, Nârâyana himself is the promulgator' declares that Nârâyana
himself revealed the Pañkarâtra doctrine. The connected purport of these
different clauses is as follows. As the systems of human origin set
forth doctrines mutually contradictory, and, moreover, teach what is in
conflict with the matter known from the Veda--which, on account of its
non-human character, is raised above all suspicion of error and other
imperfections--they cannot be accepted as authoritative with regard to
anything not depending on human action and choice. Now the matter to be
known from the Veda is Nârâyana, who is none other than the highest
Brahman. It hence follows that the entities set forth in those different
systems--the pradhâna, the soul (purusha), Pasupati, and so on--have to
be viewed as real only in so far as Nârâyana, i.e. the highest Brahman,
as known from the Vedânta-texts, constitutes their Self. This the text
directly declares in the passage, 'In all those doctrines it is seen, in
accordance with tradition and reasoning, that the lord Narayawa is the
only basis.' This means--'To him who considers the entities set forth in
those systems with the help of argumentation, it is evident that
Nârâyana alone is the basis of all those entities.' In other words, as
the entities set forth in those systems are not Brahman, any one who
remembers the teaching of texts such as 'all this indeed is Brahman,'
'Nârâyana is all,' which declare Brahman to be the Self of all, comes to
the conclusion that Nârâyana alone is the basis of those entities. As
thus it is settled that the highest Brahman, as known from the Vedânta-
texts, or Nârâyana, himself is the promulgator of the entire Pañkarâtra,
and that this system teaches the nature of Nârâyana and the proper way
of worshipping him, none can disestablish the view that in the
Pañkarâtra all the other doctrines are comprised. For this reason the
Mahâbhârata says, 'Thus the Sânkhya-yoga and the Veda and the Âranyaka,
being members of one another, are called the Pañkarâtra,' i.e. the
Sânkhya, the Yoga, the Vedas, and the Âranyakas, which are members of
one another because they are one in so far as aiming at setting forth
one Truth, together are called the Pañkarâtra.--The Sânkhya explains the
twenty-five principles, the Yoga teaches certain practices and means of
mental concentration, and the Âranyakas teach that all the subordinate
principles have their true Self in Brahman, that the mental
concentration enjoined in the Yoga is a mode of meditation on Brahman,
and that the rites and works which are set forth in the Veda are means
to win the favour of Brahman--thus giving instruction as to Brahman's
nature. Now all these elements, in their inward connexion, are clearly
set forth in the Pañkarâtra by the highest Brahman, i.e. Nârâyana,
himself. The Sârîraka Sâstra (i.e. the Vedânta) does not disprove the
principles assumed by the Sânkhyas, but merely the view of their not
having Brahman for their Self; and similarly in its criticism on the
Yoga and Pâsupata systems, it merely refutes the view of the Lord being
a mere instrumental cause, the erroneous assumptions as to the relative
position of higher and lower entities, and certain practices not
warranted by the Veda; but it does not reject the Yoga itself, nor again
the lord Pâsupati. Hence Smriti says,' The Sânkhya, the Yoga, the
Pañkarâtra, the Vedas, and the Psupata doctrine--all these having their
proof in the Self may not be destroyed by arguments.' The essential
points in all these doctrines are to be adopted, not to be rejected
absolutely as the teaching of Jina. or Sugata is to be rejected. For, as
said in the Smriti text quoted above, in all those doctrines it is seen,
according to tradition and reasoning, that the lord Nârâyana is the only
basis.'--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the impossibility of
origination.'