The motive which prompts Brahman--all whose wishes are fulfilled and who
is perfect in himself--to the creation of a world comprising all kinds
of sentient and non-sentient beings dependent on his volition, is
nothing else but sport, play. We see in ordinary life how some great
king, ruling this earth with its seven dvîpas, and possessing perfect
strength, valour, and so on, has a game at balls, or the like, from no
other motive than to amuse himself; hence there is no objection to the
view that sport only is the motive prompting Brahman to the creation,
sustentation, and destruction of this world which is easily fashioned by
his mere will.
34. Not inequality and cruelty, on account of there being regard; for so
(Scripture) declares.
It must indeed be admitted that the Lord, who differs in nature from all
other beings, intelligent and non-intelligent, and hence possesses
powers unfathomable by thought, is capable of creating this manifold
world, although before creation he is one only and without parts. But
the assumption of his having actually created the world would lay him
open to the charge of partiality, in so far as the world contains beings
of high, middle, and low station--gods, men, animals, immovable beings;
and to that of cruelty, in so far as he would be instrumental in making
his creatures experience pain of the most dreadful kind.--The reply to
this is 'not so, on account of there being regard'; i.e. 'on account of
the inequality of creation depending on the deeds of the intelligent
beings, gods, and so on, about to be created.'--Sruti and Smriti alike
declare that the connexion of the individual souls with bodies of
different kinds--divine, human, animal, and so on--depends on the karman
of those souls; compare 'He who performs good works becomes good, he who
performs bad works becomes bad. He becomes pure by pure deeds, bad by
bad deeds' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 5). In the same way the reverend Parâsara
declares that what causes the difference in nature and status between
gods, men, and so on, is the power of the former deeds of the souls
about to enter into a new creation--'He (the Lord) is the operative
cause only in the creation of new beings; the material cause is
constituted by the potentialities of the beings to be created. The being
to be embodied requires nothing but an operative cause; it is its own
potentiality which leads its being into that condition of being (which
it is to occupy in the new creation).' Potentiality here means karman.
35. If it be said 'not so, on account of non-distinction of deeds'; we
say, 'not so, on account of beginninglessness'; this is reasonable, and
it is also observed.
But before creation the individual souls do not exist; since Scripture
teaches non-distinction 'Being only this was in the beginning.' And as
then the souls do not exist, no karman can exist, and it cannot
therefore be said that the inequality of creation depends on karman.--Of
this objection the Sûtra disposes by saying 'on account of
beginninglessness,' i.e. although the individual souls and their deeds
form an eternal stream, without a beginning, yet non-distinction of them
'is reasonable' (i.e. may reasonably be asserted) in so far as, previous
to creation, the substance of the souls abides in a very subtle
condition, destitute of names and forms, and thus incapable of being
designated as something apart from Brahman, although in reality then
also they constitute Brahman's body only. If it were not admitted (that
the distinctions in the new creation are due to karman), it would
moreover follow that souls are requited for what they have not done, and
not requited for what they have done. The fact of the souls being
without a beginning is observed, viz., to be stated in Scripture,'The
intelligent one is not born and dies not' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 18); so also
the fact of the flow of creation going on from all eternity, 'As the
creator formed sun and moon formerly.' Moreover, the text, 'Now all this
was then undeveloped. It became developed by form and name' (Bri. Up. I,
4, 7), states merely that the names and forms of the souls were
developed, and this shows that the souls themselves existed from the
beginning. Smriti also says, 'Dost thou know both Prakriti and the soul
to be without beginning?' (Bha. Gî. XIII, 19.)--As Brahman thus differs
in nature from everything else, possesses all powers, has no other
motive than sport, and arranges the diversity of the creation in
accordance with the different karman of the individual souls, Brahman
alone can be the universal cause.