On account of the existence of the posterior, i.e. the effect existing
in the cause--for this reason also the effect is non-different from the
cause. For in ordinary language as well as in the Veda the effect is
spoken of in terms of the cause; as when we say, 'all these things--jars,
platters, &c.--were clay only this morning'; or when the Veda says,
'Being only was this in the beginning.'
18. If it be said 'not, on account of the designation of the (effect as
the) non-existent; we reply, not so, on account (of such designation
being due to) another attribute, (as appears) from the complementary
passage, from Reasoning, and from another Vedic text.
The assertion that ordinary speech as well as the Veda acknowledges the
existence of the effect in the cause cannot be upheld 'on account of the
designation of (the effect as) the non-existent.' For the Veda says,
'Non-being only was this in the beginning' (Ch. Up. III, 19, 1); 'Non-
being indeed was this in the beginning' (Taitt. Up. II, 6. 1); 'In the
beginning truly this was not anything whatever.' And in ordinary
language we say 'In the morning all this--jars, platters, and so on,--
was not.'--This objection the Sûtra proceeds to refute. 'Not so, on
account of such designation being due to another attribute.' The
designation of the effected substance as the non-existent is due to the
effect having at an earlier time a different quality, i.e. a different
constitution; not to its being, as you think, absolutely non-existing.
The quality different from the quality of existence is non-existence;
that is to say, of the world designated as _this_, the quality of
existence is constituted by name and form, while the quality of non-
existence consists in the subtle state opposed to name and form.--But
how is this known?--'From the complementary passage, from Reasoning, and
from another text.' The complementary passage is the one following on
the last text quoted above, viz. 'that Non-existent formed the resolve
"may I be". The resolve referred to in this complementary text serving
as an inferential sign to determine that the Non-existence spoken of is
other than absolute Non-existence, we, on the basis of the observation
that all the three texts quoted treat of the same matter, conclude that
in the other two texts also the Non-existent has to be understood in the
same sense. 'From Reasoning.' Reasoning shows Being and Non-being to be
attributes of things. The possession, on the part of clay, of a certain
shape, a broad base, a belly-shaped body, and so on, is the cause of our
thinking and saying 'the jar exists,' while the connexion, on the part
of the clay, with a condition opposed to that of a jar is the cause of
our thinking and saying 'the jar does not exist.' A condition of the
latter kind is e. g.--the clay's existing in the form of two separate
halves of a jar, and it is just this and similar conditions of the clay
which account for our saying that the jar does not exist. We do not
perceive any non-existence of the jar different from the kind of non-
existence described; and as the latter sufficiently accounts for all
current ideas and expressions as to non-existence, there is no occasion
to assume an additional kind of non-existence.--And also 'from another
text.' The text meant is that often quoted, 'Being only was this in the
beginning.' For there the view of the absolute non-being of the effect
is objected to, 'But how could it be thus?' &c., and then the decision
is given that from the beginning the world was 'being.' This matter is
clearly set forth in the text 'This was then undistinguished; it became
distinguished by name and form' (Bri. Up. I, 4, 7).
The next two Sûtras confirm the doctrine of the non-difference of the
effect from the cause by two illustrative instances.