The Sânkhya comes forward with a further objection. Although the
Vedânta-texts teach an intelligent principle to be the cause of the
world, they do not present to us as objects of knowledge anything that
could be the cause of the world, apart from the Pradhâna and the soul as
established by the Sânkhya-system. For the Kaushîtakins declare in their
text, in the dialogue of Bâlâki and Ajâtasatru, that none but the
enjoying (individual) soul is to be known as the cause of the world,
'Shall I tell you Brahman? He who is the maker of those persons and of
whom this is the work (or "to whom this work belongs") he indeed is to
be known' (Kau. Up. IV, 19). Bâlâki at the outset proposes Brahman as
the object of instruction, and when he is found himself not to know
Brahman, Ajâtasatru instructs him about it, 'he indeed is to be known.'
But from the relative clause 'to whom this work belongs,' which connects
the being to be known with work, we infer that by Brahman we have here
to understand the enjoying soul which is the ruler of Prakriti, not any
other being. For no other being is connected with work; work, whether
meritorious or the contrary, belongs to the individual soul only. Nor
must you contest this conclusion on the ground that 'work' is here to be
explained as meaning the object of activity, so that the sense of the
clause would be 'he of whom this entire world, as presented by
perception and the other means of knowledge, is the work.' For in that
case the separate statements made in the two clauses, 'who is the maker
of those persons' and 'of whom this is the work,' would be devoid of
purport (the latter implying the former). Moreover, the generally
accepted meaning of the word 'karman,' both in Vedic and worldly speech,
is work in the sense of good and evil actions. And as the origination of
the world is caused by actions of the various individual souls, the
designation of 'maker of those persons' also suits only the individual
soul. The meaning of the whole passage therefore is 'He who is the cause
of the different persons that have their abode in the disc of the sun,
and so on, and are instrumental towards the retributive experiences of
the individual souls; and to whom there belongs karman, good and evil,
to which there is due his becoming such a cause; _he_ indeed is to be
known, _his_ essential nature is to be cognised in distinction from
Prakriti.' And also in what follows, 'The two came to a person who was
asleep. He pushed him with a stick,' &c., what is said about the
sleeping man being pushed, roused, &c., all points only to the
individual soul being the topic of instruction. Further on also the text
treats of the individual soul only, 'As the master feeds with his
people, nay as his people feed on the master, thus does this conscious
Self feed with the other Selfs.' We must consider also the following
passage--which contains the explanation given by Ajatasatru to Bâlâki,
who had been unable to say where the soul goes at the time of deep
sleep--' There are the arteries called Hitas. In these the person is;
when sleeping he sees no dream, then he (or that, i.e. the aggregate of
the sense-organs) becomes one with this prâna alone. Then speech goes to
him with all names, &c., the mind with all thoughts. And when he awakes,
then, as from a burning fire sparks proceed in all directions, thus from
that Self the prânas proceed each towards its place, from the prânas the
gods, from the gods the worlds.' The individual soul which passes
through the states of dream, deep sleep and waking, and is that into
which there are merged and from which there proceed speech and all the
other organs, is here declared to be the abode of deep sleep 'then it
(viz. the aggregate of the organs) becomes one in that prâna.' Prâna
here means the individual soul in so far as supporting life; for the
text continues 'when _that_ one awakes' and neither the vital breath nor
the Lord (both of whom might be proposed as explanations of prâna) can
be said to be asleep and to wake. Or else 'asmin prâne' might be
explained as 'in the vital breath (which abides) in the individual
soul,' the meaning of the clause being 'all the organs, speech and so
on, become one in the vital breath which itself abides in this soul.'
The word 'prâna' would thus be taken in its primary literal sense; yet
all the same the soul constitutes the topic of the section, the vital
breath being a mere instrument of the soul. The Brahman mentioned at the
outset therefore is none other than the individual soul, and there is
nothing to prove a lord different from it. And as the attributes which
the texts ascribe to the general cause, viz. thought and so on, are
attributes of intelligent beings only, we arrive at the conclusion that
what constitutes the cause of the world is the non-intelligent Pradhâna
guided by the intelligent soul.
This primâ facie view the Sûtra disposes of, by saying 'because (the
work) denotes the world.' It is not the insignificant individual soul--
which is under the influence of its good and evil works, and by
erroneously imputing to itself the attributes of Prakriti becomes the
cause of the effects of the latter--that is the topic of our text; but
rather the Supreme Person who is free from all shadow of imperfection
such as Nescience and the like, who is a treasure of all possible
auspicious qualities in their highest degree of perfection, who is the
sole cause of this entire world. This is proved by the circumstance that
the term 'work' connected with 'this' (in 'of whom this (is) the work')
denotes the Universe which is an effect of the Supreme Person. For the
word 'this' must, on account of its sense, the general topic of the
section and so on, be taken in a non-limited meaning, and hence denotes
the entire world, as presented by Perception and the other means of
knowledge, with all its sentient and non-sentient beings. That the term
'work' does not here denote good and evil actions, appears from the
following consideration of the context. Bâlâki at first offers to teach
Brahman ('Shall I tell you Brahman?') and thereupon holds forth on
various persons abiding in the sun, and so on, as being Brahman.
Ajatasatru however refuses to accept this instruction as not setting
forth Brahman, and finally, in order to enlighten Bâlâki, addresses him
'He, O Bâlâki, who is the maker of those persons,' &c. Now as the
different personal souls abiding in the sun, &c., and connected with
karman in the form of good and evil actions, are known already by Bâlâki,
the term 'karman'--met with in the next clause--is clearly meant to
throw light on some Person so far not known to Bâlâki, and therefore
must be taken to mean not good and evil deeds or action in general, but
rather the entire Universe in so far as being the outcome of activity.
On this interpretation only the passage gives instruction about
something not known before. Should it be said that this would be the
case also if the subject to which the instruction refers were the true
essential nature of the soul, indicated here by its connexion with
karman, we reply that this would involve the (objectionable) assumption
of so-called implication (lakshanâ), in so far namely as what the clause
would directly intimate is (not the essential nature of the soul as free
from karman but rather) the connexion of the soul with karman. Moreover
if the intention of the passage were this, viz. to give instruction as
to the soul, the latter being pointed at by means of the reference to
karman, the intention would be fully accomplished by saying 'to whom
karman belongs, he is to be known;' while in the text as it actually
stands 'of whom this is the karman' the 'this' would be unmeaning. The
meaning of the two separate clauses 'who is the maker of those persons'
and 'of whom this is the work' is as follows. He who is the creator of
those persons whom you called Brahman, and of whom those persons are the
creatures; he of whom this entire world is the effect, and before whom
all things sentient and non-sentient are equal in so far as being
produced by him; he, the highest and universal cause, the Supreme Person,
is the object to be known. The meaning implied here is--although the
origination of the world has for its condition the deeds of individual
souls, yet those souls do not independently originate the means for
their own retributive experience, but experience only what the Lord has
created to that end in agreement with their works. The individual soul,
hence, cannot stand in creative relation to those persons.--What the
text under discussion inculcates as the object of knowledge therefore is
the highest Brahman which is known from all Vedânta-texts as the
universal cause.
17. Should it be said that this is not so on account of the inferential
marks of the individual soul and the chief vital air; we reply that this
has been explained before.
With reference to the plea urged by the Pûrvapakshin that, owing to
inferential marks pointing to the individual soul, and the circumstance
of mention being made of the chief vital air, we must decide that the
section treats of the enjoying individual soul and not of the highest
Self, the Sûtra remarks that this argumentation has already been
disposed of, viz. in connexion with the Pratardana vidyâ. For there it
was shown that when a text is ascertained, on the ground of a
comprehensive survey of initial and concluding clauses, to refer to
Brahman, all inferential marks which point to other topics must be
interpreted so as to fall in with the principal topic. Now in our text
Brahman is introduced at the outset 'Shall I tell you Brahman?' it is
further mentioned in the middle of the section, for the clause 'of whom
this is the work' does not refer to the soul in general but to the
highest Person who is the cause of the whole world; and at the end again
we hear of a reward which connects itself only with meditations on
Brahman, viz. supreme sovereignty preceded by the conquest of all evil.
'Having overcome all evil he obtains pre-eminence among all beings,
sovereignty and supremacy--yea, he who knows this.' The section thus
being concerned with Brahman, the references to the individual soul and
to the chief vital air must also be interpreted so as to fall in with
Brahman. In the same way it was shown above that the references to the
individual soul and the chief vital air which are met with in the
Pratardana vidyâ really explain themselves in connexion with a threefold
meditation on Brahman. As in the passage 'Then with this prâna alone he
becomes one' the two words 'this' and 'prâna' may be taken as co-
ordinated and it hence would be inappropriate to separate them (and to
explain 'in the prâna which abides in this soul'), and as the word
'prâna' is ascertained to mean Brahman also, we must understand the
mention of prâna to be made with a view to meditation on Brahman in so
far as having the prâna for its body. But how can the references to the
individual soul be put in connexion with Brahman?--This point is taken
up by the next Sûtra.
18. But Jaimini thinks that it has another purport, on account of the
question and answer; and thus some also.
The 'but' is meant to preclude the idea that the mention made of the
individual soul enables us to understand the whole section as concerned
with that soul.--The teacher Jaimini is of opinion that the mention made
of the individual soul has another meaning, i.e. aims at conveying the
idea of what is different from the individual soul, i.e. the nature of
the highest Brahman. 'On account of question and answer.' According to
the story told in the Upanishad, Ajâtasatru leads Bâlâki to where a
sleeping man is resting, and convinces him that the soul is different
from breath, by addressing the sleeping person, in whom breath only is
awake, with names belonging to prâna [FOOTNOTE 383:1] without the sleeper
being awaked thereby, and after that rousing him by a push of his staff.
Then, with a view to teaching Bâlâki the difference of Brahman from the
individual soul, he asks him the following questions: 'Where, O Bâlâki,
did this person here sleep? Where was he? Whence did he thus come back?'
To these questions he thereupon himself replies, 'When sleeping he sees
no dream, then he becomes one in that prâna alone.--From that Self the
organs proceed each towards its place, from the organs the gods, from
the gods the worlds.' Now this reply, no less than the questions,
clearly refers to the highest Self as something different from the
individual Self. For that entering into which the soul, in the state of
deep sleep, attains its true nature and enjoys complete serenity, being
free from the disturbing experiences of pleasure and pain that accompany
the states of waking and of dream; and that from which it again returns
to the fruition of pleasure and pain; that is nothing else but the
highest Self. For, as other scriptural texts testify ('Then he becomes
united with the True,' Ch. Up. VI, 8, 1; 'Embraced by the intelligent
Self he knows nothing that is without, nothing that is within,' Bri, Up.
IV, 3, 21), the abode of deep sleep is the intelligent Self which is
different from the individual Self, i.e. the highest Self. We thus
conclude that the reference, in question and answer, to the individual
soul subserves the end of instruction being given about what is
different from that soul, i.e. the highest Self. We hence also reject
the Pûrvapakshin's contention that question and answer refer to the
individual soul, that the veins called hita are the abode of deep sleep,
and that the well-known clause as to the prâna must be taken to mean
that the aggregate of the organs becomes one in the individual soul
called prâna. For the veins are the abode, not of deep sleep, but of
dream, and, as we have shown above, Brahman only is the abode of deep
sleep; and the text declares that the individual soul, together with all
its ministering organs, becomes one with, and again proceeds from,
Brahman only--which the text designates as Prâna.--Moreover some, viz.
the Vâjasaneyins in this same colloquy of Bâlâki and Ajâtasatru as
recorded in their text, clearly distinguish from the vijñâna-maya, i.e.
the individual soul in the state of deep sleep, the highest Self which
then is the abode of the individual soul. 'Where was then the person,
consisting of intelligence, and from whence did he thus come back?--When
he was thus asleep, then the intelligent person, having through the
intelligence of the senses absorbed within himself all intelligence,
lies in the ether that is within the heart.' Now the word 'ether' is
known to denote the highest Self; cf. the text 'there is within that the
small ether'(Ch. Up. VIII, 1, 1). This shows us that the individual soul
is mentioned in the Vâjasaneyin passage to the end of setting forth what
is different from it, viz. the prâjña Self, i.e. the highest Brahman.
The general conclusion therefore is that the Kaushîtaki-text under
discussion proposes as the object of knowledge something that is
different from the individual soul, viz. the highest Brahman which is
the cause of the whole world, and that hence the Vedânta-texts nowhere
intimate that general causality belongs either to the individual soul or
to the Pradhâna under the soul's guidance. Here terminates the
adhikarana of 'denotation of the world.'
[FOOTNOTE 383:1. The names with which the king addresses the sleeper are
_Great one, clad in white raiment, Soma, king._ The Sru. Pra. comments
as follows: _Great one_; because according to Sruti Prâna is the oldest
and best. _Clad in white raiment_; because Sruti says that water is the
raiment of Prâna; and elsewhere, that what is white belongs to water.
_Soma_; because scripture says 'of this prâna water is the body, light
the form, viz. yonder moon.' _King_; for Sruti says 'Prâna indeed is the
ruler.']