As words such as Indra and Vasishtha, which denote gods and Rishis,
denote (not individuals only, but) classes, and as the creation of those
beings is preceded by their being suggested to the creative mind through
those words; for this reason the eternity of the Veda admits of being
reconciled with what scripture says about the mantras and kândas
(sections) of the sacred text having 'makers' and about Rishis seeing
the hymns; cp. such passages as 'He chooses the makers of mantras';
'Reverence to the Rishis who are the makers of mantras'; 'That is Agni;
this is a hymn of Visvâmitra.' For by means of these very texts
Prajâpati presents to his own mind the characteristics and powers of the
different Rishis who make the different sections, hymns, and mantras,
thereupon creates them endowed with those characteristics and powers,
and appoints them to remember the very same sections, hymns, &c. The
Rishis being thus gifted by Prajâpati with the requisite powers, undergo
suitable preparatory austerities and finally _see_ the mantras, and so
on, proclaimed by the Vasishthas and other Rishis of former ages of the
world, perfect in all their sounds and accents, without having learned
them from the recitation of a teacher. There is thus no conflict between
the eternity of the Veda and the fact that the Rishis are the _makers_
of its sections, hymns, and so on. A further objection is raised. Let it
be admitted that after each pralaya of the kind called 'contingent'
(naimittika), Prajâpati may proceed to create new Indras, and so on, in
the way of remembering on the basis of the Veda the Indras, and so on,
of preceding periods. In the case, on the other hand, of a pralaya of
the kind called elemental (prâkritika), in which the creator, Prajâpati
himself, and words--which are the effects of the elemental ahankâra--
pass away, what possibility is there of Prajâpati undertaking a new
creation on the basis of Vedic words, and how can we speak of the
permanency of a Veda which perishes? He who maintains the eternity of
the Veda and the corporeality of gods, and so on, is thus really driven
to the hypothesis of the course of mundane existence being without a
beginning (i.e. not preceded by a pralaya).--Of this difficulty the next
Sûtra disposes.
29. And on account of the equality of names and forms there is no
contradiction, even in the renovation (of the world); as appears from--
Sruti and Smriti.
On account of the sameness of names and forms, as stated before, there
is no difficulty in the way of the origination of the world, even in the
case of total pralayas. For what actually takes place is as follows.
When the period of a great pralaya draws towards its close, the divine
supreme Person, remembering the constitution of the world previous to
the pralaya, and forming the volition 'May I become manifold' separates
into its constituent elements the whole mass of enjoying souls and
objects of enjoyment which, during the pralaya state, had been merged in
him so as to possess a separate existence (not actual but) potential
only, and then emits the entire world just as it had been before, from
the so-called Mahat down to the Brahman-egg, and Hiranyagarbha
(Prajâpati). Having thereupon manifested the Vedas in exactly the same
order and arrangement they had had before, and having taught them to
Hiranyagarbha, he entrusts to him the new creation of the different
classes of beings, gods, and so on, just as it was before; and at the
same time abides himself within the world so created as its inner Self
and Ruler. This view of the process removes all difficulties. The
superhuman origin and the eternity of the Veda really mean that
intelligent agents having received in their minds an impression due to
previous recitations of the Veda in a fixed order of words, chapters,
and so on, remember and again recite it in that very same order of
succession. This holds good both with regard to us men and to the
highest Lord of all; there however is that difference between the two
cases that the representations of the Veda which the supreme Person
forms in his own mind are spontaneous, not dependent on an impression
previously made.
To the question whence all this is known, the Sûtra replies 'from
Scripture and Smriti.' The scriptural passage is 'He who first creates
Brahmâ and delivers the Vedas to him' (Svet. Up. VI, 18). And as to
Smriti we have the following statement in Manu, 'This universe existed
in the shape of darkness, &c.--He desiring to produce beings of many
kinds from his own body, first with a thought created the waters and
placed his seed in them. That seed became a golden egg equal to the sun
in brilliancy; in that he himself was born as Brahmâ, the progenitor of
the whole world' (Manu I, 5; 8-9). To the same effect are the texts of
the Paurânikas, 'From the navel of the sleeping divinity there sprung up
a lotus, and in that lotus there was born Brahma fully knowing all Vedas
and Vedângas. And then Brahmâ was told by him (the highest Divinity),
'Do thou create all beings, O Great-minded one'; and the following
passage, 'From the highest Nârâyana there was born the Four-faced one.'--
And in the section which begins 'I will tell the original creation,' we
read 'Because having created water (nâra) I abide within it, therefore
my name shall be Nârâyana. There I lie asleep in every Kalpa, and as I
am sleeping there springs from my navel a lotus, and in that lotus there
is born the Four-faced one, and I tell him "Do thou, Great-minded one,
create all beings."'--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the deities.'
30. On account of the impossibility (of qualification for the
madhuvidyâ, &c.) (Jaimini maintains the non-qualification (of gods,
&c.).)
So far it has been proved that also the gods, and so on, are qualified
for the knowledge of Brahman. But a further point here presents itself
for consideration, viz. whether the gods are qualified or not to
undertake those meditations of which they themselves are the objects.
The Sûtra states as a pûrvapaksha view held by Jaimini, that they are
not so qualified, for the reason that there are no other Âdityas, Vasus,
and so on, who could be meditated on by the Âdityas and Vasus themselves;
and that moreover for the Âdityas and Vasus the qualities and position
of those classes of deities cannot be objects of desire, considering
that they possess them already. The so-called Madhuvidyâ (Ch. Up. III)
represents as objects of devout meditation certain parts of the sun
which are being enjoyed by the different classes of divine beings, Vasus,
Âdityas, and so on--the sun being there called 'madhu.' i.e. honey or
nectar, on account of his being the abode of a certain nectar to be
brought about by certain sacrificial works to be known from the Rig-veda,
and so on; and as the reward of such meditation the text names the
attainment of the position of the Vasus, Âdityas, and so on.
31. And on account of (meditating on the part of the gods) being in the
Light.
'Him the devas meditate upon as the light of lights, as immortal time'
(Bri. Up. IV, 4, 16). This text declares that the meditation of the gods
has for its object the Light, i.e. the highest Brahman. Now this express
declaration as to the gods being meditating devotees with regard to
meditations on Brahman which are common to men and gods, implies a
denial of the gods being qualified for meditations on other objects. The
conclusion therefore is that the Vasus, and so on, are not qualified for
meditations on the Vasus and other classes of deities.
32. But Bâdarâyana (maintains) the existence (of qualification); for
there is (possibility of such).
The Reverend Bâdarâyana thinks that the Âdityas, Vasus, and so on, are
also qualified for meditations on divinities. For it is in their case
also possible that their attainment of Brahman should be viewed as
preceded by their attainment of Vasu-hood or Âditya-hood, in so far,
namely, as they meditate on Brahman as abiding within themselves. They
may be Vasus and Âdityas in the present age of the world, but at the
same time be desirous of holding the same position in future ages also.
In the Madhuvidyâ we have to distinguish two sections, concerned
respectively with Brahman in its causal and its effected state. The
former section, extending from the beginning up to 'when from thence he
has risen upwards,' enjoins meditation on Brahman in its condition as
effect, i.e. as appearing in the form of creatures such as the Vasus,
and so on; while the latter section enjoins meditation on the causal
Brahman viewed as abiding within the sun as its inner Self. The purport
of the whole vidyâ is that he who meditates on Brahman in this its
twofold form will in a future age of the world enjoy Vasu-hood, and will
finally attain Brahman in its causal aspect, i.e. the very highest
Brahman. From the fact that the text, 'And indeed to him who thus knows
the Brahma-upanishad, the sun does not rise and does not set; for him
there is day once and for all,' calls the whole Madhuvidyâ a 'Brahma'--
upanishad, and that the reward declared is the attainment of Vasu-hood,
and so on, leading up to the attainment of Brahman, we clearly are
entitled to infer that the meditations which the text enjoins, viz. on
the different parts of the sun viewed as objects of enjoyment for the
Vasus, and so on, really are meant as meditations on Brahman as abiding
in those different forms. Meditation on the Vasus and similar beings is
thus seen to be possible for the Vasus themselves. And as Brahman really
constitutes the only object of meditation, we also see the
appropriateness of the text discussed above, 'On him the gods meditate
as the light of lights.' The Vrittikâra expresses the same opinion, 'For
there is possibility with regard to the Madhu-vidyâ, and so on, Brahman
only being the object of meditation everywhere.'--Here terminates the
adhikarana of 'honey.'
The Sûtras now enter on a discussion of the question whether the Sûdras
also are qualified for the knowledge of Brahman.
The Pûrvapakshin maintains that they are so qualified; for qualification,
he says, depends on want and capacity, and both these are possible in
the case of Sûdras also. The Sûdra is not indeed qualified for any works
depending on a knowledge of the sacred fires, for from such knowledge he
is debarred; but he possesses qualification for meditation on Brahman,
which after all is nothing but a certain mental energy. The only works
prerequisite for meditation are those works which are incumbent on a man
as a member of a caste or âsrama, and these consist, in the Sûdra's case,
in obedience to the higher castes. And when we read 'therefore the Sûdra
is not qualified for sacrifices,' the purport of this passage is only to
make a confirmatory reference to something already settled by reason,
viz. that the Sûdra is not qualified for the performance of sacrifices
which cannot be accomplished by one not acquainted with the sacred fires
(and not to deny the Sûdra's competence for devout meditation).--But how
can meditation on Brahman be undertaken by a man who has not studied the
Vedas, inclusive of the Vedânta, and hence knows nothing about the
nature of Brahman and the proper modes of meditation?--Those also, we
reply, who do not study Veda and Vedânta may acquire the requisite
knowledge by hearing Itihâsas and Purânas; and there are texts which
allow Sûdras to become acquainted with texts of that kind; cp. e.g. 'one
is to make the four castes to hear texts, the Brâhmana coming first.'
Moreover, those Purânas and Itihâsas make mention of Sûdras, such as
Vidura, who had a knowledge of Brahman. And the Upanishads themselves,
viz. in the so-called Samvarga-vidyâ, show that a Sûdra is qualified for
the knowledge of Brahman; for there the teacher Raikva addresses
Jânasruti, who wishes to learn from him, as Sûdra, and thereupon
instructs him in the knowledge of Brahman (Ch. Up. IV, 2, 3). All this
proves that Sûdras also have a claim to the knowledge of Brahman.
This conclusion we deny, on the ground of the absence of capability. It
is impossible that the capability of performing meditations on Brahman
should belong to a person not knowing the nature of Brahman and the due
modes of meditation, and not qualified by the knowledge of the requisite
preliminaries of such meditation, viz. recitation of the Veda,
sacrifices, and so on. Mere want or desire does not impart qualification
to a person destitute of the required capability. And this absence of
capability is due, in the Sûdra's case, to absence of legitimate study
of the Veda. The injunctions of sacrificial works naturally connect
themselves with the knowledge and the means of knowledge (i.e. religious
ceremonies and the like) that belong to the three higher castes, for
these castes actually possess the knowledge (required for the
sacrifices), owing to their studying the Veda in agreement with the
injunction which prescribes such study for the higher castes; the same
injunctions do not, on the other hand, connect themselves with the
knowledge and means of knowledge belonging to others (than members of
the three higher castes). And the same naturally holds good with regard
to the injunctions of meditation on Brahman. And as thus only such
knowledge as is acquired by study prompted by the Vedic injunction of
study supplies a means for meditation on Brahman, it follows that the
Sûdra for whom that injunction is not meant is incapable of such
meditation. Itihâsas and Purânas hold the position of being helpful
means towards meditation in so far only as they confirm or support the
Veda, not independently of the Veda. And that Sûdras are allowed to hear
Itihâsas and Purânas is meant only for the end of destroying their sins,
not to prepare them for meditation on Brahman. The case of Vidura and
other Sûdras having been 'founded on Brahman,' explains itself as
follows:--Owing to the effect of former actions, which had not yet
worked themselves out, they were born in a low caste, while at the same
time they possessed wisdom owing to the fact that the knowledge acquired
by them in former births had not yet quite vanished.
(On these general grounds we object to Sûdras being viewed as qualified
for meditation on Brahman.) The Sûtra now refutes that argument, which
the Pûrvapakshin derives from the use of the word 'Sûdra' in the
Samvarga-vidyâ.
33. (That) grief of him (arose), this is intimated by his (Jânasruti's)
resorting to him (Raikva) on hearing a disrespectful speech about
himself.
From what the text says about Jânasruti Pautrâyana having been taunted
by a flamingo for his want of knowledge of Brahman, and having thereupon
resorted to Raikva, who possessed the knowledge of Brahman, it appears
that sorrow (suk) had taken possession of him; and it is with a view to
this that Raikva addresses him as Sûdra. For the word Sûdra,
etymologically considered, means one who grieves or sorrows (sokati).
The appellation 'sûdra' therefore refers to his sorrow, not to his being
a member of the fourth caste. This clearly appears from a consideration
of the whole story. Jânasruti Pautrâyana was a very liberal and pious
king. Being much pleased with his virtuous life, and wishing to rouse in
him the desire of knowing Brahman, two noble-minded beings, assuming the
shape of flamingoes, flew past him at night time, when one of them
addressed the other, 'O Bhallâksha. the light of Jânasruti has spread
like the sky; do not go near that it may not burn thee.' To this praise
of Jânasruti the other flamingo replied, 'How can you speak of him,
being what he is, as if he were Raikva "sayuktvân"?' i.e. 'how can you
speak of Jânasruti, being what he is, as if he were Raikva, who knows
Brahman and is endowed with the most eminent qualities? Raikva, who
knows Brahman, alone in this world is truly eminent. Janasruti may be
very pious, but as he does not know Brahman what quality of his could
produce splendour capable of burning me like the splendour of Raikva?'
The former flamingo thereupon asks who that Raikva is, and its companion
replies, 'He in whose work and knowledge there are comprised all the
works done by good men and all the knowledge belonging to intelligent
creatures, that is Raikva.' Jânasruti, having heard this speech of the
flamingo--which implied a reproach to himself as being destitute of the
knowledge of Brahman, and a glorification of Raikva as possessing that
knowledge--at once sends his door-keeper to look for Raikva; and when
the door-keeper finds him and brings word, the king himself repairs to
him with six hundred cows, a golden necklace, and a carriage yoked with
mules, and asks him to teach him the deity on which he meditates, i.e.
the highest deity. Raikva, who through the might of his Yoga-knowledge
is acquainted with everything that passes in the three worlds, at once
perceives that Jânasruti is inwardly grieved at the slighting speech of
the flamingo, which had been provoked by the king's want of knowledge of
Brahman, and is now making an effort due to the wish of knowing Brahman;
and thus recognises that the king is fit for the reception of that
knowledge. Reflecting thereupon that a knowledge of Brahman may be
firmly established in this pupil even without long attendance on the
teacher if only he will be liberal to the teacher to the utmost of his
capability, he addresses him: 'Do thou take away (apâhara) (these
things), O Sûdra; keep (the chariot) with the cows for thyself.' What he
means to say is, 'By so much only in the way of gifts bestowed on me,
the knowledge of Brahman cannot be established in thee, who, through the
desire for such knowledge, art plunged in grief'--the address 'O Sûdra'
intimating that Raikva knows Jânasruti to be plunged in grief, and on
that account fit to receive instruction about Brahman. Jânasruti
thereupon approaches Raikva for a second time, bringing as much wealth
as he possibly can, and moreover his own daughter. Raikva again
intimates his view of the pupil's fitness for receiving instruction by
addressing him a second time as 'Sûdra,' and says, 'You have brought
these, O Sûdra; by this mouth only you made me speak,' i.e. 'You now
have brought presents to the utmost of your capability; by this means
only you will induce me, without lengthy service on your part, to utter
speech containing that instruction about Brahman which you desire.'--
Having said this he begins to instruct him.--We thus see that the
appellation 'sûdra' is meant to intimate the grief of Jânasruti--which
grief in its turn indicates the king's fitness for receiving instruction;
and is not meant to declare that Jânasruti belongs to the lowest caste.