17. Not the other, on account of impossibility.

The other than the highest Self, i.e. the one called jîva, even in the

state of release, is not that Self which the mantra describes; for this

is not possible. For to a Self of that kind unconditioned intelligence

(such as is, in the mantra, ascribed to Brahman; cp. the term

'vipaskitâ') cannot belong. Unconditioned intelligence is illustrated by

the power of all one's purposes realising themselves; as expressed in

the text 'He desired, may I be many, may I grow forth.' Intelligence

(vipaskittvam, i.e. power of insight into various things) does indeed

belong to the soul in the state of release; but as in the Samsâra state

the same soul is devoid of such insight, we cannot ascribe to it non-

conditioned intelligence. And if the released soul is viewed as being

mere non-differenced intelligence, it does not possess the capacity of

seeing different things, and hence cannot of course possess vipaskittva

in the sense stated above. That, however, the existence of a substance

devoid of all difference cannot be proved by any means of knowledge, we

have already shown before. Again, if the clause 'from whence speech

returns,' &c., were meant to express that speech and mind return from

Brahman, this could not mean that the Real is devoid of all difference,

but only that mind and speech are not means for the knowledge of Brahman.

And from this it would follow that Brahman is something altogether empty,

futile. Let us examine the context. The whole section, beginning with

'He who knows Brahman reaches Brahman,' declares that Brahman is all-

knowing, the cause of the world, consisting of pure bliss, the cause of

bliss in others; that through its mere wish it creates the whole

universe comprising matter and souls; that entering into the universe of

created things it constitutes their Self; that it is the cause of fear

and fearlessness; that it rules Vâyu Âditya and other divine beings;

that its bliss is ever so much superior to all other bliss; and many

other points. Now, all at once, the clause 'from whence speech returns'

is said to mean that neither speech nor mind applies to Brahman, and

that thus there are no means whatever of knowing Brahman! This is idle

talk indeed! In the clause '(that) from which speech returns,' the

relative pronoun 'from which' denotes bliss; this bliss is again

explicitly referred to in the clause 'knowing the bliss of Brahman'--the

genitive 'of Brahman' intimating that the bliss belongs to Brahman; what

then could be the meaning of this clause which distinctly speaks of a

knowledge of Brahman, if Brahman had at the same time to be conceived as

transcending all thought and speech? What the clause really means rather

is that if one undertakes to state the definite amount of the bliss of

Brahman--the superabundance of which is illustrated by the successive

multiplications with hundred--mind and speech have to turn back

powerless, since no such definite amount can be assigned. He who knows

the bliss of Brahman as not to be defined by any definite amount, does

not fear anything.--That, moreover, the all-wise being referred to in

the mantra is other than the individual soul in the state of release, is

rendered perfectly clear by what--in passages such as 'it desired,' &c.--

is said about its effecting, through its mere volition, the origination

and subsistence of the world, its being the inner Self of the world, and

so on.

The Vedanta-Sutras with the Commentary by Ramanuja Sacred Books of the East, Volume 48 · 第 62 / 339 题