TRANSITION FROM POPULAR MORAL PHILOSOPHY TO THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS

If we have hitherto drawn our notion of duty from the common use of

our practical reason, it is by no means to be inferred that we have

treated it as an empirical notion. On the contrary, if we attend to

the experience of men's conduct, we meet frequent and, as we

ourselves allow, just complaints that one cannot find a single

certain example of the disposition to act from pure duty. Although

many things are done in conformity with what duty prescribes, it is

nevertheless always doubtful whether they are done strictly from

duty, so as to have a moral worth. Hence there have, at all times,

been philosophers who have altogether denied that this disposition

actually exists at all in human actions, and have ascribed

everything to a more or less refined self-love. Not that they have

on that account questioned the soundness of the conception of

morality; on the contrary, they spoke with sincere regret of the

frailty and corruption of human nature, which thought noble enough

to take as its rule an idea so worthy of respect, is yet too weak to

follow it, and employs reason, which ought to give it the law only

for the purpose of providing for the interest of the inclinations,

whether singly or at the best in the greatest possible harmony with

one another.

In fact, it is absolutely impossible to make out by experience with

complete certainty a single case in which the maxim of an action,

however right in itself, rested simply on moral grounds and on the

conception of duty. Sometimes it happens that with the sharpest

self-examination we can find nothing beside the moral principle of

duty which could have been powerful enough to move us to this or

that action and to so great a sacrifice; yet we cannot from this

infer with certainty that it was not really some secret impulse of

self-love, under the false appearance of duty, that was the actual

determining cause of the will. We like then to flatter ourselves by

falsely taking credit for a more noble motive; whereas in fact we

can never, even by the strictest examination, get completely behind

the secret springs of action; since, when the question is of moral

worth, it is not with the actions which we see that we are

concerned, but with those inward principles of them which we do not

see.

Moreover, we cannot better serve the wishes of those who ridicule

all morality as a mere chimera of human imagination overstepping

itself from vanity, than by conceding to them that notions of duty

must be drawn only from experience (as from indolence, people are

ready to think is also the case with all other notions); for this is

to prepare for them a certain triumph. I am willing to admit out of

love of humanity that even most of our actions are correct, but if

we look closer at them we everywhere come upon the dear self which

is always prominent, and it is this they have in view, and not the

strict command of duty which would often require self-denial.

Without being an enemy of virtue, a cool observer, one that does not

mistake the wish for good, however lively, for its reality, may

sometimes doubt whether true virtue is actually found anywhere in

the world, and this especially as years increase and the judgment is

partly made wiser by experience, and partly also more acute in

observation. This being so, nothing can secure us from falling away

altogether from our ideas of duty, or maintain in the soul a well-

grounded respect for its law, but the clear conviction that although

there should never have been actions which really sprang from such

pure sources, yet whether this or that takes place is not at all the

question; but that reason of itself, independent on all experience,

ordains what ought to take place, that accordingly actions of which

perhaps the world has hitherto never given an example, the

feasibility even of which might be very much doubted by one who

founds everything on experience, are nevertheless inflexibly

commanded by reason; that, ex. gr. even though there might never yet

have been a sincere friend, yet not a whit the less is pure

sincerity in friendship required of every man, because, prior to all

experience, this duty is involved as duty in the idea of a reason

determining the will by a priori principles.

When we add further that, unless we deny that the notion of morality

has any truth or reference to any possible object, we must admit

that its law must be valid, not merely for men, but for all rational

creatures generally, not merely under certain contingent conditions

or with exceptions, but with absolute necessity, then it is clear

that no experience could enable us to infer even the possibility of

such apodictic laws. For with what right could we bring into

unbounded respect as a universal precept for every rational nature

that which perhaps holds only under the contingent conditions of

humanity? Or how could laws of the determination of OUR will be

regarded as laws of the determination of the will of rational beings

generally, and for us only as such, if they were merely empirical,

and did not take their origin wholly a priori from pure but

practical reason?

Nor could anything be more fatal to morality than that we should

wish to derive it from examples. For every example of it that is set

before me must be first itself tested by principles of morality,

whether it is worthy to serve as an original example, i. e., as a

pattern, but by no means can it authoritatively furnish the

conception of morality. Even the Holy One of the Gospels must first

be compared with our ideal of moral perfection before we can

recognise Him as such; and so He says of Himself, "Why call ye Me

(whom you see) good; none is good (the model of good) but God only

(whom ye do not see)?" But whence have we the conception of God as

the supreme good? Simply from the IDEA of moral perfection, which

reason frames a priori, and connects inseparably with the notion of

a free-will. Imitation finds no place at all in morality, and

examples serve only for encouragement, i. e. they put beyond doubt

the feasibility of what the law commands, they make visible that

which the practical rule expresses more generally, but they can

never authorise us to set aside the true original which lies in

reason, and to guide ourselves by examples.

If then there is no genuine supreme principle of morality but what

must rest simply on pure reason, independent on all experience, I

think it is not necessary even to put the question, whether it is

good to exhibit these concepts in their generality (in abstracto) as

they are established a priori along with the principles belonging to

them, if our knowledge is to be distinguished from the vulgar, and

to be called philosophical. In our times indeed this might perhaps

be necessary; for if we collected votes, whether pure rational

knowledge separated from everything empirical, that is to say,

metaphysic of morals, or whether popular practical philosophy is to

be preferred, it is easy to guess which side would preponderate.

This descending to popular notions is certainly very commendable, if

the ascent to the principles of pure reason has first taken place

and been satisfactorily accomplished. This implies that we first

found Ethics on Metaphysics, and then, when it is firmly

established, procure a hearing for it by giving it a popular

character. But it is quite absurd to try to be popular in the first

inquiry, on which the soundness of the principles depends. It is not

only that this proceeding can never lay claim to the very rare merit

of a true philosophical popularity, since there is no art in being

intelligible if one renounces all thoroughness of insight; but also

it produces a disgusting medley of compiled observations and half-

reasoned principles. Shallow pates enjoy this because it can be used

for every-day chat, but the sagacious find in it only confusion, and

being unsatisfied and unable to help themselves, they turn away

their eyes, while philosophers, who see quite well through this

delusion, are little listened to when they call men off for a time

from this pretended popularity, in order that they might be

rightfully popular after they have attained a definite insight.

We need only look at the attempts of moralists in that favourite

fashion, and we shall find at one time the Special constitution of

human nature (including, however, the idea of a rational nature

generally), at one time perfection, at another happiness, here moral

sense, there fear of God, a little of this, and a little of that, in

marvellous mixture, without its occurring to them to ask whether the

principles of morality are to be sought in the knowledge of human

nature at all (which we can have only from experience); and, if this

is not so, if these principles are to be found altogether a priori

free from everything empirical, in pure rational concepts only, and

nowhere else, not even in the smallest degree; then rather to adopt

the method of making this a separate inquiry, as pure practical

philosophy, or (if one may use a name so decried) as metaphysic of

morals, [Footnote: Just as pure mathematics are distinguished from

applied, pure logic from applied, so if we choose we may alse

distinguish pure philosophy of morals (metaphysic) from applied

(viz. applied to human nature). By this designation we are also at

once reminded that moral principles are not based on properties of

human nature, but must subsist a priori of themselves while from

such principles practical rules must be capable of being deduced for

every rational nature, and accordingly for that of man.] to bring it

by itself to completeness, and to require the public, which wishes

for popular treatment, to await the issue of this undertaking.

Such a metaphysic of morals, completely isolated, not mixed with any

anthropology, theology, physics, or hyperphysics, and still less

with occult qualities (which we might call hypophysical), is not

only an indispensable substratum of all sound theoretical knowledge

of duties, but is at the same time a desideratum of the highest

importance to the actual fulfilment of their precepts. For the pure

conception of duty, unmixed with any foreign addition of empirical

attractions, and, in a word, the conception of the moral law,

exercises on the human heart, by way of reason alone (which first

becomes aware with this that it can of itself be practical), an

influence so much more powerful than all other springs [Footnote: I

have a letter from the late excellent Sulzer, in which he asks me

what can be the reason that moral instruction, although containing

much that is convincing for the reason, yet accomplishes so little?

My answer was postponed in order that I might make it complete. But

it is simply this, that the teachers themselves have not got their

own notions clear, and when they endeavour to make up for this by

raking up motives of moral goodness from every quarter, trying to

make their physic right strong, they spoil it. For the commonest

understanding shows that if we imagine, on the one hand, an act of

honesty done with steadfast mind, apart from every view to advantage

of any kind in this world or another, and even under the greatest

temptations of necessity or allurement, and, on the other hand, a

similar act which was affected, in however low a degree, by a

foreign motive, the former leaves far behind and eclipses the

second; it elevates the soul, and inspires the wish to be able to

act in like manner oneself. Even moderately young children feel this

impression, and one should never represent duties to them in any

other light.] which may be derived from the field of experience,

that in the consciousness of its worth, despises the latter, and can by

degrees become their master; whereas a mixed ethics, compounded

partly of motives drawn from feelings and inclinations, and partly also of

conceptions of reason, must make the mind waver between motives

which cannot be brought under any principle, which lead to good only

by mere accident, and very often also to evil.

From what has been said, it is clear that all moral conceptions have

their seat and origin completely a priori in the reason, and that,

moreover, in the commonest reason just as truly as in that which is

in the highest degree speculative; that they cannot be obtained by

abstraction from any empirical, and therefore merely contingent

knowledge; that it is just this purity of their origin that makes

them worthy to serve as our supreme practical principle, and that

just in proportion as we add anything empirical, we detract from

their genuine influence, and from the absolute value of actions;

that it is not only of the greatest necessity, in a purely

speculative point of view, but is also of the greatest practical

importance to derive these notions and laws from pure reason, to

present them pure and unmixed, and even to determine the compass of

this practical or pure rational knowledge, i. e. to determine the

whole faculty of pure practical reason; and, in doing so, we must

not make its principles dependent on the particular nature of human

reason, though in speculative philosophy this may be permitted, or

may even at times be necessary; but since moral laws ought to hold

good for every rational creature, we must derive them from the

general concept of a rational being. In this way, although for its

application to man morality has need of anthropology, yet, in the

first instance, we must treat it independently as pure philosophy,

i. e. as metaphysic, complete in itself (a thing which in such

distinct branches of science is easily done); knowing well that

unless we are in possession of this, it would not only be vain to

determine the moral element of duty in right actions for purposes of

speculative criticism, but it would be impossible to base morals on

their genuine principles, even for common practical purposes,

especially of moral instruction, so as to produce pure moral dispositions,

and to engraft them on men's minds to the promotion of the greatest

possible good in the world.

But in order that in this study we may not merely advance by the

natural steps from the common moral judgment (in this case very

worthy of respect) to the philosophical, as has been already done,

but also from a popular philosophy, which goes no further than it

can reach by groping with the help of examples, to metaphysic (which

does not allow itself to be checked by anything empirical, and as it

must measure the whole extent of this kind of rational knowledge,

goes as far as ideal conceptions, where even examples fail us), we

must follow and clearly describe the practical faculty of reason,

from the general rules of its determination to the point where the

notion of duty springs from it.

Everything in nature works according to laws. Rational beings alone

have the faculty of acting according to the conception of laws, that

is according to principles, i. e., have a will. Since the deduction

of actions from principles requires reason, the will is nothing but

practical reason. If reason infallibly determines the will, then the

actions of such a being which are recognised as objectively

necessary are subjectively necessary also, i. e., the will is a

faculty to choose that only which reason independent on inclination

recognises as practically necessary, i. e., as good. But if reason

of itself does not sufficiently determine the will, if the latter is

subject also to subjective conditions (particular impulses) which do

not always coincide with the objective conditions; in a word, if the

will does not in itself completely accord with reason (which is

actually the case with men), then the actions which objectively are

recognised as necessary are subjectively contingent, and the

determination of such a will according to objective laws is

obligation, that is to say, the relation of the objective laws to a

will that is not thoroughly good is conceived as the determination

of the will of a rational being by principles of reason, but which

the will from its nature does not of necessity follow.

The conception of an objective principle, in so far as it is

obligatory for a will, is called a command (of reason); and the

formula of the command is called an Imperative.

All imperatives are expressed by the word OUGHT [or SHALL], and

thereby indicate the relation of an objective law of reason to a

will, which from its subjective constitution is not necessarily

determined by it (an obligation). They say that something would be

good to do or to forbear, but they say it to a will which does not

always do a thing because it is conceived to be good to do it. That

is practically GOOD, however, which determines the will by means of

the conceptions of reason, and consequently not from subjective

causes, but objectively, that is on principles which are valid for

every rational being as such. It is distinguished from the PLEASANT,

as that which influences the will only by means of sensation from

merely subjective causes, valid only for the sense of this or that

one, and not as a principle of reason, which holds for every one.

[Footnote 3: The dependence of the desires on sensations is called

inclination, and this accordingly always indicates a WANT. The

dependence of a contingently determinable will on principles of

reason is called an INTEREST. This therefore is found only in the

case of a dependent will, which does not always of itself conform to

reason; in the Divine will we cannot conceive any interest. But the

human will can also TAKE AN INTEREST in a thing without therefore

acting FROM INTEREST. The former signifies the PRACTICAL interest in

the action, the latter the PATHOLOGICAL in the object of the action.

The former indicates only dependence of the will or principles of

reason in themselves; the second, dependence on principles of reason

for the sake of inclination, reason supplying only the practical

rules how the requirement of the inclination may he satisfied. In

the first case the action interests me; in the second the object of

the action (because it is pleasant to me), We have seen in the first

section that in an action done from duty we must look not to the

interest in the object, but only to that in the action itself, and

in its rational principle (viz. the law).]

A perfectly good will would therefore be equally subject to

objective laws (viz. laws of good), but could not be conceived as

OBLIGED thereby to act lawfully, because of itself from its

subjective constitution it can only be determined by the conception

of good. Therefore no imperatives hold for the Divine will, or in

general for a HOLY will; OUGHT is here out of place, because the

volition is already of itself necessarily in unison with the law.

Therefore imperatives are only formulae to express the relation of

objective laws of all volition to the subjective imperfection of the

will of this or that rational being, e. g. the human will.

Now all IMPERATIVES command either HYPOTHETICALLY or CATEGORICALLY.

The former represent the practical necessity of a possible action as

means to something else that is willed (or at least which one might

possibly will). The categorical imperative would be that which

represented an action as necessary of itself without reference to

another end, i. e., as objectively necessary.

Since every practical law represents a possible action as good, and

on this account, for a subject who is practically determinable by

reason, necessary, all imperatives are formulae determining an

action which is necessary according to the principle of a will good

in some respects. If now the action is good only as a means TO

SOMETHING ELSE, then the imperative is HYPOTHETICAL; if it is

conceived as good IN ITSELF and consequently as being necessarily

the principle of a will which of itself conforms to reason, then it

is CATEGORICAL.

Thus the imperative declares what action possible by me would be

good, and presents the practical rule in relation to a will which

does not forthwith perform an action simply because it is good,

whether because the subject does not always know that it is good, or

because, even if it know this, yet its maxims might be opposed to

the objective principles of practical reason.

Accordingly the hypothetical imperative only says that the action is

good for some purpose, POSSIBLE or ACTUAL. In the first case it is a

Problematical, in the second an Assertorial practical principle. The

categorical imperative which declares an action to be objectively

necessary in itself without reference to any purpose, i. e., without

any other end, is valid as an Apodictic (practical) principle.

Whatever is possible only by the power of some rational being may

also be conceived as a possible purpose of some will; and therefore

the principles of action as regards the means necessary to attain

some possible purpose are in fact infinitely numerous. All sciences

have a practical part, consisting of problems expressing that some

end is possible for us, and of imperatives directing how it may be

attained. These may, therefore, be called in general imperatives of

Skill. Here there is no question whether the end is rational and

good, but only what one must do in order to attain it. The precepts

for the physician to make his patient thoroughly healthy, and for a

poisoner to ensure certain death, are of equal value in this

respect, that each serves to effect its purpose perfectly. Since in

early youth it cannot be known what ends are likely to occur to us

in the course of life, parents seek to have their children taught a

great many things, and provide for their skill in the use of means

for all sorts of arbitrary ends, of none of which can they determine

whether it may not perhaps hereafter be an object to their pupil,

but which it is at all events possible that he might aim at; and

this anxiety is so great that they commonly neglect to form and

correct their judgment on the value of the things which may be

chosen as ends.

There is one end, however, which may be assumed to be actually such

to all rational beings (so far as imperatives apply to them, viz. as

dependent beings), and therefore, one purpose which they not merely

MAY have, but which we may with certainty assume that they all

actually HAVE by a natural necessity, and this is HAPPINESS. The

hypothetical imperative which expresses the practical necessity of

an action as means to the advancement of happiness is Assertorial.

We are not to present it as necessary for an uncertain and merely

possible purpose, but for a purpose which we may presuppose with

certainty and a priori in every man, because it belongs to his

being. Now skill in the choice of means to his own greatest well-

being may be called prudence [The word prudence is taken in two

senses; in the one it may bear the name of knowledge of the world,

in the other that of private prudence. The former is a man's ability

to influence others so as to use them for his own purposes. The

latter is the sagacity to combine all these purposes for his own

lasting benefit. This latter is properly that to which the value

even of the former is reduced, and when a man is prudent in the

former sense, but not in the latter, we might better say of him that

he is clever and cunning, but, on the whole, imprudent. Compare on

the difference between klug and gescheu here alluded to,

Anthropologie, 45, ed. Schubert, p. no.] in the narrowest sense. And

thus the imperative which refers to the choice of means to one's own

happiness, i. e., the precept of prudence, is still always

hypothetical; the action is not commanded absolutely, but only as

means to another purpose.

Finally, there is an imperative which commands a certain conduct

immediately, without having as its condition any other purpose to be

attained by it. This imperative is Categorical. It concerns not the

matter of the action, or its intended result, but its form and the

principle of which it is itself a result, and what is essentially

good in it consists in the mental disposition, let the consequence

be what it may. This imperative may be called that of Morality.

There is a marked distinction also between the volitions on these

three sorts of principles in the DISSIMILARITY of the obligation of

the will. In order to mark this difference more clearly, I think

they would be most suitably named in their order if we said they are

either RULES of skill, or COUNSELS of prudence, or COMMANDS (LAWS)

of morality. For it is LAW only that involves the conception of an

UNCONDITIONAL and objective necessity, which is consequently

universally valid; and commands are laws which must be obeyed, that

is, must be followed, even in opposition to inclination. COUNSELS,

indeed, involve necessity, but one which can only hold under a

contingent subjective condition, viz. they depend on whether this or

that man reckons this or that as part of his happiness; the

categorical imperative, on the contrary, is not limited by any

condition, and as being absolutely, although practically, necessary,

may be quite properly called a command. We might also call the first

kind of imperatives TECHNICAL (belonging to art), the second

PRAGMATIC (to welfare), [It seems to me that the proper

signification of the word pragmatic may be most accurately defined

in this way. For sanctions [see Cr. of Pract. Reas., p. 271] are

called pragmatic which flow properly, not from the law of the states

as necessary enactments, but from precaution for the general

welfare. A history is composed pragmatically when it teaches

prudence, i. e. instructs the world how it can provide for its

interests better, or at least as well as the men of former time.];

the third MORAL (belonging to free conduct generally, that is, to

morals).

Now arises the question, how are all these imperatives possible?

This question does not seek to know how we can conceive the

accomplishment of the action which the imperative ordains, but

merely how we can conceive the obligation of the will which the

imperative expresses. No special explanation is needed to show how

an imperative of skill is possible. Whoever wills the end, wills

also (so far as reason decides his conduct) the means in his power

which are indispensably necessary thereto. This proposition is, as

regards the volition, analytical; for, in willing an object as my

effect, there is already thought the causality of myself as an

acting cause, that is to say, the use of the means; and the

imperative educes from the conception of volition of an end the

conception of actions necessary to this end. Synthetical

propositions must no doubt be employed in denning the means to a

proposed end; but they do not concern the principle, the act of the

will, but the object and its realization. Ex. gr., that in order to

bisect a line on an unerring principle I must draw from its

extremities two intersecting arcs; this no doubt is taught by

mathematics only in synthetical propositions; but if I know that it

is only by this process that the intended operation can be

performed, then to say that if I fully will the operation, I also

will the action required for it, is an analytical proposition; for

it is one and the same thing to conceive something as an effect

which I can produce in a certain way, and to conceive myself as

acting in this way.

If it were only equally easy to give a definite conception of

happiness, the imperatives of prudence would correspond exactly with

those of skill, and would likewise be analytical. For in this case

as in that, it could be said, whoever wills the end, wills also

(according to the dictate of reason necessarily) the indispensable

means thereto which are in his power. But, unfortunately, the notion

of happiness is so indefinite that although every man wishes to

attain it, yet he never can say definitely and consistently what it

is that he really wishes and wills. The reason of this is that all

the elements which belong to the notion of happiness are altogether

empirical, i. e. they must be borrowed from experience, and

nevertheless the idea of happiness requires an absolute whole, a

maximum of welfare in my present and all future circumstances. Now

it is impossible that the most clear-sighted, and at the same time

most powerful being (supposed finite), should frame to himself a

definite conception of what he really wills in this. Does he will

riches, how much anxiety, envy, and snares might he not thereby draw

upon his shoulders? Does he will knowledge and discernment, perhaps

it might prove to be only an eye so much the sharper to show him so

much the more fearfully the evils that are now concealed from him,

and that cannot be avoided, or to impose more wants on his desires,

which already give him concern enough. Would he have long life, who

guarantees to him that it would not be a long misery? would he at

least have health? how often has uneasiness of the body restrained

from excesses into which perfect health would have allowed one to

fall? and so on. In short he is unable, on any principle, to

determine with certainty what would make him truly happy; because to

do so he would need to be omniscient. We cannot therefore act on any

definite principles to secure happiness, but only on empirical

counsels, ex. gr. of regimen, frugality, courtesy, reserve, &c.,

which experience teaches do, on the average, most promote well-

being. Hence it follows that the imperatives of prudence do not,

strictly speaking, command at all, that is, they cannot present

actions objectively as practically necessary; that they are rather

to be regarded as counsels (consilia) than precepts (praecepta) of

reason, that the problem to determine certainly and universally what

action would promote the happiness of a rational being is completely

insoluble, and consequently no imperative respecting it is possible

which should, in the strict sense, command to do what makes happy;

because happiness is not an ideal of reason but of imagination,

resting solely on empirical grounds, and it is vain to expect that

these should define an action by which one could attain the totality

of a series of consequences which is really endless. This imperative

of prudence would however be an analytical proposition if we assume

that the means to happiness could be certainly assigned; for it is

distinguished from the imperative of skill only by this, that in the

latter the end is merely possible, in the former it is given; as

however both only ordain the means to that which we suppose to be

willed as an end, it follows that the imperative which ordains the

willing of the means to him who wills the end is in both cases

analytical. Thus there is no difficulty in regard to the possibility

of an imperative of this kind either.

On the other hand the question, how the imperative of morality is

possible, is undoubtedly one, the only one? demanding a solution, as

this is not at all hypothetical, and the objective necessity which

it presents cannot rest on any hypothesis, as is the case with the

hypothetical imperatives. Only here we must never leave out of

consideration that we cannot make out by any example, in other words

empirically, whether there is such an imperative at all; but it is

rather to be feared that all those which seem to be categorical may

yet be at bottom hypothetical. For instance, when the precept is:

Thou shalt not promise deceitfully; and it is assumed that the

necessity of this is not a mere counsel to avoid some other evil, so

that it should mean: thou shalt not make a lying promise, lest if it

become known thou shouldst destroy thy credit, but that an action of

this kind must be regarded as evil in itself, so that the imperative

of the prohibition is categorical; then we cannot show with

certainty in any example that the will was determined merely by the

law, without any other spring of action, although it may appear to

be so. For it is always possible that fear of disgrace, perhaps also

obscure dread of other dangers, may have a secret influence on the

will. Who can prove by experience the non-existence of a cause when

all that experience tells us is that we do not perceive it? But in

such a case the so-called moral imperative, which as such appears to

be categorical and unconditional, would in reality be only a

pragmatic precept, drawing our attention to our own interests, and

merely teaching us to take these into consideration.

We shall therefore have to investigate a priori the possibility of a

categorical imperative, as we have not in this case the advantage of

its reality being given in experience, so that [the elucidation of]

its possibility should be requisite only for its explanation, not

for its establishment. In the mean-time it may be discerned

beforehand that the categorical imperative alone has the purport of

a practical law: all the rest may indeed be called principles of the

will but not laws, since whatever is only necessary for the

attainment of some arbitrary purpose may be considered as in itself

contingent, and we can at any time be free from the precept if we

give up the purpose: on the contrary, the unconditional command

leaves the will no liberty to choose the opposite; consequently it

alone carries with it that necessity which we require in a law.

Secondly, in the case of this categorical imperative or law of

morality, the difficulty (of discerning its possibility) is a very

profound one. It is an a priori synthetical practical proposition;

[Footnote: I connect the act with the will without presupposing any

condition resulting from any inclination, but d priori, and

therefore necessarily (though only objectively, i. e. assuming the

idea of a reason possessing full power over all subjective motives).

This is accordingly a practical proposition which does not deduce

the willing of an action by mere analysis from another already

presupposed (for we have not such a perfect will), but connects it

immediately with the conception of the will of a rational being, as

something not contained in it.] and as there is so much difficulty

in discerning the possibility of speculative propositions of this

kind, it may readily be supposed that the difficulty will be no less

with the practical.

In this problem we will first inquire whether the mere conception of

a categorical imperative may not perhaps supply us also with the

formula of it, containing the proposition which alone can be a

categorical imperative; for even if we know the tenor of such

absolute command, yet how it is possible will require further

special and laborious study, which we postpone to the last section.

When I conceive a hypothetical imperative in general I do not know

beforehand what it will contain until I am given the condition. But

when I conceive a categorical imperative I know at once what it

contains. For as the imperative contains besides the law only the

necessity that the maxims [Footnote: A MAXIM is a subjective

principle of action, and must be distinguished from the objective

principle, namely, practical law. The former contains the practical

rule set by reason according to the conditions of the subject (often

its ignorance or its inclinations), so that it is the principle on

which the subject acts; but the law is the objective principle valid

for every rational being, and is the principle on which it ought to

act that is an imperative.] shall conform to this law, while the law

contains no conditions restricting it, there remains nothing but the

general statement that the maxim of the action should conform to a

universal law, and it is this conformity alone that the imperative

properly represents as necessary. [Footnote: I have no doubt that

"den" in the original before "Imperativ" is a misprint for "der,"

and have translated accordingly. Mr. Semple has done the same. The

editions that I have seen agree in reading "den," and M. Barni so

translates. With this reading, it is the conformity that presents

the imperative as necessary.]

There is therefore but one categorical imperative, namely this: Act

only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that it

should become a universal law.

Now if all imperatives of duty can be deduced from this one

imperative as from their principle, then, although it should remain

undecided whether what is called duty is not merely a vain notion,

yet at least we shall be able to show what we understand by it and

what this notion means.

Since the universality of the law according to which effects are

produced constiutes what is properly called nature in the most

general sense (as to form), that is the existence of things so far

as it is determined by general laws, the imperative of duty may be

expressed thus: Act as if the maxim of thy action were to become by

thy will a Universal Law of Nature.

We will now enumerate a few duties, adopting the usual division of

them into duties to ourselves and to others, and into perfect and

imperfect duties. [Footnote: It must be noted here that I reserve

the division of duties for a future metaphysic of morals; so that I

give it here only as an arbitrary one (in order to arrange my

examples). For the rest, I understand by a perfect duty one that

admits no exception in favour of inclination, and then I have not

merely external, but also internal perfect duties. This is contrary

to the use of the word adopted in the schools; but I do not intend

to justify it here, as it is all one for my purpose whether it is

admitted or not. [Perfect duties are usually understood to be those

which can be enforced by external law; imperfect, those which cannot

be enforced. They are also called respectively determinate and

indeterminate, officia juris and officia virtutis.]]

I. A man reduced to despair by a series of misfortunes feels wearied

of life, but is still so far in possession of his reason that he can

ask himself whether it would not be contrary to his duty to himself

to take his own life. Now he inquires whether the maxim of his

action could become a universal law of nature. His maxim is: From

self-love I adopt it as a principle to shorten my life when its

longer duration is likely to bring more evil than satisfaction. It

is asked then simply whether this principle founded on self-love can

become a universal law of nature. Now we see at once that a system

of nature of which it should be a law to destroy life by means of

the very feeling whose special nature it is to impel to the

improvement of life would contradict itself, and therefore could not

exist as a system of nature; hence that maxim cannot possibly exist

as a universal law of nature, and consequently would be wholly

inconsistent with the supreme principle of all duty. [Footnote: On

suicide cf. further Metaphysik der Sitten, p. 274.]

2. Another finds himself forced by necessity to borrow money. He

knows that he will not be able to repay it, but sees also that

nothing will be lent to him, unless he promises stoutly to repay it

in a definite time. He desires to make this promise, but he has

still so much conscience as to ask himself: Is it not unlawful and

inconsistent with duty to get out of a difficulty in this way?

Suppose, however, that he resolves to do so, then the maxim of his

action would be expressed thus: When I think myself in want of

money, I will borrow money and promise to repay it, although I know

that I never can do so. Now this principle of self-love or of one's

own advantage may perhaps be consistent with my whole future

welfare; but the question now is, Is it right? I change then the

suggestion of self-love into a universal law, and state the question

thus: How would it be if my maxim were a universal law? Then I see

at once that it could never hold as a universal law of nature, but

would necessarily contradict itself. For supposing it to be a

universal law that everyone when he thinks himself in a difficulty

should be able to promise whatever he pleases, with the purpose of

not keeping his promise, the promise itself would become impossible,

as well as the end that one might have in view in it, since no one

would consider that anything was promised to him, but would ridicule

all such statements as vain pretences.

3. A third finds in himself a talent which with the help of some

culture might make him a useful man in many respects. But he finds

himself in comfortable circumstances, and prefers to indulge in

pleasure rather than to take pains in enlarging and improving his

happy natural capacities. He asks, however, whether his maxim of

neglect of his natural gifts, besides agreeing with his inclination

to indulgence, agrees also with what is called duty. He sees then

that a system of nature could indeed subsist with such a universal

law although men (like the South Sea islanders) should let their

talents rust, and resolve to devote their lives merely to idleness,

amusement, and propagation of their species--in a word, to

enjoyment; but he cannot possibly WILL that this should be a

universal law of nature, or be implanted in us as such by a natural

instinct. For, as a rational being, he necessarily wills that his

faculties be developed, since they serve him, and have been given

him, for all sorts of possible purposes.

4. A fourth, who is in prosperity, while he sees that others have to

contend with great wretchedness and that he could help them, thinks:

What concern is it of mine? Let everyone be as happy as heaven

pleases, or as he can make himself; I will take nothing from him nor

even envy him, only I do not wish to contribute anything to his

welfare or to his assistance in distress! Now no doubt if such a

mode of thinking were a universal law, the human race might very

well subsist, and doubtless even better than in a state in which

everyone talks of sympathy and good-will, or even takes care

occasionally to put it into practice, but on the other side, also

cheats when he can, betrays the rights of men, or otherwise violates

them. But although it is possible that a universal law of nature

might exist in accordance with that maxim, it is impossible to WILL

that such a principle should have the universal validity of a law of

nature. For a will which resolved this would contradict itself,

inasmuch as many cases might occur in which one would have need of

the love and sympathy of others, and in which, by such a law of

nature, sprung from his own will, he would deprive himself of all

hope of the aid he desires.

These are a few of the many actual duties, or at least what we

regard as such, which obviously fall into two classes on the one

principle that we have laid down. We must be ABLE TO WILL that a

maxim of our action should be a universal law. This is the canon of

the moral appreciation of the action generally. Some actions are of

such a character that their maxim cannot without contradiction be

even CONCEIVED as a universal law of nature, far from it being

possible that we should WILL that it SHOULD be so. In others this

intrinsic impossibility is not found, but still it is impossible to

WILL THAT their maxim should be raised to the universality of a law

of nature, since such a will would contradict itself. It is easily

seen that the former violate strict or rigorous (inflexible) duty;

the latter only laxer (meritorious) duty. Thus it has been

completely shown by these examples how all duties depend as regards

the nature of the obligation (not the object of the action) on the

same principle.

If now we attend to ourselves on occasion of any transgression of

duty, we shall find that we in fact do not will that our maxim

should be a universal law, for that is impossible for us; on the

contrary we will that the opposite should remain a universal law,

only we assume the liberty of making an EXCEPTION in our own favour

or (just for this time only) in favour of our inclination.

Consequently if we considered all cases from one and the same point

of view, namely, that of reason, we should find a contradiction in

our own will, namely, that a certain principle should be objectively

necessary as a universal law, and yet subjectively should not be

universal, but admit of exceptions. As however we at one moment

regard our action from the point of view of a will wholly conformed

to reason, and then again look at the same action from the point of

view of a will affected by inclination, there is not really any

contradiction, but an antagonism of inclination to the precept of

reason, whereby the universality of the principle is changed into a

mere generality, so that the practical principle of reason shall

meet the maxim half way. Now, although this cannot be justified in

our own impartial judgment, yet it proves that we do really

recognise the validity of the categorical imperative and (with all

respect for it) only allow ourselves a few exceptions, which we

think unimportant and forced from us.

We have thus established at least this much, that if duty is a

conception which is to have any import and real legislative

authority for our actions, it can only be expressed in categorical,

and not at all in hypothetical imperatives. We have also, which is

of great importance, exhibited clearly and definitely for every

practical application the content of the categorical imperative,

which must contain the principle of all duty if there is such a

thing at all. We have not yet, however, advanced so far as to prove

a priori that there actually is such an imperative, that there is a

practical law which commands absolutely of itself, and without any

other impulse, and that the following of this law is duty.

With the view of attaining to this it is of extreme importance to

remember that we must not allow ourselves to think of deducing the

reality of this principle from the particular attributes of human

nature. For duty is to be a practical, unconditional necessity of

action; it must therefore hold for all rational beings (to whom an

imperative can apply at all) and for this reason only be also a law

for all human wills. On the contrary, whatever is deduced from the

particular natural characteristics of humanity, from certain

feelings and propensions, [Footnote: Kant distinguishes "Hang

(propensio)" from "Neigung (inclinatio)" as follows:--"Hang" is a

predisposition to the desire of some enjoyment; in other words, it

is the subjective possibility of excitement of a certain desire,

which precedes the conception of its object. When the enjoyment has

been experienced, it produces a "Neigung" (inclination) to it, which

accordingly is defined "habitual sensible desire."--Anthropologie,

72, 79; Religion, p. 31.] nay even, if possible, from any particular

tendency proper to human reason, and which need not necessarily hold

for the will of every rational being; this may indeed supply us with

a maxim, but not with a law; with a subjective principle on which we

may have a propension and inclination to act, but not with an

objective principle on which we should be enjoined to act, even

though all our propensions, inclinations, and natural dispositions

were opposed to it. In fact the sublimity and intrinsic dignity of

the command in duty are so much the more evident, the less the

subjective impulses favour it and the more they oppose it, without

being able in the slightest degree to weaken the obligation of the

law or to distinguish its validity.

Here then we see philosophy brought to a critical position, since it

has to be firmly fixed, notwithstanding that it has nothing to

support it either in heaven or earth. Here it must show its purity

as absolute dictator of its own laws, not the herald of those which

are whispered to it by an implanted sense or who knows what tutelary

nature. Although these may be better than nothing, yet they can

never afford principles dictated by reason, which must have their

source wholly a priori and thence their commanding authority,

expecting everything from the supremacy of the law and the due

respect for it, nothing from inclination, or else condemning the man

to self-contempt and inward abhorrence.

Thus every empirical element is not only quite incapable of being an

aid to the principle of morality, but is even highly prejudicial to

the purity of morals, for the proper and inestimable worth of an

absolutely good will consists just in this, that the principle of

action is free, from all influence of contingent grounds, which

alone experience can furnish. We cannot too much or too often repeat

our warning against this lax and even mean habit of thought which

seeks for its principle amongst empirical motives and laws; for

human reason in its weariness is glad to rest on this pillow, and in

a dream of sweet illusions (in which, instead of Juno, it embraces a

cloud) it substitutes for morality a bastard patched up from limbs

of various derivation, which looks like anything one chooses to see

in it; only not like virtue to one who has once beheld her in her

true form. [Footnote: To behold virtue in her proper form is nothing

else but to contemplate morality stripped of all admixture of

sensible things and of every spurious ornament of reward or self-

love. How much she then eclipses everything else that appears

charming to the affections, every one may readily perceive with the

least exertion of his reason, if it be not wholly spoiled for

abstraction.]

The question then is this: Is it a necessary law for all rational

beings that they should always judge of their actions by maxims of

which they can themselves will that they should serve as universal

laws? If it is so, then it must be connected (altogether a priori)

with the very conception of the will of a rational being generally.

But in order to discover this connexion we must, however

reluctantly, take a step into metaphysic, although into a domain of

it which is distinct from speculative philosophy, namely, the

metaphysic of morals. In a practical philosophy, where it is not the

reasons of what happens that we have to ascertain, but the laws of

what ought to happen, even although it never does, i. e., objective

practical laws, there it is not necessary to inquire into the

reasons why anything pleases or displeases, how the pleasure of mere

sensation differs from taste, and whether the latter is distinct

from a general satisfaction of reason; on what the feeling of

pleasure or pain rests, and how from it desires and inclinations

arise, and from these again maxims by the co-operation of reason:

for all this belongs to an empirical psychology, which would

constitute the second part of physics, if we regard physics as the

philosophy of nature, so far as it is based on empirical laws. But

here we are concerned with objective practical laws, and

consequently with the relation of the will to itself so far as it is

determined by reason alone, in which case whatever has reference to

anything empirical is necessarily excluded; since if reason of

itself alone determines the conduct (and it is the possibility of

this that we are now investigating), it must necessarily do so a

priori.

The will is conceived as a faculty of determining oneself to action

in accordance with the conception of certain laws. And such a

faculty can be found only in rational beings. Now that which serves

the will as the objective ground of its self-determination is the

end, and if this is assigned by reason alone, it must hold for all

rational beings. On the other hand, that which merely contains the

ground of possibility of the action of which the effect is the end,

this is called the means. The subjective ground of the desire is the

spring, the objective ground of the volition is the motive; hence

the distinction between subjective ends which rest on springs and

objective ends which depend on motives valid for every rational

being. Practical principles are formal when they abstract from all

subjective ends, they are material when they assume these, and

therefore particular springs of action. The ends which a rational

being proposes to himself at pleasure as effects of his actions

(material ends) are all only relative, for it is only their relation

to the particular desires of the subject that gives them their

worth, which therefore cannot furnish principles universal and

necessary for all rational beings and for every volition, that is to

say practical laws. Hence all these relative ends can give rise only

to hypothetical imperatives.

Supposing, however, that there were something whose existence has in

itself an absolute worth, something which, being an end in itself,

could be a source of definite laws, then in this and this alone

would He the source of a possible categorical imperative, i. e., a

practical law.

Now I say: man and generally any rational being exists as an end in

himself, not merely as a means to be arbitrarily used by this or

that will, but in all his actions, whether they concern himself or

other rational beings, must be always regarded at the same time as

an end. All objects of the inclinations have only a conditional

worth, for if the inclinations and the wants founded on them did not

exist, then their object would be without value. But the

inclinations themselves being sources of want, are so far from

having an absolute worth for which they should be desired, that on

the contrary it must be the universal wish of every rational being

to be wholly free from them. Thus the worth of any object which is

to be acquired by our action is always conditional. Beings whose

existence depends not on our will but on nature's, have

nevertheless, if they are irrational beings, only a relative value

as means, and are therefore called things; rational beings, on the

contrary, are called persons, because their very nature points them

out as ends in themselves, that is as something which must not be

used merely as means, and so far therefore restricts freedom of

action (and is an object of respect). These, therefore, are not

merely subjective ends whose existence has a worth for us as an

effect of our action but objective ends, that is things whose

existence is an end in itself: an end moreover for which no other

can be substituted, which they should subserve merely as means, for

otherwise nothing whatever would possess absolute worth; but if all

worth were conditioned and therefore contingent, then there would be

no supreme practical principle of reason whatever.

If then there is a supreme practical principle or, in respect of the

human will, a categorical imperative, it must be one which, being

drawn from the conception of that which is necessarily an end for

every one because it is an end in itself, constitutes an objective

principle of will, and can therefore serve as a universal practical

law. The foundation of this principle is: rational nature exists as

an end in itself. Man necessarily conceives his own existence as

being so; so far then this is a subjective principle of human

actions. But every other rational being regards its existence

similarly, just on the same rational principle that holds for me:

[Footnote: This proposition is here stated as a postulate. The

grounds of it will be found in the concluding section.] so that it

is at the same time an objective principle, from which as a supreme

practical law all laws of the will must be capable of being deduced.

Accordingly the practical imperative will be as follows: So act as

to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any

other, in every case as an end withal, never as means only. We will

now inquire whether this can be practically carried out.

To abide by the previous examples:

Firstly, under the head of necessary duty to oneself: He who

contemplates suicide should ask himself whether his action can be

consistent with the idea of humanity as an end in itself. If he

destroys himself in order to escape from painful circumstances, he

uses a person merely as a mean to maintain a tolerable condition up

to the end of life. But a man is not a thing, that is to say,

something which can be used merely as means, but must in all his

actions be always considered as an end in himself. I cannot,

therefore, dispose in any way of a man in my own person so as to

mutilate him, to damage or kill him. (It belongs to ethics proper to

define this principle more precisely so as to avoid all

misunderstanding, e. g., as to the amputation of the limbs in order

to preserve myself; as to exposing my life to danger with a view to

preserve it, &c. This question is therefore omitted here.)

Secondly, as regards necessary duties, or those of strict

obligation, towards others; he who is thinking of making a lying

promise to others will see at once that he would be using another

man merely as a mean, without the latter containing at the same time

the end in himself. For he whom I propose by such a promise to use

for my own purposes cannot possibly assent to my mode of acting

towards him, and therefore cannot himself contain the end of this

action. This violation of the principle of humanity in other men is

more obvious if we take in examples of attacks on the freedom and

property of others. For then it is clear that he who transgresses

the rights of men, intends to use the person of others merely as

means, without considering that as rational beings they ought always

to be esteemed also as ends, that is, as beings who must be capable

of containing in themselves the end of the very same action.

[Footnote: Let it not be thought that the common: quod tibi non vis

fieri, &c., could serve here as the rule or principle. For it is

only a deduction from the former, though with several limitations;

it cannot be a universal law, for it does not contain the principle

of duties to oneself, nor of the duties of benevolence to others

(for many a one would gladly consent that others should not benefit

him, provided only that he might be excused from showing benevolence

to them), nor finally that of duties of strict obligation to one

another, for on this principle the criminal might argue against the

judge who punishes him, and so on.]

Thirdly, as regards contingent (meritorious) duties to oneself; it

is not enough that the action does not violate humanity in our own

person as an end in itself, it must also harmonise with it. Now

there are in humanity capacities of greater perfection which belong

to the end that nature has in view in regard to humanity in

ourselves as the subject: to neglect these might perhaps be

consistent with the maintenance of humanity as an end in itself, but

not with the advancement of this end.

Fourthly, as regards meritorious duties towards others: the natural

end which all men have in their own happiness. Now humanity might

indeed subsist, although no one should contribute anything to the

happiness of others, provided he did not intentionally withdraw

anything from it; but after all, this would only harmonise

negatively not positively with humanity as an end in itself, if

everyone does not also endeavor, as far as in him lies, to forward

the ends of others. For the ends of any subject which is an end in

himself, ought as far as possible to be my ends also, if that

conception is to have its full effect with me.

This principle, that humanity and generally every rational nature is

an end in itself (which is the supreme limiting condition of every

man's freedom of action), is not borrowed from experience, firstly,

because it is universal, applying as it does to all rational beings

whatever, and experience is not capable of determining anything

about them; secondly, because it does not present humanity as an end

to men (subjectively), that is as an object which men do of

themselves actually adopt as an end; but as an objective end, which

must as a law constitute the supreme limiting condition of all our

subjective ends, let them be what we will; it must therefore spring

from pure, reason. In fact the objective principle of all practical

legislation lies (according to the first principle) in the rule and

its form of universality which makes it capable of being a law (say,

e. g., a law of nature); but the subjective principle is in the end;

now by the second principle the subject of all ends is each rational

being, inasmuch as it is an end in itself. Hence follows the third

practical principle of the will, which is the ultimate condition of

its harmony with the universal practical reason, viz.: the idea of

the will of every rational being as a universally legislative will.

On this principle all maxims are rejected which are inconsistent

with the will being itself universal legislator. Thus the will is

not subject simply to the law, but so subject that it must be

regarded as itself giving the law, and on this ground only, subject

to the law (of which it can regard itself as the author).

In the previous imperatives, namely, that based on the conception of

the conformity of actions to general laws, as in a physical system

of nature, and that based on the universal prerogative of rational

beings as ends in themselves--these imperatives just because they

were conceived as categorical, excluded from any share in their

authority all admixture of any interest as a spring of action; they

were however only assumed to be categorical, because such an

assumption was necessary to explain the conception of duty. But we

could not prove independently that there are practical propositions

which command categorically, nor can it be proved in this section;

one thing however could be done, namely, to indicate in the

imperative itself by some determinate expression, that in the case

of volition from duty all interest is renounced, which is the

specific criterion of categorical as distinguished from hypothetical

imperatives. This is done in the present (third) formula of the

principle, namely, in the idea of the will of every rational being

as a universally legislating will.

For although a will which is subject to laws may be attached to this

law by means of an interest, yet a will which is itself a supreme

lawgiver so far as it is such cannot possibly depend on any

interest, since a will so dependent would itself still need another

law restricting the interest of its self-love by the condition that

it should be valid as universal law.

Thus the principle that every human will is a will which in all its

maxims gives universal laws [Footnote: I may be excused from

adducing examples to elucidate this principle, as those which have

already been used to elucidate the categorical imperative and its

formula would all serve for the like purpose here.] provided it be

otherwise justified, would be very well adapted to be the

categorical imperative, in this respect, namely, that just because

of the idea of universal legislation it is not based on any

interest, and therefore it alone among all possible imperatives can

be unconditional. Or still better, converting the proposition, if

there is a categorical imperative (i.e. a law for the will of every

rational being), it can only command that everything be done from

maxims of one's will regarded as a will which could at the same time

will that it should itself give universal laws, for in that case

only the practical principle and the imperative which it obeys are

unconditional, since they cannot be based on any interest.

Looking back now on all previous attempts to discover the principle

of morality, we need not wonder why they all fail. It was seen that

man was bound to laws by duty, but it was not observed that the laws

to which he is subject are only those of his own giving, though at

the same time they are universal, and that he is only bound to act

in conformity with his own will; a will, however, which is designed

by nature to give universal laws. For when one has conceived man

only as subject to a law (no matter what), then this law required

some interest, either by way of attraction or constraint, since it

did not originate as a law from his own will, but this will was

according to a law obliged by something else to act in a certain

manner. Now by this necessary consequence all the labour spent in

finding a supreme principle of duty was irrevocably lost. For men

never elicited duty, but only a necessity of acting from a certain

interest. Whether this interest was private or otherwise, in any

case the imperative must be conditional, and could not by any means

be capable of being a moral command. I will therefore call this the

principle of Autonomy of the will, in contrast with every other

which I accordingly reckon as Heteronomy? [Footnote: Cp. "Critical

Examination of Practical Reason," p. 184.]

The conception of every rational being as one which must consider

itself as giving in all the maxims of its will universal laws, so as

to judge itself and its actions from this point of view--this

conception leads to another which depends on it and is very

fruitful, namely, that of a kingdom of ends.

By a kingdom I understand the union of different rational beings in

a system by common laws. Now since it is by laws that ends are

determined as regards their universal validity, hence, if we

abstract from the personal differences of rational beings, and

likewise from all the content of their private ends, we shall be

able to conceive all ends combined in a systematic whole (including

both rational beings as ends in themselves, and also the special

ends which each may propose to himself), that is to say, we can

conceive a kingdom of ends, which on the preceding principles is

possible.

For all rational beings come under the law that each of them must

treat itself and all others never merely as means, but in every case

at the same time as ends in themselves. Hence results a systematic

union of rational beings by common objective laws, i.e. a kingdom

which may be called a kingdom of ends, since what these laws have in

view is just the relation of these beings to one another as ends and

means. It is certainly only an ideal.

A rational being belongs as a member to the kingdom of ends when,

although giving universal laws in it, he is also himself subject to

these laws. He belongs to it as sovereign when, while giving laws,

he is not subject to the will of any other.

A rational being must always regard himself as giving laws either as

member or as sovereign in a kingdom of ends which is rendered

possible by the freedom of will. He cannot, however, maintain the

latter position merely by the maxims of his will, but only in case

he is a completely independent being without wants and with

unrestricted power adequate to his will.

Morality consists then in the reference of all action to the

legislation which alone can render a kingdom of ends possible. This

legislation must be capable of existing in every rational being, and

of emanating from his will, so that the principle of this will is,

never to act on any maxim which could not without contradiction be

also a universal law, and accordingly always so to act that the will

could at the same time regard itself as giving in its maxims

universal laws. If now the maxims of rational beings are not by

their own nature coincident with this objective principle, then the

necessity of acting on it is called practical necessitation, i. e.,

duty. Duty does not apply to the sovereign in the kingdom of ends,

but it does to every member of it and to all in the same degree.

The practical necessity of acting on this principle, i. e., duty,

does not rest at all on feelings, impulses, or inclinations, but

solely on the relation of rational beings to one another, a relation

in which the will of a rational being must always be regarded as

legislative, since otherwise it could not be conceived as an end in

itself. Reason then refers every maxim of the will, regarding it as

legislating universally, to every other will and also to every

action towards oneself; and this not on account of any other

practical motive or any future advantage, but from the idea of the

dignity of a rational being, obeying no law but that which he

himself also gives.

In the kingdom of ends everything has either Value or Dignity.

Whatever has a value can be replaced by something else which is

equivalent; whatever, on the other hand, is above all value, and

therefore admits of no equivalent, has a dignity.

Whatever has reference to the general inclinations and wants of

mankind has a market value; whatever, without presupposing a want,

corresponds to a certain taste, that is to a satisfaction in the

mere purposeless play of our faculties, has a fancy value; but that

which constitutes the condition under which alone anything can be an

end in itself, this has not merely a relative worth, i. e., value,

but an intrinsic worth, that is dignity.

Now morality is the condition under which alone a rational being can

be an end in himself, since by this alone it is possible that he

should be a legislating member in the kingdom of ends. Thus

morality, and humanity as capable of it, is that which alone has

dignity. Skill and diligence in labour have a market value; wit,

lively imagination, and humour, have fancy value; on the other hand,

fidelity to promises, benevolence from principle (not from

instinct), have an intrinsic worth. Neither nature nor art contains

anything which in default of these it could put in their place, for

their worth consists not in the effects which spring from them, not

in the use and advantage which they secure, but in the disposition

of mind, that is, the maxims of the will which are ready to manifest

themselves in such actions, even though they should not have the

desired effect. These actions also need no recommendation from any

subjective taste or sentiment, that they may be looked on with

immediate favour and satisfaction: they need no immediate propension

or feeling for them; they exhibit the will that performs them as an

object of an immediate respect, and nothing but reason is required

to IMPOSE them on the will; not to FLATTER it into them, which, in

the case of duties, would be a contradiction. This estimation

therefore shows that the worth of such a disposition is dignity, and

places it infinitely above all value, with which it cannot for a

moment be brought into comparison or competition without as it were

violating its sanctity.

What then is it which justifies virtue or the morally good

disposition, in making such lofty claims? It is nothing less than

the privilege it secures to the rational being of participating in

the giving of universal laws, by which it qualifies him to be a

member of a possible kingdom of ends, a privilege to which he was

already destined by his own nature as being an end in himself, and

on that account legislating in the kingdom of ends; free as regards

all laws of physical nature, and obeying those only which he himself

gives, and by which his maxims can belong to a system of universal

law, to which at the same time he submits himself. For nothing has

any worth except what the law assigns it. Now the legislation itself

which assigns the worth of everything, must for that very reason

possess dignity, that is an unconditional incomparable worth, and

the word RESPECT alone supplies a becoming expression for the esteem

which a rational being must have for it. AUTONOMY then is the basis

of the dignity of human and of every rational nature.

The three modes of presenting the principle of morality that have

been adduced are at bottom only so many formulae of the very same

law, and each of itself involves the other two. There is, however, a

difference in them, but it is rather subjectively than objectively

practical, intended namely to bring an idea of the reason nearer to

intuition (by means of a certain analogy), and thereby nearer to

feeling. All maxims, in fact, have--

1. A FORM, consisting in universality; and in this view the formula

of the moral imperative is expressed thus, that the maxims must be

so chosen as if they were to serve as universal laws of nature.

2. A MATTER [Footnote: The reading "Maxima," which is that both of

Rosenkranz and Hartenstein, is obviously an error for "Materie."]

namely, an end, and here the formula says that the rational being,

as it is an end by its own nature and therefore an end in itself,

must in every maxim serve as the condition limiting all merely

relative and arbitrary ends.

3. A COMPLETE CHARACTERISATION of all maxims by means of that

formula, namely, that all maxims ought by their own legislation to

harmonise with a possible kingdom of ends as with a kingdom of

nature. [Footnote: Teleology considers nature as a kingdom of ends;

Ethics regards a possible kingdom of ends as a kingdom of nature. In

the first case, the kingdom of ends is a theoretical idea, adopted

to explain what actually is. In the latter it is a practical idea,

adopted to bring about that which is not yet, but which can be

realised by our conduct, namely, if it conforms to this idea.] There

is a progress here in the order of the categories of UNITY of the

form of the will (its universality), PLURALITY of the matter (the

objects, i. e. the ends), and TOTALITY of the system of these. In

forming our moral JUDGMENT of actions it is better to proceed always

on the strict method, and start from the general formula of the

categorical imperative: ACT ACCORDING TO A MAXIM WHICH CAN AT THE

SAME TIME MAKE ITSELF A UNIVERSAL LAW. If, however, we wish to gain

an ENTRANCE for the moral law, it is very useful to bring one and

the same action under the three specified conceptions, and thereby

as far as possible to bring it nearer to intuition.

We can now end where we started at the beginning, namely, with the

conception of a will unconditionally good. THAT WILL is ABSOLUTELY

GOOD which cannot be evil, in other words, whose maxim, if made a

universal law, could never contradict itself. This principle then is

its supreme law: Act always on such a maxim as thou canst at the

same time will to be a universal law; this is the sole condition

under which a will can never contradict itself; and such an

imperative is categorical. Since the validity of the will as a

universal law for possible actions is analogous to the universal

connexion of the existence of things by general laws, which is the

formal notion of nature in general, the categorical imperative can

also be expressed thus: ACT ON MAXIMS WHICH CAN AT THE SAME TIME

HAVE FOR THEIR OBJECT THEMSELVES AS UNIVERSAL LAWS OF NATURE. Such

then is the formula of an absolutely good will.

Rational nature is distinguished from the rest of nature by this,

that it sets before itself an end. This end would be the matter of

every good will. But since in the idea of a will that is absolutely

good without being limited by any condition (of attaining this or

that end) we must abstract wholly from every end TO BE EFFECTED

(since this would make every will only relatively good), it follows

that in this case the end must be conceived, not as an end to be

effected, but as an INDEPENDENTLY existing end. Consequently it is

conceived only negatively, i.e., as that which we must never act

against, and which, therefore, must never be regarded merely as

means, but must in every volition be esteemed as an end likewise.

Now this end can be nothing but the subject of all possible ends,

since this is also the subject of a possible absolutely good will;

for such a will cannot without contradiction be postponed to any

other object. The principle: So act in regard to every rational

being (thyself and others), that he may always have place in thy

maxim as an end in himself, is accordingly essentially identical

with this other: Act upon a maxim which, at the same time, involves

its own universal validity for every rational being. For that in

using means for every end I should limit my maxim by the condition

of its holding good as a law for every subject, this comes to the

same thing as that the fundamental principle of all maxims of action

must be that the subject of all ends, i. e., the rational being

himself, be never employed merely as means, but as the supreme

condition restricting the use of all means, that is in every case as

an end likewise.

It follows incontestably that, to whatever laws any rational being

may be subject, he being an end in himself must be able to regard

himself as also legislating universally in respect of these same

laws, since it is just this fitness of his maxims for universal

legislation that distinguishes him as an end in himself; also it

follows that this implies his dignity (prerogative) above all mere

physical beings, that he must always take his maxims from the point

of view which regards himself, and likewise every other rational

being, as lawgiving beings (on which account they are called

persons). In this way a world of rational beings (mundus

intelligibilis) is possible as a kingdom of ends, and this by virtue

of the legislation proper to all persons as members. Therefore every

rational being must so act as if he were by his maxims in every case

a legislating member in the universal kingdom of ends. The formal

principle of these maxims is: So act as if thy maxim were to serve

likewise as the universal law (of all rational beings). A kingdom of

ends is thus only possible on the analogy of a kingdom of nature,

the former however only by maxims, that is self-imposed rules, the

latter only by the laws of efficient causes acting under

necessitation from without. Nevertheless, although the system of

nature is looked upon as a machine, yet so far as it has reference

to rational beings as its ends, it is given on this account the name

of a kingdom of nature. Now such a kingdom of ends would be actually

realised by means of maxims conforming to the canon which the

categorical imperative prescribes to all rational beings, IF THEY

WERE UNIVERSALLY FOLLOWED. But although a rational being, even if he

punctually follows this maxim himself, cannot reckon upon all others

being therefore true to the same, nor expect that the kingdom of

nature and its orderly arrangements shall be in harmony with him as

a fitting member, so as to form a kingdom of ends to which he

himself contributes, that is to say, that it shall favour his

expectation of happiness, still that law: Act according to the

maxims of a member of a merely possible kingdom of ends legislating

in it universally, remains in its full force, inasmuch as it

commands categorically. And it is just in this that the paradox

lies; that the mere dignity of a man as a rational creature, without

any other end or advantage to be attained thereby, in other words,

respect for a mere idea, should yet serve as an inflexible precept

of the will, and that it is precisely in this independence of the

maxim on all such springs of action that its sublimity consists; and

it is this that makes every rational subject worthy to be a

legislative member in the kingdom of ends: for otherwise he would

have to be conceived only as subject to the physical law of his

wants. And although we should suppose the kingdom of nature and the

kingdom of ends to be united under one sovereign, so that the latter

kingdom thereby ceased to be a mere idea and acquired true reality,

then it would no doubt gain the accession of a strong spring, but by

no means any increase of its intrinsic worth. For this sole absolute

lawgiver must, notwithstanding this, be always conceived as

estimating the worth of rational beings only by their disinterested

behaviour, as prescribed to themselves from that idea [the dignity

of man] alone. The essence of things is not altered by their

external relations, and that which abstracting from these, alone

constitutes the absolute worth of man, is also that by which he must

be judged, whoever the judge may be, and even by the Supreme Being.

MORALITY then is the relation of actions to the autonomy of the

will, that is, to the potential universal legislation by its maxims.

An action that is consistent with the autonomy of the will is

PERMITTED; one that does not agree therewith is FORBIDDEN. A will

whose maxims necessarily coincide with the laws of autonomy is a

HOLY will, good absolutely. The dependence of a will not absolutely

good on the principle of autonomy (moral necessitation) is

obligation. This then cannot be applied to a holy being. The

objective necessity of actions from obligation is called DUTY.

From what has just been said, it is easy to see how it happens that

although the conception of duty implies subjection to the law, we

yet ascribe a certain DIGNITY and sublimity to the person who

fulfills all his duties. There is not, indeed, any sublimity in him,

so far as he is subject to the moral law; but inasmuch as in regard

to that very law he is like-wise a legislator, and on that account

alone subject to it, he has sublimity. We have also shown above that

neither fear nor inclination, but simply respect for the law, is the

spring which can give actions a moral worth. Our own will, so far as

we suppose it to act only under the condition that its maxims are

potentially universal laws, this ideal will which is possible to us

is the proper object of respect, and the dignity of humanity

consists just in this capacity of being universally legislative,

though with the condition that it is itself subject to this same

legislation.