LETTER XXVII.

Do not fear for reality and truth. Even if the elevated idea of

aesthetic appearance became general, it would not become so, as long

as man remains so little cultivated as to abuse it; and if it became

general, this would result from a culture that would prevent all

abuse of it. The pursuit of independent appearance requires more

power of abstraction, freedom of heart, and energy of will than man

requires to shut himself up in reality; and he must have left the

latter behind him if he wishes to attain to aesthetic appearance.

Therefore a man would calculate very badly who took the road of the

ideal to save himself that of reality. Thus reality would not have

much to fear from appearance, as we understand it; but, on the other

hand, appearance would have more to fear from reality. Chained to

matter, man uses appearance for his purposes before he allows it a

proper personality in the art of the ideal: to come to that point a

complete revolution must take place in his mode of feeling,

otherwise he would not be even on the way to the ideal.

Consequently, when we find in man the signs of a pure and

disinterested esteem, we can infer that this revolution has taken

place in his nature, and that humanity has really begun in him.

Signs of this kind are found even in the first and rude attempts

that he makes to embellish his existence, even at the risk of making

it worse in its material conditions. As soon as he begins to prefer

form to substance and to risk reality for appearance (known by him

to be such), the barriers of animal life fall, and he finds himself

on a track that has no end.

Not satisfied with the needs of nature, he demands the superfluous.

First, only the superfluous of matter, to secure his enjoyment

beyond the present necessity; but afterwards he wishes a

superabundance in matter, an aesthetical supplement to satisfy the

impulse for the formal, to extend enjoyment beyond necessity. By

piling up provisions simply for a future use, and anticipating their

enjoyment in the imagination, he outsteps the limits of the present

moment, but not those of time in general. He enjoys more; he does

not enjoy differently. But as soon as he makes form enter into his

enjoyment, and he keeps in view the forms of the objects which

satisfy his desires, he has not only increased his pleasure in

extent and intensity, but he has also ennobled it in mode and

species.

No doubt nature has given more than is necessary to unreasoning

beings; she has caused a gleam of freedom to shine even in the

darkness of animal life. When the lion is not tormented by hunger,

and when no wild beast challenges him to fight, his unemployed

energy creates an object for himself; full of ardour, he fills the

re-echoing desert with his terrible roars, and his exuberant force

rejoices in itself, showing itself without an object. The insect

flits about rejoicing in life in the sunlight, and it is certainly

not the cry of want that makes itself heard in the melodious song of

the bird; there is undeniably freedom in these movements, though it

is not emancipation from want in general, but from a determinate

external necessity.

The animal works, when a privation is the motor of its activity, and

it plays when the plenitude of force is this motor, when an

exuberant life is excited to action. Even in inanimate nature a

luxury of strength and a latitude of determination are shown, which

in this material sense might be styled play. The tree produces

numberless germs that are abortive without developing, and it sends

forth more roots, branches and leaves, organs of nutrition, than are

used for the preservation of the species. Whatever this tree

restores to the elements of its exuberant life, without using it, or

enjoying it, may be expended by life in free and joyful movements.

It is thus that nature offers in her material sphere a sort of

prelude to the limitless, and that even there she suppresses

partially the chains from which she will be completely emancipated

in the realm of form. The constraint of superabundance or physical

play, answers as a transition from the constraint of necessity, or

of physical seriousness, to aesthetical play; and before shaking

off, in the supreme freedom of the beautiful, the yoke of any

special aim, nature already approaches, at least remotely, this

independence, by the free movement which is itself its own end and

means.

The imagination, like the bodily organs, has in man its free

movement and its material play, a play in which, without any

reference to form, it simply takes pleasure in its arbitrary power

and in the absence of all hindrance. These plays of fancy, inasmuch

as form is not mixed up with them, and because a free succession of

images makes all their charm, though confined to man, belong

exclusively to animal life, and only prove one thing--that he is

delivered from all external sensuous constraint--without our being

entitled to infer that there is in it an independent plastic force.

From this play of free association of ideas, which is still quite

material in nature and is explained by simple natural laws, the

imagination, by making the attempt of creating a free form, passes

at length at a jump to the aesthetic play: I say at one leap, for

quite a new force enters into action here; for here, for the first

time, the legislative mind is mixed with the acts of a blind

instinct, subjects the arbitrary march of the imagination to its

eternal and immutable unity, causes its independent permanence to

enter in that which is transitory, and its infinity in the sensuous.

Nevertheless, as long as rude nature, which knows of no other law

than running incessantly from change to change, will yet retain too

much strength, it will oppose itself by its different caprices to

this necessity; by its agitation to this permanence; by its manifold

needs to this independence, and by its insatiability to this sublime

simplicity. It will be also troublesome to recognise the instinct of

play in its first trials, seeing that the sensuous impulsion, with

its capricious humour and its violent appetites, constantly crosses.

It is on that account that we see the taste, still coarse, seize

that which is new and startling, the disordered, the adventurous and

the strange, the violent and the savage, and fly from nothing so

much as from calm and simplicity. It invents grotesque figures, it

likes rapid transitions, luxurious forms, sharply marked changes,

acute tones, a pathetic song. That which man calls beautiful at this

time, is that which excites him, that which gives him matter; but

that which excites him to give his personality to the object, that

which gives matter to a possible plastic operation, for otherwise it

would not be the beautiful for him. A remarkable change has

therefore taken place in the form of his judgments; he searches for

these objects, not because they affect him, but because they furnish

him with the occasion of acting; they please him, not because they

answer to a want, but because they satisfy a law, which speaks in

his breast, although quite low as yet.

Soon it will not be sufficient for things to please him; he will

wish to please: in the first place, it is true, only by that which

belongs to him; afterwards by that which he is. That which he

possesses, that which he produces, ought not merely to bear any more

the traces of servitude, nor to mark out the end, simply and

scrupulously, by the form. Independently of the use to which it is

destined, the object ought also to reflect the enlightened

intelligence which imagines it, the hand which shaped it with

affection, the mind free and serene which chose it and exposed it to

view. Now, the ancient German searches for more magnificent furs,

for more splendid antlers of the stag, for more elegant drinking

horns; and the Caledonian chooses the prettiest shells for his

festivals. The arms themselves ought to be no longer only objects of

terror, but also of pleasure; and the skilfully worked scabbard will

not attract less attention than the homicidal edge of the sword. The

instinct of play, not satisfied with bringing into the sphere of the

necessary an aesthetic superabundance for the future more free, is

at last completely emancipated from the bonds of duty, and the

beautiful becomes of itself an object of man's exertions. He adorns

himself. The free pleasure comes to take a place among his wants,

and the useless soon becomes the best part of his joys. Form, which

from the outside gradually approaches him, in his dwelling, his

furniture, his clothing, begins at last to take possession of the

man himself, to transform him, at first exteriorly, and afterwards

in the interior. The disordered leaps of joy become the dance, the

formless gesture is changed into an amiable and harmonious

pantomime, the confused accents of feeling are developed, and begin

to obey measure and adapt themselves to song. When, like the flight

of cranes, the Trojan army rushes on to the field of battle with

thrilling cries, the Greek army approaches in silence and with a

noble and measured step. On the one side we see but the exuberance

of a blind force, on the other; the triumph of form and the simple

majesty of law.

Now, a nobler necessity binds the two sexes mutually, and the

interests of the heart contribute in rendering durable an alliance

which was at first capricious and changing like the desire that

knits it. Delivered from the heavy fetters of desire, the eye, now

calmer, attends to the form, the soul contemplates the soul, and the

interested exchange of pleasure becomes a generous exchange of

mutual inclination. Desire enlarges and rises to love, in proportion

as it sees humanity dawn in its object; and, despising the vile

triumphs gained by the senses, man tries to win a nobler victory

over the will. The necessity of pleasing subjects the powerful

nature to the gentle laws of taste; pleasure may be stolen, but love

must be a gift. To obtain this higher recompense, it is only through

the form and not through matter that it can carry on the contest. It

must cease to act on feeling as a force, to appear in the

intelligence as a simple phenomenon; it must respect liberty, as it

is liberty it wishes to please. The beautiful reconciles the

contrast of different natures in its simplest and purest expression.

It also reconciles the eternal contrast of the two sexes, in the

whole complex framework of society, or at all events it seeks to do

so; and, taking as its model the free alliance it has knit between

manly strength and womanly gentleness, it strives to place in

harmony, in the moral world, all the elements of gentleness and of

violence. Now, at length, weakness becomes sacred, and an unbridled

strength disgraces; the injustice of nature is corrected by the

generosity of chivalrous manners. The being whom no power can make

tremble, is disarmed by the amiable blush of modesty, and tears

extinguish a vengeance that blood could not have quenched. Hatred

itself hears the delicate voice of honour, the conqueror's sword

spares the disarmed enemy, and a hospitable hearth smokes for the

stranger on the dreaded hill-side where murder alone awaited him

before.

In the midst of the formidable realm of forces, and of the sacred

empire of laws, the aesthetic impulse of form creates by degrees a

third and a joyous realm, that of play and of the appearance, where

she emancipates man from fetters, in all his relations, and from all

that is named constraint, whether physical or moral.

If in the dynamic state of rights men mutually move and come into

collision as forces, in the moral (ethical) state of duties, man

opposes to man the majesty of the laws, and chains down his will. In

this realm of the beautiful or the aesthetic state, man ought to

appear to man only as a form, and an object of free play. To give

freedom through freedom is the fundamental law of this realm.

The dynamic state can only make society simply possible by subduing

nature through nature; the moral (ethical) state can only make it

morally necessary by submitting the will of the individual to the

general will. The aesthetic state alone can make it real, because it

carries out the will of all through the nature of the individual. If

necessity alone forces man to enter into society, and if his reason

engraves on his soul social principles, it is beauty only that can

give him a social character; taste alone brings harmony into

society, because it creates harmony in the individual. All other

forms of perception divide the man, because they are based

exclusively either in the sensuous or in the spiritual part of his

being. It is only the perception of beauty that makes of him an

entirety, because it demands the co-operation of his two natures.

All other forms of communication divide society, because they apply

exclusively either to the receptivity or to the private activity of

its members, and therefore to what distinguishes men one from the

other. The aesthetic communication alone unites society, because it

applies to what is common to all its members. We only enjoy the

pleasures of sense as individuals, without the nature of the race in

us sharing in it; accordingly, we cannot generalise our individual

pleasures, because we cannot generalise our individuality. We enjoy

the pleasures of knowledge as a race, dropping the Individual in our

judgment; but we cannot generalise the pleasures of the

understanding, because we cannot eliminate individuality from the

judgments of others as we do from our own. Beauty alone can we enjoy

both as individuals and as a race, that is, as representing a race.

Good appertaining to sense can only make one person happy, because

it is founded on inclination, which is always exclusive; and it can

only make a man partially happy, because his real personality does

not share in it. Absolute good can only render a man happy

conditionally, for truth is only the reward of abnegation, and a

pure heart alone has faith in a pure will. Beauty alone confers

happiness on all, and under its influence every being forgets that

he is limited.

Taste does not suffer any superior or absolute authority, and the

sway of beauty is extended over appearance. It extends up to the

seat of reason's supremacy, suppressing all that is material. It

extends down to where sensuous impulse rules with blind compulsion,

and form is undeveloped. Taste ever maintains its power on these

remote borders, where legislation is taken from it. Particular

desires must renounce their egotism, and the agreeable, otherwise

tempting the senses, must in matters of taste adorn the mind with

the attractions of grace.

Duty and stern necessity must change their forbidding tone, only

excused by resistance, and do homage to nature by a nobler trust in

her. Taste leads our knowledge from the mysteries of science into

the open expanse of common sense, and changes a narrow scholasticism

into the common property of the human race. Here the highest genius

must leave its particular elevation, and make itself familiar to the

comprehension even of a child. Strength must let the Graces bind it,

and the arbitrary lion must yield to the reins of love. For this

purpose taste throws a veil over physical necessity, offending a

free mind by its coarse nudity, and dissimulating our degrading

parentage with matter by a delightful illusion of freedom. Mercenary

art itself rises from the dust; and the bondage of the bodily, at

its magic touch, falls off from the inanimate and animate. In the

aesthetic state the most slavish tool is a free citizen, having the

same rights as the noblest; and the intellect which shapes the mass

to its intent must consult it concerning its destination.

Consequently in the realm of aesthetic appearance, the idea of

equality is realised, which the political zealot would gladly see

carried out socially. It has often been said that perfect politeness

is only found near a throne. If thus restricted in the material, man

has, as elsewhere appears, to find compensation in the ideal world.

Does such a state of beauty in appearance exist, and where? It must

be in every finely harmonised soul; but as a fact, only in select

circles, like the pure ideal of the church and state--in circles

where manners are not formed by the empty imitations of the foreign,

but by the very beauty of nature; where man passes through all sorts

of complications in all simplicity and innocence, neither forced to

trench on another's freedom to preserve his own, nor to show grace

at the cost of dignity.

Literary and Philosophical Essays: French, German and Italian · 第 76 / 96 题