LETTER XVI.

From the antagonism of the two impulsions, and from the association

of two opposite principles, we have seen beauty to result, of which

the highest ideal must therefore be sought in the most perfect union

and equilibrium possible of the reality and of the form. But this

equilibrium remains always an idea that reality can never completely

reach. In reality, there will always remain a preponderance of one

of these elements over the other, and the highest point to which

experience can reach will consist in an oscillation between two

principles, when sometimes reality and at others form will have the

advantage. Ideal beauty is therefore eternally one and indivisible,

because there can only be one single equilibrium; on the contrary,

experimental beauty will be eternally double, because in the

oscillation the equilibrium may be destroyed in two ways--this side

and that.

I have called attention in the foregoing letters to a fact that can

also be rigorously deduced from the considerations that have engaged

our attention to the present point; this fact is that an exciting

and also a moderating action may be expected from the beautiful. The

TEMPERING action is directed to keep within proper limits the

sensuous and the formal impulsions; the EXCITING, to maintain both

of them in their full force. But these two modes of action of beauty

ought to be completely identified in the idea. The beautiful ought

to temper while uniformly exciting the two natures, and it ought

also to excite while uniformly moderating them. This result flows at

once from the idea of a correlation, in virtue of which the two

terms mutually imply each other, and are the reciprocal condition

one of the other, a correlation of which the purest product is

beauty. But experience does not offer an example of so perfect a

correlation. In the field of experience it will always happen more

or less that excess on the one side will give rise to deficiency on

the other, and deficiency will give birth to excess. It results from

this that what in the beau-ideal is only distinct in the idea, is

different in reality in empirical beauty, The beau-ideal, though

simple and indivisible, discloses, when viewed in two different

aspects, on the one hand a property of gentleness and grace, and on

the other an energetic property; in experience there is a gentle and

graceful beauty, and there is an energetic beauty. It is so, and it

will be always so, so long as the absolute is enclosed in the limits

of time, and the ideas of reason have to be realised in humanity.

For example, the intellectual man has the idea of virtue, of truth,

and of happiness; but the active man will only practise VIRTUES,

will only grasp TRUTHS, and enjoy HAPPY DAYS. The business of

physical and moral education is to bring back this multiplicity to

unity, to put morality in the place of manners, science in the place

of knowledge; the business of aesthetic education is to make out of

beauties the beautiful.

Energetic beauty can no more preserve a man from a certain residue

of savage violence and harshness than graceful beauty can secure him

against a certain degree of effeminacy and weakness. As it is the

effect of the energetic beauty to elevate the mind in a physical and

moral point of view and to augment its momentum, it only too often

happens that the resistance of the temperament and of the character

diminishes the aptitude to receive impressions, that the delicate

part of humanity suffers an oppression which ought only to affect

its grosser part, and that this course nature participates in an

increase of force that ought only to tun? to the account of free

personality. It is for this reason that at the periods when we find

much strength and abundant sap in humanity, true greatness of

thought is seen associated with what is gigantic and extravagant,

and the sublimest feeling is found coupled with the most horrible

excess of passion. It is also the reason why, in the periods

distinguished for regularity and form, nature is as often oppressed

as it is governed, as often outraged as it isi surpassed. And as the

action of gentle and graceful beauty is to relax the mind in the

moral sphere as well as the physical, it happens quite as easily

that the energy of feelings is extinguished with the violence of

desires, and that character shares in the loss of strength which

ought only to affect the passions. This is the reason why, in ages

assumed to be refined, it is not a rare thing to see gentleness

degenerate into effeminacy, politeness into platitude, correctness

into empty sterility, liberal ways into arbitrary caprice, ease into

frivolity, calm into apathy, and, lastly, a most miserable

caricature treads on the heels of the noblest, the most beautiful

type of humanity. Gentle and graceful beauty is therefore a want to

the man who suffers the constraint of matter and of forms, for he is

moved by grandeur and strength long before he becomes sensible to

harmony and grace. Energetic beauty is a necessity to the man who is

under the indulgent sway of taste, for in his state of refinement he

is only too much disposed to make light of the strength that he

retained in his state of rude savagism.

I think I have now answered and also cleared up the contradiction

commonly met in the judgments of men respecting the influence of the

beautiful, and the appreciation of aesthetic culture. This

contradiction is explained directly we remember that there are two

sorts of experimental beauty, and that on both hands an affirmation

is extended to the entire race, when it can only be proved of one of

the species. This contradiction disappears the moment we distinguish

a twofold want in humanity to which two kinds of beauty correspond.

It is therefore probable that both sides would make good their

claims if they come to an understanding respecting the kind of

beauty and the form of humanity that they have in view.

Consequently in the sequel of my researches I shall adopt the course

that nature herself follows with man considered from the point of

view of sesthetics, and setting out from the two kinds of beauty, I

shall rise to the idea of the genus. I shall examine the effects

produced on man by the gentle and graceful beauty when its springs

of action are in full play, and also those produced by energetic

beauty when they are relaxed. I shall do this to confound these two

sorts of beauty in the unity of the beau-ideal, in the same way that

the two opposite forms and modes of being of humanity are absorbed

in the unity of the ideal man.

Literary and Philosophical Essays: French, German and Italian · 第 66 / 96 题