THE FIRST MOROCCAN CRISIS
1904-1906
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS
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NEW YORK
THE CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
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TOKYO, OSAKA, KYOTO, FUKUOKA, SENDAI
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SHANGHAI
THE FIRST
MOROCCAN CRISIS
1904-1906
BY
EUGENE N. ANDERSON
_The University of Chicago_
[Decoration]
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS
COPYRIGHT 1930 BY THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. PUBLISHED JUNE 1930
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COMPOSED AND PRINTED BY THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, U.S.A.
DEDICATED
TO
MY MOTHER
PREFACE
The fall of Morocco under European control marks the nadir in the annals
of Islam. The land was the last important Mohammedan territory to be
taken by the Christians. Thereafter began the Islamic revival which is
still in course. This volume, however, deals not with that subject but
with the history of a conflict in European diplomacy, referring to
Morocco proper only when necessary to explain the moves of the Powers.
The Moroccan crisis of 1904-6 contained all those elements that were
present at the other crises on the road to the great war—desire for
colonial acquisition, trade and investment rivalries, national honor,
diplomacy which contained the threat of war, the principle of the
balance of power, fears, and counterfears. The special interest of this
episode lies in the fact that, as the first of the series, it shows the
Powers choosing sides and fixing their opinions and policies. It
determined the mental attitude of the players in the subsequent
struggles and gave direction and mind, so to speak, to the later events.
In the history of the Moroccan affair from approximately 1898 to 1906,
when the first crisis ended, are mirrored almost all the important
movements of the Powers with reference to one another. The grouping of
the Powers around France, the development of Anglo-German rivalry, the
failure of Germany’s policy of playing between Great Britain and the
Dual Alliance, Germany’s _riposte_ and attempts to restore her
position—all are either intimately connected with the Moroccan question
or can be explained in the light of it. The Moroccan problem was the
political barometer of Europe.
In making this study I have relied chiefly upon the official documents
contained in _Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette, 1871-1914_,
in _British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914_, and in the
two _Livres jaunes_ concerning the Moroccan affair from 1901-1906. The
presence of so much new material has rendered antiquated most of the
older accounts of the subject. I have therefore not cited all of this
secondary literature, preferring to give source references.
In spite of this rich material, there are still obstacles to a complete,
impartial, and balanced account of this episode. The outstanding one is
the absence of adequate French documents. The French policy has
practically to be studied through British or German eyes and on the
basis of the accomplished fact. The British and the German policies are
thus treated with more understanding and detail. But even here
difficulties arise. History cannot be written alone on the basis of the
official diplomatic documents of today. The variety and amount of
information which Ranke found condensed in the reports of the Venetian
ambassadors of the sixteenth century is now scattered in a hundred
places. The improved facilities for communication and transportation
have limited and specialized the correspondence of governments and their
foreign representatives. Information is now obtained as well from
personal interviews, newspapers, and all those means which create
governmental as well as public opinion. Much of great importance is
never written down at all. Foreign secretaries often give orders to
their ambassadors without explaining their reasons. This is particularly
true of the British, less true of the Germans. Moreover, statesmen are
at times inclined for reasons of policy to write down how they wish a
certain event to be viewed, not how they actually view it. To check and
supplement the official documents, therefore, the intimate and more
personal information in biographies, autobiographies, and memoirs has
been especially valuable, although neither the number of those works,
particularly on the French side, nor the material in them is complete.
While international relations were more complex in the pre-war days than
ever before in history, the study of them is facilitated by the fact
that diplomacy was still secret, that a relatively few individuals
guided it. By focusing attention upon these individuals, one can
interpret the motives which consciously or unconsciously determined
foreign policy. These men sublimated and represented the diplomatic mind
of the nations. A new actor had also made its appearance in their midst,
that combination of Proteus and Fata Morgana, public opinion; but even
it was given tangible shape in the minds of the responsible statesmen
who had to interpret it and respond to its demands. I have tried to test
these interpretations by checking them against the opinions of
contemporaries and by reading in the contemporary newspapers, magazines,
speeches, and letters.
Diplomatic policies and situations cannot be explained in a formula.
Statesmen are all more or less opportunists; they usually keep several
alternatives in mind. To assert that one country is bent on war and
another on peace, one on revenge and aggression and another on defense,
is to give an incomplete view. In handling the fluid and shifting
materials of diplomacy, one must avoid both oversimplicity and
historical fatalism. Further information will probably add or change
many details in this study, but I believe that the main lines of the
history of this crisis are herein explained.
I wish especially to express my appreciation to Professor Bernadotte E.
Schmitt, Professor Ferdinand Schevill, Associate Professor Arthur P.
Scott, and Associate Professor Louis R. Gottschalk—all of the University
of Chicago—for much beneficial advice and criticism in reading this work
in manuscript, and to thank my sister, Dr. Jesse May McFadyen, of the
University of Minnesota, for many hours of help in searching for the
right phrase.
EUGENE N. ANDERSON
CHICAGO, 1929
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. FRANCE AND MOROCCO, 1898-1904 1
II. THE FRANCO-ITALIAN ENTENTE, 1900-1902 19
III. THE FRANCO-SPANISH ENTENTE, 1898-1903 35
IV. DELCASSÉ’S POLICY TOWARD GREAT BRITAIN AND GERMANY, 41
1898-1902
V. THE ANGLO-GERMAN ALLIANCE NEGOTIATIONS, 1898-1901 52
VI. THE MAKING OF THE ENTENTE CORDIALE 81
VII. ANGLO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS AFTER THE MAKING OF THE ENTENTE 110
CORDIALE
VIII. FRENCH POLICY AFTER THE MAKING OF THE ENTENTE CORDIALE 117
IX. GERMANY AND THE ENTENTE CORDIALE, 1903-4 135
X. THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR A RUSSO-GERMAN ALLIANCE, 1904 159
XI. THE VISIT TO TANGIER 181
XII. THE MOROCCAN CRISIS FROM THE VISIT TO TANGIER TO THE FALL 196
OF DELCASSÉ
XIII. THE MOROCCAN CRISIS, JUNE 6-JULY 8, 1905 234
XIV. THE MOROCCAN CRISIS, JULY-OCTOBER, 1905 259
XV. THE TREATY OF BJÖRKÖ AND ITS ANNULMENT 279
XVI. THE PRELIMINARIES TO THE CONFERENCE OF ALGECIRAS 311
XVII. THE CONFERENCE OF ALGECIRAS 348
XVIII. CONCLUSION 397
INDEX 409
CHAPTER I
FRANCE AND MOROCCO, 1898-1904
I. THE DECADENT MOROCCO
Morocco was one of the last of the “backward” countries to be taken
under control by a European state. It was a historic land with a long
record of wars against the Christians; but, like many another, it had
never adapted itself to the course of European civilization, and by the
end of the nineteenth century had consequently become consigned by
statesmen interested in colonial conquest to the category of “dying
states.” Hence it was qualified for acquisition, division, or control.
The execution of this work was beset with unusually grave difficulties.
Several centuries of more or less regular diplomatic and commercial
relations with European Powers had assured Morocco international
recognition as a sovereign and independent land. Moreover, the rival
interests of the Powers there were so firmly established and so
conflicting that they seemed irreconcilable. Down to 1900 these Powers
had jealously blocked each other from a special position, and, in case
of necessity, as in 1880, had settled common problems concerning Morocco
by means of an international conference.[1] And while this disunion
obtained, that country of eight million fanatical and warlike souls able
to play one potential enemy against the other was secure.
At the opening of the twentieth century Morocco was one of the least-
known lands of the world. Insecurity of life, absence of roads and means
of transportation and communication of any but the most primitive sort,
undeveloped harbors poor by nature, and a governmental policy designed
to prevent any Power from gaining a foothold in the land by the
acquisition of property, mining or other concessions had excluded the
“Christian dogs” and maintained Mohammedan purity.[2]
Nevertheless, the country was reputed by Europeans to be rich in natural
resources, the “pearl of North Africa.”[3] The plains and valleys, if
irrigated and cultivated by modern methods, would, it was held, produce
vast supplies of foodstuffs and would become one of the granaries of
Europe. Other regions were declared to be admirably suited for grazing;
while the mountains, those bulwarks against the encroachments of the
desert, were envisaged as teeming with minerals. Popular imagination
glorified Morocco into another Promised Land.[4]
However that might be, Europeans were doing very little business there.
Official French statistics reckoned the total amount of foreign trade
with Morocco in 1903 as 109,495,888 francs. Of this small sum France and
Algeria enjoyed 31 per cent; Great Britain, 41.6 per cent; Germany, 9
per cent; Spain, 8.4 per cent; and the other Powers insignificant
amounts.[5] The contrast between economic fact and economic possibility
acted as a spur to the groups desirous of political acquisition; but the
smallness of these economic interests and their substantial equality for
a number of the Powers made it difficult to determine which had the
dominant claim to develop Morocco.
A conflict of strategic interests added to this complication. Morocco’s
geographic situation on the Straits of Gibraltar and on the route to
South Africa, her proximity to the French and Spanish possessions in
North Africa and to Spain, made the Sherifian Empire a land coveted by
all Powers with Western Mediterranean interests, in particular Great
Britain, Germany, France, Spain, and Italy. Since each state suspected
that any rival would abuse its advantages if it gained ascendancy,
disagreement over the future of Morocco persisted. However, in an era
which was coming to be more and more dominated by the urge for colonial
control, this problem would not long remain unsolved. At the close of
the century a favorable turn in international affairs and an
accentuation of the chronic state of anarchy in the land itself brought
the question to the fore.
The period of strong rule in Morocco under Sultan Mulai-el-Hassan
(1873-94) and the grand vizier, Ba-Ahmed, came to an end with the death
of the latter in May, 1900, when the young, inexperienced, and
incompetent sultan, Abd-el-Aziz, assumed authority in person. By his
preference for foreign goods and society he soon not only exhausted his
treasury but also estranged his subjects. He acquired a fantastic
collection in which figured cameras, coaches, bicycles, dolls, pianos by
the dozen, and animals for a menagerie. He amused himself lavishly with
his European friends. He listened to the advice of his two intimates,
Kaid Sir Harry Maclean, a former English soldier from Gibraltar who had
been in Moroccan service for almost two decades, and Mr. W. B. Harris,
correspondent in Morocco of the _London Times_; and by promulgating a
program of fiscal reform sought to replenish his resources and
reorganize his country in time to prevent the intervention of the
Powers, particularly of France, and the consequent loss of his
independence. But, while his intentions were good, his actions proved
disastrous for himself and his land.[6] Scandalized by the tales of his
antics with the Christians and outraged by the new taxes that violated
the Koran, the natives revolted in 1900.[7] The rebellions in the north
and northeast constituted a double menace since they might lead to
attacks on the French and Spanish possessions and bring on an
intervention of those two Powers.[8] The Sultan had no money, therefore
no army; and without an army he could collect no taxes. The rumor spread
that he had actually turned Christian and sold the land to the English.
The political and religious ties with his people were everywhere
breaking.[9] By 1903 his precarious authority was confined to a few
towns; and his capital, Fez, was itself threatened by the rebels.[10]
As this situation was nothing unusual in Moroccan annals, the natives
were not greatly disturbed. If events had been permitted to take their
normal course, a revolution would probably have replaced Abd-el-Aziz by
some stronger man, and the country would have returned to its usual
condition of semianarchy. The tragedy for Morocco lay in the fact that
this disorder gave the opportunity for the interested Powers to
intervene. The increasing insecurity of foreigners and the Sultan’s need
for loans foreshadowed the end of Moroccan independence. In 1899 Lord
Salisbury, British prime minister, had declared that Morocco was
decaying and might collapse at any moment.[11] Politicians elsewhere
began to turn their attention toward this corner of Africa. Among them
the French assumed the lead and solved the problem.
II. FRANCE AND THE MOROCCAN PROBLEM, 1898-1904
By the end of the nineteenth century France’s North African empire was
assuming definitive form. In the 1890’s agreements with Great Britain,
Germany, and Spain (1900) consolidated France’s possession and left only
Morocco, a country almost inclosed on the land side by French territory,
as an object whose acquisition was coming to be regarded by Frenchmen as
essential to the completion of their ambitions in that region.[12]
To aid in the achievement of this goal a Comité de l’Afrique française
had been organized in 1889 to popularize African questions with the
French people, to exert pressure upon the government, and to carry on a
unified and consistent activity for colonial expansion which the French
cabinets could not do. Its membership was relatively small—about seventy
in all—but very select. With the Prince d’Arenberg as its president, it
numbered in its ranks deputies, senators, military and naval officers,
officials in the government (although no cabinet members, of course),
members of the Academy, newspaper editors and owners, members of the
Institute, members of various geographical societies, colonial
societies, chambers of commerce—men such as M. Gabriel Hanotaux, former
minister of foreign affairs; M. Jules Siegfried, who resigned
temporarily when he became minister of commerce in 1893; M. Paul Révoil,
governor-general of Algeria; General Joseph Galliéni, governor-general
of Madagascar; M. Eugène Etienne, former undersecretary of state for the
colonies and future cabinet member; M. Antoine Guillain, vice-president
of the Chamber for a time and former minister of the colonies; M. Paul
Deschanel, president of the committee for foreign and colonial affairs
in the Chamber. Through common membership and close co-operation the
Comité was assured of the active support of the other colonial,
geographical, and commercial organizations. The character and position
of its members in state affairs gave it an undeniably great influence
upon the government as well as upon the nation. This influence was
enhanced by the organization of groups favoring colonial acquisition in
both the Chamber (1892) and Senate (1898), the former of which under the
presidency of M. Etienne boasted in 1902 almost two hundred members.[13]
During the 1890’s the French advocated a policy of _status quo_ with
reference to Morocco. They opposed permitting any Power to gain undue
influence there or allowing Morocco to reform herself. They were
suspicious of any individual or collective intervention by the Powers,
and wanted to hold the future completely free. But the defeats of Italy
by Abyssinia in 1896 and of Spain by the United States in 1898 dampened
the ardor of those two rivals. Then, when British attention was claimed
by the Boer War and when the internal disintegration of Morocco
increased the possibilities of intervention, the proponents of
aggression demanded that France should act.
Late in 1899 the official publication of the Comité declared that the
Moroccan question was of paramount importance in French foreign
policy.[14] It promoted the campaign for the acquisition of Morocco so
successfully that by the end of 1903 almost all parties in France,
including even the Socialists under M. Jaurès, had come to consider the
French claims to predominance in Morocco as superior to those of any
other Power.[15] The popular arguments, based largely upon the proximity
of Algeria to Morocco, ranged from the theory of the “natural frontier”
to economic and strategic contentions. In Morocco rebellions and
religious wars could easily start, it was claimed, spreading thence over
the whole of North Africa and endangering France’s possessions. If any
other European Power established itself in that land, it could utilize
the native resources in troubling France. On the other hand, by virtue
of her experience in handling and employing Mohammedans, France was
better fitted to perform this work of civilization than anyone else.
These were, of course, the stock arguments of all parties advocating the
establishment of European control over “backward” areas.
The Comité formulated a policy for handling both the internal and the
international aspects of the question—a policy which M. Delcassé,
minister of foreign affairs from 1898 to 1905, was actually to follow.
It was the popular solution, and, for France, the only possible one.[16]
As the Fashoda affair had taught the French that the approval of the
Powers was necessary for the acquisition of colonial territory, the
first requisite was to make agreements with the interested states, among
whom the _Bulletin_ included Germany. Moreover, the nature of the
problem demanded this approach. For Morocco’s international status, the
interests of the Powers there, the military strength of the fanatical
population, and the consequent need of having French hands completely
free from the danger of complications before attempting to reform
Morocco made this preliminary international understanding imperative.
The program contained four essential points. The sovereignty of the
sultan and the independence and integrity of his land should be assured.
Adequate guaranties for the freedom of the straits should be provided.
The legitimate interests of the Powers, considered to be chiefly
economic, should be satisfied through the acceptance of the principle of
full commercial liberty. Lastly, Spain’s territorial claims should be
satisfied. By this course the Comité and its followers thought to
dispose of the international aspect.
At the same time Morocco itself had to be won. The _Bulletin_ believed
that a policy of “pacific penetration” carried on through the agency of
the sultan would solve this task. The sultan was the sole source of
authority, religious as well as political, that France could properly
utilize. By working through him she might further her own interests and
might introduce reforms without provoking the natives to war. The
sovereignty of the Sultan would not be touched nor the independence and
integrity of his land be violated. The “pacific” aspect would prevent
the other Powers from taking offence and would satisfy the French
people. The “penetrating” aspect would give satisfactory reality. It was
a masterful combination, with an air of superficial plausibility so long
as one did not attempt to reconcile the phrases “pacific penetration”
and “preponderant influence” with those of “sovereignty of the sultan”
and “independence and integrity of the land.”[17]
The French minister of foreign affairs from 1898 to 1905 was, as already
said, M. Théophile Delcassé. Born in 1852, he was at a very
impressionable age when the Franco-Prussian War occurred. He became so
ardent a disciple of Gambetta that he could never speak afterward of
their friendship without emotion. Journalist, deputy, colonial
undersecretary, colonial minister—such was the course of his rise.
Uncommunicative by nature, he avoided Parliament as much as possible. He
was on intimate terms with M. Waldeck-Rousseau, premier from 1899 to
1901; but with the latter’s successors, MM. Combes and Rouvier, his
relations were cool, and he asserted his entire independence in the
conduct of his office. In a short and caustic sketch, November, 1900,
Sir Edmund Monson, British ambassador at Paris, wrote of him:
Delcassé is an unsatisfactory Minister to us diplomatists in Paris. He
is extremely uncommunicative, not to say secretive. Consequently it is
very rare that any one of us succeeds in extracting information from
him. He has plenty of commonplace conversation, which flows glibly
enough, and he will talk eloquently in an academical fashion. But he
hardly ever tells one anything in the way of political news, and he has
an adroit way of feigning ignorance which took me in at first, until I
convinced myself that it was all shamming. He always urges that he is
not a diplomatist by profession, but he carries the practice of
subterfuge to an extent which I have hardly ever met before in a
Minister of Foreign Affairs. On the other hand, he does not tell lies
systematically, as X did.[18]
His long tenure in office and the free scope given him by the cabinet
and Parliament, both engrossed in internal affairs,[19] enabled him to
put his own impress upon French foreign policy and to give it a
positive, constructive content. Although a member of radical cabinets
that reduced the military and naval budgets and neglected the defenses
of the land, he openly disapproved of that policy and advocated rearing
a virile, patriotic generation of fighters. He courted and received the
support of all parties. He took as the sole objective in his foreign
policy the maintenance and development of French interests, and avowed
himself an opportunist in his method of diplomacy. He was a
_Realpolitiker_ at a moment when the French people seemed to be turning
toward internationalism and pacifism. His policy unfolded itself
gradually, and, in the absence of adequate documentary material, it has
to be explained largely upon the basis of its accomplishments.[20]
The new elements introduced into French policy by this minister were
associated almost altogether with the Moroccan question. He seems from
the start to have coveted that country.[21] He thought that since the
Dual Alliance was firmly established, France as well as Russia ought to
reap some benefits therefrom. But, as Russia was turning her energies
more and more to the Far East and was thereby weakening the
effectiveness of the Alliance, he desired some means of re-establishing
the equilibrium of forces in Europe. Particularly was this necessary
since Germany had inaugurated her _Weltpolitik_; for, with German power
increasing at so fast a pace, France had to seek new friends for the
protection of herself, her colonies, her interests, and for the
realization of her ambitions toward Morocco before it was too late.[22]
This triple aim of better defense, of increased prestige, and of
colonial acquisition in Northwest Africa he saw could be realized by the
settlement of the international aspect of the Moroccan question. Italy
and Spain as Mediterranean neighbors and Great Britain as a formidable
colonial rival should be won to the French plan by agreements which at
the same time should create friendships between them and fortify and
aggrandize the French position in Europe. Moreover, M. Delcassé hoped to
reconcile Russia with Great Britain, above all to prevent them from
actual conflict. And, depending upon circumstances, he was apparently
willing to treat with Germany. A colonial acquisition and a
rearrangement in international relations were to be achieved together,
and the Moroccan problem came to signify both.[23]
The basis of the Franco-Moroccan relations was laid by the treaty of
1845 regulating the boundary between Algeria and her western
neighbor.[24] However, the frontier remained in part indefinite; border
raids recurred; the possession of the oases, Touat, Gourara, and
Tidikelt, discovered after the treaty was made, remained unsettled.[25]
The consequence was chronic trouble, which France tried to eliminate by
occupying these oases late in 1899 and in 1900 and by beginning to
construct railroads toward them.
Alarmed by this activity, the Sultan asked Queen Victoria in the autumn
of 1900 to obtain assurances from France which would tranquilize his
fears. Realizing that this would be impossible, the British government
refused, and Sir Edmund Monson, the British ambassador at Paris, merely
mentioned the Sultan’s anxieties to the French Foreign Minister (October
17).[26] The Italian, Spanish, and German governments also showed some
concern over this action at Touat.[27] M. Delcassé replied to them all
with the statement which he had made in the French Senate on April 3,
that in Africa France would honor all treaties signed by her, that she
would respect the frontiers of neighboring states, and that she had no
intention of changing the _status quo_ in the Mediterranean. She was
merely occupying territory manifestly belonging to her.[28]
The number of attacks of the Moroccans upon Algeria increased. After
several particularly bold raids had occurred early in 1901, the French
government sent a sharply worded note to the Sultan which he interpreted
as threatening action against his ancestral home, Tafilelt.[29] He
appealed to the British government for protection,[30] and in June and
July sent an embassy headed by the minister of war, el-Menebhi, to
London and Berlin to obtain aid against France and to negotiate a
loan.[31] As the question of an alliance was then engrossing the
attentions of both the British and the German governments, neither felt
inclined to give the Moroccans anything but innocuous advice, and this
mission was a failure.[32]
The dispatch of that embassy just at the time when Anglo-German
relations were so cordial alarmed the French Foreign Minister.[33]
Through M. Révoil, governor-general of Algeria, he warned the Moroccan
government against signing any political or commercial agreement without
French approval, and exacted a promise from a Moroccan embassy then in
Paris concerning the execution of any accord which might be signed.[34]
Among the Powers, M. Delcassé had little to fear from Spain, with whom
he was on intimate terms, or from Italy, with whom in the previous
December he had made an agreement about Morocco.[35] He assured the
British government that France had no intention of raising “serious
questions in Morocco.” The Marquess of Lansdowne, British foreign
secretary, responded with a frank account of his conversations with the
Moroccan embassy.[36] It was Germany of whose reactions M. Delcassé was
most uncertain. In June, through his friend M. Leon y Castillo, the
Spanish ambassador, he suggested to Prince Radolin, the German
ambassador in Paris, that if the German government, as the victor in
1870, would take the initiative, he would like to discuss various
matters with a view to arriving at an entente.[37] The German response
to the Spanish Ambassador was that before Germany could enter into an
arrangement with France whereby the hostility of a third Power might be
incurred the two countries must make a mutual guaranty of each other’s
territorial integrity. Since France would thereby have to guarantee the
German possession of Alsace-Lorraine, the proposed negotiation was
crushed.[38] None the less, in a conversation with Prince Radolin on
June 23, 1901, M. Delcassé made and received an important statement
about Morocco. When the Ambassador mentioned the discussion in the
French newspapers of a French protectorate over that land, the Foreign
Minister replied:
“If by that word protectorate one means that France, mistress of Algeria
and Tunis, has and must conserve toward Morocco an unique situation
[_une situation absolument à part_], it seems to me that it is self-
evident [_il me semble que c’est l’évidence même_].” “Nothing is more
just, every one takes account of that situation [_tout le mond se rend
compte de cette situation_],” answered Prince Radolin.[39]
Much or little could be read into either remark; but together with the
general diplomatic situation they enabled M. Delcassé in the Senate on
July 5 to declare that
if France, mistress of Algeria and through Algeria neighbor of Morocco
along an immense frontier, is forced to follow what occurs there with a
singular interest,—our vigilance does not aim at other than the
tranquillity, prosperity, and integrity of the Sherifian empire. . . .
.[40]
The presence of an embassy in Paris simultaneously with the one in
London and Berlin[41] gave the French Minister an opportunity for taking
the first steps toward “pacific penetration.” The mission came to Paris
to seek an agreement with the French government upon a definite boundary
line between Algeria and Morocco which would assure Moroccan isolation.
M. Delcassé, however, aimed, by leaving the frontier line indefinite, to
utilize this geographic proximity as a means of creating a community of
interests with the Sultan and his people and of familiarizing them with
things European.
The French Minister succeeded partially in incorporating this plan in an
agreement with the Moroccan embassy in July, 1901, supplementing that of
1845. Drawn “to consolidate the bonds of amity existing between them
[France and Morocco] and to develop their reciprocal good relations,”
the treaty provided that the boundary should remain uncertain, but that
France and Morocco should each have the right to set up a line of posts
for purposes of defense and customs collection in the desert region on
soil which unquestionably belonged to them. The tribes living in the
territory between those two lines should be permitted to choose which
authority they preferred to reside under. Moroccans and Algerians could
enter that territory freely for commercial or other purposes. Moroccan
tribes who owned pastures in Algeria could continue to use them, and
vice versa. For the preservation of amicable relations between the two
countries each government agreed to appoint two commissioners annually
to settle future border disputes.[42]
To Ben Sliman, the leader of the embassy to Paris, M. Delcassé offered
French friendship and aid, but added a veiled threat of the trouble
which France would make for Morocco if his offers were not accepted.
While the French Minister showed a nice regard for Moroccan
sensitiveness toward innovations, he voiced the expectation that when
the land should decide to “enter into new ways” it would give France the
preference for furnishing it with the needed resources. In an important
dispatch of July 27, 1901, M. Delcassé instructed M. Saint-René
Taillandier, the French representative at Tangier, concerning his future
conduct. The French Minister was to assure the Sultan of French respect
for the integrity of his land and for his own sovereignty, to affirm
France’s desire to give him friendly aid, and to point out the benefit
which the Sultan, as ruler, might derive therefrom. He was to warn the
latter against foreign innovations which might imperil the security of
Algeria.[43] Lastly he was to support all enterprises, commercial,
industrial, and philanthropic, calculated to increase French influence
in the land.[44]
Thus the French government could note with satisfaction that whereas the
Moroccan mission to London and Berlin had accomplished nothing, the one
to Paris had enabled France to feel out the Powers on this question, to
proclaim publicly her special interests, and to begin the actual
execution of her program. M. Delcassé was now started upon a conscious
policy of establishing French predominance in the Sherifian Empire.
When the French and Moroccan commissioners appointed to execute the
agreement of 1901 set to work, they found that its terms were
impracticable. The assassination of two French captains by Moroccans in
January, 1902, also showed that if order were ever to obtain along the
frontier, French power would have to strengthen the Sultan’s
efforts.[45] The commissioners therefore negotiated in April and May,
1902, two further treaties, the content of which was much more in
harmony with the French objective of loosening the boundary instead of
tightening it, of providing a complete program of military, economic,
and political co-operation between the two governments as follows: In
case of need the two states should concert in pacifying and policing the
frontier from Teniet-Sassi to Figuig, but no guard or customs posts
should be established between those two points. In lieu of these customs
duties, France agreed to pay Morocco a lump sum annually. In the other
frontier area the two governments should establish markets and customs
posts at specified points in order to develop commerce between Algeria
and Morocco.[46]
It became impossible to carry out the commercial clauses of the treaty
because of anarchy on the Moroccan side of the border. But the Sultan
made immediate use of the military articles by requesting permission of
the French government to send Moroccan troops and munitions to the
frontier by way of Algeria, and by asking it in July to furnish military
instructors for these troops. M. Delcassé readily agreed.[47]
Notwithstanding these requests, the Sultan was dissatisfied with the
course of affairs, and in September, 1902, sent Kaid Maclean to Europe
to seek aid in stemming the tide of the French advance. Carrying
personal letters from the Sultan to King Edward and to the German
Emperor, the Kaid went first to London. He proposed to the King and to
Lord Lansdowne that the integrity of Morocco be guaranteed by Great
Britain, or, failing that, by Great Britain and Germany, for a period of
seven years, and that, if at the end of this period Morocco had not
thoroughly reformed her government and developed her natural resources,
the guaranty should lapse. He proposed also that a Moorish loan be made
in England, France, and Germany, and that all railway concessions be
divided between those three countries. The British government approved
the method of handling the project for a loan and for railroad
construction; but, as it was already in conversation with the French
government over the future of Morocco and was disinclined to tie its
hands, it refused to consider the other measure. Thus the mission was a
failure.[48]
In 1903 the Sultan was in dire straits. While the whole country was more
or less in rebellion, the main center of danger lay in the northeast
near Taza where the pretender to the throne, Bu-Hamara, “Father of the
She-Ass,” had acquired a large following late in 1902. He was in a
position to attack the French along the border or the Sultan in Fez, and
did so. His defeat of the Sherifian army endangered Fez itself. Even in
his capital the Sultan angered his subjects by summarily executing the
murderers of a British missionary. In this plight, he turned to the
obliging French for further aid. He received permission for his troops
and the loyal border tribes to seek refuge in Algeria. After M. Delcassé
had officially intervened in his behalf, he was able to obtain a loan of
7,500,000 francs from the French banking-house of Gautsch. By the time
the Anglo-French agreement of April 8, 1904, was made, the Sultan seemed
to be falling in line with the French policy of “pacific
penetration.”[49]
[Footnote 1: This was the Conference of Madrid.]
[Footnote 2: See among the numerous works on Morocco: Albert Salmon, _Le
Maroc. Son état économique et commercial_ (Paris, 1906); René Pinon,
_L’empire de la Méditerranée_ (Paris, 1904), p. 96; Eugène Aubin,
_Morocco of To-Day_ (London, 1906), p. 119.]
[Footnote 3: Victor Piquet, _La colonisation française dans l’Afrique du
Nord: Algérie, Tunisie, Maroc_ (Paris, 1912), p. 15.]
[Footnote 4: For typical reactions see Pinon, _L’empire de la Médit._;
M. Aflalo, _The Truth about Morocco. An Indictment of the Policy of the
British Foreign Office with Regard to the Anglo-French Agreement_
(London, 1904); _Zwanzig Jahre alldeutscher Arbeit und Kämpfe_ (Leipzig,
1910), pp. 219 ff. For a more scientific discussion see Piquet, pp. 514
ff.]
[Footnote 5: The statistics about Morocco are all unreliable. They vary
according to the persons taking them. The Moroccan government took none
itself. Those given above are quoted in André Tardieu, _La conference
d’Algésiras. Histoire diplomatique de la crise marocaine (15 Janvier-7
Avril, 1906)_ (Paris, 1909), pp. 499 ff.]
[Footnote 6: On the new sultan see Pinon, _L’empire de la Médit._, pp.
150 ff.; Aubin, pp. 137 ff., 178; Walter B. Harris, _Morocco That Was_
(Edinburgh and London, 1921), esp. pp. 65 ff.]
[Footnote 7: See Aubin, pp. 203 ff.; Auguste Lombard, _La banque d’état
du Maroc_ (Montpellier, 1911), pp. 14 ff.]
[Footnote 8: On this disorder see Victor Bérard, _L’affaire marocaine_
(Paris, 1906), p. 82; Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, _Documents
diplomatiques. Affaires du Maroc, 1901-1905_ (Paris, 1905), Nos. 33 ff.,
42 ff., 61 ff., 90, 98 ff. (This _Livre jaune_ is hereafter cited as
_L.j., 1901-5_.) See also _Bulletin du comité de l’Afrique française,
Supplément_, 1901, pp. 193 ff. (This magazine is hereafter cited as
_Bulletin_.)]
[Footnote 9: Aubin, p. 109.]
[Footnote 10: _Ibid._, pp. 320-21.]
[Footnote 11: Hatzfeldt to Bülow, Feb. 8, 1899, _Die Grosse Politik der
Europäischen Kabinette, 1871-1914. Sammlung der diplomatischen Akten des
Auswärtigen Amtes_ (im Auftrage des Auswärtigen Amtes herausgegeben von
Johannes Lepsius, Albrecht Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, Friedrich Thimme;
Berlin, 1922-27), XVII, 295 f., No. 5152 (hereafter cited as _G.P._).]
[Footnote 12: See Pinon, _Empire de la Médit._; speech by M. Etienne on
June 16, 1903, reprinted in _Bulletin, Supplément_, 1903, p. 179.]
[Footnote 13: _Bulletin_, July, 1902, p. 267.]
[Footnote 14: _Ibid._, Dec., 1899, pp. 412, 429.]
[Footnote 15: See the debates in the Chamber on this subject, Nov.,
1903, _Journal officiel de la République française. Débats
parlementaires_ (Chambre des Députés, Nov., 1903); Tardieu, pp. 17 ff.]
[Footnote 16: See _Bulletin_, Dec., 1899, pp. 412, 429; Jan., 1900, p.
2; April, 1900, p. 140; June, 1901, p. 182; March, 1902, p. 107; Oct.,
1902, pp. 347, 350; Oct., 1903, pp. 301, 305; Jan., 1904, p. 3, etc.
Also speech by M. Etienne, June 16, 1903, in _ibid., Supplément_, 1903,
p. 179.]
[Footnote 17: See _ibid._, July, 1900, p. 257; Aug., 1901, pp. 259 f.;
April, 1903, p. 120; Pinon, _Empire de la Médit._, p. 182.]
[Footnote 18: Lord Newton, _Lord Lansdowne, A Biography_ (London, 1929),
p. 209.]
[Footnote 19: Such as the Dreyfus case, the law of the Congregations,
the separation of church and state.]
[Footnote 20: On Delcassé see Christian Schefer, _D’une guerre à
l’autre. Essai sur la politique extérieure de la Troisième République
(1871-1914)_ (Paris, 1920), pp. 221 f.; Georges Reynald, _La diplomatie
française. L’œuvre de Delcassé_ (Paris, 1915); René Millet, _Notre
politique extérieure de 1898 à 1905_ (Paris, 1905), p. 2; Robert Dell,
_My Second Country_ (New York, 1920), p. 176; René Pinon, _France et
Allemagne, 1870-1913_ (Paris, 1913), pp. 116 ff.; Delcassé’s speeches;
Monson to Lansdowne, Nov. 15, 1904, _British Documents on the Origins of
the War, 1898-1914_ (ed. by G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley; London,
1927——), III, 14 f., No. 11 (hereafter cited as _B.D._).]
[Footnote 21: See his speeches, _Journal officiel, Debats parlem._,
Sénat, April 3, 1900, pp. 299 f.; Chambre, Jan. 21, 1902, quoted in
_Bulletin, Supplément_, 1902, pp. 46 f.; Chambre, March 11, 1903,
_Journal officiel, Debats parlem._, p. 1356; especially his speech on
Nov. 10, 1904, in the Chambre, _ibid._, pp. 2381, 2386; Sénat, Dec. 7,
1904, pp. 1048 ff.; Reynald, p. 11.]
[Footnote 22: André Mévil, _De la Paix de Francfort à la Conférence
d’Algésiras_ (Paris, 1909), pp. 117 f. Mévil’s book contains the
official apology for Delcassé’s work.]
[Footnote 23: See Mévil, pp. 120 f., and Delcassé’s speeches. On Dec. 7,
1904, in the Senate and on Nov. 10, in the Chamber, he spoke as follows:
“The problem, in effect, was this: to establish the preponderance of
France in Morocco, thereby to augment her power in the Mediterranean,
not by alienating but rather by conciliating the Powers whose position
in the Mediterranean brings them to our attention. . . . . In
considering the positions occupied not only by England, but by Italy and
by Spain in the Mediterranean, it is evident that if diplomacy succeeds
in resolving this problem [of Morocco] it will have at one blow
fortified and aggrandized the situation of France in Europe by the
friendships which it will have procured and by the _rapprochements_ of
interests of which it will have been the creator.”
He further declared that this had been his conscious policy during his
six years of residency at the Quai d’Orsay (see _Journal officiel,
Debats parlem._, Sénat, Dec. 7, 1904, pp. 1048 ff.; Chambre, Nov. 10,
1904, p. 386).]
[Footnote 24: See Augustin Bernard, _Les confins algéro-marocaine_
(Paris, 1911). Treaty given in De Clercq, _Recueil des traités de la
France_, pp. 271 ff.]
[Footnote 25: See various articles in the _Bulletin_; also Pinon,
_Empire de la Médit._; Bérard, _L’affaire marocaine_; speech of Waldeck-
Rousseau in the Chamber, July 2, 1900, _Journal officiel, Debats
parlem._, pp. 1739 f.]
[Footnote 26: Exactly what the Sultan requested is not known. Count
Bülow, the German foreign minister, heard in June, 1900, from an Italian
source that the Grand Vizier of Morocco just before his death had
proposed to Salisbury, the British premier, that the Powers guarantee a
new boundary to be made between Algeria and Morocco, but that the
British Minister had refused to consider the matter. See Bülow to
Tschirschky, June 5, 1900, _G.P._, XVII, 318, No. 5167. On the Sultan’s
proposal of October see Monson to Salisbury, Oct. 12, 17, 1900, _B.D._,
II, 259, Nos. 312 f.]
[Footnote 27: We have positive evidence that the Spanish and German
governments did so; and as Italy was then in negotiation with France
over the question of Morocco (see below), it is safe to say that her
government did also. See Bülow to Münster, April 27, 1900, _G.P._, XVII,
299 ff., No. 5156; Münster to Hohenlohe, May 9, 1900, _ibid._, 301 f.,
No. 5157.]
[Footnote 28: See _Journal officiel, Debats parlem._, Sénat, April 3,
1900, p. 299. He also said in private that France had no intention of
attacking Morocco. Münster to Hohenlohe, May 9, 1900, _G.P._, XVII, 301
f., No. 5157; Monson to Salisbury, Oct. 17, 1900, _B.D._, II, 259, No.
313.]
[Footnote 29: See Bérard, p. 68; Aubin, p. 178; _Bulletin_, Aug., 1901,
p. 279; _L.j., 1901-5_, Nos. 1, 3, 4, 6. For the note see Révoil to
Delcassé, March 23, 1901, Révoil to Si Mohamméd Torres and Ben Sliman,
March 18, _ibid._, No. 2 and annexe.]
[Footnote 30: So the British Minister at Tangier stated to his German
colleague (Richthofen to Hatzfeldt, April 13, 1901, _G.P._, XVII, 326
f., No. 5173).]
[Footnote 31: Richthofen to Hatzfeldt, April 13, 20, 1900, _ibid._, 326
f., No. 5173; 328, No. 5174.]
[Footnote 32: See Cambon to Delcassé, July 4, 1901, _L.j., 1901-5_, 13
ff., No. 19 and annexe; Hatzfeldt to foreign office, June 19, 1901,
_G.P._, XVII, 332 f., No. 5177 and note; Holstein to Eckardstein, July
8, 1901, _ibid._, 333, No. 5178; memorandum by Mentzingen concerning the
conversations between Richthofen and the Moroccan Ambassador, _ibid._,
334 ff., No. 5179, undated though handed in to the foreign office on
July 19, 1901; Mühlberg to Mentzingen, July 19, 1901, _ibid._, 336 f.,
No. 5180; Eckardstein to F. O., July 29, 1901, _ibid._, 338 f., No.
5182.]
[Footnote 33: On the cordiality of their relations see below. Late in
1899 Joseph Chamberlain, the British colonial secretary, had made a
speech at Leicester advocating an Anglo-German-American alliance; an
accord over China had been made between them in 1900, and the Emperor
had in January, 1901, hurried to the bedside of the dying Queen
Victoria.]
[Footnote 34: Delcassé to Saint-René Taillandier, July 27, 1901, _L.j.,
1901-5_, 20, No. 21. What the promise was is not related. Also editor’s
note, _G.P._, XVII, 332 f., No. 5177; Eckardstein to F. O., July 29,
1901, _ibid._, 338 f., No. 5182; Richthofen to Hatzfeldt, July 5, 1901,
_ibid._, XVIII, 781 f., No. 5872.]
[Footnote 35: See below.]
[Footnote 36: Lansdowne to Monson, July 3, 1901, _B.D._, II, 261, No.
318; Cambon to Delcassé, July 4, 1901, _L.j., 1901-5_, 13 ff., No. 19.]
[Footnote 37: On these conversations see Radolin to Bülow, June 5, 1901,
_G.P._, XVIII, 772 ff., No. 5868; June 15, _ibid._, 775 ff., No. 5869;
_ibid._, 777 f., No. 5870. Leon y Castillo declared that Delcassé had
said to him that “he wished for nothing better than to converse with the
German Ambassador on different points, that he would be very desirous of
arriving at an entente with him” (_ibid._, 775 ff., No. 5869). At the
same time leading articles appeared in _Temps_ and _Figaro_, papers in
close touch with the foreign office, to the effect that Germany had the
opportunity in the Moroccan affair to prove her good will toward France
(Richthofen to Hatzfeldt, July 5, 1901, _ibid._, 781, No. 5872).]
[Footnote 38: Bülow to Radolin, June 19, 1901, _ibid._, 778 ff., No.
5871; Richthofen to Hatzfeldt, July 5, 1901, _ibid._, 781 f., No. 5872;
Mühlberg to Mentzingen, July 19, 1901, _ibid._, XVII, 336 f., No. 5180.]
[Footnote 39: Delcassé to Noailles, June 23, 1901, _L.j., 1901-5_, 13,
No. 18. No account of the conversation is given in _G.P._]
[Footnote 40: _Journal officiel, Debats parlem._, Sénat, July 5, 1901,
p. 1207.]
[Footnote 41: The British government might have prevented the sending of
that mission. See Richthofen to Hatzfeldt, April 20, 1901, _G.P._, XVII,
328, No. 5174. The German Minister at Tangier reported that the Sultan
had asked Mr. Nicolson, British minister there, whether he should also
send a mission to Paris and St. Petersburg.]
[Footnote 42: On these negotiations see Révoil to Delcassé, April 27,
1901, _L.j., 1901-5_, 5, No. 5; Delcassé to Martiniére, July 20, 1901,
_ibid._, 15 ff., No. 20 and annexe; Delcassé to Saint-René Taillandier,
July 27, 1901, _ibid._, 18 ff., No. 21; Saint-René Taillandier to
Delcassé, Sept. 19, 1901, _ibid._, 22, No. 22.]
[Footnote 43: Such, for instance, as the recent tax reforms.]
[Footnote 44: Delcassé to Saint-René Taillandier, July 27, 1901, _L.j.,
1901-5_, 18 ff., No. 21.]
[Footnote 45: Révoil to Delcassé, Feb. 22, 1902, _ibid._, 31, No. 25.]
[Footnote 46: Révoil to Delcassé, Jan. 18, April 26, May 17, 1902,
_ibid._, 26 ff., No. 24; 33 ff., Nos. 27 f.; Graham H. Stuart, _French
Foreign Policy from Fashoda to Serajevo (1898-1914)_ (New York, 1921),
p. 144.]
[Footnote 47: See especially Saint-René Taillandier to Delcassé, July
22, Aug. 6, 1902, _L.j., 1901-5_, 44 ff., Nos. 29 f.]
[Footnote 48: See memo. for Maclean, Oct. 24, 1902, by Lansdowne,
_B.D._, II, 272 f., No. 328; Sir Sidney Lee, _King Edward VII. A
Biography_ (London, 1925, 1927), II, 220 f. Apparently Maclean did not
go to Berlin at all, although he threatened to do so if the British
government refused his proposal. See Lee, II, 220 f.]
[Footnote 49: For instances of this co-operation see _L.j., 1901-5_,
Nos. 33, 39, 44-46, 57, 60, 68, 70-72, 77-79, 81-84, 86, 89, 91-107,
110-11, 119-26, 132; for Delcassé’s part in assuring the loan see
Delcassé to Saint-René Taillandier, Jan. 5, 1903, _ibid._, 53 ff., No.
39. The Sultan obtained similar loans in Spain and in England.]
CHAPTER II
THE FRANCO-ITALIAN ENTENTE, 1900-1902
When M. Delcassé assumed office in 1898, the Bismarckian system of
agreements which had isolated France in Europe had already crumbled
away. The formation of the Franco-Russian alliance had been followed by
the lapse in 1896 of the ententes between Austria-Hungary, Great
Britain, Italy, and Spain for the maintenance of the _status quo_ in the
Mediterranean.[50] The way was clear for the enterprising French Foreign
Minister gradually to win the friendship of the last three Powers,
previously joined in enmity against France. The first of these
_rapprochements_ to bear fruit was the one with Italy.
During the nineties, Italian dissatisfaction with the foreign policy had
been steadily growing. Italian leaders complained that Italy had
suffered from a tariff war with France, that she had been unable to
restrain France from denouncing Italian treaty rights in Tunis or from
fortifying Bizerta, that she had failed to secure colonial territory in
North Africa, especially in Tripoli, and in Abyssinia. They regarded the
Triple Alliance and the good will of Great Britain as inadequate to
Italian needs. They asserted that their country was the victim of the
Triple Alliance, made to suffer by France because of membership in it,
and not even protected against that Power, much less given compensatory
benefits for these undeserved injuries. The anger directed at Great
Britain was hardly less than that at Germany and Austria-Hungary.[51]
To meet these difficulties, the Marquis de Rudini, premier from 1896 to
1898, inaugurated a policy of friendship toward France which his
successors in office continued. While remaining loyal to her alliances,
the Marquis said, Italy would henceforth endeavor to prevent trouble
with other Powers and to restore normal relations with France.[52]
In 1896 Italy and France settled their difficulties over Tunis. In 1898
a commercial treaty put an end to ten years of tariff warfare between
them and opened the way to the flow of French capital into Italy.[53] In
the same year the two countries made a settlement of the boundary line
between their possessions on the Red Sea. So when M. Delcassé visited
Rome in 1898, he found that both he and the Italian foreign minister,
Marquis Visconti Venosta (1896-98), thought necessary a durable entente
between their two countries which would respect the French possession of
Tunis and the Italian membership in the Triple Alliance; and they agreed
that the Mediterranean, which had previously divided their states,
should become the means of their _rapprochement_.[54] The Italian
Minister was overthrown before any further steps could be taken; but
under his successor, Admiral Canevaro (1898-99), an opportunity was
offered to initiate the negotiations which finally led to the
consummation of the entente.
In March, 1899, France and Great Britain settled the differences growing
out of the Fashoda affair by an agreement which assigned to the former
the hinterland of Tripoli. Since Italian leaders regarded the eventual
possession of Tripoli as vital to the welfare of their state, they felt
that Italy had been betrayed by her supposed friend, Great Britain, and
the Italian government appealed to its German ally for advice.[55] The
latter remained noncommittal, Lord Salisbury equally so.[56] It was
France, the supposed enemy, who applied balm to the wound. The French
ambassador, M. Barrère, assured Admiral Canevaro that Italy “need in no
way fear that she will find France in her path if she should ever have
ambitions toward Tripoli.” When the Italian Minister asked for a written
statement to that effect, M. Barrère replied that, although Tripoli was
Turkish territory, M. Delcassé would “under conditions” attempt to find
some way in which to satisfy this desire. Those conditions, of course,
had to do with Italy’s relations to Morocco. The materials were thus at
hand for an agreement.[57]
The negotiations were long drawn out; for, as France had Italy at her
mercy, she drove a hard bargain. On December 14, 1900, Marquis Visconti
Venosta, Italian foreign minister (1899-1901), and M. Barrère reached a
secret agreement.[58] By its terms Italy received in writing a purely
negative assurance that France harbored no designs upon Tripoli. The
_quid pro quo_ for France was more valuable.
In that which concerns Morocco particularly, it is agreed . . . . that
the action of France has for its object to exercise and safeguard the
rights which result for her from the proximity of her territory to that
empire. Thus defined, I [Marquis Visconti Venosta] have recognized that
such action is not in our view of a nature to prejudice the interests of
Italy as a Mediterranean Power. It has been likewise agreed that if
there must result therefrom a modification of the political or
territorial status of Morocco, Italy will reserve for herself, as a
reciprocal measure, the right of eventually developing her influence in
the Cyrenaic Tripolitaine.[59]
So vague a statement could be variously interpreted. M. Barrère thought
that Italy had given France a free hand in dealing with Morocco so long
as her action did not modify the political or territorial integrity of
the land. Marquis Visconti Venosta declared later to the German
Ambassador that the accord had only permitted France to take measures
necessary for the defense of her frontier.[60] As either meaning could
be read into the documents, the future course of Franco-Italian
relations would determine which one would obtain.
The _rapprochement_, attested by M. Delcassé in the French Senate on
February 11, 1901, and affirmed by a visit to Italian waters of the
French fleet in April, had been facilitated by a number of
circumstances. On the one hand, the Italian government was angry with
Austria-Hungary for having excluded it, in violation of Article VII of
their treaty of alliance, from the negotiation in 1897 of an agreement
with Russia over Balkan affairs. Tariff difficulties with both allies
were looming up, and an occasional irredentist voice was being heard. On
the other hand, an anticlerical government in France made certain that
in the near future at least the republic would not attempt to restore
Rome to the pope. Moreover, King Victor Emmanuel, possibly influenced by
his Montenegrin wife, leaned decidedly away from his father’s policy of
strict adherence to the Triple Alliance toward one of closer friendship
with France, and, if possible, with Russia.[61] Italian public opinion
was likewise showing itself markedly pro-French, a tendency which M.
Barrère’s courting of press and public helped to develop;[62] and when
in 1901 the King chose the pro-French M. Zanardelli to form a cabinet,
the Italians applauded.[63]
The affinity for France of the new cabinet and the greater defiance
toward Italy’s allies were foreseen from the political past of some of
its members. M. Zanardelli was a native of the Trentino, and would have
been foreign minister in 1893 if the Austrian government had not
objected.[64] M. Prinetti, the new foreign minister (1901-3), had spoken
energetically in 1891 against the renewal of the Triple Alliance. M. de
Martino, his undersecretary, had asked in the Italian Chamber, December,
1899, “how this Triple Alliance is able to serve Italy.”[65] The
attitude of these men was soon manifested. Toward the end of the year
the Premier was making veiled threats of a tariff war with his
allies;[66] while M. Prinetti, ambitious, inflammatory, and unreliable,
was engaged in negotiations with France which radically transformed the
nature of Italy’s international obligations.
One of M. Prinetti’s first undertakings was to gain better terms for
Italy with reference to Tripoli. He proposed to France that “each of the
two Powers be able freely to develop its sphere of influence in the
regions Tripoli and Morocco at the moment that it judges opportune and
without the action of the one of them being subordinated to that of the
other.”[67] The French government was willing to accept his overture for
the sake of obtaining a freer hand in Morocco; it also saw an
opportunity to win an even greater advantage. As the Triple Alliance was
to be renewed in 1902, it determined to repeat its former endeavor to
nullify the clauses in that treaty referring to France.[68]
M. Barrère argued the French case to the Italian government as follows:
Italy had joined the Triple Alliance because of quarrels with France
about the Mediterranean. As the two countries were now friends, with
their difficulties already harmonized or capable of becoming so, should
not their friendship be assured for the future by the removal of any
aggressive point against France which the Triple Alliance might contain?
Were the clauses of that treaty compatible with Franco-Italian
friendship? “The alliance remains defensive,” so he summarized his
arguments later to his government. “But it permits a very broad
interpretation of the duties of the allies; if France, openly provoked,
should declare war, could Italy regard this declaration as a defensive
step on our part? It is doubtful.” So he concluded that “under defensive
appearances, the Triple Alliance implied an eventually offensive
character which ought to be eliminated in the interest of our security
and of the relations of friendship between the two countries.” Above
all, the French government desired to bring about the suppression of the
anti-French military conventions or protocols between Italy and her
allies.[69]
M. Prinetti acknowledged the force of these remarks. In June, 1901—that
is, before Great Britain had turned away from Germany to France, and
while Austria-Hungary and Italy were still on passable terms—he made a
verbal agreement with M. Barrère by which the rights of Italy toward
Tripoli were put on a par with those of France toward Morocco. In return
he promised that the renewed treaty of the Triple Alliance should
contain “nothing hostile” to France.[70]
The problem of adjusting Italy’s alliance obligations to her new
international situation growing out of the Franco-Italian entente was
taken up at the end of the year when negotiations for the renewal of the
Triple Alliance were begun.[71] To strengthen Italy’s hand, MM.
Prinetti, Delcassé, and Barrère all attested publicly in December, 1901,
and January, 1902, to the complete harmony of Franco-Italian interests
in the Mediterranean; M. Delcassé referred pointedly to Tripoli and
Morocco.[72] And the _Tribuna_ gave bold notice, January 2, that “Italy
counts for something and can with her weight turn the scale one way or
the other.”[73] In spite of his promises to France, however, M. Prinetti
made very feeble efforts to change the Triple Alliance in accordance
therewith. He said nothing to the German government about revising or
omitting Articles II, IX, X, and the protocol[74] which Italy herself
had had incorporated in the treaty. His sole proposal to Count Bülow, to
whom he repeated his promise to M. Barrère, was that an introductory
statement, intended for publication or for communication to France,
should be included affirming the purely defensive character of the
alliance. Other matters concerning Italy and her two allies were of far
more importance to the Italian Foreign Minister in these negotiations.
He wanted the allies officially to affirm Italy’s preponderant rights in
Tripoli; he wished for them to have a more binding understanding about
the Balkans; above all, he sought to make the renewal of the alliance
contingent upon the negotiation of tariff treaties with Germany and
Austria-Hungary favorable to Italy. In discussing these questions with
the German government he grew excited, wept, threatened to resign or not
to renew the alliance. About those which concerned France he was more or
less apologetic.[75]
German public opinion regarded the Franco-Italian _rapprochement_ with
misgivings. But the Chancellor assumed a nonchalant attitude, stating in
the Reichstag, January 8, 1902:
The Triple Alliance still enjoys the best of health. . . . . The Triple
Alliance is not a society for acquisition but an insurance company. It
is not offensive but defensive; it is not aggressive but peaceful to a
high degree. The Triple Alliance does not bar good relations between its
members and other Powers, and I would not consider it proper if even a
small part of the German press should show any uneasiness over Franco-
Italian agreements. In a happy marriage the husband must not become
jealous if his wife dances an innocent extra round with some one else.
The main thing is that she does not run away from him, and she will not
do so if she is best situated with him. . . . . The Franco-Italian
agreements over certain Mediterranean questions do not violate the
Triple Alliance. . . . . The goals of the present day _Weltpolitik_
extend to areas and objects which lie far from Germany’s boundaries. I
name in this connection, for example, the north coast of Africa, Persia,
the Far East.[76]
That speech, however, did not reflect the Chancellor’s actual feeling.
He still assumed that, should any important change be made in the
Mediterranean area, for instance in Morocco, Germany would be
consulted;[77] but he relied upon Russia’s retarding influence, Great
Britain’s hostility, and fear of Germany to prevent France from taking
action in that land.[78] He was dissatisfied with the turn of affairs,
and blamed Great Britain for having forced Italy into French arms by
ignoring her interests.[79] He suspected that the Franco-Italian
understanding contained more than M. Prinetti admitted.[80] He
recognized the improvement in Italy’s international relations, and
realized that her antagonism to Austria would thenceforth become
sharper, and that her Tripolitan ambitions would be so zealous as
possibly to cause trouble with Germany’s friend, the Turkish Sultan.[81]
As to renewing the alliance, which he strongly desired, the Chancellor
believed that self-interest and the known antagonism of Great Britain to
the Dual Alliance would prevent Italy from changing camps.[82] Under
other circumstances he might have been willing to make some further
concessions to Italy in return for the renewal.[83] In the previous
March he had relieved her from any obligations under the German-Italian
military convention, although permitting the military conversations to
continue as before.[84] But the Franco-Italian entente, the lever with
which M. Prinetti expected to pry loose those concessions, was the very
cause for Count Bülow’s refusing to permit any change whatever in the
treaty. As the alliance was already defensive, he said, there was no
need for an introductory statement to that effect. Pointing to the
expectation voiced by the French press that anti-French clauses would be
dropped, he declared that any modification would permit the French to
draw the desired conclusion and thereby to belie the true nature of the
alliance. Before he would renew the Triple Alliance he demanded of M.
Prinetti an assurance that Italy had made no agreements with other
states which could diminish its defensive forces. He even expressed his
willingness to drop the alliance rather than make any changes in it,
remarking that Italy’s adherence to it was of no fundamental importance.
The Chancellor’s adamantine attitude was effective. By May, 1902, M.
Prinetti agreed to the renewal.[85]
In March, 1902, M. Prinetti had reported to M. Barrère the probability
of his failure. He had refused to communicate the text of the treaty to
the Ambassador, but had declared that the protocols thereto must be
abolished,[86] and that he was ready, so M. Barrère reported, to give
France “assurances of a nature to leave no doubt in our mind as to the
character and scope of this document” (the treaty of the Triple
Alliance).[87] On May 7, M. Prinetti informed the French Ambassador that
“it will be necessary for us to discuss the future of our relations in
regard to that treaty.” Under French pressure, he agreed that
“thenceforth it was in a direct understanding with us [France] that he
should find the means of fixing the interpretation with regard to us
which Italy intended to give to her obligations as an ally.” He was
willing to put this understanding into writing.[88]
Before the proper negotiations were well under way, the actual renewal
of the alliance forced M. Prinetti to declare in the Italian Chamber,
May 22, 1902, as follows:
The Triple Alliance as it is and as it will be, completely and uniquely
pacific and defensive, will remain in the future what it has been for
years: the most solid rampart in the cause of peace. . . . . The Triple
Alliance, containing nothing aggressive, either directly or indirectly
against France, nothing which menaces her surety or tranquillity may not
in any manner constitute an obstacle to the conservation and development
of cordial relations with our Latin sister with whom we are and wish to
remain friends. . . . . And since it has been said that there exists
between certain Central Powers conventions and protocols adjoined to the
Triple Alliance which modify its pacific character and would even be
aggressive toward France, I hereby solemnly declare that there is no
convention and no protocol of that nature.[89]
Presumably even prior to this statement, which was repeated in a formal
note to the French government on June 4, M. Prinetti began negotiations
with M. Barrère over the written agreement. It was the Ambassador’s
intention that that agreement
would contain the engagement not to attack, not to join in any
aggression on the part of one or several Powers against one of the
contracting parties; not to consider as aggressive on the part of the
contracting Powers the obligation to declare war in consequence of a
manifest provocation [this was “the capital point” of the project, wrote
M. Delcassé]; finally to abandon the military protocols and other
dispositions of the same sort concerning us and envisaging war with us.
If we are able to arrive at that result [wrote M. Barrère to his chief],
we shall have obtained all that we could hope and desire.[90]
The negotiations were far enough along to permit M. Delcassé to declare
in the French Chamber, July 3, as follows:
The declarations which have thus been made to us [by the Italian
government] have permitted us to feel assured that the policy of Italy
by virtue of her alliances is not aimed either directly or indirectly
against France; that she will not in any case be a menace to us, either
in a diplomatic form or through protocols or in international military
stipulations; and that in no case and in no form will Italy become
either the instrument or the auxiliary of an aggression against our
country.[91]
That statement was stronger and more inclusive than the one by M.
Prinetti on May 22. It indicated the existence of a fuller understanding
than the public knew of. It caused M. Prinetti some embarrassment when
the German Ambassador brought up the subject. The Foreign Minister
declared himself “somewhat astonished” at the speech; but after a feeble
explanation in which he betrayed nothing, he remarked that “so far as he
was concerned, he regarded the question as settled.”[92]
Meanwhile the Franco-Italian negotiations continued. On November 1, in
an exchange of notes an understanding was reached by which Italy was
given a free hand to develop her “sphere of influence” in Tripoli, and
France the same right with reference to Morocco. Nor should the action
of the one be necessarily subordinated to that of the other. Then
followed a clause which M. Delcassé was particularly eager to have
incorporated:[93]
In case France [Italy] shall be the object of a direct or indirect
aggression on the part of one or several Powers, Italy [France] will
preserve a strict neutrality. The same will hold in case France [Italy]
as a result of direct provocation is forced to take, for the defence of
her honor or security, the initiative of a declaration of war.
A conditioning clause was added:
In that eventuality the government of the Republic [the Royal
government] must communicate beforehand its intention to the Royal
government [the government of the Republic], so that the latter may
verify that it is a case of direct provocation . . . . I am authorized
to confirm to you that there does not exist on the part of Italy
[France] and that there will not be concluded by her any protocol or
military disposition of an international contractual order which will be
in disagreement with the present declarations.
The Italian government asserted that these declarations were in
“complete harmony” with its existing international engagements. The
agreement was to be secret and to obtain until the Italian government
abrogated it. A supplementary statement by M. Prinetti defined the term
“direct provocation” to mean one which concerned the “direct relations
between the Power provoking and the Power provoked.”[94]
Was this accord compatible with the renewed and unchanged treaty of the
Triple Alliance? With Article II it could be made to agree. Articles IX
and X and the protocol it merely nullified but left standing.[95] It
broke completely not the letter, but the spirit of the alliance. The
dishonesty of the Italian Foreign Minister lay in three directions;
toward the German government by permitting it to continue in the belief
that the old relations as established in their treaty still obtained;
toward the French government by informing it that this treaty contained
nothing either directly or indirectly hostile to France, although
Articles II, IX, X, and XI and the protocol of that treaty had been
retained without any attempt to abolish them; toward Italy by not
clarifying the situation.[96] The matter was so arranged that in the
future the Italian foreign ministers would be able to determine whether
or not the agreement with France would be abrogated and the clauses of
the Triple Alliance, temporarily in abeyance, would again be called into
action. The Italian government was safeguarding its country on both
sides and giving up none of its securities, although its policy looked
toward two different international orientations. This was the equivocal
position between France and the Triple Alliance, later between the
Triple Entente and the Triple Alliance, which Italy was to occupy until
she entered the World War.[97] The advantages of it lay in the fact that
it gave greater mobility to Italian policy, that it caused Great Britain
to iron out her differences with Italy early in 1902,[98] that it opened
up a future of closer relations with Russia, and that it assured Italy
of the future possession of Tripoli.
The French government profited most from these negotiations. M. Delcassé
had won his initial victory in the execution of his policy.[99] He had,
at least for the time being, nullified the anti-French clauses of the
Triple Alliance and drawn Italy out of that group into a middle
position.[100] He had also settled the important question of Morocco
with the most jealous of the Mediterranean Powers, and had begun the
process of pulling the Powers away from Germany and drawing them around
France.
[Footnote 50: Hatzfeldt to Hohenlohe, Feb. 8, 1896, _G.P._, XI, 99 ff.,
No. 2664; Alfred Franzis Pribram (ed.), _The Secret Treaties of Austria-
Hungary, 1879-1914_ (Eng. ed. by Archibald Carey Coolidge; Cambridge,
1920-21), I, 124 ff., 142 ff.]
[Footnote 51: For manifestations of this feeling see Pribram, II, 104,
106; _Memoirs of Francesco Crispi_ (ed. by Thomas Palamenghi-Crispi;
trans. by Mary Prichard-Agnetti; London, 1914), III, 330 ff.; Hohenlohe
to Bülow, Feb. 15, 1896, _G.P._, XI, 230 ff., No. 2766; Bülow to
Hohenlohe, Feb. 5, 1896, _ibid._, 89, No. 2657; Bülow to Hohenlohe, Feb.
18, 1896, _ibid._, 89 ff., No. 2658; and in general the documents in
_ibid._, chaps. lxviii, lxix. Currie to Lansdowne, Jan. 15, 1902,
_B.D._, I, 285, No. 355; 286, No. 356; Currie to Lansdowne, Nov. 27,
1900, Lansdowne to Currie, Dec. 12, 1900, Newton, _Lord Lansdowne_, pp.
211 ff.]
[Footnote 52: Bülow to Hohenlohe, Nov. 26, 1896, _G.P._, XI, 285 f., No.
2813; Pückler to Hohenlohe, July 19, 1897, _ibid._, 286, No. 2814; Bülow
to Hohenlohe, March 17, 1896, _ibid._, 293, No. 2819; Bülow to
Hohenlohe, July 22, 1896, _ibid._, 296 ff., No. 2821; Bülow to
Hohenlohe, Oct. 23, 1896, _ibid._, 299 f., No. 2823.]
[Footnote 53: _Política èstera italiana_ (1916), p. 499; André Tardieu,
_La France et les alliances_ (Paris, 1910), pp. 97 ff.; Radolin to
Bülow, April 19, 1901, _G.P._, XVIII, 716, No. 5833; Pinon, _Empire de
la Médit._, pp. 39, 44 f., 48.]
[Footnote 54: Mévil, _De la Paix de Francfort à la Conférence
d’Algésiras_ (Paris, 1909), p. 121; André Tardieu, _Questions
diplomatiques de l’année, 1904_ (Paris, 1905), p. 14.]
[Footnote 55: Canevaro called it an act of “perfidy,” of “dishonesty,” a
“sharp slap in the face.” See Saurma to F. O., March 29, 1899, _G.P._,
XIV, 429, No. 3946; Saurma to F. O., April 1, 1899, _ibid._, 429 f., No.
3947; Saurma to Hohenlohe, March 29, 1899, _ibid._, 430 f., No. 3948;
Marschall to Hohenlohe, April 14, 1899, _ibid._, 434 f., No. 3952;
Bernhard Schwertfeger (ed.), _Zur europäischen Politik_ (Berlin, 1919),
I, No. 12; Rumbold to Salisbury, March 31, 1899, _B.D._, I, 203, No.
246; Currie to Salisbury, April 4, 1899, _ibid._, 203, No. 247.]
[Footnote 56: Hatzfeldt to Hohenlohe, April 4, 1899, _G.P._, XIV, 432
f., No. 3950; Saurma to F. O., April 28, 1899, _ibid._, 435, No. 3953;
Bülow to Romberg, April 29, 1899, _ibid._, 436, No. 3954; Romberg to F.
O., April 30, 1899, _ibid._, 436 f., No. 3955; Bülow to Saurma, April
30, 1899, _ibid._, 437, No. 3956; Currie to Salisbury, Nov. 4, 1898,
_B.D._, I, 194, No. 236; Currie to Salisbury, April 4, 1899, _ibid._,
204, No. 247; Currie to Salisbury, April 10, 1899, _ibid._, 204 f., Nos.
248 f.; Salisbury to Currie, April 25, 1899, _ibid._, 206, No. 251;
Salisbury to Currie, May 13, 1899, _ibid._, 207, No. 252; Salisbury to
Currie, Oct. 12, 1900, _ibid._, 282, No. 350. In Sept., 1900, Currie,
apparently on his own initiative, appealed to his government to give the
Lateran “some proof of our determination to stand by Italy in the event
of her being attacked.” Lansdowne refused (Newton, pp. 211 ff.).]
[Footnote 57: Saurma to F. O., April 28, 1899, _G.P._, XIV, 435, No.
3953; Currie to Salisbury, April 4, 1899, _B.D._, I, 204, No. 247. See
also Canevaro’s declaration in the Italian Senate, April 24, 1899,
Senato, _Discussioni, XX Legislatura_ (2d sess.), p. 946, quoted by G.
Salvemini, “La Triple Alliance,” _Revue des nationes latines_, Oct.,
1916, p. 250. Also see the interview between Delcassé and Ojetta in
_Giornale d’Italia_, Jan. 3, 1902, reprinted in the _London Times_, Jan.
4, 1902.
Italy had formerly thought that she had vital interests in Morocco, and
her hope to acquire the land had received expression in a clause
concerning its future in the treaty of the Triple Alliance of 1891
(Pribram, I, 150 ff.; Vol. II, chap. iii). But the Moroccan vogue had
passed; her wishes had become more modest. To be sure, the French
occupation of Touat caused the Italian government in April, 1900, to
declare excitedly to its German ally that the Moroccan question could
become a reef upon which the House of Savoy might suffer shipwreck; but,
as M. Prinetti later explained, what his predecessor in office had
feared was that a French occupation of Morocco might force Italy to
seize Tripoli in order to maintain the equilibrium of interests in the
Mediterranean (Bülow to Münster, April 27, 1900, _G.P._, XVII, 300, No.
5156; Bülow to Hatzfeldt, May 14, 1900, _ibid._, 302 f., No. 5158; Wedel
to Bülow, Dec. 12, 1901, _ibid._, 718, No. 5834).]
[Footnote 58: On these negotiations, about which very little is known,
see Barrère to Delcassé, Jan. 10, 1901, Ministère des Affaires
Etrangères, _Documents diplomatiques. Les accords franco-italiens,
1900-1902_ (Paris, 1919), 1 f., No. 1. (This _Livre jaune_ is hereafter
cited as _L.j., 1900-2_.) Salvemini, Oct., 1916, p. 249; Wedel to Bülow,
March 31, 1901, _G.P._, XVIII, 712 ff., No. 5831; Metternich to F. O.,
Dec. 21, 1901, _ibid._, 726 f., No. 5840; Wedel to Bülow, Jan. 5, 1902,
_ibid._, 738 f., No. 5845; Wedel to Bülow, Jan. 19, 1902, _ibid._, 747
f., No. 5851; Diplomaticus, “The Shifting Foundations of European
Peace,” _Fortnightly Review_, LXXVIII (Sept. 1, 1902), 370 f.;
Anonymous, “The Marquis of Salisbury,” _Quarterly Review_, CXCVI (Oct.,
1902), 664 ff.]
[Footnote 59: Terms of the accord given in _L.j., 1900-2_, 3 f., No. 1,
Annexes I and II. See also Wedel to Bülow, Jan. 19, 1902, _G.P._, XVIII,
747 ff., No. 5851.]
[Footnote 60: Barrère to Delcassé, Jan. 10, 1901, _L.j., 1900-2_, 1 f.,
No. 1; Wedel to Bülow, Jan. 19, 1902, _G.P._, XVIII, 747 f., No. 5851.]
[Footnote 61: See Bülow to Wedel, Nov. 30, 1900, _G.P._, XVIII, 502 f.,
No. 5704. The King made his first state visit to St. Petersburg in 1902
(A. Savinsky, _Recollections of a Russian Diplomat_ [London, ——], pp. 25
f.).]
[Footnote 62: On Barrère’s activity see Currie to Salisbury, Jan. 18,
1899, _B.D._, I, 281, No. 347; Currie to Salisbury, April 24, 1899,
_ibid._, 205, No. 250; memo. by Richthofen, Dec. 17, 1901, _G.P._,
XVIII, 507 f., No. 5708.]
[Footnote 63: Salvemini, Jan., 1917, p. 12; _London Times_, Dec. 16,
1901, p. 5; _G.P._, Vol. XVIII, chap. xxii.]
[Footnote 64: Salvemini, Jan., 1917, p. 12 f., quoting Un Bresciano,
“L’intervènto e le pressióni dell Austria nella crisi ministeriale de
1893” (_Nuova antologia_, Oct. 16, 1915).]
[Footnote 65: Salvemini, Jan., 1917, pp. 13 f.; Prinetti’s explanation
of this speech in the Chamber, June 14, 1901, is quoted in _Política,
èstera italiana_, pp. 536 f. See also Zanardelli’s interview in the _New
York World_, quoted in _London Times_, March 27, 1901, p. 5.]
[Footnote 66: Dispatch of Jan. 24, 1902, _Zur europ. Politik_, I, 91.]
[Footnote 67: Barrère to Poincaré, March 10, 1912, _L.j., 1900-2_, 11
ff., No. 11.]
[Footnote 68: It had attempted to do this or to break the alliance in
1891 and 1896. See _G.P._, Vol. XI, chap. lxix; _ibid._, Vol. VIII,
chap. lxv.]
[Footnote 69: These arguments are contained in Barrère to Poincaré,
March 10, 1912, _L.j., 1900-2_, 11 ff., No. 11. One other argument,
which, however, M. Barrère probably did not use with Prinetti, he
formulated as follows: “What is more, nothing prevented her [Italy] from
going beyond the actual text of the treaty, if she should judge that her
political interests demanded it of her.” See also Salvemini, Feb., 1917,
p. 197. The military agreement of 1887 between the allies had become
known to the French government soon after its signing. See Salvemini,
Feb., 1917, p. 198; also Jules Hansen, _L’alliance franco-russe_ (Paris,
1897), p. 42. In March, 1901, _Matin_ published a version of it and
demanded its annulment (quoted in the _London Times_, March 27, 1901).]
[Footnote 70: According to other reports from the German Ambassador in
Rome, Prinetti promised “nothing aggressive” (Wedel to Bülow, Jan. 5,
June 27, 1902, _G.P._, XVIII, 512, No. 5711; 757, No. 5858).]
[Footnote 71: See Salvemini, Feb., 1917, p. 197.]
[Footnote 72: The occasion for these statements was the French
occupation of Mytilene, which alarmed Italian public opinion. See
Prinetti’s speech in the Italian Chamber, Dec. 14, 1901, Cámera dei
Depitatio, _Discussioni_, p. 6747; Delcassé’s interview in _Giornale
d’Italia_, Jan. 3, 1902, quoted in the _London Times_, Jan. 4, 14, 1902;
Barrère’s speech on Jan. 1, 1902, before the French colony in Rome,
quoted in _ibid._, Jan. 2, 1902; Delcassé’s speech before the French
Senate, March 20, 1902, _Journal officiel, Debats parlem._, p. 605.]
[Footnote 73: _London Times_, Jan. 4, 1902.]
[Footnote 74: Article II of the Triple Alliance read as follows: “In
case Italy, without direct provocation on her part, is attacked by
France for any reason whatsoever, the two other contracting parties will
furnish to the party attacked aid and assistance with all their forces.
The same obligation is incumbent upon Italy in case of an aggression not
directly provoked by France against Germany.” Articles IX, X, XI, and
the protocol provided for the maintenance of the _status quo_ in the
Cyrenaic, Tripoli, Tunis, and Morocco, and, in certain eventualities,
for an aggressive attack by Italy aided by her allies, upon France. See
the document given in _G.P._, VII, 99 ff., No. 1426.]
[Footnote 75: On these negotiations see _ibid._, Vol. XVIII, chaps.
cxxii, cxxv.]
[Footnote 76: Bernhard von Bülow, _Reden_ (hrsg. von Johannes Penzler;
Leipzig, 1903), I, 243 ff.]
[Footnote 77: Bülow to Metternich, Dec. 18, 1901, _G.P._, XVIII, 721,
No. 5835.]
[Footnote 78: Alvensleben to F. O., Dec. 26, 1901, _ibid._, 727 f., No.
5841; Bülow to Wedel, Dec. 17, 1901, _ibid._, 508 ff., No. 5709.]
[Footnote 79: Bülow to Metternich, Dec. 18, 1901, _ibid._, 720 f., No.
5835.]
[Footnote 80: Memo. by Bülow, Jan. 12, 1902, _ibid._, 524, No. 5715;
Mühlberg to Bülow, April 25, 1902, _ibid._, 589, No. 5754; Bülow to F.
O., April 26, 1902, _ibid._, 590 f., No. 5755; Wedel to Bülow, Dec. 26,
1901, _ibid._, 728 ff., No. 5852; memo. by Holstein, Dec. 31, 1901,
_ibid._, 735, No. 5844.]
[Footnote 81: Bülow to Wedel, Dec. 17, 1901, _ibid._, 508 ff., No.
5709.]
[Footnote 82: Memo. by Bülow, Jan. 12, 1902, _ibid._, 523 ff., No. 5715;
Wedel to Bülow, April 10, Dec. 17, 1901, _ibid._, 715 f., No. 5832; 723,
No. 5836; Bülow to Wedel, Dec. 17, 1901, _ibid._, 509 f., No. 5709.]
[Footnote 83: Bülow to Wedel, Feb. 24, 1902, _ibid._, 545, No. 5727.]
[Footnote 84: _Ibid._, chap. cxxiv.]
[Footnote 85: See the documents in _ibid._, chaps. cxxii, cxxiv, esp.
Nos. 5712, 5727, 5749, 5755.]
[Footnote 86: This was easily said since the German government had in
the previous year released Italy from her obligations under the military
convention (see above). Prinetti made it appear as a special favor yet
to be performed.]
[Footnote 87: Barrère to Poincaré, March 10, 1912, _L.j., 1900-2_, 12,
No. 11.]
[Footnote 88: Barrère to Delcassé, May 8, 1902, _ibid._, 4 f., No. 3;
Barrère to Poincaré, March 10, 1912, _ibid._, 12 f., No. 11.]
[Footnote 89: Quoted in Salvemini, July, 1917, p. 321.]
[Footnote 90: Barrère to Delcassé, May 8, 1902, _L.j., 1900-2_, 5, No.
3; Delcassé to Barrère, June 18, 1902, _ibid._, 6, No. 5.]
[Footnote 91: _Journal officiel, Debats parlem._, Chambre, July 3, 1902,
pp. 444 f.]
[Footnote 92: Wedel to Bülow, July 6, 1902, _G.P._, XVIII, 758 f., No.
5859.]
[Footnote 93: Barrère to Delcassé, May 8, 1902, _L.j., 1900-2_, 4 f.,
No. 3; Delcassé to Barrère, June 18, 1902, _ibid._, 6, No. 5.]
[Footnote 94: Terms given in _ibid._, 7 ff., Nos. 7 and 8. On July 20
Barrère reported that Prinetti regarded the following cases as examples
of direct provocation:
“1. The publication of sharpened dispatches [_dépêches maquillées_] by
Prince Bismarck in 1870; King William’s refusal to receive M. Benedetti.
“2. The Schnaebele incident.”
As examples of indirect provocation, Prinetti cited “Prince
Hohenzollern’s candidacy to the throne of Spain, and such indirect
initiative in Far Eastern affairs which do not aim at one of the
contracting Powers, although that initiative may displease it and appear
contrary to its direct interest” (Barrère to Delcassé, July 20, 1902,
_ibid._, 7, No. 6). The choice of examples is significant.]
[Footnote 95: See above.]
[Footnote 96: For a severer criticism of his actions see G. Lowes
Dickinson, _The International Anarchy, 1904-1914_ (New York, 1926), pp.
94 ff. Dickinson asserts that the Italian Minister broke both the letter
and the spirit of the Triple Alliance. The analogy of this agreement to
that of Bismarck’s reinsurance treaty with Russia of 1887 was remarked
upon by Italian statesmen at the time (see Lansdowne to Currie, Dec. 17,
1901, _B.D._, I, 284, No. 353). Bismarck’s pacific attitude toward
Russia was well known, however, and he was not responsible for the
inclusion of the anti-Russian clauses in the Austro-German treaty of the
Alliance. See Trützschler v. Falkenstein, _Bismarck und die Kriegsgefahr
von 1887_ (Berlin, 1924), chap. v., and _G.P._, Vol. V. The Italian
government, on the other hand, had not only pursued an anti-French
policy, but had been responsible for including the clauses antagonistic
to France in the treaty of the Triple Alliance.]
[Footnote 97: For analyses of the Italian policy see Rodd to Lansdowne,
July 9, 1902, _B.D._, I, 292 ff., No. 364; Bertie to Lansdowne, Oct. 20,
1903, _ibid._, 295, No. 366. For the German discussion see below. Mr.
Bertie in October, 1903, formulated his conception of the Italian King’s
foreign policy as follows: “His aim, I believe, is that Italy should be
a link between the several Powers of Europe and at the same time remain
a partner in the Triple Alliance: that France should have hopes of
drawing Italy away from Austria and Germany, and that those two Powers
should be made to feel that an understanding between Italy and France
and perhaps even with Russia also is possible. As to England the King
probably feels pretty sure that her interests will not seriously clash
with those of Italy, and he relies on England standing in the way of
French supremacy in the Mediterranean” (Bertie to Lansdowne, Oct. 20,
1903, _ibid._, 295, No. 366).]
[Footnote 98: On the renewal of the Anglo-Italian entente see Lansdowne
to Currie, Dec. 17, 1901, _ibid._, 284, No. 353; Currie to Lansdowne,
Jan. 1, 1902, _ibid._, 285, No. 355; Currie to Lansdowne, Jan. 5, 1902,
_ibid._, 286, No. 356; Lansdowne to Currie, Feb. 3, 1902, _ibid._, 287,
No. 359; Lansdowne to Currie, March 7, 1902, _ibid._, 291, No. 361;
Plunkett to Lansdowne, April 10, 1902, _ibid._, 291, No. 362.]
[Footnote 99: This he realized. See _L.j., 1900-2_, 4 f., Nos. 2 f.]
[Footnote 100: Cf. Barrère to Poincaré, March 10, 1912, _ibid._, 13, No.
11.]
CHAPTER III
THE FRANCO-SPANISH ENTENTE, 1898-1903
The close of the nineteenth century found Spain at one of the lowest
points in her history. She was disorganized, isolated, defeated in 1898
by the United States; her navy was destroyed; her colonial empire was
shattered. Spain was particularly embittered toward Great Britain, whose
Premier had openly spoken of “moribund nations” with direct reference to
her, and whose attitude during the recent war had been strongly pro-
American.[101] Fearful that the British might seize a Spanish port,[102]
M. Silvela, head of the Conservative government, with the approval of
the Liberal leaders, early in 1899 determined upon a change of policy by
which Spain would seek to bring about a secret defensive alliance with
France, Germany, and Russia.[103]
The sympathy of those Powers had been on the side of Spain during the
recent war. But when the Premier laid the plan before them,[104] the
German government was encouraging but skeptical; the French government,
dilatory; the Russian government seemed not to favor it and advised
Spain instead to hold closely to France.[105] Nevertheless, during the
next few years the Spanish government continued its effort to realize
this program, particularly a Franco-German _rapprochement_.
One of the main objects of this grouping was the defense of Spanish
interests in Morocco. In spite of Spain’s colonial losses in the war of
1898, her concern over the future of that Islamic land remained active.
Spain claimed a special position with reference to it, just as France
did. Economic interests, the number of her subjects resident in Morocco
(larger than that of any other foreign nation), geographic proximity,
historical attempts at conquest, and Spanish pride were all advanced in
support of this claim. Strategic reasons, reinforced by her actual
possession of small bits of territory in Northern Morocco, also prompted
Spain to seek control of at least the northern part of the land and
above all to prevent that area from falling into the hands of France or
Great Britain.[106] The Spanish leaders recognized the French interests
in Morocco and the British right to participate in any settlement of the
problem of the straits. But, conscious of their weakness in dealing with
other Powers, they preferred to maintain the _status quo_ as long as
possible unless the larger Continental grouping was consummated.
In 1899 and 1900, when M. Delcassé showed a willingness to negotiate an
accord over Morocco, the Spanish government evaded the overture,[107]
and settled with him only the long standing dispute over the boundary of
Rio de Oro.[108] During 1901 events moved faster. In March a Liberal
ministry under M. Sagasta with the Duke of Almodovar as foreign minister
came into office. It saw France, unchecked by Great Britain, pushing her
frontier steadily forward in the desert region back of Morocco. So it
suspected the existence of a secret accord between those two Powers. The
British government denied it,[109] but Spain feared that an accord might
be made to her exclusion and injury. The Franco-Italian entente also
aroused her alarm. In this uncertainty the Spanish government endeavored
to use the presence of the Moroccan missions in Europe in June and July
to bring about a _rapprochement_ between France and Germany.[110] The
move failed. In August, M. Silvela published an article in _La Lectura_
advocating a solution of the Moroccan problem by agreement with France.
Encouraged by this expression and urged on by M. Leon y Castillo,
Spanish ambassador in Paris, the Spanish government determined to open
direct negotiations with M. Delcassé on the subject.[111] And that
minister was ready to listen. The negotiations progressed slowly, not
only because M. Delcassé was disinclined to concede to Spain the
territory which she desired,[112] but also because he was treating with
Italy and, to the disgust of the Spanish Ambassador, with Great Britain
at the same time.[113] By September, 1902, the main lines of the accord
were agreed upon. Then came further discussion over details; and, after
a last effort (October, 1902) by M. Leon y Castillo to bring France and
Germany together had failed, the accord was ready for signing early in
December.
By the terms of the agreement Spain was to receive the region of the Sus
in the south and almost all of the old kingdom of Fez, including the
capital and Tangier in the north, as her sphere of influence, while the
rest was to constitute that of France. The two governments agreed upon a
policy of pacific penetration of the land, and the French government
promised its diplomatic support to Spain in the execution of the
treaty.[114]
The failure of this agreement was an accident. On December 1 the Duke of
Almodovar was called away from Madrid. Before he could return and issue
instructions to sign the treaty, his government unexpectedly fell
(December 3).[115] The incoming Conservative ministry under M. Silvela
with M. Abarzuza at the foreign office refused to complete the accord.
Although they recognized its advantages to Spain, they feared the
possible attitude of Great Britain and decided to sound her out before
completing the treaty. Upon doing so they were informed by Lord
Lansdowne, early in January, 1903, that in case of a break-up of
Morocco, Spain “would be entitled to a voice in any new international
arrangements” over that land, but that the British government was
strongly opposed to any discussion of such an eventuality at that
moment.[116] In February, 1903, M. Abarzuza revealed the nature of the
Franco-Spanish negotiations to the British Ambassador, and asked for an
official British objection to it so that he (M. Abarzuza) would be in a
firmer position to refuse his signature.[117] Lord Lansdowne replied as
follows:
We regard it as of the utmost importance that Spain and Great Britain
should act together in regard to Morocco. . . . . I have more than once
informed French Ambassador here that we deprecated attempts to bring
about a virtual partition of Morocco. . . . . We should certainly not
tolerate an attempt to deal with Morocco without regard to British
interests.[118]
Thus while M. Delcassé was assuring the Spanish government that their
agreement could be concluded without fear since Great Britain was
interested only in Tangier,[119] the Spanish Foreign Minister was being
informed to the contrary by Lord Lansdowne himself. As M. Abarzuza did
not believe in the possibility of an Anglo-French agreement over
Morocco, he let the negotiations with France fall through.[120]
Immediately thereafter, however, arose a report of Anglo-French
conversations for that very purpose. In alarm the Spanish government
questioned the British Foreign Secretary and received the following
assurance: “We are quite willing to enter into an agreement with the
Spanish Government that neither will commit itself to any settlement of
Moorish question without previously consulting the other.”[121]
As it developed later, Spain lost by relying upon Great Britain and not
concluding this accord. For the British promise was too general to be of
much value, and after the Anglo-French agreement was made, Spain had to
accept the territory which the two Powers had reserved for her. Her
portion was naturally not as large as before, nor were the terms as
favorable. For France and M. Delcassé, on the other hand, it was
fortunate that the project failed. The resulting agreement would have
been strongly opposed by the French as too advantageous to Spain.[122]
France obtained better terms by first arriving at a settlement with
Great Britain. But the _rapprochement_ between the two Latin Powers was
an actuality, and that had been one of M. Delcassé’s main objects.
[Footnote 101: In 1898 Chamberlain publicly advocated an alliance with
the United States. See Jerónimo Becker, _Historia de Marruecos_ (Madrid,
1915), pp. 414 f.; Wolff to Salisbury, May 15, 1898, _B.D._, II, 253,
No. 300.]
[Footnote 102: Early in 1899 Silvela asserted to the ambassadors of
Germany, France, and Russia that if Great Britain and France had gone to
war in the previous year, the former had intended to occupy Vigo
(_G.P._, XV, Vol. Nos. 4205-8). When this fear was brought to the
attention of the British government, by an exchange of notes with the
Spanish government it denied any such intention. See Wolff to Salisbury,
March 10, 1899, _B.D._, II, 255 f., No. 305; Salisbury to Wolff, March
16, 1899, _ibid._, 256, No. 306; Conde de Romanones, _Las
responsabilidades politicas del antique régimen de 1875 á 1923_ (Madrid,
——), p. 36; Becker, pp. 415 f. The British and Spanish governments also
found by an exchange of views in January, 1899, that they both wished to
maintain the _status quo_ in Morocco. The Spanish diplomat and
historian, Becker, has written that they were about to make an agreement
to that effect when the Liberal government in Spain fell from power
(March, 1899) (_op. cit._, p. 415; Salisbury to Wolff, Jan. 11, 1899,
_B.D._, II, 255, No. 304).]
[Footnote 103: The plan was approved by Sagasta, leader of the Liberals,
by Leon y Castillo, the Liberal ambassador at Paris, and by the Queen
Regent. See Alberto Mousset, _La politica exterior de España, 1873-1918_
(Madrid, 1918), chap. v; Radowitz to Hohenlohe, April 15, 1899, _G.P._,
XV, 115 ff., No. 4205; Bülow to Radowitz, April 27, 1899, _ibid._, 119
ff., No. 4206; Radowitz to Hohenlohe, May 28, 1899, _ibid._, 125 ff.,
No. 4210; and others in _ibid._, chap. ic. Cf. F. de Leon y Castillo,
_Mis tiempos_ (Madrid, 1921), II, 255, written after the World War.]
[Footnote 104: Radowitz to Hohenlohe, May 28, 1899, _G.P._, XV, 125 ff.,
No. 4210; Radowitz to Hohenlohe, Aug. 12, 1899, _ibid._, 127 ff., No.
4211.]
[Footnote 105: Bülow to Radowitz, April 27, 1899, _ibid._, 119 ff., No.
4206; Bülow to Radowitz, May 16, 1899, _ibid._, 124 f., No. 4209;
Radowitz to Hohenlohe, Oct. 5, 1899, _ibid._, 130 ff., No. 4214;
Tschirschky to Hohenlohe, Oct. 24, 1899, _ibid._, 133 f., No. 4213;
Radowitz to Hohenlohe, Feb. 4, 1900, _ibid._, 134 f., No. 4214.]
[Footnote 106: Romanones, pp. 34 f.; Gabriel Maura, _La question du
Maroc au point de vue espagnol_ (Paris, 1911), pp. 1 ff.; Becker, pp.
446 ff., esp. chap. lxi; Pinon, _L’empire de la Médit._, pp. 123 ff.;
Emile Vidal, _La politique de l’Espagne au Maroc_ (Montpellier, 1913),
pp. 1 ff.; M. Ribera, “L’Espagne et la question du Maroc,” _Questions
diplomatiques et coloniales_, Jan. 1, 1902, pp. 46 ff.]
[Footnote 107: This is asserted by Becker although he does not cite his
authority. See Becker, pp. 414, 419; Radowitz to Hohenlohe, May 10,
1899, _G.P._, XV, 123 f., No. 4208; Radowitz to Hohenlohe, Oct. 5, 1899,
_ibid._, 130 ff., No. 4212; Tschirschky to Hohenlohe, Oct. 23, 1899,
_ibid._, 133 f., No. 4213; Münster to Hohenlohe, May 9, 1900, _ibid._,
XVIII, 301 f., No. 5157; Wolff to Salisbury, Oct. 11, 1900, _B.D._, II,
258, No. 311; Becker, p. 426; Romanones, p. 39.]
[Footnote 108: Schefer, _D’une guerre à l’autre, etc._, p. 237; Mousset,
pp. 121 ff.; Romanones, p. 38; Delcassé’s statement in the French
Senate, Feb. 11, 1901, _Journal officiel, Debats parlem._, p. 295; Leon
y Castillo, II, 143 ff.]
[Footnote 109: Durand to Lansdowne, April 13, 1901, _B.D._, II, 259 f.,
No. 314; Lansdowne to Durand, April 16, 1901, _ibid._, 260, No. 315.]
[Footnote 110: See below.]
[Footnote 111: Romanones, pp. 40 ff.; Mousset, pp. 132 ff.; Becker, pp.
425 ff.; Vidal, p. 138; Leon y Castillo, II, 173 ff., 122 ff. See also a
speech of the Duke of Almodovar in the Spanish Chamber, June 8, 1904,
_Diario de las sesiones de Cortes, Legislatura de 1903_ (Congreso de los
Diputados), pp. 4919 ff.; speech by Romanones in the same, June 7, 1904,
_ibid._, p. 4883; Radolin to Bülow, June 15, 1901, _G.P._, XVIII, 777
f., No. 5870.]
[Footnote 112: Romanones, p. 41.]
[Footnote 113: _G.P._, XVII, 343, editor’s note; Becker, p. 427.]
[Footnote 114: Leon y Castillo was allowed a free hand in those
negotiations. See Romanones, pp. 41 f.; Becker, pp. 427 f.; Mousset, p.
135; speeches by Almodovar and Romanones in the Spanish Chamber, June 7,
8, 1904, _Sesiones del Congreso, Legislatura_, pp. 4883, 4944 f., 4917
ff.; exchange of letters between Silvela and Almodovar published in
_L’Imparcial_, June, 1904, and reprinted in Leon y Castillo, II, 185 ff.
The result was shown to Silvela early in September, 1902, and received
his entire approval, “provided one treats of a work of peace and concord
guaranteed against all suspicion and opposition of friendly Powers.” The
exact terms of the proposed accord are not known, only the main points.
See R. Gay de Montella, _España ante el problema del Mediterráneo_
(Barcelona, 1917), pp. 40 ff., quoting an article by Leon y Castillo in
_Mercurio_, May 27, 1917; André Tardieu, “France et Espagne, 1902-1912,”
_Revue des deux mondes_, Dec. 1, 1912, pp. 635 f.; Durand to Lansdowne,
Feb. 14, 1903, _B.D._, II, 279, No. 336; Lansdowne to Monson, Aug. 5,
1903, April 29, May 13, 1904, _ibid._, 306 ff., No. 364; III, 33, No.
34; 35, No. 37; Monson to Lansdowne, May 20, 1904, _ibid._, 37, No. 41;
Lansdowne to Egerton, April 27, 1904, _ibid._, 31 f., No. 32; Leon y
Castillo, II, 177 ff.]
[Footnote 115: Mousset, p. 135; Leon y Castillo, II, 128.]
[Footnote 116: On this question see a speech by Maura, minister of
foreign affairs, in the Spanish Chamber, June 9, 1904, _Sesiones del
Congreso, Legislatura_, p. 4959; Becker, pp. 429 f.; Tardieu, p. 635;
Durand to Lansdowne, Jan. 3, 1903, _B.D._, II, 276 f., No. 332;
Lansdowne to Durand, Jan. 5, 1903, _ibid._, 277, No. 333; Durand to
Lansdowne, Jan. 17, 1903, _ibid._, 278, No. 335; Metternich to F. O.,
Dec. 31, 1902, _G.P._, XVII, 247 f., No. 5192; Groeben to F. O., Sept.
17, 1903, _ibid._, 353 f., No. 5198 and note; Monson to Lansdowne, April
22, 1904, _B.D._, III, 30, No. 30; Leon y Castillo, II, 179 f. There is
a story that Silvela tried to change the basis of the accord in such a
way as also to obtain Russian support for Spain against Great Britain
and that he was willing to enter the anti-British camp. His proposal to
spend eight hundred million _pesetas_ in the building of a navy pointed
in this direction; but that there is anything to the tale seems
doubtful. See Mousset, pp. 137 ff.; Tardieu, pp. 635 f.; Anonymous, “Una
nouva alleanza,” _Nouva antologia_, Aug. 1, 1903, pp. 511.]
[Footnote 117: Durand to Lansdowne, Feb. 14, 1903, _B.D._, II, 279, No.
336.]
[Footnote 118: Lansdowne to Durand, Feb. 16, 21, 1903, _ibid._, 279 f.,
No. 337; 280, No. 339.]
[Footnote 119: Durand to Lansdowne, Feb. 21, 1903, _ibid._, 280, No.
338.]
[Footnote 120: See Tardieu, p. 635; Leon y Castillo, II, 179 f.]
[Footnote 121: Durand to Lansdowne, Feb. 21, 1903, _B.D._, II, 280, No.
338; Lansdowne to Durand, Feb. 21, 1903, _ibid._, 280, No. 339;
Lansdowne to Durand, March 29, 1903, _ibid._, 282, No. 334; Leon y
Castillo, II, 180.]
[Footnote 122: Maura, p. 88; speeches by Ribot and Deschanel in the
French Chamber, March 11, Nov. 19, 1903, _Journal officiel, Debats
parlem._, pp. 793, 1111 f.; Millet, _Notre politique extérieure_, pp.
193 ff.; Pinon, _France et Allemagne_, pp. 143 f.]
CHAPTER IV
DELCASSÉ’S POLICY TOWARD GREAT BRITAIN AND GERMANY, 1898-1902
M. Delcassé assumed office at a most unpropitious time for the success
of his policy with reference to Great Britain. On September 1, 1898, he
remarked to Sir Edmund Monson, the British ambassador, that “he had
always . . . . regarded as eminently desirable a cordial understanding
between England, France, and Russia,” and offered his service “in
soothing the way both at St. Petersburgh and Paris for the attainment of
this object.”[123] From then until March of the next year he repeatedly
urged Lord Salisbury, British premier and foreign minister, to agree to
a general understanding on all matters at issue, so that Great Britain
and France could exchange the old relation of hostility for one of
friendship.[124] But in spite of the French Minister’s cordiality the
Fashoda crisis in the autumn and early winter of 1898 brought the two
countries perilously close to war.[125] Anglo-Russian difficulties in
China and elsewhere also remained acute.[126] Furthermore, Lord
Salisbury replied to M. Delcassé that French ministries were too
unstable to deal with.[127] Hence, instead of improving, relations
between the two countries became more strained. In the late winter and
early spring of 1899, the bellicose stand on the Fashoda affair taken by
the British government and press aroused a general fear in France of a
British attack.[128] By August, the French Foreign Minister complained
bitterly to the British Ambassador that “the conduct of her Majesty’s
Government seemed to show a deliberate intention of being unfriendly to
France in every possible way,” and added that “he began to believe that
the politicians who argue that there is nothing to be done with England
are right.”[129]
During the period of the Boer War, the presence of Lord Salisbury at the
foreign office, the bitter feeling of the French against the British,
the continued Anglo-Russian trouble in China, and the British attempt to
align with Germany prevented M. Delcassé from obtaining any
results.[130] In fact, conditions were more favorable for the pursuance
of a directly anti-British policy. The Russian government wished it, and
worked for closer concert against Great Britain among the Continental
Powers.[131] The Spanish government had the more far-reaching ambition
of bringing about a definite Continental union against Great
Britain.[132] Italy was at odds with the latter. The German Emperor and
his government had been wooing France and making veiled proposals for
co-operation since 1890.[133] And French feeling toward Germany had
become more amicable than at any time since 1870.
The French Foreign Minister did not deviate from his original
purpose,[134] but tried rather to be friendly to both Great Britain and
Germany, to play between them for the advantage of France; and, warned
by Mr. Chamberlain’s[135] open advocacy in November, 1899, of an
alliance with Germany and the United States and by the signs of an
Anglo-German _rapprochement_, he sought to eliminate the occasion for
this alliance.[136] This policy had been foreshadowed during the Fashoda
crisis.
In December, 1898, immediately after France had retreated before the
British demands, M. Delcassé in a conversation with Herr Arthur von
Huhn, correspondent of the _Kölnische Zeitung_, had bitterly denounced
the brutal threats of Great Britain against France, had expressed his
fear that that Power was seeking war in order to have an excuse for
destroying the French fleet, and had proposed a _rapprochement_ with
Germany for pursuing a common policy against British encroachments and
for making colonial accords.[137] Simultaneously with this indirect
overture, which had never been followed up by either government, the
French Minister had threatened the British government with the
acceptance of indirect proposals from Germany for co-operation against
it if Great Britain did not change her attitude toward France and assent
to his offer of a general accord.[138]
During 1899 M. Delcassé had turned farther away from Great Britain and
had sought means of holding her in check.[139] But when the Boer War
broke out, he held aloof from any movements for intervention, even
risked unpopularity by publicly denouncing the expressions of rabid
anti-British sentiment on the part of the French people.[140] Upon the
retirement of Lord Salisbury from the foreign office in November, 1900,
he again suggested a general understanding to the British
government.[141] He was accused of being Anglophile to the detriment of
French interests, particularly in Morocco;[142] for many of the French
writers advocated a policy of co-operation with Germany for the
settlement of colonial questions (among which, of course, would be
included the Moroccan), while Great Britain could not effectively
object.[143] But M. Delcassé was willing merely to occupy the Saharan
oases back of Algeria during the war and to initiate the French policy
for the eventual acquisition of the Sherifian Empire.
Not that the French Foreign Minister was averse to any accord with
Germany. As already seen, he made an indirect overture to the German
government for an agreement while the Moroccan missions were in Europe
in 1901. Although rebuffed on that occasion, he made another attempt in
October of the same year at the urging of the Spanish and the Russian
governments.[144] At this time M. Jules Hansen, a French agent, stated
to the German Ambassador in Paris that M. Delcassé had recently
expressed to him the earnest wish to meet Count Bülow personally. The
problem was where and how to meet. The French Minister had said that if
the Count would come secretly and unofficially to Paris, he would greet
him most heartily and would make a public visit to Berlin in
return.[145]
Although very much interested, Count Bülow refused to run the risk. The
time was inopportune, he said; the French government and people must
first be more solicitous of closer relations with Germany.[146] That
reply postponed the matter to the Greek calends.
In 1902 M. Delcassé made a concentrated effort to establish the French
claim to ascendancy in Morocco. His negotiations with Italy, which led
to the agreement of November of that year, and those with Spain, which
in December proved abortive, have already been considered.
Simultaneously therewith, M. Delcassé again endeavored to negotiate with
Great Britain and, perhaps, with Germany on the same question.
On several occasions in January and February, M. Cambon, the French
ambassador at London, discussed Anglo-French differences, including the
Moroccan one, with Mr. Chamberlain, British colonial minister, and with
Lord Lansdowne, British foreign secretary since November, 1900. While
the British officials showed some interest, no progress was made.[147]
For after the publication of the Anglo-Japanese treaty of alliance in
February, France was forced to declare with her ally that the Dual
Alliance extended to the Far East.[148] Under pressure from Russia[149]
and with the hope of obtaining support while negotiating a treaty with
Siam,[150] the French government drew closer to Germany.
Late in June the French Ambassador, in asking the German views on the
Siamese question, remarked to Count Bülow that “the present good
relations between Germany and France justified the hope that France
would receive the support [_coup d’épaule_] of Germany in the Siamese
affair.”[151] As the German government ignored the suggestion, however,
and as the French government was alarmed at the growing influence of
certain Englishmen, particularly Kaid Maclean, over the Sultan of
Morocco, M. Delcassé determined, in spite of probable Russian
objection,[152] to open the Moroccan question with the British
government.
On July 23, when M. Cambon asked Lord Lansdowne about discussing fully
the Moroccan problem, the British Minister replied that he would be
ready to consider it “in the frankest possible manner.”[153] On August
6, therefore, the Ambassador officially proposed an accord over the
future of Siam and Morocco. After a consideration of the former
question, the two men took up the latter one. While asserting that the
French government preferred that the Moroccan problem should not become
acute, the Ambassador desired that the two governments “frankly discuss
the action which they might be constrained to adopt in the event of
Morocco passing ‘into liquidation.’” Spain, he explained, could be
satisfied by a sufficient allowance of hinterland behind her coastal
possessions; Tangier could be converted into an international and open
port—for France could not allow it to pass into the hands of any
European Power; and beyond the Spanish line, France would expect
“exclusive influence.”
Lord Lansdowne replied that although he listened to the French proposal
with great interest, yet since Italy, Spain, and Germany had also at
various times manifested a concern in the Moroccan question, he regarded
with the “greatest apprehension” any attempt to deal prematurely with a
liquidation of that land, which “would be sure to lead to serious
complications.” The Ambassador answered that at any rate there could be
no harm “in discussing these eventualities in good time.” He pointed out
that Spain and Germany had both failed egregiously in their attempts to
establish themselves in Morocco, and that at present Germany was “not to
the front there or elsewhere in the Mediterranean.” But the British
Foreign Secretary, denying that his government had made any difficulties
in Morocco for France, postponed further consideration of the proposal
until after the government holiday.[154] When in October M. Cambon
returned to the subject, Lord Lansdowne not only replied that the French
terms were unsatisfactory, but he also refused to discuss the
possibility of a liquidation of Morocco.[155]
In the meantime, M. Delcassé had been again seeking the co-operation of
Germany. In September the German government assured France of its
disinterestedness in Siam, provided German economic interests remained
uninjured. Although this reply contained no mention of the larger
request for support made by the French Ambassador in June, yet the
latter, in expressing the satisfaction of his government with the German
answer, added that this opportunity had been used to emphasize the
community of French and German interests, and not only in Siam. To this
broad hint the German government made no response.[156]
In the next month the Spanish Ambassador in Paris reported to Prince
Radolin that the French Foreign Minister had recently said to him:
I do not believe that Germany wishes to come to an understanding with
France. . . . . Four years ago it was said to M. de Noailles at Berlin
that there were points upon which the two countries might place
themselves in accord. I found the matter so important that I immediately
took it to the president of the Republic and to the premier. I was
authorized by them to telegraph to M. de Noailles that I was disposed to
treat with Germany on all points on which the two countries would be
able to agree. M. de Noailles reported that they had informed him in the
_Wilhelmstrasse_ that in view of its importance the question deserved to
be studied. That was four years ago. Since then not a word more has been
said on that subject. Our ambassador still awaits a response.[157]
The German government replied to this overture with recriminations
against the French Minister. It complained that his proposals had lacked
in concreteness, that France had rejected several German offers of co-
operation, and it accused M. Delcassé of consistent bias in favor of
Great Britain.[158]
When this reply was passed on to M. Delcassé by the Spanish Ambassador
late in November, he remarked, “Then M. de Noailles is a fool”;
thereafter he had no business to transact with the German
representative.[159]
The refusal by both the British and the German governments of the French
overtures was followed in December by that of the Spanish government to
sign the agreement over Morocco. So M. Delcassé’s campaign of 1902
terminated in failure. At the end of the year he reverted to the policy
of the _status quo_, and, anxious about the situation in Morocco,
proposed to Lord Lansdowne that if disorders there should necessitate
action “the Powers interested should take counsel together as to its
nature and scope, and should agree that there should be no single-handed
intervention . . . . on the part of any one Power.” In approving this
policy the British Minister asked M. Cambon for a further explanation of
the phrase “interested Powers.” The latter replied that Great Britain,
France, and Spain were the ones referred to, that Italy had no interest
in Morocco, and that the French government was solicitous of excluding
the United States, and, above all, Germany from that group. He thought
that “it would be most desirable that if Germany were at any moment to
come forward and attempt to assume a conspicuous rôle, it should be
intimated to her that she had no _locus standi_.” Upon that point Lord
Lansdowne refused to commit himself.[160]
M. Delcassé had shown a pro-British inclination from the start, and it
may be that his approaches to Germany had been intended primarily to
press Great Britain to an agreement. Certainly they had been
sufficiently vague to be in harmony with the traditional French attitude
of irreconcilability with the victor of 1870-71. But they had also been
concrete enough to show the difficulty, if not the impossibility, of
negotiating with Germany on acceptable terms. Whether M. Delcassé was
sincere in those overtures cannot be said, although he seems to have
been. At any rate, despairing of Germany, he devoted his full energies
in 1903 toward achieving an accord with Great Britain, from whom no
irredentist problem separated France.
[Footnote 123: Monson to Salisbury, Sept. 1, 1899, _B.D._, I, 216, No.
262.]
[Footnote 124: Monson to Salisbury, Sept. 8, 1898, _ibid._, 163, No.
188, and other documents in chaps. iv, v. Delcassé went so far as to
state to Monson on Sept. 28, 1898, that “he would much prefer an Anglo-
French to a Franco-Russian alliance.” See Monson to Salisbury, Sept. 28,
1898, _ibid._, 171, No. 198.]
[Footnote 125: Monson to Salisbury, Sept. 22, 1898, _ibid._, 169, No.
196, and other documents in the same chapter.]
[Footnote 126: Monson to Salisbury, Sept. 8, 1898, _ibid._, 37, No. 58;
and others in _ibid._, chap. i.]
[Footnote 127: So stated by Paul Cambon in an interview in the _London
Times_, Dec. 22, 1920.]
[Footnote 128: Monson to Salisbury, Jan. 13, 1899, _B.D._, I, 199, No.
241.]
[Footnote 129: Monson to Salisbury, Aug. 14, 1899, _ibid._, 212, No.
259. Cambon had in March made similar complaints to Salisbury (Salisbury
to Monson, March 15, 1899, _ibid._, 211, No. 257).]
[Footnote 130: For expression of French public opinion against Great
Britain see two articles by Ernst Lavisse in the _Revue de Paris_, Feb.
1, 1899, and Jan. 1, 1900. See also Monson to Salisbury, Feb. 3, 1899,
_B.D._, I, 200 f., No. 242; Mévil, _De la paix de Francfort, etc._, pp.
128 f.; Sir Thomas Barclay, _Thirty Years; Anglo-French Reminiscences,
1876-1906_ (London, 1914), pp. 193 f., 209 f.; J. A. Spender, _Life,
Journalism, and Politics_ (London, 1927), I, 183 ff.; Newton, _Lord
Lansdowne_, p. 209.]
[Footnote 131: Romanones, _Las responsabilidades politicas, etc._, pp.
27, 36; Monson to Salisbury, Oct. 27, 1899, _B.D._, I, 234 f., No. 287;
Rumbold to Salisbury, Nov. 3, 1899, _ibid._, 237, No. 291; _G.P._, Vol.
XV, chaps. ic, ci, ciii.]
[Footnote 132: See above, chap. iii; also Emil Bourgeois et Georges
Pagès, _Les origines et les responsabilités de la grande guerre_ (Paris,
1922), p. 276.]
[Footnote 133: The German Emperor made a special endeavor to win France;
hence his numerous telegrams of congratulations or condolence to French
leaders, his toasts and decorations for French officers, etc. The French
called him the “new Lohengrin.” Both he and Bülow made repeated hints to
the French representatives for a _rapprochement_; and one of the
Emperor’s favorite schemes to form a Continental grouping against Great
Britain and the United States was well known from his frequent
references to it. See Theodor Wolff, _Das Vorspiel_ (Munich, 1924), pp.
110, 114, 117, 123 f.; _G.P._, Vol. XVIII, Nos. 5860-71; Bourgeois et
Pagès, pp. 277 ff., 256 f.; William II to Bülow, Oct. 29, 1899, _G.P._,
XV, 406 ff., No. 4394; and the editor’s long note thereto, pp. 406 ff.
On June 4, 1899, the French Ambassador reported a conversation between
the French naval attaché, Buchard, and the Emperor in which the latter
said: “The hour is certainly come when the Continent must defend itself
against England and America, and I think that it is necessary for
Germany and France to rely upon each other [_s’appuient l’une sur
l’autre_].” And Buchard added, “The Emperor is very desirous of
establishing good relations with you” (Bourgeois et Pagès, p. 279). See
also Spring Rice to Villiers, April 24, 1900, Stephen Gwynn (ed.), _The
Letters and Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring Rice. A Record_ (Boston and
New York, 1929), I, 220.]
[Footnote 134: How entirely alien to Delcassé’s mind was the idea of a
Continental alliance with Germany was shown by the fact that in August,
1899, at his instigation the phrase “the maintenance of the equilibrium
between the forces of Europe” was introduced into the Dual Alliance. See
Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, _Documents diplomatiques. L’alliance
franco-russe_ (Paris, 1918), pp. 94 f.; Dickinson, _The International
Anarchy, 1904-1914_ (New York, 1926), p. 108; Georges Michon,
_L’alliance franco-russe, 1891-1917_ (Paris, 1927), pp. 87 ff.]
[Footnote 135: Chamberlain was Colonial minister in the Unionist
cabinet.]
[Footnote 136: In September, 1898, Delcassé had spoken to Monson of the
rumors of an “alliance” between Great Britain and Germany (Monson to
Salisbury, Sept. 8, 1898, _B.D._, I, 162, No. 187).]
[Footnote 137: Memo. by Huhn, Dec. 5, 1898, _G.P._, XIII, 247 ff., No.
3558.]
[Footnote 138: Monson to Salisbury, Oct. 28, 1898, _B.D._, I, 185, No.
221; Monson to Salisbury, Dec. 9, 1898, _ibid._, 196, No. 238.]
[Footnote 139: Count Witte writes in his _Memoirs_ (New York, 1921), p.
178, that when Delcassé came to St. Petersburg in August, 1899, he
sought means of accomplishing this end, and urged the Russian government
to push the construction of the Orenburg-Tashkent Railway so that in
emergency Russia could threaten India. Leon y Castillo, Spanish
ambassador at Paris and an intimate friend of the Minister, likewise
stated in round terms to Radowitz, German ambassador at Madrid, in May,
1899, that Delcassé belonged to the party desirous of a closer
understanding with Germany (Radowitz to Hohenlohe, May 28, 1899, _G.P._,
XV, 125 ff., No. 4210. On the other hand, Sir Thomas Barclay records
that upon Delcassé’s departure for St. Petersburg in August, 1899, the
latter said to him that “there was nothing he [Delcassé] personally
would welcome more warmly than a state of feeling which would permit the
two Governments [French and British] to negotiate a solution of their
outstanding difficulties in a friendly give-and-take spirit” (Barclay,
p. 170).]
[Footnote 140: Barclay, pp. 169 f.; Monson to Salisbury, Dec. 1, 1899,
_B.D._, I, 242, No. 300; Monson to Salisbury, Nov. 7, 1899, _ibid._,
239, No. 294; Wolff to Salisbury, June 9, 1900, _ibid._, II, 258, No.
210.]
[Footnote 141: Lee, _King Edward VII_, II, 214.]
[Footnote 142: According to an anonymous article, “Quatre ans de
politique extérieure,” _Revue politique et parlementaire_, Oct., 1902,
pp. 24 f., 31, on one occasion during the Boer War when a deputy asked
Delcassé if he did not think this an opportune time to settle the
Moroccan affair with Great Britain, the Minister replied, “How do you
wish me to speak with the English Government? It is so occupied that it
has no time to reply.”]
[Footnote 143: Robert de Caix, writing in the _Bulletin_, was one of
these. Moreover, in March, 1901, not long after the German Emperor’s
visit to England, Delcassé took advantage of the opportunity offered by
the presence of the British mission in Paris for announcing the
accession of King Edward VII to the throne, to let the British know that
the French government wanted a “good understanding” with them (Lee, II,
14 f.).]
[Footnote 144: It must be remembered that Delcassé was then discussing
the Moroccan problem with the Spanish Ambassador, who sought to use that
question as the means for paving the way to the new Continental
combination. Moreover, the Czar and the German Emperor, together with
their foreign ministers, had an interview at Danzig in September at
which the Russian Minister openly advocated a Russo-German alliance.
From Danzig the Czar journeyed to France, and a short time thereafter
occurred Delcassé’s indirect overture to Radolin. On the meeting at
Danzig see Bülow’s account of the conversations on Sept. 12, 14, 1901,
in _G.P._, XVIII, 28 ff., Nos. 5393-95; Savinsky, _Recollections of a
Russian Diplomat_, pp. 17 ff.]
[Footnote 145: The identical project was also proposed to Radolin by
Pallain, governor of the Banque de France. Hansen also remarked that an
important Russian personage had told him positively that Lamsdorff had
spoken to Delcassé of the trip to Berlin. The idea seems to have been
suggested to the Russian Minister by the German Emperor (Radolin to
Bülow, Oct. 27, 1901, _ibid._, 782 ff., No. 5873).]
[Footnote 146: Bülow to Radolin, Nov. 6, 1901, _ibid._, 785, No. 5874.]
[Footnote 147: Metternich to F. O., Jan. 30, 1902, _ibid._, XVII, 342
f., No. 5186; Hermann Freiherr von Eckardstein, _Lebenserinnerungen und
politische Denkwürdigkeiten_ (Leipzig, 1919, 1921), II, 379; Lansdowne
to Monson, Jan. 22, 1902, _B.D._, II, 262 f., No. 320; interview with
Cambon published in the _London Times_, Dec. 22, 1920; Monson to
Lansdowne, Feb. 6, 1902, _B.D._, I, 274, No. 339. Lansdowne was so much
interested in the French Ambassador’s ideas that the latter wrote him a
letter enumerating the differences which might be treated. King Edward
read the letter and declared to Cambon, “It is excellent. You must go
on” (interview with Cambon published in the _London Times_, Dec. 22,
1920).]
[Footnote 148: A few days later, however, Delcassé spoke in the Chamber
so vaguely of this declaration and emphasized so strongly France’s
pacific intentions that he cast great doubt upon its value. See Mévil,
pp. 81 f. n.; Tardieu, _La France et les alliances_, pp. 21 f.; see also
Newton, pp. 226 f.]
[Footnote 149: Memo. by Bülow of a conversation with the French
Ambassador, March 20, 1902, _G.P._, XVII, 179 f., No. 5064. In February
the Russian government urged the German government to enter into an
agreement against the new alliance, but the offer was refused (_ibid._,
chap. cx, Part B).]
[Footnote 150: On Siamese affairs, an old cause of trouble between Great
Britain and France, see _ibid._, XVIII, 795 ff., Nos. 5881-83; Schefer,
_D’une guerre à l’autre, etc._, p. 242; _Quest. dipl. et col._, Nov. 15,
1902, pp. 577 ff.; and others.]
[Footnote 151: Richthofen to Metternich, June 30, 1902, _G.P._, XVIII,
795 f., No. 5881.]
[Footnote 152: Memo. by Bülow of a conversation with the Russian
Ambassador, Feb. 25, 1902, _ibid._, XVII, 160 ff., No. 5051; Alvensleben
to F. O., Feb. 25, 1903, _ibid._, 349, No. 5195.]
[Footnote 153: Lansdowne to Monson, July 23, 1902, _B.D._, II, 263 f.,
No. 321.]
[Footnote 154: Lansdowne to Monson, Aug. 6, 1902, _ibid._, 264 ff., No.
322.]
[Footnote 155: Lansdowne to Monson, Oct. 15, 1902, _ibid._, 268 ff., No.
325; Newton, pp. 268 f.]
[Footnote 156: Mühlberg to Radolin, Aug. 18, 1902, _G.P._, XVIII, 795
f., No. 5882; Schlözer to F. O., Sept. 22, 1902, _ibid._, 797, No.
5883.]
[Footnote 157: Radolin to Bülow, Oct. 15, 1902, _ibid._, 797 ff., No.
5884.]
[Footnote 158: Richthofen to Radolin, Oct. 23, 1902, _ibid._, 799 f.,
No. 5885. These accusations were unfair. In the previous June in a
dispatch to Metternich, ambassador at London, two instances had been
mentioned in which the French government had tried to secure the co-
operation of Germany. The editors of _G.P._ admit that one of these
proposals was definite; and in August, 1901, Holstein of the German
foreign office had written that the French government was “not in itself
irreconcilable.” That admission speaks volumes. Moreover, the German
reply admitted that the French Ambassador had usually taken the
initiative in these attempts at co-operation. See Richthofen to
Metternich, June 30, 1902, _ibid._, 795 f., No. 5881; Holstein to Bülow,
Aug. 8, 1901, _ibid._, XVII, 341, No. 5184.]
[Footnote 159: Radolin to Bülow, Dec. 4, 1902, _ibid._, XVIII, 801, No.
5886. As an explanation for this very marked attitude, Delcassé said to
a third party that he had tried to co-operate with Germany but had been
refused (Memo. by Klehmet, April 19, 1903, _ibid._, 801 f., No. 5887).
None the less, up to Oct., 1903, the French government continued to
approve the investment of French capital in the Bagdad Railway (memo. by
Rosen, Oct. 29, 1903, _ibid._, 456 ff., No. 5274).]
[Footnote 160: This conversation occurred on Dec. 31, 1902. Lansdowne to
Monson, Dec. 31, 1902, _B.D._, II, 274 ff., No. 330; Lansdowne to
Monson, Dec. 28, 1902, Monson to Lansdowne, Dec. 31, 1902, Newton, pp.
269 f.]
CHAPTER V
THE ANGLO-GERMAN ALLIANCE NEGOTIATIONS, 1898-1901
The international position of Great Britain at the end of the nineteenth
century was uncomfortable. The major Powers were all busy in the
colonial world more or less in opposition to her interests;
_Weltpolitik_ was the order of the day; the navies of all states were
growing rapidly and by combining might be able to threaten her maritime
supremacy. On the Continent, the German Emperor’s courtship of an
apparently complaisant France, cordial relations between Russia and
Germany, an agreement in 1897 between Russia and Austria-Hungary over
Balkan affairs, and a growing amity between France and Italy and between
France and Spain gave evidence of a developing _rapprochement_ between
the two systems of alliance. Trouble in West Africa with France in 1897
and early in 1898 made Anglo-French relations acute. Fashoda was on the
way; so was the Boer War. British markets in China were being menaced by
Russia, and the British feared that the Russian, French, and German
governments might co-operate on Chinese affairs to their injury. Public
opinion demanded that the government defend British interests more
actively.[161] These were the more important of the difficulties
confronting the island empire.
To dispel these dangers, two policies were advocated by members of the
Unionist cabinet. Lord Salisbury, prime minister and foreign secretary,
did not believe that a Continental alliance against Great Britain would
be made.[162] He clung to the traditional position of “splendid
isolation,” of making special agreements with the various Powers over
specific issues. As he realized the inadequacy of this policy if Great
Britain attempted to expand her influence too largely in China, South
Africa, and elsewhere, he only half-heartedly supported a vigorous
program of aggression.[163] In January, 1898, he proposed to the Russian
government a general agreement over China and Turkey.[164] On March 8 he
asked the United States government to co-operate in maintaining the open
door in China.[165] However, he was old, in poor health, and inclined to
permit Mr. Chamberlain, the colonial secretary, to force his hand. In
fact, the last five years of his administration have been called the
“Chamberlain period,” so great was the latter’s influence.[166]
This “stormy petrel” from Birmingham favored an entirely new
policy.[167] Determined to maintain and extend British interests in the
whole world, he sought to form a corporation for directing world-affairs
by close co-operation with the United States and Germany. He was
supported more or less fully by the Prince of Wales (who in 1901 became
King Edward VII), in the cabinet by Mr. Balfour (who in 1902 succeeded
Lord Salisbury as prime minister), and by the Duke of Devonshire;[168]
while his influence with the masses and with the business elements
seemed to assure him of popular approval.
Various difficulties had in recent years arisen between Great Britain
and Germany. But Mr. Chamberlain thought that in view of the German
Emperor’s offers of alliance to the British government at various times
during the 1890’s, one as late as January, 1898,[169] the German
government would eagerly accept a proposal to that effect. When Lord
Salisbury’s policy toward Russia failed and trouble with Russia[170] and
with France[171] threatened, in March and April, 1898, the British
Colonial Minister declared to Count Hatzfeldt, the German ambassador,
that Great Britain would have to relinquish her isolation. Under threat
of coming to terms with Russia or France if his overture were refused,
he made an unofficial offer of defensive alliance to Germany.[172]
Mr. Chamberlain’s proposal was coolly received. Count Bülow, the German
secretary of state for foreign affairs, and his inspirer and guide, Herr
von Holstein, privy councilor (_vortragender Rat_) in the foreign
office, who with occasional interference from the Emperor were the
directors of the German foreign policy, not only were mistrustful of
British intentions, but also saw no reason for dissatisfaction with the
current international position and prospects of their state.[173]
Besides, this overture so increased the power of their situation that
they were able to lay down a policy of the “free hand” to be followed
during the next few years. A telegram from Emperor William II to Count
Bülow on April 10, 1898, together with the latter’s marginal notes, best
expressed this policy. After stating that Germany had less need of a
British alliance since Great Britain had turned her attention from the
Continent to the colonial world, the Emperor wrote:
If the English need of support direct itself in the future toward
European affairs also, we could consider it more closely than now.
Nevertheless, it is also of great significance for the present to keep
the official attitude in England favorable and hopeful toward us
[Bülow’s comment, “Yes”]. . . . . Through an England friendly to us we
hold another card in our hand toward Russia. [Bülow’s comment, “Very
true, we must remain independent between them, be the tongue to the
wagon, not the pendulum restlessly swinging about.”] And we thereby have
prospects of gaining colonial and commercial advantages from England.
[Bülow’s comment, “Also the reverse. The calmer relations we have with
Russia, the more will England treat us with respect, not to say take
great care with respect to us.”]
The Emperor proposed that Count Hatzfeldt be instructed not to refuse
the overture abruptly, but rather to express pleasure at the prospect of
a profitable co-operation leading toward an alliance. To the Emperor’s
remark that the pro-German sentiment of the British cabinet would not
long remain concealed from Russia, Count Bülow wrote, “It does not
matter, if only the English cannot prove to the Russians and _vice
versa_ with the evidence in hand that we have played falsely.”[174] In
accordance with the Emperor’s suggestion, Mr. Chamberlain’s offer was
for the time refused.[175]
The German leaders had found the policy by which they hoped to carry out
their program of _Weltpolitik_, already so resoundingly proclaimed in
their speeches and acts.[176] “I am the balance of power,” declared the
Emperor in 1901;[177] and by utilizing the advantages of that position,
he and his advisers hoped to gain colonial concessions from the Powers,
to construct the Bagdad Railway, and to build the German battle fleet.
It was a policy of finesse and at times of intrigue, one nicely suited
to Count Bülow’s ingratiating nature, but one full of pitfalls. Success
depended upon whether Anglo-Russian and Anglo-French hostility was
temporary or relatively permanent, upon whether Mr. Chamberlain was in
earnest in declaring that Great Britain must abandon her policy of
isolation,[178] upon whether German diplomacy would be competent to
force concessions from those Powers without driving them together.
Guided by Emperor William II, Count Bülow, and Herr von Holstein, the
policy of the “free hand” seemed almost foredoomed to failure.
In 1898 the Emperor was thirty-nine years of age, but experience had
taught him very little caution, moderation, or political understanding.
He remained the spoiled sovereign of a spoiled country; each had risen
to power so rapidly as to be unable to take this position for granted
and not to demand explicit recognition of it, and as to be inclined
consequently to abuse its power. The Emperor’s belief in and practice of
his divine right to rule were not tempered by any consistent application
to his task. While not devoid of political intuition, he lacked most of
the qualities of a statesman. He was brilliant, but erratic and
impulsive. In spite of his seeming wide knowledge, he was mentally lazy
and devoid of profundity. Of a highly nervous temperament, he was guided
chiefly by his emotions. He appeared rigid, severe, and forbidding on
state occasions, but he loved to relax, to be jocose and sociable. He
could be cordial and wonderfully amiable and charming, like his mother,
and again, when his temper was aroused, he could be ruthless and
crushing. He spoke often and dramatically, and traveled as much and as
widely as he could. He frequently antagonized and angered people
unintentionally by his imperious obtuseness. Then he would feel
aggrieved and abused, for he expected all the understanding to come from
the other side. One could not take him at his word; one had to interpret
his meaning from his acts and intentions as well. At times his words
would leave exactly the opposite meaning from that which he intended. He
once remarked to Sir Frank Lascelles, the British ambassador, that “the
noodles seem to have had a lucid interval,” when upon further
conversation it developed he had intended thereby to express his great
satisfaction with the communication from the British government.[179] He
loved to set countries at odds by his intrigues and gossip. His jealousy
of Great Britain, her empire, and her fleet was a cardinal reason both
for his being constantly attracted to England and for his desiring to
become her colonial and naval rival. Nevertheless, after twelve years of
personal contact with the Emperor, Sir Frank Lascelles came to the
following sane conclusion about him:
In spite of his habit of twirling his moustache and rattling his sabre
(I trust that this sentence may be taken in its metaphorical and not in
its literal sense, for, as a matter of fact, I have never either seen
him twirl his moustache or heard him rattle his sword), which he may
think a befitting attitude for the ruler of a mighty Empire, he is
really animated by the most pacific sentiments, and . . . . his great
ambition now is that his name should be handed down to posterity as that
of the German Emperor who kept the peace. It would seem that this is the
estimate which the Emperor has formed of his own character, as in a
recent conversation with Prince Radolin[180] he said he was at a loss to
understand how, with his well-known peaceful intentions, he had come to
be looked upon as a disturbing element—an instance, perhaps, of that
“inconscience” which M. Herbette[181] considered a characteristic of the
German nation, and concluded with the almost pathetic sentence, “Ich bin
doch kein böser Mensch” [I am really not a bad person].[182]
The Emperor’s deficiences were in part made up by Count Bülow, who had
been chosen secretary of state for foreign affairs in 1897 to execute
the program of _Weltpolitik_. Born in 1849 of an old North German
family, he had had diplomatic service at St. Petersburg, Vienna, Athens,
Paris, Bucharest, and Rome where he had been ambassador since 1894. He
came to his task at a crucial time in the history of Germany’s foreign
relations, but he lacked the farsightedness, decision, and firmness of
character necessary to deal with the problems adequately. Although he
learned with time, recognized his mistakes, and tried to readjust the
German foreign policy, he was then unable to do so. While his
cosmopolitan culture and knowledge enabled him to understand other
nations better than most Germans did, he seemed incapable of using this
understanding practically. Under him the German policy appeared to
demand something for nothing, anywhere or everywhere, merely because
Germany was so strong a Power. In 1907 Lord Sanderson, British permanent
undersecretary of state for foreign affairs, 1894-1906, a sane,
sympathetic witness, stigmatized the German method of handling foreign
affairs as follows:
The Germans are very tight bargainers, they have earned the nickname of
“_les Juifs de la diplomatie_.” The German Foreign Office hold to a
traditional view of negotiation that one of the most effective methods
of gaining your point is to show how intensely disagreeable you can make
yourself if you do not. They are surprised that the recollection of
these methods should rankle, and speaking generally the North Germans
combine intense susceptibility as regards themselves with a singular
inability to appreciate the susceptibilities of others.[183]
Under Count Bülow, German foreign policy lacked direction and stability.
It aroused the mistrust of the other Powers, who could not comprehend
what Germany wanted. The Count was abler at extricating himself from
difficulties than at avoiding them. A confirmed optimist at all times,
he was suave and reassuring; the French Ambassador complained that he
“was a fluent speaker but when one came to recall and note down what he
had said very little came out of it.” Sir Frank Lascelles called him a
perfect master at expressing vague generalities.[184] Count Bülow no
doubt had a difficult time keeping the Emperor within bounds and undoing
the latter’s mischief, but he was by no means an able statesman himself,
and he relied for advice upon a person whom many considered a
psychopath.
Since Prince Bismarck’s dismissal in 1890, Herr von Holstein had been a
dominant influence in the German foreign office as the preserver of the
Bismarckian tradition. Strangely secretive, he avoided all publicity and
all responsible offices, yet he lusted after power behind the scenes. He
was irascible, morbidly suspicious, both timorous and bold, by nature
unfit to handle foreign affairs. He could not make up his mind to act.
He could not understand the other government’s viewpoint. He knew few of
the foreign representatives in Berlin personally, and rarely consulted
with any of them. He relied for information chiefly upon the dispatches
and upon newspapers, thus lacking the intimate contact with reality
which might have balanced his recluse judgment. His mobile mind could
make two plus two equal three, five, or seven and a half, but seldom
four. His training under Prince Bismarck had taught him that master’s
use of threats and force but not his caution and comprehensive sagacity.
His adroit and intricate analysis of diplomatic situations and policies
made him a power in the foreign office. The Emperor urged his dismissal,
but Count Bülow clung to him, consulted him on all matters, and
generally followed his advice.[185]
During the next year the German plan worked. On the one hand, with
troubles coming to a head in China, the Sudan, and South Africa, the
British government was grudgingly compelled to play the German game by
agreeing to a division of the Samoan Islands and a prospective partition
of the Portuguese colonies and by acknowledging the utility of similar
accords.[186] On the other hand, an indirect bid for a _rapprochement_
by M. Delcassé in December, 1898,[187] and a proposal from the Russian
government in 1899 for an agreement over Asia Minor[188] signified equal
success, although the German government refused both offers. Then when
the Boer War began late in 1899, Great Britain, surprised by the
universal outburst of hatred against her on the Continent and
apprehensive of German, French, and Russian intervention in favor of the
Boers, had urgent need of Germany’s friendship. Hence the pressing
invitation to the Emperor William II and his foreign secretary in the
autumn of 1899 to visit England.[189]
As Count Bülow cared nothing about the fate of the Boers, the visit took
place (November 21-24). He and the Emperor were received
enthusiastically by government, court, and people. The British ministers
showed anger at France and Russia and a desire for co-operation with
Germany.[190] Mr. Chamberlain, who boldly asserted that the two
countries “must sooner or later come to a general understanding because
we need each other,” repeated his wish for a grouping of Germany, the
United States, and Great Britain.
The German leaders responded as in the previous year that more intimate
relations between the two countries should be prepared for by special
agreements. The British Colonial Minister, readily accepting this
program, suggested two subjects for negotiation, the Bagdad Railway and
Morocco; whereupon it was agreed that he should take up the latter
question with the German Ambassador in the very near future.[191]
The visit to Windsor was apparently a complete success. Both governments
were highly pleased with the results. The only discord in the harmony
was the expression of mutual antagonism on the part of the English and
German press. To counteract this opposition, Mr. Chamberlain, at Count
Bülow’s suggestion,[192] openly advocated his project in a speech at
Leicester on November 30 as follows:
The same sentiments which bring us into closer sympathy with the United
States of America may also be evoked to bring us into closer sympathy
and alliance with the Empire of Germany. . . . . If the union between
England and America is a powerful factor in the cause of peace, a new
triple alliance between the Teutonic race and the two great branches of
the Anglo-Saxon race will be a still more potent influence in the future
of the world.[193]
The Colonial Secretary’s act had the very reverse effect of that
intended, for the German people rejected with vituperation the idea of
allying with the oppressors of the Boers. The German Foreign Minister,
ambitious for the chancellorship when the aged Prince Hohenlohe should
retire, and inclined to follow the dictates of public opinion, felt
compelled to take cognizance of this feeling. Speaking before the
Reichstag on December 11, he made a cool rejoinder to Mr. Chamberlain’s
proposal. In a chauvinistic declaration of Germany’s need for colonies
and a navy, he proclaimed: “As for England we are gladly willing to live
with her in peace and harmony on a basis of complete reciprocity. But
since our international position is at present a favorable one, we must
utilize it in order to safeguard ourselves for the future.”[194]
Mr. Chamberlain was indignant at this reply, even though the German
government made special efforts to explain it away.[195] Hence, as the
two presses were at each other’s throats and the governments were
wrangling over minor troubles arising out of the Boer War, he dropped
the idea of an alliance, presumably also that of a Moroccan accord, at
least until the close of the war.[196]
In 1900, with the French advance on Touat, the Moroccan question became
acute. In April the German government for the first time weighed
carefully its ambitions with reference to Morocco and the means for
realizing them.[197] Count Bülow held that Germany had maritime
interests of her own in that land, and was no longer concerned merely
for the sake of Italy, as she had been ten years before. He coveted
particularly the southern area on the Atlantic Coast. A British seizure
of Moroccan territory without consideration for German interests, he
stated, “would within Germany greatly weaken and discredit the
Government and in its foreign relations make any future co-operation
with England impossible and force us to seek connection with Russia and
France at almost any price”; while an Anglo-French settlement of the
question to the exclusion or detriment of Germany “would have
incalculable results for the further course of German internal and
external policy.” In either case German foreign policy would be forced
to take another direction whether the government wished it or not; and
relations with Great Britain would become more strained than ever
before. In fact, the German government “could not possibly accept either
eventuality.”[198]
In these words lies the key to the understanding of Germany’s
precipitation of the Moroccan crisis in 1905.
To obviate those dangers, the German government preferred an agreement
with Great Britain. In May, 1900, it proposed to Mr. Chamberlain that
they negotiate a Moroccan accord. But the Colonial Minister, while
acknowledging that the only peaceful way to solve the Moroccan problem
was by an agreement between Great Britain and Germany, had become more
wary and requested the German government to make an official proposal
which he could submit to the cabinet. He felt sure, he said, that it
would be favorably received, and promised to support it, provided his
well-known desires were given due consideration.[199]
Fearing a rejection, the German government deemed it inadvisable to
follow Mr. Chamberlain’s suggestion. Nor did Count Bülow warn the
British government that Germany must participate in any Moroccan
settlement, since he believed it possible to prevent the Moroccan affair
from becoming serious until the opportunity for an Anglo-German
agreement arose.[200] He held that an Anglo-French understanding about
Morocco was impossible because of the conflict of French and British
interests over the possession of the south shore of the straits. To
avert a crisis, he issued a discreet warning to M. Delcassé in May,
1900, not to go beyond treaty limits in the action against Touat;[201]
he incited the Russian Foreign Minister, who, he thought, would be
opposed to any Anglo-French agreement or to a European disturbance over
Morocco, to restrain the French Minister;[202] and he instructed the
German representative at Tangier to retard the collapse of the Sherifian
Empire.[203] Thereafter the Moroccan question remained in abeyance for a
time.[204]
In November, 1900, Lord Salisbury resigned the secretaryship of foreign
affairs to Lord Lansdowne. Lord Lansdowne had had a varied life. Of high
aristocratic and wealthy family, he had entered politics as a matter of
course and had served as governor-general of Canada, viceroy of India,
and secretary of state for war. He fitted admirably into his new
position as foreign secretary, for he possessed patience, tact, and the
ability to inspire confidence, and he assumed responsibility with
decision and courage. While he entered office with very few
preconceptions, he wrote to Sir Frank Lascelles, he did believe that “we
should use every effort to maintain and, if we can, to strengthen the
good relations which at present exist between the Queen’s Government and
that of the Emperor” of Germany.[205] In his foreign policy he sided
with the new school, already represented by Mr. Balfour and Mr.
Chamberlain. When King Edward VII gave royal support to this group after
his accession to the throne in January, 1901, the Victorian policy of
“splendid isolation” definitely terminated. However, the old Marquess of
Salisbury remained premier until 1902; and the foreign policy eventually
adopted was a compromise between the old and the new.
The international position of Great Britain remained bad. If anything,
it had grown worse since 1899; for the Boer War lingered on, and France
and Russia were endangering important British interests, the one by her
active policy with reference to Morocco, the other by her use of the
Boxer Rebellion to extend her power in China and by her activity in
Persia and Afghanistan.
In the autumn of 1900, the British government had negotiated an accord
with Germany over China to hold Russia in check.[206] In January of the
next year Mr. Chamberlain, after repeating his assertion that Great
Britain must ally either with Germany and the Triple Alliance or with
France and Russia, proposed to Baron Eckardstein, first secretary of the
German embassy in London, that as an introduction to the project for an
alliance the two governments agree over Morocco. The subject could be
taken up with Lord Lansdowne, he said, as soon as Lord Salisbury, still
in feeble health, left for the south.[207] Before any negotiations were
begun, however, far eastern affairs, as more pressing and vital, brought
to the fore the question of alliance.[208]
Early in 1901, reports were spread of a Russo-Chinese agreement which
would give Russia practically a protectorate in Southern Manchuria. The
problem which thereupon confronted the British government was
illuminatingly summed up by Mr. Bertie, undersecretary of state for
foreign affairs, as follows (March 11, 1901):
Germany has assured Japan that there is no secret understanding between
Germany and Russia respecting the Far East, and that, in the event of a
crisis, Germany will observe a benevolent neutrality, the effect of
which would be to keep the French fleet in check.
The Japanese Government ask whether His Majesty’s Government have been
consulted by Germany, and whether they believe the assurances given to
Japan; and they further ask: “How far may Japan rely upon the support of
Great Britain in case Japan finds it necessary to approach Russia?”
It is assumed by the Japanese Minister that “approach” in the context
means “resist,” which is war.
Unless Japan can make sure of neither Germany nor France taking an
active part on the side of Russia, she will not fight Russia over the
Manchurian Agreement. If the possession of Corea by Russia were at
issue, Japan would fight, with or without support, and independently of
whether France or Germany would remain neutral.
If Germany and England, in answer to the Japanese Government’s
inquiries, deprecated war, and said that if unfortunately war broke out
between Japan and Russia, it would be the object of England and Germany
to restrict as much as possible the theatre of it, and they would
consequently remain neutral, so long as no third Power attempted to take
a part in it, then I think that such an assurance might be sufficient to
satisfy Japan that France would not be allowed to join with Russia, and
that Japan might fight Russia single-handed. . . . .
If France were allowed to side with Russia, and they crushed Japan, the
result might be a renewal of the triple understanding—viz., Russia,
France, and Germany. Those three Powers would become supreme in China,
and we should go to the wall.
If Russia alone, or in combination with France, defeated Japan, and we
came to the rescue to prevent the obliteration of Japan, we should incur
the lasting enmity of Russia and France, and a defeated, and probably
ungrateful, Japan would not be of much use to us as against Russian
encroachments.
It has been suggested that if Japan defeated Russia there would be grave
danger to European interests in the Far East.
A great military and naval Power, with unbounded natural resources and
an immense population such as Russia, is not likely to accept defeat
permanently. She would reorganize for a further trial of strength, but
such a trial might be a long way off, and it would be greatly retarded
by Japan being allowed to take as the spoils of war the Liaotung
Peninsula. Its possession by Japan would be a guarantee that there would
be no reconciliation between Russia and Japan. This would be an
advantage to England and Europe. The yellow danger would be kept in
check by Russia and the Russian danger by Japan.
If we do nothing to encourage Japan to look upon us as a friend and
possible ally against Russia and France, we may drive her to a policy of
despair, in which she may come to some sort of terms with Russia. I do
not say that it is probable, but it is possible, and our interests would
greatly suffer if she did.[209]
Therein lies the deciding reason why the British government tried to
secure the support of Germany; why it made the alliance with Japan when
this attempt came to naught; and why it subsequently established the
entente with France. An agreement with Germany, supplemented by one with
Japan, would have solved Great Britain’s difficulty of defending her
colonial interests by assuring the maintenance of the balance of power
in Europe. Failing this, an alliance with Japan and a policy of
reconciliation and entente with the other Powers furnished the best
solution. But in any case either alliance or close friendship with a
European Power was essential.
At the time the prospect of obtaining German aid looked favorable. The
German Emperor had rushed impetuously to the bedside of the dying Queen
Victoria late in January, 1901, and had remained for her funeral. In his
talk with the British officials he had denounced Russia for her
aggressions in China, had informed them that Great Britain needed an
alliance, and, in a dinner speech at Marlborough House on February 5,
had declared: “We ought to form an Anglo-German alliance, you to keep
the seas while we would be responsible for the land.”[210]
Late in January the British government tried to obtain German aid
against the Russian aggressions in Manchuria by calling into action the
Anglo-German agreement of the previous year; but the German government
refused to permit an interpretation of that accord which would embroil
it with its eastern neighbor.[211] Instead, it tried to persuade the
British government to connive at embroiling Russia and Japan in war
without binding themselves.[212] It assured Japan of the localization of
that conflict by remarking that Germany would remain neutral and would
thereby hold France neutral. In March, Lord Lansdowne, following up this
assertion, asked Baron Eckardstein if Germany would undertake to hold
France neutral in case of war (March 16). In violation of strict orders
from Herr von Holstein “not to breathe a word of alliance” to the
British government,[213] Baron Eckardstein replied that “if there were a
defensive alliance between Germany and Great Britain covering all
eventualities,” Germany would be able to do so.[214] Two days later Lord
Lansdowne declared to the Baron that “England now stands at a turning
point and must decide upon her future policy”; and in accordance with
the Baron’s strong hint, a defensive alliance was tentatively set forth
for consideration. By its terms each Power should preserve neutrality in
case of an attack upon the other by either France or Russia but should
come to its aid in case of an attack by those two Powers combined.[215]
Baron Eckardstein reported the proposal as coming from the British
Minister, and his government looked upon it as a British offer. Lord
Lansdowne made the Baron responsible for the initiative. With the
existing evidence, the contradiction cannot be cleared up; yet as each
government was under the impression that the other had taken the first
step and was therefore more eager for the alliance than was really the
case, the negotiations endured longer than they might otherwise have
done.[216]
In the next two and a half months the course of the negotiations was
checkered. On March 22, Baron Eckardstein unofficially brought up the
subject with Lord Lansdowne. During their discussion they agreed that it
would be best for the _casus foederis_ to arise when one of the Powers
was attacked by two or more Powers, and that the accord should be
ratified by the two parliaments. The British Secretary declared that the
Premier approved “in principle of a strictly defined defensive
alliance.”[217] On March 29 they again touched on the matter; but owing
to Lord Lansdowne’s inability to consult his chief, who was ill, and
owing to a flare-up between the two governments over a minor matter
connected with the Chinese customs, Baron Eckardstein postponed the
negotiations.[218] On April 9 he was ready to resume the discussion; and
for the first time he mentioned to the British Minister the
indispensable stipulation of his government, that Austria-Hungary and
Italy must also be included in the alliance.[219]
From the start the attitude of the German government toward these
proposals was mistrustful. Since the British government had been
disinclined to execute the Anglo-German accord of 1898 for a future
division of the Portuguese Colonies, the German government was reluctant
to consider even Mr. Chamberlain’s suggestion for an accord over
Morocco, at least until events permitted its immediate execution.[220]
Count Bülow and Herr von Holstein refused to believe that the British
government would make an alliance so long as Lord Salisbury remained in
authority. Moreover, they feared that if the negotiations failed and
became known to France and Russia, owing to British perfidy or to
Parliament’s rejecting the treaty—and either outcome seemed likely to
them—Germany would be the one to suffer from the wrath of those two
Powers while Great Britain, protected by the sea, would enjoy greater
international security than before.
I am especially mistrustful of this present storm of friendship by
Chamberlain and comrades [wrote Herr von Holstein to Count Metternich]
because the threatened understanding with Russia and France is such
complete fraud. A retreat by England would postpone her struggle for
existence for a few years, but would then make it all the more certain,
because the opponents [France and Russia] will have been strengthened,
while the English will have been weakened in power and prestige. A
reasonable agreement with England, that is, one in which a proper
consideration is given to the almost certain danger of war to which we
should thereby expose ourselves, can in my opinion first be achieved
when the appreciation of her constrained position has become more
general in England than it is at present.[221]
Count Bülow, chancellor since the previous October, held the same view.
In fact, he was even more inclined to preserve the policy of the “free
hand.” “Facts, sir, facts,” he wrote in connection with this question of
alliance, and above all he wanted facts in the form of colonial
acquisitions in Africa.[222] So while sensible of the power of such an
alliance, these two would have it only on German terms, an alliance
between the British Empire, on the one hand, and the Triple Alliance, on
the other; or, as an alternative formulation, an alliance by which Great
Britain joined the Triple Alliance.[223] To obviate all possibility of
betrayal, they instructed Baron Eckardstein to demand of Lord Lansdowne
the acceptance of this basic condition before continuing the
negotiations. Not until then, they declared, should the terms of the
Triple Alliance be imparted to the British government.[224]
Conversations were resumed in the second half of May. When, on May 23,
Count Hatzfeldt made clear to Lord Lansdowne the provision of his
government, an _impasse_ was soon reached. The British Foreign Secretary
approved the project of alliance in principle, but he had never expected
much to come of it. Upon ascertaining the German condition he foresaw a
breakdown when the time came to formulate the terms.[225]
Moreover, Lord Salisbury persistently refused to admit that Great
Britain needed an alliance. He asserted that it would be a bad bargain
to join the Triple Alliance, for the “liability of having to defend the
German and the Austrian frontiers against Russia is heavier than that of
having to defend the British Isles against France.” He opposed any
secret agreement on the grounds that Parliament had the right to decide
questions of war and peace; and he continued to favor isolation and
dependence on public opinion to determine governmental policy in a
crisis. Nor did he believe that German public opinion, so hostile to
Great Britain, would accept an Anglo-German defensive alliance.[226]
Thus while some of the members of the cabinet discussed the possible
terms of an alliance, and Sir Thomas Sanderson, permanent undersecretary
of state for foreign affairs, even drew up two trial drafts of a treaty,
the opposition of Lord Salisbury together with the German refusal to
communicate the terms of the Triple Alliance forced the negotiations to
a halt in June.[227]
The German Chancellor readily accepted this turn of affairs. After
expressing a desire for a future alliance, he assured the British
government that Germany would continue the policy of the “free
hand.”[228]
The visit of the Moroccan embassy to London and Berlin in June and July
afforded an opportunity to revive the Moroccan question. Lord
Lansdowne’s uneasiness about the French actions with reference to
Morocco was not allayed by the French Ambassador’s assertion to him on
July 3 that France had no intention of raising that problem.[229] But
nothing was done.[230]
When el-Menebhi, the leader of that embassy, was dismissed in disgrace
on his return home, the British Foreign Secretary expressed the wish to
remain in constant touch with the German government on the Moroccan
question.[231] Each Power, however, acted separately in defending the
Moroccan Minister; and the German government looked on this as another
occasion in which Great Britain was trying to employ Germany to defend
British interests. The German leaders likewise thought that by refusing
to make any separate agreements with Great Britain they would eventually
force the latter to accept their terms for an alliance.[232]
As soon as the negotiations with Germany showed no prospect of success,
the British government followed up Japan’s offer of an alliance and in
August began official conversations on that subject.[233] None the less
it continued its efforts to make some kind of agreement with Germany.
But on August 23, at Wilhelmshöhe, a meeting between Emperor William II
and King Edward VII, which the British leaders hoped would pave the way
for an understanding, had no result.[234] In November, Lord Lansdowne
regarded the difficulties in the way of an alliance as “at the present
moment virtually insuperable,” enumerating some of them as follows:
1. The impossibility of arriving at a definition of the _casus foederis_
which would not be either so rigid as to greatly hamper our freedom of
action or so vague as to deprive the alliance of all practical value.
2. The certainty of alienating France and Russia.
3. Complications with the Colonies, which might not at all approve of
the idea of hanging on to the skirts of the Triple Alliance.
4. The risk of entangling ourselves in a policy which might be hostile
to America. Without knowledge of the German Emperor’s views in regard to
the United States, this is to my mind a formidable obstacle.
5. The difficulty of carrying Parliament with us at a moment when the
Parliamentary situation is as little satisfactory as it is at
present.[235]
But, he wrote, “the argument that, because we have in the past survived
in spite of our isolation, we need have no misgivings as to the effect
of that isolation in the future,” could be pushed too far. Besides,
since negotiations then in progress for an alliance with Japan virtually
signified that Great Britain did not wish to remain alone, he proposed
that the government seek “a much more limited understanding with Germany
as to our policy in regard to certain matters of interest to both
Powers”—for instance, they might agree to co-operate for the
preservation of the territorial _status quo_ on the shores of the
Mediterranean, the Adriatic, the Aegean, and the Black Seas, for the
maintenance of the “freedom for the commerce and navigation . . . . in
the Persian Gulf, and the prevention of any territorial acquisitions on
its shores by other Powers which might interfere with that object.” But
only “whenever the occasion for it might arise” should the nature of
their co-operation be determined.[236]
The Premier remained vigorously opposed to the project; but Lord
Lansdowne urged that the German government probably expected him to
reopen the negotiations, and that if he made this offer, that government
would be deprived of any grounds for complaining that Great Britain “had
treated it inconsiderately or brusquely rejected its overture.” As he
also suspected that “the German Gov’t. (or the German Emperor) desire
something much more precise and far-reaching . . . . and that they would
refuse an overture on the above lines,” he maintained that the proposal
could cause no damage.[237]
On December 19 the British Foreign Minister recalled to Count
Metternich, the new German ambassador at London, the negotiations for an
alliance and stated that “while . . . . we certainly did not regard the
German proposal with an unfriendly or indifferent eye, I did not think
that for the moment we could afford to take it up.” Instead he suggested
that the two governments arrive at “an understanding with regard to the
policy which they might pursue in reference to particular questions or
in particular parts of the world in which they are alike interested.”
Count Metternich expressed surprise that the British government had not
“jumped at” this “magnificent opportunity” to end its isolation, and
replied that he did not expect his government to favor this restricted
proposal. “It was a case of the whole or none.”[238]
There the matter rested. Lord Lansdowne and King Edward were both
dissatisfied with Count Metternich’s critical tone;[239] but they
continued to voice their solicitude, which the German Emperor and Count
Bülow reciprocated, that the two governments keep in close touch.[240]
However, public opinion in both countries remained bitterly hostile, and
when in October, 1901, Mr. Chamberlain spoke disparagingly of the
actions of the German army in the war of 1870-71, the protest of the
German press was so vehement that the Chancellor, on January 8, 1902,
declared in the Reichstag, “let the man go and do not become excited. He
bites on granite.”[241] The pleasant visit of the Prince of Wales to
Germany a short time later did not offset the discord resulting from
this war of words.[242] By March, Count Metternich wrote that he
“wouldn’t give two pence for Anglo-German relations”; while the
Chancellor admitted that so far as Great Britain was concerned the
Emperor was Germany’s “best card.”[243] It was a dismal fiasco for so
momentous a negotiation.
The British government thought that by considering an alliance the
German leaders had manifested friendly feeling. Lord Lansdowne did not
believe that the animosity of Germany toward Great Britain would last
forever or that Germany would “let us ‘go under’ before a great European
coalition.” “Is it not more likely,” he wrote, April 22, 1902, to Sir
Frank Lascelles, “that she will stick to her rôle of the honest broker,
taking advantage, if you like, of our difficulties in order to pursue a
_politique de pourboire_ at our expense, but without pooling her
ironclads with those of France and Russia?” The Ambassador agreed with
him; but after talking to the British naval attaché in Berlin he pointed
out for the first time that the German navy was definitely aimed at
Great Britain.[244] The future for Anglo-German relations was therefore
none too bright for the British government, and British public opinion
cordially approved when on January 30, 1902, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance
was concluded.
The German government was not at all alarmed by this failure. Its
relations with France and Russia were of the best. As a result of the
Anglo-German intimacy in 1901, M. Delcassé had twice endeavored to
approach Germany, while in September, during a meeting at Danzig of the
Russian and German rulers together with their foreign ministers, the
Russian Minister had asserted that “an alliance between Germany and
Russia would be the greatest blessing and is a goal to be striven for.”
The overtures were disregarded.[245] When the Anglo-Japanese Alliance
was concluded in February, 1902, the Russian government urged Germany to
enter a Continental combination against those Powers; but Count Bülow,
pleased to see obviated the possibility of an Anglo-Russian
understanding, bluntly rejected the proposal.[246] Nor did he believe
that, since Russia and Great Britain were so decisively at odds, France
would dare make an accord with the latter.[247] And Herr von Holstein
wrote on December 31, 1901, that “at the present day Germany with her
enormous strength on land and sea is a factor which no Power that wishes
to perform an important act dare leave in its rear without having
previously come to an understanding with her.”[248]
Thus, the German apostles of _Weltpolitik_ guiding the destinies of an
acquisitive and chauvinistic nation, refused to co-operate with Great
Britain, France, or Russia. Apparently they did not know what they
wanted or how they might utilize their favorable situation; for they
derived no benefits whatever from any of the opportunities offered. An
Anglo-German agreement would have prevented the formation of the Entente
Cordiale and would very likely have brought about a settlement of the
Moroccan question to Germany’s advantage. By cultivating France and
encouraging her to draw closer, Germany might have come to some
agreement with that Power through which she could have prevented the
later Entente Cordiale from becoming so cordial, and through which she
might have shared in the general improvement of relations between the
Powers and in the settlement of the Moroccan question. The whole
Moroccan crisis and many others to follow might thereby have been
avoided. In a world of shifting friendships, of swiftly changing
policies, a world demanding resolute and judicious statesmanship, the
German Chancellor and Herr von Holstein refused to take risks. Toward
the British government they had showed themselves too sensitive,
suspicious, and peremptory in their demands.[249] The French and Russian
governments they had rebuffed even more brusquely. Deluded by wrong
preconceptions of international politics and overprudent in their
negotiations, they believed themselves entirely safe in playing their
favorite rôle of sphinx and of aligning with no one.[250] Their naval
program alarmed Great Britain; their construction of the Bagdad Railway
antagonized Russia; their Moroccan policy exasperated France. They
played against all three Powers, and still did not expect them to draw
together against a common opponent. Instead of alliances or ententes,
they reaped animosities. By their refusals and their clumsy diplomacy,
they paved the road for the Anglo-French and the Anglo-Russian ententes.
And when, a few years later, those Powers came to agreement, the German
leaders feared that their country was being encircled and isolated.
[Footnote 161: Memo. by Bertie, March 14, 1898, _B.D._, I, 17 f., No.
24; memo. by Tilley, on relations between Russia and Great Britain,
1892-1904, Jan. 14, 1905, _ibid._, 1 ff., No. 1; O’Conor to Salisbury,
March 15, 1898, _ibid._, 20, No. 29; Salisbury to O’Conor, March 24,
1898, _ibid._, 24 f., No. 38; Monson to Salisbury, Feb. 26, 1898,
_ibid._, 146, No. 172; Monson to Salisbury, March 6, 1898, _ibid._, 147,
No. 173; Monson to Salisbury, May 19, 1898, _ibid._, 154, No. 179; memo.
by Bertie, June 30, 1898, _ibid._, 54, No. 72; Erich Brandenburg, _Von
Bismarck zum Weltkriege_ (Berlin, 1924), chaps. iv, v; Sir A. W. Ward
and G. P. Gooch (eds.), _The Cambridge History of British Foreign
Policy, 1783-1919_ (Cambridge, 1923), Vol. III, chaps. iii, iv,
_passim_; _G.P._, Vol. XIV, chap. xci. The British were especially
concerned over maintaining the open door in China. See Alfred L. P.
Dennis, _Adventures in American Diplomacy, 1896-1906_ (New York, 1928),
pp. 179, 182 f.]
[Footnote 162: For expressions of this fear see Gwynn, _The Letters and
Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring Rice_, I, 182 f., 225 f., 331 f.]
[Footnote 163: Hatzfeldt to Hohenlohe, April 26, 1898, _G.P._, XIV, 221
ff., No. 3793; dispatches from Hatzfeldt recounting conversations with
Salisbury, May 12, 15, 1898, _ibid._, 230 ff., and notes; Hatzfeldt to
F. O., May 15, 1898, _ibid._, 233 ff., No. 3797. The best exposition of
Salisbury’s views is given in a memorandum by him, May 29, 1901, _B.D._,
II, 68 f., No. 86. See also J. A. Spender, _The Public Life_ (New York,
1925), I, 79; Salisbury to Lansdowne, April 21, 1897, Newton, _Lord
Lansdowne, A Biography_, pp. 145 f. On Aug. 30, 1899, Salisbury wrote to
Lansdowne that the British army would not be needed for a Continental
war “in a blue moon” (_ibid._, p. 157).]
[Footnote 164: Salisbury to O’Conor, Jan. 17, 25, 1898, _B.D._, I, 5,
No. 5; 8, No. 9; and others in _ibid._, chap. i.]
[Footnote 165: Dennis, pp. 170 f.]
[Footnote 166: Salisbury was prime minister from 1895 to 1902.]
[Footnote 167: On Chamberlain see Spender, I, 79.]
[Footnote 168: Hatzfeldt, German ambassador to London, also thought that
the Liberal leaders, Lord Rosebery and Sir William Harcourt, approved of
Chamberlain’s plan. Hatzfeldt to Hohenlohe, April 7, 1898, _G.P._, XIV,
209 ff., No. 3788. See also Gwynn, I, 188, 191.]
[Footnote 169: Lieut. Col. Grierson, British military attaché at Berlin,
reported to the British Ambassador a conversation with the Emperor on
Jan. 15, 1898, as follows: “He [the Emperor] said that for eight years
he had striven to be friendly with Great Britain to gain her alliance,
and to work hand in hand with her, but had failed” (Grierson to
Lascelles, Jan. 19, 1898, _B.D._, I, 42, No. 62). The Emperor said the
same to Lascelles on Feb. 1. See Lascelles to Salisbury, Feb. 1, 1898,
_ibid._, 43 f., No. 63; memo. by Tilley on the relations between Germany
and Great Britain (1892-1904), Jan. 5, 1905, _ibid._, Appendix, 322 ff.;
Brandenburg, chaps. i-iv.]
[Footnote 170: Russia had just occupied Port Arthur. In speaking to the
Russian Ambassador about that act on March 24, Balfour declared that the
British government regarded it with “grave objection,” as a “menace” to
the friendship of the two countries. See Salisbury to O’Conor, March 24,
1898, _B.D._, I, 24 f., No. 38.]
[Footnote 171: Monson to Salisbury, March 6, 1898, _ibid._, 147, No.
173. Salisbury tried to obtain the support of the United States on
Chinese affairs (Dennis, p. 170).]
[Footnote 172: It was on March 24 that Hatzfeldt reported that Alfred
Rothschild had arranged a meeting between him and Chamberlain and
Balfour. See Hatzfeldt to F. O., March 24, 1898, _G.P._, XIV, 193 f.,
No. 3779. For reports of the conversations between Hatzfeldt and Balfour
and Chamberlain see the following dispatches: Hatzfeldt to F. O., March
25, 29, April 1, 1898, _ibid._, 195 ff., Nos. 3781, 3782, 3784;
Hatzfeldt to Hohenlohe, April 26, 1898, _ibid._, 221 ff., No. 3793. The
editors of the _British Documents_ could find “practically no evidence”
concerning this proposal in the archives of the British foreign office,
and have stated that Chamberlain apparently treated the affair as
private (_B.D._, Vol. I, Foreword). See also the dispatch from Lascelles
to Balfour, Aug. 23, 1898, _ibid._, 101, No. 122. That Chamberlain was
uncertain about the sort of agreement he wished was evident from the
different formulations of the proposal which he made. As to the American
aspect of his plan, Chamberlain was influenced by Ambassador John Hay,
who supported the idea of an Anglo-American alliance. On May 13, 1898,
at Birmingham the British Minister spoke publicly in favor of that
alliance (Dennis, pp. 117 f., 122). Nothing of course came of the
matter. The great affinity for the United States on the part of the
British government was shown in July, 1898, by its indirect warning to
Germany not to interfere in the Spanish-American War (Gwynn, I, 251,
253). On the Anglo-German negotiations for an alliance see Friedrich
Meinecke, _Geschichte des deutsch-englischen Bündnisproblems, 1890-1901_
(München and Berlin, 1927); Eugen Fischer, _Holsteins Grosses Nein_
(Berlin, 1925).]
[Footnote 173: Holstein thought that the possibility for this alliance
would first enter “when (1) Russia threatens us; (2) England acts less
haughty than today.” See Holstein’s minute to a dispatch from Hatzfeldt
to Hohenlohe, April 26, 1898, _G.P._, XIV, 223, No. 3793. On the German
reaction see also the dispatch from Bülow to Hatzfeldt, April 3, 1898,
_ibid._, 204 ff., No. 3785, and the following documents.]
[Footnote 174: William II to F. O., April 10, 1898, _ibid._, 217 f., No.
3790.]
[Footnote 175: Bülow to Hatzfeldt, April 3, 24, 1898, _ibid._, 207, No.
3785; 218 ff., No. 3792.]
[Footnote 176: In January, 1896, the Emperor had sent the famous
telegram to President Krueger of the Transvaal which was regarded by the
British as showing a desire to take the Boers under Germany’s wing. On
Dec. 6, 1897, Bülow in his first speech before the Reichstag as
secretary of state for foreign affairs declared: “The days are past when
the German left to one neighbor the earth, to another the sea, and
reserved for himself the air. . . . . We do not wish to place anyone in
the shadow, but we demand also our place in the sun” (Bülow, _Reden_, I,
7 f.). In 1898 the first important navy bill was passed by the
Reichstag. On September 23, 1898, the Emperor declared, “Our future lies
on the sea” (G. P. Gooch, _History of Modern Europe, 1878-1919_ [New
York, 1923], pp. 225 ff.). These were merely a few examples of Germany’s
changed interests.]
[Footnote 177: William II to Bülow, Jan. 29, 1901, _G.P._, XVII, 28, No.
4987.]
[Footnote 178: Hatzfeldt to Hohenlohe, April 26, 1898, _ibid._, 224, No.
3793.]
[Footnote 179: The occasion for this remark was the conclusion of the
Anglo-Japanese Alliance early in 1902 (Lascelles to Lansdowne, Feb. 8,
1902, Newton, p. 247).]
[Footnote 180: German ambassador at Paris at the time.]
[Footnote 181: Formerly French ambassador at Berlin.]
[Footnote 182: Extract from “General Report on Germany for 1906, May 24,
1907,” _B.D._, III, 437 f.]
[Footnote 183: Memo. by Sanderson, Feb. 21, 1907, _ibid._, p. 429.]
[Footnote 184: Whitehead to Lansdowne, June 28, 1905, _ibid._, 108 f.,
No. 135; extract from “General Report on Germany for 1906,” _ibid._, p.
435.]
[Footnote 185: Emil Ludwig, _Wilhelm der Zweite_ (Berlin, 1926); G. P.
Gooch, “Baron von Holstein,” _Cambridge Historical Journal_, Vol. I;
Johannes Haller, _Die Ära Bülow; eine historisch-politische Studie_
(Stuttgart and Berlin, 1922); Otto Hammann, _Bilder aus der letzten
Kaiserzeit_ (Berlin, 1922); extract from “General Report on Germany for
1906,” _op. cit._, III, 434 ff.; Wilhelm Spickernagel, _Fürst Bülow_
(Hamburg, 1921); André Tardieu, _Le Prince de Bülow_ (Paris, 1909).]
[Footnote 186: _G.P._, Vol. XIV, chaps. xcii, xcvi; _B.D._, Vol. I,
chaps. ii, iii.]
[Footnote 187: Memo. by Huhn, Dec. 5, 1898, _G.P._, XIII, 247 ff., No.
3558. See above.]
[Footnote 188: Memo. by Bülow, April 18, 1899, _ibid._, XIV, 540 f., No.
4017, and the following documents. According to a memorandum by Bülow on
May 5, 1899, Count Osten-Sacken, the Russian ambassador, attempted “in
every way” to convince him that Germany “should hold in all questions to
Russia and France and take position against England.” “England is strong
only because Germany and France do not co-operate,” said the Ambassador
(_ibid._, 546 ff., No. 4020).]
[Footnote 189: Hatzfeldt to F. O., Sept. 30, 1899, _ibid._, XV, 397, No.
4386; Bülow to F. O., Sept. 25, 1899, _ibid._, 396 f., No. 4385; Monson
to Salisbury, Aug. 14, 1899, _B.D._, I, 213, No. 259; Monson to
Salisbury, Oct. 1, 1899, _ibid._, 233, No. 285; and other documents in
_ibid._, chap. vii.; Dennis, pp. 125 ff.]
[Footnote 190: Salisbury was absent on account of the death of his wife,
but the officials in the British foreign office assured Hatzfeldt that
the premier was not at all prejudiced against Germany, as the latter
supposed. See Hatzfeldt to Hohenlohe, Dec. 2, 1899, _G.P._, XV, 423, No.
4401; cf. Gwynn, I, 351.]
[Footnote 191: On this visit see Lee, _King Edward VII_, I, 747;
Eckardstein, _Lebenserinnerungen und politische Denkwürdigkeiten_, Vol.
II, chaps. iv, v; memo. by Bülow, Nov. 24, 1899, _G.P._, XV, 413 f., No.
4398; Eckardstein to Hatzfeldt, Nov. 30, 1899, _ibid._, 421 f., No.
4400; Hatzfeldt to Hohenlohe, Dec. 2, 1899, _ibid._, 422 ff., No. 4401.]
[Footnote 192: Eckardstein, II, 107.]
[Footnote 193: _Annual Register_ (1899), p. 227. Salisbury agreed to
this act, but warned Chamberlain that Germany would very probably
disappoint him (Spring Rice to Miss Lascelles, April 17, 1902, Gwynn, I,
351).]
[Footnote 194: Bülow, I, 88 ff.]
[Footnote 195: Eckardstein, II, 126 ff., 133 ff.]
[Footnote 196: _Ibid._, p. 125.]
[Footnote 197: On several previous occasions Morocco had been the topic
of conversation between British and German officials. In January, 1897,
not to go back any farther, Lord Salisbury had sounded the German
government on that question, but the latter had not been interested
(_G.P._, XVII, No. 4979 n.). But when the subject was brought up in a
conversation between the Premier and Hatzfeldt in February and again in
June, 1899, the German policy, now launched on its career of
_Weltpolitik_, was different. Salisbury stated that in case of the
break-up of the Sherifian Empire, “Great Britain could not with
indifference see the Atlantic seaboard pass under any other dominion.”
Hatzfeldt replied that in his personal opinion his government would
approve a British acquisition of territory in that land only in case
Germany received her share; and he added that it would be very desirable
to exchange views and ideas on the subject whenever action should become
pressing. Salisbury, however, expressed the wish for the _status quo_ to
be indefinitely maintained, and refused to enter into details. See
Hatzfeldt to Bülow, Feb. 8, 1899, _ibid._, 295 f., No. 5152; Salisbury
to Lascelles, June 7, 1899, _B.D._, II, 256 f., No. 307.
A short time before the visit to Windsor in Nov., 1899, Chamberlain
suggested to Eckardstein that the two governments make a secret
agreement over Morocco by which the Mediterranean coast should be left
free for Great Britain while Germany should receive far-reaching
concessions on the Atlantic seaboard. See Hatzfeldt to F. O., _G.P._,
XVII, 297, No. 5153. Eckardstein also states that in Jan., 1901,
Chamberlain and Devonshire both told him that in 1899 Salisbury had
approved the idea of a solution of the Moroccan problem with Germany
(Eckardstein, II, 359).]
[Footnote 198: These remarks by Bülow were chiefly contained in his
minutes to the dispatches from Hatzfeldt. See Bülow to Münster, April
27, 1900, _G.P._, XVII, 299 ff., No. 5156; Hatzfeldt to Hohenlohe, May
1, 1900, _ibid._, 303 ff., No. 5159; Hatzfeldt to F. O., May 27, 1900,
_ibid._, 309 ff., No. 5162; Bülow to Hatzfeldt, May 29, 1900, _ibid._,
313 f., No. 5165; Hatzfeldt to Hohenlohe, June 1, 1900, _ibid._, 314
ff., No. 5166.]
[Footnote 199: Bülow’s plan was also to associate Italy later in the
Moroccan settlement. See Bülow to Hatzfeldt, May 14, 1900, _ibid._, 302
f., No. 5158; Hatzfeldt to Hohenlohe, May 21, 1900, _ibid._, 303 ff.,
No. 5159; Bülow to Hatzfeldt, May 23, 1900, _ibid._, 308 f., Nos. 5160
f.; Hatzfeldt to F. O., May 27, 1900, _ibid._, 309 ff., No. 5162.]
[Footnote 200: Hatzfeldt to Hohenlohe, May 21, 1900, _ibid._, 303 ff.,
No. 5159; Bülow to Hatzfeldt, May 23, 1900, _ibid._, 308, No. 5160;
Hatzfeldt to F. O., May 27, 1900, _ibid._, 309 ff., No. 5162; Bülow to
Hatzfeldt, May 28, 1900, _ibid._, 311 f., No. 5163; Hatzfeldt to F. O.,
May 29, 1900, _ibid._, 312 f., No. 5164; Hatzfeldt to Hohenlohe, June 1,
1900, _ibid._, 314 ff., No. 5166.]
[Footnote 201: Bülow to Münster, April 27, 1900, _ibid._, 299 f., No.
5156; Münster to Hohenlohe, May 9, 1900, _ibid._, 301 f., No. 5157.]
[Footnote 202: Bülow to Tschirschky, June 5, 1900, _ibid._, 318 ff., No.
5167; Bülow to Hatzfeldt, June 13, 1900, _ibid._, 321 ff., No. 5168.]
[Footnote 203: Derenthall to Mentzingen, Aug. 2, 1900, _ibid._, 324, No.
5170.]
[Footnote 204: Bülow to Hatzfeldt, June 30, 1900, _ibid._, 323 ff., No.
5169 and note.]
[Footnote 205: Newton, pp. 196 f.]
[Footnote 206: _G.P._, Vol. XVI, chap. cv; _B.D._, Vol. II, chap. ix,
Part I.]
[Footnote 207: Eckardstein, II, 235 ff.; Hatzfeldt to F. O., Jan. 18,
1901, _G.P._, XVII, 14 ff., No. 4979. In the same month Lansdowne
expressed to the German government the desire to remain in “complete
harmony” with it on Chinese affairs. See Lascelles to Lansdowne, Jan. 4,
1901, _B.D._, II, 20 f., No. 25; Lascelles to Lansdowne, Jan. 18, 1901,
_ibid._, 21 f., No. 26.]
[Footnote 208: On those far eastern troubles see _G.P._, Vol. XVI;
_B.D._, Vol. II, chap. ix.]
[Footnote 209: _B.D._, II, 43, No. 54. On Anglo-Russian relations see
also Newton, pp. 215 f.]
[Footnote 210: Quoted in Lee, II, 11. This was against Bülow’s advice
(Bülow to William II, Jan. 21, 1901, _G.P._, XVII, 20 f., No. 4983). On
the Emperor’s visit see Eckardstein to F. O., Jan. 29, 1901, _ibid._, 23
f., No. 4986; William II to Bülow, Jan. 29, 1901, _ibid._, 24 ff., No.
4987; Lansdowne’s memo., Jan., 1901, Newton, p. 199. The Emperor had
been given an enthusiastic welcome in England. The Harmsworth press had
called him “A Friend in Need” (Newton, p. 198).]
[Footnote 211: Memo. by Mühlberg, Jan. 28, 1901, _G.P._, XVI, 286, No.
4785, and following documents.]
[Footnote 212: Lansdowne to Lascelles, March 18, 1901, Newton, pp. 199
f.]
[Footnote 213: Eckardstein, II, 279.]
[Footnote 214: He naturally did not report this statement to Berlin
(_ibid._, pp. 280 f.).]
[Footnote 215: _Ibid._, pp. 277 ff.; Eckardstein to F. O., March 19,
1901, _G.P._, XVII, 41 f., No. 4994; Lansdowne to Lascelles, March 18,
1901, _B.D._, II, 61, No. 77; Newton, pp. 199 f. As the Ambassador was
ill during most of this time, Eckardstein carried on the negotiations.]
[Footnote 216: Eckardstein has written in his memoirs that in his
private correspondence with Holstein he took the latter’s peculiarities
into account and used expressions that were adapted to his “complex
mentality.” “For instance, I very often avoided using the word
_alliance_ and spoke of a _defensive arrangement_; then I emphasized
that the whole affair was yet in embryo, although in fact the
negotiations progressed very smoothly and were on the point of
conclusion, etc. As soon as the negotiations began to run smoothly and
lightly, Holstein became suspicious, and if the other party were willing
to accede to our wishes, smelled a rat.” The truth seems to be that for
this very reason Eckardstein sent home not less but more favorable
reports of the British desire for an alliance than was really the case,
and by stretching his instructions to the utmost in his ardent desire to
ally the two Powers, may have been responsible for the contradiction
mentioned above (Eckardstein, II, 273).]
[Footnote 217: Hatzfeldt to F. O., March 23, 1901, _G.P._, XVII, 46 ff.,
No. 4997; Eckardstein, II, 321 ff.]
[Footnote 218: Lansdowne to Lascelles, March 29, 1901, _B.D._, II, 62,
No. 79; Eckardstein, II, 326 ff.]
[Footnote 219: Lansdowne to Lascelles, April 9, 1901, _B.D._, 62 f., No.
80; Eckardstein, II, 335.]
[Footnote 220: Bülow to Hatzfeldt, Jan. 20, 1901, _G.P._, XVII, 17 f.,
No. 4981.]
[Footnote 221: Holstein to Metternich, Jan. 21, 1901, _ibid._, 22, No.
4984. Metternich accompanied the Emperor to England at that time.]
[Footnote 222: See his minutes to the dispatch from Holstein to
Hatzfeldt, Feb. 11, 1901, _ibid._, 37, No. 4989; Bülow to Hatzfeldt,
Jan. 20, 1901, _ibid._, 17 f., No. 4981; Bülow to William II, Jan. 21,
1901, 20 f., No. 4983.]
[Footnote 223: The two formulations were in no way identical, but the
negotiations never proceeded far enough to permit their being
discussed.]
[Footnote 224: Bülow to Hatzfeldt, March 24, 1901, _ibid._, 49, No.
4998; Bülow to Hatzfeldt, May 11, 1901, _ibid._, 54 ff., No. 5003;
Richthofen to Hatzfeldt, May 18, 1901, _ibid._, 60 ff., No. 5007;
Richthofen to Hatzfeldt, May 20, 1901, _ibid._, 64 f., No. 5009; and the
following documents.]
[Footnote 225: Lansdowne to Lascelles, April 13, 1901, _B.D._, II, 63,
No. 81; Lansdowne to Lascelles, March 18, 1901, Newton, pp. 199 f.]
[Footnote 226: Memo. by Salisbury, May 29, 1901, _B.D._, II, 68 f., No.
86.]
[Footnote 227: Memo. by Sanderson, May 27, 1901, _ibid._, 66 ff., No.
85; Lansdowne to Eckardstein, May 24, 1901, _ibid._, 66, No. 84;
Lansdowne to Lascelles, May 30, 1901, _ibid._, 69 ff., No. 87 and
inclosures; Hatzfeldt to Lansdowne, May 30, 1901, _ibid._, 71, No. 88;
Hatzfeldt to F. O., May 27, 1901, _G.P._, XVII, 68 f., No. 5012; and the
following documents.]
[Footnote 228: Lascelles to Lansdowne, Aug. 25, 1901, _B.D._, II, 73,
No. 90; memo. by Holstein, June 14, 1901, _G.P._, XVII, 83 ff., No.
5019. Late in October, 1901, Holstein and Bülow had long talks with
Valentine Chirol of the _London Times_ to a like effect. See memo. by
Holstein, Oct. 31, Nov. 1, 1901, _G.P._, XVII, 101 ff., Nos. 5026 f.;
Sir Valentine Chirol, _Fifty Years in a Changing World_ (London, 1927),
pp. 288 ff.]
[Footnote 229: On April 13, 1901, Lansdowne had written to Lascelles:
“Things in Morocco look ugly. Do you hear anything?” See _B.D._, II, 64,
No. 81; Lansdowne to Monson, July 3, 1901, _ibid._, 261, No. 318.]
[Footnote 230: Eckardstein gives the following story:
Early in July, soon after the arrival of the Moroccan embassy in London,
Sir Arthur Nicolson, British minister in Morocco, told him that France
was intriguing in that land for the establishment of a protectorate. At
Lansdowne’s request he suggested the co-operation of Great Britain and
Germany for the maintenance of the _status quo_ in Morocco. Then he
touched upon the subject of a common Anglo-German peaceful penetration
of that country, which should be inaugurated by a commercial treaty with
the Sultan. Between the two European states an agreement should be made
to determine which concessions each should receive. He proposed that
Germany be given, among others, the right of supplying all railway and
electrical materials and of installing them, and that all further
political, financial, or economic measures should be carried through by
the two Powers together. Eckardstein states that he sent a long telegram
to Berlin in regard to this conversation, but received no reply
(Eckardstein, II, 357 f.). The editors of _G.P._, however, found no such
telegram (_G.P._, XVII, 333 n.), nor is there any mention of the
proposal in any of the documents published by them or by the British.
Still the offer may have been made, as will be evident later. Hammann,
director of the press department in the German foreign office at that
time, has also written that on the dismissal of el-Menebhi, the British
government proposed common action to the German government, but that it
was refused (Otto Hammann, _Zur Vorgeschichte des Weltkrieges.
Erinnerungen aus den Jahren 1897-1906_ [Berlin, 1918], pp. 139 f.).]
[Footnote 231: Eckardstein to F. O., July 29, 1901, _G.P._, XVII, 338
f., No. 5182.]
[Footnote 232: Memo. by Mühlberg, Aug. 8, 1901, _ibid._, 339 f., No.
5183; Holstein to Bülow, Aug. 8, 1901, _ibid._, 341, No. 5184; Bülow to
F. O., Aug. 9, 1901, _ibid._, 341 f., No. 5185.]
[Footnote 233: _B.D._, Vol. II, chap. x; Newton, pp. 221 ff.]
[Footnote 234: On that meeting see Lee, II, 130 f.; Lascelles to
Lansdowne, Aug. 25, 1901, _B.D._, I, 259, No. 323; Lascelles to
Lansdowne, Aug. 23, 1901, _ibid._, II, 73, No. 90; memo. by William II,
Aug. 23, 1901, _G.P._, XVII, 94 ff., No. 5023. For the meeting Lansdowne
gave to King Edward a memorandum on the questions which might be brought
up. “With regard to Morocco,” he wrote, “the policy of the German and
British Governments would appear to be identical. Both desire the
maintenance of the _status quo_, and both would probably resent any
indignity offered to the Moorish Envoy who lately visited, and was
received with honours at the German and British Courts” (_ibid._, 124,
No. 5033). By mistake King Edward gave a copy of this memorandum to the
Emperor, whose government responded with a similar communication to the
British government. The statement about Morocco was as follows: “In
Morocco we follow a policy of reserve. The Morocco question by itself is
not sufficiently important for us to justify a policy by which Germany
might incur the risk of serious international complications” (_ibid._,
129, No. 5025, Anlage).]
[Footnote 235: Memo. by Lansdowne (very secret), Nov. 11, 1901, _B.D._,
II, 78, No. 92. Late in July, Lascelles had expressed to Eckardstein his
personal opinion that an alliance between Great Britain and the Triple
Alliance was hardly possible, that at most one between Great Britain and
Germany was all that could be expected (Eckardstein to F. O., July 29,
1901, _G.P._, XVII, 91, No. 5021).]
[Footnote 236: Memo. by Lansdowne, Nov. 11 and Dec. 4, 1901, _B.D._, II,
76 ff., Nos. 92 f.]
[Footnote 237: Memo. by Lansdowne, Dec. 4, 1901, _ibid._, 79 f., No. 93,
and Salisbury’s minutes.]
[Footnote 238: Lansdowne to Lascelles, Dec. 19, 1901, _ibid._, 80 ff.,
No. 94; memo. by Metternich, Dec. 28, 1901, _G.P._, XVII, 111 ff., No.
5030.]
[Footnote 239: Lee, II, 133 ff.]
[Footnote 240: Lascelles to Lansdowne, Jan. 16, 1902, _B.D._, I, 268,
No. 331; Plunkett to Lansdowne, April 11, 1902, _ibid._, 274 f., No.
340; Lascelles to Lansdowne, Jan. 3, 1902, _ibid._, II, 84, No. 95;
memo. by Mühlberg, Dec. 27, 1901, _G.P._, XVII, 109 f., No. 5028;
William II to Edward VII, Dec. 30, 1901, _ibid._, 110 f., No. 5029.]
[Footnote 241: He was quoting Frederick the Great (Bülow, I, 242). See
Metternich to Bülow, Nov. 19, 1901, _G.P._, XVII, 194 f., No. 5073;
Bülow to Metternich, Nov. 26, 1901, _ibid._, 195 ff., No. 5074;
Metternich to F. O., Nov. 26, 1901, _ibid._, 197 ff., No. 5075; Buchanan
to Lansdowne, Nov. 20, 1901, _B.D._, I, 263, No. 325; Lansdowne to
Buchanan, Nov. 26 and Dec. 3, 1901, _ibid._, 263, No. 326; 265, No. 328;
Lansdowne to Lascelles, Jan. 14, 1902, _ibid._, 266 f., Nos. 329 f.;
Lascelles to Lansdowne, Jan. 16, 1902, _ibid._, 268 f., No. 332. Cf.
Chirol, p. 297; Gwynn, I, 350.]
[Footnote 242: Lee, II, 138 ff.; _B.D._, I, Nos. 334 ff.]
[Footnote 243: Bülow to Metternich, March 13, 1902, _G.P._, XVII, 149
ff., No. 5046.]
[Footnote 244: Newton, pp. 247 f.]
[Footnote 245: Bülow to F. O., Sept. 12 and 14, 1901, _G.P._, XVIII, 28
f., Nos. 5393 f.; memo. by Bülow, Sept. 14, 1901, _ibid._, 29 ff., No.
5395.]
[Footnote 246: Alvensleben to F. O., Feb. 19, 1902, _ibid._, XVII, 156
f., No. 5049; Bülow to Alvensleben, Feb. 22, 1902, _ibid._, 157 ff., No.
5050; memo. by Bülow, Feb. 25, 1902, _ibid._, 160 ff., No. 5051; and the
following documents.]
[Footnote 247: See below.]
[Footnote 248: Memo. by Holstein, Dec. 31, 1901, _ibid._, XVIII, 737,
No. 5844.]
[Footnote 249: Eckardstein, III, 93.]
[Footnote 250: Hammann, _Zur Vorgeschichte des Weltkrieges_, pp. 144 f.]
CHAPTER VI
THE MAKING OF THE ENTENTE CORDIALE
I
The Boer War had revealed to Great Britain the depth of antagonism
toward her among the European nations and the haphazard inadequacy of
her defensive preparations. The British government had therefore sought
the support of Germany and of Japan. But the alliance with the second
had not compensated for the rebuff from the first; and in 1902 the
future direction of the British foreign policy, particularly with
reference to Europe, remained undecided.
In February, 1903, Mr. Balfour, who succeeded Lord Salisbury as premier
in 1902, appointed as a permanent body a Committee of Imperial Defence,
whose duty, he said, was
to survey as a whole the strategical military needs of the Empire, to
deal with the complicated questions which are all essential elements in
that general problem, and to revise from time to time their own previous
decisions, so that the Cabinet shall always have at its disposal
information upon these important points.[251]
Great Britain also wanted to maintain peace, to settle her outstanding
international difficulties, and to form ententes. In the first part of
1903 the government tried to co-operate with the various Powers. In
January and February it asked the aid of Austria-Hungary and Italy in
preventing Russia from sending ships of war through the Dardanelles and
the Bosphorus. The two states refused although both were cordial friends
of Great Britain.[252] Moreover, the British government associated
itself with Germany in the Venezuela affair and expressed its
willingness to participate in the Bagdad Railway. British public opinion
protested strenuously, however, for it mistrusted Germany, regarding her
as so chauvinistic, so hungry for colonies, so bold in her naval
ambitions as to be not a friend but a rival. Hence the government had to
settle the one affair as quickly as possible and, in March, to recede
entirely from its stand on the other.[253]
Anglo-Russian relations were most troublesome. Early in 1903 the
antagonism of these two Powers became acute all along the line from the
Bosphorus and the Dardanelles to Persia to Afghanistan to Tibet to
China. The British government offered in March to negotiate over
Afghanistan, but Russia refused.[254] Still more pressing for Great
Britain was the problem which resulted from the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.
In April, 1903, the renewal of Russian activity in Manchuria and its
extension into the Yalu Valley caused a grave increase of tension
between Russia and Japan.[255] The revived danger of war between those
two states brought home to the British government the urgent need of
assurance that it would not become involved if hostilities did ensue. By
the terms of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, the _casus foederis_ would
arise only in case of an attack upon one of the allies by two or more
Powers. Manifestly it would depend upon France and upon the nature of
her obligations as ally to Russia whether Great Britain could preserve
neutrality in case of a conflict.[256] Hence the British government,
which in the previous year had refused to touch the dangerous Moroccan
question, now concluded to accept the French proposal for a Moroccan
accord and to liquidate the various differences with France. It would
thereby win a friend who could act as mediator between Great Britain and
Russia and would make certain that a Russo-Japanese war would not
involve the allies of those Powers.
The way toward France instead of Germany was indicated clearly by the
drift of British public opinion; for while the animosity between the
British and German peoples had increased in 1902 and 1903, the flow of
vituperation between the British and French press over the Boer War and
the Dreyfus case[257] had practically ceased, and concerted movements
were on foot to create a popular basis for an “entente cordiale.”
Political and business groups took the lead in this work. By 1903 King
Edward, who two years previously had desired an alliance with Germany,
advocated strongly a _rapprochement_ with France. His personal dislike
and mistrust of his nephew, William II, and of Germany, his wide
knowledge of men and of international affairs, his sensitiveness to
currents of public opinion, caused him to incline toward France.[258]
His willingness to take the initiative in clarifying public opinion and
in defending British interests enabled him to play an important rôle in
transforming British foreign relations.[259] One of his advisers was
Lord Esher, a man who held no official position but who exerted quiet
influence upon court, government, and press. Particularly interested in
naval and military problems, he was instrumental in creating the
Committee of Imperial Defence, of which he became a permanent member.
Through him the press leaders were kept informed about the needs of
defense and were guided toward friendship with France.[260] The
influence of the business world in the same direction was represented by
Mr. Thomas Barclay, former president of the British Chamber of Commerce
in Paris and an active worker for the improvement of international
relations. In 1901 he began a campaign in both France and England for a
_rapprochement_, to which during the next two years he devoted his
entire time and fortune.[261] In England these efforts had complete
success.[262] In France they encountered more difficulty, for France had
usually been the loser in Anglo-French diplomatic battles. However, the
_revanche_ anti-German group, the socialists and internationalists, and
the commercial and business elements approved. Then, after the French
people at large became convinced that Great Britain was not so
thoroughly egoistic and chauvinistic as they had supposed, and that she
really felt amicable toward France, they heartily welcomed a
_rapprochement_ as flattering and beneficial to their country.[263]
Nevertheless, they remained skeptical about the durability of any
entente with their old rival. The French press laid down as conditions
for one that the Dual Alliance should not be weakened thereby and that
Great Britain should convince France of her serious intentions by
treating her equitably in the settlement of their colonial differences,
particularly the Moroccan question.[264] This mistrust was not entirely
dispelled for several years.
Informal conversations for an agreement were resumed in April, 1903,
between representatives of the two governments.[265] Then King Edward
visited Paris (May 1-5); and, although at first he was met with cold
silence, his felicity of speech and act soon won the French people. As a
French Anglophobe said to a friend: “I can’t think what has come over
the population of Paris. The first day they behaved well; the second
day, they merely displayed interest; but the third day, _c’était
attristant—ils ont acclamé le Roi!_”[266] This visit, so unexpectedly
successful, created a favorable atmosphere for further
negotiations.[267] Later in the month, at M. Cambon’s initiative, the
project of a treaty of arbitration was taken up.[268] In July, when
President Loubet, accompanied by M. Delcassé, returned the King’s visit,
the newspapers reported a statement by King Edward to the effect that M.
Loubet would be more heartily welcomed in England than any chief of
state had ever been. The President was able to speak of the Entente
Cordiale as established.[269]
During the visit the foreign ministers agreed that the time was “in
every way propitious for a frank exchange of opinions.” They began that
long negotiation from which the Entente Cordiale was to result. They
discussed the question of the fishing rights off the coast of
Newfoundland, the question of Siam, of the New Hebrides, of Sokoto, of
the treatment of British firms in French Congo, and of Morocco. The
French Minister frankly stated that if they could come to terms over
Morocco, “all other difficulties would disappear, or become
comparatively easy to deal with.” While denying any desire “to get rid
of the Sultan or to annex his country” or to “force the pace,” he
declared that in view of the rapidly waning authority of the Sultan,
France could not regard with indifference the prevalence of chronic
disorder in Morocco or permit any other Power to undertake the task of
regenerating the land. What France wished, said M. Delcassé, was a
“reasonable assurance that their policy would not be obstructed by Great
Britain.”
In reply, Lord Lansdowne made three conditions for an accord over
Morocco. First, British interests in the Mediterranean seaboard of
Morocco, particularly in Tangier and the neighboring coast, must be
protected. Second, Spanish ambitions must be fairly dealt with. Third,
complete equality of economic opportunity in Morocco must be assured. M.
Delcassé unhesitatingly accepted all three stipulations. Then the
British Minister proposed that they make the settlement a comprehensive
one by including the Egyptian question. Again the French Minister
agreed, provided they reached accord “as to the position of France and
Morocco.”[270]
A few days later M. Cambon made to the British Minister a more detailed
statement of the French proposal. Concerning Morocco, he said, the two
governments could agree that the existing constitution _au point de vue
politique_ as well as _au point de vue territorial_ should be
maintained. But the British should acknowledge that France “has a
peculiar interest in maintaining peace within that country, and in
assisting the Moorish Government to bring about the administrative,
economical, and financial improvements of which Morocco stands so much
in need.” The French, in turn, should expressly attest that these
improvements would not infringe in any way upon the principle of
commercial liberty. The two governments, continued M. Cambon, might co-
operate in securing a free passage through the Straits of Gibraltar by
preventing the erection of any fortifications on the southern shore.
When Lord Lansdowne raised the objection that Great Britain was
interested in other parts of the Moorish littoral besides that abutting
on the straits, the Ambassador readily acknowledged this point, and
remarked that France wished to prevent any Power from establishing
itself at any strategic position on the Moroccan coast.
As M. Cambon did not mention the Egyptian problem, the British Minister
immediately stated that its inclusion was an absolute condition to any
consideration of the Moorish question. The Ambassador proposed that they
leave Egypt alone for the present; but, when this suggestion was
refused, he declared that if the French government, by acknowledging the
permanency of the British hold upon that land, extracted this “big thorn
from the foot of Great Britain,” it would expect _une grosse
compensation_. This, he said, “might take the shape of greater liberty
of action in Morocco—something less remote and conjectural . . . . than
she [France] had yet asked for.”[271]
After this agreement upon the questions to be included in the
negotiation there remained the other preliminary matter of how to deal
with Spain. Lord Lansdowne thought that “it would not be difficult for
us to come to terms with France if Spain were out of the way.”[272] But,
bound by the promise of the previous March to that Power and more
desirous of having weak and decadent Spain than powerful France control
the south shore of the straits, he upheld Spain’s interest in Morocco.
M. Cambon declared that his government acknowledged this position,
mentioning the Franco-Spanish negotiations of 1902 as proof. At his
suggestion they decided on August 5 that a subsequent settlement between
France and Spain in harmony with the proposed Anglo-French accord be
made and be communicated to the British government.[273]
The negotiations over these complex problems lasted almost ten months.
Two months passed before the British answer was ready; for the members
of the cabinet were on their vacation, a ministerial crisis occurred in
September as a result of which several resigned,[274] and Lord Cromer,
British consul-general and agent in Egypt, had to be consulted. This
influential official had previously received permission to send Sir
Eldon Gorst, financial adviser to the Egyptian government, to Paris in
the autumn in order to sound the French government about converting the
Egyptian debt and abolishing the _caisse de la dette_. Foreseeing the
failure of that effort unless the British government made concessions in
Morocco, Lord Cromer urged it to do so. He realized that thereby Morocco
would “to all intents and purposes become before long a French
province”; none the less he supported the proposed accord fully to
strengthen British control in Egypt, and played a major rôle during the
negotiations in determining the British policy.[275]
On October 1 Lord Lansdowne stated to M. Cambon the British conditions
for an arrangement.[276] He accepted the French proposal about Morocco
with slight modifications. He suggested that France should agree not to
erect any military or naval works along the Moroccan coast from Algeria
to Mazaghan, and that the two Powers should engage not to permit any
others to do so; that a certain amount of territory in Northern Morocco
“should be recognized as destined to fall under Spanish influence” and
that “in the event of a complete collapse of the Sultan’s authority,”
Spain should be intrusted with the administration of the Moroccan
seaboard as far south as Mazaghan. However, Spain was to “be precluded
from fortifying this portion of the coast, and also from alienating it
or her existing possessions in Morocco to another Power.” As the _quid
pro quo_ for these concessions to France, the British Minister required
in Egypt the lifting of the time limit to the British occupation and the
French sanction of the abolishment of the _caisse de la dette_, the
reorganization of the railway administration, and the conversion of the
Egyptian debt. He also requested the consent of the French government to
examine at some future time proposals abolishing the capitulations in
Egypt and “tending to assimilate the Egyptian legislative and judicial
systems to those in force in other civilized countries.” “His Majesty’s
Government would, on their side,” he continued, “be ready to examine, in
consultation with the Government of the French Republic, similar
proposals with regard to Morocco, if at any future period France should
acquire so predominant a position in Morocco as to become outwardly
responsible for the good government of the country.” The other questions
considered in the Minister’s reply, those of Newfoundland, Siam, New
Hebrides, Nigeria, Zanzibar, and Madagascar, were less significant.[277]
With the offers of each party known, the bargaining began. On October 27
M. Cambon replied. He was still averse to dealing with the Egyptian
affair so fully, and declared that the terms offered were unequal; for,
whereas France received “hopes” alone in Morocco, Great Britain would
enjoy immediate and concrete benefits in Egypt. Moreover, France would
have to settle with Spain, and might even have to reckon with the
pretensions of Germany. So he suggested that the proposed changes in
Egypt be introduced _pari passu_ with correlative ones in Morocco. He
also objected to giving Spain control over any seacoast farther south
than the Sebou River. He further suggested that Great Britain and France
undertake “to maintain, save for the consequences of the present accord,
the territorial _status quo_ within a radius of 500 miles around the
straits.”[278]
When these terms were submitted to Lord Cromer, he was pleased with the
progress that had been made. “Who would have imagined, only a short time
ago,” he wrote Lord Lansdowne, November 1, “that we should ever have got
so far? . . . . We _must_ manage to come to terms. . . . . I regard this
as by far the most important diplomatic affair that we have had in hand
for a long time past. . . . . _We must not fail_.” He added that Great
Britain was asking for much more in Egypt than she offered France in
return in Morocco. Lord Lansdowne agreed with him; but, he said, the
French “are extremely anxious to have their position in Morocco
recognized, and we must turn this feeling to account.” His suggestion to
Lord Cromer that consideration of the conversion of the Egyptian debt be
postponed so as to diminish the difficulties was not carried into
execution.[279]
On November 19 Lord Lansdowne replied to M. Cambon that he was willing
to limit the Spanish and the neutralized portions of the Moroccan coast
to those between Melilla and Rabat; but he refused the French proposal
concerning the simultaneous introduction of changes in Egypt and
Morocco, particularly the change by which the “abandonment of financial
control by France in Egypt would proceed _pari passu_ with the
acquisition of financial control by France in Morocco.” He likewise
wished the French government to join Great Britain “in addressing the
other Powers for the purpose of securing their assent” to the suggested
British changes in Egypt. And he held out for absolute guaranties of
full economic liberty in Morocco.[280]
In the French response of December 9 M. Cambon reported that his
government agreed to assist the British government in obtaining the
assent of the other Powers to the Egyptian changes; but he objected
strongly to the exclusion of Rabat from the French sphere. Moreover, he
desired that the period of commercial liberty in Morocco be limited to
fifteen or twenty years, and that the construction and administration of
railways and ports there be kept under governmental control. In
explaining the five-hundred-mile proposal, M. Cambon pointed out
Germany’s designs upon Morocco which had recently been renewed, in all
probability under the encouragement of Spain. He recalled the Spanish
proposal in 1887 for the assembly of a European conference to discuss
the Moroccan question, and added:
It was quite likely that some such proposal might now be revived. It was
in view of these circumstances that the French Government had proposed
the maintenance of the _status quo_ within a radius of 500 miles from
the Straits—a radius which would include the Balearic Islands, in which
Germany might perhaps desire to obtain a footing.[281]
Both Lord Lansdowne and Lord Cromer knew that Germany was interested in
the fate of Morocco, and they fully anticipated a request from her for
some territory there, for example, Rabat or some other port. They also
realized that the French expected Great Britain to help in keeping
Germany out of Morocco, and Lord Cromer gathered from conversations with
French officials in Egypt that the French would like to embroil Great
Britain and Germany, bring about an Anglo-Russian agreement, and isolate
Germany. As both statesmen felt that a demand on the part of Germany for
a coaling station would be very awkward to meet, Lord Lansdowne did
nothing to clarify the situation beyond refusing M. Cambon’s anti-German
project.[282] He thereby left to the French the possibility of forcing
Great Britain to aid them in case Germany did try to intervene in the
Moroccan question.
In reply to M. Cambon on December 11 Lord Lansdowne signified his
apprehension that if Rabat were not neutralized France might later
transform it into a torpedo-boat station. The other points concerning
Morocco he agreed to, except that he extended the limit for commercial
equality to fifty years.[283]
Thus far the negotiations had proceeded smoothly. The Anglo-French
arbitration treaty had been signed on October 14. Agreement over the two
main questions, those of Egypt and of Morocco, had practically been
reached.[284] And on November 23 M. Delcassé had been able to declare in
the French Chamber, with evident reference to Great Britain, that “when
one speaks today of a Moroccan problem, the idea that in the solution
the decisive word pertains to France has become almost familiar and
appears almost natural, even to those who in the past would have
believed themselves obliged to oppose it with the greatest vigor.”[285]
II
These discussions had been closely connected with another diplomatic
movement. The Anglo-French _rapprochement_ was logically followed by
attempts at an Anglo-Russian settlement which in turn would have an
alleviating effect upon Russo-Japanese relations. The British and French
governments immediately recognized this fact, as did also Count
Lamsdorff, Russian foreign minister. In July, just after M. Delcassé’s
visit to England, conversations began, at the instigation of the French
Foreign Minister,[286] between Lord Lansdowne and the Russian
Ambassador. The British Foreign Secretary remarked to Count
Benckendorff, July 29, as follows: “If Russia would put us in full
possession of her ideas, and if she would bear in mind that for any
concessions which she obtained from us we should expect corresponding
concessions from her, I believe that we might put an end to the
unfortunate rivalry which had so long prevailed between us in China and
in the other parts of Asia.” But he declared a few days later that until
he was “thoroughly satisfied” by Russia, especially as to Manchuria, he
“must remain observant and critical.” The Ambassador, who seemed
favorable toward a general agreement, left in August for a visit to St.
Petersburg, and did not see Lord Lansdowne again until November 7.[287]
An understanding along the lines mentioned by Lord Lansdowne would have
settled both the Anglo-Russian and the Russo-Japanese problems. As an
inducement to a _rapprochement_ the British Foreign Secretary was
showing compliance with Russia’s policy in the Balkans,
even to the extent [wrote on October 26 Sir Louis Mallet, précis writer
to Lord Lansdowne] of suggesting reforms which will give them [Russia] a
foothold in the Balkans. H. M. G. are therefore committed to a certain
extent to a policy of not opposing Russia’s advance to Constantinople.
At least, I read it in that light. . . . . It’s a chance Russia will
never get again of buying off our opposition to their advance to
Constantinople.[288]
Russia, however, continued her Asiatic activity, so objectionable to
Great Britain and Japan. She dallied with the Japanese offer of
agreement over their Chinese differences while she made new demands on
China, extended her interests in the Yalu Valley and in Seoul itself,
and seemed on the way to take Korea.[289] She asserted her right to send
agents into Afghanistan at will, contrary to the old understanding with
Great Britain; and on October 5 made a communication to the British
government on that subject which Sir Charles Hardinge, assistant
undersecretary of state for foreign affairs, regarded as “peremptory in
tone, and almost discourteous in its terms.”[290]
In this grave situation Lord Lansdowne besought the help of the French
government in restraining Russia. On October 26 he expressed regret to
M. Cambon over the absence of frankness in Anglo-Russian intercourse.
“Their conduct [the Russian government’s],” he complained, “placed us in
a very embarrassing position.” The pledges which they gave—for example,
with respect to the evacuation of Manchuria—remained unfulfilled. “We
were . . . . told that the obstructiveness of the Chinese was to blame.
There might be some truth in this, but it was impossible to test the
truth of the assertion unless the Russian Government would really tell
us what they wanted.” Lord Lansdowne expressed the hope that during
Count Lamsdorff’s forthcoming visit to Paris (October 29-31) his
conversations with M. Delcassé “might indirectly have an effect upon the
attitude of the Russian Government towards that of this country.”[291]
M. Delcassé took the hint. Count Lamsdorff agreed with him on the value
of an arrangement with both Great Britain and with Japan.[292] He also
expressed publicly Russia’s satisfaction with the Anglo-French and the
Franco-Italian _rapprochements_.[293]
This intercession had an immediate result. When Count Benckendorff
returned to London, Lord Lansdowne summed up his assertions, November 7,
as follows:
Count Lamsdorff felt strongly that it was of importance that an
endeavour should be made to remove all sources of misunderstanding
between the two Governments, and that there should be “a change for the
better” in our relations. Count Benckendorff was therefore instructed to
discuss frankly with me the various questions outstanding between Great
Britain and Russia, with the object of arriving at an agreement as to
the manner in which they should be dealt with. In the meantime, the
Russian Government would be careful to avoid any action bearing the
appearance of hostility to this country.
Lord Lansdowne was pleased at this response, for, as he said, he “had
been seriously concerned at the position into which the two Powers were
apparently drifting.” The two men then discussed in general terms the
questions dividing their countries.[294] On November 17 and 25 they
returned to the subject, and on November 22 King Edward and Sir Charles
Hardinge each had an interview with Count Benckendorff. The Count stated
that “the moment was riper now for a friendly understanding than at any
time during the past twenty years.” He said that the matters for
consideration “seemed naturally to group themselves into (1) questions
concerning China in which Russia had a special interest (2) questions
concerning India, in which Great Britain had a special interest and (3)
questions concerning Persia in which both Powers were interested.” But
it became clear from these conversations that the Ambassador was
instructed merely to discuss the problems, that he had no definite
proposals to make. Nor were the discussions satisfactory. The Ambassador
could make no statement about Russian aims in China. He objected to the
division of Persia into spheres of influence. He protested strongly
against the British expedition to Tibet announced in that month. He
refused to put anything on paper about Afghanistan.
In order to make some headway, Lord Lansdowne made a frank exposition of
the British desires. On December 11 Count Lamsdorff voiced “much
satisfaction” with this “ready response.” The British Ambassador urged
him to make “an early and equally frank expression of the views of the
Russian Government,” which might “lead to a satisfactory understanding.”
Count Lamsdorff promised to try to reply before February 2, when
Parliament was to reassemble. And Count Benckendorff planned to go to
St. Petersburg early in 1904 for consultation.[295]
Just as Lord Lansdowne had expected, the negotiations did not proceed
beyond that point; Russia would not limit her Asiatic ambitions. She
would not accept the British terms, which of course included
stipulations concerning China satisfactory to Japan, nor would she
settle with Japan alone. Count Lamsdorff was willing to do so; but, as
was well known by the other governments, he had no control over Russia’s
far eastern policy. Since August this policy had been directed by the
viceroy in the Far East, back of whom stood the Czar and the coterie
around him interested in Russian expansion into Manchuria and Korea.
Count Lamsdorff’s hands were tied; Russian activity made war with Japan
a certainty. Toward the end of 1903 this menace grew so ominous that on
December 11 Lord Lansdowne warned M. Cambon as follows:
H. E. [His Excellency] was no doubt aware that, under the Agreement with
Japan, our intervention could only be demanded in case that Power were
assailed by two others. On the other hand, public opinion here might
render it extremely difficult for us to remain inactive if Russia were
to find some pretext for attacking Japan and were to endeavour to crush
her out of existence.
It seemed to me in these circumstances that it was the duty of our two
Governments, which were, I rejoiced to think, at this moment in such
friendly relations, to do all in their power to keep the peace.[296]
The French government reciprocated this wish, and let the British
government perceive that it would not enter a Russo-Japanese war. Early
in January the other Powers also asserted their intention of remaining
neutral.[297]
Having been fully informed about Russo-Japanese relations, the British
government had recognized the danger of war since July and had in
consequence not let the negotiations with France lag or fail.[298] But
since it now felt reasonably certain of not being drawn into the
impending struggle, it allowed the transactions with France, on January
13, 1904, to come to a deadlock over a question hitherto cursorily
considered. M. Delcassé requested territorial indemnity for the
relinquishment of certain fishing rights off the coast of Newfoundland;
and the British government refused to give the amount desired. The
difficulty imperiled the entire settlement since both sides were so
fearful of public opinion that they refused to make concessions.[299]
But on February 10 the Russo-Japanese War began. Admiral Fisher was
certain that Japan would be defeated.[300] Rumors were abroad concerning
Russo-German negotiations for closing the Baltic Straits,[301] and some
British officials had misgivings that a coalition of Russia, France, and
Germany might be formed against their country.[302] Moreover, the
British government feared that a Balkan war might break out in the
spring.[303] Under these circumstances the British government could not
afford to risk alienating France.[304]
M. Delcassé was surprised by the outbreak of the war.[305] His ambition
had been for the Anglo-French _rapprochement_ to be supplemented by an
Anglo-Russian one. Then as Italy was also trying to approach Russia, a
more or less loose grouping of France, Russia, Great Britain, Italy,
Spain, and Japan would be created.[306] Busy with the Anglo-French
negotiations, he had been misled by the optimism of the Russian
government into thinking that war would not occur.[307] He had not
appreciated fully the weakness of Count Lamsdorff’s position. Not until
January, 1904, did he perceive the danger and make belated efforts to
maintain peace. But Great Britain refused to aid him.[308] Immediately
after the war began he tried again to secure British co-operation in
stopping it. When the British government again refused, M. Delcassé
became incensed, for he saw the defeat of his larger program.[309] His
better judgment soon calmed him, however, for with France’s ally
eliminated from European affairs, he needed British co-operation more
than ever in order to keep the war from spreading[310] and to offset the
increased power of Germany. Late in February both parties were therefore
ready to compromise.[311] And, after a threat by Lord Lansdowne on March
31 to break off negotiations when the French Foreign Minister, alarmed
by French public opinion, attempted to reopen the Newfoundland
question,[312] the accord was finally completed on April 8, 1904.
This agreement consisted of three documents: first, a convention which
settled the Newfoundland question, modified certain boundaries between
French and British colonies in Africa, and gave the Iles de Los to
France; second, a declaration concerning Siam, Madagascar, and the New
Hebrides; and third, a declaration concerning Egypt and Morocco. Only
the convention had to be submitted to the two parliaments, since it
alone provided for territorial changes in the existing possessions of
the two states. While the solution of all these difficulties established
the Entente Cordiale, the last-named declaration gave to the entente its
great significance in international affairs; for through it two of the
old sore spots in Anglo-French diplomacy were healed, and the basis for
the future co-operation of the two Powers was laid.
By the terms of this declaration France relinquished her rights and
interests in Egypt in favor of Great Britain; Great Britain, in favor of
France in Morocco. Only the clauses concerning Morocco are of interest
here. Article II read as follows:
The Government of the French Republic declare that they have no
intention of altering the political status of Morocco.
His Britannic Majesty’s Government . . . . recognize that it appertains
to France . . . . to preserve order in that country, and to provide
assistance for the purpose of all administrative, economic, financial,
and military reforms which it may require.
They declare that they will not obstruct the action taken by France for
this purpose, provided that such action shall leave intact the rights
which Great Britain, in virtue of Treaties, Conventions, and usage,
enjoys in Morocco. . . . .
Article IV provided for full commercial liberty, which, however, should
obtain for only thirty years. Each government reserved the right “to see
that the concessions for roads, railways, ports, etc. [in Morocco and
Egypt], are only granted on such conditions as will maintain intact the
authority of the State over these great undertakings of public
interest.” By Article VII the free passage and non-fortification of the
south shore of the Straits of Gibraltar were assured. According to
Article VIII the interests of Spain in Morocco were to be respected, and
the compact over them to be worked out between the Spanish and French
governments was to be communicated to the British government. Article IX
was included at the insistence of the British government, which planned
thereby to enjoy French support in obtaining the acquiescence of the
other Powers to the proposed changes in Egypt. Although the French
reluctantly agreed to it, it eventually proved to be of the greatest
value to them. It read as follows: “The two Governments agree to afford
to one another their diplomatic support, in order to obtain the
execution of the clauses of the present Declaration regarding Egypt and
Morocco.”
Five secret articles supplemented the public agreement. Article I was as
follows:
In the event of either Government finding themselves constrained, by the
force of circumstances, to modify their policy in respect to Egypt and
Morocco, the engagements which they have undertaken towards each other
by Articles IV, VI and VII of the Declaration of to-day’s date would
remain intact.
Article II was included at the wish of the British:
His Britannic Majesty’s Government have no present intention of
proposing to the Powers any changes in the system of the Capitulations,
or in the judicial organization of Egypt.
In the event of their considering it desirable to introduce into Egypt
reforms tending to assimilate the Egyptian legislative system to that in
force in other civilized countries, the Government of the French
Republic will not refuse to entertain any such proposals, on the
understanding that His Britannic Majesty’s Government will agree to
entertain the suggestions that the Government of the French Republic may
have to make to them with a view of introducing similar reforms in
Morocco.
Articles III and IV marked out the portion of Morocco which should come
within the “sphere of influence” of Spain “whenever the Sultan ceases to
exercise authority over it,” and provided for the validity of the Anglo-
French declaration in case Spain refused to make an agreement.[313]
Article V concerned the Egyptian debt.
The contradictions in the accord are apparent. The “political status” in
Morocco was to be preserved, but it would take a statesman trained in
diplomatic casuistry to explain how this was possible with France alone
making all the proposed internal reforms. Of course, what was meant was
that the “international status” of the land should be respected.
However, the terms of the secret articles foresaw a future change even
in that; and it can hardly be called showing a nice regard for Morocco’s
international and sovereign independence for two alien Powers to set a
time limit to the right of commercial liberty in that land. The doctors
were agreeing upon a division of the patient’s property before they
began to operate. That Morocco, an independent state, would eventually
be partitioned into French and Spanish protectorates was evident to
anyone with an understanding of contemporary political practices. To
preserve peace and amity between themselves, Great Britain and France
had simply made a division of spoils at Morocco’s expense.[314]
The new accord was most cordially welcomed by all parties in Great
Britain. In the House of Commons on June 1, Earl Percy, speaking for the
government, and Sir Edward Grey, speaking for the opposition, both
emphasized the need for Great Britain henceforth to follow a policy of
“administrative concentration and consolidation” of her empire, and
declared that similar agreements should be made with other Powers. Not
all troubles with France had been disposed of, said Earl Percy, but the
chief ones had been, and the others could now be more easily settled. As
to the terms dealing with Morocco, while he admitted that the Sultan had
not been consulted beforehand, he declared that Morocco needed setting
to rights and that France had a better claim to execute that work than
anyone else. He also emphasized the unique quality of the Entente
Cordiale.
The parties pledge themselves not merely to abstain from poaching on
each other’s preserves but to do all in their power to further one
another’s interests. We promise to give to one another, as friends,
advantages which are ordinarily given only to allies, and it is as a
pledge of friendship rather than as the terms of a compromise between
jealous and exacting litigants that we ask the House to consent to these
concessions.
Sir Edward Grey approved of the relinquishment of Morocco to France.
Together with other speakers, he praised the spirit of the agreement,
and he expressed the hope that Article IX would enable the two nations
to draw closer together by increasing the “opportunities for the
interchange of international courtesies between them.”
During the debates Mr. Gibson Bowles declared that the agreement
amounted to a “partition of three new Polands” (Egypt, Morocco, and
Siam), “a compact of plunder.” But from a European point of view he
considered it of “the highest import,” for it signified a “return to the
. . . . system of the balance of power.” “There are stalking through
Europe,” he stated, “ambitions which must be curtailed and which may be
developed to a greater extent than seems at present. Against such it is
well to raise a visible barrier in England and France.” Mr. Balfour, the
premier, however, denied that there had been “any reversal of the
traditional policy of our party,” or that anything had been done
“prejudicial to the interests of Germany or any other Power.”
The _Times_ did not agree with him. Its Paris correspondent wrote on
April 14 as follows:
The Triple Alliance has long since ceased to be the European bogey which
it once was. . . . . There is the Dual Alliance, the Anglo-French
Agreement, and the Franco-Italian _rapprochement_, with benevolent
diplomatic neutrality on the part of Russia. Now, in the midst of this
happy family, the Triple Alliance only appears as the ghost of its
former self.
The editorial comment of that paper was in a similar tone.
The days have gone by when the Germans could assume with some shadow of
plausibility that in the larger questions of international politics
Great Britain must follow in the wake of the Triple Alliance, and that
the attitude of France might be ignored. There is no alliance between
them, but there is a cordial understanding which will induce both to
discuss all subjects affecting them fairly and without jealousy or
suspicion, and which, combined with the relations in which they stand to
Italy, must exercise a great influence upon all States, and, it may be,
a great attraction upon some of them.
Events soon proved that the _Times’s_ estimate of that entente was more
accurate than that of Mr. Balfour.[315]
Although happily surprised by the conclusion of the Anglo-French
agreement, French public opinion did not accept the accord as whole-
heartedly as did the British. Opposition to various parts of the
settlement was expressed by extremists who regretted the final
renunciation of French ambitions in Egypt and who thought that French
interests in Siam and elsewhere had not been adequately upheld; by those
in the maritime districts of Northern and Northwestern France who
criticized the terms concerning Newfoundland as disastrous to French
fishing interests in that region; and more or less openly by the enemies
of M. Combes, the premier, whose stringent anticlerical policy had
aroused bitter antagonism among the French. These critical forces,
however, were more than offset by the elements who praised the
agreement. “It is equitable, the equilibrium of the accord is
irreproachable,” wrote M. de Caix. The recognition of France’s special
interests in Morocco was especially commended by almost all parties. The
strengthening of France’s international position was also acknowledged
with satisfaction. In reporting the agreement to the Chamber of Deputies
on November 3 M. Deloncle declared: “We do not wish a . . . . passing
entente between our two countries. We think . . . . of the formation of
accords always more intimate and durable, which, loyally executed by
both parties, . . . . on the basis of reciprocal confidence, will cement
the community and solidarity of the two countries.” Alliance with
Russia, friendship with Great Britain, was the popular formula.
Nevertheless, the convention over Newfoundland was accepted by the
Chamber only on condition that M. Delcassé attempt to reopen the
question with the British government. Many warned M. Delcassé not to
trust Great Britain too far, not to permit the entente to assume in any
way the character of an alliance, and not to involve France in the
Anglo-German rivalry. In the Chamber on November 8 M. Delafosse declared
that the accord signified a “detente,” not an “entente.” M. René Millet,
former governor of Tunis, wrote that the arrangement was “a retreat in
good order” which “does not justify the enthusiasm with which it has
been received.” M. Millet found insufficient the diplomatic preparation
for the French action in Morocco.
It is not possible [he wrote] for France to undertake anything without
knowing the thoughts of Germany. . . . . Our bad will toward the Germans
will only render them more imperious, and, without declaring war, they
will have more than one means of being disagreeable to us, especially at
the time when Russia . . . . is unable to help us. . . . . Of all
pretensions, the most foolish would be to wish to isolate the German
Empire, as certain musketeers of the press advise.[316]
Alarmed by the criticism of the Newfoundland convention, M. Delcassé
tried in June and July to obtain some further concessions from the
British government.[317] Although he had no success, he felt compelled
during the debates in the French Chamber, November 3-10, to promise to
reopen negotiations on the Newfoundland question. Otherwise, he feared a
rejection. This meaningless concession, together with the fact that the
entente had already proved its value by enabling M. Delcassé to mediate
between Great Britain and Russia in October for a peaceful settlement of
the Dogger Bank episode,[318] smoothed the path for parliamentary
approbation. Hence M. Delcassé, in his speech of defense, was able to
confine himself to generalities. He reviewed his achievement of the
ententes with Italy, Spain, and Great Britain, by which the Moroccan
question had been settled in favor of France and by which the French
position in the world had been elevated. He advocated a policy of peace
and conciliation, but he also declared that France must maintain her
defenses.
And this is what procures for France [he concluded], augmented in her
credit and prestige, the trust and sympathy of the world. The world is
convinced to-day that French policy does not seek the advantage for
France other than in the harmony of French interests with the interests
of others. And she is happy to affirm that that harmony, which no one
believes or pretends to believe unrealisable, is being realised each day
to the benefit of all.
It will be the honor of our democracy to have practiced that policy.
He was roundly applauded, and his achievements were approved by both
Parliament and people. The accord was ratified in the Chamber by a vote
of 443 to 105, and in the Senate by one of 215 to 37.[319]
[Footnote 251: 4 Hansard, Vol. CXVIII, col. 1579.]
[Footnote 252: See Rodd to Lansdowne, Jan. 9, 1903, _B.D._, IV, 41 f.,
No. 32, and following documents. However, an extract from _Defence
Committee Paper 1b_ (Feb. 11, 1903), read as follows: “What difference
would it make to the balance of power in the Mediterranean if Russia
were to obtain, through possession of Constantinople, free egress from
the Black Sea through the Dardanelles, these remaining closed, as at
present, against other Powers?
“The answer to this question unanimously accepted by the Committee was
that, while Russia would no doubt obtain certain naval advantages from
the change, it would not fundamentally alter the present strategic
position in the Mediterranean.”
An extract from _Defence Committee Paper 2b_ of the same month read as
follows: “It may be stated generally that a Russian occupation of the
Dardanelles, or an arrangement for enabling Russia to freely use the
waterway between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, such as her
dominating influence can extract from Turkey at her pleasure, would not
make any marked difference in our strategic dispositions as compared
with present conditions” (_B.D._, IV, 59 f.). This opinion was approved
on April 22, 1904, by King Edward and by Sir Charles Hardinge, who had
just been appointed ambassador at St. Petersburg (Lee, _King Edward
VII_, II, 289 f.). It apparently led to a change of policy in the autumn
of 1903 (see below).]
[Footnote 253: Chirol, _Fifty Years in a Changing World_, pp. 276 ff.;
_G.P._, Vol. XVII, chaps. cxii, cxiv, Part A; _B.D._, Vol. II, chap.
xii. See also Lansdowne to Curzon, April 24, 1903, Newton, _Lord
Lansdowne_, p. 254.]
[Footnote 254: See _B.D._, IV, 41 ff., Nos. 32 ff.; memo. on British
policy in Persia, Oct. 31, 1905, _ibid._, 365 ff., No. 321; memo.
respecting Russia and Afghanistan, Oct. 14, 1903, _ibid._, 512 ff., No.
465; Newton, pp. 271 ff.]
[Footnote 255: The Japanese Foreign Minister, in communicating to the
British Minister on April 27 the Russian demands to China, spoke “with
unwonted seriousness” and asserted “that he considered the situation
exceedingly grave” (MacDonald to Lansdowne, April 27, 1903, _B.D._, II,
198 ff., No. 226. The dispatch was received first on June 2, but there
is no reason to doubt that the view expressed therein was immediately
known to the British government since the two governments were in
constant communication. See Lansdowne to MacDonald, April 29, 1903,
_ibid._, 200 f., No. 228; memo. communicated by Hayashi, Japanese
minister to London, to Lansdowne, April 27, 1903, _ibid._, 201 f., No.
228, inclosure; William L. Langer, “Der Russisch-Japanische Krieg,”
_Europäische Gespräche_, June, 1926, pp. 310 ff.; Tyler Dennett,
_Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War_ (New York, 1925), pp. 139 f., 355
ff.]
[Footnote 256: When Russo-Japanese relations became strained early in
1901, Lansdowne asked Monson whether he thought “that France is under
any engagement to take part on the side of Russia in the event of war,
or that without such obligation she would attempt to do so” (Lansdowne
to Monson, March 8, 1901, _B.D._, II, 40, No. 49). Monson replied that
he did not know whether the Dual Alliance laid down the obligation of
military aid outside of Europe, and that while the French people showed
little zeal for far eastern affairs, yet nationalistic hatred against
Great Britain might be aroused at any time and might make the French
stand uncertain (Monson to Lansdowne, March 13, 1901, _ibid._, 44 f.,
No. 56). The Franco-Russian declaration of 1902 in reply to the Anglo-
Japanese Alliance stated that the Dual Alliance was extended to the Far
East, although a few days later Delcassé cast doubt upon the
significance of this engagement. While French public opinion was opposed
to becoming involved in the Far East for the sake of Russia, yet this
ambiguity left the French position in case of a war in doubt (see
above).]
[Footnote 257: See Pinon, _France et Allemagne_, pp. 79 f.; Jean Darcy,
_France et Angleterre. Cent années de rivalité coloniale: L’Afrique_
(Paris, 1904); Barclay, _Thirty Years: Anglo-French Reminiscences,
1876-1906_, chaps. xiii-xvi.]
[Footnote 258: Philippe Crozier, who in 1903 was French minister at
Copenhagen, states that to his intimate friends King Edward “even
foresaw the hypothesis of a positive alliance” with France (“L’Autriche
et l’avant guerre,” _Revue de France_, April 15, 1921, p. 271).]
[Footnote 259: Lee, II; Newton, pp. 292 f. Early in 1915 Balfour wrote
to Lansdowne denying that King Edward was the author of the Entente
Cordiale. “Now, so far as I remember, during the years which you and I
were his Ministers, he [King Edward] never made an important suggestion
of any sort on large questions of policy” (Newton, p. 293). This
estimate may be true, but it does not give the King credit for what he
actually did.]
[Footnote 260: Spender, _Life, Journalism and Politics_, I, 185 ff.
Esher had been furnishing information to Spender, who was editor of the
_Westminster Gazette_, a Liberal paper, since 1900. Spender denies that
the British foreign office inspired the newspapers (_op. cit._, I,
185).]
[Footnote 261: J. L. de Lanessan, _Histoire de l’entente cordiale
franco-anglaise_ (Paris, 1916), pp. 218 ff., 229, 234; Barclay, chaps.
xvii-xx.]
[Footnote 262: The _Times_, the Northcliffe Press, the Chamberlain
Press, the _National Review_, _Fortnightly Review_, _Contemporary
Review_, the Liberals as well as the Conservatives, supported the
movement. See _G.P._, XVII, Nos. 5081-83, 5087-88, 5094, 5026-27;
Hammann, _Zur Vorgeschichte des Weltkrieges_, pp. 175 f.; Wolff, _Das
Vorspiel_, p. 135; Barclay, pp. 177 f.]
[Footnote 263: See Barclay, chaps. xvii, xx.]
[Footnote 264: Reports from the Belgian ministers in Paris and London,
May 4, 1902, _Zur europ. Politik_, I, 105 f. Impressed with the
unanimity of friendliness toward France among the British, M. Delcassé
expressed to Monson his regret that the French did not fully reciprocate
this feeling. See Monson to Lansdowne, July 24, 1903, _B.D._, II, 302
f., No. 361; _Bulletin_, July, 1903, pp. 211 ff.; _Quest. dipl. et
col._, XV, 656 f., XVI, 147; articles from _Figaro_ and the _Temps_
quoted in the _London Times_, May 5, 1903; article by Etienne in the
_National Review_, July 1, 1903, esp. p. 748_a_.]
[Footnote 265: So Eckardstein asserts, _Lebenserinnerungen, etc._, II,
337; cf. Schefer, _D’une guerre à l’autre, etc._, p. 249.]
[Footnote 266: King Edward’s trip was a bold move, for Paris was the
center of anti-British feeling, and some members of the British
government were doubtful about its success. But the King initiated the
visit and took the entire responsibility for it, feeling certain that he
would be well received. In his first public speech, more optimistically
than truthfully, he declared: “There may have been misunderstandings and
causes of dissension in the past [between the two countries], but all
such differences are, I believe, happily removed and forgotten, and I
trust that the friendship and admiration which we all feel for the
French nation and their glorious traditions may in the near future
develop into a sentiment of the warmest affection and attachment between
the peoples of the two countries. The achievement of this aim is my
constant desire.” Quoted in the _London Times_, May 2, 1903, M. Paul
Cambon’s estimate of the significance of the King’s visit is as follows:
“Of course, King Edward helped immensely. His visit to Paris in the
spring of 1903 really made it [the Anglo-French entente] possible. . . .
.” See interview with Cambon in _ibid._, Dec. 22, 1920. On the visit see
Captain the Hon. Sir Seymour Fortescue, _Looking Back_ (London, 1920),
pp. 279 ff.; _Quest. dipl. et col._, XV, 656 f.; Lee, II, 221 ff., 236
ff.; Barclay, p. 218; Viscount Esher, _The Influence of King Edward and
Essays on Other Subjects_ (London, 1915), pp. 57 ff.; Pinon, p. 114;
Herbert H. Asquith, _The Genesis of the War_ (New York, 1923), p. 30;
Metternich to Bülow, June 2, 1903, _G.P._, XVII, 590 ff., No. 5376;
Crozier, pp. 272 ff.; Newton, pp. 275 f., 278 f.]
[Footnote 267: Shortly before this visit Chamberlain remarked to
Eckardstein: “Here in England the King’s visit to Paris is very popular,
and if France gives him a good reception then everything will go well
between us in the future.” See Eckardstein to Bülow, May 10, 1903,
_G.P._, XVII, 568, No. 5369; Metternich to Bülow, June 2, 1903, _ibid._,
590 ff., No. 5376.]
[Footnote 268: Monson to Lansdowne, Jan. 20, 1902, _B.D._, II, 261 f.,
No. 319; Lansdowne to Monson, May 19, 1903, _ibid._, 289, No. 352;
Monson to Lansdowne, May 22, 1903, _ibid._, 290, No. 353; Monson to
Lansdowne, May 29, 1903, _ibid._, 290 f., No. 354; Lansdowne to Monson,
July 21, 1903, _ibid._, 301 f., No. 360, and inclosures; _Annual
Register_ (1903), pp. 216 f.; Barclay, pp. 235, 242; expressions of
public opinion on this project contained in _Quest. dipl. et col._, July
1 and 15, Aug. 1, Sept. 1 and 15, 1903.]
[Footnote 269: King Edward’s assertion had direct reference to the
German Emperor, with whom he had never agreed (_Zur europ. Politik_, I,
110; Lee, II, 244 ff.; _Quest. dipl. et col._, XVI, 147 ff.).]
[Footnote 270: On this interview see the dispatch from Lansdowne to
Monson, July 7, 1903, _B.D._, II, 294 ff., No. 357; also Delcassé’s
interview in _Petit Parisien_, April 10, 1904, reprinted in _Quest.
dipl. et col._, April 16, 1904, pp. 616 f. Delcassé’s conversation with
Lansdowne had been prefaced by the talks between Cambon and Lansdowne
during the previous year and also by a long talk on July 2, 1903,
between Lansdowne and Etienne. Etienne had stated one of the reasons for
an Anglo-French entente as follows (the account is from the hand of the
British minister): “M. Etienne expressed his belief that the most
serious menace to the peace of Europe lay in Germany, that a good
understanding between France and England was the only means of holding
German designs in check, and that if such an understanding could be
arrived at, England would find that France would be able to exercise a
salutary influence over Russia and thereby relieve us from many of our
troubles with that country” (Lansdowne to Monson, July 2, 1903, _B.D._,
II, 293, No. 356).]
[Footnote 271: Lansdowne to de Bunsen, July 15, 1903, _ibid._, 298, No.
358; Lansdowne to Monson, July 29, Aug. 5, 1903, _ibid._, 304 ff., Nos.
363 f.]
[Footnote 272: Lansdowne to Durand, July 14, 1903, Newton, p. 280.]
[Footnote 273: Then Lansdowne notified the Spanish government of the
steps which he had taken and asked for a statement of its views on the
Moroccan question. Whether Spain replied is not evident. See Lansdowne
to Monson, Aug. 5, 1903, _B.D._, II, 306 f., No. 364; Lansdowne to
Durand, Aug. 11, 1903, _ibid._, 309 f., No. 366; Newton, p. 280.]
[Footnote 274: J. A. Spender, _The Life of the Right Hon. Sir Henry
Campbell-Bannerman_ (London), Vol. II, chaps. xxiii-xxiv.]
[Footnote 275: Cromer to Lansdowne, July 17, 1903, _B.D._, II, 298 ff.,
No. 359; memo. by Cromer, Aug. 7, 1903, _ibid._, 307 ff., No. 365;
Newton, pp. 280 ff.]
[Footnote 276: Lee, II, 245 f.; Lansdowne to Cambon, Oct. 1, 1903,
_B.D._, II, 311 ff., No. 369; 400 n.]
[Footnote 277: Lansdowne to Cambon, Oct. 1, 1903, _ibid._, 311 ff., No.
369.]
[Footnote 278: Lansdowne to Monson, Oct. 7, 1903, _ibid._, 317 f., No.
370; Cambon to Lansdowne, Oct. 26, 1903, _ibid._, 320 ff., No. 373.]
[Footnote 279: Cromer to Lansdowne, Nov. 1, 1903, Lansdowne to Cromer,
Nov. 17, 1903, Newton, pp. 283 ff.]
[Footnote 280: Cromer to Lansdowne, Oct. 30, 1903, _B.D._, II, 323, No.
374; Lansdowne to Cambon, Nov. 19, 1903, _ibid._, 324 ff., No. 376.]
[Footnote 281: The French government, Cambon said, knew that “the Queen
of Spain during her recent visit to the Continent had been in
communication with the German Emperor upon the subject of Morocco”
(Lansdowne to Monson, Dec. 9, 1903, _ibid._, 329 ff., No. 378).]
[Footnote 282: Lansdowne to Cromer, Nov. 17, 1903, Cromer to Lansdowne,
Nov. 27, 1903, Newton, pp. 285 f.]
[Footnote 283: Lansdowne to Monson, Dec. 11, 1903, _B.D._, II, 333 f.,
No. 380. It was evident that in view of the monopolistic tendencies of
the French, British trade in Morocco would practically cease at the end
of the time limit (Cromer to Lansdowne, Dec. 11, 1903, _ibid._, 332 f.,
No. 379).]
[Footnote 284: Lansdowne to Monson, Jan. 13, 1904, _ibid._, 338, No.
384; Cromer to Lansdowne, Dec. 11, 1903, _ibid._, 332, No. 379.]
[Footnote 285: Quoted in _Quest. dipl. et col._, Dec. 1, 1903, p. 821.]
[Footnote 286: Delcassé had received the hint from Chamberlain (see next
reference).]
[Footnote 287: Lansdowne to Scott, July 29, Aug. 12, 1903, _B.D._, II,
212 f., Nos. 242 f. In September, Lansdowne wrote in a memorandum for
the cabinet as follows: “A good understanding with France would not
improbably be the precursor of a better understanding with Russia” (Lee,
II, 246). In July, Lansdowne also sought the co-operation of the United
States in checking Russia in the Far East (Dennis, _Adventures in
American Diplomacy_, p. 359).]
[Footnote 288: Mallet to Spring Rice, Oct. 26, 1903, Gwynn, _Letters and
Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring Rice_, I, 366 f.]
[Footnote 289: Lansdowne to MacDonald, July 3, 13, 1903, _B.D._, II, 206
ff., Nos. 237 f., and the following documents. See MacDonald to
Lansdowne, Sept. 4, Oct. 1, 1903, _ibid._, 214 ff., Nos. 246, 248;
Alfred von Hedenström, _Geschichte Russlands von 1878 bis 1918_
(Stuttgart and Berlin, 1922), p. 170; _Cambridge History of British
Foreign Policy_, III, 324 f.; Langer, pp. 312 ff.]
[Footnote 290: _B.D._, IV, 621; memo. respecting Russia and Afghanistan,
Oct. 14, 1903, _ibid._, 518 f., No. 465; memo. on Russo-Afghan
relations, Oct. 11, 1905, _ibid._, 519 f., No. 466; Hardinge to
Lansdowne, Nov. 22, 1903, _ibid._, 194, No. 181 (_b_). There was also
trouble over Tibet and the Persian Gulf (see Newton, p. 287).]
[Footnote 291: Lansdowne to Monson, Oct. 26, 1903, _B.D._, II, 217 f.,
No. 250.]
[Footnote 292: Lansdowne to Monson, Nov. 4, 1903, _ibid._, 221 f., No.
257.]
[Footnote 293: Spring Rice to Grey, Feb. 12, 1906, _ibid._, IV, 224, No.
209; Bülow to F. O., Oct. 31, 1903, _G.P._, XVIII, 853, No. 5918.]
[Footnote 294: Lansdowne to Spring Rice, Nov. 7, 1903, _B.D._, II, 222
ff., No. 258.]
[Footnote 295: Lansdowne to Spring Rice, Nov. 7, 17, 25, 1903, _ibid._,
222 ff., No. 258; IV, 183 ff., Nos. 181 f.; 306 f., No. 289; Scott to
Lansdowne, Dec. 22, 1903, _ibid._, II, 226, No. 262; Lee, II, 280 f.;
Lansdowne to Cromer, Dec. 7, 1903, Newton, p. 287.]
[Footnote 296: Lansdowne to Monson, Dec. 11, 1903, _B.D._, II, 224, No.
259.]
[Footnote 297: In Dec., 1903, Delcassé informed the Japanese Minister in
Paris that he did not approve of all of Russia’s designs in the Far East
(Dennis, p. 385). Hayashi, Japanese minister in London, believed as
early as Dec. 23 that France would remain neutral. See Eckardstein, III,
62, 188; see also Metternich to F. O., Jan. 8, 1904, _G.P._, XIX, 20 f.,
No. 5931; memo. by Eckardstein, Jan. 17, 1904, _ibid._, 38 ff., No.
5945; Langer, p. 317; Bülow to William II, Jan. 12, 1904, _G.P._, XIX,
26, No. 5936.]
[Footnote 298: Lee, II, 282; Langer, pp. 316 f.; Dennis, chap. xiii.
However, as late as Nov. 4, 1903, Lansdowne did not expect war, nor did
Sir Charles Hardinge as late as Dec. 25. By Jan. 5, the latter did
(Gwynn, I, 391 f.).]
[Footnote 299: Cambon to Lansdowne, Dec. 27, 1903, _B.D._, II, 336, No.
382; and the following documents, particularly the dispatch from
Lansdowne to Monson, Jan. 18, 1904, _ibid._, 339, No. 386. The British
were also surprised to learn early in January that Delcassé had kept his
colleagues in the dark concerning the details of the arrangement, and
feared some trouble on that account. It seems that as late as March 2
Delcassé had not consulted the French Colonial Minister (Lansdowne to
Cromer, Jan. 5, 1904, Monson to Lansdowne, Jan. 8, 1904, Newton, pp. 287
ff.).]
[Footnote 300: _Ibid._, p. 307.]
[Footnote 301: _G.P._, XIX, 89 f., editor’s note, and the documents in
_G.P._, Vol. XIX, chap. cxxix; Gwynn, I, 391.]
[Footnote 302: Spring Rice to Ferguson, Feb. 4, 1904, Spring Rice to
Roosevelt (no date given, though written in Feb. or March, 1904), Gwynn,
I, 392 ff.; Sternburg to F. O., March 21, 1904, _G.P._, XIX, 112, No.
5992. See also the dispatch from Alvensleben to Bülow, Dec. 20, 1903,
_ibid._, 18, No. 5929. Sir Charles Dilke summed up the danger of the
situation as follows: “If Germany were to declare war on Japan, Great
Britain would be forced by her treaty engagement to declare war on
Russia and Germany; and France, it is understood, to declare war upon
Great Britain and Japan” (Dilke, “The War in the Far East,” _North
American Review_, April, 1904, quoted in Dennett, p. 94).]
[Footnote 303: Lansdowne to Monson, Feb. 17, 1904, _B.D._, V, 67 f., and
following documents.]
[Footnote 304: Lansdowne to Monson, Feb. 25, 1904, _ibid._, II, 346, No.
391, and following documents; on March 1, King Edward wrote to Balfour
strongly advising in favor of the territorial sacrifice asked by the
French on the Newfoundland question, for, he wrote, “_more than ever
now_ [in italics in the original] we must leave no bone of contention
between ourselves and the French Government” (Lee, II, 248). See also
Holstein’s keen analysis of the situation on Jan. 23, 1904, _G.P._, XIX,
48 ff., No. 5951. Cromer also urged his government to make concessions
(Newton, p. 289).]
[Footnote 305: Tardieu, _La France et les alliances_, p. 23; E. J.
Dillon, _The Eclipse of Russia_ (New York, 1918), pp. 330 ff.;
Eckardstein, III, 57 ff., 187 ff.; Crozier, pp. 282 f.; Mévil, _De la
paix de Francfort, etc._, pp. 83 ff.; Radolin to F. O., Feb. 11, 1904,
_G.P._, XIX, 60 f., No. 5960.]
[Footnote 306: Mévil, p. 82.]
[Footnote 307: For an illustration of that optimism see Nicholas II to
William II, Jan. 24, 1904, _G.P._, XIX, 53, No. 5952.]
[Footnote 308: Lansdowne to Scott, Jan. 19, 1904, _B.D._, II, 237, No.
280; Lansdowne to Monson, Jan. 27, 1904, _ibid._, 240, No. 283.]
[Footnote 309: In July, 1905, Spring Rice reported to his friend
Roosevelt a conversation which he had recently had with Lansdowne, as
follows: “In speaking in general terms of our relations with Japan, he
[Lansdowne] pointed out that from the very first our political interest
had been to prevent the war [between Russia and Japan] which would not
only expose us to great dangers of loss in Asia itself, but would
seriously imperil our good understanding with France. . . . .” Then
after explaining why Great Britain refused to press Japan to maintain
peace, he continued: “As a result we all but lost our agreement with
France” . . . . (Dennett, pp. 213 f.). Cf. Eckardstein to Schwabach,
Feb. 10, 1904, _G.P._, XIX, 60, No. 5959. Spring Rice’s assertion was no
doubt exaggerated in order to prove to Roosevelt that Great Britain
really desired peace between Russia and Japan.]
[Footnote 310: See Radolin to Bülow, March 15, 1904, _ibid._, XX, 3 f.,
No. 6366.]
[Footnote 311: See Lansdowne to Monson, March 1, 1904, _B.D._, II, 347,
No. 393, and following documents.]
[Footnote 312: See Monson to Lansdowne, March 30, 1904, _ibid._, 357,
No. 405; Lansdowne to Monson, March 30, 31, 1904, _ibid._, 358, No. 406;
359 f., No. 408; Newton, pp. 289 f.]
[Footnote 313: The first two articles were kept secret at Delcassé’s
desire; the next two for obvious reasons.]
[Footnote 314: Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, _Documents
diplomatiques. Accords conclus, le 8 avril, 1904, entre la France et
l’Angleterre au sujet du Maroc, de l’Egypte, de Terre-Neuve, etc._
(Paris, 1904); _Parliamentary Papers. Declaration between the United
Kingdom and France Respecting Egypt and Morocco, together with the
Secret Articles Signed at the Same Time. Signed at London, April 8,
1904_ (Cd. 5969), Vol. CIII (1911); _B.D._, II, 373 ff., No. 417. The
secret articles were first revealed in 1911.]
[Footnote 315: On the reaction of the British people to the accord see
Spender, _Life, Journalism and Politics_, I, 188 ff.; _London Times_,
April 12 and 14, 1904; _Spectator_, quoted in Schulthess, _Europäischer
Geschichtskalendar 1904_, p. 223. For the debates in the British
Parliament see 4 Hansard, Vol. CXXXV, cols. 502 ff. Adverse opinion was
expressed by Lord Rosebery, the _Daily Chronicle_, the _Morning Post_,
and Mr. Aflalo who had lived in Morocco and was particularly interested
in the fate of the land; but their voices were lost in the general
applause (Metternich to Bülow, April 9, 1904, _G.P._, XX, 13 f., No.
6375).]
[Footnote 316: _Bulletin_, April, 1904, p. 107: Millet, _Notre politique
extérieure 1898-1905_, pp. 168, 173. Millet was a follower of Hanotaux,
Delcassé’s predecessor at the foreign office, and a consistent critic of
the latter.]
[Footnote 317: Count de Montferrand, who in company with M. Cambon
talked with Sanderson about the Newfoundland question, remarked that “if
M. Delcassé was not able to inform the French Chambers that they had
secured this right, the Convention would be rejected” (memo. by
Sanderson, June 30, 1904, _B.D._, III, 6, No. 5; see _ibid._, chap. xvi,
Part I).]
[Footnote 318: See below.]
[Footnote 319: For a summary see the article by Louis-Jaray, “L’Accord
entre la France et l’Angleterre. L’Opinion publique et le rapprochement
franco-anglais,” _Quest. dipl. et col._, XVIII (Nov. 16, 1904), 593 ff.
The debates in the Chamber, Nov. 3-10, 1904, and in the Senate, Dec.
5-7, 1904, are to be found in the _Journal officiel, Debats. parlem._
(Chambre), pp. 2255 ff.; _ibid._ (Sénat), pp. 1013 ff. See also Monson’s
reports to Lansdowne, Nov. 9, Dec. 8, 1904, _B.D._, III, 11 ff., Nos. 8
ff.]