ON THE USES OF EUTHANASIA

I

The proposal to forestall a painful death by a painless one is not,

to normal sensibilities, “shocking.” If persuaded of its expediency

no physician should give it a hesitating advocacy through fear of

being thought brutal. It is an error to suppose that familiarity with

death and suffering exhausts the springs of compassion in one born

compassionate. Like many other qualities, compassion grows by use: none

has more of it than the physician, the nurse, the soldier in war. He

to whom the menace of an injustice is a louder voice than the call of

conscience has no standing in the House of Pain, no warrant to utter

judgment as to the conduct of its affairs.

Pain is cruel, death is merciful. Prolongation of a mortal agony is

hardly less barbarous than its infliction. Who when sane in mind and

body would not choose to guard himself against a futile suffering by

an assurance of accelerated release? Every memory is charged with

instances, observed or related, of piteous appeals for death from the

white lips of agony, yet how rarely can these formulate the prayer!

To its concession, regulated by law, there is the objection that

law is frangible and judgment fallible. But that objection has no

greater cogency in this than in other matters; laws we must have, and

execute them with such care as we can. Our courts sometimes err in the

diagnosis of crime, yet they warrant our trust in the general service

of our need. The mariner’s compass is fallible, the winds baffle and

the waves destroy; yet we have navigation. Even the anarchist cries

out against law, not because it does not accomplish its purpose, but

because, roughly, it does.

We build civilization with such tools as we have; if we waited for

perfect ones the structure would never rise. The juror is no more

nearly just and infallible than the physician; if we can entrust

ourselves with death as a penalty for crime we need not shrink from

the no more awful responsibility of according it as a boon to hopeless

pain. In neither case can a blunder do more than hasten the inevitable.

“When I was born I cried,” said a philosopher; “now I know why.” He

did not know why; it was because at the moment of his birth Nature

spoke the sentence of his death.

It may be that proponents of euthanasia for suffering incurables are

pushing their adventurous feet too far ahead in the march of mind to

expect anything better in the nature of encouragement than a copious

dead-catting and bad-egging from laggard processionists arear.

Sometimes, however, they get decenter treatment than they have the

hardihood to claim: occasionally, through the roar of calumniation is

heard the voice of dull and dignified protestation, even of argument.

For example, _The British Medical Journal_ once pointed out, with

more gravity than grammar, that “the medical profession has always

strongly set its face against a measure that would inevitably pave

the way to the grossest abuses, and which would degrade them to the

position of executioners.”

I don’t know that the medical profession speaks with any special

authority in a matter of this kind. Perhaps it knows a little better

than other trades and professions that cases of hopeless agony are

of frequent occurrence, but as to the expediency of relieving them

by the compassionate _coup de grâce_—of that a physician is no

better judge than anyone else. As to the fear of being “degraded to the

position of executioners,” the position is not degrading. The office of

executioner—even when execution is punishment, not mercy—is, and should

be considered, an almost sacred office. Its popular disrepute harks

back to the bad old days when a majority of the people in countries

now partly civilized were criminal in act or sympathy, living in hate

and terror of the law—the days of Tyburn Tree with its roaring mobs,

cheering the malefactor and pelting the hangman. It was not from fear

of a merely social reprobation that the mediæval headsman wore a mask;

it was from fear of being torn to pieces if ever recognized unguarded

in the public street. A man of to-day, ambitious to prove his descent

from a criminal ancestry, can most easily do so by damning the hangman.

His humble origin is no disgrace to him if he is a good citizen, but it

makes him invincible to the suasion of argument against his fad. One

might as profitably attempt to reform the color of his eyes or dissuade

him from the shape of his nose.

The Collected Works of Ambrose Bierce, Volume 09 Tangential Views · 第 72 / 83 题