By this time, Madam, you will have reflected on what I had the honor to
address to you, and perceived how impossible it is to found a certain
and invariable morality on a religion enthusiastic, ambiguous,
mysterious, and contradictory, and which never agreed with itself.
You know that the God who appears to have taken pleasure in rendering
himself unintelligible, that the God who is partial and changeable, that
the God whose precepts are at variance one with another, can never serve
as the base on which to rear a morality that shall become practicable
among the inhabitants of the earth. In short, how can we fonnd justice
and goodness on attributes that are unjust and evil; yet attributes of a
Being who tempts man, whom he created, for the purpose of punishing him
when tempted? How can we know when we do the will of a God who has said,
_Thou shalt not kill_, and who yet allows his people to exterminate
whole nations? What idea can we form of the morality of that God who
declares himself pleased with the sanguinary conduct of Moses, of the
rebel, the assassin, the adulterer, David? Is it possible to found
the holy duties of humanity on a God whose favorites have been inhuman
persecutors and cruel monsters? How can we deduce our duties from the
lessons of the priests of a God of peace, who, nevertheless, breathes
only sedition, vengeance, and carnage? How can we take as models for our
conduct _saints_, who were useless enthusiasts, or turbulent fanatics,
or seditious apostates; who, under the pretext of defending the cause of
God, have stirred up the greatest ravages on the earth? What wholesome
morality can we reap from the adoption of impracticable virtues, from
their being supernatural, which are visibly useless to ourselves, to
those among whom we live, and in their consequences often dangerous? How
can we take as guides in our conduct priests, whose lessons are a tissue
of unintelligible opinions, (_for all religion is but opinion_,) puerile
and frivolous practices, which these gentlemen prefer to real virtues?
In fine, how can we be taught _the truth_, conducted in an unerring
path, by men of a changeable morality, calculated upon and actuated
by their present interests, and who, although they pretend to preach
good-will to men, humanity, and peace, have, as their text-book, a
volume stained with the records of injustice, inhumanity, sedition, and
perfidy? J You know, Madam, that it is impossible to found morality on
notions that are so unfixed and so contrary to all our natural ideas of
virtue. By virtue, we ought to understand the habitual dispositions to
do whatever will procure us the happiness of ourselves and our species.
By virtue, religion understands only that which may contribute to render
us favorable to a hidden God, who attaches his favor to practices and
opinions that are too often hurtful to ourselves, and little beneficial
to others. The morality of the Christians is a mystic morality, which
resembles the dogmas of their religion; it is obscure, unintelligible,
uncertain, and subject to the interpretation of frail creatures. This
morality is never fixed, because it is subordinate to a religion which
varies incessantly its principles, and which is regulated according to
the pleasure of a despotic divinity, and, more especially, according
to the pleasure of priests, whose interests are changing daily, whose
caprices are as variable as the hours of their existence, and who are,
consequently, not always in agreement with one another.
The writings which are the sources whence the Christians have drawn
their morality, are not only an abyss of obscurity, but demand continual
explications from their masters, the priests, who, in explaining, make
them still more obscure, still more contradictory. If these oracles of
heaven prescribe to us in one place the virtues truly useful, in another
part they approve, or prescribe, actions entirely opposed to all the
ideas that we have of virtue. The same God who orders us to be good,
equitable, and beneficent, who forbids the revenging of injuries,
who declares himself to be the God of clemency and of goodness, shows
himself to be implacable in his rage; announces himself as bringing
_the swords and not peace_; tells us that he is come to set mankind at
variance; and, finally, in order to revenge his wrongs, orders rapine,
treason, usurpation, and carnage. In a word, it is impossible to find
in the Scriptures any certain principles or sure rules of morality.
You there see, in one part, a small number of precepts, useful and
intelligible, and in another part maxims the most extravagant, and the
most destructive to the good and happiness of all society.
It is in punctuality to fulfil the superstitious and frivolous duties,
that the morality of the Jews in the Old Testament writings is chiefly
conspicuous; legal observances, rites, ceremonies, are all that occupied
the people of Israel. In recompense for their scrupulous exactness to
fulfil these duties, they were permitted to commit the most frightful of
crimes. The virtues recommended by the Son of God, in the New Testament,
are not in reality the same as those which God the Father had made
observable in the former case. The New Testament contradicts the Old. It
announces that God is not pacified by sacrifices, nor by offerings,
nor by frivolous rites. It substitutes in place of these, supernatural
virtues, of which I believe I have sufficiently proved the inutility,
the impossibility, and the incompatibility with the well-being of man
living in society. The Son of God, by the writers of the New Testament,
is set at variance with himself; for he destroys in one place what he
establishes in another; and, moreover, the priests have appropriated to
themselves all the principles of his mission. They are in unison only
with God when the precepts of the Deity accord with their present
interest. Is it their interest to persecute? They find that God ordains
persecution. Are they themselves persecuted? They find that this pacific
God forbids persecution, and views with abhorrence the persecution of
his servants. Do they find that superstitious practices are lucrative to
themselves? Notwithstanding the aversion of Jesus Christ from offerings,
rites, and ceremonies, they impose them on the people, they surcharge
them with mysterious rites: they respect these more than those duties
Which are of essential benefit to society. If Jesus has not wished that
they should avenge themselves, they find that his Father has delighted
in vengeance. If Jesus has declared that his kingdom is not of this
world, and if he has shown, contempt of riches, they nevertheless find
in the Old Testament sufficient reasons for establishing a hierarchy
for the governing of the world in a spiritual sense, as kings do in a
political one,--for the disputing with kings about their power,--for
exercising in this world an authority the most unlimited, a license the
most terrific. In a word, if they have found in the Bible some precepts
of a moral tendency and practical utility, they have also found others
to justify crimes the most atrocious.
Thus, in the Christian religion, morality uniformly depends on the
fanaticism of priests, their passions, their interests: its principles
are never fixed; they vary according to circumstances: the God of whom
they are the organs, and the interpreters, has not said any thing but
what agrees best with their views, and what never contravenes their
interest Following their caprices, he changes his advice continually;
he approves, and disapproves, of the same actions: he loves, or detests,
the same conduct; he changes crime into virtue, and virtue into crime.
What is the result from all this? It is that the Christians have not
sure principles in morality: it varies with the policy of the priests,
who are in a situation to command the credulity of mankind, and who,
by force of menaces and terrors, oblige men to shut their eyes on their
contradictions, and minds the most honest to commit faults the greatest
which can be committed against religion. It is thus that under a God who
recommends the love of our neighbor, the Christians accustom themselves
from infancy to detest an heretical neighbor, and are almost always in a
disposition to overwhelm him by a crowd of arguments received from their
priests. It is thus that, under a God who ordains we should love our
enemies and forgive their offences, the Christians hate and destroy
the enemies of their priests, and take vengeance, without measure, for
injuries which they pretend to have received. It is thus, that under
a just God, a God who never ceases to boast of his goodness, the
Christians, at the signal of their spiritual guides, become unjust and
cruel, and make a merit of having stifled the cries of nature, the voice
of humanity, the counsels of wisdom, and of public interest.
In a word, all the ideas of justice and of injustice, of good and evil,
of happiness and of misfortune, are necessarily confounded in the head
of a Christian. His despotic priest commands him, in the name of God, to
put no reliance on his reason, and the man who is compelled to abandon
it for the guidance of a troubled imagination will be far more likely to
consult and admit the most stupid fanaticism as the inspiration of
the Most High. In his blindness, he casts at his feet duties the most
sacred, and he believes himself virtuous in outraging every virtue. Has
he remorse? his priest appeases it speedily, and points out some
easy practices by which he may soon recommend himself to God. Has he
committed injustice, violence, and rapine? he may repair all by giving
to the church the goods of which he has despoiled worthy citizens; or by
repaying by largesses, which will procure him the prayers of the priests
and the favor of heaven. For the priests never reproach men, who give
them of this world's goods, with the injustice, the cruelties, and the
crimes they have been guilty, to support the church and befriend her
ministers; the faults which have almost always been found the most
unpardonable, have always been those of most disservice to the clergy.
To question the faith and reject the authority of the priesthood, have
always been the most frightful crimes; they are truly the sin against
the Holy Ghost, which can never be forgiven either in this world or in
that which is to come. To despise these objects which the priests have
an interest in making to be respected, is sufficient to qualify one for
the appellation of a blasphemer and an impious man. These vague words,
void of sense, suffice to excite horror in the mind of the weak vulgar.
The terrible word sacrilege designates an attempt on the person, the
goods, and the rights of the clergy. The omission of some useless
practice is exaggerated and represented as a crime more detestable than
actions which injure society. In favor of fidelity to fulfil the duties
of religion, the priest easily pardons his slave submitting to vices,
criminal debaucheries, and excesses the most horrible. You perceive,
then, Madam, that the Christian morality has really in view but the
utility of the priests. Why, then, should you be surprised that they
endeavor to make themselves arbitrary and sovereign; that they deem
as faults, and as criminal, all the virtues which agree not with their
marvellous systems? The Christian morality appears only to have been
proposed to blind men, to disturb their reason, to render them abject
and timid, to plunge them into vassalage, to make them lose sight of the
earth which they inhabit, for visions of bliss in heaven. By the aid of
this morality, the priests have become the true masters here below; they
have imagined virtues and practices useful only to themselves; they have
proscribed and interdicted those which were truly useful to society;
they have made slaves of their disciples, who make virtue to consist in
blind submission to their caprices.
To lay the foundations of a good morality, it is absolutely necessary
to destroy the prejudices which the priests have inspired in us; it is
necessary to begin by rendering the mind of man energetic, and freeing
it from those vain terrors which have enthralled it; it is necessary to
renounce those supernatural notions which have, till now, hindered men
from consulting the volume of nature, which have subjected reason to the
yoke of authority; it is necessary to encourage man, to undeceive him as
to those prejudices which have enslaved him; to annihilate in his bosom
those false theories which corrupt his nature, and which are, in fact,
infidel guides, destructive of the real happiness of the species. It is
necessary to undeceive him as to the idea of his loathing himself, and
especially that other idea, that some of his fellow-creatures are not to
labor with their hands for their support, but in spiritual matters for
his happiness. In fine, it is necessary to influence him with self-love,
that he may merit the esteem of the world, the benevolence and
consideration of those with whom he is associated by the ties of nature
or public economy.
The morality of religion appears calculated to confound society and
replunge its members into the savage state. The Christian virtues tend
evidently to isolate man, to detach him from those to whom nature has
united him, and to unite him to the priests--to make him lose sight of
a happiness the most solid, to occupy himself only with dangerous
chimeras. We only live in society to procure the more easily those
kindnesses, succors, and pleasures, which we could not obtain living by
ourselves. If it had been destined that we should live miserably in
this world, that we should detest ourselves, fly the esteem of others,
voluntarily afflict ourselves, have no attachment for any one, society
would have been one heap of confusion, the human kind savages and
strangers to one another. However, if it is true that God is the author
of man, it is God who renders man sociable; it is God who wishes man to
live in society where he can obtain the greatest good. If God is good,
he cannot approve that men should leave society to become miserable; if
God is the author of reason, we can only wish that men who are possessed
of reason should employ this distinguishing gift to procure for
themselves all the happiness its exercise can bring them. If God has
revealed himself, it is not in some obscure way, but in in revelation
the most evident and clear of all those supposed revelations, which are
visibly contrary to all the notions we can form of the Divinity. We
are not, however, obliged to dive into the marvellous to establish the
duties man owes to man, since God has very plainly shown them in the
wants of one and the good offices of another person. But it is only by
consulting our reason that we can arrive at the means of contributing to
the felicity of our species. It is then evident that in regarding man as
the creature of God, God must have designed that man should consult his
reason, that it might procure him the most solid happiness, and those
principles of virtue which nature approves.
What, then, might not our opinions be were we to substitute the morality
of reason for the morality of religion? In place of a partial and
reserved morality for a small number of men, let us substitute a
universal morality, intelligible to all the inhabitants of the earth,
and of which all can find the principles in nature. Let us study
this nature, its wants, and its desires; let us examine the means of
satisfying it; let us consider what is the end of our existence in
society; we shall see that all those who are thus associated are
compelled by their natures to practise affection one to another,
benevolence, esteem, and relief, if desired; we shall see what is that
line of conduct which necessarily excites hatred, ill-will, and all
those misfortunes which experience makes familiar to mankind; our
reason will tell us what actions are the most calculated to excite real
happiness and good will the most solid and extensive; let us weigh these
with those that are founded on visionary theories; their difference will
at once be perceptible; the advantages which are permanent we will not
sacrifice for those that are momentary; we will employ all our faculties
to augment the happiness of our species; we will labor with perseverance
and courage to extirpate evil from the earth; we will assist as much as
we can those who are without friends; we will seek to alleviate their
distresses and their pains; we will merit their regard, and thus fulfil
the end of our being on earth.
In conducting ourselves in this manner, our reason prescribes a morality
agreeable to nature, reasonable to all, constant in its operation,
effective in its exercise in benefiting all, in contributing to the
happiness of society, collectively and individually, in distinction to
the mysticism preached up by priests. We shall find in our reason and in
our nature the surest guides, superior to the clergy, who only teach us
to benefit themselves. We shall thus enjoy a morality as durable as the
race of man. We shall have precepts founded on the necessity of things,
that will punish those transgressing them, and rewarding those who obey
them. Every man who shall prove himself to be just, useful, beneficent,
will be an object of love to his fellow-citizens; every man who shall
prove himself unjust, useless, and wicked will become an object of
hatred to himself as well as to others; he will be forced to tremble at
the violation of the laws; he will be compelled to do that which is good
to gain the good will of mankind and preserve the regard of those who
have the power of obliging him to be a useful member of the state.
Thus, Madam, if it should be demanded of you what you would substitute
for the benefit of society, in place of visionary reveries, I reply,
a sensible morality, a good education, profitable habits, self-evident
principles of duty, wise laws, which even the wicked cannot
misunderstand, but which may correct their evil purposes, and
recompenses that may tend to the promotion of virtue. The education of
the present day tends only to make youth the slaves of superstition;
the virtues which it inculcates on them are only those of fanaticism,
to render the mind subject to the priests for the remainder of life;
the motives to duty are only fictitious and imaginary; the rewards and
punishments which it exhibits in an obscure glimmering, produce no other
effect than to make useless enthusiasts and dangerous fanatics. The
principles on which enthusiasm establishes morality are changing and
ruinous; those on which the morality of reason is established are fixed,
and cannot be overturned. Seeing, then, that man, a reasonable being,
should be chiefly occupied about his preservation and happiness--that he
should love virtue--that he should be sensible of its advantages--that
he should fear the consequences of crime--is it to be wondered I should
insist so much on the practice of virtue as his chief good? Men ought to
hate crime because it leads to misery. Society, to exist, must receive
the united virtue of its members, obedience to good laws, the activity
and intelligence of citizens to defend its privileges and its rights.
Laws are good when they invite the members of society to labor for
reciprocal good offices. Laws are just when they recompense or punish in
proportion to the good or evil which is done to society. Laws supported
by a visible authority should be founded on present motives; and thus
they would have more force than those of religion, which are founded
on uncertain motives, imaginary and removed from this world, and which
experience proves cannot suffice to curb the passions of bad men, nor
show them their duty by the fear of punishments after death.
If in place of stifling human reason, as, is too much done, its
perfectibility were studied; if in place of deluging the world with
visionary notions, truth were inculcated; if in place of pleading a
supernatural morality, a morality agreeable to humanity and resulting
from experience were preached, we should no longer be the dupes of
imaginary theories, nor of terrifying fables as the bases of virtue.
Every one would then perceive that it is to the practice of virtue, to
the faithful observation of the duties of morality, that the happiness
of individuals and of society is to be traced. Is he a husband? He will
perceive that his essential happiness is to show kindness, attachment,
and tenderness to the companion of his life, destined by his own choice
to share his pleasures and endure his misfortunes. And, on the other
hand, she, by consulting her true interests, will perceive that they
consist in rendering homage to her husband, in interdicting every
thought that could alienate her affections, diminish her esteem and
confidence in him. Fathers and mothers will perceive that their children
are destined to be one day their consolation and support in old age, and
that by consequence they have the greatest interest in inspiring them in
early life with sentiments of which they may themselves reap the benefit
when age or misfortune may require the fruits of those advantages that
result from a good education. Their children, early taught to reflect on
these things, will find their interest to lie in meriting the kindness
of their parents, and in giving them proofs that the virtues they are
taught will be communicated to their posterity. The master will perceive
that, to be served with affection, he owes good will, kindness, and
indulgence to those at whose hands he would reap advantages, and by
whose labor he would increase his prosperity; and servants will discover
how much their happiness depends on fidelity, industry, and good temper
in their situations. Friends will find the advantages of a kindred heart
for friendship, and the reciprocity of good offices. The members of the
same family will perceive the necessity of preserving that union
which nature has established among them, to render mutual benefits in
prosperity or in adversity. Societies, if they reflect on the end of
their association, will perceive that to secure it they must observe
good faith and punctuality in their engagements. The citizen, when he
consults his reason, will perceive how much it is necessary, for the
good of the nation to which he belongs, that he should exert himself to
advance its prosperity, or, in its misfortunes, to retrieve its glory.
By consequence every one in his sphere, and using his faculties for
this great end, will find his own advantage in restraining the bad as
dangerous, and opposing enemies to the state as enemies to himself.
In a word, every man who will reflect for himself will be compelled to
acknowledge the necessity of virtue for the happiness of the world. It
is so obvious that justice is the basis of all society; that good will
and good offices necessarily procure for men affection and respect; that
every man who respects himself ought to seek the esteem of others; that
it is necessary to merit the good opinion of society; that he ought to
be jealous of his reputation; that a weak being, who is every instant
exposed to misfortunes, ought to know what are his duties, and how he
should practise them for the benefit of himself and the assembly of
which he is a member.
If we reflect for one moment on the effects of the passions, we shall
perceive the necessity of repressing them, if we would spare ourselves
vain regrets and useless sorrows, which certainly always afflict those
who obey not the laws. Thus, a single reflection will suffice to show
the impropriety of anger, the dreadful consequences of revenge, calumny,
and backbiting. Every one must perceive that in giving a free course to
unbridled desires, he becomes the enemy of society, and then it is the
part of the laws to restrain him who renounces his reason and despises
the motives that ought to guide him.
If it is objected that man is not a free agent, and therefore is unable
to restrain his passions, and that consequently the law ought not
to punish him, I reply that the community are impelled by the same
necessity to hate what is injurious, and for their own conservation and
happiness have the right to restrain an unhappily organized individual
who is impelled to injure himself and others. The inevitable faults of
men necessarily excite the hatred of those who suffer from them.
If the man who consults his reason has real and powerful motives for
doing good to others and abstaining from injuring them, he has present
motives equally urgent to restrain him from the commission of vice.
Experience may suffice to show him that if he becomes sooner or later
the victim of his excesses, he ceases to be the friend of virtue, and
exists only to serve vice, which will infallibly punish him. This being
allowed, prudence, or the desire of preserving one's self free from the
contamination of evil, ought to inculcate to every man his path of
duty; and, unless blinded by his passions, he must perceive how much
moderation in his pleasures, temperance, chastity, contribute to
happiness; that those who transgress in these respects are necessarily
the victims of ill health, and too often pass a life both infirm and
unfortunate, which terminates soon in death.
How is it possible, then, Madam, from visionary theories to arrive
at these conclusions, and establish from supernatural phantasms the
principles of private and public virtue? Shall we launch into unknown
regions to ascertain our duty and to keep our station in society? Is
it not sufficient if we wish to be happy that we should endeavor to
preserve ourselves in those maxims which reason approves, and on which
virtue is founded? Every man who would perish, who would render his
existence miserable, whoever would sacrifice permanent happiness for
present pleasure, is a fool, who reflects not on the interests that are
dearest to him.
If there are any principles so clear as the morality of humanity has
been and is still proved to be, they are such as men ought to observe.
They are not obscure notions, mysticism, contradictions, which have made
of a science the most obvious and best demonstrated, an unintelligible
science, mysterious and uncertain to those for whom it is designed.
In the hands of the priests, morality has become an enigma; they have
founded our duties on the attributes of a Deity whom the mind of man
cannot comprehend, in place of founding them on the character of man
himself. They have thrown in among them the foundations of an edifice
which is made for this earth. They have desired to regulate our
manners agreeably to equivocal oracles which every instant contradict
themselves, and which too often render their devotees useless to society
and to themselves. They have pretended to render their morality more
sacred by inviting us to look for recompenses and punishments removed
beyond this life, but which they announce in the name of the Divinity.
In fine, they have made man a being who may not even strive at
perfection, by a preordination of some to bliss, and consequent
damnation of others, whose insensibility is the result of this
selection.
Need we not, then, wonder that this supernatural morality should be so
contrary to the nature and the mind of man? It is in vain that it aims
at the annihilation of human nature, which is so much stronger, so
much more powerful, than imagination. In despite of all the subtile and
marvellous speculations of the priests, man continues always to love
himself, to desire his well being, and to flee misfortune and sorrow. He
has then always been actuated by the same passions. When these passions
have been moderate, and have tended to the public good, they are
legitimate, and we approve those actions which are their effects. When
these passions have been disordered, hurtful to society, or to the
individual, he condemns them; they punish him; he is dissatisfied with
his conduct which others cannot approve. Man always loves his pleasures,
because in their enjoyment he fulfils the end of his existence; if he
exceeds their just bounds he renders himself miserable.
The morality of the clergy, on the other hand, appears calculated to
keep nature always at variance with herself, for it is almost always
without effect even on the priesthood. Their chimeras serve but to
torture weak minds, and to set the passions at war with nature and their
dogmas. When this morality professes to restrain the wicked, to curb the
passions of men, it operates in opposition to the established laws
of natural religion; for by preserving all its rigor, it becomes
impracticable; and it meets with real devotees only in some few fanatics
who have renounced nature, and who would be singular, even if their
oddities were injurious to society. This morality, adopted for the most
part by devotees, without eradicating their habits or their natural
defects, keeps them always in a state of opposition even with
themselves. Their life is a round of faults and of scruples, of sins and
remorse, of crimes and expiations, of pleasures which they enjoy, but
for which they again reproach themselves for having tasted. In a word,
the morality of superstition necessarily carries with it into the heart
and the family of its devotees inward distress and affliction; it makes
of enthusiasts and fanatics scrupulous devotees; it makes a great many
insensible and miserable; it renders none perfect, few good; and
those only tolerable whom nature, education, and habit had moulded for
happiness.
It is our temperament which decides our condition; the acquisition
of moderate passions, of honest habits, sensible opinions, laudable
examples, and practical virtues, is a difficult task, but not impossible
when undertaken with reason for one's guide, It is difficult to be
virtuous and happy with a temperament so ardent as to sway the passions
to its will. One must in calmness consult reason as to nis duty. Nature,
in giving us lively passions and a susceptible imagination, has made
us capable of suffering the instant we transgress her bounds. She then
renders us necessary to ourselves, and we cannot proceed to consult
our real interest if we continue in indulgence that she forbids. The
passions which reason cannot restrain are not to be bridled by religion.
It is in vain that we hope to derive succors from religion if we despise
and refuse what nature offers us. Religion leaves men just such as
nature and habit have made them; and if it produce any changes on some
few, I believe I have proved that those changes are not always for the
better.
Congratulate yourself, then, Madam, on being born with good
dispositions, of having received such honest principles, which shall
carry you through life in the practice of virtue, and in the love of
a fine and exalted taste for the rational pleasures of our nature.
Continue to be the happiness of your family, which esteems and honors
you. Continue to diffuse around you the blessings you enjoy; continue to
perform only those actions which are esteemed by all the world, and all
men will respect you. Respect yourself, and others will respect you.
These are the legitimate sentiments of virtue and of happiness. Labor
for your own happiness, and you will promote that of your family,
who will love you in proportion to the good you do it. Allow me to
congratulate myself if, in all I have said, I have in any measure swept
from your mind those clouds of fanaticism which obscure the reason;
and to felicitate you on your having escaped from vague theories of
imagination. Abjure superstition, which is calculated only to make you
miserable; let the morality of humanity be your uniform religion; that
your happiness may be constant, let reason be your guide; that virtue
may be the idol of your soul, cultivate and love only what is virtuous
and good in the world; and if there be a God who is interested in
the happiness of his creatures, if there be a God full of justice
and goodness, he will not be angry with you for having consulted
your reason; if there be another life, your happiness in it cannot be
doubtful, if God rewards every one according to the good done here.