THE INVASIONS OF ENGLAND
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[Illustration:
_A. Rischgitz._
ADMIRAL MICHIEL ADRIAANSZOON DE RUIJTER.
The guns of whose fleet were heard at Whitehall in 1667. The greatest
of Dutch naval commanders.]
THE INVASIONS
OF ENGLAND
BY EDWARD FOORD
AND GORDON HOME
A. AND C. BLACK, LIMITED
SOHO SQUARE, LONDON, W. : 1915
_Published, 1913, as_ ‘ENGLAND INVADED’
_Reissued, 1915, as_ ‘THE INVASIONS OF ENGLAND’
PREFACE TO REISSUE
It has quite recently been stated in an American journal that Herr
Dernburg--the German official apologist to the United States--speaking
of the shelling of Hartlepool and Yorkshire watering-places, was
convinced that it would ‘bring home to the English people a keen
realization of the fact that every serious attempt to invade England
in the past has been successful.’ Had Herr Dernburg read any connected
narrative of the invasions of England we are of opinion that he would
never have made this statement, for it is obvious that since the Norman
conquest no successful invasion has taken place without the active
sympathy and assistance of a great section of the population.
Both before and during the present war the Germans have shown
themselves so incapable of reading correctly the habits of thought of
the British, of Americans, of Indians, of South Africans, that one is
scarcely surprised to find them ignorant of the history of the British
peoples also.
Let Herr Dernburg study the history of the Cinque Ports, or of any
of the seafaring towns of South Devon and Cornwall, and he will find
that sporadic raids and bombardments were frequent enough in mediæval,
Tudor, and even later times; but for any invasion that did not meet in
some degree with the approval of the country he will search in vain
after he has passed the landmark of 1066. Even the Norman conquest was
achieved through the lack of that real national cohesion which could
not come to pass within such a brief period as the interval between the
last Danish invasion and the death of Edward the Confessor.
Great Britain and Ireland in 1915 show a united front to the invader,
and the inevitable fate of any force that has the temerity to set
hostile feet on British soil will be the same as that of General Tate
and his 1,400 men in the year 1797.
There is such a widespread lack of exact knowledge on the subject of
the invasions of England that this new edition, at a popular price, of
a volume concerned with the whole of them, from Cæsar to Napoleon, may
help to clear a good many minds of misconceptions.
E. F.
G. H.
PREFACE
Since the year 1794, when England seethed with excitement through fear
of a French Republican invasion, no book has been produced dealing with
the invasions of England. The historical and archæological work of the
century that has passed has shed so much light on dark and shadowy
periods of English history that the materials available for a new work
on the subject have become increasingly extensive, and the authors have
endeavoured to take full advantage of all this new material. They have,
either together or separately, visited all the important, and many of
the minor, battle sites and campaign areas mentioned in the text, and,
as a result of close study, they have in certain instances arrived at
conclusions at variance with those generally accepted.
By careful topographical work, aided by every shred of historical
evidence available, the authors venture to hope that they may have
thrown a little new light upon the great campaign in which the Roman
general Paulinus crushed the British struggle for independence
under Boudicca. They have also devoted much time and thought to the
elucidation of the problem of the identity of the heroes of the
Romano-British contests with the oncoming Teutons, and to the areas of
their chief military operations. After much consideration and study of
the available authorities, they have arrived at the conclusion, which
they have not hesitated to express, that Arthur, or Artorius, is a
well-established historical figure. One of the authors has, through
his family’s territorial connection with the Eastern Border, had
exceptional opportunities for becoming familiar with the topography of
the wild and intricate region in which both are inclined to place the
fields of at least four, and perhaps six, of Arthur’s twelve famous
victories.
The field of Senlac has been examined by the authors in the company of
Sir Augustus Webster, Bart., the present owner of Battle Abbey, himself
a practical soldier. The result of their investigations has been to
convince them that the line of the Norman advance lay considerably to
the east of where it is generally placed, and that the great bulk of
Harold’s army was massed about the site of the abbey itself. His right
wing, being almost unassailable owing to the protection given to it by
the marshy ground in its front, was probably very weakly held. Relying
on the contemporary evidence of the Bayeux tapestry, and considering
the circumstances of Harold’s march, the authors are inclined to
discount any effective entrenchments or palisading.
In regard to the strategy and tactics of Flodden, a close study of
contemporary documents and authorities tends to emphasize certain
features which are often overlooked or ignored. First, the Scottish
army evidently changed its position twice to counteract Surrey’s
puzzling flanking movement. Second, it can have had no proper service
of scouts, and was too cumbrous to manœuvre readily, circumstances
which left it at the mercy of its numerically inferior antagonist.
Third, it was never able to form a complete line of battle owing to the
slowness of the right wing in coming into action. Fourth, so far as
appears from the letters of the English leaders, there was no slackness
on the part of the Scottish Lord Chamberlain who commanded the left
wing.
Much has been written on the relative strengths of the English and
Spanish fleets in 1588. The authors’ opinions may be summarized as
follows: (1) The Spaniards had an undoubted superiority in tonnage,
but in strength of ships actually built for war the English had the
advantage. (2) The English ships, being manned by a majority of
sailors, were infinitely better handled; and the galleons of the Royal
Navy were faster sailers than those of the Spanish. (3) There is no
real reason to think that the Spaniards were outmatched in number and
power of guns, but the English gunnery, though bad, was better and
more rapid than that of their antagonists. (4) The Spanish tactics,
as compared with that of the English, was antiquated, being based on
the formation of line abreast and a close order, which hampered the
manœuvring of individual ships and impeded the use of broadsides.
The exigencies of space have compelled the authors to pass briefly
over the later period of attempted invasions, and to concentrate
attention upon those attempts which actually succeeded so far as to
effect a landing upon English soil. An exception has, however, been
made in regard to Napoleon’s project of 1804-5, which has been briefly
discussed. It was the last attempt of an ancient enemy, France having
been actively organizing invasions of England in 1744 and again in
1759. The latter project was ably planned by Choiseul and Belleisle,
and was at least as feasible as Napoleon’s far more celebrated design;
but it shared its fate of hopeless failure owing to Britain’s supremacy
on the sea.
To Mr. Julian Corbett the authors are indebted for his kindness
in reading the proofs of the chapters on the Armada period. The
observations on Napoleon’s project of invasion are based entirely upon
the works of Mr. Corbett and Colonel Desbrière.
In writing on a subject of such permanently vital interest to the
British nation as the question of invasion, it may be thought desirable
that the authors should express the conclusions to which they have been
led in the course of their researches. They, however, prefer to merely
direct the attention of their readers to the fact that no successful
invasion of England has taken place since 1066 without the active
sympathy and assistance of a considerable section of the population.
Prior to that date Britain and England were not in any real sense of
the word single united communities.
The salient fact is that so long as England remained strong at sea, and
her strength was intelligently and vigorously directed, she was able
to beat off every serious attempt against her. It is unnecessary to
insist here on the universally accepted axiom that British national and
imperial existence rests on the maintenance of a supreme navy.
The maps have all been drawn by the authors for the express purpose of
illustrating their deductions, and among the objects illustrated are
several which have never before, it is believed, been depicted in any
published work.
EDWARD FOORD.
GORDON HOME.
_September, 1913._
CONTENTS
CHAPTER PAGE
I. CÆSAR’S INVASIONS 1
II. THE CLAUDIAN INVASION AND THE ROMAN CONQUEST 30
III. THE ROMAN PROVINCE AND THE EARLIER TEUTONIC INVASIONS 58
IV. THE ENGLISH CONQUEST 85
V. THE VIKING RAVAGES 114
VI. ALFRED AND THE SAVING OF WESSEX 132
VII. THE CONQUEST OF THE DANELAW 152
VIII. LATER VIKING RAIDS AND THE DANISH CONQUEST 162
IX. THE INVASIONS OF 1066 177
X. CONTINENTAL INVASIONS 209
XI. SCOTTISH INVASIONS 223
XII. LATER SCOTTISH INVASIONS 249
XIII. THE SPANISH ARMADA 275
XIV. THE AFTERMATH OF THE ARMADA 312
XV. DE RUIJTER AND WILLIAM OF ORANGE 318
XVI. THE ‘FIFTEEN’ AND THE ‘FORTY-FIVE’ 332
XVII. FRENCH RAIDS, 1690-1797 344
XVIII. THE NAPOLEONIC DESIGN, 1804 351
APPENDIX A.--THE SITE OF THE BATTLE OF ACLEA 357
APPENDIX B.--THE ENGLISH AND SPANISH FLEETS IN 1588 357
INDEX 363
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
PRINTED SEPARATELY FROM THE TEXT
ADMIRAL MICHIEL ADRIAANSZOON DE RUIJTER _Frontispiece_
FACING PAGE
GAIUS JULIUS CÆSAR 17
CLAUDIUS I. 32
JOHN DUDLEY, VISCOUNT LISLE 213
A GREAT-SHIP OF THE REIGN OF HENRY VIII. 220
THOMAS HOWARD, EARL OF SURREY 261
KING JAMES IV. OF SCOTLAND 268
ADMIRAL PERO MENENDEZ DE AVILES 289
SIR FRANCIS DRAKE 304
LORD HOWARD OF EFFINGHAM 309
SIR JOHN HAWKINS 316
JAMES, DUKE OF MONMOUTH 321
WILLIAM OF ORANGE 336
PRINCE CHARLES EDWARD STUART 341
GENERAL LAZARE HOCHE 346
A HIGHLAND OUTPOST 348
PRINTED IN THE TEXT
PAGE
TYPES OF ROMAN SOLDIERS 10
A BRITON 15
A ROMAN TRIREME OFF DOVER 19
THE ROMAN WALL BETWEEN AESICA AND BORCOVICUS 55
ANGLO-SAXON WEAPONS IN THE BRITISH MUSEUM 95
A VIKING WARRIOR 115
THE OSEBERG DRAGON SHIP 118
SCANDINAVIAN WEAPONS IN THE BRITISH MUSEUM 121
IRON HAFTED BATTLE-AXE FOUND AT WINCHESTER 123
PLANKS TAKEN FROM A NINTH-CENTURY WAR VESSEL SUNK IN THE
HAMBLE RIVER 133
AN ANGLO-SAXON WEARING A HELMET OF LEATHER STRENGTHENED
WITH METAL BANDS 135
NORSE SHIP FOUND AT GOKSTAD 151
HORSES BEING LANDED FROM TRANSPORTS 189
WILLIAM’S FLAGSHIP, THE ‘MORA’ 189
THE ATTACK ON THE ENGLISH SHIELD-WALL AT HASTINGS 201
A VERY EARLY CAST-IRON BREECH-LOADING GUN 215
WROUGHT-IRON GUN FROM THE ‘MARIE ROSE’ 219
A BRASS CANNON ROYAL OF THE TIME OF HENRY VIII. 220
THE VIEW NORTH-WEST FROM FLODDEN FIELD 253
WEAPONS NOW PRESERVED IN BAMBOROUGH CASTLE 256
AN ENGLISH BILLMAN 262
A SCOTTISH PIKEMAN 265
BROWN BILL AND A BILL OF THE TIME OF HENRY VIII. 267
AN ELIZABETHAN MIDDLE-RATE GALLEON OR BATTLESHIP 281
IRON CANNON OF THE ARMADA PERIOD 290
BRASS DODECAGONAL SAKER OF THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY 296
A DUTCH TWO-DECKED BATTLESHIP 325
A HIGHLAND CLANSMAN OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 335
MARTELLO TOWERS ON THE SUSSEX COAST 362
MAPS AND PLANS
PAGE
CÆSAR’S TWO EXPEDITIONS TO BRITAIN IN 55 AND 54 B.C. 27
THE CAMPAIGN OF A.D. 60 AGAINST BOUDICCA 49
THE PASS THROUGH THE LAMMERMUIRS 101
BRITAIN FROM ABOUT 500-570 103
BRITAIN ABOUT 613 111
ENGLISH AND NORTHMEN AT THE DEATH OF ALFRED 149
THE FINAL STRUGGLE BETWEEN EADMUND II. AND CNUT 175
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1066 185
PLAN OF THE BATTLE OF HASTINGS 195
PLAN OF THE FLODDEN MANŒUVRE 259
PLAN OF THE BATTLE OF FLODDEN 264
ORDER OF SAILING OF THE SPANISH ARMADA 297
THE DUTCH IN THE MEDWAY 322, 323
ENGLAND INVADED
CHAPTER I
CÆSAR’S INVASIONS
In the year 57 B.C. Gaius Julius Cæsar, Roman politician, statesman,
and legislator, and already, though he had only girt on the sword at
forty-three years of age, a famous soldier, was campaigning in northern
Gaul. The year before, a mere carpet warrior, as his enemies would
have men believe, he had come up the Rhone with six legions of sturdy
swarthy Italian yeomen, and summarily put an end to the great Helvetic
migration, a migration perhaps little less dangerous than that of the
Cimbri and ‘Teutones,’ which his kinsman Marius had annihilated at Aquæ
Sextiæ and Vercellæ. Then, grimly resolute, with reluctant officers,
with the scented young nobles who had followed him for a little
plunder and mild excitement foreboding disaster, with even the stout
legionaries--all save the men of the immortal Xth--hanging back and
half afraid, he had turned on the Germans who were overrunning Gaul,
and hurled them in rout and ruin across the Rhine. And--significant
fact!--he wintered not in the sunny Roman Province--that Provence
which still proclaims to the world from a hundred sites that Imperial
Rome swayed her sceptre there for twenty generations--not in the
Italian Gallia along the Po, but there, where he was, in the very
homeland of the Celts, which five hundred years before had sent forth
the hordes that had wasted Italy and burned Rome. The Gauls, disunited,
faction-ridden, fickle, and suspicious of each other, but proud, brave,
and patriotic, began to take alarm.
Whether Cæsar had intended from the first to subjugate Gaul, or whether
his horizon became enlarged as his successes multiplied, are questions
that cannot be discussed here. But he certainly seems to have shown
his hand in 58 B.C. ‘Celtic’ and ‘Aquitanian’ Gaul remained passive,
but in the north, where the ‘Belgæ’ had had little to do with Roman
envoys and traders, much less with Roman generals and legions, a
confederacy was quickly formed to oppose Cæsar. It was headed nominally
by Galba, King of the Suessiones, whose predecessor, Divitiacus, had
ruled an ephemeral dominion extending over a large region of northern
Gaul and parts of Britain. So writes Cæsar in the second book, ‘De
Bello Gallico’; and thus, in a single terse sentence of his perfect,
unadorned Latin, Britannia is swept by a roving searchlight of
historical allusion.
Early next year Cæsar came up from Central Gaul, now with a formidable
force of eight legions, with cavalry from Gaul and elsewhere, with
Numidian light troops, with archers from the East and slingers from
the Baleares, with engineers and siege artillery, to deal with the
Belgians. The great ill-cemented confederacy was shattered with slight
difficulty, but the fighting Nervii and other tribes, which would not
be daunted by a single defeat, proved foes worthy of Cæsar’s steel,
and were only subdued after a desperate battle. In 57 B.C. all the
coast tribes from the Loire to the Rhine united against Cæsar, and this
time there is distinct reference to regular intercourse between Gaul
and Britain. This confederacy was crushed, after hard and harassing
fighting, by a great naval victory off the southern coast of Brittany.
It had been supported by British troops, and perhaps by British ships.
At any rate, it must have been plain to the great proconsul that
Britain was a factor that could not be ignored in dealing with the
Gallic problem.
On Cæsar’s staff at this time was a Gallic noble named Commius, whom
he had made king of the Atrebates in Belgium. The most important fact
about him for our present purpose is that he had connections with
Britain. The Belgæ had indeed far overflowed the limits of their Gallic
territory; it is possible that the entire south-east of Britain from
the Wash to the Somersetshire Avon, and thence to Southampton Water,
was occupied by Belgic or Belgicized tribes. In a region roughly
corresponding to Wiltshire, Hampshire, and Somerset, there was a
confederacy which preserved the racial appellation of Belgæ. In Berks
and Surrey dwelt the Atrebates, evidently cognate with the Atrebates
of Belgica; while the name of the great and warlike Catuvellauni of the
south-east Midlands clearly points to a connection with the Catalauni
of the Marne. It is at least possible that the other tribes of the
south-east--the Cantii of Kent, the Regni of Sussex, the wealthy
Trinobantes of Essex and Suffolk, and even the Iceni of Norfolk--were
of Belgic origin.
So much Cæsar may easily have learned from Commius, or from hostages
and prisoners. That there was a close ethnic affinity between the
tribes on either side of the Channel a man of his intellectual powers
would not be slow to infer. Whether he was fully acquainted with the
economic condition of the island is another matter. Pytheas he may
have, Polybius he must have, read, but possibly the scepticism of the
Achæan may have prejudiced him against the Massiliot.
But be this as it may, when Cæsar began to collect intelligence
concerning Britain from Gallic merchants, he was presented with
information largely untrustworthy, and some of which its furnishers
must have known to be false. The statement that some of the British
tribes practised polyandry may or may not be true--the traders had
no obvious motive for deceiving Cæsar on such a point; but they may
themselves have depended upon hearsay evidence. But otherwise they
appear to have done their best to misinform the proconsul, with the
obvious intention of inducing him to abandon any idea of an invasion.
Their motive was clearly trade-jealousy. The whole British trade,
which appears to have been considerable, was in their hands; they
feared--naturally enough--Italian competition. Then, too, they may have
been influenced by political motives. Britain was, as things went,
an admirable place of refuge for Gallic organizers of revolt and for
defeated leaders.
So, as far as one can see, Cæsar’s Gallic informants told him as
little as possible. On the one hand, they seem to have done their best
to overrate the savage ferocity of the people; on the other, they
depreciated the wealth of the island. As they could hardly assert that
systematic cultivation of cereals was unknown in the island, they
explained that this was the case only in the south-east; elsewhere
the people lived on milk and flesh, and, having no knowledge of
weaving, dressed in skins. It is difficult to know how far Cæsar was
deceived. To some extent he certainly was, for he repeats the false
statements which were made to him. It may perhaps seem curious that he
did not verify them while in Britain, but, of course, he had military
business in plenty to occupy him. His statement about the iron bar
currency is the strangest of all, since it is certain that gold coins,
struck in imitation of Philip of Macedonia’s gold staters, had been
in circulation for not less than a century. It is just possible that
he means that iron bars took the place of a copper coinage. It seems
incredible that he can have marched for more than a hundred miles into
Britain without meeting with some of the gold pieces of which so many
survive, even if he had not seen them in Gaul. In that part of Britain
with which he was personally acquainted he notes that the population
was dense, and dwellings, or groups of dwellings, thickly dotted over
the country-side. But it is clear that in many respects his information
was very imperfect.
Upon Cæsar’s credibility as an historian volumes have been written.
To the impartial observer the absolute frankness with which he admits
the commission of deeds which shock, or are supposed to shock, the not
over-sensitive consciences of twentieth-century Europeans, is evidence
in his favour. In curt unadorned phrases, without a trace of emotion,
he tells of the enslaving of human beings by scores of thousands, or
of the pursuit by cavalry of crowds of women and children. The fact,
of course, is that such occurrences were common in war as it was waged
in those days. Cæsar herein was neither better nor worse than hundreds
of Roman or Greek generals. He was better than many, for he never
massacred his own captive countrymen. It cannot be said that he was
worse than Skobelev, who at the taking of Geok-Tepe in 1880 sent his
cavalry in pursuit of a flying horde that was largely composed of women
and children, just as Cæsar did at the destruction of the Usipetes
and Teucteri in 55 B.C. All this is simply to lead up to the point
that, while Cæsar may, as is suggested by a good many critics, have
had unworthy motives for his expedition--such as greed of slaves and
plunder, or a desire to dazzle the Roman populace--he gives a perfectly
sound, statesmanlike reason for his action. He says that he had found
that there were usually British contingents in the ranks of the hostile
Gauls, and that he thought it advisable to cow the islanders. That
some of his officers expected, like professional soldiers of every
age, to enrich themselves is certain; it is at least probable that
Cæsar hoped that the expedition might prove a paying investment. But
that he regarded it only as a plundering raid there is no reason to
think. Neither is there any solid evidence to show that his position
as a Roman party-leader ever affected his military operations. That
when he left Rome to take up his command he had a general idea of using
his army to attain supreme power is possible, even probable. But once
in Gaul the natural genius of the man as soldier and statesman was
devoted to consolidating his country’s position there. His action as
regards Ariovistus shows that self-interest was already subordinated
to statesmanship which must benefit Rome, and could only serve his own
ends incidentally.
In 55 B.C. Cæsar was very active in Belgic Gaul. He had swept the
Teutonic hordes which had invaded Gaul in the winter back into Germania
with frightful slaughter, not without treachery on his part; he had
bridged the Rhine, and displayed the Eagles in a long raid on its
eastern bank. This had occupied him until late in the summer. Then, as
he says, it occurred to him that the short remainder of the campaigning
season might be utilized for an expedition to Britain for the purpose
of collecting useful information--in short, for what in modern military
parlance would be termed a reconnaissance in force. It does not appear
that he had anything further in mind. Later on he tells us that he
had no intention of making a long stay, and he took only a few days’
provisions. Moreover, the time was too short for collecting anything
like the number of ships required for the transportation of several
legions.
Nevertheless, the concentration of the Roman Army of Gallia on the
coast opposite Dover was an event which could not but alarm the
Britons, and, while Cæsar was completing his arrangements, some of
their tribes sent over envoys. Presumably, the idea was that by making
a nominal submission the invasion might be averted. Cæsar, however,
quietly observed that he would visit them at home in a few days, and
sent them back with, as his personal emissary, Commius the Atrebatian.
Commius had instructions to use his influence to bring about a general
submission, but his British companions made him prisoner immediately
upon landing. Cæsar meanwhile was collecting Gallic merchant-ships for
the transit, and had sent a trusted officer, Gaius Volusenus, with a
galley, to reconnoitre for landing-places. The haste and incompleteness
of his preparations were so far of slight account, since, though the
Britons were determined on resistance, there was no time to form a
confederacy. Caswallon (Cassivellaunus), king of the Catuvellauni, the
most powerful chieftain of Britain, was endeavouring to coerce the
Trinobantes; the attack would be met by the local tribal levies only.
Having gone so far, it may be advisable to say a few words on the
subject of the invading army and the forces which were likely to oppose
it. The Roman Army of Gaul, though it had perhaps hardly reached the
pitch of excellence which it attained at the outbreak of the Civil War,
was, nevertheless, in 55 B.C., one of the finest that the world has
ever seen. There were eight legions of Italian troops, and of these
the two newest had seen three years’ hard service. Two had served four
campaigns, and the remaining four were the pith of the army. Their
numbers were VII., VIII., IX., and X. All of them had served four years
under Cæsar, had learnt to idolize him and to follow him with perfect
confidence, and all were composed of war-hardened veterans of many
years’ experience--men to whom the hardships of war were but matter
for jests, and a battle a mere incident of everyday life. Knowing them
as we do, thanks to the man whom they served so well, we may fairly
doubt whether any soldiers of any age ever surpassed them. The Xth
has come down through the ages associated with, perhaps, the noblest
eulogy ever paid by any leader to his soldiers. A great Roman army,
not yet knowing itself or its leader, was trembling at the thought of
meeting the dreaded warriors of Germany. Its fears came to Cæsar, and
Cæsar made his immortal reply: ‘So be it! Since none else will follow,
I will go forward with the Xth Legion alone. It will not forsake me!’
And the legion sent to thank its leader for the honour of being allowed
to die with him. Never again did Cæsar’s soldiers hang back, but the
Xth always remained ‘Cæsars Own.’ But Cæsar was not Napoleon; he never
nursed or favoured it as Napoleon did the Old Guard. When it forgot its
discipline, Cæsar punished it like any other corps; it shared equally
in all the trials of the Army of Gallia. At its head Cæsar took his
stand on the field of Pharsalus, and to this day, when an exalted
standard of devotion is sought, it is enough to cite that of Cæsar’s
Xth Legion.
[Illustration: TYPES OF ROMAN SOLDIERS.
On the left an officer, in the centre a standard bearer, and on
the right a legionary soldier carrying his two _pila_.]
The Xth was undoubtedly the finest of the legions, but the three other
old corps were not greatly inferior; and the younger divisions were
steadily improving, proud of themselves and of their leader.
The legion of Cæsar’s day was a division of six thousand infantry
at full strength, exclusive of officers. It was divided into
ten battalions (_cohortes_), and each cohort into six companies
(_centuriæ_), each of one hundred men, under a centurion (_centurio_)
generally, so far as is known, promoted from the ranks. Into the
complicated question of the ranking and promotion of these officers,
there is no need to enter here; it is sufficient to say that the senior
centurions were entitled to sit in councils of war, and that the
senior of all (_primi pili centurio_ or _primipilus_) often appears as
playing a very distinguished part. Attached to each legion were six
officers called tribunes, frequently young gentlemen learning the art
of war. Often, as might be expected, they were rather a nuisance than
otherwise; but there were exceptions, notably C. Volusenus, who has
just been mentioned. Probably the trouble was to induce them to take
their military position seriously. Cæsar’s higher executive officers
were his ten lieutenant-generals (_legati_), of whom we frequently
meet several in command of one, two, or more legions. The best was
Titus Labienus, strangely enough the only one who sided against his
general in the Civil War. He was a greedy, cruel, and unprincipled
man, but beyond doubt a great general; Cæsar repeatedly gives him
unstinted praise. Of the others, probably the most promising was
the young P. Licinius Crassus, who was to perish on his father’s
ill-starred expedition against the Parthians; but several were men of
real distinction. Among them may be mentioned M. Antonius, afterwards
the rival of Augustus; Decimus Junius Brutus, the hero of the naval
victory over the Veneti; C. Fabius Maximus; Q. Tullius Cicero, brother
of the more famous Marcus, but himself a soldier of great merit; and
C. Trebonius. Cæsar’s chief administrative officer was his _quæstor_
(quartermaster-general), M. Licinius Crassus.
The legionary soldier’s equipment was perhaps unsurpassed in those ages
for lightness and completeness. His clothes consisted of a sleeveless
woollen shirt, drawers reaching to just below the knee, and over them
a tunic. On his feet he wore half-boots with light uppers, and heavy
soles studded with nails. His defensive arms consisted of a corselet
of long overlapping strips of steel, a helmet with a low crest, and a
semi-cylindrical shield some 4 feet long, made of wood covered with
ox-hide, with a rim and central boss of iron, combining the minimum
of weight with the maximum of protection. For purposes of offence the
soldier bore two of the famous _pila_, and a short, sharp-pointed,
double-edged sword. The _pilum_ was a long, heavy javelin, which could
also be used as a pike. It consisted of a thick wooden shaft some 4
feet long, with a slender iron rod, terminating in a small lancehead,
projecting for about 3 feet more. It appears to have had a range,
when in practised hands, of some 50 yards. Rank after rank delivered
volleys of these heavy missiles, and when the well-drilled swordsmen
charged, they usually found the enemy severely shaken. Against mounted
troops bearing the bow the legion, intended for close fighting, was, of
course, at a great disadvantage, but for many centuries it was the lord
of Mediterranean battlefields.
The defects of the legion had not escaped the notice of Roman military
organizers, and it was already accompanied by auxiliary cohorts of
light troops. In Cæsar’s army they were not very numerous as compared
with the legionaries--perhaps about as one to six. Northern Africa
supplied excellent skirmishers--its light cavalry was world-renowned,
but Cæsar does not appear to have had any of it in Gaul. Crete supplied
him with archers, and Balearic slingers served with him as with
Hannibal. Later the proportion of auxiliaries is found steadily on the
increase. Under the Empire there were at least as many auxiliaries
as legionaries. Cæsar, however, depended mainly on his legions. For
cavalry he relied chiefly on friendly Gallic tribes, though it is
probable that he had a small body of Italian or Italian-Gallic horse.
From 52 B.C. onward he had a brigade of German cavalry in his pay.
The engineering department of the Roman army has never been equalled.
There was a corps of engineers, but entrenching was part of the private
soldier’s training. No body of troops ever halted for the night without
surrounding themselves with a rampart and ditch. The result of constant
experience of spade-work was that Roman troops frequently accomplished
feats of engineering that seem almost miraculous. The work that in
modern armies falls upon the engineers was in that of Rome chiefly
done by the infantry privates. Cæsar in his campaigns made good use
of the siege artillery of the period, and his march was generally
accompanied by a train of _balistæ_ (gigantic crossbows), _catapultæ_,
and _scorpiones_.
Every legion had a baggage train, of course, and probably every
privates’ mess had at least one slave for menial service; but the
legionary bore a great part of his baggage himself, and it is a marvel
how he contrived to march--as we know he did--anything from fifteen to
twenty-five miles a day under his burdens. Besides arms, armour, and
cloak, he carried grain or flour to last for a fortnight, a spade, a
saw, a basket, several pales wherewith to crown the camp rampart, as
well as his share of the mess service and other matters.
The standard of the legion was now always the famous Eagle, which had
been introduced or generally established by Marius. The Eagle-bearer
(_Aquilifer_) was always a soldier chosen for good conduct and
gallantry. He wore the skin of a wild beast over his helmet as the sign
of his honourable position. With one of these gallant men we shall soon
make acquaintance.
[Illustration: A BRITON.
His weapons and shield drawn from originals in the British Museum.]
Against this magnificent military machine the Britons had little but
a mass of disorderly and ill-armed levies, formidable in numbers,
individual courage and physical strength, but without cohesion. Most
of them fought on foot, and few can have possessed body-armour; they
were protected only by helmet and shield, perhaps not always the
former. They were armed with badly-tempered iron swords and spears, and
in battle made free use of missiles of all kinds--chiefly, it would
seem, darts and stones. Of cavalry there were few; the British horses
were too small for riding. The bulk of the wealthier warriors fought
from timber cars. This chariotry was evidently a formidable force, and
gave the Romans serious trouble. The small active horses took the cars
along at a great rate, and the picked warriors who manned them--strong,
active, and brave, as well as skilled with their weapons--were capable
of being extremely dangerous. The cars certainly were not armed with
scythes on their axles; their effectiveness lay chiefly in their
mobility and the skill with which they were manœuvred, to which Cæsar
bears emphatic testimony. In the nobles who went into battle on them
the pomp and circumstance of British war was seen at its best. With
their brightly-dyed garments, their tall helmets surmounted by bronze
ornaments or waving plumes, their body-armour and shields bright with
enamel and gilding, and displaying all the wonderful intricacies of
Celtic spiral metal-work, their beautifully wrought scabbards and
sword-hilts, their golden bracelets and collars, the British chiefs
must have been splendid figures.
[Illustration: GAIUS JULIUS CÆSAR.
First Roman Emperor. Born, 102 B.C.; assassinated 44 B.C. The first
Roman General to invade Britain.]
Volusenus returned after a cruise of five days. He had not ventured
to land, but brought information of value as to landing-places. Some
ninety-eight vessels were now collected in the country of the Morini,
most of them probably at the modern Boulogne, and on eighty of them
Cæsar embarked his two best legions, the VIIth and the Xth, with no
doubt, some light troops--perhaps ten thousand men in all. On board the
other eighteen, which lay in a neighbouring harbour, were to go about
five hundred cavalry. The order reached them late, and there was
further delay in carrying it out.
Meanwhile, probably on the evening of August 25, the main body of
the transports, escorted by some warships, set sail, and early next
morning was off Dover. The war-galleys were in front, the heavy
transports slowly coming up from the rear. Volusenus had, no doubt,
pointed out Dover Harbour as the most usual place for landing, but
the Britons were in force to oppose the disembarkation. The beach was
lined with chariots, the slopes of Castle Hill and the Western Heights
were swarming with foot-levies; and in a place where, as Cæsar says,
darts could be rained upon the beach from the cliffs a landing would
be extremely dangerous. From Volusenus he knew that only six or seven
miles northward there was the open shelving beach of Deal. At noon the
whole fleet had assembled, and Cæsar gave the order to weigh and move
northward.
The Britons at once followed suit. Horse, foot, and chariots faced to
their left, climbed over Castle Hill, and streamed down its farther
slope. The infantry were soon left behind; the charioteers and
horsemen, however, outpaced the heavily-laden Roman ships, and galloped
down to the shore in time to oppose the landing. The ships, heavy-draft
Gallic merchantmen, grounded some way out, and the troops, smitten
by showers of missiles, and seeing the gallant show on the beach,
hesitated to jump with arms and armour into several feet of water.
Cæsar ordered the war-galleys, manned by the archers and slingers, to
row forward and engage the Britons. This was done, but the only effect
was to make them withdraw a little way; they still stood threatening to
charge. A lead was necessary, and it was given by the standard-bearer
of the Xth, who sprang into the surges and led the way, bearing the
Eagle of Rome against the enemy. ‘Forward, comrades!’ he shouted,
‘unless you would betray the Eagle! I will do my duty to Rome and
Cæsar!’ With a cheer every man on his ship followed. All down the line
men sprang recklessly overboard, and singly and in groups began to wade
up the shingly beach; and all along the shore, in gallant response, the
Britons drove their chariots forward to the attack. There was a furious
struggle among the breakers, and for some time the men of Kent held
the strand; but when the steady Roman veterans began to close up into
regular bodies, with boats full of archers covering their flanks, the
Britons gave way. The Romans completed their landing, and laid out and
fortified a camp.
Next day the Britons sent envoys to Cæsar. They brought with them
Commius, whom they now released, and offered submission. Cæsar was, no
doubt, highly pleased. He exacted hostages. Some were brought during
the next two days; others were to follow.
[Illustration: A ROMAN TRIREME OFF DOVER.
Reconstructed from Roman wall-paintings and sculptures of the first and
second centuries of the Christian era.]
On the morning of the 30th, however, a north-easter came roaring down
Dover Strait. Cæsar’s cavalry transports, on their way at last, were
swept back and scattered into various harbours; the main fleet was
seriously damaged. Twelve vessels were destroyed; many others so
shattered as to need extensive repairs. The troops, knowing that they
had only a few days’ food in hand, were depressed, as Cæsar himself
admits. If we needed any proof that nothing but a reconnaissance had
been intended we have it here; it is evident that the force had not
even the usual fortnight’s grain.
Cæsar set the men to work on the necessary repairs, but the Britons
were encouraged by the disaster to renew hostilities. Their chariotry
and horsemen caught the VIIth Legion while it was foraging, and would
have undoubtedly defeated it had not Cæsar come up just in time with
two cohorts of the Xth. Several days of heavy rain followed, but the
spirits of the Kentishmen were high. On the first fine day they moved
up against the camp, and when Cæsar’s legions formed line outside they
attacked them furiously. They were of course driven back, and fled in
disorder, and Commius, with thirty mounted retainers and officers, was
able to pursue and cut up some of the stragglers.
The weather was now fine; Cæsar had no intention of being again
stormbound. He could now be sure of a quiet embarkation; but while
he was making his preparations, Kentish envoys again appeared. He
ordered them to send twice as many hostages as before, but this time
to Gaul, as he was returning that night. The passage was effected
without trouble; but once they saw their enemies clear of their
coast, the men of Kent troubled no more about hostages. Two clans
alone sent their quota. Probably the Britons argued that Cæsar’s
departure was a confession of defeat, and as a number of modern
writers have endeavoured to maintain the same, we cannot blame them.
Victories have been claimed in modern times on no better grounds than
that a reconnaissance has been driven in. In sober military terms the
situation was simply this: Cæsar had made a reconnaissance in force in
Britain. Owing to various accidents and mistakes, he had been obliged
to make a longer stay than he had intended. He had obtained some
knowledge of the kind of resistance that he was likely to experience,
and his troops had held their own in such fighting as had taken place.
Cæsar, on returning to the Continent, went on as usual to the
‘Province’ and Cisalpina, but left his legions on the coast, with
orders to build as many ships as possible specially designed for
disembarkation work, and also fitted with oars. He quietly tells us
that during the winter the troops built no less than six hundred, as
well as twenty-eight war-galleys! The magnitude of the task and the
speed with which it was accomplished are alike amazing, but the history
of the Army of Gaul is full of such feats.
The place of concentration for the fleet was ‘Portus Itius,’ about
thirty (Roman) miles from Britain. The latest and best authority
on Cæsar appears to think that this must be the modern Wissant,
four miles east of Cape Gris Nez. In all some 800 warships and
transports were assembled there by the beginning of July, 54 B.C. The
expeditionary force consisted of five legions, 2,000 cavalry, chiefly
Gauls, and some thousands of light troops--perhaps 30,000 men in all.
Cæsar took with him to Britain several Gallic chiefs as a measure of
precaution. Labienus was left in charge of Portus Itius with three
legions, some auxiliaries, and 2,000 cavalry.
Meanwhile, in Britain, Caswallon of the Catuvellauni was striving hard
to form a defensive confederacy. But the Trinobantes hung back, and
_moribus majorum_ Caswallon tried to coerce them. He slew their king,
but the only result was that the dead chief’s son, Mandubracius, fled
to Cæsar for protection, thus furnishing him with a very pretty _casus
belli_. Caswallon was left to face the Romans with the Trinobantes
still hostile--almost at his door.
Cæsar landed near Sandwich, this time unmolested. The vast size of his
fleet precluded all idea on the part of the Kentishmen of opposing the
landing. Caswallon was collecting his levies, and was still far behind.
Cæsar landed his force, fortified a strong camp, in which he stored his
reserve supplies, and told off ten cohorts (_i.e._, probably two from
each legion), and 300 cavalry as its garrison, under an officer named
Quintus Atrius.
During the day information was brought in that the Kentish levies
were entrenched in a defensive position about twelve (Roman) miles
inland. Cæsar, anxious to strike a heavy blow at the local resistance,
marched off to attack them before dawn next day. The British position
was probably on the Stour, near Thanington, where there are traces of
ancient entrenchments.
In any case, whether the men of Kent were at the Little Stour, as
has been thought, or the Great Stour by Canterbury, their position
was stormed without difficulty. From Cæsar’s description it appears
that their chariotry and cavalry were thrown forward, and harassed
the Roman columns as they moved towards the main position. They were,
however, pushed back or aside, and the VIIth Legion, forming the dense
shield-covered column of attack, which the Romans aptly termed the
tortoise (_testudo_), carried the entrenchments with slight loss. The
defenders fell back into the woods. There was no pursuit.
Next day, just as Cæsar was feeling his way forward with cavalry, a
message of disaster came from Atrius. In the night there had been a
heavy gale, and great damage had been inflicted on the fleet. Cæsar’s
fighting eagerness, and consequent neglect to profit by last years
lesson, nearly led to a grave disaster. As it was, he was obliged
to move back to the coast and keep the whole army hard at work for
ten days hauling the fleet up the beach beyond high-water mark, and
protecting it with embankments. Forty vessels were so shattered as
to be incapable of repair. Many of the rest were seriously damaged.
Labienus was ordered to send across a detachment of artificers chosen
from his legions to assist in repairing them. Cæsar’s trust in his good
fortune had carried him too far.
The result was that Caswallon was able to reach the front with his
Midland levies, and rally the Kentishmen. Cæsar, on his part, sent
the exile Mandubracius to the Trinobantes to raise trouble in his
adversary’s rear; and, having as far as possible put his ships in
safety and seen repairs well under way, again took the road inland. His
objective, as he clearly indicates, was the nearest point of passage on
the Lower Thames. Once across the river, he would be in the territory
of the Catuvellauni, and able to communicate with the Trinobantes.
He was to have no easy task. Caswallon was a foeman worthy of Cæsar’s
steel. He seems to have fully realized that the British foot-levies
were useless against the legions except at a great advantage. He
declined to defend the line of the Stour, but as soon as it was
across the stream, the Roman column found itself engaged in a running
fight, in which the heavily armed and burdened legionaries were at a
disadvantage. The next day Caswallon set upon the Romans as they were
laying out their camp, drove in the outposts, killing the tribune in
command, burst through the intervals of the supporting cohorts, and
drew off with little loss, after causing great confusion. This half
success, however, led to a severe defeat. Probably the king could not
restrain his eager and undisciplined foot-levies. On the morrow Cæsar
sent out all his cavalry and three legions under Trebonius to forage.
The force was attacked by the British mounted arms, but the foot-levies
got out of hand and charged the legions while they were still in close
order. They were repulsed with much bloodshed, of course, and the Roman
cavalry, closely supported by infantry, was able to cut them up badly
before they could regain the woods.
Caswallon, unshaken, fell back on his guerrilla tactics. His chariotry
and cavalry were intact. Cæsar says that they were about four thousand,
a moderate estimate which shows it to be near the truth. With them he
faced his great antagonist, while the southern levies took refuge in
the Weald, and those of the Catuvellauni went back to entrench the
fords of the Thames. From the neighbourhood of Canterbury to that of
London the Romans advanced slowly, probably along the line of the
later Watling Street, while Caswallon moved parallel to them in the
woods, hung about the line of march, and harassed it incessantly. The
Gallic horsemen never dared to move far from the infantry columns.
Caswallon was ever watchful. But it was not guerrilla warfare, however
skilful and gallant, that could stay the march of Cæsar’s legions. The
advance was slow and difficult, but still it continued steadily until
the Thames was reached. Caswallon retreated across it, and the Romans
followed.
Where the British leader was stationed it is hard to say. The course
of the Thames, meandering among marshes, must have varied much from
what it is to-day, and, having no embankments, it was probably much
shallower. Cæsar may have crossed near Brentford or Halliford; there
are said to be the remains of a stockade in the bed of the river
opposite the former place. At any rate, Cæsar gives the impression that
the ford was well known. Its northern end was guarded by entrenchments,
and the passage itself was obstructed by stakes. The position was a
formidable one, yet it was carried with unexpected ease. The Roman
cavalry led the way into the Thames, the infantry followed, with the
water at their necks, passed the stakes--how we do not know--carried
the stockade, and drove the Britons off towards the north.
[Illustration: CÆSAR’S TWO EXPEDITIONS TO BRITAIN IN 55 AND 54 B.C.
The probable line of advance on Verulam is indicated by the broken
line.]
Cæsar, having passed the Thames, halted for a time to receive hostages
and supplies from the neighbouring Trinobantes. Caswallon fell back on
his tribal stronghold (almost certainly Verulam), and sent orders to
the four sub-kings of Kent to attack Cæsar’s base-camp, and so draw
him back from the Thames. It was the last fine stroke of Caswallon’s
admirable strategy, but fate was against him. Atrius marched boldly out
to attack the men of Kent, defeated and scattered them with great loss,
capturing a prominent chief named Lugotorix. Cæsar, having rested his
men in the Trinobantian territory near London, advanced upon Verulam.
He describes it as a great earthwork among woods and marshes. It was
captured by a simultaneous attack on two fronts. The British loss was
heavy, and included thousands of captives, besides vast quantities of
supplies. Verulam had evidently been the place of refuge of a great
part of the tribe.
Caswallon had done his best and had failed. Through Commius, who was
with the Romans, he made overtures, and Cæsar was not unready to
accept them. Reports were coming in from Labienus of alarming unrest
among the Gauls, which was soon to blaze out into a great national
uprising. It was clearly time to go. Cæsar was justified in supposing
that he had done enough to convince the Britons that interference in
Gallic affairs would, for the future, be dangerous. His terms of peace
were, therefore, moderate enough. Caswallon was to keep the peace
with Mandubracius, pay a yearly tribute to Rome, and, of course, give
hostages for the observance of the conditions. They were accepted,
and, with his hostages and captives, Cæsar returned to the coast. Two
trips were necessary owing to the large number of prisoners to be
transported. Apart from them (and being only fit for rough field and
house work, they would hardly fetch a high price) there appears to have
been little spoil of value, much to the disappointment of many greedy
officers. Cicero quaintly voices this discontent in his letters. We
hear, however, that Cæsar dedicated to Venus a cuirass ornamented with
British pearls, so that possibly some were lucky.
All this probably weighed little with Cæsar beside the fact that
he was not likely to have Britain on his rear during the Gallic
disturbances. If Caswallon, a man, as far as we can see, of remarkable
ability for war, had been able to intervene in the great struggle with
Vercingetorix two years later, the consequences might have been very
serious. As it was, we hear no more of British aid given to the Gauls,
and Cæsar was content. Whether the tribute was paid we do not know;
possibly it was so long as Cæsar was in Gaul. When the civil war broke
out, it probably lapsed; but the general political results of the
expedition appear from Cæsar’s point of view to have been satisfactory.