went to Berlin at the end of March 1935 for conversations about the
possibilities of an agreement in the naval question.
In this connection, I particularly want to draw attention to the
testimony of the witness Ambassador Dr. Dieckhoff, who was heard here.
Only France, in consequence of her attitude that only the League of
Nations was entitled to solve collectively the problems of disarmament
and, therefore, of peace—only France considered it necessary to submit
the measures taken by Germany to the League of Nations, on 20 March
1935, and to induce the League to establish that Germany had committed a
violation of a duty incumbent on all nations, the duty of carrying out
contracted obligations. It goes without saying that the German
Government, in its note of 20 April 1935, refused to accept the renewed
discrimination contained in this resolution of the League of Nations.
However, neither this resolution, nor the signing, on 2 May 1935, of the
afore-mentioned Franco-Russian Treaty of Mutual Assistance, nor the
Russian-Czechoslovak Treaty of Mutual Assistance which supplemented it,
prevented Germany from continuing her very active efforts for an
agreement with the Western Powers. On 21 May 1935 Hitler, in the German
Reichstag, proclaimed a new peace program, in which he again stressed
and underlined in the most emphatic manner possible his own and the
German people’s irrevocable will for peace, and his full readiness to
participate in any system, or in a collective collaboration, which would
guarantee European peace, to re-enter the League of Nations, provided
that Germany’s equality of rights was acknowledged, and to apply to the
rearmament of the German Wehrmacht any restriction which the other
powers might also adopt. This speech of Hitler and the diplomatic
discussions with other powers, initiated at the same time, had the
promising result that the well-known Naval Agreement of 18 June 1935,
establishing a fixed ratio of the respective naval forces, was concluded
between England and Germany.
This German-English agreement is of the greatest importance in two
respects. On the one hand, from a diplomatic point of view, it
constitutes no more and no less than the _de facto_ acknowledgment, on
the part of England, of German armed sovereignty, the negation of the
League of Nations’ resolution and, therefore, of the French point of
view, and England’s acknowledgment and approval of the German act which
had been stigmatized by the League of Nations as a treaty violation. For
the first time, therefore, Germany’s equality of rights was recognized
not only _de jure_ but also _de facto_ by one of the Western Powers, and
by one of the most important ones.
On the other hand, this agreement proves irrefutably, from the point of
view of this Trial, that the Prosecution’s contention that Germany’s
rearmament was an act of preparation for Hitler’s future wars of
aggression is incorrect. On the contrary, this naval agreement shows
quite clearly that German foreign policy, at that time, while it was
still conducted by my client, had no warlike intentions of any sort, not
to speak of plans, and that the reinstatement of German armed
sovereignty was not under any circumstances an indication of warlike
intentions, but an obviously defensive measure and nothing else. Would a
statesman who harbors warlike intentions or plans, moreover, voluntarily
consent to a restriction of his armaments to the extent provided by the
naval agreement, and thus endanger the successful execution of his
intentions and plans? Even the most malevolent person cannot earnestly
maintain that the naval power granted Germany by this agreement was even
remotely sufficient for a war of aggression; that has been clearly
established by the evidence in this Trial. Through this agreement Hitler
actually deprived himself of the possibility of creating a navy
sufficiently powerful to wage a war of aggression. It is clear that any
considerable transgression of the agreed ratio of the two navies which,
as things were, could under no circumstances and by no means have been
kept secret, would beyond doubt have induced England immediately either
to increase her own navy accordingly or to obstruct this German
intention by force, as she had the power to do at any time. From
whatever point of view one may look at this naval agreement, nothing can
remove the fact that it was, and is, an unshakable proof of the absolute
honesty and sincerity of the repeated declarations of Germany’s will for
peace, an irrefutable proof against the existence of any, even the most
secret warlike designs or plans of German foreign policy and, therefore,
of its leader, the Defendant Von Neurath.
In France this Anglo-German naval agreement met with general opposition.
It was regarded as an arbitrary act on the part of England, a departure
from the common line which still found expression in the resolution of
the League of Nations, a departure, moreover, which was bound to
interfere with French plans. So France was very reluctant and negative
in her attitude toward the negotiations which England had begun with the
aim of concluding a general air pact, and which ran parallel with the
negotiations for the naval agreement. Hitler’s speech of 21 May 1935 had
also been the cause for these negotiations, because in it, Hitler,
referring to the London communiqué, had also offered to take part in an
agreement for the limitation of air armament, and the German Government,
taking up the English suggestion, actually presented a draft for such an
air pact on 29 May 1935. But talks of nearly 3 months’ duration between
the English and French Governments were necessary before England
succeeded in inducing France to consent even to participate in these
negotiations. This consent, however, was in reality not a consent at all
because, among other things, it was made dependent on the condition that
the realization of this air pact must keep pace with the negotiations
for the Eastern treaty, and since this treaty had, at that time, to be
rejected by Germany for reasons of her own security, as has already been
mentioned, it was clear that the French condition would block the way to
successful negotiations from the very beginning. When the
Soviet-sponsored Comintern Congress met in Moscow on 25 July 1935, and
it became quite clear that the Comintern’s aim was world revolution,
Germany’s opposition—as will be understood—only stiffened.
It could not be surprising that on 16 September 1935 the Defendant Von
Neurath informed the English Ambassador that the German Foreign Office
did not consider that an answer to the memorandum of the British
Government of 5 August 1935 would be opportune; that was the memorandum
which had demanded answers to a number of French questions hardly
connected with the air pact. Besides, the conflict between Italy and
Abyssinia had already cast its shadows, which alone were sufficient to
suspend further negotiations for the air pact. For how could a political
agreement between the five powers of the Locarno Treaty be possible—and
the German Foreign Office very rightly pointed this out—if co-operation
between these powers was in a state of dissolution, and if some of these
powers were even facing each other in armed readiness. On 7 September
1935, as is known, the British Home Fleet set out for the Mediterranean,
and negotiations between England and France for the application of
sanctions against Italy were in full swing. On 3 October 1935 war broke
out between Italy and Abyssinia.
German foreign policy succeeded in keeping out of the events which now
followed in Africa and the efforts of the powers to apply sanctions
against Italy. But nevertheless these events proved of importance for
German foreign policy, too; because they prepared, and especially the
question of sanctions, a new constellation of powers, which on one hand
led to a closer union between England and France and the adoption by
England of France’s point of view, and on the other hand brought
Germany, again defamed by the resolution of the League of Nations of 17
April 1935, naturally closer together with Italy, who was also defamed
by the sanctions applied against her. These sanctions, at the same time,
logically enough resulted in the dissolution of the Locarno Treaty, for
it was quite impossible to consider a treaty as still justified in its
existence if its participants were opposed to one another in such a
hostile way that the danger of warlike actions was always present.
The efforts of the French Government, already having begun in its note
of 10 September 1935 to draw England also into the net of its pacts and
obligations, clearly showed the tendency of French policy, and were only
to confirm the German statesmen’s conviction that France was
consistently following her policy of encirclement, which was regarded as
a menace to Germany. But Germany’s leaders and the Defendant Von Neurath
were still reluctant to draw the consequences from this state of affairs
and take the absolutely essential step for the most primitive needs of
Germany’s security. German foreign policy, in its unshakable desire for
peace and its readiness to negotiate, was still hoping that an agreement
could be reached, that France would abandon her course, and that a
really honest and sincere understanding with France could be reached.
This hope, however, was soon a delusion.
On 16 January 1936 the French Foreign Minister Laval announced that
after his return from Geneva at the beginning of February he would ask
the French Parliament to ratify the Pact of Mutual Assistance concluded
with Russia. And at about the same time the Defendant Von Neurath heard
from reliable sources that the French General Staff had worked out
military plans for an attack on Germany, providing for the advance of
French troops from the Rhineland, along the course of the river Main,
for a link with the Russian armies through Czechoslovakia. This proved
even to the most naive the offensive character of the Franco-Russian
pact, and there was even less room for doubt if one took into
consideration the negotiations which took place inside and outside the
French Chamber before the ratification of the pact. For even in France,
opposition to this pact, specifically on account of its offensive
character, was not small. The French veterans of the first World War
headed the opposition: The _Union Nationale des Combattants_ declared,
in a resolution of 8 February 1936, that this pact contained more
certainties of war than possibilities of peace. And the speech of Deputy
Montigny in the French Chamber on 13 February 1936 was a single flaming
protest—this is contained in my Document Book 4, Document Neurath-107.
The pact, Montigny said, only widened the breach between France and
Germany, and Germany must more than ever gain the impression that she
was being encircled if a party dependent on Moscow, like the Communist
Party, followed the policy of Delcassé, the policy of revenge and the
policy of the former Russo-French pact. The greatest danger of war would
arise if France were to convey the impression that she enjoyed the
secret protection of Moscow.
Even the German Government made a last attempt to dissuade France from
ratifying the pact. In the interview which he gave to Bertrand de
Jouvenel, the correspondent of the French newspaper _Paris Midi_, on 21
February 1936—Document Book 4, Document Neurath-108—Hitler once again
held out his hand to the French people for an understanding, for lasting
peace and for friendship. “I want to prove to my people,” Hitler said,
“that the idea of hereditary enmity between France and Germany is an
absurdity.” And in that interview Hitler once and for all disposed of
the continual references to his book _Mein Kampf_, which were being made
at that time just as much as today in this courtroom, when he said:
“When I wrote this book, I was in prison. At that time, French
troops occupied the Ruhr—it was at the moment of greatest
tension between our two countries. Yes, we were enemies, and I
stood by my country as I was bound to do, just as I stood by my
country against yours when I spent 4 years and 6 months in the
trenches. I should despise myself if, in the event of a
conflict, I had not considered myself a German first and
foremost. But today there is no longer any reason for a
conflict.
“You would like me to correct my book, as a writer would do....
But I am not a writer; I am a politician. I make my corrections
in my foreign policy, which is directed toward an understanding
with France. If I achieve this German-French understanding, it
will be a worthwhile correction.”
In the same interview, however, Hitler drew attention quite clearly to
the inevitable consequences of the Franco-Russian pact:
“My personal efforts for such an understanding will never cease.
But this more than regrettable pact would, in fact, create a new
situation. Are you in France not conscious of what you are
doing?
“You are allowing yourself to be drawn into a diplomatic game of
a power which is interested only in causing confusion among the
great European nations, a state of affairs from which this power
alone will derive an advantage. One must not lose sight of the
fact that Soviet Russia is a political factor with an explosive
revolutionary idea and gigantic armaments.”
He concluded the interview by emphasizing again that France could, if
she wanted, end this alleged German danger permanently, because the
German people had complete confidence in him, their leader, and he
desired friendship with France. That Hitler was honest and sincere in
these declarations has been proved by the evidence of the Trial.
But it was all in vain. The French Government could no longer be moved
to abandon its rigid attitude, and on 27 February 1936, the French
Chamber, in spite of all warnings, voted to ratify the pact. The die was
cast. On 7 March 1936 German troops again marched into their old
garrisons in the Rhineland zone, demilitarized until then. The German
Reich had restored its full sovereignty over the entire territory of the
Reich. The last of the barriers of the Versailles Treaty, restricting
this full sovereignty, had fallen.
This reinstatement of the full sovereignty of the Reich over the
Rhineland, however, was of importance for a reason which, from the
standpoint of existence of the German State and nation, far surpassed
the politics and prestige of this step, and which was also the sole
cause for the grave decision of the German Government. This reason was
the security of the Reich. As long as the Rhineland was demilitarized,
not only was one of the most valuable and most important provinces of
the Reich, but the Reich itself, and especially its life source, the
Ruhr territory, defenseless against any military attack from the West.
The only protection for Germany against this terrible latent danger was
the Locarno Treaty of 1925, which was guaranteed by Great Britain and
Italy, and in which France and Belgium, on the one hand, and Germany on
the other hand, undertook not to wage war against each other. Therefore,
for the German Reich, if it was in the future to accept the
vulnerability of its western frontier in the form of a demilitarized
Rhineland, it was a matter of life and death that the protection which
this treaty afforded should not be falsified.
But the meaning of this treaty and its essence, the protection of
Germany, were, in fact, falsified at the moment when the political
conditions and constellations which had existed at the time of the
conclusion of the treaty changed fundamentally. When the Locarno Treaty
was concluded, political conditions in Europe, and also in Germany, were
governed and determined solely by the four power—England, France,
Italy, and Germany—acting in unison. And, therefore, the men who made
the Locarno Treaty for Germany could legitimately rely on the
faithfulness to this treaty of France and Belgium as sufficient
protection. These circumstances, however, ceased to exist—and,
therefore, the meaning and essence of this treaty, and with it the
conditions for the protection for Germany, were bound to change or to be
falsified—when France altered this political relationship in Europe
fundamentally by concluding her pact of mutual assistance with Russia,
and thereby creating a situation which frustrated the aim and purpose of
the Locarno Treaty—namely, to give Germany protection against the
permanent danger arising from the demilitarization of the Rhineland.
The political constellation of Europe had been completely changed,
indeed reversed, by this pact, because the world’s greatest military
power, which was, moreover, at that time openly revolutionary-minded,
had now entered the political arena. In the face of the obscure
situation in the East, amply strewn with the seeds of a conflict, the
pact could easily result in the possibility of France, in view of her
obligations toward Russia, being drawn into a war against Germany, and
attacking Germany who might be involved in a conflict in the East. One
has to admit that it was in no way certain, or in any case highly
problematical, whether the guaranteeing powers, England and Italy, would
under those circumstances consider the case in point as one in which the
guarantee applied, and would actively assist Germany against a French
attack, or whether they would not rather prefer to stay neutral. That
this possibility actually existed, also from the legal point of view of
the treaty, was already shown in the German note of 25 May 1935 about
the French-Russian pact—Document Book 3, Document Neurath-105—and was
emphasized again in the German memorandum of 7 March 1936 to the
signatory powers of the Locarno Treaty—Document Book 4, Document
Neurath-109.
As I have already said, this possibility, this danger, became even
greater and more imminent as a result of the events leading up to the
ratification of the French-Russian pact by the French Chamber, and as a
result of the ratification itself. It was, therefore, an imperative and
manifest act of self-defense and self-preservation when the German
Government, in realizing this tremendous danger, took the minimum steps
necessary to meet this danger—namely, when it restored the armed
sovereignty of the Reich in 1935, when one year later it reoccupied the
demilitarized zone, the ideal base for any French attack, and thus
advanced the defense line against any attack from the West forward to
the border of the Reich.
With all due respect to the rights and rightful interests of other
nations, the very highest, overriding duty of every government—and of
all responsible statesmen—was, is now, and always will be, to maintain
and safeguard the existence and life of its own state and nation. A
statesman who neglects this duty commits a sin against his nation. The
re-establishment of armed sovereignty, rearmament, and the reoccupation
of the Rhineland were the natural reactions, the dutiful answer, of the
German statesmen—and of the Defendant Von Neurath—to the policy of the
French Government, in which, after all that had gone before, they saw a
threat to Germany.
Far be it from, me—and I wish to state this quite emphatically—to
reproach by my foregoing statements the French Government here, morally
or otherwise, for its policy as I have described it. I am, in
fact—together with the Defendant Von Neurath—firmly convinced, and I
recognize fully, that the French policy was dictated solely by France’s
interests, and that the French statesmen surely did only what they
believed was right from the French point of view. And if, in doing this,
they proceeded on a premise which, according to German conviction, was a
false one—namely, the premise that a Germany which had regained her
strength constituted a danger and a threat to France, and that the
German people had always regarded the French people with blind rage,
hatred, and enmity, and were animated only by a passion for aggression
and a desire for revenge—then my client and I can only sincerely
deplore this, but we cannot condemn it.
But, on the other hand, I, too, must claim for the German statesmen—for
the Defendant Von Neurath—the right that their deeds and actions be
judged on the basis of their reasons, on the basis of the needs and
circumstances of the time, and from the viewpoint of German interests;
and that these men not be accused of motives which in themselves are
more than improbable and were, in any case, far from their minds.
Politics, diplomacy, is history come to life. Like the entire universe,
like everything that lives and moves in it, this living history, too, is
subject to an unchangeable fundamental law, the law of causality. And I
believe, Gentlemen of the Tribunal, that I have been able to produce
clear evidence that the two actions with which the defendant is charged
by the Prosecution, and which are said to incriminate him, in
particular, because they constituted treaty violations in preparation
for war—namely, the re-establishment of the armed sovereignty of the
Reich and the remilitarization of the Rhineland—were a logical and
inevitable sequence of the events and the political development during
the years of my client’s activity as Foreign Minister, the result of the
policies of the Western Powers; and that neither he nor Hitler
consciously, intentionally, or according to a preconceived plan, brought
them about, but that they were the unavoidable outcome of French policy.
They, therefore, not only cannot have an aggressive character or
tendency, and cannot indicate preparations for war, as the Prosecution
assert in their retrospective consideration of these things but, on the
contrary, they served only the defensive purpose of warding off a
possible attack, and have a decidedly defensive and, therefore, peaceful
character. That they cannot, therefore, be viewed as actions preparatory
for a future war of aggression on the part of Germany, I need hardly
emphasize.
The assertion of the Prosecution proves only that it is absolutely
inappropriate and quite absurd to view retrospectively and draw
conclusions from single historical actions and events torn out of their
context and roughly and incoherently put together. This way of viewing
things is absolutely useless for the purpose of investigating and
finding historical truth, which is surely the first condition and duty
of this High Tribunal not only for the forming of their judgment but
also for their task of showing the way for a new conception.
But a critical examination of the two steps charged against the
defendant as breaches of international treaties fails, upon closer
scrutiny of the circumstances, to prove the charges sound. For the
Treaty of Versailles, as well as the Treaty of Locarno, had, in the
course of time and events, not only lost their significance and
therewith their inherent justification, but both of them had long since
been broken by French policy and, therefore, annulled. The Treaty of
Versailles had been broken by the obstinate refusal to carry out the
disarmament obligations imposed upon France, as well as upon the other
contracting nations, in return for Germany’s disarmament; and the Treaty
of Locarno had been broken by the conclusion of the agreement with
Russia, which was incompatible with the Locarno Treaty. History, as
often before, had passed over them, and had thus shown the absurdity of
applying rigidly the dogma _Pacta servanda sunt_, as France tried to do
with regard to Germany. This fact cannot be altered by the League of
Nations resolution of 19 March 1936, which had been proposed by France,
and which in itself was not astonishing in view of France’s dominating
position in the League of Nations; in this resolution the League stated
that by reoccupying the Rhineland, Germany had violated Article 43 of
the Treaty of Versailles. But history passed over that, too.
I do not think that further comments are needed upon this resolution and
the statements and parleys between the participating nations which
preceded and followed it; they came to nothing, in the course of events,
and Europe finally made the best of the accomplished facts.
But even on the supposition that this resolution were correct, a breach
of an international treaty is punishable—according to the Charter of
the High Tribunal—only if it served in the preparation of a war of
aggression. And during this Trial one of the gentlemen of the American
Prosecution expressly stated that it was absolutely legal and
justifiable to bring about the revision or annulment of treaties by
peaceful means; and German foreign policy did nothing else. The whole
military action of the reoccupation of the Rhineland was, in view of the
small force of troops used—only one division, and the Luftwaffe did not
take part in it at all—in reality only a symbolic act for the
restoration of the sovereignty of the Reich; that was already evident
from the fact that, as early as 12 March 1936, the German Government,
through a statement of its Ambassador in London, contained in my
Document Book 4, Document Neurath-113, made the proposal that in the
case of reciprocity it would not reinforce its troops and would not
order them to advance closer to the borders. The proposal was rejected
by France.
German policy has throughout, and in every respect, remained true to its
principle of peace for which it had consistently stood for many years;
and in reality it only desired to serve and did serve peace and its
maintenance in Europe. Both steps, the restoration of armed sovereignty
and the reoccupation of the Rhineland, were—and I especially want to
emphasize this here—were nothing else but the visible expression of the
full and unrestricted sovereignty of the Reich. This sovereignty had
already been recognized by the Western Powers in the oft-mentioned Five
Power Agreement of 11 December 1932, containing the recognition of
Germany’s right of equality. More conclusive evidence can hardly be
found for the love of peace and the clear policy of peace of the
Defendant Von Neurath than the fact that he waited for years for the
realization of this recognition in order to avoid complications which,
in view of the earlier attitude of the French and their policy, might
possibly have arisen. He waited for years—up to the moment when, in
consequence of the changed balance of power, this realization became an
unquestionable necessity for the security of the Reich, a necessity of
self-defense.
And German foreign policy continued unchanged in practice to follow this
peaceful tendency even after, and in spite of this resolution. In the
German memorandum of 31 March 1936—Document Book 4, Document
Neurath-116—the German Foreign Office, on behalf of the Reich
Government, once more submitted to the powers a new great peace plan for
a quarter of a century of peace in Europe, by means of which, as is
stated at the end, it wanted to make its contribution to the building of
a new Europe on the basis of mutual respect. This again was clear and
unmistakable evidence of its unalterable will for peace. It was not
Germany’s fault that this German peace plan—and its absolute honesty
and sincerity has been affirmed here upon oath by the defendant—was not
successful and did not lead to the building of a new and peaceful
Europe.
The same peaceful tendencies and intentions continued to be uppermost in
the defendant’s policy during the years 1936-1937, in spite of all
disappointments. Evidence of this is, above all, the treaty between the
German Reich and Austria, which was concluded on 11 July 1936, as the
result of negotiations which had been conducted for some time by the
Defendant Von Papen. Not only the defendant’s own testimony but also the
testimony of the witnesses Köpke and Dieckhoff proves beyond doubt that
the view on the Austrian question, which from the very beginning the
defendant consistently held and supported, was this: closer co-operation
between the two countries—both in the political and particularly in the
economic field—must indeed be aimed at, but Austria’s independence
must, under all circumstances, be respected and remain untouched. For
that reason, the defendant was an implacable opponent of any German
attempts to interfere in the internal politics of Austria, and of the
attempts of the Party to support the Austrian National Socialists in
their fight against the Austrian Governments of Dollfuss and
Schuschnigg; and he again and again protested to Hitler against them,
not without success. That he, this Christian-minded and honorable man,
abhorred and condemned the murder of Dollfuss from the bottom of his
heart, I need not emphasize. And exactly from that point of view he
welcomed the agreement of 11 July 1936, since it so fully corresponded
to his own opinions. This alone refutes the assertion of the Prosecution
that the agreement was concluded with intent to defraud—that is, with
the intention to lull the Austrian Government into security and thereby
to prepare and facilitate for the future the real intention already
existing at that time—namely, to incorporate Austria by force into the
German Reich.
The absolute sincerity and honesty of the defendant during the
conclusion of the agreement is confirmed by the sworn testimony of the
then Austrian Foreign Minister Dr. Guido Schmidt. And that the Defendant
Von Neurath had no reason to doubt Hitler’s honesty and sincerity with
regard to this treaty was shown quite irrefutably by the witness Köpke,
who confirmed Hitler’s statements to the British Foreign Secretary Simon
during his visit to Berlin in March 1935; the defendant himself gave
evidence that, immediately after the conclusion of the agreement, Hitler
told the leaders of the Austrian National Socialists Rainer and
Globocznik that it was their duty and the duty of the Austrian Nazis to
adhere strictly to this agreement. And so, from his viewpoint, the
defendant considered this agreement as another step on the road toward
peace in Europe, since the recognition of Austria’s independence, which
he had pronounced in the agreement, eliminated the European danger point
inherent in the Austrian problem.
In the same way, the defendant worked for an improvement of the
relations between Germany and the Czechoslovakian Republic. It was only
with this aim in mind that he so often pointed out to the Czechoslovak
Ambassador Dr. Mastny that the Czechoslovak Government must at last meet
the demands of the Sudeten Germans, still very moderate at that time,
which were based on a promise once given by the Czechoslovak Government
in Versailles, but not kept. Nothing, however, was further from the
defendant’s mind, in both the Austrian and the Czechoslovak question,
than the idea of a solution of these questions by force, a solution
which later, after the defendant had left his position as Foreign
Minister, Hitler considered right.
And his efforts to improve the relations between the Reich and the
southeastern European nations also did not serve any aggressive
intentions or even plans to partition Czechoslovakia with the help of
these nations. If in Messersmith’s affidavit it is alleged that in order
to secure this aim Germany had promised to the southeastern states, and
also to Poland, parts of Czechoslovakia and even of Austria, then these
are entirely absurd ideas which do not contain a word of truth. What the
true value of these assertions is becomes clear from the fact that the
Prosecution have not been able to submit a single report from one of the
diplomats of the Western Powers accredited in the states in question,
which could confirm the accuracy of these assertions. Was only Mr.
Messersmith clever enough to obtain knowledge of such plans? In reality,
the defendant’s efforts and his trip to Budapest, Belgrade, and Sofia
served only peaceful purposes—namely, the exchange and strengthening of
economic relations between Germany and these states. As the testimony of
the witness Köpke showed, the defendant was particularly interested in
these efforts, and they influenced his policies.
How much he opposed any policy which seemed to him even remotely out of
line with his own policy of peace and international reconciliation is
best proved by the fact that he rejected the negotiations with Japan,
which the Defendant Von Ribbentrop had entered into and conducted in
London without his assistance and completely independent of him on
direct instructions from Hitler, and also the Anti-Comintern Pact which
was finally concluded with Japan. He expressed his opposition clearly by
refusing to sign this pact, and it was, as is well known, signed by Herr
Von Ribbentrop as Ambassador, which was a most unusual procedure. The
objection of the defendant to this kind of policy could hardly find a
stronger form of expression.
The Defendant Von Neurath adhered faithfully and unflinchingly to his
consistent peace policy up to the last moment, in spite of the
influences of other circles—especially Party circles—on Hitler which
made themselves felt during the defendant’s last years in office. He
hoped, until the last moment, that he would be able to check these
influences successfully, to eliminate them and to continue directing the
policies of Germany along peaceful lines, according to his own
convictions and his promise to Hindenburg.
When Hitler’s speech on 5 November 1937, and the defendant’s subsequent
conversation with Hitler about it, forced him in 1938 to the conclusion
that he no longer had any influence on Hitler, that Hitler would no
longer shrink back from aggressive, warlike measures, he immediately
took the consequences and submitted his resignation, which was accepted.
His task, entrusted to him by Hindenburg, had become impossible to
fulfill. He would not, and could not, have anything to do with a policy
which did not shrink from warlike measures. It was completely out of the
question for him to endorse such a policy with his name; it would have
been the negation of his entire life work; he would have betrayed
himself and his people.
But this did not mean that the defendant, who placed the welfare of his
people above everything, even above all his personal interests and
desires, would not make himself available again if the need arose, or if
he believed that he would be able to save Germany from warlike
complications, for that was the danger of the policy which Hitler now
directed along a line different from that of the defendant. This
attitude of the defendant readily explains why, when Hitler summoned him
on 11 March 1938 to inform him of the march of German troops into
Austria and, because Reich Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop was away in
London, to ask him to advise him and to answer the note of protest from
the British Embassy, he declared himself willing to do so.
If the Prosecution now charge that the contents of this answer were
factually incorrect, the following must be pointed out in response. In
this letter the defendant only stated what Hitler himself had told him
about the events. The defendant himself knew just as little about the
actual events as the rest of the world, since after his resignation as
Foreign Minister he no longer received political information of any
sort. Hitler’s announcement that German troops were marching in
surprised him just as much as it surprised everybody else, and as the
order for it had surprised even the highest commander of the German
Armed Forces, which Henderson himself admits in his well-known book,
wherein he adds that Hitler’s decision to march in could have been made
only a few days before. There was even less reason for him to doubt the
accuracy of the description which Hitler had given him of the preceding
events, because he had given it in the presence of Göring who had not
contradicted it. It did not even occur to him—because of his own
upright and true nature, and because of his entire previous official
activity under clean and honest governments—that the head of the State,
Hitler, could lie to him and at such an important moment, for the
purpose of answering the British note of protest, give him information
which was bound within a very short time to be proved manifestly
incorrect. And whom could he really have consulted? Only very few men
besides Göring had real knowledge; but those he could not approach,
because they were not in Berlin. Göring did not contradict Hitler’s
description.
I particularly want to point out that the reply which the defendant
authorized to be drafted on the basis of Hitler’s description, and for
which he also did not use the letterhead of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, was not signed by him in his own name nor on behalf of the
absent Foreign Minister but, as the wording of the document discloses,
the description of the events was forwarded by him on the order of the
Reich Government. But the Reich Government was Hitler, or rather on that
day Göring. He, therefore, made perfectly plain that he was not writing
in his own name, on his own responsibility, but that like an attorney,
he was only forwarding information of a third person—namely Hitler. He
really cannot be reproached for not having doubted the accuracy of this
information and for not having checked the official description of the
head of the State—and Hitler was, after all, the head of the
State—quite apart from the fact that he would not have been in a
position to check it.
He also cannot be reproached for the statement which he made a short
time later to the Czechoslovak Ambassador Dr. Mastny. In the first
place, according to the sworn statement of the defendant, the discussion
in question took place in a way rather different from that described in
the report of Ambassador Dr. Mastny, which apparently aimed at greater
emphasis and effect. But, in any case, the penultimate paragraph of this
report—Document Book 5, Document Neurath-141—shows clearly that even
Mastny interpreted and understood the statement of the defendant that
Hitler had no intention of attacking Czechoslovakia and, now as before,
considered himself bound by the provisions of the agreement of
arbitration which offered no guarantee for ever after but only for the
immediate future; that is, until the action against Austria had been
terminated. In view of the insufficient preparations of the Wehrmacht
for a war, confirmed here by the Defendant Jodl, there was absolutely no
reason to doubt the accuracy of this statement; that is, to doubt that
it actually corresponded to Hitler’s wish at the time, in spite of the
references of the Prosecution to Hitler’s statements, in his speech on 5
November 1937, about the conquest of Austria and Czechoslovakia. For
these statements referred only to the possibility of war with other
states and to a much later period.
So the accusations raised by the Prosecution against the defendant on
this point are also unfounded. That already a few months after his
speech on 5 November 1937 Hitler decided to incorporate Austria into
Germany came as a surprise to all, even to his closest collaborators.
This decision, however, was taken not only on the basis of developments
in Austria, but most likely not least on the basis of conferences
between Hitler, the defendant, and Lord Halifax, the then Lord President
of the Council, in November and December 1937, in which, according to
the sworn statement of the defendant, Lord Halifax declared that the
British people would not understand why they should enter a war because
two German countries had united.
[_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]
_Afternoon Session_
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Once more, in the autumn of 1938, the Defendant
Von Neurath took it upon himself to stem the tide of events in order to
spare the German people the immediate danger of war. In view of the
corroboratory testimony of Göring and other witnesses, I need not
describe in detail how the Munich conference, toward the end of
September 1938, had come about. The fact remains that it was held and
was successful—I refer to the agreement with Britain and France on the
Sudeten question—and this was due in no small measure to the initiative
and co-operation of the defendant.
If, however, he was able to accomplish this, it is because of a
circumstance which the Prosecution, completely misunderstanding the
situation, now include among the accusations—namely, that upon his
resignation as Foreign Minister he was appointed President of the Secret
Cabinet Council, which had been newly created by Hitler at this time.
Had he not been in this position it would not have been at all possible
for him to get to see Hitler in September 1938 and persuade him to agree
to the Munich conference; for, contrary to the allegation of the
Prosecution, even though he kept the title of Reich Minister from the
day he resigned as Foreign Minister, he was no longer a member of the
Reich Cabinet, which is already shown by the fact that from that day on
his salary was decreased by one-third. Any joint responsibility which
the defendant might have had for the policy of the Reich ceased as from
that day; for, contrary to the assertion of the Prosecution, as
President of the Secret Cabinet Council he was not a member of the Reich
Cabinet and had no access to it, let alone a seat or a vote in the
Cabinet sessions. This is established beyond doubt by the very wording
of Hitler’s decree whereby this Secret Cabinet Council was created; for
there it says expressly that the sole purpose of this Secret Cabinet
Council was to advise the Führer personally—that is, Hitler alone—and
only on questions concerning foreign policy. Even Huber’s book
_Verfassungsrecht des Grossdeutschen Reiches_, quoted by the Prosecution
under Document 1744-PS in their attempt to prove the contrary, shows
that the Secret Cabinet Council and its President had nothing whatsoever
to do with the Reich Cabinet, and was not a branch or an organ of it,
but only one of several of the Führer’s personal offices.
As had been shown by the testimony of Göring, Lammers, and other
witnesses, the Secret Cabinet Council never really functioned, and was
never meant to function. In point of fact, all that was intended was to
bestow a personal honor on the defendant, and thus efface the impression
that differences had arisen between him and Hitler. That he himself did
not look upon his appointment in any other way is proved by the fact
that after 4 February 1938 the defendant lived a life of leisure on his
own estate in Württemberg as a private citizen, and went only very
rarely to Berlin where, however, he was not and could not have been
active in any official capacity, since all information as to what was
happening in the Foreign Ministry was deliberately kept from him.
If the Prosecution believe that they are able to conclude, from the
documents submitted under Number 3945-PS, that the defendant received
sums of money from the Reich, or the Reich Chancellery, for obtaining
diplomatic information, then—apart from the defendant’s own testimony
under oath—this is refuted by a letter among these documents, dated 31
May 1939, from Amtsrat Koeppen, the head of the office of the Secret
Cabinet Council, which was kept going merely for the sake of
appearances—a letter which proves conclusively that these not very
large payments at long intervals were for covering the cost of
maintaining this office, and were not intended for purposes of secret
information.
And if the defendant made no use of his position as President of this
Secret Cabinet Council—except for this one occasion in September
1938—he made just as little use of his position as a member of the
Reich Defense Council, to which he was appointed by the Reich Defense
Laws. Here, too, the Prosecution err when they make use of this
membership to accuse the defendant of warlike intentions or of promoting
such intentions.
Since this Reich Defense Council has already been discussed so much
during the hearing of the evidence, I believe there is no need for me to
examine more closely this assertion of the Prosecution, and that I can
limit myself to pointing out that no aggressive tendencies of any kind
were embodied in these Reich Defense Laws; but that, on the contrary, as
their contents state, they merely contain—as is the custom in any
country which has to reckon with the possibility of a war—the necessary
provisions in the event of the Reich’s being attacked, or being drawn
into a war in some other manner. How one can deduce from them that the
defendant had warlike intentions, or planned for war, is utterly
incomprehensible. Moreover, the defendant did not take part in a single
one of the meetings of this Council, and no reports about the decisions
of this Council were ever forwarded to him. The Document 2194-PS,
submitted by the Prosecution as alleged counterevidence, was not sent to
the defendant at all, but to a department of the Reich Ministry of
Transportation attached to the Government of the Protectorate—namely,
the transport department—and was intended for the latter. Also the
sender of the document was not the Reich Defense Council, but the
Ministry for Economy and Labor of Saxony.
All these and similar efforts will never enable the Prosecution to prove
that the defendant, by his policies, was at any time directly or
indirectly guilty of a crime of planning or preparing an aggressive war,
or even of approving or supporting such a war. Quite the contrary. All
his efforts were directed to one end, and one end only: to attain by
peaceful means and in a peaceful way only those aims which had been
sought by all former democratic Governments after 1919—namely, the
removal of the provisions of the Versailles Treaty which discriminated
against Germany and stamped the German Reich as a second-rate power, and
the bringing about of a general pacification of Europe. Not one of his
diplomatic actions served any other purpose, or was performed with any
intention which would imply a crime in the sense of the Charter. It is
not surprising, therefore, that his resignation as Reich Foreign
Minister was received by the whole world with anxiety and dismay, both
outside Germany—I refer to the statement of the witness Dieckhoff—as
well as inside Germany, and especially in conservative circles. This
alone serves to prove that the assertion of the Prosecution, that he was
active in these circles as a fifth columnist, is untrue.
All the Prosecution’s references to Hitler’s speech to his generals in
November 1939, and still less to the speeches by the defendant himself
of 29 August and 31 October 1937, will alter none of those facts.
Hitler’s speech was made at the time of the first military successes and
was calculated to vindicate Hitler’s state leadership, and should be
taken at its face value. The speeches made by the defendant, however,
say just the opposite of what the Prosecution see fit to put into them.
For both speeches, Numbers 126 and 128 in my Document Book 4, stress
quite clearly the success of the peaceful intentions of the German
foreign policy conducted by the defendant, and lay particular emphasis
on the fact that the results were obtained entirely by peaceful means,
and not by means of force. In particular, the speech of 31 October 1937,
the last public speech of the defendant as Foreign Minister, is actually
a résumé of his peace policy. That this was and still is a correct
résumé, the Prosecution themselves have had to admit in this Court—that
Hitler’s speech of 5 November 1937, which was used by my client as an
excuse for his resignation, was, as described by a member of the
Prosecution, the turning point in German foreign policy. Thus the
Prosecution acknowledged unequivocally that up to that day German
foreign policy had not been an aggressive policy of force, or pursued
any warlike plans or schemes, but had been peaceful throughout.
Indeed it could not have been otherwise, in view of the defendant’s
political and humane creed; and this has been unanimously confirmed by
all witnesses examined here and in all of the questionnaires and
affidavits in my document books. This creed was built on three main
pillars: love of men, love of the fatherland, and love of peace—all
three springing from and sustained by a deep sense of responsibility
toward himself, toward his God, and toward his people.
When, a few days after the occupation of Czechoslovakia, Hitler called
the defendant to Vienna from his well-deserved _otium cum dignitate_ on
his estate, and told him that he had been selected as Reich Protector
for Bohemia and Moravia, it was this same sense of responsibility which
made him feel it his duty to accept this post. At first he was opposed
to the idea and struggled long with himself, for he had always been an
inveterate opponent of any interference in the affairs of other nations,
let alone the more or less forcible annexation of a country to the
German Reich. It was for this reason that he had also condemned the
annexation of Czechoslovakia and the so-called protection pact concluded
with President Hacha, although at this time he had not the slightest
idea of how this really came about. He got to know the true facts of
this incident for the first time here in Nuremberg.
In spite of his reluctance to accept a public office once more,
especially at his age, and to serve, again under Hitler and his regime
of which he heartily disapproved, his sense of responsibility toward his
people and his humane principles persuaded him that it would be wrong to
refuse this mission. When Hitler explained to him that he had chosen him
as being the only man possessing the necessary qualities to reconcile
the Czechoslovakian people with the new conditions and with the German
people—which Hitler said was his desire—he could not fail to recognize
that the task given him was one which, in the interests of the German
people, of humanity, and of international understanding, he ought not to
refuse. And was it not indeed a task worthy of the utmost effort, to
appease by just government and humane treatment a people who would
regard every restriction and encroachment on their liberty and
independence as the worst injustice that could be done them, and who
would be filled with mortal hatred and resentment toward a people they
felt to be an intolerable oppressor, and to reconcile them with these
very people and the conditions for which they were directly responsible?
But was not this aim in line with the endeavor to insure and preserve
peace, which clearly and unequivocally pervaded his whole foreign
policy? And he had every justification for telling himself that if he
refused this task, then another man from Hitler’s entourage would in all
probability be nominated Reich Protector, who would be neither able nor
willing to conciliate the Czech people by humane and just treatment, but
who, on the contrary, would be more inclined to hold them down by force
and terror, as indeed happened 2½ years later.
Such were the only thoughts and considerations which led him to accept
the appointment offered him, setting aside all personal interests and
willing to face the risk that this might be interpreted and held against
him in some quarters as denoting approval and support of Hitler and his
regime—for Hitler had made him the definite and firm promise that he
would at all times be willing to support the defendant’s intended policy
of appeasement and reconciliation for the Czech people through humane
and just treatment and through safeguarding the interests of the Czech
people to the greatest extent.
He was fully aware that the task which he had accepted was a difficult
one. I do not hesitate to admit that it was here a question of a
decision, the justification of which could—if one admits the point of
view put forward here by the British prosecutor that it was immoral to
remain in a government which should be repudiated because of its
amorality—cause embarrassment in the judgment of a man whose thoughts
and dealings were different from those of the Defendant Von Neurath. But
having in mind the character of Herr Von Neurath, which I hope has been
described to you clearly enough, and his deep sense of responsibility,
this decision was the only possible and logical one. It is a veritable
tragedy, resembling those of the ancient Greeks, that the failure of
this mission, which had been undertaken with only the highest ethical
motives, should have brought the Defendant Von Neurath into this dock.
But at this point now, I should like to make the following comments on
the Prosecution’s attempt by means of the photostatic documents which
they submitted under Document 3859-PS—consisting of a letter from the
defendant to the Chief of the Reich Chancellery Lammers, dated 31 August
1940, and its alleged enclosures—to discredit the defendant’s assertion
that in assuming his office as Reich Protector his sole aim was to
appease and reconcile the Czech people by safeguarding to the utmost
their interests and their national traditions, and thus work for the
well-being of this people and their prosperity as a nation. I believe
that the second examination of the defendant, which the Tribunal, in
their readiness to help, granted to me, has proved that those documents,
particularly the two reports attached to the letter to Lammers—which
indeed, with regard to the question of the Germanization of the Czech
people, cannot be reconciled with the intentions and tendencies of the
defendant as mentioned above—have no evidentiary value. Not only do
those photostatic copies in no way tally—and the defendant has made a
definite statement to this effect—with the contents and the form—that
is, the length of the originals attached to the letter to Lammers, and
which had been submitted to the defendant for signature and approved by
him—but the photostatic copies also give rise in several places to
well-founded doubts as to whether they are really identical with the
enclosures to the letter addressed to Lammers, and this owing to the
following facts.
Contrary to the practice adopted by all administration offices, neither
of the photostatic copies bears the reference number of the letter to
Lammers, or even a note that they are enclosures to a third document,
let alone to the Lammers letter. Neither does the photostatic copy of
the first report bear the defendant’s signature which, according to his
definite statement, when he signed the letter to Lammers, he added to
the report enclosed with it, which report had been drawn up by himself
or by his office according to his instructions, and submitted to him in
a fair copy. Another thing which strikes one is that it only bears a
correction note of the copy which should have been, but actually was
not, signed by an SS Obersturmführer working in the office of State
Secretary Frank.
These facts support the defendant’s assertion that, if the reports from
which the photostatic copies have been made were in fact annexed to the
Lammers letter, they have been substituted for the original report of
the defendant and for Frank’s report—the draft of which was approved by
the defendant in the office of State Secretary Frank which was entrusted
with the dispatch—either by the latter or by his orders. Furthermore,
the defendant’s statement, made by him in order to explain the purpose
of this Lammers letter and its enclosures, is quite worthy of belief:
namely, in the same way as was intended by the plan contained in General
Friderici’s report—dated 15 October 1940, submitted under Exhibit
USA-65, Document L-150—to induce Hitler by reporting verbally to him,
and on the basis of the two reports sent, to abstain from dividing the
Protectorate territory and from germanizing the Czech people in any way
whatever, and to prohibit any such plans, a course which the defendant
repudiated for many reasons, but chiefly because he had at heart the
interests of the Czech nation, which had been entrusted to him, and its
national character and unity. These assertions of the defendant are
confirmed by the statements of the witness Von Holleben in the
questionnaire answered by him,—Document Book 5, Document
Neurath-156—of the witness Dr. Von Burgsdorff, as well as by the
defendant’s letter to Baroness Ritter—quoted in her affidavit, Document