THE WAR OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION
AND THE DEATH OF LOUIS XIV.
The campaign of Prince Eugene in Italy--Appointment of Marlborough
to the command in the Netherlands--His character and abilities--He
establishes himself upon the Rhine--Advance of the French upon
Vienna--Savoy joins the Grand Alliance--Critical position of
the Emperor--The campaign and battle of Blenheim--The English
gain the command of the Mediterranean--Death of the Emperor
Leopold--The campaign and battle of Ramillies--Expedition of the
Archduke Charles to Spain--The battle of Almanza--The campaign and
battle of Oudenarde--Siege and capture of Lille--Negotiations for
peace--Appeal of Louis to his people--The campaign and battle of
Malplaquet--Dismissal of Marlborough--Victories of the Spaniards
over the Allies--The negotiations at Gertruydenberg--The peace of
Utrecht--Its policy and justification--The end of the seventeenth
century--The death of Louis XIV.
[Illustration:
MAP
TO ILLUSTRATE
THE CAMPAIGNS IN
NORTH ITALY,
1701–1706.]
[Sidenote: =Campaign of prince Eugene in Italy, 1701.=]
The war broke out in Italy. By a treaty concluded with the duke of
Savoy in the spring of 1701 the road to north Italy was opened to the
soldiers of France, and Catinat at the head of 40,000 men occupied the
Milanese. Pushing forward his advanced guard to the frontiers of the
territories of Venice at the Lago di Garda, he prepared to fall upon
the Austrian army as it debouched into the plain from the passes of
the mountains. To an invader who comes from Austria or the east, the
plain of north Italy presents serious military difficulties. His path
to the south is blocked by the strong and deep stream of the Po, which,
with its surrounding marshes, treacherous banks, and swift currents,
forms an almost impassable obstacle in the face of an active enemy;
especially as the most important points of its course are defended by
the fortresses of Alessandria, Piacenza, and Mantua. From the Alps on
the north descend into the Po a series of rivers, similar in character
though less in volume, each of which forms, both from the nature of its
stream, and the cities which command it, a strategical position very
easy to defend and exceedingly difficult to attack directly. From the
Lago Maggiore runs the stream of the Ticino joining the Po a little
below Pavia. From the Valtelline through the Lago di Como the Adda
pours its waters into the Po at Cremona, passing a little to the east
of Milan. To the east of the Adda, from the mountains of Bergamo, flows
the stream of the Oglio, receiving on its way to its home in the Po the
waters of a tributary which protects the important city of Brescia.
Further to the east, from the southern end of the Lago di Garda, close
to the fortress of Peschiera, the Mincio makes its way directly into
the Po below Mantua. A few miles further, from the wide valley leading
to the Brenner pass, descends the great stream of the Adige, which,
running through the dominions of Venice, passing the fortresses of
Verona, Legnago and Carpi, makes its own way into the sea north of
the Po amid impassable marshes. Invaders of the Milanese from Germany
and Austria must therefore either force the positions of these rivers
one by one in the face of the enemy, or turn them by thrusting their
way through the mountains on the north. Catinat had made up his mind
that the Austrians would attempt the latter feat, and was carefully
watching the mountain valleys north of the Lago di Garda, when prince
Eugene suddenly appeared behind him at Brescia. Quickly descending the
valley of the Adige he had not scrupled to violate Venetian territory.
Marching behind Verona he crossed the Adige at Carpi, then turning
north-west crossed the Mincio above Mantua without opposition, and
appeared between Peschiera and Brescia, in the rear of the French,
before Catinat knew that he had left the obscurity of the mountains.
The French had only just time to beat a hasty retreat to the Oglio and
cover Milan.
[Sidenote: =Defeat and capture of Villeroy, 1702.=]
Louis was highly indignant at this ominous beginning to the war,
and sent his friend and courtier Villeroy to supersede Catinat. The
change was not to his advantage. Villeroy was a good dancer but an
indifferent general. Having an army far outnumbering that of prince
Eugene, he crossed the Oglio and attacked him on the 1st of September
1701 at Chiari, but was repulsed. Acquiescing in his failure he took up
a position on the Oglio defending Milan, and placed his headquarters
at Cremona for the winter, where he amused himself in all security.
Prince Eugene saw his opportunity. From Mantua, which he was besieging,
he advanced in February 1702, surprised Cremona under cover of night,
captured the French general and his staff, and obliged his army to
retire behind the Adda. The results of this bold stroke were quickly
seen. The dukes of Modena and Guastalla joined the imperialists, the
duke of Savoy began to trim, and to look out for an opportunity of
changing sides. But reinforcements soon came to the French. The duke of
Vendôme and Philip V. left Naples and appeared on the flank
of prince Eugene in Lombardy in August 1702. Greatly outnumbered, the
Austrians had to fall back to a defensive position behind the Adige,
where the French did not dare to attack them.
[Sidenote: =Marlborough appointed to the command in the Netherlands.=]
Meanwhile the war had become general. In May 1702 Marlborough, who
had been appointed to the chief command of the English forces by
Anne, and had been elected captain-general of the Dutch forces by the
states-general, took command of the allied army in the Netherlands.
He had under him about 10,000 English troops, about 20,000 Dutch
troops, and about as many mercenaries, chiefly Germans, in the pay
of England and the United Provinces. It is interesting to notice
how small the body of purely British soldiers was who fought in the
armies of Marlborough. They were never as numerous as the mercenaries,
though they increased in numbers regularly as the war went on. At the
commencement of hostilities, owing no doubt to the great jealousy of a
standing army evinced by all Englishmen, and to the national distrust
of William III., there were very few English soldiers fit to
take the field against the veterans of France.
[Sidenote: =His military qualities.=]
What England lost through want of training among her soldiers was more
than made up to her by the eminent capacity of her general. Marlborough
had learned his first lessons of war in the school of Turenne, he
had shown his talents for command in his successful management of an
expedition to the south of Ireland in 1689, but no one could have
anticipated from his past, when he was appointed to the supreme
command in 1702, the singular combination of qualities which made him
incomparably the first man in Europe. Full of resource, gifted with
a notable mastery over men, and thoroughly trained in the science of
war, he is one of the few generals who have had the power of conceiving
and executing combined movements on a large scale. His provident
eye could take in the whole of Europe as a theatre of operations,
and direct the movements of four or five armies to a common end. As
a strategist, he was too seldom permitted freedom of action for his
originality and resourcefulness fully to display themselves. In this he
must be compared, not with Frederick the Great or Napoleon or Moltke,
but with Wellington or Turenne, and he need not fear the result.
Even when driven by the timidity and unreasonableness of the Dutch,
or by political danger at home into the commonplace, his campaigns
show a grasp of the proportion of things, which is only found in the
highest order of intellects. He fixes with lightning rapidity upon the
important thing to be done, and sees at once how best to do it with
the resources at his command. He never fritters away his strength, he
never wastes life,[7] or runs risks unnecessarily, or for mere effect.
He strikes directly at the key of the position, his combinations are
all aimed at the central point of the enemies’ power. In this capacity
to appreciate exactly the ratio of his strength and resources to those
of the enemy, he strongly resembles his great successor Wellington.
Like him he never lost a battle, unlike him he never failed in a
campaign. The same characteristics are observable in the battle-field.
He had an extraordinarily quick eye for the weak point in an enemy’s
position, and saw at once how best to utilise the opportunities which
the ground afforded for attaining his object. At Blenheim and at
Ramillies, it was his skilful use of difficult ground that mainly
contributed to the victory. And when his real attack was developed, he
showed something of Napoleon’s power of combining the whole strength
of his army upon the end to be achieved. At Blenheim he forced his way
through the centre of his adversaries’ position, and reduced the enemy
from a disciplined army into disorganised masses at a stroke, much as
Napoleon did afterwards by Soult’s famous attack at Austerlitz. But
apart from his military genius, he was no less conspicuous for his
powers of diplomacy, and his singular management of men. [Sidenote:
=His character.=] Of unwearied patience, imperturbable temper,
and immovable resolution he rarely failed to gain his end in the long
run. The Grand Alliance of 1701–2, and the negotiations with Charles
XII. of Sweden at Altranstadt in 1708, are undeniable proofs
of his diplomatic ability. His close friendship with prince Eugene
and Godolphin, and his tender love for his imperious and fretful
wife, attest the warmth of his affections, and the amiableness of his
disposition. The wonderful self-command with which he saw his best
plans ruined, his reputation endangered, his motives suspected, his
very successes decried, by the stupidity of the half envious and half
timid Dutch, and the malignancy of English party spirit, is no mean
tribute to the steadfastness of his patriotism. If France had not the
resources of the allies upon which to draw, neither had she their
divisions and quarrels with which to contend.
[Illustration:
MAP
TO ILLUSTRATE THE
DUTCH WAR OF 1672,
AND THE WAR OF THE
SPANISH SUCCESSION
IN THE NETHERLANDS.
_The advance of Condé & Turenne
open Amsterdam 1672_ -=-=
_Typo. Etching Co. Sc._]
[Sidenote: =Dangerous isolation of Austria, 1702.=]
When Marlborough took command of the allied armies in the Netherlands
in 1702, it was clear to him, that the danger to the cause of the
allies generally lay in the isolation of Austria. Cut off from the
sea, she could not be directly assisted by the English and Dutch
fleets. Accessible from Italy through the passes of Tirol, she might
easily be taken in flank should she receive a repulse in that quarter.
On the side of the Rhine the danger was not only threatening, but
imminent. Bavaria was about to make common cause with Louis, and a
united French and Bavarian force might be at the gates of Vienna long
before tardy succours could force their way there from north Germany
or the Netherlands. It was therefore all-important to Marlborough to
gain command of the lower Rhine valley, so as to be able to open
up communications with the imperial troops on the upper Rhine or
upper Danube if necessary. But in the way of this policy there were
considerable difficulties. The Netherlands formed one vast intrenched
camp in the hands of the French. Behind the curtain of their fortresses
they could make their preparations in secret for a sudden advance upon
Amsterdam, or recruit their armies after a repulse. Boufflers at the
head of the French forces occupied a line which stretched from Antwerp
on the Scheldt, through Venlo on the Meuse, to Kaiserwerth on the
Rhine, thus blocking the three river valleys. If driven from that by a
front attack, he had but to retire on the line of the Demer, between
Antwerp and Liége, or a little further back to the line of the Mehaigne
from Antwerp through Louvain and Tirlemont to Namur, or further back
still to the line of the frontier, and take refuge under the great
fortresses of Lille, Tournai, Mons, Charleroi and Namur. To force these
positions one after another, and capture the fortresses which defended
them, in the face of a watchful and valiant enemy, was a task of much
difficulty, and must take many years. [Sidenote: =Marlborough gains
a footing on the Rhine, 1702.=] To try and turn the fortresses
by advancing on France by the valleys of the Rhine and the Moselle
was sure to be bitterly opposed by the Dutch, whose timidity already
pictured the French at the gates of Amsterdam. Marlborough had
therefore to act very cautiously. He took advantage of Boufflers’s too
extended position, and directed an attack as if to turn his left in
Brabant. Boufflers fell into the trap, moved his troops in all haste
to defend his left, and so gave his right flank over into the enemies’
hands. Marlborough easily turned his right flank between the Meuse and
the Rhine, drove him back on the line of the Mehaigne, and established
himself strongly on the valleys of the Meuse and the Rhine, capturing
Venlo, Ruremonde, and Liége.
[Sidenote: =His indecisive campaign of 1703.=]
The next year he prepared to push his success further. Instructing the
Dutch to advance on the right wing into Flanders, capture Antwerp,
and seize the line of the Scheldt, he with the left wing pushed down
the Rhine, overran the electorate of Köln, and in May 1703 made
himself master of Bonn. He was now secure of his communications with
north Germany, and was preparing to organise a German army to operate
upon the Moselle, and keep up communications between himself and the
Emperor, when he was recalled to the Netherlands in hot haste to
assist the Dutch. Tired of waiting for the siege train and transport
necessary to form the siege of Antwerp, the Dutch had begun to send
out detachments into Flanders for pure plundering purposes. One of
these under Opdam was suddenly attacked by Boufflers, and completely
destroyed in June 1703. Whereupon the Dutch, in the extremity of
terror, absolutely refused to undertake the siege of Antwerp at all.
On Marlborough’s arrival Boufflers withdrew behind the lines of the
Mehaigne, which he had carefully fortified by ramparts and towers.
Marlborough, sure of his ability to force the lines, made preparations
for the attack, but the Dutch declined to co-operate, and the English
general, baffled and dispirited, was obliged to content himself with
the capture of a few inferior fortresses.
[Sidenote: =Advance of the French upon Vienna, 1703.=]
Meanwhile on the upper Rhine things were going badly for the allies.
Louis had always intended to make his main attack in this quarter. His
plan included a simultaneous advance upon Vienna by the Danube and by
Italy, with the help of the duke of Savoy and the elector of Bavaria,
while Boufflers in the Netherlands merely kept the English and the
Dutch army occupied and entangled amid fortresses and fortifications.
The success of prince Eugene in Italy, and his own want of preparation
delayed for some time the commencement of this movement, but by the
beginning of the year 1703 all was ready. Vendôme was facing prince
Eugene upon the Adige ready to attack. The elector of Bavaria had
definitely declared himself on the French side and captured Ulm.
Accordingly in February 1703 Villars crossed the Rhine at Strasburg,
took Kehl by storm, forced the passes of the Black Forest, and joined
the elector on the Danube; while Tallard at the head of another army
on the Rhine supported his movements, and protected his communications
with France. Prince Louis of Baden, and count Stirum, who commanded the
allied forces, unable to make head against the enemy, withdrew into
the lines of Stolhofen, a little below Kehl, which they had carefully
fortified in order to form a base of operations for the imperial armies
on the upper Rhine, and there kept Tallard at bay. The Emperor was in
terrible straits. The Hungarians had risen under Ragotsky, and were
preparing to attack Vienna from the east. Vendôme was pushing prince
Eugene slowly before him over the Brenner pass to Innsbruck. The only
other Austrian force was cooped up behind Stolhofen. There was not a
man between the elector and Vienna, and Villars strongly urged Max
Emanuel to march at once with all his forces on Vienna, and end the war
at a blow, while he posted himself on the Danube at Donauwörth, and
defended Bavaria from a flank attack.
[Sidenote: =Savoy joins the Grand Alliance, 1703.=]
Unfortunately for himself and his ally the elector had not the required
energy. The opportunity passed never to return. Max Emanuel determined
to crush prince Eugene first. In June he was at Kufstein on his way to
Innsbruck, while Vendôme had penetrated up the pass as far as Trent.
The army of Eugene was entangled in the mountains between them. He
owed his preservation to fortune, not to skill. Just at this moment
Victor Amadeus of Savoy, after hesitating some months, made up his mind
that the winning side would be that of the allies. He joined the Grand
Alliance, and Vendôme had to hasten back to Piedmont to preserve his
communications. The elector hearing of the retreat of Vendôme, dared
not face Eugene by himself in such a country, and began to retire.
The Tirolese at once rose on behalf of their much-loved master, and
Max Emanuel had to fight his way back to Bavaria as best he could. He
found Villars defending himself with difficulty against prince Louis of
Baden and Stirum. On the arrival of the elector before Augsburg, prince
Louis left Stirum and marched to Augsburg, hoping to raise the siege,
but Villars was too quick for him. Falling upon Stirum he defeated
him completely at Höchstadt on the 20th of September, and drove him
back on Nuremberg. Prince Louis had at once to retire to the lines of
Stolhofen, and Augsburg fell into the hands of the elector.
[Sidenote: =Dangerous position of the Emperor, 1704.=]
For the moment the Emperor was safe. The year was too far advanced to
permit of a combined movement upon Vienna. But it was clear to all
parties that the attempt would be made in the next campaign. It seemed
equally certain that if made it must succeed, unless Marlborough and
the army of the Netherlands could come to the rescue. Louis made great
preparations for the effort. Villars, whose arrogance was displeasing
to the elector, was recalled and sent to the Cevennes, where the
remnants of the Huguenots had risen under the name of the Camisards.
His place was taken by Marsin, and his army strongly reinforced. The
plan of campaign was simple. Marsin and the elector were to march
straight upon Vienna down the Danube, while Ragotsky attacked the city
from the side of Hungary. Tallard, at the head of 35,000 men, was
posted in Alsace to support the movement, preserve the communications,
and defend the army from any flank attack. Villeroy, with 30,000 men,
was sent to the Netherlands to keep Marlborough at bay and prevent him
from coming to the rescue. Against this overwhelming force Austria
could only oppose the armies of prince Louis of Baden, and prince
Eugene. If the Emperor was to be saved, it must be by Marlborough,
and how could Marlborough leave the Netherlands without throwing open
the United Provinces to invasion? Was it likely that the Dutch would
endanger their own safety for the sake of the Emperor? Even if they
did, was it possible to escape the combined attack of the armies of
Tallard and Marsin and the elector when the Danube was reached?
[Sidenote: =Plan of Marlborough.=]
These were the questions to which Marlborough was preparing to give
an answer in the summer of 1704. He had conceived the brilliant plan
of moving the whole of his army, except the Dutch, from the field of
operations in the Netherlands to a totally new base upon the upper
Danube, and of crushing Marsin and the elector before Tallard could
come to their help from the Rhine, or Villeroy overtake him from the
Meuse. It was a scheme which was certain to fail except in the hands of
a consummate general, for it involved not merely a victory over equal
and possibly superior forces, but a long and extremely hazardous flank
march over difficult country, and a race against time. And that was not
all, for before he could even undertake it, he had to deceive the Dutch
and lull Villeroy into a false security. If the Dutch once suspected
that he was going to move his army away from the protection of their
frontier, they would impose an energetic and decided veto. If Villeroy
once divined that Marlborough was engaged in making a long march up
the Rhine, he could ruin the whole plan in a moment by a well-directed
flank attack. To surmount these difficulties, Marlborough, keeping
his real plan an absolute secret, let it be generally known that he
intended to try and turn the lines and fortresses of the Netherlands,
by advancing into France by way of the Moselle, and he publicly asked
for, and obtained, the permission of the Dutch to that scheme. This
enabled him to summon the Brandenburg contingent to the Rhine at
Mainz, and to move his own headquarters to Coblentz without incurring
suspicion, and to leave Overkirk with the Dutch army and the Dutch
deputies at Maestricht on his extreme right, to guard the line of the
Meuse should Villeroy advance on Amsterdam during his absence. The plan
succeeded admirably. Villeroy, completely deceived, took up a strong
position on the upper Moselle near Trier to resist the advance of the
allies, and waited in vain for the first signs of the invading army.
[Sidenote: =His flank march to the Danube.=] The Dutch left behind
at Maestricht could not interfere with Marlborough’s plans. All was
ready.[8] In June 1704 he threw off the mask, advanced up the Rhine by
forced marches to Mainz, then, picking up the Brandenburg contingent
as he went, he left the Rhine and directed his army straight upon the
upper Danube at Donauwörth. At Heilbronn he was joined by a German
force, and near Ulm by prince Eugene and prince Louis of Baden. It was
agreed that Eugene should return to Stolhofen to prevent Tallard, and
possibly Villeroy if he appeared upon the scene, from coming to the
assistance of the elector and Marsin before the allies could attack
them. Marlborough himself and prince Louis of Baden marched straight
against the elector, who had entrenched himself on the Schellenberg
near Donauwörth, carried the lines by assault on the 2d of July and
drove the elector back on Augsburg, thus thrusting themselves in
between the French and Vienna and completely protecting the latter city.
[Sidenote: =Difficulties of Marlborough.=]
So far the campaign had been brilliantly successful, but the most
difficult part was yet to come. Villeroy on discovering the trick
played upon him by Marlborough marched across Alsace and joined Tallard
before Stolhofen with 30,000 men. This enabled Tallard to leave prince
Eugene to the care of Villeroy, and to march to the assistance of
Marsin and the elector, whom he joined at Augsburg early in August.
Counting the army of Villeroy, the French and Bavarians far outnumbered
the allies. Marlborough himself was a long distance from his true
base of operations. He had no fortress or entrenched camps where he
could collect stores, establish his hospitals, or recruit his army.
It was essential to his safety to be able to strike hard and quick.
Fortunately for him the French played into his hands. Marsin and
Tallard were anxious to have the sole credit of crushing this impudent
Englishman. They would not wait for Villeroy. They would not hear of
Fabian tactics. They determined to destroy him at a blow, and marched
down the Danube to meet him. Prince Eugene, who had abandoned Stolhofen
in pursuit of Tallard, effected his junction with Marlborough near
Donauwörth on the 11th of August, and on the 13th the two armies found
themselves facing each other on the field of Blenheim.
[Sidenote: =The battle of Blenheim.=]
The French generals had taken up a defensive position at right angles
to the Danube, just behind the little stream of the Nebel. Tallard at
the head of the right wing occupied in force the village of Blenheim,
the left wing under Marsin and the elector the village of Lutzingen.
The centre was considered sufficiently protected from serious attack
by the stream of the Nebel and its adjacent marshes, and was weakly
held, chiefly by cavalry. The plan of battle which they had adopted,
clearly was to permit the allies to dash themselves in vain against
the strong positions of Blenheim and Lutzingen, and when they were
exhausted finally to overwhelm them by an advance from the two wings.
Marlborough on reconnoitring the ground saw at once that the weakness
of their position lay in the centre, and that the marshes were not so
impassable as they seemed. Accordingly he instructed prince Eugene to
direct a strong attack upon Marsin and the elector at Lutzingen, and
Cutts to do the same upon Tallard at Blenheim. Under cover of these
assaults he made his real attack on the centre. With some difficulty he
succeeded in crossing the marshes, then, thrusting himself in between
the two wings of the enemy he completely drove the Maison du Roi off
the ground and cut the French line in two. Then turning to the left
he hemmed Tallard in at Blenheim between his army and the Danube, and
forced him to surrender with all his infantry. Marsin and the elector
finding their centre and right wing annihilated fled as best they could
through the Black Forest to Villeroy on the Rhine pursued by the fiery
Eugene. Never was defeat more complete As the sun set on the field of
Blenheim the glory of Louis XIV. departed.
[Sidenote: =Its results.=]
No one can wonder at the outburst of joy which thrilled through England
and Europe at the news of the battle of Blenheim. It was felt to be
decisive of the main issues of the war. France had other armies in
the field and could raise new troops, but she could never replace the
loss of her veterans. She could not again tyrannise over Europe. She
might win victories, she might defend her frontiers, she might emerge
honourably from the contest, but she could no more hope to dictate
terms to Europe after Blenheim, than she could a century later after
the retreat from Moscow. But Blenheim had not only put a bridle in the
mouth of Louis XIV., it had not only destroyed his veteran
army, it had not only saved the Emperor from absolute ruin, it had
unexpectedly brought to light a new and most important factor among
the decisive forces of Europe. The English sailor had been recognised
as a formidable power since the days of the Armada, but the English
soldier had not had an opportunity of proving his real worth since the
fight of Agincourt. Blenheim was as important an event in the history
of civilised warfare as Rocroy, not because it gave the death-blow to
an antiquated system of tactics, but because it was the birthplace of
a new military power of the first class. From Blenheim to Waterloo the
English soldier stands out as the best fighting material in Europe, and
England takes her place among the first military nations of the world.
[Sidenote: =The English gain the mastery in the Mediterranean,
1702–1704.=]
While France was losing her military prestige and superiority at
Blenheim she received a humiliating reminder of her inferiority at
sea. In 1702 a combined fleet of English and Dutch ships was sent
under the command of Sir George Rooke to the coast of Spain, which by
a stroke of good luck fell in with the Spanish plate fleet and the
French ships which were protecting it in the harbour of Vigo, and
after a spirited action completely destroyed them both. Two years
afterwards, in the summer of 1704, Rooke captured the impregnable
rock of Gibraltar, and defeated the French fleet which attempted its
recovery. This gave England an important position in the Mediterranean,
the value of which made itself gradually recognised as the century
wore on, and established the superiority of the allies at sea, the
effect of which soon resulted in the loss of Italy to the French power.
Directly north Italy fell into the hands of the imperialists, as it did
after the brilliant campaign of prince Eugene in Italy in 1706, there
was no means of keeping up communications between Naples and France.
Consequently after the victory of prince Eugene at Turin in 1706 had
finally driven the French back behind their own frontier, a revolution
broke out at Naples which ended in the total loss of Italy to the
French cause.
After the battle of Blenheim the French armies were obliged to act upon
the defensive, and the interest of the war turned once more to the
Netherlands. In 1705 Marlborough took up in earnest the plan with which
he had deceived Villeroy and the Dutch the year before. [Sidenote:
=Death of the Emperor Leopold, 1705.=] He arranged with Prince
Louis of Baden (for Eugene had returned to his command in Italy), a
combined attack upon France by the Moselle and the Saar, in order to
turn the defensive fortresses of the Netherlands. But time slipped
away, and the allies had not completed their preparations, when in May
1705 the Emperor Leopold died, and the imperial troops were summoned
home. All hope of a combined movement had to be abandoned. At the
same time Villeroy, who commanded upon the Meuse, moved forward and
threatened Liége. [Sidenote: =Marlborough forces the lines of the
Mehaigne, 1705.=] Marlborough at once left the Moselle and marched
to relieve Liége, and Villeroy retired into the fortified lines of
the Mehaigne between Antwerp and Namur, just as Boufflers had done in
1703. But by this time the Dutch had learned to have somewhat more
confidence in Marlborough’s skill, and he was permitted to attack.
Making a feint at the two extremities of the lines he easily forced
them in the centre at Tirlemont, and drove Villeroy back on Louvain and
Brussels, thus cutting him off from Namur and his direct communications
with France. The marshal took up a position behind the Dyle, which
the Dutch thought too strong to be safely attacked in front, and
Marlborough moved to the west to turn it and threaten Brussels. To
save Brussels the French retired on the city, and stood at bay near
the forest of Soignes, on ground which in a little more than a hundred
years was to become celebrated for all time as the English position
at Waterloo. Marlborough in pursuit took up the ground afterwards
occupied by Napoleon and prepared to attack. But Dutch timidity stepped
in to prevent this most interesting rehearsal of the last tragedy of
the Napoleonic war with the parts reversed. Marlborough was forced to
retire when the prey was in his grasp. Deeply chagrined he contemplated
leaving the struggle in the Netherlands to the Dutch, and combining
his forces with those of the gallant Eugene in Italy, but this was not
permitted. He could not be spared as long as Villeroy was unhurt on the
Dyle, and Villars held his own upon the Rhine. [Sidenote: =Campaign
of 1706.=] So in the spring of 1706 he again took command of the
army of Flanders and prepared to bring Villeroy to book. That incapable
and boastful general was equally anxious to cross swords with the hero
of Blenheim. Refusing to wait for the arrival of a reinforcement of
15,000 men under Marsin, who were on their way, he left the line of the
Dyle in the spring, and marched towards Namur. On his way Marlborough
met him at Ramillies on 23d of May.
[Sidenote: =Battle of Ramillies.=]
Villeroy had chosen his ground with some skill. His right occupied
the village of Tavières, which stood on a slight eminence above the
Mehaigne, and was protected by that stream. His centre rested upon
the village of Ramillies, which, with the mound called the tumulus
of Ottomond behind it, formed the key of the position. His left was
defended by the marshes in which the stream of the little Gheet rises.
The bulk of his troops were massed at Tavières and Ramillies, and
his left being so well defended by the nature of the ground was very
weakly held. The quick eye of Marlborough soon detected this defect.
He saw too that owing to the nature of the ground within his own
position he could move troops from his own right to his centre without
being observed by the enemy. On these two facts he based his plan of
battle. Early in the morning of the 23d of May he directed a strong
and imposing attack against the French left. Villeroy thinking that he
was going to force his way over the marshes of the little Gheet, as
he had forced his way over the marshes of the Nebel, began to hurry
up troops from his centre in hot haste to defend his threatened left.
Directly Marlborough saw this movement, he marched the bulk of his
troops from his right to his centre under cover of the ground, so that
the operation could not be seen by the enemy, merely leaving enough men
before the French left to keep Villeroy persuaded that the main attack
was still being made in that quarter. When all was prepared he suddenly
launched the bulk of his army upon the weakened French centre between
Tavières and Ramillies. Tavières was carried by the impetuous rush
but the battle was not yet won. The Maison du Roi, mindful of their
old fame, and burning to avenge the disgrace of Blenheim, checked the
advance of the allies upon Ramillies by repeated and heroic charges.
The French infantry hurried back to their old posts from the left, and
round the village of Ramillies the battle swayed backwards and forwards
for some time. At last the French fell slowly back, the village was
won, and the centre of the French position forced. Villeroy gave the
signal for a retreat which quickly changed into a rout. His army was
destroyed as a fighting force. In rapid succession the chief towns of
the Netherlands opened their gates to the victorious allies, and the
French were driven back to the line of the frontier fortresses.
[Sidenote: =Expedition of the Archduke Charles to Spain.=]
The battle of Turin and the battle of Ramillies had reduced France to
the line of her frontiers, but in the next year a gleam of success
visited the arms of her indefatigable master. Marlborough was too
much occupied with the negotiations at Altranstädt and hampered by the
badness of the weather to attempt anything of importance, while on
the Rhine Villars succeeded in capturing the lines of Stolhofen and
preventing the imperialists from moving. But the best news came from
Spain. In the year 1703 through the exertions of Methuen, the English
ambassador at Lisbon, a treaty had been negotiated between England and
Portugal, which had the effect of making Portugal the devoted political
adherent of England for more than a century, and of introducing
English statesmen to the too seductive influences of port wine. By the
accession of Portugal to the Grand Alliance an opening was made for the
archduke Charles to make good his claims to his kingdom. In 1704 he
landed at Lisbon with a force of 12,000 English and Dutch troops under
Schomberg with the object of invading Spain. The expedition met with
little success and Galway replaced Schomberg in 1705. In the same year
the English ministry sent the earl of Peterborough at the head of 5000
men to the assistance of the duke of Savoy, but gave him permission to
employ himself in Spain if he found an opportunity. Peterborough, who
was a man of brilliant imagination and boastful temperament, induced
the archduke to trust himself to his guidance. Sailing round the coast
of Spain he landed in Catalonia, captured Barcelona, chiefly through
the efforts of prince George of Darmstadt in October 1705, and quickly
made himself master of Arragon.
[Sidenote: =His power limited to Catalonia.=]
In the following year Galway determined to support the success achieved
in Arragon by marching upon Madrid from Portugal. The French armies
were engaged in a fruitless siege of Barcelona, and Galway occupied
Madrid and proclaimed the archduke Charles as king almost without
opposition. But now the political wisdom of the determination of Louis
not to force a foreign king upon the Spaniards against their will
showed itself. A national opposition to Charles quickly grew up in
1706, just as it did a century later to Joseph Buonaparte. Wherever the
English soldiers were quartered, all was submission. Directly their
backs were turned all was opposition. To make things worse disease
broke out among the troops, and Galway found it necessary to retire
from Madrid and join Charles and Peterborough in Arragon. In the next
year he determined to repeat the attempt, and leaving Charles at
Barcelona sailed down to Valencia, and marched from there on Madrid. At
Almanza he was met by Berwick, who had lately been strongly reinforced
from the army of Italy, and was completely crushed. Valencia and
Arragon were lost, and the power of Charles limited to the turbulent
province of Catalonia. From that time the allies ceased for some years
to make any serious efforts to oust Philip V. by force from
the throne of Spain. Galway was recalled and Stanhope appointed in his
place, but with the exception of the capture of Port Mahon in Minorca
in 1708 he was unable to achieve anything of importance. Having failed
in open warfare the allies found diplomacy a better weapon with which
to effect the retirement of Philip V.
[Sidenote: =Great efforts of Louis in 1708.=]
The security of Spain and the defeat of the imperialists on the Rhine
in 1707 nerved Louis to make a great effort in 1708 to recover the
ground which he had lost. He fitted out a fleet to land the Chevalier
in Scotland and take advantage of the hostility felt to the Act of
Union with England, which had been lately passed. He placed one army
under Berwick on the Moselle to watch Eugene and the imperialists,
while the main force under Vendôme advanced and occupied almost
without opposition the great towns of Ghent and Bruges in Flanders,
and established itself behind the Scheldt, prepared to move forward
when Berwick was ready to co-operate. In July, finding Marlborough
still inactive, Vendôme advanced his right wing as far as Mons, and
laid siege to Oudenarde in the centre, thus spreading himself out
in an extended line over the whole country between Mons and Bruges.
Marlborough saw his opportunity. Sending in haste to Eugene to join
him with his cavalry he struck sharply at the centre of the French
position. Vendôme at once perceived his mistake and concentrated his
army on Oudenarde by a hurried retreat. Marlborough and Eugene followed
him with all speed, pushed his rear guard over the Scheldt, and finally
forced it to turn and give battle a few miles from Oudenarde on the
left bank of the river. The battle did not begin till three o’clock
in the afternoon. It was a soldiers’ fight. Each regiment as it came
up took ground as it best could and engaged. But the allies had the
advantage of a single command. [Sidenote: =The battle of Oudenarde,
1708.=] The French generals Vendôme and the duke of Burgundy in the
excitement and hurry of a disorganised melée gave contradictory orders,
and made confusion worse confounded. Eventually Marlborough succeeded
in outnumbering the French right, turning it and driving it off the
field. That operation put an end to the battle. The French retired on
Ghent. Marlborough had succeeded in interposing his army between the
French and the frontier. Nothing stood between him and Paris except the
great fortresses of the frontier, of which Lille was the greatest. It
is said that he wished to neglect that fortress altogether and march
straight upon Paris, but the scheme was too bold even for Eugene,
considering that Boufflers held the place with 15,000 men and Berwick
was at Mons with 30,000. In August the siege was begun. Eugene took
charge of the trenches, while Marlborough, posted between the Lys and
the Scheldt, protected the convoys coming from Ostend, and prevented
Berwick or Vendôme from marching to the assistance of the doomed
city. Neither dared to attempt a rescue. [Sidenote: =Capture of
Lille.=] They contented themselves with trying to cut off convoys.
After an attempt of this sort had been entirely defeated at Wynendaal
on September 27th, more by the valour of General Webb than by the skill
of Marlborough, Lille could hold out no longer. On the 22nd of October
the city surrendered. Vendôme made his way safely to Mons, which with
Namur now remained the only great fortress in the hands of France.
Paris lay open to the advance of the allies.
[Sidenote: =Unpopularity of the war in England.=]
But just in proportion as the opportunities for a brilliant and
decisive campaign were opening out to the allies their ability to take
advantage of them was diminishing. In England the strain of the long
war was making itself felt in spite of the accessions to her colonies
and trade which her supremacy over the sea was daily making. Tory
feeling reasserted itself directly the danger to European liberty and
English commerce passed away after the battle of Blenheim. No one in
England cared one straw whether Bourbon or Habsburg sat on the throne
of Spain, as long as the free and peaceful development of Europe and
England went quietly on. Within the precincts of the court itself a
revolution was in progress, and every courtier knew that the ascendency
of the duchess of Marlborough over the mind of Anne was a thing of the
past. In this state of affairs Marlborough did not dare to run the
risk of a doubtful campaign. In the field he restricted himself to the
commonplace. In the cabinet he professed himself willing to listen to
suggestions of peace. [Sidenote: =Exhaustion of France.=] Louis
was overjoyed at the news. France was in a state of extreme exhaustion.
Her veteran armies were destroyed, her magazines empty, her generals
discredited. The taxes had reached a point beyond which taxation could
no further go. Offices were created by the hundred to be sold for what
they would fetch. Loans could be raised no longer. The capitation tax
was made permanent, and even births, marriages and deaths were obliged
to contribute to the revenue. To make the misery still more intolerable
the terribly severe winter of 1708–9 destroyed the fruit-trees and the
vines, and brought the horrors of famine into the fairest districts
of France. Early in 1709 negotiations were begun at the Hague, but it
soon appeared that the allies were determined not merely to humiliate
Louis but to disgrace him. They demanded as a condition precedent to
entering on negotiations for a final treaty of peace, that Louis was
to surrender Mons and Namur, evacuate Alsace including Strasburg, and
force his grandson Philip V. to retire from Spain. [Sidenote:
=Appeal of Louis to France against the demands of the allies.=]
The obligation to make war upon his own grandson in the interests of
the enemy was more than Louis, dispirited as he was, could with honour
accept. He determined to appeal to French patriotism against terms so
cruelly unjust. France responded nobly to his call. Men volunteered
everywhere to protect the sacred soil of France from the invader.
Nobles sent their plate, ladies their jewels, and the peasants their
hoarded sous to organise a national army. Never was Louis more truly
king and leader of his people than when in the days of his humiliation
he sent the last army of France to the front in 1709.
[Sidenote: =Battle of Malplaquet, 1709.=]
Villars was selected as the general to be intrusted with the last hopes
of France. He proved himself equal to the responsibility. Carefully
entrenching himself in strong positions, while he trained his recruits
and collected supplies, he trusted to the great ally Time whom he
knew could not fail him. At last as the summer grew on Marlborough
and Eugene, not daring to attack him in his camp near Lens, marched
upon Mons, and Villars was forced to advance in order to relieve it.
He took up an almost impregnable position at Malplaquet, resting his
two flanks on wooded heights, and holding the gap in the middle, which
he had strongly entrenched, with his main force. There he awaited the
onslaught of the allies. There was nothing for it but a front attack.
The position, if taken at all, must be taken by a direct assault. On
the 11th of September Marlborough and Eugene hurled their troops up
the gap. It was not a battle, it was a carnage. Fighting desperately
hand-to-hand, the victors of Blenheim and Ramillies at last forced the
position. Villars himself was wounded, but Boufflers who succeeded to
the command effected his retreat in good order. Mons remained the prize
of the conquerors.
The battle of Malplaquet was more honourable to the vanquished than to
the victors. It did not even re-establish Marlborough’s influence in
England. In the year in which it was fought the duchess was dismissed
from her court appointments. [Sidenote: =Dismissal of Marlborough,
1711.=] In the following year a definitely Tory and peace ministry
was formed under Harley. It was obvious that the dismissal of
Marlborough was only a question of time. Determined to run no risk,
he contented himself with forcing Villars slowly back into France. At
the beginning of 1711 he learned that the ministry had secretly opened
negotiations for peace, and he proceeded methodically to drive Villars
back from one position to another while awaiting the final blow.
Political necessities had entirely superseded military opportunities.
At last the blow fell. On December 31st, 1711, he was dismissed from a
command which had long ceased to be a reality.
[Sidenote: =Defeat of the allies in Spain, 1710.=]
Meanwhile in Spain the necessities of Louis actually strengthened the
position of Philip V. In 1709 all the French troops were
withdrawn to defend their own frontiers. Stanhope and Stahremberg, who
commanded the imperialists, accordingly advanced against Philip in
1710, drove him first out of Arragon, then almost out of Castile to
Valladolid, and occupied Madrid. The result was a national movement of
the Spaniards in favour of their king. Louis allowed Vendôme to take
command of the Spanish army. The allies found it impossible to maintain
themselves at Madrid, and retreated in two divisions upon Arragon.
Vendôme manœuvring with great skill forced himself between them,
surrounded Stanhope at Brihuega and obliged him to capitulate, then
throwing himself on Stahremberg, routed him at Villa Viciosa, and drove
him back to Barcelona. Again the Spaniards had emphatically pronounced
their determination that Philip, and none but Philip, should reign over
them.
In spite of this the allies were still endeavouring to compel Louis
to make war upon his grandson. In the winter of 1709–10 negotiations
were resumed at Gertruydenberg. [Sidenote: =Negotiations of
Gertruydenberg.=] Louis consented to surrender Alsace, and offered
not only to recognise the archduke Charles as king, but to forbid his
subjects to serve in Spain, and even to provide supplies for the allied
armies in Spain. But the allies were determined to put Louis openly to
shame before the face of Europe, and insisted that he should force his
grandson to resign the crown. Again the negotiations fell through. They
were not renewed. Directly a Tory ministry came into power they opened
private communications with Louis without taking their allies into
their confidence. [Sidenote: =The treaty of Utrecht, 1713.=] By
September 1711 an agreement was arrived at between France and England
alone, and preliminaries of peace settled. These were then communicated
to the Dutch and the other allies, and were accepted with some protests
by all except the Emperor. In accordance with the preliminaries a
congress was held at Utrecht in 1712, and the final peace drawn up
there and signed in 1713.
[Sidenote: =The war continued by the Emperor.=]
The Emperor still stubbornly refused to yield. In 1711, that terrible
year of mortality among princely houses, Joseph I. had died,
and the archduke Charles was now Emperor. His pride would not suffer
him to surrender the crown of Spain to his rival, and Eugene was
instructed to push on military operations in spite of the defection of
the English. Without the aid of Marlborough even Eugene was powerless
against the patriotism of France. Beaten at the bridge of Denain by
Villars in 1712, he was driven back to the frontier of the Netherlands,
and had in consequence of the conclusion of the peace to transfer
his army to the upper Rhine. [Sidenote: =Treaties of Rastadt and
Baden.=] But misfortune pursued him there. In 1713 Villars burst
into Alsace, crossed the Rhine at Strasburg, forced Eugene from his
entrenched camp at Freiburg, and obliged the Emperor at last to consent
to make peace. The definitive treaties were eventually signed at
Rastadt and Baden in 1714.
[Sidenote: =Terms of the Peace of Utrecht.=]
By the treaties of Utrecht, Rastadt, and Baden, generally grouped
together under the name of the Peace of Utrecht, the following
arrangements were effected.
(1) Philip V. was recognised as King of Spain and the Indies,
on the condition that the crowns of France and Spain should never be
united on the same head.
(2) Naples, the Milanese, Sardinia, and the Netherlands were given
to the Emperor, subject to the right of the Dutch to the military
government of Furnes, Ypres, Menin, Ghent, Tournai, Mons, Charleroi
and Namur as their barrier against France.
(3) France was permitted to retain Alsace including Strasburg, as
she had been by the peace of Ryswick, but she had to surrender the
fortresses of Kehl, Breisach, and Freiburg, which she had seized on
the right bank of the Rhine.
(4) The electors of Köln and Bavaria were restored, the succession
of the House of Hanover in England acknowledged, and the Chevalier
banished from France.
(5) England received Gibraltar, Minorca, Newfoundland (subject to
certain rights of fishing on the banks), Hudson’s Bay, Acadia, and S.
Kitts, and acquired by an assiento, or agreement, with Spain the right
to trade under strict limitations with certain towns in Spanish waters
set apart for the purpose.
(6) The kingdom of Prussia was recognised and received upper
Guelderland.
(7) Sicily and part of the Milanese were given to the duke of Savoy,
and the fortifications of Dunkirk were agreed to be demolished.
[Sidenote: =The peace justly liable to censure.=]
The peace of Utrecht has been denounced perhaps with greater fervour
than any of the great settlements of European affairs, except the
treaty of Vienna in 1815. But in these denunciations attention has
usually been directed more to the particular interests of nations and
parties than to the general welfare of Europe. From this circumscribed
point of view much may be said against the treaty itself, and still
more against the means which were taken to bring it about. To institute
secret negotiations for a private peace, behind the back of her
own allies, was a proceeding most unworthy of England. To leave the
Catalans, and the Cevennois, entirely without protection, to the tender
mercies of Philip and Louis, after they had been induced to rise
against their rulers by the promises and assistance of the allies, was
both a crime and a blunder. Who could trust to English faith again?
To permit Philip to retain the crown of Spain, and France to keep
Alsace, to the detriment of the House of Habsburg, was unfair to the
one power which had consistently opposed the supremacy of France,
and unfaithful to the pledges of the Grand Alliance. All this is to
a certain extent true. [Sidenote: =Yet a recognition of existing
fact.=] After the concessions made by Louis at the Hague and
Gertruydenberg, there is no doubt that he would eventually have signed
a treaty much more favourable to the Emperor and his supporters than
the peace actually made, rather than run the risk of continuing the
war. It may be admitted that the Tory ministry made peace as quickly as
they could, without much consideration for anybody except themselves,
in order to be free from foreign complications when the crisis of the
succession should occur at home. Yet from the larger point of view of
the welfare of Europe, the peace of Utrecht, like its predecessor the
peace of Westphalia, mainly registered and sanctioned accomplished
facts. Substantially it ordered Europe for the future on the basis of
development at which it had then arrived.
Since the last great settlement of the affairs of Europe three great
changes had occurred in European politics.
[Sidenote: =1. It recognised the due position of France.=]
(1) France had acquired beyond all question the position of the leading
nation of Europe, and that, not merely through the extension of her
frontiers, the splendour of her court, or the ambition of her king;
but through the energy and ability of her people, the richness of her
soil, and the advantages of her geographical position. A settlement of
Europe, which ignored this fact, could not stand for ten years, and
the allies showed their wisdom in permitting France to retain the
position which she had legitimately won, and guarding against her abuse
of it by forming states on her frontiers, powerful enough to keep her
in check. Events proved that they were right. Austria and the Dutch
in combination on the dangerous northern frontier, Prussia and the
Empire to the east, Savoy to the south-east, with Austria in reserve in
Italy, were as a matter of fact found strong enough to deal with France
in the eighteenth century; and it was not until the balance of power
and the European states system were alike swept away by the militant
democracy of the Revolution, that France became once more a menace to
the liberties of Europe.
[Sidenote: =2. The commercial and maritime supremacy of England.=]
(2) England had launched herself on that career of colonial and
commercial ascendency which has made her the most prosperous country
in the world. She was learning to found her colonial empire more upon
the conquests of colonies, which France could not support, than upon
the efforts of her own children. Her acknowledged superiority at sea,
dating from the battle of La Hogue, emphasised by the battle of Vigo,
and the capture of Gibraltar and Minorca, might from time to time be
questioned by France and Spain, it could never be overthrown, and
it brought naturally with it the acquisition of French colonies and
Spanish trade privileges. The assiento was the thin end of the wedge
by which England soon obtained the lion’s share of the lucrative
and nefarious slave-trade. The cessions in north America were the
beginning of her hold over the vast stretches of land to the north of
her plantations, which were to be reduced wholly under her rule during
the eighteenth century, and are now known as the Dominion of Canada,
and the colony of British Columbia. In securing to England power and
privileges, which she alone, owing to her maritime supremacy could
properly use, the peace not only helped her forward on her true line of
national development, but contributed in no slight degree to add to the
resources and prosperity of the world at large.
[Sidenote: =3. It established European safe-guards against
France.=]
(3) The dismemberment of the Empire, which had been recognised and
made permanent by the peace of Westphalia, had finally removed the
last vestiges of national feeling and national policy in Germany.
The smaller German states grouped themselves for purposes of offence
or defence naturally around the larger powers of the north and
south,--Prussia and Austria. The barrier to French aggression on the
Rhine had therefore to be sought, not in bolstering up an effete
institution like the Empire, out of which vitality had long ago
departed, but in strengthening and utilising the national forces of
the two leading powers. The peace of Utrecht adopted this policy as
far as was at that time possible. It planted Prussia as a sentinel
over against France on the lower Rhine, and added to her possessions
in that quarter as well as to her general dignity, in order to make
her discharge her duties with the greater zeal. The subsequent history
of Europe is one long commentary on the wisdom of this policy. Austria
required no incentive to fulfil a similar task in the upper Rhine and
in Italy, but she was sadly deficient in the necessary resources. In
the last war the gold of England and the armies of England alone had
saved her from irretrievable ruin. By giving over to her the richest
part of Italy, and defending her from French attack by the buffer
state of Savoy, the peace did all that was possible to strengthen
the defences of Europe against a renewal of French tyranny, while
ministering to the dynastic ambition of the House of Habsburg.
[Sidenote: =Advantages gained by the peace.=]
If Europe had no just reason to find fault with the peace of Utrecht
from the point of view of her larger interests, neither could the
nations themselves complain that their individual aspirations had
been unduly neglected. In the Austrian Netherlands, in spite of the
grotesque device of the barrier fortresses, the United Provinces gained
a protection against the aggression of France and the rivalry of
Antwerp, not less efficient than the Spanish Netherlands had proved to
be. By the partial opening of the Spanish trade, and the establishment
of a colonial empire by England, the maritime nations obtained the
extension of their commerce, which was one of the principal objects
which they hoped to gain by taking up arms. Portugal regained its
independence and opened up through the Methuen treaty an important and
lucrative trade with England. Savoy retained its political importance
as a buffer state, and was encouraged to make itself more definitely an
Italian power. Prussia was received into the brotherhood of independent
monarchies. Even Spain, though she lost the integrity of her empire,
was able to retain the king of her own choice. It is here that the
provisions of the peace have been most violently assailed, but with
little justice. The war of the Spanish Succession was fought, say the
critics of the peace, to prevent the House of Bourbon from ascending
the throne of Spain, and after eleven years of terrible bloodshed the
peace of Utrecht sanctioned the very connection between the two crowns
of France and Spain, which the Grand Alliance was formed to render
impossible. The family compacts of the eighteenth century are adduced
to show the evil effects of such a policy. It may be frankly admitted
that the relations between the houses of Habsburg and Bourbon were the
least satisfactory parts of the settlements effected at Utrecht, and
for the simple reason that they were the most difficult satisfactorily
to settle. It might have been possible to impose the archduke Charles
upon the Spanish people under the Partition Treaty or at the beginning
of the war. It had become impossible in 1712, when the Spaniards
themselves had driven him out without French assistance. It was wholly
out of the question when after the death of his brother Joseph he had
become Emperor. Philip V. was left on the throne of Spain because there
was no one else who could be put there. Events soon proved that Austria
could not even hold Naples and Sicily against Spain, much less could
she conquer her. The weak point in the peace of Utrecht, the danger
to Europe from the family compacts, much exaggerated as it has been,
came from a cause over which the negotiations of the peace could have
no control whatever--the inherent weakness of the House of Habsburg.
The danger to Europe from the family compacts lay not in the fact
that France and Spain were intrinsically so much more powerful than
Austria, the Milanese and Naples, but in the far greater ability to use
their opportunities which distinguished the House of Bourbon and their
political advisers.
[Sidenote: =It is the end of the seventeenth century.=]
The seventeenth century ends properly speaking with the peace of
Utrecht. The earnestness and the ambitions to which it had given birth
found in that peace either their accomplishment or their burial-place.
The attempt of France to establish a dictatorship over Europe,
which has formed the dramatic interest of the century, has failed.
France remains but one, and not always the chief, of the nations of
Europe. The determination of England on the contrary to attain the
commercial leadership of the world, the effort made by Prussia to
obtain leadership in Germany, of Austria to obtain command of the left
bank of the Danube, and a footing in Italy, have been crowned with
success. By the treaties of Passarovitch and Nystädt, which were to
follow the peace of Utrecht, as the treaties of Oliva and the Pyrenees
followed the peace of Westphalia, Sweden and Poland have to give way to
Russia and Prussia in the north, while Turkey stands face to face with
Russia on the Pruth and the Black Sea. In the peace of Westphalia the
religious rivalries of the century found their appropriate solution.
In the treaties of Utrecht and Nystädt the political questions of the
century received their appropriate answer. The rivalry between the
House of Bourbon and the House of Habsburg for the Rhine was over.
The aggrandisement of Prussia, the rise of Russia, the development
of England, the failure of Sweden, the decline of the Ottoman Turks,
were accomplished facts, recognised and dealt with by the treaties.
In the future the great political questions of Europe take a somewhat
different form. As the power of the Austro-Spanish house is finally
broken at Utrecht, the Franco-German question begins to take the place
of the Franco-Imperial question. As Russia advances to the Pruth, and
the Turks retire behind the Danube the Eastern Question takes its rise.
As English traders press into every part of the world the old rivalry
between France and England breaks out again and again in another
‘hundred years war.’ But these are the problems of the years which
are to come, and as they appear upon the scene the questions of the
seventeenth century which have given birth to them pass into history.
[Sidenote: =The last years of Louis XIV.=]
Two years were still to drag their weary length along before the
greatest figure of the seventeenth century passed away from the
struggles and the disappointments of life. They were years of domestic
misfortune and public gloom. In the fatal year 1711 the Dauphin and
his eldest son, the duke of Burgundy, the much-loved pupil of Fénélon,
were carried off by the smallpox. The heir of France was the baby duke
of Anjou, and the only legitimate member of the royal family capable
of acting as regent was the libertine and atheist Philip of Orléans.
As Louis XIV. looked into the future he could see nothing but what
he most dreaded for France. As he turned his eyes to the present the
picture was one of sombre misery unrelieved. In his despair of being
able to make public affairs better, Louis turned in the closing years
of his life with almost feverish excitement to the task of atoning for
his sins. Urged on by Madame de Maintenon he determined to root out
heresy from his dominions while still it was possible. He attacked
the Jansenists, procured their condemnation by Pope Clement XI., and
destroyed Port Royal, the home of the keenest intellects and perhaps
the noblest lives in France. [Sidenote: =His death, 1715.=] In the
middle of this strife of mistaken duty his own call came, and on the
15th of September 1715 the great king breathed his last, leaving a
weakly child of five the inheritor of his power. It was a sad and
pathetic ending to a career often mistaken, but never ignoble. The sun
set indeed amid dark and murky clouds. Yet on the page of history he
shines out in clear predominance over all contemporary sovereigns, and
of him it may be said, with more truth than of most kings or statesmen,
that during a reign extending over more than half a century the motive
and inspiration of his every thought and plan was the glory and welfare
of his country.
APPENDIX I.
+------+------------------+------------+---------------+------------+---------------+
| | England. | France. | The Empire. | Spain. | The Papacy. |
+------+------------------+------------+---------------+------------+---------------+
|1598. |Elizabeth. |Henry IV. |Rudolf II. |Philip III. |Clement VIII. |
|1603. |James I. | | | | |
|1604. | | | | | |
|1605. | | | | |Paul V. |
|1608. | | | | | |
|1610. | |Louis XIII. | | | |
|1611. | | | | | |
|1612. | | |Matthias. | | |
|1617. | | | | | |
|1618. | | | | | |
|1619. | | |Ferdinand II. | | |
|1621. | | | |Philip IV. |Gregory XV. |
|1622. | | | | | |
|1623. | | | | | |
|1624. | | | | |Urban VIII. |
|1625. |Charles I. | | | | |
|1632. | | | | | |
|1637. | | |Ferdinand III. | | |
|1640. | | | | | |
|1643. | |Louis XIV. | | | |
| | | d. 1715.· | | | |
|1644. | | | | |Innocent X. |
|1645. | | | | | |
|1648. | | | | | |
|1649. |The Commonwealth. | | | | |
|1654. | | | | | |
|1655. | | | | |Alexander VII. |
|1658. | | |Leopold I. | | |
|1660. |Charles II. | | | | |
|1665. | | | |Charles II. | |
|1667. | | | | |Clement IX. |
|1670. | | | | |Clement X. |
|1676. | | | | |Innocent XI. |
|1682. | | | | | |
|1685. |James II. | | | | |
|1687. | | | | | |
|1688. |William III. | | | | |
|1689. | | | | |Alexander VII. |
|1691. | | | | |Innocent XII. |
|1695. | | | | | |
|1697. | | | | | |
|1699. | | | | | |
|1700. | | | |Philip V. |Clement XI. |
| | | | | d. 1746.· | d. 1724. |
|1702. |Anne. | | | | |
|1703. | | | | | |
|1705. | | |Joseph I. | | |
|1711. | | |Charles VI. | | |
| | | | d. 1742. | | |
|1713. | | | | | |
|1714. |George I. | | | | |
| | d. 1727. | | | | |
-------------------+------------------+-----------------+--------------+--------------+------
Brandenburg. | Sweden. | Russia. | Turkey. | Denmark. |
-------------------+------------------+-----------------+--------------+--------------+------
Joachim Frederick. |Sigismond of |Boris Godunoff. | Mohammed III.|Christian IV. | 1598.
| Poland. | | | |
| | | Achmet. | | 1603.
|Charles IX. | | | | 1604.
| |The Troublous | | | 1605.
| | Times. | | |
John Sigismund. | | | | | 1608.
| | | | | 1610.
|Gustavus Adolphus.| | | | 1611.
| |Michael Romanoff.| | | 1612.
| | | Mustapha I. | | 1617.
| | | Osman II. | | 1618.
George William. | | | | | 1619.
| | | | | 1621.
| | | Mustapha I. | | 1622.
| | | (restored). | |
| | | Murad IV. | | 1623.
| | | | | 1624.
| | | | | 1625.
|Christina. | | | | 1632.
| | | | | 1637.
Frederick William. | | | Ibrahim. | | 1640.
| | | | | 1643.
| | | | |
| | | | | 1644.
| |Alexis. | | | 1645.
| | | Mohammed IV. |Frederick III.| 1648.
| | | | | 1649
|Charles X. | | | | 1654.
| | | | | 1655.
| | | | | 1658.
|Charles XI. | | | | 1660.
| | | | | 1665.
| | | | | 1667.
| | | |Christian V. | 1670.
| |Theodore. | | | 1676.
| |Peter and Ivan | | | 1682.
| | | | | 1685.
| | | Suleiman II. | | 1687.
Frederick III. | | | | | 1688.
| |Peter the Great. | | | 1689.
| | d. 1724. | | |
| | | Achmet II. | | 1691.
| | | Mustapha II. | | 1695.
|Charles XII. | | | | 1697.
| d. 1720. | | | |
| | | |Frederick IV. | 1699.
| | | | d. 1730. |
| | | | | 1700.
| | | | |
| | | | | 1702.
| | | Achmet III. | | 1703.
| | | deposed 1727.| |
| | | | | 1705.
| | | | | 1711.
| | | | |
Frederick William. | | | | | 1713.
d. 1740. | | | | |
| | | | | 1714.
APPENDIX II.
THE HOUSE OF BOURBON.
CHARLES OF BOURBON =
d. of Vendôme, |
1537. |
|
+----------------------------------------------------+-----------
|
Antony, = Jeanne d’Albert,
1562. | Q. of Navarre.
|
HENRY IV., = Marie de Medicis.
1610. |
|
+----------+------------+------------------------+--------------
| | | |
LOUIS XIII., = Anne of Elizabeth = PHILIP IV. Christina = Victor Amadeus
1643. | Austria. of Spain. of Savoy.
|
+-------------------------------+
| |
LOUIS XIV., = Maria Theresa, Philip of = Henrietta, d.
1715. | d. of PHILIP IV. Orleans, of CHARLES I.
| of Spain. 1701.
|
Louis the = Maria of
Dauphin. | Bavaria.
1711.
|
+-------------------------------+
| |
Louis, d. of = Marie of PHILIP V. of Spain,
Burgundy, | Savoy. d. of Anjou.
1712. |
|
|
|
LOUIS XV.
of France.
Continuation of family tree to the right of above.
Francoise of Alençon.
------+-------------------------------------------------------+
| |
Margaret = Francois, d. of Louis, Prince
| Nevers, 1562. of Condé,
| 1569.
Henrietta = Louis Gonzaga |
of Mantua. |
|
------+-----------------------------+ |
| | |
Gaston d. of = Marie of Henrietta = CHARLES I. |
Orleans, | Montpensier. Maria. of England. |
1660. | |
| |
Anne of Montpensier +----------------+
(La Grande Demoiselle), | |
1693. HENRY I. of Francois,
Condé, Prince of
1588. Conti, _ob._
| _s.p._ 1614.
HENRY II.
of Condé.
1646.
|
+---------------+---------------+
| | |
LOUIS II. Armand, Anne, d. of
the Great, Prince of Longueville,
1686. Conti, 1666. 1679.
| |
HENRY, |
1709. |
| |
LOUIS III. |
|
+-----------------+
| |
Louis Armand, Francois Louis,
1685. 1709.
APPENDIX III.
THE SUCCESSION TO CLEVES-JÜLICH.
William, = Maria, d. of Emperor
1592. | Ferdinand I.
|
+----------------------+------+------+-------------+
| | | |
| John William, | Magdalen = John, d. of
| 1609. | Zweibrücken.
| |
Mary Eleanor, = Albert, d. Anne, = Philip Lewis,
1608. | of Prussia, | of Neuburg,
| 1618. | 1614.
| |
+--------+--------------------------+ +------+
| | |
Anne = John Sigismond, Magdalen = John George |
| Elector of Elector of Saxony. |
| Brandenburg, |
| 1619. Wolfgang William = Magdalen, d. of
| 1653. | William, d. of
| | Bavaria.
| |
George William, Philip William,
of Brandenburg, Elector Palatine,
1640. 1685.
APPENDIX IV.
THE SPANISH SUCCESSION.
PHILIP III. = Margaret.
|
+-------------------------------+----+----------------------------+
| | |
LOUIS XIII., = Anne of Austria. | FERDINAND III., = Maria.
1643. | | |
| | |
| Elizabeth, = PHILIP IV., =========++ |
| d. of HENRY IV. | 1665. || |
| | || |
| +------------------+ || +-+------+
+---------+ | +----------------------+--|| | |
| | | | || | |
| | | | ++==Maria. Leopold I.
| | | |
| | Louise, = CHARLES II., = Marie |
| | of Orleans, 1700. of Neuburg. |
| | 1689. |
| | |
LOUIS XIV., = Maria Theresa. Margaret Theresa,=LEOPOLD I.,= Eleanor
1715. | | 1705. | of
| | | Neuburg.
| | |
| +--------+ +-----+--+
| | | |
Louis the Dauphin, Max Emanuel, = Maria Antonina. JOSEPH I., |
1711. of Bavaria. | 1711. |
| | |
| | CHARLES VI.,
| | archduke.
+--------------------+ +-----------+
| | |
Louis of Burgundy, PHILIP V., Joseph Ferdinand,
1711. d. of Anjou. Electoral Prince,
| 1699.
LOUIS XV.
INDEX
Accord, the, 64.
Adrian, patriarch of Moscow, 304.
Aides, the, in France, 21.
Aix-la-Chapelle, treaty of, 213.
Alais, peace of, 146.
Aldringer, 102.
Alexander VII. humiliated by Louis XIV., 208.
Alexis, Czar of Russia, 281, 299.
---- son of Peter the Great, 303.
Ali Cumurgi, recaptures the Morea, 288.
Alliance, the Grand, 340.
Almanza, battle of, 361.
Alte Veste, attack on the, 97.
Altranstädt, peace of, 306;
negotiations at, 360.
Amboyna, massacre of, 220.
Amsterdam, importance of, 219;
saved from William II., 224;
saved from the French, 238.
Ancre, marshal of, 33, 36.
Andrusoff, treaty of, 281.
Angoulême, treaty of, 36.
Anne of Austria, regent of France, 118, 154;
appoints Mazarin prime minister, 155;
clever management of the Fronde by, 163;
claim on the Spanish crown of, 314.
Antwerp, truce of, 65.
Apafy, prince of Transylvania, 284.
Assiento, the, 367.
Augsburg, the religious peace of, questions left unsettled by, 46;
the league of, 260.
Augustus the Strong, of Saxony and Poland, 306.
Aulic Council, the, 8.
Austria, the estates of, assist the Bohemians, 57.
Austro-Spanish house, rivalry of with France, 10, 25, 26.
Azof, capture of by Peter the Great, 288, 302;
given back to the Turks, 309.
Baden, treaty of, 367.
Baden-Durlach, margrave of, 49, 65.
Baner, 116.
Barbesieux, 264.
Barrier, the Dutch, question of, 210, 267.
Bärwalde, treaty of, 88, 113.
Bavaria, elector of. _See_ Maximilian, Max Emanuel.
---- electoral prince of. _See_ Joseph Ferdinand.
Beachy Head, battle off, 263.
Beaufort, duke of, 161.
Belgrade, capture of, 287.
Berg, duchy of, 28, 177;
ceded to the count of Neuberg, 51.
Berwick, Marquis of, 361.
Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar, takes the command at Lützen, 99;
demands a duchy, 100;
appointed general of the league of Heilbronn, 100;
defeated at Nördlingen, 103;
takes service under France, 114;
captures Breisach, 116;
death of, 116.
Bethlen Gabor assists the Bohemians, 58;
makes terms with Ferdinand II., 61;
assists Christian IV. of Denmark, 71;
makes the treaty of Pressburg, 72.
Biron, marshal, 24.
Blake, admiral, 228.
Blécourt, 330.
Blenau, battle of, 163.
Blenheim, battle of, 355.
Boguslav, duke of Pomerania, 88.
Bohemia, Ferdinand recognised king of, 52;
revolt of the Protestants of, 52;
supported by Savoy, 55;
by the Silesians and estates of Austria, 56, 57;
Frederick V. elected king of, 59;
the revolt of, crushed at the White Mountain, 63;
Protestantism suppressed in, 64.
Bohemian royal charter, the, 50.
Bordeaux, capture of, 162.
Bossuet, bishop of Meaux, 250, 255.
Boufflers, marshal, negotiates the treaty of Ryswick, 264;
strong position of, in the Netherlands, 349;
outwitted by Marlborough, 349;
defeats the Dutch, 350;
defends Lille, 362;
retreats from Malplaquet, 364.
Bouillon, duke of, 24, 37;
plots of against Richelieu, 152, 161.
Boyne, battle of the, 263.
Brandenburg, John Sigismond, elector of, 28;
acquires Cleves, Mark, and Ravensberg, 51.
---- George William, elector of, refuses to join Gustavus Adolphus, 88;
joins Saxony and the Swedes, 91;
rivalry of, with Sweden, 175.
---- Frederick William, the Great Elector, makes a treaty with the Swedes, 123;
gains of at the peace of Westphalia, 125;
character and policy of, 174;
state of the dominions of on his accession, 176;
establishes his authority, 179;
annexes east Pomerania, 180;
gives Charles X. a passage through Pomerania, 181;
intrigues against him, 181;
forced to acknowledge Swedish suzerainty, 182;
makes war with Sweden against Poland, 182;
obtains independence from Sweden at Labiau, 182;
makes war upon Sweden with Poland, 183;
obtains independence from Poland at Wehlau, 183;
joins the coalition against France, 239, 296;
is recognized in east Prussia, 293;
establishes personal rule in Prussia, 294;
his policy of centralization, 295;
wins the battle of Fehrbellin, 296;
accepts the treaty of S. Germain-en-Laye, 297.
---- Frederick III., elector of, reign of, 310;
recognised as king of Prussia, 310;
accepts the partition treaty, 328;
joins the Grand Alliance, 340.
Brandenburg, mark of, 176.
Breda, treaty of, 231.
Breisach, capture of, 116.
Breitenfeld, battle of, 91.
Bresse, duchy of, ceded to France, 27.
Brihuega, battle of, 365.
Brömsebro, treaty of, 169.
Broussel, arrest of, 158.
Buckingham, duke of, tries to relieve La Rochelle, 145.
Bucquoi, 53, 56, 57.
Buczacz, treaty of, 282.
Budweis, siege of, 56.
Bugey, duchy of, ceded to France, 27.
Burgundy, Louis, duke of, 362, 373.
Calvinism, character of, in France, 3, 6;
political aspects of, in Germany, 10, 40.
Calvinists, the difficulties of, in Germany, 46, 47.
Camisards, rising of the, 352.
Canada, colonisation of, 17.
Candia, siege of, 209, 267, 275, 277.
Cape of Good Hope, colonisation of, 221.
Carelia ceded to Sweden, 85.
Carlowitz, peace of, 288.
Catalonia, revolt of, 117.
Catalans, desertion of the, in the peace of Utrecht, 368.
Catinat, 149, 342.
Cevennes, risings in the, 256.
Chalais, conspiracy of, 143.
Chambre des Comptes, the, 19.
Chambre de S. Louis, 157.
Charleroi, 213, 236.
Charles I. of England interferes in the thirty years’ war, 68;
marriage of, 110;
makes war with France, 144.
---- II. of England, enters into the triple alliance, 211;
makes the treaty of Dover, 215;
makes war upon the Dutch, 229;
accepts the treaty of Breda, 231;
declares war against the Dutch in 1672, 236;
withdraws from it, 240.
---- II. of Spain, 312;
makes a will in favour of the electoral prince, 322;
intrigues round the deathbed of, 329;
makes a will in favor of France, 330;
death of, 330.
---- IX. of Sweden, reign of, 83.
---- X. of Sweden, accession of, 171;
defeats John Casimir of Poland, 181;
forces Brandenburg to acknowledge his suzerainty, 182;
conquers Poland, 182;
makes the treaty of Labiau, 182;
conquers Denmark, 183;
death of, 183.
Charles XI. of Sweden, regency during minority of, 292;
defeated at Fehrbellin, 296;
makes the treaty of S. Germain-en-Laye, 297;
effects a monarchical revolution, 297;
death of, 305.
---- XII. of Sweden, coalition against, 305;
defeats Denmark, 305;
wins the battle of Narva, 306;
occupies Poland, 306;
makes Stanislas king of Poland, 306;
over runs Saxony, 306;
his position at Altranstädt, 306;
invades Russia, 307;
is defeated at Pultava, 308;
death of, 309.
---- archduke of Austria, claims of to the throne of Spain, 314;
share of under the first partition treaty, 322;
share of under the second treaty, 324;
lands in Portugal, 360;
becomes master of Arragon, 360;
proclaimed king at Madrid, 360;
driven out of Spain, 361;
refuses the terms of Utrecht, 366;
makes the treaties of Rastadt and Baden, 367.
---- Emanuel of Savoy. _See_ Savoy.
---- Lewis, Elector Palatine, 124.
Charnacé, 112.
Cherasco, peace of, 91, 112.
Chevalier de S. George, the, recognised by Louis XIV., 340.
Chevreuse, duchess of, 143.
Chiari, battle of, 344.
Choczim, battle of, 282.
Christian of Anhalt, 48;
advises Frederick to accept the crown of Bohemia, 60.
---- of Brunswick, 65;
dismissed by Frederick V., 66;
employed by the Dutch, 67;
defeated at Stadtlohn, 67.
---- IV. of Denmark, interferes in the Thirty Years’ War, 68;
treaty of with England, 68;
defeated at Lutter, 73;
makes the peace of Lübeck, 75;
attacks Sweden, 85;
makes a treaty with Gustavus Adolphus, 87;
raises the dues of the Sound, 169;
makes the treaty of Brömsebro, 169.
Christina of Sweden, promotes the peace of Westphalia, 123;
character of, 171;
political ability of, 173;
abdication and subsequent life of, 173.
Church, the, religious revival in, 41.
Cinq-Mars, conspiracy of, 152.
Civita, battle of, 263.
Clement VIII., 6.
---- XI., 373.
---- of Bavaria, archbishop of Köln, 264.
Clément, Jacques, 3.
Cleves-Jülich, question of, 28;
partition of, 51.
Cleves, duchy of, 177.
Clissow, battle of, 306.
Colbert, training of under Mazarin, 194;
appointed controller of finance, 196;
administrative reforms of, 197;
principles of the policy of, 198;
objects of the protective system of, 198;
advantages of it to France, 201;
its defects, 202;
character of, 203.
Coligny, 209.
Condé, Henry II., Prince of, 33.
---- Louis II., Prince of, wins Rocroy, 118;
conquers the Rhineland, 120;
wins the battle of Lens, 158;
joins the Fronde against Mazarin, 158;
comes over to the court, 161;
arrested by Mazarin, 162;
rebels against the king, 163;
joins the Spaniards, 130, 164;
overruns Franche Comté, 213;
invades the United Provinces, 237;
defends Alsace, 239;
wins the battle of Seneff, 242;
checks Montecuculli in Alsace, 243;
retirement of, 244.
Conti, prince of, 161.
Copenhagen, treaty of, 183.
Corpus Evangelicorum, the, 95.
Cossacks, the, of the Ukraine, 281.
Counter-Reformation, progress of the, 11, 43, 45.
Créqui, duke of, 208.
Cromwell, makes peace with the Dutch, 228.
Dantzig, 86.
Denmark. _See_ Christian IV., Frederick III., Frederick IV.
Design, the Great, of Henry IV., 28.
Dessau, the bridge of, 71.
Devereux, 102.
Devolution, the law of, 209.
Diet, the German, 8.
Donauwörth, the troubles of, 48.
Dorislaus, Dr., murder of, 227.
Douanes, the, in France, 21.
Dover, treaty of, 215, 236.
Downs, the, battle off, 117.
Dragonades, the, 256.
Dunes, the, the battle of, 131.
Dunkirk, purchase of by France, 208.
Dupes, the Day of, 150.
Duplessis, marshal, 162.
Duquesne, 259.
Dutch, the, employ Mansfeld and Christian of Brunswick, 67;
oppose Louis XIV., 210;
character of the war of independence of, 216;
constitution of, 217;
supremacy of the town councils among, 218;
position of Holland among, 218;
position of the House of Orange among, 219;
prosperity of, 220;
internal dissensions of, 221;
quarrel of, with the English Commonwealth, 227;
rivalry of with England, 228;
war of with Charles II., 229;
attack of Louis XIV. upon, 236;
defence of under William III., 239;
position of at the treaty of Nimwegen, 244;
adhesion of to the League of Augsburg, 260;
position of at the treaty of Ryswick, 264;
opposition of to the partition treaty, 327, 334;
recognition of Philip V. by, 334;
adhesion of to the Grand Alliance, 339, 340;
election of Marlborough as captain general by, 345;
defeat of by Boufflers, 350;
resistance of to Marlborough’s plans, 350, 353, 358;
position of at the treaty of Utrecht, 367, 370.
Ecclesiastical Reservation, the, 47.
Electorate of the Palatinate, transference of, 66.
Elector Palatine. _See_ Frederick V., Charles Lewis.
Emanuel, duke of Savoy. _See_ Savoy.
Emperor, the, position of in 1598, 7;
in 1715, 370.
England, condition of in 1598, 12;
in 1715, 369.
Epernon, duke of, 24, 31, 36.
Esthonia, annexed by Sweden, 84.
Estrades, count of, 207, 212.
Eternal Peace, treaty of, 300.
Eugene, prince, victory of at Zenta, 287;
victory of at Peterwardein, 288;
campaign of in Italy 1701, 342;
capture of Villeroy by, 344;
retreat of behind the Adige, 345;
critical position of at Innsbruck, 351;
junction of with Malborough, 354;
victory of at Blenheim, 355;
conquest of north Italy by, 357;
junction with Marlborough before Oudenarde, 362;
capture of Lille by, 362;
storm of Malplaquet by, 364;
defeat of by Villars at Denain and Freiburg, 366.
Exclusion, act of, 228, 229.
Fabert, 139, 149.
Fabricius, 52.
Faubourg S. Antoine, battle of, 163.
Fehrbellin, battle of, 244, 296.
Ferdinand I. emperor, 10.
---- II., emperor, religious policy of, 45;
election of as king of Hungary, 51;
recognised as king of Bohemia, 52;
critical condition of at Vienna, 57;
election of as Emperor, 59;
deposition of by the Bohemian estates, 59;
conquest of Bohemia by, 63;
suppression of Protestantism in Bohemia by, 64;
effect of military success upon, 76;
issue of the Edict of Restitution by, 77;
dismissal of Wallenstein by, 80;
Saxony driven to alliance with Sweden by, 91;
appeal of to Wallenstein, 95;
appointment of Wallenstein as dictator by, 96;
Wallenstein declared traitor by, 102;
refusal of to give the Swedes German territory, 115;
death of, 121.
---- III., emperor, 102, 121.
---- the cardinal infant, 102.
Form of Government, the, 167.
Fouquet, Nicholas, 195.
France, condition of in 1598, 2;
the indefensible frontier of, 25, 108;
the colonial empire of, 204;
condition of in 1715, 368.
Franche Comté, acquisition of, by France, 213, 244.
Frauenstadt, battle of, 306.
Frederick Henry of Nassau, 220, 224.
Frederick III. of Denmark, war of with Sweden, 182;
defeat of by Charles X., 183;
monarchical revolution effected by, 291.
---- IV. of Denmark, war of with Sweden, 305;
defeat of by Charles XII., 306.
---- V., Elector Palatine, head of the Protestant Union, 49;
character of, 55;
support to the Bohemians sent by, 55;
conduct of at the imperial election, 58;
election of as king of Bohemia, 59;
acceptance of the crown of Bohemia by, 61;
alienation of England and the Lutherans by, 61;
driven from Bohemia and the Palatinate, 63;
death of, 122.
Frederick William of Brandenburg, _See_ Brandenburg.
Freiburg, battle of, 120.
Fronde, the, weakness of France owing to, 130;
outbreak of, 157;
constitutional reforms of, 157, 158;
opposition of to a prime minister, 159;
weakness of the constitutional element in, 160;
lead of taken by the nobles, 160;
risings of in the provinces, 162;
factious character of, 163;
end of, 164.
Fuentes, count of, 120.
GABELLE, the, 20.
Gallas, 102.
Gallican Church, liberties of the, 249.
Galway, expedition of to Portugal, 360;
occupation of Madrid by, 360;
defeat of at Almanza, 361;
recall of, 361.
Gaston, duke of Orléans, plots of against Richelieu, 143, 149, 150;
reconciliation of with Richelieu, 152;
conduct of in the Fronde, 162.
George William of Brandenburg. _See_ Brandenburg.
Germain-en-Laye, S., treaty of, 297.
Germany, condition of in 1598, 7–9;
in 1715, 370.
Gertruydenberg, negotiations at, 366.
Gibraltar, capture of, 357.
Golitsin, Prince Basil, 300.
Gondi, archbishop of Paris, 158.
Gordon, general, 302.
Gothard, S., battle of, 209, 277.
Guiton, mayor of La Rochelle, 146.
Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden, interference of in Germany, 80;
objects of, 81;
Swedish policy of, 84;
wars of with Denmark, Russia, and Poland, 85;
negotiations of with England, 86;
landing of in Germany, 87;
alliance of with France, 88;
reception of in Germany, 88;
failure of to relieve Magdeburg, 90;
retreat of to Werben, 90;
alliance of with Saxony and Brandenburg, 91;
victory of at Breitenfeld, 91;
conquest of central Germany by, 94;
proposal of for a Protestant alliance under Sweden, 95;
victory of at the Lech, 95;
failure of before Nuremberg, 97;
march of into Saxony, 97;
victory and death of at Lützen, 98;
results of the death of, 99.
Gustavus Vasa of Sweden, 82.
Hague, the, negotiations at in 1708, 363.
Harcourt, count of, ambassador at Madrid, 326, 331, 336.
Harley, Tory ministry of in 1710, 365;
private negotiations of with Louis XIV., 366;
the treaty of Utrecht made by, 366.
Heilbronn, league of, 100, 113.
Heinsius, grand pensionary of Holland, negotiations for a partition treaty by, 318, 320;
the first partition treaty concluded by, 322;
negotiations of for a second treaty, 323;
the second partition treaty concluded by, 324;
unpopularity of the policy of, 334;
the Grand Alliance joined by, 340.
Henrietta Maria, queen of England, marriage of, 110;
treaty between Louis XIV. and Charles II. negotiated by, 230.
Henry III. of France, 3.
---- IV. of France, absolution of, 6, 14;
difficulties of, 14;
character of, 15;
economical policy of, 17;
policy of towards the nobles, 23;
foreign policy of, 24–30;
death of, 30.
Höchstadt, battle of, 352.
Höchst, battle of, 66.
Hogue, La, battle of, 263.
Holland, the province of, importance of, 218, 223.
Holy League, the, 286.
Horn, general, 89, 103.
Hospitallers, the Knights, 267, 275.
Huguenots, the, rising of in 1620, 36;
position of in 1622, 140;
organization of, 141;
risings of, 141, 145;
suppression of as a political organization, 146;
existence of contrary to Louis XIV.’s love of uniformity, 253;
persecution of, 255;
emigration of, 257.
Ibrahim I., Ottoman Sultan, 275.
Imperial courts, the, of Germany, 8.
Ingria, ceded to Sweden, 85.
Innocent XI., quarrel of with Louis XIV., 250.
Innocent XII., reconciliation of with Louis XIV., 252.
Intendants, appointment of in France, 19, 154.
Italy, condition of in 1598, 13.
Ivan the Terrible, Czar of Russia, 298.
---- II., Czar of Russia, 300, 302.
Ivry, battle of, 3.
Jagellon, Catherine, 44, 82.
James I. of England, policy of towards Spain, 55;
attitude of towards the Bohemian question, 60;
disavowal of Frederick by, 61;
enlistment of troops authorised by, 68;
war declared against Spain by, 68.
---- II. of England, quarrel of with Louis XIV., 261;
expulsion of from England, 262;
death of, 340.
Janizaries, the, 270.
Jansenists, condemnation of the, 373.
Jeannin, 35.
Jesus, the Society of, 11, 42.
John Casimir, of Poland, recognition of the Great Elector by, 179;
war of with Sweden, 181;
defeat of at Warsaw, 182;
the treaty of Wehlau made by, 183;
participation of in the treaty of Oliva, 183;
war of with Russia and the Cossacks, 281;
abdication of, 281.
John George, elector of Saxony, refusal of to help the Bohemians, 53;
policy of with regard to the imperial election, 58;
invasion of Silesia by, 64;
refusal of to join Gustavus Adolphus, 88;
refusal of to disband his troops, 91;
alliance of with Gustavus Adolphus, 91;
occupation of Bohemia by, 95;
expulsion of by Wallenstein, 96;
the peace of Prague made by, 103;
political views of, 104;
defeat of at Wittstock, 116;
treaty with the Swedes made by, 123.
John Sigismond, elector of Brandenburg. _See_ Brandenburg.
Joseph, Father, 79, 112, 116.
---- I., emperor, 366.
---- Ferdinand, electoral prince, claim of to the throne of Spain, 313;
share of in the partition treaty, 322;
death of, 323.
Jülich, duchy of, question of the succession to, 28, 51.
Kalkstein, count, 293, 294.
Kara Mustafa, grand vizier, 283;
war of against the empire, 284;
defeat of before Vienna, 286;
death of, 286.
Kardis, treaty of, 183.
Kingship, theory of in the seventeenth century, 187, 188.
Kiuprili, Mohammed, grand vizier, 276;
quarrel of with France, 277.
---- Achmet, grand vizier, attack of upon the empire, 277;
defeat of at S. Gothard, 277;
capture of Candia by, 278;
war of with Poland, 282;
death of, 283.
---- Mustafa, grand vizier, 287.
Knärod, peace of, 85.
Königsberg, treaty of, 181.
Labiau, treaty of, 182.
La Feuillade, 209.
La Force, 37.
La Rochelle, 6, 38;
siege of, 145.
La Vieuville, 38.
League, the Catholic, in Germany, 49;
Ferdinand assisted by in Bohemia, 62;
the dismissal of Wallenstein procured by, 79.
Lefort, 302.
Leopol, battle of, 282.
Leopold I., emperor, the partition treaty of 1667 made by, 211;
coalition against Louis joined by, 239;
war of with the Turks, 277;
the Hungarians persecuted by, 283;
the kingdom of Prussia recognised by, 310;
claim of to the throne of Spain, 314;
designs of, upon Italy, 316;
refusal of to accept the partition treaty, 328;
the Grand Alliance joined by, 340;
death of, 357.
Lepanto, battle of, 267, 273.
Lesdiguières, 30, 37, 110.
Leslie, Alexander, 87.
Le Tellier, 162.
Levenhaupt, 308.
Lille, acquisition of by France, 213;
capture of by prince Eugene, 362.
Lionne, 162, 215.
Lit de justice, a, 5.
Livonia, acquired by Sweden, 84, 86.
Longueville, duke of, 161, 162.
Lorraine, duchy of, occupied by the French, 151.
---- duke of, 284, 286, 327.
Loudun, treaty of, 33.
Louis of Baden, prince, 351, 354.
---- XIII., of France, declared of age, 35;
Luynes supported by, 36;
promise of to let Mansfeld cross France, 68;
withdrawal of the promise, 68;
invasion of Italy by, 111;
character of, 139;
suppression of the Huguenots by, 146;
serious illness of, 149;
support of Richelieu by in the Day of Dupes, 150;
death of, 118, 154.
---- XIV., of France, declared of age, 163;
suppression of the Fronde by, 164;
character and qualities of, 188;
theory of kingship of, 190;
attention of to detail, 193;
organisation of France under, 193;
choice of policy before in 1671, 204;
determination of to be dictator of Europe, 206;
humiliation of Spain and the Pope by, 207, 208;
assistance of the Portuguese and Venetians by, 209;
claim of to the Netherlands by the law of devolution, 209;
defeated by the Triple Alliance, 212;
greatness of the position of in 1672, 235;
attack of upon the Dutch, 236;
formation of a coalition against, 239;
the treaty of Nimwegen made by, 244;
quarrel of with the Pope, 248;
the four resolutions promulgated by, 250, 251;
reconciliation of with Innocent XII., 252;
alteration in the character of, 254;
attempt of to convert the Huguenots, 255;
persecution of the Huguenots by, 256;
revocation of the edict of Nantes by, 256;
aggressions of after Nimwegen, 257;
alienation of Europe by, 260;
invasion of England permitted by, 261;
war of against Europe, 262;
treaty of Ryswick made by, 264;
support of the Turks against the emperor by, 284;
foresight of with regard to the Spanish Succession question, 316;
adoption of a policy of partition by, 317;
objects of during the negotiations, 319;
conclusion of the partition treaties by, 322, 324;
policy of in concluding the treaties, 324;
will of Charles II. accepted by, 331;
policy of in accepting it, 332, 339;
difficulties of, 339;
aggressive policy of, 340;
war of against Europe, 340;
plan of for the conduct of the war, 350, 352;
results of the battle of Blenheim upon, 357;
loss of Italy by, 357;
negotiations of for peace, 363;
appeal of to France, 364;
renewal of negotiations, 365;
conclusion of the peace of Utrecht by, 367;
death of, 373.
Louis, the Dauphin, claim of to the throne of Spain, 313;
share of in the partition treaties, 322, 324;
advocacy of his son’s rights by, 331;
death of, 373.
Louvois, minister of war, 215;
advice of to refuse the Dutch terms, 1672, 239;
organisation of the army by, 259;
death of, 264.
Loyola, Ignatius, 42.
Lübeck, peace of, 75.
Lutheranism, political aspects of in Germany, 10, 11, 40.
Lutter, battle of, 73.
Lützen, battle of, 98.
Luxemburg, duke of, 244.
Luynes, count of, 36, 37.
Macchiavelli, influence of in politics, 108.
Magdeburg, sack of, 89.
Mahon, Port, capture of, 361.
Maintenon, Madame de, 252, 254, 331, 373.
Malplaquet, battle of, 364.
Mancini, Marie, 172.
Mansfeld, employment of in Bohemia, 55–57;
abandonment of the upper Palatinate by, 65;
dismissal of by Frederick V., 66;
employment of by the Dutch and English, 67;
campaign of against Wallenstein, 71;
death of, 72.
Mantua, question of the succession to, 111.
Margaret Theresa, claim of to the throne of Spain, 313.
Maria, daughter of Philip III., claim of to the throne of Spain, 314.
Maria Antonia, claim of to the throne of Spain, 313.
Maria Theresa, claim of to the throne of Spain, 313.
Marie de Medicis, marriage of, 27;
regency of, 31;
disastrous government of, 32–36;
attack of on Richelieu, 150.
Marie of Neuburg, queen of Spain, 329.
Marienbad, treaty of, 182.
Maritime nations, the policy of with regard to Spain, 315.
Marlborough, duke of, visit of to Charles XII., 307;
appointment of, to the command in the Netherlands, 345;
the military qualities of, 345;
personal character of, 347;
occupation of the lower Rhineland by, 349, 350;
the Blenheim campaign of, 353–356;
the Ramillies campaign of, 358;
the Oudenarde campaign of, 361;
critical political situation of, 363;
victory of at Malplaquet, 364;
dismissal of, 365.
Marsin, 352, 355.
Martinitz, 52.
Masaniello, 130.
Matthias, emperor, rising of against Rudolf II. in Austria, 50;
recognition of as king of Bohemia, 50;
election of as emperor, 50;
death of, 56.
Maurice of Nassau, 31, 65, 219, 221, 223.
Maximilian of Bavaria, 30;
religious policy of, 45;
suppression of Protestantism by at Donauwörth, 48;
appointed head of the Catholic league, 49;
assistance of to Ferdinand, 62;
character of, 62;
recognition of as elector, 66;
defeat of by Turenne, 121;
gains of at the peace of Westphalia, 124.
Max Emanuel, elector of Bavaria, 313, 334;
adhesion of to Louis XIV., 350;
campaign of against Eugene, 351;
defeat of by Marlborough, 354, 355.
Mazarin, cardinal, employment of in the peace of Cherasco, 112;
Richelieu’s foreign policy continued by, 118;
success of at the peace of Westphalia, 129;
alliance of with Cromwell, 131;
success of at the peace of the Pyrenees, 131;
character of, 156;
policy of towards the Parlement de Paris, 158;
unpopularity of, 159;
arrest of the princes by, 162;
flight of, 162;
return of to power, 164.
Mazeppa, 307.
Mehaigne, the lines of the, 350.
Mello, 118.
Menschikoff, 304.
Messenius, 173.
Methuen, 360.
Michael, king of Poland, 282.
Michael Romanoff, Czar of Russia, 299.
Milanese, the, 25.
Mocenigo, 275, 277.
Modena, duke of, 344.
Mohacz, battle of, 287.
Mohammed II., 268, 271.
---- III., 275.
---- IV., 287.
Molé, 161.
Monaleschi, murder of, 172.
Monk, general, 230, 231.
Mons, 262, 364.
Montauban, 6, 37.
Montecuculli, victory of at S. Gothard, 209, 277;
campaigns of on the Rhine, 240–243.
Montmorency-Bouteville, execution of, 144.
Montmorency, rising of, 151.
Montpellier, treaty of, 38, 143.
Montpensier, Anne of, Mademoiselle, 163.
Monzon, treaty of, 111, 143.
Morea, the capture and recapture of, 287, 288.
Moriscoes, the expulsion of, 30.
Morosini, 277, 286–288.
Mülhausen, agreement of, 62.
Münster, congress of, 122.
Münster, treaty of, 224.
---- bishop of, 215, 230, 240.
Murad IV., 275.
Mustafa II., 287.
Nantes, the edict of, 6, 14, 256.
Namur, capture of, 263.
Narva, battle of, 306.
Naryshkins, the, 300.
Navigation, act of, 227.
Neerwinden, battle of, 263.
Nevers, duke of, 111.
Neuburg, count palatine of, 28.
Nimwegen, peace of, 244.
Ninon de l’Enclos, 172.
Nördlingen, battle of, 102;
second battle of, 120.
Nystädt, peace of, 309.
Olden-Barneveldt, execution of, 223.
Oliva, peace of, 183, 281, 290.
Opdam, admiral, 228, 229.
---- general, 350.
Orange, House of, importance of the, 219;
rivalry of with the republican party, 221.
Ornano, 143.
Osnabrück, congress of, 122.
Oudenarde, battle of, 362.
Oxenstjerna, leadership of after Lützen, 100;
conduct of in the Thirty Years’ War, 100, 101, 115;
character and policy of, 166;
oligarchy established in Sweden by, 168;
war of with Denmark, 169;
acquisition of Halland by, 170.
Papacy, the, quarrel of with Louis XIV., 250.
Pappenheim, general, 89, 92, 98, 99.
Parkan, battle of, 286.
Parlement de Paris, character and powers of, 4;
recognition of Marie de Medicis as regent by, 31;
the will of Louis XIII. set aside by, 155;
refusal of to register the octroi edict, 157;
programme of reform of, 157, 158;
surrender of to the nobles and populace, 160.
Parthenon, the, destruction of, 287.
Partition Treaties, the, of 1667, 211;
negotiations for that of 1699, 317–321;
conclusion of the first of, 322;
chances of the success of, 322;
conclusion of the second of, 324;
unpopularity of among the English and Dutch, 327;
general acceptance of in Europe, 327;
opposition to by the Emperor and Savoy, 328;
difficulties in the carrying out of, 332.
Passarovitz, treaty of, 289.
Patkul, 305, 306.
Paulette, the, 18, 24.
Paul V., 45.
Pays d’election, and pays d’état, 19.
Pelisson, 255.
Perpetual Edict, the, 233.
Peter the Great, Czar of Russia, capture of Azof by, 288, 302;
defeat of on the Pruth, 288, 309;
education of, 301;
character of, 302;
domestic policy of, 303;
foreign policy of, 304;
defeat of, at Narva, 306;
victory of at Pultava, 308.
Peterborough, earl of, 360.
Petersburg, S., foundation of, 304, 307.
Peterwardein, battle of, 288.
Philip III. of Spain, 63.
---- IV. of Spain, 209.
---- V. of Spain, claim of, 313;
acknowledged as king by the Spaniards, 334, 365;
recognised by the treaty of Utrecht, 367.
Piccolomini, general, 98, 102, 121.
Pinerolo, 27.
Poland, the Counter-Reformation in, 44;
condition and institutions of, 278;
weakness of, 280.
_See_ Sigismund, John Casimir, John Sobieski, Augustus the Strong.
Pomerania, question of the succession to, 175.
---- east, acquired by Brandenburg, 180.
Pontchartrain, 264.
Portland, duke of, 264, 318.
Porto-Carrero, cardinal, 330.
Portugal, independence of, 117.
Prague, treaty of, 103.
Pressburg, treaty of, 72.
Project of Harmony, the, 233.
Protective system, the, of the seventeenth century reasons for, 16, 198.
Protestantism, inherent weakness of, 40;
critical state of in Germany in 1630, 76.
Prussia, East, duchy of, 176.
---- West or Polish, 178.
---- kingdom of, 310.
Pultava, battle of, 308.
Pyrenees, the, peace of, 131.
Quadruple Alliance, the, 230.
Quebec, foundation of, 17.
Ragotsky, 351.
Ramillies, battle of, 358.
Rastadt, treaty of, 366.
Ravaillac, 30.
Ravensberg, duchy of, 51, 177.
Reformation, the, in Germany, 9.
Regale, the, right of, 250.
Regensburg, diets at, 66, 79;
truce of, 259.
Restitution, Edict of, 77, 96.
Rethel, battle of, 162.
Réunions, Chambres des, 258.
Rhode, 293.
Richelieu, cardinal, adviser of Marie de Medicis, 36;
entry of into the ministry, 38;
alliance of with Gustavus Adolphus, 88, 113;
foreign policy of, 106;
the Valtelline recovered by, 110;
interference of in the Mantuan question, 111;
intrigues of in Germany, 112;
declaration of war against Spain by, 114;
want of success of at first, 115;
ultimate success of, 117;
position of France at the death of, 117;
character of, 133;
principles of the government of, 134;
want of sympathy of with the people, 137;
suppression of the Huguenot rising of 1625 by, 142;
war of with England, 144;
the political power of the Huguenots suppressed by, 146;
administrative changes of, 148;
success of in the Day of Dupes, 150;
the power of the nobles crushed by, 151, 152;
centralising policy of, 153.
Rie, battle of, 37.
Rocroy, battle of, 119.
Rohan, risings of, 36, 145.
Romanoff dynasty, the, accession of, 299.
Rooke, Sir George, 356.
Royal, Port, 373.
Rudolf II., emperor, 10, 11, 29, 45, 50.
Ruel, peace of, 162.
Ruppa, 54.
Russia, early history of, 298;
rivalry of with Sweden, 84;
supremacy of after Nystädt, 309.
---- _See_ Alexis, Sophia, Peter the Great.
Ruvigny, 257.
Ruyter, 229, 239.
Ryswick, peace of, 264.
Saluzzo, 27.
Savoy, importance of the duchy of, 26.
---- Emanuel, duke of, 27.
---- Charles Emanuel, duke of, assistance given to the Bohemians by, 55.
---- Victor Amadeus, duke of, defeat of at Staffarda, 263;
refusal of to accept the partition treaty, 328;
alliance of with France, 342;
the Grand Alliance joined by, 351.
Schellenberg, the, storming of, 354.
Schomberg, 208, 257.
Schwartzenburg, 179.
Secularised lands in Germany, question of, 46.
Sedan, surrender of to France, 152.
Seignelay, 259, 264.
Selim the Sot, 273.
Seneff, battle of, 242.
Servien, 162.
Seventeenth century, importance of, 1;
alteration in the political ideas of, 185;
end of the, 372.
Sigismond Augustus, of Poland, 279.
---- of Poland, religious policy of, 44;
expulsion of from Sweden, 83;
war of with Gustavus Adolphus, 85.
Silesia, occupation of by Wallenstein, 73.
Silesians, assistance given by to the Bohemians, 56;
reduction of by John George of Saxony, 64.
Sinzheim, battle of, 242.
Sitvatorok, treaty of, 273.
Slavata, 52.
Sobieski, John, of Poland, alienation of by Louis XIV., 260;
defeat of Russia and the Cossacks by, 281;
defeat of the Cossacks and Turks by, 282;
election of as king of Poland, 283;
the peace of Zurawno made by, 283;
alliance of with the emperor, 284;
relief of Vienna by, 285;
the Turks driven out of Hungary by, 286.
Soissons, count of, 143.
Somers, 327.
Sophia, princess, regency of, 300.
Soubise, risings of, 37, 142.
Spain, state of, in 1598, 12;
weakness of, 129, 322.
Spanish Succession, the, question of, 312.
Spinola, 67, 111.
S. Germain, assembly of, 251.
S. Germain-en-Laye, treaty of, 297.
S. Gothard, battle of, 209.
S. Menehould, treaty of, 33.
St. John, 227.
Stadtholderate, the Dutch, put into commission, 225.
Stadtlohn, battle of, 67.
Staffarda, battle of, 263.
Stahremberg, defence of Vienna by, 285.
---- defeat of, at Villa Viciosa, 365.
Stanhope, capture of Port Mahon by, 361;
capitulation of, 365.
Stanislas Leczinski made king of Poland, 306.
States-General, the, of France, character of, 3;
meeting of in 1614, 33.
Steinkirk, battle of, 263.
Stolbova, peace of, 85.
Stolhofen, lines of, 351.
Stralsund, siege of, 74.
Strasburg, seizure of by Louis XIV., 258.
Streltsi, the, 299;
revolts of, 300;
abolition of, 304.
Stuhmsdorf, treaty of, 86, 87.
Suleiman, the Magnificent, 268, 271.
Sully, character of, 15;
economical policy of, 16;
financial reforms of, 17, 21;
retirement of, 31.
Sweden, condition of at the beginning of the century, 81, 84;
acquisition of Holland by, 170;
adhesion of to the Triple Alliance, 212;
alliance of with France, 215;
loss of supremacy in the north by, 309.
---- _See_ Gustavus Adolphus, Oxenstjerna, Charles X., Charles XI., Charles XII.
Swieten, Cornelius Bicker von, 225.
Szcelankemen, battle of, 287.
Taille, the, in France, 18, 19.
Tallard, count, the partition treaties negotiated by, 318, 323;
advice to Louis XIV. to keep faith, 331;
campaigns of on the Rhine, 351, 354, 355.
Taxation in France, 18–21.
Temple, Sir William, 211.
Theodore, Czar of Russia, 300.
Throwing from the window, the, 52.
Thurn, count, 52, 57.
Tilly, count, general of the League, 30, 49;
victory of at the White Mountain, 63;
victories of at Höchst, Wimpfen and Lutter, 66, 73;
invasion of Saxony by, 91;
defeat of at Breitenfeld, 92;
defeat of at the Lech, and death of, 95.
Tököli, 284, 286.
Tolhuys, the, crossing of the Rhine at, 238.
Torcy, 331.
Torstenson, general, 92, 120, 169.
Tourville, de, admiral, 259, 263.
Travendal, treaty of, 306.
Triple Alliance, the, 212, 215.
Tromp, admiral, 228, 229.
Troublous Times, the, 299.
Turenne, count of, advice of at Freiburg, 120;
determination of the Thirty Years’ War by, 120;
campaign of against Condé in Champagne, 130;
victory of at the Dunes, 131;
adhesion of to the Fronde, 161;
defeat of at Rethel, 162;
return of to the king’s side and defeat of Condé by, 163;
campaign of in the Netherlands, 210;
invasion of the United Provinces by, 237;
campaigns of on the Rhine, 239, 240, 242;
winter campaign of, 242;
death of, 243.
Turin, battle of, 357, 359.
Turks, the Ottoman, establishment of in Europe, 266;
defects of the rule of, 268;
causes of the success of, 270;
summit of the power of, 271;
alliance of with France, 272;
antagonism of to Austria, 274;
revival of under the Kiuprili, 276;
defeat of at Vienna, 285;
loss of the Danube valley by, 288.
Urban VIII., 111.
Union, the Protestant, in Germany, 49, 65.
United Provinces, the. _See_ The Dutch.
Utrecht, peace of, provisions of the, 367;
merits and demerits of the, 367–372.
VALTELLINE, the valley of the, 13, 109.
Vasvar, treaty of, 277.
Vauban, 258, 262.
Vendôme, duke of, 36, 143, 156.
---- duke of, campaign of against Eugene in Italy, 345;
advance of to Trent, 351;
retreat of to Piedmont, 351;
campaign of in the Netherlands, 361;
campaign of in Spain, 365.
Vere, 65.
Vervins, peace of, 6, 11, 14, 27.
Victor Amadeus. _See_ Savoy.
Vigo, battle at, 356.
Villa Viciosa, victory of the Portuguese at, 209;
victory of the Spaniards at, 365.
Villars, marshal, campaign of on the Danube 1703, 351;
capture of Stolhofen by, 360;
intrusted with the last army of France, 364;
campaigns of on the frontiers, 364, 365;
victories of on the Rhine, 366.
Villeroy, marshal, campaign of in Italy, 344;
campaigns of in the Netherlands, 355, 357, 358.
WALLENSTEIN, count, conduct of at Zablat, 58;
character and views of, 69;
offer of to raise an army, 70;
campaign against Mansfeld, 71, 72;
occupation of Silesia and Pomerania by, 73;
resistance of Stralsund to, 74;
political results of the success of, 75;
difference of with Ferdinand and the League, 78;
dismissal of by Ferdinand, 80;
appealed to by Ferdinand, 95;
appointed dictator, 96;
campaigns of against Gustavus Adolphus, 97, 98;
ambitious schemes of, 101;
declared traitor and murdered, 102.
Warsaw, battle of, 182.
Webb, general, 362.
Wehlau, treaty of, 183, 281.
Werth, John, 120.
Westphalia, peace of, the provisions of the, 123, 124;
importance of the, 125–129.
White Mountain, battle of, 63.
William the Silent, of Orange, 217, 219.
---- II. of Orange, attempt of to become king, 224;
death of, 225.
---- III. of Orange, education of by the State, 230;
elected captain general, 233;
accessory to the murder of de Witt, 234;
defence of Holland by in 1672, 237;
elected stadtholder, 239;
defeat of at Seneff, 242;
attacks Luxemburg near Mons to prevent peace, 244;
character of, 246;
made king of England, 262;
campaigns of in the Netherlands, 263;
negotiations for a partition treaty, 318–324;
policy of in the negotiations, 320;
unpopularity of in England, 327;
recognition of Philip V. by, 334;
formation of the Grand Alliance by, 340;
death of, 341.
Willstedt, truce of, 32.
Wimpfen, battle of, 66.
Wittstock, battle of, 116.
Witt, John de, negotiation of the Triple Alliance by, 210–212;
appointment of as grand pensionary of Holland, 225;
character and policy of, 226;
policy of towards England, 228, 231;
policy of towards France, 232;
enmity of to the House of Orange, 226, 233;
murder of, 234.
Wrangel, 121.
Wynendaal, battle of, 362.
Xanten, treaty of, 51, 177.
York, New, capture of by England, 229, 231.
Zablat, battle of, 58.
Zenta, battle of, 288.
Zurawno, peace of, 283.
Zusmarshausen, battle of, 121.
_Crown 8vo. With Maps. 7s. 6d._
European History, 476–918
By C. W. C. OMAN, M.A., Fellow of All Souls College, Oxford.
Forming Volume I. of PERIODS OF EUROPEAN HISTORY.
‘Notwithstanding its modest scale, this volume (Period I.) will be
valued by all historical students as supplying a real want in our
historical literature, and supplying it well. ... He paints on a small
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The Balance of Power, 1715–1789
By A. HASSALL, M.A., Student of Christ Church, Oxford.
Forming Volume IV. of PERIODS OF EUROPEAN HISTORY.
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The Ascendancy of France, 1598–1715
By H. O. WAKEMAN, M.A., All Souls College, Oxford.
Forming Volume V. of PERIODS OF EUROPEAN HISTORY.
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European History, 1789–1815
By H. MORSE STEPHENS, M.A., Balliol College, Oxford.
Forming Volume VII. of PERIODS OF EUROPEAN HISTORY.
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ought to be widely used....’--=Manchester Guardian.=
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‘This is a clear and vigorous summary of the history of a period
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FOOTNOTES:
[1] See Appendix III.
[2] See Appendix II.
[3] See map facing p. 124.
[4] See map, p. 241.
[5] See Appendix IV. p. 381.
[6] The Tuscan Ports comprised Santo Stéphano, Porto Ercole, Orbitello,
Porto Longone, Talamone, and Piombino.
[7] It is sometimes said that he fought Malplaquet, and wasted life
unnecessarily there, in order to restore his waning popularity in
England, but it must be remembered that in 1709, Mons was the last of
the first-class fortresses belonging to the French, and the army of
Villars and Boufflers the only real obstacle between Marlborough and
Paris. Can any one doubt that had Marlborough been well supported in
England, the allies would have been in Paris in 1710?
[8] See Map, p. 241.
Transcriber’s Notes: 1. Obvious printers’, punctuation and spelling
errors have been corrected silently.
2. Some hyphenated and non-hyphenated versions of the same words have
been retained as in the original.
3. Italics are shown as _xxx_.
4. Bold print is shown as =xxx=.