CHAPTER XXVI.

President Hayes was inaugurated on the 5th day of March (1877)--the

4th falling on a Sunday. As matter of precaution the oath of office

was administered to him by Chief Justice Waite on Sunday--Mr. Hayes

deeming it wise and prudent that he should be ready as President of

the United States to do his official duty if any Executive act should

that day be required for the public safety. Although his title had

been in doubt until within forty-eight hours of his accession, he had

carefully prepared his Inaugural address. It was made evident by his

words that he would adopt a new policy on the Southern question and

upon the question of Civil Service Reform. It was plainly his

determination to withdraw from the South all National protection to

the colored people, and to put the white population of the

reconstructed States upon their good faith and their honor, as to

their course touching the political rights of all citizens.

The Inaugural address did not give satisfaction to the radical

Republicans, but was received with every mark of approbation by the

more conservative elements of the party. Many Democrats would have

supported Mr. Hayes cordially but for the mode of his election. It

was impossible for them to recover from the chagrin and disappointment

of Mr. Tilden's defeat. The new President, therefore, began his

administration with a bitter personal opposition from the Democracy,

and with a distrust of his own policy on the part of a large number of

those who had signally aided in his election.

The one special source of dissatisfaction was the intention of the

President to disregard the State elections in the three States upon

whose votes his own title depended. The concentration of interest was

upon the State of Louisiana, where Governor Packard was officially

declared to have received a larger popular majority than President

Hayes. By negotiation of certain Commissioners who went to Louisiana

under appointment of the President, the Democratic candidate for

Governor, Francis T. Nicholls, was installed in office and Governor

Packard was left helpless.(1) No act of President Hayes did so much to

create discontent within the ranks of the Republican party. No act of

his did so much to give color to the thousand rumors that filled the

political atmosphere, touching a bargain between the President's

friends and some Southern leaders, pending the decision of the

Electoral Commission. The election of the President and the election

of Mr. Packard rested substantially upon the same foundation, and many

Republicans felt that the President's refusal to recognize Mr. Packard

as Governor of Louisiana furnished ground to his enemies for disputing

his own election. Having been placed in the Presidency by a title as

strong as could be confirmed under the Constitution and the laws of the

country, it was, in the judgment of the majority of the Republican

party, an unwise and unwarranted act on the part of the President to

purchase peace in the South by surrendering Louisiana to the Democratic

party.

The Cabinet selected by President Hayes was regarded as one of great

ability. Mr. Evarts, Secretary of State, Mr. Sherman, Secretary of

the Treasury, Mr. Schurz, Secretary of the Interior, were well known.

--The Secretary of War, George W. McCrary of Iowa, had steadily grown

in public esteem by his service in the House of Representatives, and

possessed every quality desirable for the administration of a great

public trust.

--Mr. Richard W. Thompson of Indiana, appointed Secretary of the Navy,

was in his sixty-eighth year, and had been a representative in Congress

thirty-five years before. He was known throughout the West as an

ardent Whig and an equally ardent Republican.

--Charles Devens of Massachusetts was appointed Attorney-General. His

standing as a lawyer can be inferred from the fact that he had left

the Supreme Bench of his State to accept the position. To eminence in

his profession he added an honorable record as a soldier, having

served with distinction in the civil war and attained the rank of

Brigadier-General. As a private gentleman he was justly and widely

esteemed.

--For Postmaster-General the President selected David M. Key of

Tennessee, who during the previous session had served in the Senate,

by appointment of the Governor of his State, to fill the vacancy caused

by the death of Ex-President Johnson. The selection of Mr. Key was

made to emphasize the change of Southern policy which President Hayes

had foreshadowed in his Inaugural address. Mr. Key was a Democrat,

and personally popular. A Southern Democrat in a Republican Cabinet

presented a novel political combination, and it is evidence of the tact

and good sense of Mr. Key that he administered his Department in such

manner as to secure, not merely the respect of the Republican party,

but the sincere friendship of many of its leading members. He was wise

enough and fortunate enough to induce Hon. James N. Tyner, whom he

succeeded as Postmaster-General, to remain in the Department as First

Assistant, in order that Republican senators and representatives might

freely communicate upon party questions, which Mr. Key delicately

refrained from even hearing. The suggestion was made, however, by men

of sound judgment, that in projecting a new policy towards the South,

which was intended to be characterized by greater leniency in certain

directions, it would have been wiser in a party point of view, and more

enduring in its intrinsic effect, to make the overture through a

Republican statesman of rank and ability.

Among the new senators of the Forty-fifth Congress were some who were

transferred from the House and were already well known to the country.

James B. Beck of Kentucky, George F. Hoar of Massachusetts, Benjamin

H. Hill of Georgia, had each made a brilliant record by his service in

the House. Mr. Blaine of Maine now entered for a full term, but had

come to the Senate several months before as the successor of Honorable

Lot M. Morrill, when that gentleman was called by President Grant to

administer the Treasury Department.--Among those who had not served in

Congress were several distinguished men. David Davis of Illinois, who

had been fifteen years on the Bench of the Supreme Court of the United

States, now entered the Senate as the successor of General Logan. With

the exception of John Rutledge, who served in the House of

Representatives after he had been on the Supreme Bench, Judge Davis is

the only man who entered Congress after service on the Bench. John

Jay was Minister to Great Britain and Governor of New York after he

resigned the Chief-Justiceship; and Oliver Ellsworth was Minister to

France after his retirement from the Bench. A large proportion of

the justices had been in Congress before they entered upon their

judicial service; but the transfer of Judge Davis to the Senate was

a reversal of the natural order.

Samuel J. Kirkwood, already well known by his service in the Senate,

now returned from Iowa.--Preston B. Plumb of Kansas, who had

been printer, editor, soldier in the civil war with the rank of

Lieutenant-Colonel, member of the Bar, reporter of the Supreme Court of

his State, Speaker of the House of Representatives of Kansas, now

succeeded James M. Harvey. Mr. Plumb was actively and largely engaged

in business affairs, and had perhaps as accurate knowledge of the

resources of the West as any man in the country.--A. H. Garland entered

from Arkansas, being promoted from the Governorship of his State. He

was popular among his own people, and had been a member of the

Secession Convention and of both branches of the Confederate Congress.

His reputation as a lawyer had preceded his entrance into the Senate,

where he was at once accorded high rank among his political

friends.--John R. McPherson, a business man of good repute in New Jersey,

succeeded Mr. Frelinghuysen.--Edward R. Rollins of New Hampshire,

who had creditably served six years in the House, now came to the

Senate as the successor of Aaron H. Cragin.--Alvin Sanders, who was

appointed Governor of the Territory of Nebraska by Mr. Lincoln in

1861, and held the position until the State was admitted to the Union

in 1867, now came as one of her senators.--Richard Coke who had been

Governor of Texas, and Lafayette Grover who had been Governor of

Oregon, now entered the Senate.--Isham G. Harris, who had been in

Congress twenty-five years before and had played a somewhat conspicuous

part in the rebellion as Governor of Tennessee, now succeeded Henry

Cooper as senator from that State.

--William Pinkney Whyte, who entered the Senate the previous Congress

for a full term, had already served in that body for a brief period in

1868-69, succeeding Reverdy Johnson when he resigned to accept the

mission to England. In the interval between the close of his first

service and his second election he had served as Governor of Maryland.

He is a grandson of the eminent William Pinkney, who was a member of

the Senate at the time of his death, and who as an orator was

considered by Mr. Benton, Mr. Clay, and the younger men of that period,

as the most eloquent in the country. Mr. Pinkney Whyte held a

distinguished position at the bar of Maryland, was recognized as a

senator of great ability, and as a private gentleman was highly

esteemed without reference to party lines.

--Stanley Matthews took the seat made vacant by the transfer of Mr.

Sherman to the Treasury Department. His reputation as a lawyer was

well established. He had ben United-States District Attorney for three

years preceding the war. He commanded an Ohio regiment for two years

in the field and resigned to accept a position on the bench of the

Supreme Court. His legislative experience had been limited to a single

term in the Ohio Senate, and as the Democrats had carried Ohio in the

autumn of 1877 before he could take his seat, he saw before him a short

service in Congress. Within the limit of two years, however, he made

a profound impression upon his associates in the Senate. He proved

to be an admirable debater, and seemed intuitively to catch the style

of Parliamentary discussion as distinguished from an argument in court.

He left the Senate with an enlarged reputation, and with a valuable

addition to his list of personal friends.

--Simon Cameron from Pennsylvania resigned his seat in the spring of

1877. He had been four times elected to the body, and had twice

resigned, leaving his total service some eighteen years. He was in his

seventy-ninth year when he retired, but in exceptional vigor of body

and mind. He had the graces of age without its infirmities, and shared

the good will of his fellow senators on both sides of the chamber in

an exceptional degree. He was succeeded by his son, James Donald

Cameron, who up to that period had never been a member of any

legislative body and who was in this forty-fourth year when he took

his seat in the Senate. He was educated at Princeton and had indeed

devoted his life to business. During the last year of President

Grant's Administration he was a member of the Cabinet as Secretary of

War, in which position he showed the same executive power that had

characterized the prompt and orderly dispatch of his private business.

--A fortnight after the meeting of Congress the Senate sustained a deep

loss in the death of Oliver P. Morton. He died at his home in Indiana

on the 1st day of November (1877). He had for several years been in

ill health, but struggled with great nerve against the advances of

disease. Few men could have resisted so long and so bravely. An

iron will sustained him and enabled him through years of suffering to

assume a leading part in the legislation of the country and in

directing the policy of the Republican party.

Governor Morton was succeeded by Daniel W. Voorhees, already widely

known by his service of ten years in the House. Mr. Voorhees was a

Democrat of the most pronounced partisan type, but always secured the

personal good will of his political opponents in Congress.

--M. C. Butler of South Carolina entered the Senate on the 2d of

December, 1877. He had been engaged in all the partisan contests by

which the Republican party was overthrown in South Carolina, and

encountered much prejudice when he first took his seat; but his

bearing in the Senate rapidly disarmed personal hostility, and even

gave to him a certain degree of popularity upon the Republican side

of the chamber.

The House was organized at an extra session called by the President

on the 15th of October, 1877. The failure of the Army Appropriation

Bill at the preceding session rendered this early meeting of Congress

necessary. Samuel J. Randall was re-elected Speaker, receiving 149

votes; his Republican competitor, James A. Garfield, receiving 132.

Among the new members of the House were some men who were afterwards

advanced to great prominence.--Thomas B. Reed of Maine came from the

Portland district. He had been a member of the Bar some twelve years,

had rapidly risen in rank, had served in the State Legislature two

terms, and had been Attorney-General of his State for three years. He

was a strong man in his profession, and had an admirable talent for

parliamentary service. His promotion was not more rapid than his

ability justified and his friends expected.--The Massachusetts

delegation received a strong reinforcement in several new members.

George D. Robinson was a conspicuous figure. He developed great

readiness as a debater, and his career in the House plainly indicated

the eminence he has since attained.--George B. Loring came from the

Salem district. He had served several terms in both branches of the

Massachusetts Legislature and had been President of the Senate. He had

for many years taken part in National contests, and of the _personnel_

and principles of the political parties he possessed a knowledge

equaled by few men in the United States.--William W. Rice of the

Worcester district had devoted himself assiduously to his profession of

the law and had generously shared in its rewards and its honors. From

the midst of his full practice he was chosen to Congress.--William

Claflin, well known as a merchant, had taken active part in the

politics of Massachusetts, had been in both branches of the

Legislature, and served as Lieutenant-Governor, and Governor of the

State.

Horace Davis (a son of the eminent Senator John Davis of

Massachusetts), long resident in California, came as the representative

of the San Francisco district. He had been successful as a business

man on the Pacific Coast, and brought to the service of the House

large experience, strong sense, and high character.--The Indiana

delegation was especially strong, with Thomas M. Browne, John H.

Baker, and William H. Calkins, among its members. Mr. Browne and Mr.

Calkins united a talent for parliamentary discussion with exceptional

power as platform speakers. Mr. Baker was one of the most thorough

men in the House on all questions of finance and taxation.--Hiram

Price, who had already served six years, returned from Iowa.--William

A. Phelps, Dudley C. Haskell and Thomas H. Ryan made a strong

delegation from Kansas.--James F. Briggs, a lawyer of good standing,

entered from the Manchester district of New Hampshire.--John T. Wait,

a highly intelligent representative from Connecticut, had served a

part of the Forty-fourth Congress, and was now returned for a full

term.--Edwin Willets who proved to be a wise legislator came from

Michigan.--Anson G. McCook, of the well-known Ohio family that

furnished so large a number of good soldiers, came from New-York City,

with the personal distinction of having carried a Democratic district.

--Frank Hiscock came from the Syracuse district. He had been a member

of the Convention of 1867 and stood high as a lawyer. He rose rapidly

in the House, soon acquiring a position of the first rank.--John H.

Starin and George A. Bagley were among the conspicuous members of the

New-York delegation.--Judge A. B. James, of long service on the Supreme

Bench of his State, came from the Ogdensburg district, and George W.

Patterson, in his seventy-ninth year, from the Chautauqua district.

Mr. Patterson was Lieutenant-Governor of the State when Hamilton Fish

was governor.

Among the prominent Ohio representatives were Jacob D. Cox, from the

Toledo district; Joseph W. Keifer, from the Madison district,

afterwards promoted to the Speakership of the House; Amos Townsend,

from the Cleveland district, a successful merchant and a man of strong

sense.--General Thomas Ewing came from the Fairfield district. He

was one of the private secretaries of President Taylor before he had

attained his majority, was Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of

Kansas at thirty-one years of age and a member of the Ohio

Constitutional Convention in 1873-74. He was an able lawyer and

strong debater.--William McKinley, jun., entered from the Canton

district. He enlisted in an Ohio regiment when but seventeen years

of age, and won the rank of Major by meritorious service. The interest

of his constituency and his own bent of mind led him to the study of

industrial questions, and he was soon recognized in the House as one

of the most thorough statisticians and one of the ablest defenders of

the doctrine of Protection. He was more widely known afterwards as

a platform speaker, always welcomed by large audiences.

Russell Errett and Thomas M. Bayne entered from the Pittsburg

districts, Pennsylvania. Mr. Errett was a veteran editor in the

anti-slavery cause, and Mr. Bayne was recognized as a young man of

superior ability, ready in debate and with special adaptation to

parliamentary service.--John I. Mitchell, afterwards chosen senator,

entered from the Lycoming district, and Edward Overton from the

Bradford district.--General Harry White entered from the Armstrong

district. He had been confined in Libby Prison for sixteen months

during the war and being a member of the Pennsylvania Senate his

absence made a tie vote. He was not allowed to send his resignation

and thus permit a Republican successor to be chosen, because the

Confederates were not engaged at that time in promoting Republican

success. His resignation was finally sent through the lines, concealed

in a Testament carried by an exchanged surgeon.

The distinctive measure of the Forty-fifth Congress was the passage

of the Act for the coinage of silver dollars. The subject had been

discussed in the Senate and House and before the people, with increased

zeal, ever since the movement for resumption of specie payment took

decided form. For those who had not given special attention to the

question, arguments were at hand from an official source. It would be

more difficult to find a more exhaustive examination into the silver

question than is embodied in the report of the Monetary Commission

(organized under the joint resolution of August 15, 1875), presented

to Congress on the 2d of March, 1877. It has permanent value for the

compact and lucid form in which the history of the precious metals is

presented, and for the clear statement of conflicting theories in

regard to monetary systems.

--Three members of the Commission, John P. Jones and Louis V. Bogy of

the Senate, and George Willard, a representative from Michigan,

believed that the United States should remonetize silver without

regard to the future policy of Europe, and that a law should be passed

fixing 15½ to 1 as the standard of relative value between silver and

gold in this country.

--Mr. William S. Groesbeck favored the remonetization of silver at the

old relation in the United States of 16 to 1, and was joined in this

suggestion by Mr. Richard P. Bland of Missouri.

--Senator George S. Boutwell expressed the opinion that it was not

expedient to coin silver dollars to be a legal-tender, and that the

introduction of silver as currency should be postponed until the effort

to secure the co-operation of other nations had been faithfully made.

--Professor Francis Bowen and Representative Randall L. Gibson thought

that a double standard was an illusion and an impossibility, and

declared the proper place for silver in the monetary system to be that

of subsidiary or token currency, considerably overvalued by law and a

legal-tender only within certain minor limits. They advocated the

coinage of silver dollars of 345-6/10 grains, to be legal-tender for

sums not over twenty dollars, and to take the place of all paper

currency of less denomination than five dollars.

President Hayes presented the subject in his message, December 3, 1877.

He did not believe that "the interests of the Government or the people

would be promoted by disparaging silver," but held that it should be

used only at its commercial value. "If," said he, "the United States

had the undoubted right to pay its bonds in silver coin, the little

benefit from that process would be greatly over-balanced by the

injurious effect of such payments if made or proposed against the

honest convictions of the public creditors."

Secretary Sherman, in his annual report at the same time, said that in

the work of refunding he had informed his associates in an official

letter that "as the Government exacts in payment for bonds their full

face value in coin, it is not anticipated that any future legislation

of Congress or any action of any Department of the Government will

sanction or tolerate the redemption of the principal of these bonds,

or the payments of the interest thereon, in coin of less value than

the coin authorized by law at the time of their issue,--being gold

coin." He earnestly urged Congress to give its sanction to this

assurance.

These official utterances were put forward in the heat of the general

discussion, and fell upon the ears of persons already engaged on one

side of the other of the earnest controversy in regard to the coinage

of silver. Congress was at once called upon from an unexpected

source to make a declaration hostile in its aim and purpose to the

policy advocated both by the Head of the Nation and its chief

financial officer. In direct hostility to the recommendations of an

Ohio President and an Ohio Secretary of the Treasury, an Ohio senator,

Mr. Stanley Matthews, moved a concurrent resolution in the Senate,

declaring that "all bonds of the United States are payable in silver

dollars of 412½ grains, and that to restore such dollars as a full

legal-tender for that purpose, is not in violation of public faith or

the rights of the creditor." A motion to refer the resolution to the

Committee on the Judiciary was defeated--_ayes_ 19, _noes_ 31. It was

kept before the Senate for immediate consideration and discussion.

The eagerness for debate on the subject is shown by the record.

Thirty-four senators delivered speeches, most of them elaborately

prepared, going over the history of the precious metals, the field

of American legislation, and international practice in money.

The Senate refused to adopt Mr. Conkling's suggestion to make the

resolution _joint_ instead of _concurrent_ and thus require the

signature of the President. Mr. Matthews had framed it so as simply

to evoke an expression by both branches of Congress without sending it

to the Executive, whose opinions had just been made known through his

annual message. This was intended as an expression of dissent on

the part of Congress from the views of the President. Mr. Edmunds

moved an amendment declaring that "the bonds are payable in gold coin

or its equivalent, and that any other payment without the consent of

the creditor would be in violation of the public faith." It was

defeated--_ayes_ 18, _noes_ 44. On an amendment offered by Mr. Justin

S. Morrill, declaring that "the bonds will be payable in silver if the

Silver Bill becomes the law of the land," the division was _ayes_ 14,

_noes_ 41. On the passage of the resolution in the Senate, the _ayes_

were 43, the _noes_ 22. In the House of Representatives, the

resolution was passed under a suspension of the rules,--_ayes_ 189,

_noes_ 79. This proclamation of the financial creed of Congress was

made complete on the 28th of January, 1878.

On the 5th of the previous November, during the extra session, the

House passed, under a suspension of the rules, a bill for the free

coinage of silver dollars of 412½ grains, full legal tender for

all debts public and private. Mr. Richard P. Bland of Missouri was

the author of the measure. The vote upon it stood 163 _ayes_ to 34

_noes_, 93 members not voting. It was reported in the Senate with

amendments, in December, and its discussion was superseded for the

time by the resolution of Mr. Matthews. As reported from the Finance

Committee, it provided for a coinage of dollars of 412½ grains to

the extent of not less than $2,000,000 or more than $4,000,000 per

month; all seigniorage to accrue to the Treasury. A second section,

proposed by Mr. Allison of Iowa, authorized the President to invite

other nations to take part in a conference, and to appoint three

Commissioners to represent the United States, with a view to the

adoption of a common ratio for gold and silver.

The bill gave rise to a longer and broader discussion than that which

had occurred on Mr. Matthews' resolution. It was opened by Mr. Morrill

of Vermont. He pronounced the measure a "fearful assault upon the

public credit. It resuscitates the obsolete dollar which Congress

entombed in 1834, worth less than the greenback in gold, and yet to be

a full legal-tender." He thought that the causes of the depreciation

of silver were permanent. "The future price may waver one way or the

other, but it must finally settle at a much lower point. Nothing less

than National will and power can mitigate its fall."

--Mr. Wallace of Pennsylvania charged that the opponents of the bill,

were "taking a course for the abasement, depreciation and disuse of

silver. The supporters of the bill favor both gold and silver."

--Mr. Dawes dwelt on the uncertain commercial value of silver and on

the harm to the public credit threatened by the impending measure,

insisting that the cheapest money would be our only money.

--Mr. Beck of Kentucky submitted a proposition to direct the coinage

of "not less than $3,000,000 per month, or as much more as can be

coined at the mints of the United States."

--Mr. Morgan of Alabama said the law did not deal with commercial

values. It promised coin to the bondholder--coin of silver or coin of

gold.

--Mr. Thurman of Ohio thought that the contract provided for the

payment of public debts in coin of the standard of 1870, when the

dollar of 412½ grains was full legal-tender, and that such dollar

would approximate to gold in value.

--Mr. Kernan of New York said: "This bill does not proceed upon the

basis that we are to make a silver dollar equivalent to a gold dollar,"

and thought that the cheaper coin would inevitably drive out the gold

coin.

--Mr. Blaine submitted an argument "that gold and silver are the money

of the Constitution, the money in existence when the Constitution was

formed, and Congress had the right to regulate their relations." He

favored the coinage of "such a silver dollar as will not only do

justice among our citizens at home, but prove an absolute barricade

against the gold monometallists." He did not believe that "412½

grains of silver would make such a dollar."

--Mr. Davis of West Virginia favored the utilization of silver,

"because it is one of our chief products, will make the money known to

the Constitution more abundant, will relive distress, and lead back

to prosperity."

--Mr. McDonald of Indiana thought that "if no change had been made in

our coinage laws, no proposition would be made to change them now.

The Act of 1873 demonetizing the silver dollar made the pending

measure necessary."

--Mr. McPherson said that he was "charged by a large majority of the

people of New Jersey to remonstrate against the measure, which they

believe will retard prosperity, and throw a blot upon our National

integrity."

--Mr. Sargent of California, representing a mining State, opposed the

bill, "as against good faith, and against the interests of the

Government and of the people."

--Mr. Jones of Nevada supported the bill in a very elaborate speech.

He had an enthusiastic faith in silver as a circulating medium, and

had given a great deal of study to the question.

--Mr. Ingalls of Kansas argued "that the public debt is payable in

silver, and if the money unit should be established in the metal least

subject to fluctuation that metal is silver. Gold is the money of

monarchs, and was in open alliance with our enemies in the civil war."

--Mr. Lamar presented resolutions from the Legislature of his State,

instructing the senators and representatives to vote for the pending

measure. He explained that he could not comply with the instructions,

and would give the reasons for his vote to his own people.

--Mr. Allison of Iowa closed the debate, drawing the distinction

between free coinage as proposed in the House Bill, and limited coinage

as proposed in the Senate amendment. He dwelt on the invitation

for an International Monetary Conference. He recited the growing

demand for gold in Europe, and explained that "France ceased coining

silver because she already had in circulation as full legal-tender

from $350,000,000 to $400,000,000 in that coin."

In the course of the discussion the history of the Demonetizing Act

of 1873 was brought out, and the degree of attention, or rather

inattention, which was given to its passage,--On proceeding to vote

the Senate rejected an amendment by Mr. Morrill, providing that for

the first year only 25 per cent, and for the second year only 50 per

cent, of the duties should be receivable in silver.--The amendment of

Mr. Wilson "that $100,000,000 should be coined in silver dollars within

three years, and then the coinage should cease if bullion should be

more than three per cent below par," was also rejected.--The Senate

refused to agree to an amendment offered by Mr. Edmunds, "that

nothing in this section contained shall be construed to interfere with

the coinage of gold and of the subsidiary silver now authorized by

law."--The section providing for an International Conference was

adopted,--_ayes_, 40; _noes_, 30.--Several forms of amendment relative

to the legal-tender provision were suggested, but the phrase as it

appears in the law was preferred.--Amendments offered by Mr. Eaton,

Mr. Christiancy, Mr. Blaine, and Mr. Cameron of Wisconsin to increase

the amount of silver in the coin, so as to approximate it to the value

of the gold dollar, were severally rejected by large majorities.--After

providing, on Mr. Chaffee's motion, for certificates of not less than

$10 in exchange for silver coin deposited and redeemable in the same

on demand, the Senate passed the bill with its amendments, by _ayes_

48, _noes_ 21.

On the return of the bill to the House of Representatives debate began

on February 21st.--Mr. Phillips of Kansas advocated the double

standard with the ratio of metal properly determined, and he thought

this was done in the dollar of 412½ grains.--General Butler of

Massachusetts was in favor of insisting on the House bill for free

coinage, and was seconded by Mr. Atkins of Tennessee.--Mr. Bland was

willing to accept the Senate amendments and then pass a supplementary

measure for free coinage on an appropriation bill. He added: "If we

cannot do that I am in favor of issuing paper money enough to stuff

down the bondholders until they are sick."--Mr. Dwight of New York

sought to limit the legal-tender quality of the silver dollar to $50,

and for larger sums to make it receivable at its value in gold.--A

motion by Mr. Hewitt of New York to lay the bill on the table was

lost by _ayes_ 71, _noes_ 205. The several amendments of the Senate

were then adopted; that limiting coinage by 203 _ayes_, to 72 _noes_,

and that for an International Monetary Conference by _ayes_ 196, _noes_

71.(2) The concurrence of the House in these amendments passed the bill.

President Hayes returned the bill the House of Representatives with

his objections, on the 28th of February. He based his veto on the

proposition that "the silver dollar authorized is worth eight to

ten per cent less than it purports to be worth, and is made a legal

tender for debts contracted when the law did not recognize such coin

as lawful money. The effect would be to put an end to the receipt

of revenue in gold, and thus compel the payment of silver for both

the principal and interest of the public debt." This he thought would

be regarded as a grave breach of public faith: "It is my firm

conviction that if the country is to be benefitted by a silver coinage,

it can only be done by the issue of silver dollars of full value

which will defraud no man. A currency worth less than it purports to

be worth, will in the end defraud not only creditors, but all who

are engaged in legitimate business, and none more surely than those

who are dependent on their daily labor for their daily bread."

The House voted at once on the veto--passing the bill against the

objections of the President, by _ayes_ 196, to _noes_ 73. The vote

was taken in the Senate on the same day, without debate, and the bill

was passed over the veto by _ayes_ 46, _noes_ 19. The senators not

voting were paired. Had every senator been present and voted the

result would have been _ayes_ 53, _noes_ 23. New England, New York

and New Jersey supplied the principal part of the negative vote.

Mr. Bayard, Mr. Pinkney Whyte, Mr. Butler of South Carolina, and

Mr. Lamar were the senators from the South who voted in the negative.

Pennsylvania, the South and the West sustained the bill. The Pacific

coast was divided,--Mr. Booth supporting the bill and Mr. Sargent

opposing it. The only vote for the bill in either House from New

England was that of General Butler. The proportion and general

location of the votes in the House were about the same as in the Senate.

The opinions of senators and representatives were of three distinct

types. The majority believed, as the vote showed, in the policy of

coining silver dollars of full legal-tender, regardless of their

intrinsic equality of value with gold dollars,--thus creating two

metallic currencies differing in value for all purposes of commercial

interchange with the world, and keeping them at an equality of value

at home by the force of law. The great mass of the Democratic party

and a considerable number of Republicans joined in this view.

A small minority of both parties disbelieved in the use of silver as

money, except for subsidiary coins, with its legal-tender value limited

to small sums,--fifty dollars being the highest proposed, the majority

apparently favoring ten dollars.

A majority of Republicans and a minority of Democrats asserted the

necessity of maintaining silver coin at full legal-tender, but upon

the basis of equality in intrinsic value with the gold dollar. This

class feared the effect of an exclusively gold standard, while the

supply of gold, compared with the commercial demands of the world, is

relatively and rapidly growing less. They had seen the ratio of

gold-supply far beyond that of silver for a series of years following

1850, and then for a series of years the ratio of silver-supply in

excess of the supply of gold. The theory advanced by this class rested

upon the proposition that the dollar of commerce could not with safety

be exclusively based either upon the scarcer or upon the more plentiful

metal. An adjustment is required providing for the employment of

both metals--maintaining between them such fair equalization as would

not violently disturb the value of real property or of annual products,

and most important of all would secure a steadiness to the wages of

labor and a sound currency in which to recompense it. The supply of

both metals for two periods of sixteen years each (1850-1865 both

included and 1866-1881 both included) in the United States and in the

world at large may suggest some useful lessons.(3)

From the Silver Bill the public interest turned to the approaching day

of Specie Resumption, January 1, 1879. To the last month there had

been many doubters, but when the day came it was found that the

Treasury was fully prepared and the gold coin which had borne a premium

for the seventeen years of specie suspension was not now demanded even

by those who had been hoarding legal-tender notes for that express

purpose.

The result has proved that legislators and financiers were wisest who

had the largest faith in the resources of the nation. The legislation

proved to be adequate to the end in view, and resumption was achieved

with the least practicable disturbance of trade and the least

practicable depression to industry. The process of funding the debt

was of great assistance, as was the constant reduction of the

principal, which all the while drew our bonds from Europe and thus

reduced the amount due for foreign interest. The monthly charge for

interest had been in 1865 as high as $12,581,474.--a part payable in

paper. During the fiscal year ending with June, 1879, it was only

$6,981,148. It is obvious that from this source alone the Treasury

was greatly strengthened.

Generous credit was accorded to Secretary Sherman for the great

achievement. It seldom happens that the promoter of a policy in

Congress had the opportunity to carry it out in an Executive

Department. But Mr. Sherman was the principal advocate of the

Resumption Bill in the Senate, and during the two critical years

preceding the day for coin payment he was at the head of the Treasury

Department. He established a financial reputation not second to that

of any man in our history.

During the period of the Crimean war (1854-6), the mercantile marine of

the United States gained so rapidly that it approached equality with

that of England, in tonnage. But even before the calamities of our

civil war, a change was foreshadowed favorable to England, hostile to

the United States. It was the change from sail to steam. The

utilization of iron as a ship-building material, the cheapening of

fuel, the superior speed, all betokened a radical change in

transportation on the principal ocean routes of the world. From the

close of 1856 to the outbreak of the rebellion the average loss to

the Navigation interests of the United States was two per cent

annually. This ratio of loss was immensely accelerated by the course

of events during the civil war, involving the utter destruction of

many American vessels or their change of flag. The natural result was

that in the spring of 1865 we stood in the carrying trade relatively

and absolutely far behind our position in 1855.

Practically, nothing has since been done to recover the lost ground.

Provision was made by Congress for the admission of certain ship-building

materials free of duty. This somewhat improved the prospects and

stimulated the construction of sailing vessels; but the competition

in the world's carrying-trade is in steam-vessels. Great Britain had

for many years covered the ocean with subsidized steamers, paying

heavily for mail service until the lines were self-supporting, and

withdrawing her aid only when competition could be safely defied.

Congress steadily refused to enter upon any system of the same kind.

Fitful aid was granted to special lines here and there, but no general

system was devised, and the aid extended being temporary and

accompanied sometimes by scandals in legislation was in the end rather

hurtful than helpful.

Meanwhile the products we were exporting and importing enlarged so

rapidly that we were giving more cargoes to ships than any other

nation of the world,--furnishing in the year 1879 between thirteen

and fourteen million tons of freight, and this altogether exclusive of

our coasting trade. Some very extreme cases occurred, strikingly

illustrative of the reluctance of Congress to help the American

carrying trade. It was shown by statistics that we were exporting

to Brazil not over $7,000,000 of our own products, and taking from her

over $40,000,000 of her products. We had no steam communication with

Rio Janeiro, except by way of Europe. In 1876 the Emperor of Brazil,

an able and enlightened monarch, visited the United States. As a

result of his inquiries and examinations His Majesty expressed a

sincere desire for closer commercial connections between the two

countries, and eagerly spoke of his willingness to contribute by an

annual bounty to the establishment of a line of steamers.

After the Emperor's return to his dominions John Roach (a native of

Ireland, but long naturalized in the United States), an energetic

and capable ship-builder, of unusual foresight, energy, and integrity

of purpose, sent an agent to Rio Janeiro, and procured a contract

from the Brazilian Government pledging $125,000 per annum, provided

the Government of the United States would give the same amount, for

the establishment of a steam line between the two countries. Not

doubting the readiness of the American Government to respond, Mr.

Roach proceeded with full confidence, and built vessels for the line

in his own shipyard. The enterprise promised the best commercial

results; but to his chagrin and discomfiture, Mr. Roach found that no

amount of argument or appeal by those who were willing to speak for him

could induce Congress to contribute a single dollar for the

encouragement of the line. Brazil cancelled her offer when the United

States refused to join with her. Mr. Roach's ships were withdrawn,

and the line was surrendered to an inferior class of English steamers.

During the period of this futile experiment, as well as before and

afterwards, Congress annually appropriated more than a million dollars

for the maintenance of the South-American squadron of naval vessels,

to protect a commerce that did not exist, and for the creation of which

the United-States Government was unwilling to pay even ten per cent

of the cost annually of maintaining the squadron. Every intelligent

man knows that it is impossible to maintain a navy unless there be a

commercial marine for the education of sailors. The American marine

preceding 1861 was so large that it could furnish seventy-six thousand

sailors to maintain a blockading squadron on the South Atlantic and

Gulf coasts. The value of this school for seamen, as one of the arms

for National defense, could not have been more strikingly illustrated,

or more completely proved. The lesson should have been heeded. It is

a familiar adage requiring no enforcement of argument, that navies do

not grow at the top. They grow from and out of a commercial marine

that educates men for sea service. If the Government of the United

States had, since the close of the war, expended annually upon the

mercantile marine one-fifth of the amount that has been expended upon

the Navy, our ships would have covered every sea, and the Navy would

have grown of itself. Instead of that, we have been constructing the

navy as an exotic, forcing it to grow without a favoring atmosphere,

establishing it with officers and not with men, educating cadets on

land, and not educating sailors on the ocean.

The Democratic party in Congress was hostile to every movement for the

encouragement of our carrying trade, and the Republican party was

fatally divided. The men who had earnestly attempted to do something

were therefore constantly defeated and compelled to abandon the effort.

Following this came the demand for the ships, which meant simply that

American capitalists might secure the registry of the United States

for vessels built in English ship-yards and manned with English

sailors. This is the last movement necessary to complete the dominion

of Great Britain over the sea, to complete the humiliation of the

United States as a commercial country. It would abolish the art of

ship-building on this side of the Atlantic, would educate no American

sailor, except in the coasting trade. As a result, our naval vessels,

if a Navy should be maintained, would necessarily be constructed where

the merchant vessels were constructed; and the last point of absurdity

in this policy would be reached when, in case of possible conflict with

a European Power, we should be dependent for naval vessels upon a

foreign country from which we could be cut off by the superior strength

of our opponent on the sea.

With a more extended frontage on the two great oceans of the world than

any other nation; with a larger freightage than that of any other

nation, it will be a reproach to the United States, more pointed and

decisive every year, if it neglects to establish a policy which shall

develop a mercantile marine, and as the outgrowth of the mercantile

marine, a Navy adequate to all the wants of the Republic. If Congress,

in the sixteen years following the war, had given a tithe of

encouragement to the building and sailing of ships, that it has wisely

given to manufactures, to the construction of railways, and to every

industrial pursuit on land, our flag would before the close of that

period have stood relatively on the ocean as strong and permanent as

it stood before steam was applied to the carrying trade of the world.

In those sixteen years the Government expended more than three hundred

millions on the Navy!(4) It expended scarcely three millions to aid in

building up its mercantile marine, and expended much of that unwisely.

[(1) The Louisiana Commission was composed as follows:

General Joseph R. Hawley of Connecticut, Judge Charles B. Lawrence of

Ohio, General John M. Harlan of Kentucky, Ex-Governor John C. Brown of

Tennessee, Hon. Wayne McVeagh of Pennsylvania.]

[(2) The International Monetary Conference for which provision was made

in the bill was held at Paris in the autumn of 1878. The American

Commissioners were Reuben K. Fenton, William S. Groesbeck, and Francis

A. Walker, with S. Dana Horton as Secretary. The principal European

Nations were present with the exception of Germany. The Commissioners

receive the impression that decided progress had been made towards the

remonetization of silver in Europe, but subsequent event have not

vindicated their judgment. Mr. Goschen, who was the head of the

British delegation, declared that "it would be a misfortune for the

world if a movement for a sole gold standard should succeed;" but he

indicated no purpose on the part of his own government to change from

the gold standard. The Conference came to no practical conclusion,

simply agreeing that "it is necessary to maintain in the world the

monetary functions of silver as well as those of gold;" but that "the

selection for use of one or the other of the two metals, or both

simultaneously, should be governed by the special position of each

State or group of States." The proposition of the United States "that

the delegations recommend to their respective governments the

adjustment of a fixed relation between the two metals and the use of

both in that relation as unlimited legal-tender money," was rejected.

The supporters of a bi-metallic standard, though disappointed in the

immediate result of the Conference, received encouragement from the

advance in International opinion in the years that had elapsed since

the previous Conference (1867). At that time the Nations declared

almost unanimously in favor of a single standard of gold. Many of

them had found in the interval great difficulty in maintaining it and

were withheld from declaring for the double standard simply by the

influence and example of England.]

[(3) The following tables have been prepared with care by Hon. A. Loudon

Snowden, the able superintendent for several years of the United States

Mint at Philadelphia.

ANNUAL PRODUCTION OF GOLD AND SILVER IN THE UNITED STATES, FROM

1850 TO 1881, INCLUSIVE.

YEARS. GOLD. SILVER. YEARS. GOLD. SILVER.

1850 . . . $50,000,000 $50,000 1866 . . . $53,500,000 $10,000,000

1851 . . . 55,000,000 50,000 1867 . . . 51,725,000 13,500,000

1852 . . . 60,000,000 50,000 1868 . . . 48,000,000 12,000,000

1853 . . . 65,000,000 50,000 1869 . . . 49,500,000 12,000,000

1854 . . . 60,000,000 50,000 1870 . . . 50,000,000 16,000,000

1855 . . . 55,000,000 50,000 1871 . . . 43,500,000 23,000,000

1856 . . . 55,000,000 50,000 1872 . . . 36,000,000 28,750,000

1857 . . . 55,000,000 50,000 1873 . . . 36,000,000 35,750,000

1858 . . . 50,000,000 500,000 1874 . . . 33,500,000 37,300,000

1859 . . . 50,000,000 100,000 1875 . . . 33,500,000 31,700,000

1860 . . . 46,000,000 150,000 1876 . . . 39,930,000 38,780,000

1861 . . . 43,000,000 2,000,000 1877 . . . 46,900,000 39,800,000

1862 . . . 39,200,000 4,500,000 1878 . . . 51,200,000 45,281,000

1863 . . . 40,000,000 8,500,000 1879 . . . 38,900,000 40,800,000

1864 . . . 46,100,000 11,000,000 1880 . . . 36,000,000 39,200,000

1865 . . . 53,225,000 11,250,000 1881 . . . 30,650,000 43,150,000

Total. . $822,525,000 $38,400,000 Total. . $678,805,000 $467,011,000

Total Gold for thirty-two years, $1,501,330,000. Total Silver, $505,411,000

ANNUAL PRODUCTION OF GOLD AND SILVER IN THE WORLD, EXCLUSIVE OF THE

UNITED STATES, FROM 1850 TO 1881, INCLUSIVE.

YEARS. GOLD. SILVER. YEARS. GOLD. SILVER.

1850 . . . $15,000,000 $39,500,000 1866 . . . $67,600,000 $40,750,000

1851 . . . 12,600,000 39,950,000 1867 . . . 52,300,000 40,725,000

1852 . . . 72,750,000 40,550,000 1868 . . . 61,725,000 38,225,000

1853 . . . 90,450,000 40,550,000 1869 . . . 56,725,000 35,500,000

1854 . . . 67,450,000 40,550,000 1870 . . . 56,850,000 35,575,000

1855 . . . 80,075,000 40,550,000 1871 . . . 63,500,000 38,050,000

1856 . . . 82,600,000 40,600,000 1872 . . . 63,600,000 36,500,000

1857 . . . 78,275,000 40,600,000 1873 . . . 60,200,000 53,500,000

1858 . . . 74,650,000 40,150,000 1874 . . . 57,250,000 34,200,000

1859 . . . 74,850,000 40,650,000 1875 . . . 64,000,000 48,800,000

1860 . . . 73,250,000 40,650,000 1876 . . . 63,770,000 48,820,000

1861 . . . 70,800,000 42,700,000 1877 . . . 67,100,000 41,200,000

1862 . . . 68,550,000 40,700,000 1878 . . . 67,800,000 49,519,000

1863 . . . 66,950,000 40,700,000 1879 . . . 69,800,000 55,200,000

1864 . . . 66,900,000 40,700,000 1880 . . . 70,400,000 57,500,000

1865 . . . 66,975,000 40,700,000 1881 . . . 65,800,000 62,800,000

Total $1,072,125,000 $649,800,000 Total $1,008,420,000 $716,864,000

Total Gold, $2,080,545,000. Total Silver, $1,366,664,000.

TOTAL FOR THE WHOLE WORLD.

GOLD. SILVER.

1850-1856 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $1,894,650,000 $ 688,200,000

1866-1881 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,687,225,000 1,183,875,000]

[(4) The Naval expenditures for the sixteen years following the war

were as follows:--

Four years under President Johnson . . . . . $114,500,000

Eight years under President Grant . . . . . 154,500,000

Four years under President Hayes . . . . . . 57,000,000]

Twenty Years of Congress, Volume 2 From Lincoln to Garfield, with a Review of the Events Which Led to the Political Revolution of 1860 · 第 26 / 30 章