The civil war closed with ill-feeling amounting to resentment towards
England on the part of the loyal citizens of the United States. They
believed that the Government of Great Britain, and especially the
aristocratic and wealthy classes (whose influence in the kingdom is
predominant), had desired the destruction of the Union and had connived
at it so far as connivance was safe; they believed that great harm had
been inflicted on the American marine by rebel cruisers built in
English ship-yards and manned with English sailors; they believed that
the war had been cruelly prolonged by the Confederate hope of British
intervention,--a hope stimulated by the utterances of high officials
of the British Government; they believed that her Majesty's Ministers
would have been willing at any time to recognize the Southern
Confederacy, if it could have been done without danger of a European
conflict, the effect of which upon the interests of England could not
be readily measured.
Their belief did not wait for legal proofs or written arguments, nor
was it in any degree restrained by technicalities. The American people
had followed the varying fortunes of the war with intense solicitude,
and had made up their minds that the British Government throughout the
contest had been unfriendly and offensive, manifestly violating at
every step the fair and honorable duty of a neutral. They did not
ground their conclusions upon any specially enunciated principles of
international law; they did not seek to demonstrate, by quotations from
accepted authorities, that England had failed in this or in that
respect to perform her duty towards the American Government. They
simply recognized that England's hand had been against us, concealed
somewhat, and used indirectly, but still heavily against us. They
left to the officers of their own Government the responsible task of
stating the law and submitting the evidence when the proper time should
come.
Perhaps the mass of the people in no other country keep so close a
watch upon the progress of public events as is kept by the people of
the United States. If the scholarship of the few is not so thorough
as in certain European countries, the intelligence of the many is far
beyond that of any other nation. The popular conclusions, therefore,
touching the conduct of England, did not spring from imagination or
from prejudice; nor were they the results of illogical inference. To
the outside world the British Government is the British Parliament; and
citizens of the United States knew that their country had been
subjected in the House of Lords and in the House of Commons to every
form of misrepresentation, to every insult which malice could invent,
to every humiliation which insolence and arrogance could inflict. The
most distant generation of Americans will never be able to read the
Parliamentary reports from 1861 to 1865 without indignation.
Discussions touching the condition of the United States occupied no
small share of the time in both Houses, and in the House of Lords
cordiality was never expressed for the Union. In the House of Commons
the Government of the United States had sympathizing friends, eloquent
defenders, though few in number. Bright, Forster, Cobden, and men of
that class, spoke brave words in defense of the cause for which brave
deeds were done by their kindred on this side of the Atlantic--a
kindred always more eager to cherish gratitude than to nurture revenge.
But from the Government of England, terming itself _Liberal_, with Lord
Palmerston at its head, Earl Russell as Foreign Secretary, Mr.
Gladstone as Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Duke of Argyll as Lord
Privy Seal, and Earl Granville as Lord President of the Council, not
one friendly word was sent across the Atlantic. A formal neutrality
was declared by Government officials, while its spirit was daily
violated. If the Republic had been a dependency of Great Britain,
like Canada or Australia, engaged in civil strife, it could not have
been more steadily subjected to review, to criticism, and to the menace
of discipline. The proclamations of President Lincoln, the decisions
of Federal courts, the orders issued commanders of the Union armies,
were frequently brought to the attention of Parliament, as if America
were in some way accountable to the judgment of England. Harsh comment
came from leading British statesmen, while the most ribald defamers of
the United States met with cheers from a majority of the House of
Commons, and indulged in the bitterest denunciation of a friendly
Government without rebuke from the Ministerial benches.(1)
The notorious Mr. Roebuck, in a debate, March 14, 1864, upon the
progress of the civil war, said: "The whole proceedings in this
American war are a blot upon human nature; and when I am told that I
should have sympathy for the Northern States of America, I turn in
absolute disgust from their hypocrisy. If there is a sink of political
iniquity, it is at Washington. They are corrupt; they are base; they
are cowardly; they are cruel." This highly indecorous speech was made
in the presence of members of the British Ministry. The Premier, Lord
Palmerston, followed Mr. Roebuck on the floor, calling him his
"honorable and learned friend," and offering neither rebuke nor
objection to the words he had used. On the contrary, with jaunty
recklessness he accused the American Government of secretly and
cunningly recruiting its armies in Ireland, by inducing Irishmen to
emigrate as laborers and "then to enlist in some Ohio regiment or
other, and become soldiers with the chance of plunder, and God knows
what besides."
Lord Robert Cecil, since known as the Marquis of Salisbury, and at
present (1885) Premier of England, only a few months before Mr.
Roebuck's disreputable speech, attacked the Judiciary of the United
States, and told a story so remarkable that it needs no
characterization. "American courts," said his lordship, "are not
free from circumstances of suspicion attaching to them peculiarly.
It might be that in old times judges sat on the American Bench who enjoyed
world-wide reputation, but within the last two or three years the
American tribunals have delivered their decisions under the pressure
of fixed bayonets. The Supreme Court of America two years ago was
applied to for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of the American
Constitution; but the Judges were unable to pronounce the judgment
which their consciences would have prompted them to deliver, _because
the soldiers of President Lincoln, appearing at their doors in arms,
so terrified them that they perverted the law to suit the design of
the Executive_." If his Lordship believed this groundless calumny,
his ignorance concerning the United States would be subject of pity.
If his Lordship did not believe it, the just accusation against him
is too serious to be stated in these pages.
During the first year of the war Lord Robert Cecil had so frankly
expressed his view of the situation and his belief in the gain to
England which would result from the destruction of the American Union,
that his extraordinary madness may at least be said to have had a
method. He was already a prominent member of the party of which he
is now the head, and really reflected their sentiment as to the
advantage which would come to England if the rebellion should be
successful and the Southern Confederacy established. They had
witnessed the marvelous growth of the United States and had concluded
that, already a powerful rival, the Republic would certainly be
dangerous as an enemy. This view is discernible in the Tory speeches
in Parliament and in the Tory press of England, and was the motive
which inspired so many Englishmen to connive at the destruction of the
American Union. They went to great length, even establishing an
association to promote the cause of the rebellion, and to supply the
Confederate Treasury with money. Lord Robert Cecil was one of the
Vice-Presidents of the "Southern Independence Association" and a
subscriber to the Confederate loan, as were also Mr. Roebuck, Mr.
Gregory, and many other members of the British Parliament.(2)
The conduct of the Tories was not, however, a surprise to the
American people. From the earliest period of our National existence
we had received from that party constant demonstrations of
unfriendliness; and where safe opportunity offered, insult was added.
But of the Liberal party Americans had hoped, nay, had confidently
expected, if not open demonstrations of sympathy, at least a neutrality
which would deprive the Rebel leaders of any form of encouragement.
When the first shadow of real danger to the Union appeared in 1860-61,
there was instinctive gladness among loyal Americans that a Liberal
ministry was in power in England, composed of men who would in no
event permit their Government to be used in aid of a rebellion, whose
first object was the destruction of a kindred nation, and whose
subsequent policy looked to the perpetuation of human slavery. But the
hope proved to be only the delusion of a day. Americans found the
Palmerston Ministry in a hostile mood and ready to embarrass the
Government of the Union by every course that might be taken with safety
to the interests of England; and they at once recognized a vast
increase of the force against which they must contend.
But there was one apprehension which constantly enforced a limitation
upon the action of the British Government, and that was the danger that
an open espousal of the cause of the Confederacy would be the signal
for a European conflict. Russia was more than friendly to us: Germany
had no interest in our destruction. Russia was hostile to England:
Germany was hostile to France. Active intervention by England and
France, so much talked of, might have caused an earlier dethronement
of Napoleon III, and a struggle in the East which would have left
England no military power to expend on this side of the Atlantic. The
American citizen cannot so wholly or ignorantly deceive himself as to
believe that the Palmerston Government, from any consideration of the
duties of neutrality, from any sympathy with the anti-slavery aspect
of the contest, or from any ennobling impulse whatever, refrained from
formal recognition of the Southern Confederacy and the open espousal of
its cause.
When the question of recognizing the Confederacy came before
Parliament, it was withdrawn after discussion by request of Mr.
Gladstone, Chancellor of the Exchequer. He assured the House that
"the main result of the American contest is not, humanly speaking,
_in any degree doubtful_." He thought "there never was a war of more
destructive, more deplorable, more hopeless character." The contest
in his judgment was "a _miserable_ one." "We do not," said he,
"believe that the restoration of the American Union by force is
attainable. _I believe that the public opinion of this country is
unanimous upon that subject_. It is not, therefore, from indifference,
it is not from any belief that this war _is waged for any adequate
or worthy object on the part of the North_, that I would venture to
deprecate in the strongest terms the adoption of the motion of the
honorable and learned gentleman." The "honorable and learned
gentleman" was Mr. Roebuck, already quoted; and his motion was for the
recognition of the Southern Confederacy as an independent Nation. The
argument which Mr. Gladstone brought against it was in effect that
the Confederacy was sure to succeed without foreign intervention. The
fruit when ripe would fall of itself, and hence there was no need
of prematurely beating the tree. The platform speeches of Mr.
Gladstone were still more offensive and unjust, but he need be held
answerable only for official declarations.
The only friends of the United States in England at that trying period
were to be found among the "middle classes," as they are termed, and
among the laboring men. The "nobility and gentry," the bankers, the
great merchants, the ship-builders, were in the main hostile to the
Union,--wishing and waiting for the success of the Confederacy. The
honorable exceptions to this general statement were so few in number
that they could exert little influence on public opinion and still less
upon the course of the Ministry. The philanthropy, the foresight, the
insight of the realm were found among the humbler classes. In all
parts of the kingdom the laboring men were on the side of the Union.
Though they suffered from a cotton-famine, they knew by intuition that
the founding of a slave empire in America would degrade labor
everywhere; they knew that the triumph of the Union signified the
equality of human rights and would add to the dignity and reward of
labor. It would have been well for England's fame and for her
prosperity if the statesmen at Westminster had shared the wisdom and
the nobler instincts of the operatives of Lancashire.
When the National Government had finally triumphed over the rebellion
despite the evil wishes and machinations of England, Parliament
suddenly ceased to consider the condition of the United States as one
of the regular orders of the day; and Lord Palmerston when inquiry was
addressed to him whether any representations would be made in regard
to the arrest of Jefferson Davis, curtly replied that it was not the
intention of the Government in any respect to interfere with the
internal affairs of the United States. The only expression now made
in Parliament touching our policies, was one of solicitude lest our
government should deal with the citizens of the Southern States in
terms of severity. In June, 1865, two months after the war closed,
two noble earls, Russell and Derby, took it upon themselves to advise
the American Government against the indulgence of passion and revenge
towards those who had engaged in the rebellion. Earl Derby thought
that "the triumphant Government should seek not to exasperate the
feelings of their former antagonists, which have already been too much
embittered, but should endeavor by deeds of conciliation and of mercy
to re-cement if possible a Union so nearly dissolved." Earl Russell
expressed opinion that it was "most desirable that there should be no
appearance of passion of the part of those who have the guidance of
affairs in the American Union."
Kindly advice is never to be rudely repelled; but this was counsel
which the American Government did not need. The war had closed without
the execution of a single man who had borne arms against the
Government, without imprisonment, without confiscation of property,
without even depriving one rebel of his franchise as an elector. The
advice of the noble earls, on the side of mercy, would have had more
weight and influence, had weight and influence been needed, if their
own Government, after every rebellion, however small or under however
great provocation, had not uniformly followed its victory by the
gibbet, by imprisonment, by transportation of the men who had taken up
arms against intolerable oppression. If noble earls of England had
scrutinized English policy, and advised their own Government as they
now advised the Government of the United States, some heroic lives
would have been spared to Ireland, and subjects in India would not have
been doomed to a personal degradation which heightened the horror of
impending death.
But while offensive surveillance of American affairs ceased in
Parliament, offensive criticisms in the British Press continued
throughout the period of Reconstruction, and our Government was held
answerable for alleged wrongs and outrages against a conquered foe.
Especial hostility was exhibited towards the Republican party, which
had conducted the Government through the war and led it to its complete
triumph. This party controlled Congress when it levied heavy
protective duties and stimulated manufacturing in American as the basis
of that financial strength which proved during the civil war a marvel
to the world. Offended by the Protective policy of the United States,
the British Press now denounced the measures proposed for the
Reconstruction of the South. No censure was too harsh, no epithet
too severe to apply to the policy and to the Republican party that
stood sponsor for it. It might have surprised those English critics
to learn that the opponents of the Reconstruction policy at home could
find nothing to say of it so denunciatory or so concentrated in
bitterness as that the National Government was trying to reduce the
Southern States to the condition of Ireland. And thus while we were
receiving from British oracles multiplied instructions as to the
manner of dealing with the States that had attempted to break from
their allegiance, those States knew that almost within sight of
England's shores there could be found the worst governed, the most
cruelly treated people within the circle of Christendom. The American
mote could be plainly descried beyond the broad ocean, but the Irish
beam was not visible across the narrow channel.
The comparison of the Southern States under the measures of
Reconstruction, with Ireland under the measures of the British
Government, naturally suggested by hostile criticism in the English
press, is not without its useful lessons. The complaint of
discontented people in the Southern States was that there had been too
great an expansion of popular rights, too large an extension of the
elective franchise. But in Ireland, according to eminent British
statesmen and historian, the suffering was from directly opposite
causes.(3) Self-government of all the people was the rule established
in the Southern States: subjection of all the people and government
with the sword was the rule established in Ireland. Even if the
American Government had made a mistake in its treatment of the
Southern States, the history and traditions of the Republic gave ample
guarantees that wrong steps would be speedily retraced, that all
grievances would be thoroughly redressed; whereas the complaints of
Ireland have remained unredressed for centuries.
There is no parallel among civilized nations to the prolonged
discontent among the Irish people. A race gifted with many of the
noblest qualities of humanity, strong in intellect and quick in
apprehension, could not for centuries complain of grievances if they
did not exist, and the grievances could not exist for centuries without
serious reproach to the British Government. To the lasting honor of
American statesmanship, Southern grievances were not allowed by neglect
or arrogance to grow and become chronic after the civil war had closed.
The one safeguard against an evil so great was the restoration of
self-government to the people who had rebelled, the broadening of the
elective franchise, the abolition of caste and privilege. If
Englishmen had studied the Reconstruction policy instead of deriding
it, they might have learned that the American Government accomplished
for the South in four years what their own Government has failed to
accomplish for Ireland through ten generations.
The Government of the United States had steadily protested during the
continuance of the civil war against the unfriendly and unlawful
course of England, and it was determined that compensation should be
demanded upon the return of Peace. Mr. Adams, under instructions from
Secretary Seward, had presented and ably argued the American case.
He proposed a friendly arbitration of the _Alabama_ claims, but was
met by a flat refusal from Earl Russell, who declined on the part of
the British Government either to make reparation or compensation, or
permit a reference to any foreign State friendly to both parties.
In the autumn succeeding the close of the war, Mr. Seward notified
the British Government that no further effort would be made for
arbitration, and in the following August (1866) he transmitted a list
of individual claims based upon the destruction caused by the
_Alabama_. Lord Stanley (the present Earl of Derby) had succeeded
Earl Russell in the Foreign Office, and declined to recognize the
claims of this Government in as decisive a tone as that employed by
Earl Russell. Of opposite parties, Earl Russell and Lord Stanley
were supposed to represent the aggregate, if not indeed the unanimous,
public opinion of England; so that the refusal to accede to the demands
of the United States was popularly accepted as conclusive. Mr. Adams
retired from his mission, in which his services to the country had
been zealous and useful, without effecting the negotiations which he
had urged upon the attention of the British Government. He took his
formal leave in May, 1868, and was succeeded the following month by
Mr. Reverdy Johnson.
The new Minister carried with him the respect and confidence of his
fellow-citizens. Appointed directly after the Impeachment trial of
President Johnson, he was among the few statesmen of the Democratic
party who could have secured the ready confirmation of the Senate for
a mission which demanded in its incumbent a talent for diplomacy and
a thorough knowledge of International law. The only objection
seriously maintained at the time against Mr. Johnson's appointment, was
the fact that he was in his seventy-third year, and might not therefore
be equal to the exacting duties which his mission involved.
Before Mr. Johnson could open his negotiation, the British Ministry
was changed,--Mr. Disraeli giving way to Mr. Gladstone as Premier, and
Lord Stanley being succeeded by Lord Clarendon as Minister of Foreign
Affairs. With the latter Mr. Johnson very promptly agreed upon a
treaty, which reached the United States in the month of February, 1869.
It purported to be a settlement of the questions in dispute between the
two countries. There was great curiosity to learn its provisions.
Much was hoped from it, because it was known to have been approved by
Mr. Seward at the various stages of the negotiation,--a constant and
confidential correspondence having been maintained by cable, between
the State Department and the American Legation in London, on every
phase of the treaty.
Mr. Seward had earned approbation so hearty and general by his
diplomatic correspondence with Great Britain during the war and in the
years immediately succeeding, that no one was prepared for the
disappointment and chagrin experienced in the United States when the
Johnson-Clarendon treaty was made public. It gave almost personal
offense to the mass of people in the loyal States. It overlooked, and
yet by cunning phrase condoned, every unfriendly act of England during
our civil war. It affected to class the injuries inflicted upon the
Nation as mere private claims, to be offset by private claims of
British subjects,--the whole to be referred to a joint commission,
after the ordinary and constantly recurring method of adjusting claims
of private individuals that may have become matters of diplomatic
importance.
The preamble to the treaty established its character and proved its
utter inadequacy to meet the demands of the United States. It was in
these words: "Whereas claims have at various times since the exchange
of the ratifications of the convention between Great Britain and the
United States of America, signed at London on the 8th of February,
1853, been made upon the Government of her Britannic Majesty on the
part of citizens of the United States, and upon the Government of the
United States on the part of subjects of her Britannic Majesty; and
whereas _some of such claims are still pending and remain unsettled_,
her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Ireland, and the President of the United States of America, being of
opinion that a speedy and equitable settlement of all such claims will
contribute much to the maintenance of the friendly feelings which
subsist between the two countries, have resolved to make arrangements
for that purpose by means of a convention."
Among the first provisions of the treaty was a declaration that the
result of the proceedings of the commission thus to be provided for,
should be considered as "a full and final settlement of every claim
upon either government arising out of any transaction of a date prior
to the exchange of ratifications;" and all claims thereafter were to
be "considered and treated as finally settled and barred, and
thenceforth inadmissible." For eight years the Government of the
United States had been protesting against the unfriendly course of
Great Britain, against her premature recognition of the Confederate
States as belligerents, against her special concession of ocean
belligerency, against her making the dockyards and arsenals on her
own soil the dockyards and arsenals of the Confederacy, against her
wilful depredation upon the commerce of the United States, against the
destruction of property belonging to American citizens by her agency
and her fault. And now Mr. Johnson and Lord Clarendon had concluded
a treaty which practically admitted that the complaints of the United
States, as a government, against the conduct of Great Britain, as a
government, had been mere rant and bravado on the part of the United
States, and were not to be insisted on before any International
tribunal, but to be merged in an ordinary claims convention, by whose
award a certain amount in dollars and cents might be paid to the
American claimants and a certain amount in pounds, shillings, and pence
might be paid to British claimants. The text of the treaty did not
indicate in any manner whatever that either nation was more at fault
than the other touching the matters to be arbitrated.
The treaty had short life in the Senate. The Committee of Foreign
Relations, after examination of its provisions, reported that it
should "be rejected." Mr. Sumner, who made the report, said it was
the first time since he had entered the Senate that such a report had
been made concerning any treaty. Amendments, he said, were sometimes
suggested, and sometimes a treaty had been reported without any
recommendations; but the hostility to the entire spirit and to every
detail of the Johnson-Clarendon treaty was so intense that the
Committee had made the positive recommendation that it be rejected.
This action was taken in the month of April, 1869, a few weeks after
President Grant had entered upon his office. It was accompanied by a
speech from Mr. Sumner, made in Executive session, but by direction
of the Senate given to the public, in which the reasons for the action
of the Senate were stated with great directness, precision and force.
After enumerating the extent of our losses, National and individual,
direct and indirect, Mr. Sumner said: "If the case against England is
strong, and if our claims are unprecedented in magnitude, it is only
because the conduct of that power at a trying period was most
unfriendly, and the injurious consequences of this conduct were on a
scale corresponding to the theatre of action. Life and property were
both swallowed up, leaving behind a deep-seated sense of enormous
wrong, as yet unatoned and even unacknowledged, which is one of the
chief factors in the problem now presented to the statesmen of both
countries. . . . The truth must be told, not in anger, but in sadness.
England has done to the United States an injury most difficult to
measure. Considering when it was done and in what complicity, it is
most unaccountable. At a great epoch of history, not less momentous
than that of the French Revolution or that of the Reformation, when
civilization was fighting a last battle with slavery, England gave
her influence, her material resources, to the wicked cause, and
flung a sword into the scale with slavery."
President Grant was in full sympathy with the Senate in its prompt
rejection of the Johnson-Clarendon treaty, and in his annual message to
Congress in the ensuing December (1869) he expressed his entire dissent
from its provisions.(4) He thought the rejection of the treaty was
"followed by a state of public opinion on both sides not favorable to
an immediate attempt at renewed negotiation," and expressed "the hope
that the time will soon arrive when the two Governments can approach
the solution of this momentous question, with an appreciation of what
is due to the rights, dignity, and honor of each."
The rejection of the Johnson-Clarendon treaty was formally announced
to the British Government through Mr. Motley, who succeeded Mr.
Johnson as Minister in London. Mr. Fish, in his letter of
instructions, suggested to Mr. Motley the propriety of suspending
negotiations for the present on the whole question. At the same time
he committed the Government of the United States anew to the
maintenance of the claim for National damages, as well as for the
losses of individual citizens. And thus the matter was allowed to
rest. The United States, though deeply aggrieved, did not desire to
urge the negotiation in a spirit of hostility that implied readiness
to go to war upon the issue, and simply trusted that a returning sense
of justice in the British Government would lead to a renewal of
negotiations and a friendly adjustment of all differences between the
two Governments.
A year went by and nothing was done. The English Government was not
disposed to go a step beyond the provisions of the Johnson-Clarendon
treaty, and had indeed been somewhat offended by the promptness
with which the Senate had rejected that agreement, especially by
the emphasis which the speech of Mr. Sumner had given to the
Senate's action. President Grant remained altogether patient and
composed--feeling that postponement could not be a loss to the
American Government, and would certainly prove no gain to the British
Government. In his annual message to Congress of December, 1870, he
assumed a position which proved embarrassing to England. He recognized
the fact that "the Cabinet at London does not appear willing to
concede that her Majesty's Government was guilty of any negligence, or
did or permitted any act of which the United States has just cause of
complaint;" and he re-asserted with great deliberation and emphasis
that "_our firm and unalterable convictions are directly the reverse_."
The President therefore recommended that Congress should "authorize the
appointment of a commission to take proof of the amounts and the
ownership of these several claims, _on notice to the representative of
her Majesty at Washington_, and that authority be given for the
settlement of these claims by the United States, so that the Government
shall have the ownership of the private claims, as well as the
responsible control of all the demands against Great Britain."
President Grant was evidently resolved that the Government of the
United States should not allow the pressing need of private claimants
to operate in any degree upon public opinion in the United States, so
as to create a demand for settlement with England on any basis below
that which National dignity required. He felt assured that Congress
would respond favorably to his recommendation, and that with the
individual claimants satisfied our Government could afford to wait the
course of events. This position convinced the British Government that
the President intended to raise the question in all its phases above
the grade of private claims, and to make it purely an international
affair. No more effective step could have been taken; and the
President and his adviser, Secretary Fish, are entitled to the highest
credit for thus elevating the character of the issue--an issue made
all the more impressive from the quiet manner in which it was
presented, and from the characteristic coolness and determination of
the Chief Magistrate who stood behind it.
Meanwhile the sanguinary war between Germany and France has broken out,
and was still flagrant when President Grant's recommendation for paying
the _Alabama_ claims from the National Treasury was sent to Congress.
Though the foreign conflict terminated without involving other nations,
it forcibly reminded England of the situation in which she might be
placed if she should be drawn into a European war, the United States
being a neutral power. It would certainly be an unjust imputation upon
the magnanimity and upon the courage of the people of the United States
to represent them as waiting for an opportunity to inflict harm upon
England for her conduct towards this Government in the hour of its
calamity and its distress. It was not by indirection, or by stealthy
blows, or by secret connivance with enemies, or by violations of
international justice, that the United States would ever have sought
to avenge herself on England for the wrongs she had received. If there
had been a disposition among the American people impelling them to
that course, it would assuredly have impelled them much farther.
But England was evidently apprehensive that if she should become
involved in war, the United States would, as a neutral power, follow
the precedent which the English Government had set in the war of the
rebellion, and in this way inflict almost irreparable damage upon
British shipping and British commerce. Piratical _Alabamas_ might
escape from the harbors and rivers of the United States as easily as
they had escaped from the harbors and rivers of England; and she might
well fear that if a period of calamity should come to her, the people
of the United States, with the neglect or connivance of their
Government, would be as quick to add to her distress and embarrassment
as the people of England, with the neglect or connivance of their
Government, had added to the distress and embarrassment of the United
States. Conscience does make cowards of us all; and Great Britain,
foreseeing the possibility of being herself engaged in a European war,
was in a position to dread lest her ill intentions and her misdeed in
the time of our civil struggle should return to plague her.
These facts and apprehensions seem to have wrought a great change in
the disposition of the British Government, and led them to seek a
re-opening of the negotiation. In an apparently unofficial way Sir
John Rose, a London banker (associated in business with Honorable L.
P. Morton, a well-known banker and distinguished citizen of New York),
came to this country on a secret mission early in January, 1871.
President Grant's message had made a profound impression in London, the
Franco-Prussian war had not yet ended, and Her Majesty's Ministers had
reason to fear trouble with the Russian Government. Sir John's duty
was to ascertain in an informal way the feeling of the American
Government in regard to pending controversies between the two
countries. He showed himself as clever in diplomacy as he was in
finance, and important results followed in an incredibly short space
of time. An understanding was reached, which on the surface expressed
itself in a seemingly casual letter from Sir Edward Thornton to
Secretary Fish of the 26th of January, 1871, communicating certain
instructions from Lord Granville in regard to a better adjustment of
the fishery question and all other matters affecting the relations of
the United States to the British North-American possessions. To settle
this question Sir Edward was authorized by his Government to propose
the creation of a Joint High Commission, the members to be named by
each Government, which should meet in Washington and discuss the
question of the fisheries and the relations of the United States to her
Majesty's possessions in North America.
Mr. Fish replied in a tone which indicated that Sir Edward was really
serious in his proposition to organize so imposing a tribunal to
discuss the fishery question. He informed Sir Edward that "in the
opinion of the President the removal of differences which arose during
the rebellion in the United States, and which have existed since then,
growing out of the acts committed by several vessels, which have given
rise to the claims generally known as the _Alabama_ Claims, will also
be essential to the restoration of cordial and amicable relations
between the two Governments." Sir Edward waited just long enough to
hear from Lord Granville by cable, and on the day after the receipt of
Mr. Fish's note assented in writing to his suggestions, adding a
request that "all other claims of the citizens of either country,
arising out of the acts committed during the recent civil war in the
United States, might be taken into consideration by the Commission."
To this Mr. Fish readily assented in turn.
The question which for six years had been treated with easy
indifference if not with contempt by the British Foreign Office had in
a day become exigent and urgent, and the diplomatic details which
ordinarily would have required months to adjust were now settled by
cable in an hour. The first proposal for a Joint High Commission was
made by Sir Edward Thornton on the 26th of January, 1871; and the
course of events was so rapid that in twenty-seven days thereafter
the British Commissioners landed in New York _en route_ to Washington.
They sailed without their commissions, which were signed by the Queen
at the castle of Windsor on the sixteenth day of February and forwarded
to them by special messenger. This was extraordinary and almost
undignified haste, altogether unusual with Plenipotentiaries of Great
Britain. It was laughingly said at the time that the Commissioners
were dispatched from London "so hurriedly that they came with
portmanteaus, leaving their servants behind to back their trunks and
follow." For this change of view in the British Cabinet and this
courier-like speed among British diplomatists, there was a double
cause,--the warning of the Franco-Prussian war, and President Grant's
proposition to pay the _Alabama_ Claims from the Treasury of the
United States--and wait. Assuredly the President did not wait long!
The gentlemen constituting the Joint High Commission were well known
in their respective countries, and enjoyed the fullest measure of
public confidence, thus insuring in advance the acceptance of whatever
settlement they might agree upon.(5) The result of their deliberations
was the Treaty of Washington, concluded on the eighth day of May, 1871.
It took cognizance of the four questions at issue between the two
countries, and provided for the settlement of each. The _Alabama_
claims were to be adjusted by a commission to meet at Geneva, in
Switzerland; all other claims for loss or damage of any kind, between
1861 and 1865, by subjects of Great Britain or citizens of the United
States, were to be adjusted by a commission to meet in Washington;
the San Juan question was to be referred for settlement to the
Emperor of Germany, as Umpire; and the dispute in regard to the
fisheries was to be settled by a commission to meet at Halifax, Nova
Scotia.
The basis for adjusting the _Alabama_ claims was promptly agreed upon.
This question stood in the forefront of the treaty, taking its proper
rank as the principal dispute between the two countries. Her
Britannic Majesty had authorized her High Commissioners and
plenipotentiaries "to express in a friendly spirit the regret felt by
Her Majesty's Government for the escape, under whatever circumstances,
of the _Alabama_ and other vessels from British ports, and for the
depredations committed by those vessels." And with the expression of
this regret, Her Britannic Majesty agreed, through her Commissioners,
that all the claims growing out of acts committed by the aforesaid
vessels, and generally known as the _Alabama_ claims, "shall be
referred to a tribunal of arbitration, to be composed of five
arbitrators,--one to be named by the President of the United States,
one by the Queen of England, one by the King of Italy, one by the
President of the Swiss Confederation, and one by the Emperor of
Brazil." This was a great step beyond the Johnson-Clarendon treaty,
which did not in any way concede the responsibility of England to the
Government of the United States. It was a still greater step beyond
the flat refusal, first of Earl Russell and then of Lord Stanley, to
refer the claims to the ruler of a friendly state.
But England was willing to go still farther. She agreed that "in
deciding the matters submitted to the arbitrators, they shall be
governed by three rules, which are agreed upon by the high contracting
parties as rules to be taken as applicable to the case; and by such
principles of International Law, not inconsistent therewith, as the
Arbitrators shall determine to have been applicable to the case.(6)"
Her Brittanic Majesty had commanded her High Commissioners to declare
that "Her Majesty's Government cannot assent to these rules as a
statement of the principles of International Law which were in force at
the time when the claims arose; but that Her Majesty's Government, in
order to evince its desire of strengthening the friendly relations
between the two countries, and of making satisfactory provision for
the future, agrees that in deciding the questions between the two
countries arising out of those claims, the Arbitrators shall assume
that Her Majesty's Government had undertaken to act upon the principles
set forth in these rules."
There is some question as to whether the British Government has
discharged one of the obligations which it assumed under the treaty.
After the three rules had been agreed upon, a clause of the treaty
declared that "the high contracting parties agree to observe these
rules as between themselves in the future, and to bring them to the
knowledge of the other maritime powers and invite them to accede to
them." Declaring that the three rules had not been recognized
theretofore as International Law by her Majesty's Government, it was
a fair agreement that they should be recognized thereafter, and that
the combined influence of the British and American Governments should
be used to incorporate them in the recognized code of the world.
But the Government of England has been unwilling to perform the duty
which had thus been agreed upon, and this refusal gives rise to the
impression that England does not desire to bind itself with other
nations as she has bound herself with the United States. As the
matter stands, if England should be involved in war with a European
power, the United States is strictly bound by the letter and spirit of
these three rules; but if two Continental powers become engaged in war,
England is not bound by those rules in her conduct towards them. She
certainly has gained much in securing the absolute neutrality of the
United States when she is engaged in war, but it cannot be considered
an honorable compliance with the obligations of the treaty if she
fails to use her influence to extend the operation of the rules.
Following the provision for arbitration of the _Alabama_ claims, the
Treaty of Washington provided for a Commission to adjust "all claims on
the part of corporations, companies or private individuals, citizens of
the United States, upon the Government of her Britannic Majesty; and on
the part of corporations, companies or private individuals, subject
of her Britannic Majesty, upon the Government of the United States."
These were claims arising out of acts committed against the persons or
property of citizens of either country by the other, during the period
between the 13th of April, 1861, and the 9th of April, 1865, inclusive,
--being simply the damages inflicted during the war. The tribunal to
which all such claims were referred was constituted of three
Commissioners; one to be named by the President of the United States,
one by her Britannic Majesty, and the third by the two conjointly.
The Commission was organized at Washington on the 26th of September,
1871, and made its final award at Newport, Rhode Island, on the 25th
of September, 1873. The claims presented by American citizens before
the Commission were only nineteen in number, amounting in the aggregate
to a little less than a million of dollars. These claims were all
rejected by the Commission--no responsibility of the British Government
having been established. The subjects of her Majesty presented 478
claims which, with interest reckoned by the rule allowed by the
Commission, amounted to $96,000,000. Of this number 181 awards were
made in favor of the claimants, amounting in the aggregate to
$1,929,819, or only two per cent of the amount claimed. The amount
awarded was appropriated by Congress and paid by the United States to
the British Government. All claims accruing between 1861 and 1865 for
injuries resulting in any way from the war were thereafter barred.(7)
The subject of the north-western boundary line, commonly known as the
San Juan question, was one of very considerable importance, over which
there had been long contention between the two Governments. The treaty
of Independence in 1783 was followed by a series of disputes relating
to the boundary between the United States and British America. It was
inevitable that a tortuous line, drawn from the north-western angle of
Nova Scotia to the Lake of the Woods and thence (as the treaty
erroneously described it) due west to the Mississippi River, would
give occasion for honest difference of opinion and very frequent
opportunity for technical disputes. The face of the country was
imperfectly known in 1783, and the highlands and water-courses by which
the line was to be determined could not at that time be laid down with
accuracy.
Beyond the Mississippi (then an unknown country) territorial disputes
grew up between Spain and Great Britain. By the purchase of Louisiana
in 1803, and by the subsequently acquired claim to the Oregon country,
the sovereignty of the Republic was extended to the Pacific; Great
Britain claiming to be co-terminous for the entire distance. By the
treaty of 1818 the forty-ninth parallel was agreed upon as the
boundary from the line of the Lake of the Woods to the "Stony
Mountains." The boundary from the Stony Mountains to the Pacific was
left for subsequent settlement, and was finally adjusted (as already
narrated in these pages) by the treaty of 1846. By that treaty the
two governments agreed to continue the forty-ninth parallel as the
boundary from the Stony Mountains "westward to the middle of the
channel which separates the continent from Vancouver's Island, and
thence southerly through the middle of said channel and of Fuca Straits
to the Pacific Ocean."
The Commissioners appointed by the two Governments to run the line
could not come to an agreement upon it,--the British Government
claiming that it should be run through the Rosario Straits, and the
Government of the United States that it should be run through the Canal
de Haro. If the line should be run by the Rosario Straits the Island
of San Juan belonged to Great Britain; if by the Canal de Haro the
island belonged to the United States and formed part of Washington
Territory. It was now agreed in the Treaty of Washington that the
question should be left to the Emperor of Germany, who was "authorized
to decide finally and without appeal which of these claims is most in
accordance with the true interpretation of the treaty of June 15,
1846." The question thus submitted to his Imperial Majesty was purely
a geographical one. Its decision either way could scarcely wound the
susceptibilities of either party, however it might affect National
interests. It also relieved the august arbitrator from the
consideration of all the political prejudices and pretensions which
had marked the long line of boundary discussions between the two
countries, and the jealousies and misunderstandings between the two
countries, and the jealousies and misunderstandings which had proved so
troublesome during the period of joint occupation of the Oregon
territory. The Emperor referred the detailed examination of the
subject to a Commission of eminent experts both in law and science, and
in accordance with their report decided in favor of the claim of the
United States that the line should be run through the Canal de Haro.
The Government of the United States was fortunate in having its rights
and interests represented before the Umpire by its Minister at Berlin,
the Honorable George Bancroft. He was a member of President Polk's
Cabinet during the period of the discussion and completion of the
treaty of 1846, and was Minister at London when the San Juan dispute
began. With his prolonged experience in historical investigation, Mr.
Bancroft had readily mastered every detail of the question, and was
thus enabled to present it in the strongest and most favorable light.
His success fitly crowned an official career of great usefulness and
honor. His memorial to the Emperor of Germany, when he presented the
case, was conceived in his happiest style. The opening words were
felicitous and touching: "The treaty of which the interpretation is
referred to Your Majesty's arbitrament was ratified more than a
quarter of a century ago. Of the sixteen members of the British
Cabinet which framed and presented it for the acceptance of the United
States, Sir Robert Peel, Lord Aberdeen, and all the rest but one,
are no more. The British Minister at Washington who signed it is
dead. Of American statesmen concerned in it, the Minister at London,
the President and Vice-President, the Secretary of State, and every one
of the President's constitutional advisers, except one, have passed
away. I alone remain, and after finishing the threescore years and ten
that are the days of our years, am selected by my country to uphold its
rights."
The decision of the Emperor was given on the 21st of October (1872).
The British Government accepted it cordially and Lord Granville
immediately instructed Sir Edward Thornton to propose that the two
Governments should resume the work of the boundary commission, which
was interrupted in 1859. In accordance with this proposition a chart
was immediately prepared and approved by both parties to the treaty.
It is unnecessary to point out the advantage to the United States of
the decision. A glance at the map will show it in full detail. The
conclusion of the negotiation enabled President Grant to say in his
message to Congress, December, 1872,--ninety years after the close of
the Revolutionary War,--"It leaves us for the first time in the
history of the United States as a nation, without a question of
disputed boundary between our territory and the possessions of Great
Britain on the American continent."
His Majesty's Government had needlessly lost six years in coming to
a settlement which was entirely satisfactory to the Government and
people of the United States. Indeed a settlement at the close of the
war could have been made with even less concession on the part of
Great Britain, and perhaps if it had been longer postponed the demands
of the Government of the United States might have increased. Wars have
grown out of less aggravation and dispute between nations; but the
Government of the United States had never anticipated such a result as
possible, and felt assured that in the end Great Britain would not
refuse to make the reparation honorably due.
The Arbitrators met in the ensuing December at Geneva, Switzerland,
and after a hearing of nine months agreed upon an award, made public
on the 14th of September, 1872. The judgment was that "the sum of
$15,500,000 in gold be paid by Great Britain to the United States for
the satisfaction of all the claims referred to the consideration of
the tribunal." Sir Alexander Cockburn, the British Commissioner,
dissented in a somewhat ungracious manner from the judgment of his
associates; but as the majority had been specially empowered to make
an award, the refusal of England's representative to join in it did not
in the least degree affect its validity.(8)
[NOTE.--The question of the fisheries--the last for whose adjudication
the Treaty of Washington provided--is referred to in a subsequent
chapter.]
[(1) The following extracts are from Hansard's Parliamentary Debates:--
May 16th, 1861. Earl Derby, in discussing our blockade of the Southern
coast, said: "A blockade extending over a space to which it is
physically impossible that an effectual blockade can be applied will
not be recognized as valid by the British Government." And he
intimated that "it is essentially necessary that the Northern States
should not be induced to rely upon _our forbearance_."
--Feb. 10, 1862. Earl Derby discussed the right of Mr. Lincoln to
suspend the writ of _habeas corpus_, and even when Congress had passed
a resolution affirming the course taken by the President, the noble
Earl declared that "No law can be shown to support the President's
exercise of the power."
--May 28, 1861. Mr. Bernal Osborne, in discussing the civil war in the
United States, said: "If this were the proper time, I could point to
outrages committed by the militia of New York in one of the Southern
States occupied by them, where the General commanding, on the pretext
that one of his men had been poisoned by strychnine, issued an order
of the day, threatening to put a slave into every man's house to incite
the slaves to murder their masters. Such was the general order issued
by General Butler."
--Feb. 17, 1862. Lord Palmerston discussed the Constitutional powers
of the Government, and said he knew that Mr. Seward and Mr. Lincoln
could not make war upon their own authority. "We know that very well.
_It requires the sanction of the Senate_."
--March 7, 1862. Mr. Gregory, in discussing the blockade of the
Southern ports, said: "Now I can assure my honorable friend that, so
far as I was concerned, I should have made use of no irritating
expression. I should have affirmed then, as, undeterred by what
has occurred since then, I affirm now, that secession was a right, that
separation is a fact, and that reconstruction is an impossibility."
Mr. Gregory denounced Mr. Seward as "lax, unscrupulous, and lawless of
the rights of others."
--March 7, 1862. General Butler's orders were discussed by the Earl
of Carnarvon, in the Lords, and by Sir John Walsh and Mr. Gregory in
the Commons. Lord Palmerston was pleased to tell them that "with
regard to the course which Her Majesty's Government may, upon
consideration, take on the subject, the House I trust will allow me to
say that that will be matter of reflection."
--March 7, 1862. Mr. G. W. P. Bentinck made a very bitter and abusive
speech of the United States, and invited Her Majesty's Government to
offer some explanation why, according to the policy which they had
pursued with respect to Italian affairs, they had abstained from
recognizing the independence of the Confederacy. He sneeringly
referred to the "endless corruption in every public department in the
Northern States."
--April 23, 1863. Mr. G. W. P. Bentinck transcended every limit of
courtesy when in referring to Mr. Adams he said: "The idea of the
American Minister of honesty and neutrality is remarkable. Every thing
is honest to suit his own purposes."
--March 7, 1862. Lord Robert Cecil, in discussing the blockade of
the Southern coast, said: "The plain matter of fact is, as every one
who watches the current of history must know, that the Northern States
of America never can be our sure friends, for this simple reason--not
merely because the newspapers write at each other, or that there are
prejudices on both sides, but because we are rivals, rivals
politically, rivals commercially. We aspire to the same position. We
both aspire to the government of the seas. We are both manufacturing
people, and in every port, as well as at every court, we are rivals
to each other. . . . With respect to the Southern States, the case is
entirely reversed. The population are an agricultural people. They
furnish the raw material of our industry, and they consume the produce
which we manufacture from it. With them, therefore, every interest
must lead us to cultivate friendly relations, and we have seen that
when the war began they at once recurred to England as their natural
ally."
--July 18, 1862. Mr. Lindsay, in discussing the questions of the civil
war, said: "The re-establishment of the Union is indeed hopeless.
That being so,--if we come to that conclusion,--it behooves England, in
concert, I hope, with the great Powers of Europe, to offer her
meditation, and to ask these States to consider the great distress
among the people of this country caused entirely by this unhappy civil
war which is now raging."
--Aug. 4, 1862. Lord Campbell (discussing the civil war) said: "But
if the present moment is abandoned what are we to wait for? Not for
Northern victories. Such victories would clearly limit our capacity
to acknowledge Southern independence, as it was limited from the
defeat and death of Zollicoffer in the winter down to the events which
have lately driven General McClellan to the river. _We are to wait,
therefore, for new misfortunes to the Government of Washington before
we grant to this unhappy strife the possibility of closing_."
--March 23, 1863. Lord Campbell said: "Swelling with omnipotence,
Mr. Lincoln and his colleagues dictate insurrection to the slaves of
Alabama." And he spoke of the administration as "ready to let loose
four million negroes on their compulsory owners and to renew from sea
to sea the horrors and crimes of San Domingo."--He argued earnestly
in favor of the British Government joining the government of France in
acknowledging Southern independence. He boasted that within the last
few days a Southern loan of £3,000,000 sterling had been offered in
London, and that £9,000,000 were subscribed. He said: "Southern
recognition will take away from the Northern mind the hope which
lingers yet of Southern subjugation. From the Government of
Washington it will take away the power of describing eleven communities
contending for their liberty as rebels. . . . Victorious already,
animated then, the Southern armies would be doubly irresistible. They
would not have, if they retain it now, the power to be vanquished."
--Feb. 5, 1863. Earl Malmesbury spoke disdainfully of treating with so
extraordinary a body as the Government of the United States, and
referred to the horrors of the war,--"horrors unparalleled even in the
wars of barbarous nations."
--March 27, 1863. Mr. Laird of Birkenhead (the builder of the
_Alabama_ and the rebel rams) was loudly cheered when he declared that
"the institutions of the United States are of no value whatever, and
have reduced the very name of liberty to an utter absurdity."
--April 23, 1863. Mr. Roebuck declared "that the whole conduct of the
people of the North is such as proves them not only unfit for the
government of themselves, but unfit for the courtesies and the
community of the civilized world." Referring to some case of an
English ship that had been seized by an American man-of-war, he
declared: "It may lead to war; and I, speaking here for the English
people, am prepared for war. I know that language will strike the
heart of the peace party in this country, but it will also strike the
heart of the insolent people who govern America."
--Lord Palmerston, Prime Minister, simply replied, without other
comment, that the question to which Mr. Roebuck referred "is of the
greatest possible importance."
--June 30, 1863. Mr. Roebuck asserted that "the South will never come
into the Union, and what is more, I hope it never may. I will tell you
why I say so. America while she was united ran a race of prosperity
unparalleled in the world. Eighty years made the Republic such a
power, that if she had continued as she was a few years longer she
would have been the great bully of the world. . . . As far as my
influence goes, I am determined to do all I can to prevent the
reconstruction of the Union. . . . I say then that the Southern States
have indicated their right to recognition; they hold out to us
advantages such as the world has never seen before. I hold that it
will be of the greatest importance that the reconstruction of the
Union should not take place."
--April 24, 1863. Mr. Horsman of Stroud said: "We have seen the
leviathan power of the North broken and driven back, with nothing to
show for two years of unparalleled preparation and vast human sacrifice
but failure and humiliation; the conquest of the South more hopeless
and unachievable than ever, and Washington at this moment in greater
jeopardy than Richmond. . . . I am not surprised that we should hear
the questions asked now, 'How long are these afflictions to be endured?
How long are the cotton ports of the South to remain sealed to Europe?
How long are France and England to be debarred from intercourse with
friendly States that owe no more allegiance to the North than they
owe to the Pope? And how long are our patient but suffering operatives
to remain the victims of an extinct authority and an aggressive and
a malevolent Legislature?'"
--June 15, 1863. The Marquis of Clanricarde objected to our blockade,
and said it was kept up "although every man of common sense in the
United States is now convinced that it is impossible to compel the
Southern States to re-enter the Union. . . . It is the duty of the
British Government not to allow these infractions of maritime law to
continue, which are in effect setting aside all law and practice as
hitherto maintained."
--June 26, 1863. The Marquis of Clanricarde thought that "proceedings
of American prize courts should be closely watched, for if doctrines
are admitted there contrary to those maintained in the highest courts
of this country, great confusion will be the result hereafter."
--June 29, 1863. Mr. Peacocke, complaining of some decisions made in
the prize courts of the United States, said: "It is therefore the duty
of the House to see how the law is administered in those courts." He
confessed that he greatly distrusted these prize courts as they were at
the time constituted.
--June 30, 1863. Mr. Clifford spoke of the "wanton barbarity with
which the Federal Government has allowed its officers to wage the
war, as though they sought to emulate the ravages of Attila and
Genghis-Khan. . . And these things were done not for military objects
which would afford some excuse for them, but out of such sheer wanton
malice that even the negroes looked on disgusted and aghast."
--Feb. 9, 1864. Mr. Haliburton said: "The Canadians feel that the
Americans are a lawless people, who are bound by no ties, who disregard
International Law, who resort to violence and force."
--March 4, 1864. Lord Robert Montagu tauntingly remarked that it
seemed to him "that it is the Federals who are bound to stop the
depredations of the _Alabama_. Why have they not a ship quick enough
to catch her and strong enough to destroy her?"
--March 14, 1864. Sir James Fergusson declared that "wholesale
peculations and robbery have been perpetrated under the form of war
by the Generals of the Federal States, and worse horrors than, I
believe, have ever in the present century disgraced European armies,
have been perpetrated under the eyes of the Federal Government and yet
remain unpunished. These things are notorious as the proceedings of a
Government which seems anxious to rival one despotic and irresponsible
power of Europe in its contempt for the public opinion of mankind."
--March 18, 1864. The Earl of Donoughmore, referring to a statement
in regard to the enlistments made by Captain Winslow of the United
States ship _Kearsarge_, said that "either he stated what was a
transparent falsehood or else he was not fit for his post." He then
added: "The fact, however, is that any transparent falsehood seems to
be a sufficient excuse for a particular line of conduct when it comes
from the Federal Government."
--May 19, 1864. Mr. Alderman Rose declared "the whole system of
Government in the Northern States is false, rotten, and corrupt; while
the South is making for herself a great name and a glorious history."
--June 9, 1864. Lord Brougham said that he believed there was "but
one universal feeling not only in this country, but all over Europe, of
reprobation of the continuance of this war, of deep lamentation for its
existence, and of an anxious desire that it should at length be made to
cease." He lived in hopes "that before long an occasion might arise
when in conjunction with our ally on the other side of the channel we
shall interfere with effect, and when an endeavor to accommodate
matters and restore peace between the two great contending parties will
be attended with success."
--Lord John Russell agreed with Lord Brougham that "it is a most
horrible war in America. There seems to be such hatred and animosity
between great hosts of men, who were lately united under one
government, that no consideration seems powerful enough to induce them
to put an end to their fratricidal strife; and it is difficult to deal
with them on those ordinary principles which have hitherto governed the
conduct of civilized mankind."]
[(2) The subscribers to the Confederate loan in England were very
numerous. The following were among the most conspicuous, as given in
an official list.
Right Hon. Lord Wharncliffe; Marquis of Bath; Marquis of Lothian;
Admiral, Right Hon. Lord Fitzardinge; Right Hon. Lord Claud Hamilton,
M. P.; Right Hon. Viscount Lefford; Right Hon. Lord Teynham; Viscount
Goimanson; Lord Robert Cecil, M. P.; Lord Henry F. Thynne, M. P.; Sir
John W. H. Anson; Sir Gerald George Aylmer; Sir George H. Beaumont;
Sir Samuel Bignold; Sir W. H. Capell Brook; Sir C. W. C. de Crispigny;
Sir T. B. Dancer; Sir Arthur H. Elton; Sir W. H. Fielden; Sir W.
Fitzherbert; Rev. Sir C. H. Foster; General Sir J. W. Guise; Sir Robert
Harty; Sir William Hartopp; Sir Henry A. Hoare; Sir Henry de Hoghton;
Vice-Admiral Hon. Sir Henry Keppel; Sir Edward Kerrison, M. P.; Sir
John Dick Lander, M. P.; Sir E. A. H. Lechmere; Sir Coleman M. O.
Loghlin, M. P.; Rev. C. R. Lighton, Bart.; Lieut.-Col. Sir Coutts
Lindsay; Captain Sir G. N. Brooke Middelton; Sir Edmund Prideaux; Sir
George Ramsey; Sir John S. Richardson; Sir George S. Robinson; Sir John
S. Robinson; Sir J. A. Stewart; Sir W. D. Stewart; Sir John Tysser
Tyrrell; Sir C. F. Lascelles Wraxall; Hon A. Duncombe, M. P.; Colonel,
Right Hon. G. C. W. Forester, M. P.; Right Hon. J. Whiteside, M. P.;
Hon. Percy S. Windham, M. P.; Lieut.-Col. T. Peers Williams, M. P.;
Hon. W. Ashley; Major Hon. W. E. Cochrane; Hon. M. Portman; Hon S. P.
Vereker; Richard Breminge, M. P.; W. H. Gregory, M. P.; Judge
Halliburton, M. P.; John Hardy, M. P.; Beresford A. J. B. Hope, M. P.;
J. T. Hopewood, M. P.; W. S. Lindsay, M. P.; Matthew Henry Marsh, M.
P.; Francis Macdonough, M. P.; J. A. Roebuck, M. P.; William
Scholefield, M. P.; William Vansittart, M. P.; Arthur Edwin Way, M. P.]
[(3) Three eminent British authorities may be quoted as to the mode in
which England had governed Ireland.
--Mr. Lecky, in his history of England in the eighteenth century, in
reviewing the condition of Ireland, says, in 1878: "It would be
difficult in the whole compass of history to find another instance
in which such various and such powerful agencies concurred to degrade
the character and to blast the prosperity of a nation. That the
greater part of them sprang directly from the corrupt and selfish
Government of England is incontestable. No country ever exercised
a more complete control over the destinies of another than did
England over those of Ireland for three-quarters of a century after
the Revolution. No serious resistance of any kind was ever attempted.
The nation was as passive as clay in the hands of the potter, and it is
a circumstance of peculiar aggravation that a large part of the
legislation I have recounted was a distinct violation of a solemn
treaty. The commercial legislation which ruined Irish industry, the
confiscation of Irish land, which disorganized the whole social
condition of the country, the scandalous misapplication of patronage,
which at once demoralized and impoverished the nation, were all
directly due to the English Government and the English Parliament."
--Mr. Macaulay, in a speech in the House of Commons on the state of
Ireland, in Feb., 1844, said: "My first proposition, sir, will
scarcely be disputed. Both sides of the House are fully agreed in
thinking that the condition of Ireland may well excite great anxiety
and apprehension. That island, in extent about one-fourth of the
United Kingdom, in population more than one-fourth, superior probably
in natural fertility to any area of equal size in Europe, possessed
of natural facilities for trade such as can nowhere else be found in
an equal extent of coast, an inexhaustible nursery of gallant soldiers,
a country far more important to the prosperity, the strength, the
dignity of this great empire than all our distant dependencies
together, than the Canadas and the West Indies added to Southern
Africa, to Australasia, to Ceylon, and to the vast dominions of the
Moguls,--that island, sir, is acknowledged by all to be so ill affected
and so turbulent that it must, in any estimate of your power, be not
added, but deducted. You admit that you govern that island, not as
you govern England and Scotland, but as you govern your new conquests
in Scinde; not by means of the respect which the people feel for the
laws, but by means of bayonets, of artillery, or entrenched camps."
--Edmund Burke, writing to Sir Hercules Langrishe, in 1792, said: "The
original scheme was never deviated from for a single hour. Unheard-of
confiscations were made in the Northern parts, upon grounds of plots
and conspiracies never proved upon their supposed authors. The war
of chicane succeeded to the war of arms and of hostile statutes; and
a regular series of operations were carried on, particularly from
Chichester's time, in the ordinary courts of justice and by special
commissions and inquisitions: First under pretense of tenures, and
then of titles in the Crown, for the purpose of the total extirpation
of the interests of the natives in their own soil, until the species
of subtle ravage kindled the flames of that rebellion which broke out
in 1641. By the issue of that war, by the turn which the Earl of
Clarendon gave to things at the Restoration, and by the total reduction
of the kingdom of Ireland in 1691, the ruin of the native Irish, and in
a great measure too of the first races of the English, was completely
accomplished."]
[(4) The following is the language of President Grant in his message:--
"Toward the close of the last Administration a convention was signed
at London for the settlement of all outstanding claims between Great
Britain and the United States, which failed to receive the advice and
consent of the Senate to its ratification. The time and the
circumstances attending the negotiation of that treaty were unfavorable
to its acceptance by the people of the United States, and its
provisions were wholly inadequate for the settlement of the grave
wrongs that had been sustained by this Government as well as by its
citizens.
"The injuries resulting to the United States by reason of the course
adopted by Great Britain during our late civil war in the increased
rates of insurance; in the diminution of exports and imports, and other
obstruction to domestic industry and production; in its effect upon
the foreign commerce of the country; in the decrease and transfer to
Great Britain of our commercial marine; in the prolongation of the
war and the increased cost, both in treasure and in lives, of its
suppression, could not be adjusted and satisfied as ordinary commercial
claims, which continually arise between commercial nations. And yet
the convention treated them simply as such ordinary claims, from which
they differ more widely in the gravity of their character than in the
magnitude of their amount, great even as is that difference. Not a
word was found in the treaty, and not an inference could be drawn from
it, to remove the sense of the unfriendliness of the course of Great
Britain in our struggle for existence, which has so deeply and
universally impressed itself upon the people of this country.
"Believing that a convention thus misconceived in its scope and
inadequate in its provisions would not have produced the hearty,
cordial settlement of pending questions, which alone is consistent
with the relations which I desire to have firmly established between
the United States and Great Britain, I regarded the action of the
Senate in rejecting the treaty to have been wisely taken in the
interest of peace, and as a necessary step in the direction of a
perfect and cordial friendship between the two countries. A sensitive
people conscious of their power are more at ease under a great wrong
wholly unatoned than under the restraint of a settlement which
satisfies neither their ideas of justice nor their grave sense of the
grievance they have sustained."]
[(5) The Commissioners on behalf of Great Britain were the Earl de Grey
and Ripon, President of the Queen's Counsel; Sir Stafford Northcote,
late Chancellor of the Exchequer; Sir Edward Thornton, British Minister
at Washington; Sir John Macdonald, Premier of the Dominion of Canada;
and Montague Bernard, Professor of International Law in the university
of Oxford. On the part of the United States the Commissioners were
Hamilton Fish, Secretary of State; Robert C. Schenck, who had just been
appointed Minister to Great Britain; Samuel Nelson, Justice of the
Supreme Court; E. Rockwood Hoar, late Attorney-General; and George H.
Williams, late senator of the United States from Oregon.--The
Secretaries were Lord Tenterden, under secretary of the British Foreign
Office, and J. C. Bancroft Davis, Assistant Secretary of State of the
United States.]
[(6) The following are the three rules agreed upon:--
"A neutral Government is bound--
"First, to use due diligence to prevent the fitting out, arming, or
equipping, within its jurisdiction, of any vessel which it has
reasonable ground to believe is intended to cruise or to carry on war
against a power with which it is at peace; and also to use like
diligence to prevent the departure from its jurisdiction of any vessel
intended to cruise or carry on war as above, such vessel having been
specially adapted, in whole or in part, within such jurisdiction, to
warlike use.
"Secondly, not to permit or suffer either belligerent to make use of
its ports of waters as the base of naval operations against the other,
or for the purpose of the renewal or augmentation of military supplies
or arms, or the recruitment of men.
"Thirdly, to exercise due diligence in its own ports and waters, and,
as to all persons within its jurisdiction, to prevent any violation of
the foregoing obligations and duties."]
[(7) The Commission that made these labored and accurate awards was
composed as follows:--
Right Hon. Russell Gurney, M. P., was the English Commissioner; Hon.
James S. Fraser of Indiana was Commissioner for the United States;
Count Louis Corti (Minister from Italy to the United States) was
selected as third Commissioner. Hon. Robert S. Hale, a learned member
of the bar of New York, and distinguished as a representative in
Congress, was appointed agent of the United States; and Mr. Henry
Howard, one of the British secretaries of Legation at Washington, and
most favorably known to the people of the Capital, was agent of Her
Majesty's Government.]
[(8) The arbitrators who met at Geneva were as follows:--
Great Britain appointed Sir Alexander Cockburn; the United States
appointed Mr. Charles Francis Adams; the King of Italy named Count
Frederick Sclopia; the President of the Swiss Confederation named
Mr. Jacob Stæmpfli; the Emperor of Brazil named the Baron d'Itajubá.
Mr. J. C. Bancroft Davis was appointed Agent of the United States;
and Lord Tenterden was the Agent of Great Britain.]