The stirring events which preceded the Presidential campaign of 1868
brought both parties to that contest with aroused feeling and earnest
purpose. The passionate struggle of which President Johnson was the
centre, had inspired the Republicans with an ardor and a resolution
scarcely surpassed during the intense period of the war. The failure,
on the 16th of May, to find the President guilty as charged in the
Eleventh Article of Impeachment, was received by the public as a
general acquittal, without waiting for the vote of the 26th. A large
proportion of the delegates to the Republican National Convention which
met at Chicago on the 20th of May, gathered under the influence of
keen disappointment at the President's escape from what they believed
to be merited punishment. Though baffled in their hope of deposing
the man whom they regarded with the resentment that always follows the
political apostate, they were none the less animated by the high spirit
which springs from conscious strength and power. They were the
representatives of an aggressive and triumphant party, and felt that
though suffering an unexpected chagrin they were moving forward with
certainty to a new and brilliant victory. The chief work of the
Convention was determined in advance. The selection of General Grant
as the candidate for the Presidency had for months been clearly
foreshadowed and universally accepted by the Republican party. At an
earlier stage there had been an effort to direct public thought towards
some candidate who was more distinctively a party chief, and who held
more pronounced political views; but public sentiment pointed so
unmistakably and irresistibly to General Grant that this effort was
found to be hopeless and was speedily abandoned. The enthusiasm for
General Grant was due to something more than the mere fact that he was
the chief hero of the war. It rested upon broader ground than popular
gratitude for his military services--great as that sentiment was.
During the conflict between Congress and the President, General Grant
had been placed in a trying position, and he had borne himself with a
discretion and dignity which deepened the popular confidence in his
sound judgment and his tact. The people felt that besides the great
qualities he had displayed in war, he was peculiarly fitted to lead in
restoring peace and the reign of law.
Though the main work of the Convention was simply to ratify the popular
choice, the party sent many conspicuous men as delegates. Joseph R.
Hawley, William Claflin, Eugene Hale, George B. Loring, and William
E. Chandler were present from the New-England States. New York was
especially strong in the number of its prominent men. General Daniel
E. Sickles, with his honorable war record, Lyman Tremaine, who had
been Attorney-General of the State, Charles Andrews, since its Chief
Justice, Moses H. Grinnell, Chauncey M. Depew, Ellis H. Roberts, Frank
Hiscock, and others of scarcely less rank made up the notable
delegation. Pennsylvania sent Colonel Forney and General Harry White,
while Colonel A. K. McClure appeared in the Convention as a substitute.
Maryland sent John A. J. Creswell, afterward in General Grant's
Cabinet. John A. Bingham came from Ohio. The Indiana delegation
included Richard W. Thompson and Senator Henry S. Lane. John A. Logan
and Emory A. Storrs represented the great State of which General Grant
was a citizen. Governor Van Zandt of Rhode Island, Senator Cattell and
Cortlandt L. Parker of New Jersey, Ex-Attorney-General Speed of
Kentucky, Carl Schurz and Governor Fletcher of Missouri, added strength
and character to the roll of delegates.
The Convention rapidly completed its work, being in session but two
days. The opening speech by the Chairman of the National Committee,
Governor Ward of New Jersey, was short and pointed. He expressed the
dominant thought in the minds of all when he said: "If, as indicated
by the unanimity of feeling which prevails here, you shall designate
as our leader the great Captain of the age, whose achievements in the
field have been equaled by his wisdom in the Cabinet, the Nation will
greet is as the precursor of victory to our cause, of peace to the
Republic." Carl Schurz was selected as temporary chairman, and his
speech reflected the prevalent feeling of all Republicans. He exulted
in the great achievements of the party, now freshly recalled in its
first National Convention since the successful close of the war, and
proclaimed its purpose to finish and perfect the work of reconstructing
the Union on the broad basis of equal rights.
For permanent President of the Convention General Sickles and General
Hawley had both been prominently mentioned and warmly advocated. The
vote between them in the committee on permanent organization was a tie.
But New York bent every thing to the purpose of nominating Governor
Fenton for the Vice-Presidency, and feared that the selection of
General Sickles for the highest honor of the Convention might prejudice
his chances. By the casting vote of Hamilton Harris of Albany, a
special friend of Governor Fenton and a man of marked sagacity in
political affairs, the choice fell upon General Hawley. His speech on
taking the chair was earnest and impressive. He briefly reviewed what
the party had accomplished, in war and in peace, and emphasized the
obligation of crowning these triumphs with the permanent establishment
of equal and exact justice. He was especially forcible in rebuking the
current financial heresies and in insisting that the full demands of
the Nation's honor should be scrupulously observed. "For every dollar
of the national debt," he declared, "the blood of a soldier is
pledged." "Every bond, in letter and in spirit, must be as sacred as
a soldier's grave." As these patriotic maxims were pronounced by
General Hawley, the whole Convention broke forth in prolonged applause.
The platform, reported on the second day, succinctly stated the
Republican policy. It made two principles conspicuous: first, equal
suffrage; and second, the maintenance of the public faith. These were
the pivots on which the political controversy of the year turned. They
embraced the two supreme questions left by the war. The one involved
the restoration of public liberty, in harmony with public safety, in
the lately rebellious States. The other involved the honor of the
Republic in observing its financial obligations. The Reconstruction
policy rested on equal suffrage as its corner-stone, and the Convention
congratulated the country on its established success, as shown by its
acceptance already in a majority of the Southern States, and its
assured acceptance in all. Equal suffrage was still regarded however
rather as an expedient of security against disloyalty than as a
measure of National right, rather as an incident to the power of
re-organizing rebellious communities than as a subject of National
jurisdiction for all the States.
The Fourteenth Amendment was about to be proclaimed, and would place
American citizenship under Constitutional protection. The Fifteenth
Amendment, ordaining equal political and civil rights, had not yet
come. In this period of transition the platform asserted that the
guarantee of suffrage to the loyal men of the South must be maintained,
but that the question of suffrage in the loyal States belonged to the
States themselves. This was an evasion of duty quite unworthy of the
Republican party, with its record of consistent bravery through
fourteen eventful years. It was a mere stroke of expediency to escape
the prejudices which negro suffrage would encounter in a majority of
the loyal States, and especially in Indiana and California, where a
close vote was anticipated. The position carried with it an element of
deception, because every intelligent man knew that it would be
impossible to force negro suffrage on the Southern States by National
authority, and leave the Northern States free to exclude it from their
own domain. It was an extraordinary proposition that the South, after
all the demoralization wrought by the war, should be called upon to
exhibit a higher degree of political justice and virtue than the North
was willing to practice.
On the financial issue the platform was earnest and emphatic. It
denounced all forms of repudiation as a national crime, and demanded
the payment of the public debt in the utmost good faith, according to
the letter and the spirit of the law. The resolutions reflected
universal Republican feeling in an impassioned arraignment of President
Johnson. At the same time they commended the spirit of magnanimity
and forbearance with which those who had taken up arms against the
Union were received into fellowship with loyal men, and favored the
removal of all political disabilities as rapidly as was consistent with
public safety.
When the preliminary business of the Convention had been concluded,
John A. Logan, in a vigorous and eloquent speech, presented the name
of General Grant for President. On a call of the roll the nomination
was repeated by the entire Convention without a dissenting voice. The
announcement of his unanimous nomination was received with a great
outburst of enthusiasm. The parallel to his unanimity could be found
in but few instances in our political history, and it augured well
for the success of the canvass in which General Grant was thus made
the standard-bearer.
The absence of any contest on the chief nomination imparted unusual
spirit and interest to the struggle for the Vice-Presidency. Three
candidates were urged by their respective friends with great zeal and
earnestness. Benjamin F. Wade, of Ohio, President _pro tempore_ of
the Senate, was already acting Vice-President. If the Impeachment
trial had ended in the conviction of President Johnson, Mr. Wade would
have succeeded him for the unexpired term, and from this coign of
vantage would doubtless have secured the nomination for the second
office. The failure of Impeachment, though fatal to his success, did
not dissipate the support which his long services and marked fidelity
had commanded, without any of the adventitious aids of power. He had
entered the Senate seventeen years before and found there but four
members devoted to the cause of free soil. Seward, Sumner, Chase, and
John P. Hale had preceded him. Less favored than these senators in
the advantages of early life, less powerful in debate, he yet brought
to the common cause some qualities which they did not possess. His
bluff address, his aggressive temper, his readiness to meet the
champions of slavery in physical combat as well as in intellectual
discussion, drew to him a large measure of popular admiration.
For several years Governor Fenton had been rising to leadership among
New-York Republicans. His political skill had been shown while a
member of the House, in forming the combination which made Galusha A.
Grow Speaker of the Thirty-seventh Congress. Though not conspicuous
in debate he had gained a high reputation as a sagacious counselor and
a safe leader. Of Democratic antecedents, he had never been in favor
with the political dynasty which so long ruled New York, and of which
Thurlow Weed was the acknowledged head. With his conservative views
that consummate politician could not keep pace with his party during
the war, and thus lost the mastery which he had so long held without
dispute. Thereupon Mr. Fenton quietly seized the sceptre which Mr.
Weed had been compelled to relinquish. Elected Governor over Horatio
Seymour in 1864, he was re-elected in 1866 over John T. Hoffman, and
his four years in that exalted office not only increased his reputation
but added largely to his political power. The New-York delegation to
the National Convention was chosen under his own eye and was admirably
fitted to serve its purpose. It was not only earnest in its loyalty
but strong in character and ability. It embraced an unusual number of
representative men, and with the favorable estimate which Republicans
everywhere held of Governor Fenton's services and administration, their
efforts made a marked impression upon the Convention.
The friends of Schuyler Colfax relied less on thorough organization and
systematic work than upon the common judgment that he would be a fit
and available candidate. He was then at the height of his successful
career. He was in the third term of his Speakership, and had acquitted
himself in that exacting place with ability and credit. Genial and
cordial, with unfailing tact and aptitude, skilful in cultivating
friendships and never provoking enmities, he had in a rare degree the
elements that insure popularity. The absence of the more rugged and
combative qualities which diminished his force in the stormy struggles
of the House, served now to bring him fewer antagonisms as a candidate.
Beside the names of Wade, Fenton, and Colfax, two or three others were
presented, though not so earnestly urged or so strongly supported.
Senator Wilson of Massachusetts had warm friends and was fourth in the
rank of candidates. Pennsylvania presented Governor Curtin, but with
a divided and disorganized force which crippled at the outset the
effort in his behalf. The delegation was nominally united for him,
but fourteen of the number were friends of Senator Cameron, and were
at heart hostile to Governor Curtin. Mr. J. Donald Cameron, son of
the senator, appeared in person as a contesting delegate. The State
Convention had assumed the authority to name the delegates from the
several Congressional districts. Mr. Cameron denied that the State
Convention had any such prerogative. He presented himself with the
Dauphin credentials as the champion of the right of district
representation. He was admitted to nothing more than an honorary seat,
but the opposition of himself and his friends had the desired effect
in preventing the candidacy of Governor Curtin from becoming formidable.
On the first ballot Mr. Wade led with 147 votes. Mr. Fenton was next
with 126, Mr. Colfax followed with 125, and Mr. Wilson with 119. Mr.
Curtin had 51, and the remainder were scattering. Several of the minor
candidates immediately dropped out, and on the second ballot the vote
for Wade was raised to 170, for Colfax to 145, and for Fenton to 144.
The third and fourth ballots showed nearly equal gains for Wade and
Colfax, while Fenton made no increase. All other names were withdrawn.
Wade had been weakened by the fact that after the first ballot his own
State of Ohio had given several votes for Colfax, to whom the tide now
turned with great strength. Iowa was the first State to break solidly.
Pennsylvania turned her vote to Colfax instead of Wade whose friends
had confidently counted upon it. Other changes rapidly followed, until
the fifth ballot, as finally announced, showed 541 for Colfax, 38 for
Wade, and 69 for Fenton. The result was received with general and
hearty satisfaction, and the Convention adjourned with undoubting
faith in a great victory for Grant and Colfax. General Grant's brief
letter of acceptance followed within a week, and its key-note was
found in the memorable expression, "Let us have peace!" It was spoken
in a way and came from a source which gave it peculiar strength and
significance.
The Democratic National Convention of 1868 was invested with remarkable
interest, less from any expectation that it would seriously contest and
jeopard Republican ascendency, than from the several personal issues
which entered into it, and the audacious public policies which would be
urged upon it. The general drift of the party was clear and
unmistakable, but its personal choice and the tone of its declarations
would determine how bold a stand it would take before the country.
Would it openly proclaim the doctrine of paying the public debt in
depreciated paper money, and emphasize its action by nominating Mr.
George H. Pendleton, the most distinct and conspicuous champion of the
financial heresy? Would it attempt a discussion and review of its
tendency and designs, and make what would approach a new departure,
in appearance if not in fact, by going outside of its own ranks and
nominating Chief Justice Chase? Would the recreancy of President
Johnson to his own party and his hope of Democratic support find any
considerable response? And aside from the issue of virtually
repudiating the public debt, would the party now re-assert its hostile
and revolutionary attitude towards the well-nigh completed work of
Reconstruction? These various possibilities left a degree of
uncertainty which surrounded the Convention with an atmosphere of
curious expectation.
The movement most deliberately planned and most persistently pressed
was that on behalf of Mr. Pendleton. The Greenback heresy had sprung
up with rapid growth. The same influence which had resisted the issue
of legal-tender notes during the war, when they were deemed vital to
the National success, now demanded that they be used to pay the public
debt, though depreciated far below the standard of coin. "_The same
currency for the bond-holder and the plough-holder_" was a favorite
cry in the mouths of many. This plausible and poisonous fallacy
quickly took root in Ohio, whose political soil has often nourished
rank and luxuriant outgrowth of Democratic heresies, and it came to
be known distinctively as "The Ohio Idea." The apt response of the
Republicans was, _the best currency for both plough-holder and
bond-holder!_ Mr. Pendleton was peculiarly identified with the _Ohio
Idea_. If not its author he had been its zealous advocate, and had become
widely known as its representative. The policy which typified the easy
way of paying debts spread through the West and South, and brought to
Mr. Pendleton a wide support. His popular address and attractive style
of speech increased his strength as a candidate, and his partisans
came to the Convention under the lead of able politicians, with the
only movement which was well organized and which had positive and
concentrated force behind it.
While the Pendleton canvass was earnestly, openly, and skilfully
promoted it was also adroitly opposed. The keen and crafty politicians
of New York were neither demonstrative nor frank in indicating their
course, but they were watchful, sinuous, and efficient. Their plot was
carefully concealed. They were ready to have a New-York candidate
thrust upon them by other sections. If called upon to look outside of
their own State and select from the list of avowed aspirants, they
modestly suggested Mr. Hendricks of Indiana, a friend and co-laborer
of Mr. Pendleton. But the favorite scheme in the inner councils of the
New-York Regency, was to strike beyond the Democratic lines and
nominate Chief Justice Chase. This proposition was little discussed in
public, but was deeply pondered in private by influential members of
the Democratic party. Mr. Chase himself presented no obstacle and no
objection. He cherished an eager ambition to be President. He had
desired and sought the Republican nomination in 1864, and though the
overwhelming sentiment for Mr. Lincoln had soon driven him from the
field, the differences he had encouraged led to his retirement from the
Cabinet. His elevation to the highest judicial office in the land did
not subdue or even check his political aspirations. For a time he
looked forward with hope to the Republican nomination in 1868; but when
it became evident that none but General Grant could be the chosen
leader, his thoughts evidently turned towards the Democratic Convention.
Certain circumstances made the possible selection of the Chief Justice
as the Democratic candidate a less inconsistent procedure than his long
antagonism to the party might at first suggest. In the beginning of
his political career Judge Chase had leaned towards the Democratic
party, and at a more recent period had been promoted to the Senate
by the aid of Democrats. He had consistently advocated the fundamental
principles which originally distinguished the party. Recent
circumstances had separated him from active sympathy with the
Republicans and placed him in opposition to the policy of some of its
leading members. He had taken occasion to criticise what he called
the military governments in the Southern States. Other causes had
tended to separate him from the Republican party and to commend him to
the Democracy. When he took his seat on the bench of the Supreme
Court a majority of the judges belonged to the Democratic party, and
with them he soon acquired personal intimacy and confidential
relations. He had secured many friends in the South by joining in the
opinions pronounced by Mr. Justice Field for the court in 1867, in
regard to the test-oaths prescribed in the Missouri constitution, and
also in regard to the test-oath of lawyers known as the case _ex parte_
Garland. All the impressions touching his Democratic tendencies had
been deepened and increased during the Impeachment trial. It was
evident that he was not in harmony with the Republican senators, and he
took no pains to conceal his willingness to thwart them, so far as was
consistent with his duty, in the position of Presiding officer.
This demonstration of political sympathy, made manifest through
judicial channels, had brought Judge Chase and the Democratic managers
nearer together. Both realized however that a complete change of
position would defeat its own purpose. On one important point indeed
Judge Chase never wavered and was unwilling to compromise. In all
utterances and all communications he firmly maintained the principle
of universal suffrage as the primary article of his political creed.
If the Democrats should accept him they must accept this doctrine
with him. Six weeks prior to the Convention Mr. August Belmont in a
private letter advised him that the leading Democrats of New York
were favorable to his nomination, and urged upon him that with the
settlement of the slavery question, the issue which separated him from
the Democratic party had disappeared. Judge Chase replied that the
slavery question had indeed been settled, but that in the question of
Reconstruction it had a successor which partook largely of the same
nature. He had been a party to the pledge of freedom for the
enfranchised race, and the fulfillment of that pledge required, in his
judgment, "the assurance of the right of suffrage to those whom the
Constitution has made freemen and citizens."
Not long after this correspondence the Chief Justice caused a formal
summary of his political views to be published, with the evident
purpose of gaining the good will of the "American Democracy." The
summary touched lightly on most of the controversial political
questions, and contained nothing to which the Democrats would not have
readily assented except the declaration for universal suffrage. To
this policy all Democratic acts and expressions had been
uncompromisingly hostile, and the sentiment of the party might not
easily be brought to accept a change which was at once so radical and
so repugnant to its temper and its training. Judge Chase hoped to
induce its acquiescence and believed that such an advance might open
the way to success. But his tenacity on this point was undoubtedly
an obstacle to his nomination. Another difficulty was the strenuous
opposition of the Ohio delegates and the zealous preference for Mr.
Pendleton. Superadded to all these objections was a popular aversion
to any thing which looked like a subordination of judicial trust to
political aims. Incurring this reproach through what seemed to be
inordinate ambition, Judge Chase had forfeited something of the
strength to secure which could be the only motive for his nomination
by his old political opponents.
Notwithstanding all these apparent obstacles, there was among the most
considerate men of the Convention a settled purpose to secure the
nomination of the Chief Justice. They intended to place him before the
people upon the issues in regard to which he was in harmony with the
Democratic party, and omit all mention of issues in regard to which
there was a difference of view. This was a species of tactics not
unknown to political parties, and might be used with great effect if
Mr. Chase should be the nominee. The astute men who advocated his
selection saw that the great need of the Democracy was to secure a
candidate who had been unquestionably loyal during the war, and who
at the same time was not offensive to Southern feeling. The prime
necessity of the party was to regain strength in the North--to recover
power in that great cordon of Western States which had for so many
years prior to the rebellion followed the Democratic flag. The States
that had attempted secession were assured to the Democracy as soon as
the party could be placed in National power, and to secure that end
the South would be wise to follow the lead of New York as obediently
as in former years New York had followed the lead of the South. It
was a contest which involved the necessity of stooping to conquer.
The Chief Justice was, so far as his position would permit, active in
his own behalf. He was in correspondence with influential Democrats
before the Convention, and in a still more intimate degree after the
Convention was in session. On the 4th of July he wrote a significant
letter to a friend who was in close communication with the leading
delegates in New York. His object was to soften the hostility of the
partisan Democrats, especially of the Southern school. Referring to
the policy of Reconstruction, he said, "I have always favored the
submission of the questions of re-organization after disorganization
by war to the entire people of the whole State." This was intended
to assure Southern men that if he believed in the justice of giving
suffrage to the negro, he did not believe in the justice of denying
it to the white man.
The strangest feature in Judge Chase's strange canvass was the
apparent friendship of Vallandingham, and the apparent reliance of the
distinguished candidate upon the strength which the notorious anti-war
Democrat could bring to him. Vallandingham had evidently been sending
some kind messages to the Chief Justice, who responded while the
Democratic Convention was in session, in these warm words: "The
assurance you give me of the friendship of Mr. V., affords me real
satisfaction. He is a man of whose friendship one may well be proud.
Even when we have differed and separated most widely, I have always
admired his pluck and consistency, and have done full justice to his
abilities and energies." The plain indication was that Vallandingham,
who had come to the Convention as an earnest friend of Pendleton, was
already casting about for an alternative candidate in the event of
Pendleton's failure, and was considering the practicability of
nominating the Chief Justice.
President Johnson had also aspired to the Democratic candidacy.
Ambitious, untiring, and sanguine, this hope of reward had served him
in the bitter quarrel with his own party. The fate of Tyler and
Fillmore had no terrors and no lessons for one who eagerly and blindly
sought a position which would at once gratify his ambition and minister
to his revenge. He was using all the powers of the Executive in a vain
fight to obstruct and baffle the steadily advancing Republican policy.
The Democrats, instead of following a settled chart of principles,
were making the cardinal mistake of supporting him in all his tortuous
course of assumptions and usurpations, and it was not strange that he
should expect them to turn towards him in choosing a leader to continue
the contest. But it is an old maxim, repeatedly illustrated, that
while men are ready to profit by the treason, they instinctively detest
the traitor. Mr. Johnson had embittered the party he had sought to
serve. By his attempt to re-establish the political power of the
elements which had carried the South into rebellion he had acquired
some friends in that section, but his intemperate zeal had so greatly
exasperated public feeling in the North that even those who applauded
his conduct were unwilling to take the hazard of his candidacy.
The re-awakened opposition and designs of the Southern leaders were
shown in the active participation of several of the conspicuous
Confederate chiefs in the Convention. When the last preceding National
Convention was held they were in arms against the Government. This
was the first occasion upon which they could re-appear in the arena
of National politics. It had been suggested to them from friendly
sources that while the memory of their part in the bloody strife was
still so fresh it would be prudent for them to remain in the
background, but they vigorously resented this proposed exclusion.
General Forrest of Tennessee published an indignant letter, in which he
referred to "the counsel of timid men" that those who had prominently
borne the flag of rebellion should abstain from any share in political
action. He vehemently repelled the suggestion. Instead of exacting
only secondary places he boldly asserted the highest claims. He
appealed to the people and directly urged upon his associates, "that
we, who are the true representatives of the greater portion of the
true Constitutional men of the States, shall not exclude ourselves from
the Democratic Convention." This spirit found a hearty response, and a
large number of Confederate officers appeared in the National council
of the party; of whom the foremost were Generals Forrest, Wade Hampton,
John B. Gordon, and William Preston.
The Convention met in New York on the fourth day of July. Besides
those active in the rebel armies, there were several leaders who had
been conspicuous in the civil councils of the Confederacy. A. H.
Garland of Arkansas, Benjamin H. Hill of Georgia, Zebulon B. Vance
of North Carolina, and R. Barnwell Rhett of South Carolina were the
most widely known. Louisiana sent two delegates whom she has since
advanced to the Senate--Randall L. Gibson and James B. Eustis. Thomas
S. Bocock, fourteen years a representative in the National Congress,
afterwards Speaker of the Confederate Congress, came from Virginia.
Montgomery Blair, who like his more impulsive brother Frank had fallen
back into the party which seemed to be the natural home of the Blair
family, came from Maryland as the colleague of William Pinckney Whyte.
New York presented a strong array of delegates, among whom the most
conspicuous were Horatio Seymour, Samuel J. Tilden, Henry C. Murphy,
Augustus Schell, and Francis Kernan. Several of the regularly chosen
delegates from Ohio gave way in order that the State might, in Mr.
Pendleton's interest, secure greater parliamentary and debating talent;
and to this end, Allen G. Thurman, Clement L. Vallandingham, George E.
Pugh, and George W. Morgan appeared on the floor of the Convention.
Pennsylvania sent ex-Senator Bigler and Judge George W. Woodward,
whose ability was equaled by his rank Bourbonism. William R. Morrison
and William A. Richardson of Illinois, William W. Eaton of Connecticut,
Josiah G. Abbott of Massachusetts, James A. Bayard of Delaware, John
G. Carlisle of Kentucky, Joseph E. McDonald and Daniel W. Voorhees of
Indiana, were names familiar in Democratic councils.
Mr. August Belmont's lurid speeches had become the accepted signal-guns
of national Democratic conventions, and he did not disappoint
expectation on this occasion. His prophetic vision and historic
recital were even more expanded and alarming than before. He drew a
dark picture of evils which he charged upon the Republican party, and
then proceeded: "Austria did not dare to fasten upon vanquished
Hungary, nor Russia to impose upon conquered Poland, the ruthless
tyranny now inflicted by Congress on the Southern States. Military
satraps are invested with dictatorial powers, overriding the decisions
of the courts and assuming the functions of the civil authorities; and
now this same party which has brought all these evils upon the country
comes again before the American people asking for their suffrages! And
whom has it chosen for its candidate? The General commanding the
armies of the United States. Can there be any doubt as to the designs
of the Radicals if they should be able to keep their hold on the reins
of government? They intend Congressional usurpation of all the
branches and factions of the Government, to be enforced by the bayonet
of a military despotism."
Apparently it never occurred to Mr. Belmont that each succeeding
sentence of his speech carried with it its own disproof. With loud
voice and demonstrative manner, speaking in public before a multitude
of people, with his words certain to be quoted in the press on account
of the accident of his position, Mr. Belmont denounced the policy of
our Government as more tyrannical than that of Russia or Austria. What
did Mr. Belmont suppose would have been his fate if on the soil of
Russia or Austria he had attempted the slightest denunciation of the
policy of those empires? How long would he have ventured upon a tithe
of the unrestrained vituperation which he safely indulged in here? In
his visions he now saw General Grant upholding a Congressional
usurpation with bayonets. Four years before, he saw in Mr. Lincoln's
election "the utter disintegration of our whole political and social
system amid bloodshed and anarchy." Mr. Belmont had evidently not
proved a true prophet and did not aspire even to be a trustworthy
historian.
Mr. Henry M. Palmer of Wisconsin, who was chosen temporary chairman,
did not delay the Convention, and the organization was speedily
completed by the election of Governor Seymour as permanent president.
He had filled the same position in the convention of 1864. He was
destined to hold a still more important relation to the present body,
but that was not yet foreseen. His admirers looked to him as a
political sage, who if not less partisan than his associates was more
prudent and politic in his counsels. No other leader commanded so
large a share of the confidence and devotion of his party. No other
equaled him in the art of giving a velvety touch to its coarsest and
most dangerous blows, or of presenting the work of its adversaries in
the most questionable guise. It was his habit to thread the mazes
of economic and fiscal discussion, and he was never so eloquent or
apparently so contented as when he was painting a vivid picture of the
burdens under which he imagined the country to be suffering, or giving
a fanciful sketch of what might have been if Democratic rule had
continued. From the beginning of the war he had illustrated the
highest accomplishments of political oratory in bewailing, like the
fabled prophetess of old, the coming woes--which never came. In his
address on the present occasion he arraigned the Republican party for
imposing oppressive taxes, for inflicting upon the country a
depreciated currency, and for enforcing a military despotism. Like all
the other speakers he affected to see a serious menace in the
nomination of General Grant. Referring to the Republican platform and
candidate he said, "Having declared that the principles of the
Declaration of Independence should be made a living reality on every
inch of American soil, they put in nomination a military chieftain who
stands at the head of that system of despotism which crushes beneath
its feet the greatest principles of the Declaration of Independence."
And with this allusion he proceeded to condemn an assumed military rule
with all its asserted evils.
Extreme as was the speech of Mr. Seymour, it was moderate and
conservative in spirit compared with other displays and other
proceedings of the Convention. The violent elements of the Democratic
party obtained complete mastery in the construction of the platform.
They presented in the resolutions the usual declarations on many
secondary questions, together with an elaborate and vehement
arraignment of Republican rule. But the real significance of the new
Democratic creed was embodied in two salient and decisive propositions.
The first was the declaration "_that all the obligations of the
Government, not payable by their express terms in coin, ought to be
paid in lawful money_." This was a distinct adoption of the Greenback
heresy. The movement to nominate Mr. Pendleton did not succeed in its
personal object, but it did succeed in embodying its ruling thought in
the Democratic creed. It proved to be the guiding and mastering force
of the Convention. The greenback issue went there with the positive,
resolute support of a powerful candidate, and of a formidable array of
delegates who knew precisely what they wanted. It was organized under
a name and had the strength of a personality. There was opposition,
but it was not coherent, organized or well led. In fact the platform
was expressly framed to fit Mr. Pendleton; and if, as often happens,
the champion and the cause did not triumph together, he compelled his
party to commit itself fully and unreservedly to his doctrine.
The second vital proposition related to the policy and Acts of
Reconstruction. If Chief Justice Chase was to be nominated, the
party must accept the broad principle of universal suffrage or it
must abandon his lifelong professions. But universal suffrage,
especially if ordained by National authority, was irreconcilable with
Democratic traditions and Democratic prejudices. The Democrats had
uniformly maintained that the right of suffrage was a question which
came within the political power of the States and did not belong to
National jurisdiction. They denied that the States had in any degree,
even by rebellion, forfeited their prerogatives or changed their
relations. They insisted that nothing remained but to recognize them
as restored to their old position. In framing the present platform
they re-affirmed this doctrine, under the declaration that "any attempt
of Congress, on any pretext whatever, to deprive any State of its
right (to regulate suffrage), or interfere with its exercise, is a
flagrant usurpation of power, which cannot find any warrant in the
Constitution." This broad assertion was designed to deny even the
right of Congress to make impartial suffrage in the revised
constitutions a condition precedent to the re-admission of the
rebellious States to representation. But the platform did not stop
here. With a bolder sweep it declared "_that we regard the
Reconstruction Acts of Congress as usurpations, unconstitutional,
revolutionary, and void_." This extreme proposition, deliberately
adopted, was calculated to produce a profound public impression. It
was not a mere challenge of the policy or rightfulness of the
Reconstruction Acts; it was not a mere pledge of opposition to their
progress and completion; but it logically involved their overthrow,
with the subversion of their results, in case the Democratic party
should acquire the power to enforce its principles and to execute its
threats.
The import of this bold declaration received additional light from
the history of its genesis and adoption. Its immediate paternity
belonged to Wade Hampton of South Carolina. In a speech at Charleston,
within two weeks from the adjournment of the Convention, General
Hampton recounted the circumstances which attended its insertion in
the platform, and proudly claimed it as his own plank. He himself
was a member of the Committee on Resolutions, and took an active part
in its deliberations. All the members, he said, agreed that the
control of suffrage belonged to the States; but General Hampton himself
contended that the vital question turned on what were the States. In
order that there might be no room for dispute he proposed that the
platform should specifically say "the States as they were before
1865." To this however some of the members objected as impolitic
and calculated to raise distrust, and it was accordingly dropped.
General Hampton then proposed to insert the declaration that the
"Reconstruction Acts are unconstitutional, revolutionary, and void;"
and the manner in which this suggestion was received is given by
General Hampton himself: "When I presented that proposition every
member, and the warmest were from the North, came forward and pledged
themselves to carry it out." He further reported to his people that
the Democratic leaders declared their "willingness to give us every
thing we could desire; but they begged us to remember that they had
a great fight to make at the North, and they therefore besought us not
to load the platform with a weight that they could not carry against
the prejudices which they had to encounter. _Help them once to regain
the power, and then they would do their utmost to relieve the Southern
States and restore to us the Union and the Constitution as it had
existed before the war_."
This declaration received still further emphasis from at least one of
the nominations to which the Convention was now ready to proceed. The
New-York delegation, which was believed to be friendly to Chief Justice
Chase, had determined to mask itself for the present behind a local
candidate, and it chose Sanford E. Church for that purpose.
Pennsylvania, whose ultimate design was less certain, put forward Asa
Packer in the same way. James E. English of Connecticut, Joel Parker
of New Jersey, and several minor candidates, were presented as local
favorites. The first ballot verified the claims of Mr. Pendleton's
friends, and showed him to be decisively in the lead, though still far
short of the number necessary to nominate. He had 105, while Andrew
Johnson had 65, Judge Church 34, General Hancock 33, Packer 26, English
16, with the remainder scattering. President Johnson had a higher vote
than was expected, but after the first ballot it immediately and
rapidly declined. On the second ballot Pendleton fell of to 99, but
recovered on the third, rising to 119, and thereafter slowly declining.
The first day of voting, which was the third of the Convention, ended
after six ballots without any material change or decisive indication.
The name of Mr. Hendricks of Indiana had been brought forward just at
the close of the third day with thirty votes, and at the opening of the
following day he immediately developed more strength. The adroit use
of his name, devised by the New-York regency, was fatal to Mr.
Pendleton. Coming from the adjoining State Mr. Hendricks divided a
section on which the Ohio candidate relied. A majority of the Indiana
delegation deserted to his banner. New York, with an air of gratified
surprise, withdrew Church and voted solidly for Hendricks. Pendleton
reached his highest vote of 156½ on the eighth ballot and
thenceforward steadily declined. Meanwhile Hancock had been gaining
as well as Hendricks. South Carolina, Virginia, and several other
States changed to his support. Then Illinois broke from Pendleton
and cast half her vote for Hendricks. On the twelfth ballot the
announcement of ½ a vote from California for Chief Justice Chase was
received with a great and prolonged outburst of cheering. It was
suspected that a single delegate from the Pacific coast had cast the
vote at the instigation of the New-York managers, in order to test the
sense of the galleries as well as of the Convention. The day closed
with the eighteenth ballot, on which Hancock had 144½, Hendricks 87,
and Pendleton 56½. With such an apparent lead after so many
ballots, the nomination of General Hancock on the ensuing day would,
under ordinary circumstances, have been reckoned as a probable result.
But it was not expected. It was indeed against the logic of the
situation that a Democratic Convention could at that time select a
distinguished Union general, of conservative record and cautious mind,
for a Presidential candidate. General Hancock's name was in fact used
only while the actual contestants of the Convention were fencing for
advantageous position in the final contest.
The outlook for Mr. Hendricks was considered flattering by his
immediate supporters, but to the skilled political observer it was
evident that the figures of the eighteenth ballot gave no assurance to
the friends of any candidate. After the adjournment of the Convention,
and throughout the night that followed, calculation and speculation
took every shape. The delegations from New York and Ohio absorbed
the interest of the politicians and the public. The two delegations
were playing at cross-purposes--each trying to defeat the designs of
the other, and each finding its most available candidate in the State
of the other. The tactics of New York had undoubtedly defeated
Pendleton, and the same men were now planning to nominate Chief Justice
Chase. The leading and confidential friends of Mr. Pendleton were
resolved that the New York plot should not succeed, and that Mr. Chase
should not, in any event, be the candidate. In a frame of mind which
was half panic, half reason, they concluded that it would be impossible
to defeat the Chief Justice if his name should be placed before the
Convention by the united delegation of New York speaking through the
glowing phrases of Mr. Seymour, who, as it was rumored, would next
morning leave the chair for that purpose. It was concluded, therefore,
in the consultations of Mr. Pendleton's friends, that the movement
should be anticipated by proposing the name of Mr. Seymour himself.
The consultations in which these conclusions were reached were made up
in large part of the aggressive type of Western Democrats, who had been
trained to political fighting under the lead of Stephen A. Douglas.
Among the most active and combative was Washington McLean of the
Cincinnati _Enquirer_. It was this class of Democrats that finally
rendered the nomination of the Chief Justice impossible.
On the following morning (of the last day of the Convention, as it
proved), the Ohio delegation took the first and most important step, in
formally withdrawing the name of Mr. Pendleton. The voting was then
resumed, and the nineteenth and twentieth ballots showed a slight loss
for Hancock, and a corresponding gain for Hendricks. On the
twenty-first ballot Hancock had 135½, and Hendricks 132; with 48½
divided among minor candidates. At this point the Ohio delegation,
having been absent in conference, entered the hall, and amid a hush
of expectation and interest proposed the name of Horatio Seymour. Mr.
Seymour had been frequently mentioned, and would have been formidable
from the first if he had permitted the use of his name, but he had
invariably met the proposition with the answer that he could under no
circumstances become a candidate. He now repeated this statement from
the chair, but Ohio insisted and New York assented. With a whirl of
excitement all the States followed, and the nomination was made on the
twenty-second ballot by a unanimous vote. Mr. Seymour had, no doubt,
been sincere in declining to be a candidate; but the prolonged
balloting had produced a great anxiety among the delegates, and the
pressure had at last come in a form which he could not resist.
The ticket was completed without delay. Just prior to the Convention
General Frank Blair had written a remarkable letter to Colonel
Brodhead, one of the Missouri delegates. General Blair's name had been
mentioned as a Presidential candidate, and in this letter he defined
his position. He insisted, as the supreme issue, that the
Reconstruction Acts and their fruits must be overthrown. How they
should be overthrown he thus indicated: "There is but one way to
restore the Government and the Constitution, and that is for the
President to declare these Acts null and void, compel the army to
undo its usurpations at the South, dispossess the carpet-bag State
governments, allow the white people to re-organize their own
governments and elect senators and representatives." General Blair
contended that this was "the real and only question," and that until
this work was accomplished "it is idle to talk of bonds, greenbacks,
the public faith, and the public credit." This letter, as will be
noted, harmonized in thought and language with the plank which Wade
Hampton had inserted in the platform, and its audacious tone commended
its author to those who had been potential in committing the Convention
to this extreme position. General Preston of Kentucky, who had won
his stars in the Confederate army, presented General Blair for
Vice-President. General Wade Hampton, distinguished in the same cause,
seconded it, and the nomination was made of acclamation.
The Democratic party thus determined, through its platform and
partially through its candidates, to fight its battle on the two issues
of paying the debt in depreciated paper currency and overthrowing
Reconstruction. Other questions practically dropped out. The whole
discussion of the canvass turned on these two controlling propositions.
No violence of design which the Republicans imputed to their
adversaries exceeded their open avowals. The greater positiveness of
General Blair, the keener popular interest in the Southern question
and the broader realization of its possible dangers, made the issue on
Reconstruction overshadow the other. The utterances of Southern
leaders confirmed its superior importance in the public estimate. The
jubilant expressions of Wade Hampton at Charleston have already been
given. In a speech at Atlanta, Robert Toombs declared that "all these
Reconstruction Acts, as they are called, these schemes of dissolution,
of violence and of tyranny, shall no longer curse the statute-book
nor oppress the free people of the country; these so-called governments
and legislatures which have been established in our midst shall at once
be made to vacate. The convention at New York appointed Frank Blair
specially to oust them." Howell Cobb and Benjamin H. Hill also made
incendiary speeches during the canvass, proclaiming their confidence
in the practical victory of those who had waged the Rebellion; and
Governor Vance of North Carolina boasted that all they had lost when
defeated by Grant they would regain when they triumphed with Seymour.
It is not probable that the Democrats could, by any policy, have
achieved success in this contest. The prestige of Grant's great fame
and the momentum given to the Republican party by his achievements
during and immediately after the war, would have defeated any
opposition, however skillful. But had Governor Seymour himself framed
the platform on which he was to stand, and had he been free from the
burden and the embarrassment of Blair's imprudent and alarming
utterances, his greater sagacity and adroitness would have insured a
more formidable battle. As it was, the rash action of the Democratic
Convention made it reasonably clear from the beginning that the ticket
was doomed to defeat. The progress of the canvass strengthened this
impression; the Democracy was placed everywhere on the defensive; its
own declarations shotted every gun that was aimed against it; and its
orators and organs could neither make effective reply nor divert public
attention from its fatal commitment.
The Democrats however made a strenuous contest and sought to
counterbalance the weakness of their national contest by strong State
tickets. In Indiana Mr. Hendricks was nominated for Governor, and it
was hoped that the influence of his name would secure the advantage
of success in the preliminary October struggle. In Pennsylvania a
vigorous canvass was conducted under the skillful management of William
A. Wallace. But all these efforts were unavailing. The October
elections clearly presaged Republican victory. The Republicans carried
Pennsylvania, in spite of surprising and questionable Democratic gains
in Philadelphia; they held Ohio by a satisfactory majority; and in
Indiana, Conrad Baker was elected Governor over Mr. Hendricks. With
this result in the October States the November battle could not be
doubtful.
The Democratic leaders however did not yet surrender the field. They
made one more energetic effort to snatch the victory which seemed
already in the grasp of their adversaries. But their counsels were
divided. One element proposed to try heroic surgery and cut off the
diseased member. While the echoes of the October verdict were still
resounding, the _New-York World_, the leading Metropolitan organ of the
Democratic party, in a series of inflammatory articles demanded that
General Blair should be withdrawn from the ticket. This disorganizing
demonstration met with little favor in the ranks of the party, and only
served as a confession of weakness without accomplishing any good. A
more significant and better advised movement was that of Governor
Seymour himself. He had thus far borne no public part in the campaign,
but he now took the field in person to rally the broken cohorts of his
party and if possible recover the lost ground. Up to this time General
Blair, through his self-assertion and his bold proclamation of
Democratic designs, had been the central figure of the canvass. It was
now determined that Blair should go to the rear and that Governor
Seymour should go to the front and make a last and desperate effort to
change the line of battle.
He started the week following the October elections, and went through
Western New York, Ohio, Illinois and Pennsylvania; ending his tour
only with the close of the National canvass. Delivering at least one
extended address each day at some central point, and speaking
frequently by the way, his journey fastened the attention of the
country and amply illustrated his versatile and brilliant intellectual
powers. No man was more seductive in appeal, or more impressive in
sedate and stately eloquence. With his art of persuasion he combined
rare skill in evading difficult questions while preserving an
appearance of candor. His speeches were as elusive and illusive as
they were smooth and graceful. In his present series of arguments he
labored to convince the country that if the Democrats elected the
President they would still be practically powerless, and that
apprehension of disturbance and upheaval from their success was
unfounded. He sought also to draw the public thought away from this
subject and give it a new direction by dwelling on the cost of
government, the oppression of taxes, the losses from the disordered
currency and the various evils that had followed the trials and perils
through which the country had passed. But it was not in the power of
any man to change the current of public feeling. The popular judgment
had been fixed by events and by a long course of concurrent evidences,
and no single plea or pledge could shake it. The election resulted in
the success of General Grant. Virginia, Mississippi, and Texas, in
which Reconstruction was not yet completed, did not choose electors.
Of the remaining thirty-four States Mr. Seymour carried but eight.
General Grant's majority on the popular vote was 309,584. Of the
electors he had 214 and Mr. Seymour had 80.