The hostility of the President to all measures which the Republican
party deemed necessary for the proper reconstruction of the Southern
States, had made a deep impression upon certain members of his Cabinet,
and before midsummer it was known that a crisis was impeding. On the
11th of July Mr. William Dennison, the Postmaster-general, tendered his
resignation, alleging as the chief cause the difference of opinion
between himself and the President in regard to the proposed Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution. He had for some months felt that it
would be impossible for him to co-operate with the President, and the
relations between them were no longer cordial, if they were not indeed
positively hostile. Alexander W. Randall of Wisconsin, the first
assistant Postmaster-general, was an outspoken supporter of the
measures of the Administration, and was using every effort to prejudice
Mr. Johnson's mind against Mr. Dennison, whom he was ambitious to
succeed. Mr. Dennison felt that he was seriously compromising his
position at home by remaining in the Cabinet, though he had been urged
to that course by some zealous opponents of the Administration, who
desired, as long as possible, to restrain the President from using the
patronage of the Government in aid of his policy. Mr. Randall was
promptly nominated as Mr. Dennison's successor and proved, in all
respects, a faithful follower of his chief.
A week later Mr. James Speed resigned his post as Attorney-general. He
had been regarded as very conservative on all pending issues relating
to Reconstruction, but he now saw plainly that the President was
inevitably drifting, not only to extreme views on the issue presented,
but to an evident alliance with the Democratic party and perhaps a
return to its ranks. Against this course Mr. Speed revolted. His
inheritance of Whig principles, his anti-slavery convictions, his
personal associations, all forbade his following the President in his
desertion of the Republican party. He saw his duty, and promptly
retired from a position which he felt that he could not hold with
personal consistency and honor. His successor was Henry Stanbery of
Ohio, a lawyer of high reputation and a gentleman of unsullied
character. He belonged to that association of old Whigs who, in
their extreme conservatism on the slavery question, had been driven
to a practical union with the Democratic party.
A few days after Mr. Speed's resignation Mr. James Harlan retired from
the Interior Department. He would have broken his relations with the
President long before, but for the same cause that had detained Mr.
Dennison. He was extremely reluctant to surrender the large patronage
of the Interior Department to the control of a successor who would
undoubtedly use it to promote the Reconstruction policy of the
President, just as Mr. Randall would use the patronage of the Post-office
Department. Mr. Harlan had therefore remained in the Cabinet as
long as was consistent with his personal dignity, for the purpose of
protecting the Republican principles which the President and he were
alike pledged to uphold. He was succeeded by Mr. Orville H. Browning
of Illinois, who had been a devoted friend of Mr. Lincoln, and had done
much to secure his nomination at Chicago. He had served for two years
in the Senate after the death of Mr. Douglas, and but for the immediate
control over his course by President Lincoln would have been a co-laborer
with those who were hostile to the mode in which the war was prosecuted.
His faith in Mr. Lincoln, his great admiration for his talents and
his strong personal attachment to him, had for the time maintained
Mr. Browning in loyalty to the Republican party; but with the
restraining influence of the great President gone, Mr. Browning, by
reason of his prejudices not less than his convictions, at once
affiliated and co-operated with the Democratic party. He was a man of
fair ability and of honorable intentions, but always narrow in his
views of public policy. Any thing that could possibly be considered
radical inevitably encountered his hostility.
The political campaign of 1866 was one of greater excitement than had
ever been witnessed in this country, except in the election of a
President. The chief interest was in choosing members of the House of
Representatives for the Fortieth Congress, and in controlling the
Legislatures which were to choose senators of the United States and
pass upon the Fourteenth Amendment. In elections of this character,
even in periods of deepest interest, the demonstrations of popular
feeling are confined to the respective States, but in this instance
there were no less than four National Convention, three of them, at
least, of imposing magnitude and exerting great influence on popular
action.
The first was called by the friends of President Johnson to meet in
Philadelphia on the 14th of August. The object was to effect a
complete consolidation of the Administration Republicans and the
Democratic party, under the claim that they were the true conservators
of the Union, and that the mass of the Republican party, in opposing
President Johnson, were endangering the stability of the Government.
A large majority of the delegates composing the convention were
well-known Democrats, and they were re-enforced by some prominent
Republicans, who had left their party and followed the personal
fortunes of President Johnson. The most conspicuous of these were
Montgomery Blair (who for some years had been acting with the
Republicans), Thurlow Weed, Marshall O. Roberts, Henry J. Raymond,
John A. Dix and Robert S. Hale in New York, Edgar Cowan of
Pennsylvania, James R. Doolittle and Alexander W. Randall of Wisconsin,
O. H. Browning of Illinois, and James Dixon of Connecticut. The
Democrats were not only overwhelmingly in the majority, but they had a
very large representation of the leaders of the party in several
States. So considerable a proportion of the whole number were men who
had been noticeably active as opponents of Mr. Lincoln's
Administration, that the convention was popularly described as a
gathering of malignant copperheads, who, during the war, could not have
assembled in the city where they were now hospitably received, without
creating a riot. Among the most conspicuous and most offensive of this
latter class,--those who had especially distinguished themselves for
the bitterness, and in some cases for the vulgarity, of their personal
assaults upon Mr. Lincoln,--were Mr. Vallandingham of Ohio, Fernando
Wood, Benjamin Wood and James Brooks of New York, Edmund Burke and John
G. Sinclair of New Hampshire, Edward J. Phelps of Vermont, George W.
Woodward, Francis W. Hughes and James Campbell of Pennsylvania, and
R. B. Carmichael of Maryland. Among the leading Democrats, less noted
for virulent utterances against the President, were Samuel J. Tilden,
Dean Richmond and Sanford E. Church of New York, John P. Stockton and
Joel Parker of New Jersey, David R. Porter, William Bigler and Asa
Packer of Pennsylvania, James E. English of Connecticut, Robert C.
Winthrop and Josiah G. Abbott of Massachusetts, William Beach
Lawrence of Rhode Island, and Reverdy Johnson of Maryland.
Mr. Vallandingham's participation in the proceedings was met with
objection. He had not spoken more violently and offensively against
President Lincoln and against the conduct of the war than some other
members of the convention, but his course had been so notorious and
had been rendered so odious by his punishment, both in being sent
beyond the rebel lines and afterwards in being defeated for governor
of his State by more than one hundred thousand majority, that many of
the delegates were not content to sit with him,--a sentiment which Mr.
Vallandingham is said to have considered one of mawkish sentimentality,
but one to which he deferred by quietly withdrawing from all
participation in the proceedings. It was believed, and indeed openly
asserted, at the time, that if he had chosen to remain the attempt to
eject him by resolution, as was threatened, would have led to a
practical dissolution of the convention.
The work of the convention was embodied in a long series of resolutions
reported by Mr. Cowan of Pennsylvania, and an address prepared and read
by Mr. Henry J. Raymond. Both the resolutions and the address simply
emphasized the issue already presented to the country by the
antagonistic attitude of the President and Congress. In the
resolutions, in the address, and in all the speeches, the one refrain
was the right of every State to representation in Congress. The
convention challenged the right of Congress to deny representation to
a State, for a single day after the war was ended and submission to
the National authority had been proclaimed throughout the area of the
Rebellion. In every form in which the argument could be presented,
they disputed the right of power to attach any condition whatever to
the re-admission of the rebel States to a free participation in the
proceedings of Congress. One of the resolutions declared that
"representation in the Congress of the United States or in the
Electoral College is a right recognized by the Constitution as abiding
in every State and as a duty imposed upon its people, fundamental in
its nature and essential to the exercise of our republican
institutions; and neither Congress nor the General Government has any
authority or power to deny the right to any State, or withhold its
enjoyment under the Constitution from the people thereof; and we call
upon the people of the United States to elect to Congress, as members
thereof, none but men who admit this fundamental right of
representation and who will receive to seats in Congress their loyal
representatives from every State in allegiance to the United States."
This sentiment was embodied in many forms in Mr. Raymond's address,
was, in fact, the one fundamental article in the creed of the
Administration and the Democratic party, and afforded the common ground
for their political co-operation.
Mr. Raymond undoubtedly marred the general effect of his address by
carrying his argument to an extreme point. "It is alleged," said he,
"that the condition of the Southern States and people is not such
as renders safe their re-admission to a share in the government of the
country, that they are still disloyal in sentiment and purpose, and
that neither the honor, the credit, nor the interest of the Nation
would be safe if they were re-admitted to a share in its counsels."
Mr. Raymond maintained, even if the truth of this premise were granted,
that it was sufficient to reply that "we have no right, for such
reasons, to deny to any portion of the States or people rights
expressly conferred upon them by the Constitution of the United States,
and we have no right to distrust the purpose or the ability of the
people of the Union to protect and defend, under all contingencies and
by whatever means may be required, its honor and its welfare."
This assertion of the right of the Southern States to take part at
once and peremptorily in the legislation of a country they had sought
to ruin, was not conceded by the people of the loyal States. They did
not require any refinement of argument to convince them that men who
attempt to destroy a Government should not be permitted at once to
share in its administration. They believed that the Congress of the
United States would be guilty of a great wrong if it should
unconditionally surrender its power to the men who demanded admission
to peaceful control of the National only because they had failed to
disrupt it by war. Mr. Raymond's personal friends and admirers, who
were not confined to any one party, were amazed at the recklessness of
his position. He did violence to sound logic by claiming more than
was necessary to his argument, and he seriously injured his reputation
for political shrewdness by attempting to enforce a policy which grated
on the sensibilities and aroused the prejudices of the vast majority
of those who had filled the ranks of the Union Army.
Great advantage was expected by the President's supporters from
the fact that the convention, as they averred, was so truly
"National"--having delegates from every State of the Union. This feature
was presented as in hurtful contrast with Republican conventions, whose
members came almost entirely from the loyal States. A striking
spectacle was attempted by having members from Northern and Southern
States enter the great wigwam (which had been specially prepared for
the meetings of the convention) arm in arm. To intensify the effect
Massachusetts and South Carolina headed the procession, General Couch
and ex-Speaker Orr typifying in this display the thorough cordiality
of Unionist and Confederate in the return of peace and amicable
relations. The danger of all such exhibitions is that they may be
made a subject of ridicule. This did not escape. The "wigwam" was
parodied by the political wits of the Republican party as "Noah's Ark,"
into which there went, as described in Genesis, "_in two and two,_"
"_of clean beasts, and of beasts that are not clean, and of fowls, and
of every thing that creepeth upon the earth._" The humor which this
comparison evoked was of a kind especially adapted to the stump and
was used most effectively. Indeed the President's supporters, long
before the canvass closed, heartily regretted that they had ever
resorted to dramatic scenes as a method of promoting a political cause.
The convention of the President's supporters was followed a fortnight
later (September 3rd) in the same city--Philadelphia--by a still more
imposing assemblage called by the loyalists of the South, who, desiring
to explain their exact situation to co-operating friends, invited
delegations from the Northern States to meet them. Prominent
Republicans from every loyal Commonwealth responded in full force to
these men who were endeavoring to reconstruct their States on an
enduring basis of Constitutional liberty. Pennsylvania sent a
generous delegation as hosts to those who were to enjoy the
hospitalities of the State. Governor Curtin haded the list.
Associated with him were General Geary, already named as his successor,
General Simon Cameron, at that time a private citizen, Colonel John
W. Forney, then editor of the _Philadelphia Press_, and representatives
from every Congressional district in the State. Other States responded
with equal cordiality. Senators Morgan and Harris, Horace Greeley,
and John Jacob Astor, came from New York. Massachusetts sent her
governor, her senators, and all her living ex-governors. It became,
indeed, the fashion for the New-England States to send governors and
ex-governors, and every State was represented in this way. New Jersey
did likewise. The Western States were fully represented by their
ablest and most zealous men. Two future Presidents were on the
delegation from Ohio, with General Schenck and Stanley Matthews and
the influential German editor Frederick Hassaurek. Oliver P. Morton
came from Indiana, Lyman Trumbull from Illinois, Fairchild and Howe
from Wisconsin, Zachariah Chandler and Carl Schurz (then editor of the
_Detroit Post_) from Michigan. The border slave States sent strong
men. N. B. Smithers came from Delaware; Senator Creswell, Francis
Thomas, and C. C. Fulton of the _Baltimore American_, from Maryland;
Governor Boreman, A. W. Campbell and Nathan Goff from West Virginia;
Robert J. Breckenridge accompanied ex-Attorney-general Speed from
Kentucky; while Missouri sent Governor Fletcher, sustained by an able
delegation, of whom Van Horn, Finkelnburg and Louis Gottschalk were
prominent members. A number of business men, headed by E. W. Fox,
came from St. Louis.
Many of the Southern States were somewhat scantily represented. It was
not safe in certain sections of the South to hold a convention for the
selection of delegates, and yet one or more appeared from every one of
the lately rebellious States. Thomas J. Durant and H. C. Warmoth came
from Louisiana; D. H. Bingham and M. J. Safford from Alabama; G. W.
Ashburn from Georgia; and Governor A. J. Hamilton, Lorenzo Sherwood
and George W. Paschal from Texas. Albion W. Tourgee, who has since won
a brilliant reputation in literature, came from North Carolina with a
strong delegation; J. W. Field and H. W. Davis from Mississippi.
Virginia and Tennessee, of the original Confederacy, sent a large
number of good men. From the former came John Minor Botts, George W.
Somers, Lucius H. Chandler, Daniel H. Hoge, Lewis McKenzie, James M.
Stewart, and some hundred and fifty others; the latter was represented
by Governor Brownlow, Joseph S. Fowler, Samuel Arnell, A. W. Hawkins,
Thomas H. Benton, General John Eaton, Barbour Lewis, and many others
whose loyalty had been tested by many forms of personal peril.
These names give a fair indication of the character and weight of the
convention. It was intended to be, and was, a representative body of
true Union men, of the men who had borne persecution for Loyalty's
sake, of the men who, having aided in achieving great victory, were
resolved that it should not fail to bear its legitimate fruits. The
delegates from all the States first assembled in Independence Square,
and after a meeting of congratulation, marked by great enthusiasm,
proceeded to form into two conventions,--one containing the loyalists
who had called the convention, and the other the Northern delegates who
had met to welcome them. Of the Southern Convention Mr. Thomas J.
Durant of Louisiana was selected as temporary chairman, and Honorable
James Speed of Kentucky as permanent chairman; and of the Northern
Convention Governor Curtis of Pennsylvania was both temporary and
permanent chairman. The motive for thus separating was to leave the
Southern loyalists entirely untrammeled in their proceedings, in order
that their voice might have greater weight in the country than if it
were apparently directed by a large majority of Northern men assembling
in the same body with them.
The Northern Convention concluded its proceedings on the third day with
a mass-meeting larger than any that had ever assembled in Philadelphia.
The Southern Convention remained in session full five days. The
interest was sustained from beginning to end, and besides the delegates
present, a vast assemblage of people thronged the streets of
Philadelphia during all the sessions of the conventions. In an off
year, as partisans call it, there had never been seen so great
excitement, enthusiasm and earnestness in any political assemblage.
Mr. Durant called the Southern Convention to order with the same gavel
that had been used in the Secession Convention in South Carolina.
Governor Hamilton of Texas, who presented it for the occasion,
reminded his audience that the whirligig of time brings about its
revenges, and that it seemed a poetic retribution that a convention
of Southern loyalists should be called to order with the same
instrument that had rapped the South into disunion and anarchy.
On taking the chair as permanent president of the Southern Convention,
Mr. Speed spoke of the Administration, of which for the past few
months he had been a reluctant member, with a freedom which, during his
connection with it, would have been improper if not impossible. He
described the late convention in this place as one with which "we could
not act." "Why was that convention here? It was here in part because
the great cry came up from the white man of the South,--My
Constitutional and my natural rights are denied me; and then the cry
came up from the black man of the South--My Constitutional and my
natural rights are denied me. These complaints are utterly
antagonistic, the one to the other; and this convention is called to
say which is right. Upon that question, if upon the truth as you feel
it, speak the truth as you know it, speak the truth as you love
permanent peace, as you may hope to establish the institutions of this
Government so that our children and our children's children shall enjoy
a peace that we have not known. . . . The convention to which I have
referred, as I read its history, came here to simply record in abject
submission the commands of one man. That convention did his commands.
The loyal Congress of the United States had refused to do his commands;
and whenever you have a Congress that does not resolutely and firmly
refuse, as the present Congress has done, to merely act as the
recording secretary of the tyrant at the White House, American liberty
is gone forever."
Mr. Speed's language was a complete revelation, more emphatic than
had yet been made, of the great differences which had prevailed in the
Cabinet of the President with respect to his policy; and his words
naturally created a sensation, not alone in the convention, but
throughout the country. The fact of his identification with the
President, in the closest official intercourse, ever since his
accession, added vastly to the weight of Mr. Speed's address and gave
to it an influence which he had not, perhaps, anticipated when he
delivered it. This influence was doubtless enhanced by the fact that
the author of the speech was a native and citizen of the South. It was
a stimulus to the patriotic zeal of Northern Republicans to find a man
from the South taking advanced ground that possibly involved peril
to himself before the angry contest should be finally settled.
--The address agreed upon in the Southern Convention was in the form
of an appeal "from the loyal men of the South to their fellow-citizens
of the United States." It declared that the representatives of eight
millions of American citizens "appeal for protection and justice to
their friends and brothers in the States that have been spared the
cruelties of the Rebellion and the direct horrors of civil war."
"Having," said the address, "lost our champion, we return to you who
can make presidents and punish traitors. Our last hope, under God,
is in the unity and firmness of the States that elected Abraham
Lincoln and defeated Jefferson Davis."
--"We cannot better define at once our wrongs and our wants than by
declaring, that since Andrew Johnson affiliated with his early
slanderers and our constant enemies, his hand has been laid heavily
upon every earnest loyalist of the South."
--"History, the just judgment of the present and the certain
confirmation of the future, invites and commands us to declare, that
after neglecting his own remedies for restoring the Union, Andrew
Johnson has resorted to the weapons of traitors to bruise and beat
down patriots."
--"After declaring that none but the loyal should govern the
reconstructed South, he has practiced upon the maxim that none but
traitors shall rule."
--"In the South he has removed the proved and trusted patriot from
office, and selected the unqualified and convicted traitor."
--"After brave men, who had fought the great battle for the union, had
been nominated for positions, their names were recalled and avowed
rebels substituted."
--"Every original Unionist in the South, who stands fast to Andrew
Johnson's covenants from 1861 to 1865, has been ostracized."
--"He has corrupted the local courts by offering premiums for the
defiance of the laws of Congress, and by openly discouraging the
observance of the oath against treason."
--"While refusing to punish one single conspicuous traitor, though
great numbers have earned the penalty of death, more than one thousand
devoted Union soldiers have been murdered in cold blood since the
surrender of Lee, and in no cases have their assassins been brought to
judgment."
--"He has pardoned some of the worst rebel criminals, North and South,
including some who have taken human life under circumstances of
unparalleled atrocity."
--"While declaring against the injustice of leaving eleven States
unrepresented, he has refused to authorize the liberal plan of
Congress, simply because they have recognized the loyal majority and
refused to perpetuate the traitor minority."
--"In every State south of Mason and Dixon's line his policy has
wrought the most deplorable consequences,--social, moral, and
political."
Upon these indictments a powerful address was based, giving argument,
illustration, fact and indisputable conclusion. The address was
framed by Senator Creswell of Maryland, and the style and tone were
beyond praise. It was received with great applause in the convention,
was adopted with unanimity, and created a profound influence upon the
public opinion of the North. It was the deliberate, well-conceived
and clearly stated opinion of thoughtful and responsible men, was
never disproved, was practically unanswered, and its serious
accusations were in effect admitted by the South. The one objective
point proclaimed in the address, repeated in the resolutions, echoed
and re-echoed by every speaker, both in the Northern and Southern
Conventions, was the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. It was
evidently the unalterable determination of the Republicans to make
that the leading feature of the campaign, to enforce it in every party
convention, to urge it through the press, to present it on the stump,
to proclaim it through every authorized exponent of public opinion.
They were determined that the Democratic party of the North should not
be allowed to ignore it or in any way to evade it. It was to be the
Shibboleth of the Republican canvass, and the rank and file in every
loyal State were engaged in its presentation and its exposition.
The friends of the Administration, feeling the disadvantage under
which they labored by an apparent combination of all the earnest
supporters of the war for the Union against them, sought to create a
re-action in their favor by calling a soldiers' convention to meet at
Cleveland, on the 17th of September. A considerable number of
respectable officers responded to the summons; but relatively the
demonstration was weak, ineffective and in the end hurtful to the
Administration. The venerable General Wool of the regular army, the
oldest major-general in the United States at the time, was made
president of the convention and his selection was significant of the
proceedings. He had been all his life a solider and nothing but a
soldier. He was a major of infantry in the war of 1812 and had been
in continuous service thereafter. He denounced the Abolitionists after
the manner that had been the custom in the regular army prior to the
war. He thought the convention had been called to protest against
another war which he was sure the Abolitionists were determined to
force on the county. "Another civil war is foreshadowed," said he,
"unless the freedmen are placed on an equality with their previous
masters. If this cannot be accomplished, radical partisans, with a
raging thirst for blood and plunder, are again ready to invade the
Southern States and lay waste the country not already desolated, with
the sword in one hand and the torch in the other. These revengeful
partisans would leave their country a howling wilderness for the want
of more victims to gratify their insatiable cruelty. . . . Let there
be peace! Yet there are those among us who are not sufficiently
satiated with blood and plunder, and cry for more war." General Wool
would have been severely criticised if it had not been remembered that
for nearly sixty years he had been a faithful soldier and had loyally
followed the flag of the Union in three wars.
Many members of the convention were outspoken Democrats and their
presence, therefore, did not indicate and division in the Republican
ranks,--the objective point to which all the efforts of the
Administration were steadily addressed. Conspicuous representatives
of this class were Generals John A. McClernand of Illinois, J. W.
Denver of California, Willis A. Gorman of Minnesota, James B. Steedman
of Ohio. The delegates who had been Republicans were all of the most
conservative type, and it is believed that every one of them became
permanently identified with the Democratic party. The most prominent
of these were General Thomas Ewing of Kansas, Governor Bramlette and
General Rousseau of Kentucky, and Honorable Lewis D. Campbell of Ohio.
General Gordon Granger and General George A. Custer of the regular army
were very active in organizing the convention. It was evident that the
number of soldiers present was small; and the convention really failed
in its principal aim, which was to strengthen the President in the
loyal States.
A telegram, expressing sympathy with its proceedings, was received by
the convention from a number of Confederate officers who were gathered
at Memphis. But it was unfortunate that General N. B. Forrest was a
conspicuous signer; still more unfortunate that the convention passed
a resolution of thanks to Forrest and his rebel associates for the
"magnanimity and kindness" of their message. Forrest's name was
especially odious in the North for his alleged guilty participation in
the massacre at Fort Pillow. All other circumstances united did not
condemn the convention in Northern opinion so deeply as this incident.
Further investigation of the Fort Pillow affair has in some degree
ameliorated the feeling against General Forrest, but at that time his
name among the soldiers of the Union was as bitterly execrated as was
that of the Master of Stair among the Macdonalds of Glencoe, or of
Haynau, at a later day, among the patriots of Hungary.
The only noteworthy speech in the convention was delivered by General
Thomas Ewing. It was able, but extreme in its hostility to the policy
of Congress. He and Mr. Browning were law-partners at the time of
Mr. Johnson's accession to the Presidency. Both had supported Mr.
Lincoln, and both now resolved to oppose the Republican party. General
Ewing's loss was regretted by a large number of friends. He had
inherited talent and capacity of a high order, was rapidly rising in
his profession, and seemed destined to an inviting political career in
the party to which he had belonged from its first organization. In
supporting the policy of President Johnson he made a large
sacrifice,--large enough certainly to free his action from the slightest
suspicion of any other motive than conviction of duty. General Ewing
has since adhered steadily to the Democratic party.
The fourth of the National Conventions which this remarkable year
witnessed, was that of the citizen soldiers and sailors, held at
Pittsburg on the 25th and 26th of September. Nine out of ten, perhaps
even a larger proportion, of those who had defended the Union with
arms, were hostile to the President's policy. As soon therefore as it
was attempted to secure a political advantage for the Administration
by calling the Cleveland Convention, the great mass of Union soldiers
demanded that a convention be held in which their true position might
be proclaimed. The response was overwhelming both in numbers and
enthusiasm. Pittsburg was literally overrun. In addition to the large
number of regimental and company officers who had done their duty in
the service, there was an immense outpouring of privates. It was said
that not less than twenty-five thousand who had served in the ranks of
the Union army were present. A private soldier, L. Edwin Dudley, was
chosen temporary president, and a majority of the prominent officers
of the convention were privates and non-commissioned officers. Mr.
Dudley was a clerk in the Treasury Department at Washington, and being
refused a leave of absence for two days to attend the convention, he
promptly resigned his place and joined his brethren at Pittsburg. The
incident of the resignation strikingly illustrates the depth of feeling
which the contest between the President and Congress had developed
among the soldiery of the Union.
Officers of high rank in the volunteer service were not wanting.
Generals Butler and Banks of Massachusetts, Palmer and Farnsworth of
Illinois, Negley, Geary, Hartranft and Collis of Pennsylvania,
Cochrane, Barnum and Barlow of New York, Chamberlain from Maine,
Schenck and Cox from Ohio, Duncan and Harriman from New Hampshire,
Daniel McCauley of Indiana, and many of their fellow-officers, took
active and zealous part in the convention. Every loyal State except
possibly Oregon was represented. Far-off California and Nevada, then
without the facility of railway connection, sent delegates. The border
States of the South were present in full force, and Union men who had
borne their part in the civil contest came from every Confederate
State. General John A. Logan had been unanimously elected as permanent
president of the convention, but at the last moment he found himself
unable to attend and his place was filled, with equal unanimity of
selection, by General Jacob D. Cox of Ohio. General Cox, on taking the
chair, made an address of great firmness. It was even radical in its
positions and aggressive in its general tone.
He said it was "unpleasant to recognize the truth that it is in the
minds of some to exalt the Executive Department of the Government into
a despotic power and to abase the representative portion of our
Government into the mere tools of despotism. Learning that this is
the case, we now, as heretofore, know our duty, and knowing, dare
maintain it. The citizen soldiery of the United States recognize the
Congress of the United States as the representative government of the
people. We know and all traitors know that the will of the people has
been expressed in the complexion and character of the existing
Congress. . . . We have expressed our faith that the proposition which
has been made by Congress for the settlement of all difficulties in the
country [the Fourteenth Amendment] is not only a wise policy, but one
so truly magnanimous that the whole world stood in wonder that a people
could, under such circumstances, be so magnanimous to those whom they
had conquered. And when we say we are ready to stand by the decision
of Congress, we only say as soldiers that we follow the same flag and
the same principles which we have followed during the war."
The resolutions, read by General B. F. Butler, were explicit and
unqualified in their declarations, and were indorsed with absolute
unanimity. They declared that "the action of the present Congress in
passing the pending Constitutional amendment is wise, prudent and just.
That amendment clearly defines American citizenship and guarantees all
his rights to every citizen. It places on a just and equal basis the
right of representation, making the vote of a man in one State equally
potent with the vote of another man in any State. It righteously
excludes from places of honor and trust the chief conspirators and
guiltiest rebels, whose perjured crimes have drenched the land in
blood. It puts into the very frame of our Government the inviolability
of our National obligations, and nullifies forever the obligations
contracted in support of the Rebellion." The resolutions further
declared it to be "unfortunate for the country that the propositions
contained in the Fourteenth Amendment have not been received with the
spirit of conciliation, clemency and fraternal feeling in which they
were offered, as they are the mildest terms ever granted to subdued
rebels."
The members of the convention were in a tempest of anger against the
President. They declared "that his attempt to fasten his scheme of
Reconstruction upon the country is as dangerous as it is unwise; that
his acts in sustaining it have retarded the restoration of peace and
unity; that they have converted conquered rebels into impudent
claimants to rights which they have forfeited and to places which they
have desecrated. If the President's scheme be consummated it would
render the sacrifice of the Nation useless, the loss of her buried
comrades vain, and the war in which we have so gloriously triumphed a
failure, as it was declared to be by President Johnson's present
associates in the Democratic National Convention of 1864." Many other
propositions of an equally decisive character were announced by the
convention, and General John Cochrane declared that "a more complete,
just and righteous platform for a whole people to occupy has never
before been presented to the National sense."
Of the four conventions held, this, of the soldiers who had fought the
battles of the Union, was far the most influential upon public opinion.
In its membership could be found representatives of every great
battle-field of the war. Their testimony was invaluable. They spoke
for the million comrades with whom they had stood in the ranks, and
their influence consolidated almost _en masse_ the soldier vote of the
country in support of the Republican party as represented by Congress.
Their enthusiasm was greater, their feeling more intense, their
activity more marked than could be found among the civilians of the
country who were supporting the same principles. They declared the
political contest to be _their own fight_, as they expressed it, and
considered themselves bearing the banner of loyalty as they had borne
it in the actual conflict of arms. Their convention, their
expressions, their determination were felt throughout the entire Union
as an aggressive, irresistible force. From their ranks came many of
the most attractive and most eloquent speakers, who discussed the
merits of the Constitutional amendment before popular audiences as ably
as they had upheld the flag of the Union through four years of bloody
strife. Their convention did more to popularize the Fourteenth
Amendment as a political issue than any other instrumentality of the
year. Not even the members of Congress, who repaired to their
districts with the amendment as the leading question, could commend it
to the mass of voters with the strength and with the good results which
attended the soldier orators who were inspired to enter the field.
Other events powerfully contributed to the political overthrow of the
President. After the change in his policy in the summer and autumn of
1865, which has already been noted, the Southern rebels, who had at
first been cast down and discouraged, saw before them the prospect of
regaining complete ascendency in their respective States. As the
division between the President and Congress widened, their confidence
increased; and as their confidence increased, a reign of lawlessness
and outrage against the rights of the defenseless was inaugurated. The
negroes, who had begun to learn their freedom, were not only subjected
to laws of practical re-enslavement, but to a treatment whose brutality
could not have been foreseen. It was estimated that before the
adjournment of Congress more than a thousand negroes and many white
Unionists had been murdered in the South, without even the slightest
attempt at prosecuting the murderers. Though the aggregate number of
victims was so great, they were scattered over so vast a territory that
it was difficult to impress the public mind of the North with the real
magnitude of the slaughter. But this incredulity vanished in a
moment when the nation was startled on the 30th of July, two days after
the adjournment of Congress, by a massacre at New Orleans, which had
not the pretense of justification or even or provocation.
The circumstances that led to it may be briefly stated. The convention
which formed the free constitution of the State in 1864 was ordered to
re-assemble by its president, upon authority which, he held, was
conferred upon him by the convention at the time the constitution was
formed. Apprehending that some measures were to be taken hostile to
the re-establishment of rebel power in the State of Louisiana, it was
resolved by the opponents of the Republican party that the members of
the convention should not be allowed to come together and organize.
Threats were insufficient to effect this end. Intimidation of every
character had been tried in vain. The men who thought they had the
right, as American citizens, to meet for conference refused to be
bullied out of their plain privileges under the guarantees of the
National Constitution. There was a dispute as to their legal right to
take any action touching the constitution of the State--a dispute
altogether proper for judicial inquiry. Even if they had assembled
and proceeded to amend the constitution, their action could have had
no binding effect until approved by the vote of the people. The
question which lay at the bottom of the agitation was that of negro
suffrage; but the negroes were not entitled to vote under the
constitution as its stood, nor could they vote upon an amendment to
the constitution conferring the right of suffrage upon them. Whatever
the convention might do, therefore, would be ineffectual until approved
by a majority of the white men of the State. It obviously followed
that the men who violently resisted the assembling of the convention
could not justify themselves by the declaration that negro suffrage was
about to be imposed upon them. Their position practically was that a
majority of the white population should not exercise the right of
giving suffrage to the negro.
When the convention attempted to assemble against the desire and
remonstrance of their political opponents, a bloody riot ensued--not a
riot precipitated by the ordinary material that makes up the mobs of
cities, but one sustained by the obvious sympathy and the indirect
support of the municipal authorities of New Orleans, and by the leading
rebels of the State. General Absalom Baird, an able and prudent
officer of the regular army, was in command of the district, but was
purposely deceived by the municipal authorities, to the end that troops
might not be at hand to quell the riot and stop the assassination which
had been planned with diabolical ingenuity. The slaughter, in point of
numbers, resembled that of a brisk military engagement in the field.
The number killed outright was about forty. The wounded exceeded one
hundred and fifty, of whom perhaps one-third were severely injured,
many of them mortally. The city police of New Orleans aided the
rioters. General Sheridan, in command of the department, officially
reported that "the killing was in a manner so unnecessary and
atrocious as to compel me to say it was murder." The lamentable
transaction was investigated by a committee of Congress, composed of
Messrs. Eliot of Massachusetts, Shellabarger of Ohio, and Boyer of
Pennsylvania, the first two being Republicans, the last-named a
Democrat. An investigation was also made under the direction of the
War Department, by a commission of military officers, composed of
Generals Mower, Quincy, Gregg, and Baldy. These officers reported that
in their opinion "the whole drift and current of the evidence tend
irresistibly to the conclusion that there was among the class of
_violents_ known to exist in the State, and among the members of the
ex-Confederate associations, a preconcerted plan and purpose of attack
upon the convention, provided any possible pretext therefor could be
found."
The majority of the Congressional Committee took the same view,
declaring that "the riotous attack upon the convention with its
terrible results of massacre and murder was not an accident. It was
the determined purpose of the mayor of the city of New Orleans to
break up this convention by armed force." The Congressional Committee
did not make their investigation until the succeeding winter session of
1866-7. "We state one fact," said the committee, "significant both as
bearing upon the question of preparation and as indicating the true and
prevailing feeling of the people of New Orleans. Six months have
passed since the convention assembled, when the massacre was
perpetrated and more than two hundred men were slain and wounded. This
was done by city officials and New-Orleans citizens, but not one of
those men has been punished, arrested or even complained of. These
officers of the law, living in the city and known to that community,
acting under the eye of superiors, clothed with the uniform of office,
and some of them known, as the proof shows, to the chief officer of
police, have not only escaped punishment but have been continued in
their places."
Not only were the men who instigated and committed the terrible murders
left unpunished, but, as the committee said, "the gentlemen who
composed the convention have not, however, been permitted to escape.
Prosecutions in the criminal court, under an old law passed in 1805,
were at once commenced and are now pending against them for breach of
the peace." Another authority declares that "the judge of the criminal
court in New Orleans instructed the grand jury to find bills of
indictment against the members of the convention and the spectators,
charging them with murder; giving the principle of law and applying it
in this case, that whoever is engaged in an unlawful proceeding from
which death ensues to a human being, is guilty of murder, and alleging
that as the convention had no right to meet and the police had killed
many men on the day of its meeting, the survivors were, therefore,
guilty of murder." The Congressional Committee did not hesitate to
declare that "the facts tend strongly to prove that the criminal actors
in the tragedy were the agents of more criminal employés, and
demonstrate the general sympathy of the people in behalf of the men who
did the wrong against those who suffered the wrong."
The President came in for a full share of censure in connection with
this unhappy event. The committee reported that "The President knew
that riot and bloodshed were apprehended. He knew what military orders
were in force, and yet, without the confirmation of the Secretary of
War or the General of the Army, upon whose responsibility these
military order had been issued, he gave orders by telegraph, which if
enforced, as they would be, would have compelled our soldiers to aid
the rebels against the men in New Orleans who had remained loyal during
the war, and sought to aid and support, by official sanction, the
persons who designed to suppress, by arrest and criminal process under
color of law, the meeting of the convention; and all this, although the
convention was called with the sanction of the governor, and by one of
the judges of the Supreme Court of Louisiana claiming to act as
President of the convention. The effect of the action of the President
was to encourage the heart, to strengthen the hand, and to hold up the
arms of those who intended to prevent the convention from assembling."
Mr. Boyer, the minority member of the committee, submitted a report
dissenting from the conclusions of the majority, and making, as nearly
as could be done, a defense of the men who had really been the guilty
aiders and abettors of the crime; but he did not deny the fact of the
riot nor of the great number of its victims.
The substantial correctness of the report made by the majority of the
Congressional Committee was never shaken, though it was angrily
attacked by the supporters of the Administration. Aside from the
credit imparted to it by the conscientious character of both Mr. Eliot
and Mr. Shellabarger, the corroboration of all its material statements
by the Commission of Army officers was invaluable. The military men
were not suspected of partisan motives. They had no political theories
to maintain, no animosities to indulge, no personal revenges to
cherish. They proceeded as coolly as though they were investigating
alleged frauds by army contractors or were hearing evidence touching
the damage to frontier settlers by an Indian raid. The intelligence
and impartiality of investigations entrusted to army officers have
become proverbial, and their report of the facts in the New Orleans
riot arrested the attention of the North in an unprecedented degree.
Every thing possible was done by the opponents of the Republican party
to break the force of the damaging facts, but apparently without
success. Indeed the people of the United States have rarely been
stirred to greater excitement than that aroused by the full details of
this nefarious transaction as it came to them through the public press
and through official reports. The effect was disastrous to the
President, and was hurtful, in the extreme, to the cause of prompt
reconstruction. The Northern people shrank from the responsibility of
transferring the government of States to the control of men who had
already shown themselves capable of desperate deeds. In their wrathful
zeal for justice they would hear no apology and no defense of the
President. They held him as an accomplice in the crime,--as one having
in advance a guilty knowledge of the pre-arranged assassination. In
every way in which public indignation can be expressed, in every form
in which public anger can vent itself, the loyal people of the Northern
states manifested their feelings, and did not spare in their bitter
denunciations the personal character of the President or the
unspeakable guilt of his Southern supporters.
The bloody tragedy of midsummer, which had weighed down the people with
a sense of the gravest solicitude, was followed by what might well be
termed its comedy. During the early spring the President had accepted
an invitation from the citizens of Chicago to attend the ceremony of
laying a corner-stone for a monument to be erected to the memory of
Stephen A. Douglas. The date fixed for the President's visit was
September 6th, and he left Washington on the 28th of August,
accompanied by Secretary Welles, Postmaster-general Randall,
General Grant, Admiral Farragut, by a considerable number of army
officers and by a complement of private secretaries and newspaper
reporters,--apparently intending to convert the journey into a political
canvass. Mr. Seward joined the company in New York. The somewhat
ludicrous effect produced by combining a series of turbulent partisan
meetings to be addressed by the President with the solemn duty of paying
respect to the memory of a dead statesman, did not fail to have its
effect upon the appreciative mind of his countrymen, and from the
beginning to the end of the tour there was a popular alternation between
harsh criticism and contemptuous raillery of Mr. Johnson's conduct.
His journey was by way of Philadelphia and New York, to Albany; thence
westward to Chicago. At all the principal cities and towns along the
route large bodies of people assembled. Democrat and Republican,
Administration and anti-Administration, were commingled. The President
spoke everywhere in an aggressive and disputatious tone. It has been
the decorous habit of the Chief Magistrate of the country, when upon a
tour among his fellow-citizens, to refrain from all display of
partisanship, and to receive popular congratulations with brief and
cordial thanks. President Johnson, however, behaved as an ordinary
political speaker in a heated canvass, receiving interruptions from the
crowd, answering insolent remarks with undignified repartee, and
lowering at every step of his progress the dignity which properly
appertains to the great office. At Cleveland the meeting resembled
occasions not unfamiliar to our people, where the speaker receives from
his audience constant and discourteous demonstrations that his words
are unwelcome. The whole scene was regarded as lamentable and one
which must have been deeply humiliating to the eminent men who
accompanied the President.
He made the tour the occasion for defending at great length his own
policy of Reconstruction, and arraigned with unsparing severity the
course of Congress in interposing a policy of its own. The most
successful political humorist of the day(1), writing in pretended support
of the President, described his tour as being undertaken "to arouse
the people to the danger of concentrating power in the hands of
Congress instead of diffusing it through one man." Wit and sarcasm
were lavished at the expense of the President, gibes and jeers and
taunts marked the journey from its beginning to its end. "My policy"
was iterated and reiterated, until the very boys in the streets,
without knowing its meaning, knew it was the source and subject of
ridicule, and made it a jest and a by-word at Mr. Johnson's expense.
The whole journey came to be known as "swinging around the circle,"
and its incidents entered daily into the thoughts of the people only
as subjects of disapprobation on the part of the more considerate,
and of persiflage and ribaldry on the part of those who regarded it
only as a matter of amusement. With whatever strength or prestige the
President left Washington, he certainly returned to the Capital
personally discredited and politically ruined. Upon the direct public
issue which he had raised he would undoubtedly have been beaten in
nearly all the Northern states, but when his weakness had brought him
within fair range of ridicule, he became powerless even in the place of
power.
Meanwhile, during the National Conventions referred to and during the
remarkable tour of the President, the cause of his opponents was urged
in every State and in every district, with extraordinary energy on the
part of leaders, with corresponding interest on the part of the people.
The contest for the governorship of New York between Reuben E. Fenton
and John T. Hoffman, and for the governorship of Pennsylvania between
John W. Geary and Hiester Clymer, excited deep interest far beyond the
borders of either State. The vote for these candidates was looked to
as giving the aggregate popular expression touching the merits of the
Administration, and carried with it the united interest which attached
to all the Congressional districts. When at last a test was reached
and the people had an opportunity to speak the Administration was
overwhelmingly defeated. Vermont, usually so strong in its Republican
vote, now increased the ordinary majority by thousands. Maine elected
General Chamberlain governor by twenty-eight thousand majority.
Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana and Iowa were then all known in current
phrase as October States. They voted for members of Congress and State
officers on the second Tuesday of that month. The result was a
significant verdict against the Administration. In Pennsylvania Geary,
on a much fuller vote than was cast at the Presidential election two
years before, led Clymer by nearly as large a majority as that by
which Lincoln led McClellan. The Congressional elections resulted in
the choice of eighteen Republicans to six Democratic representatives.
Ohio, on her State ticket, gave forty-three thousand majority against
the Administration, and elected sixteen Republican representatives in
Congress, leaving only three districts to the Democrats. In Indiana,
a State always hotly contested, the Republicans secured the popular
vote by a majority of nearly fifteen thousand and carried every
Congressional district except three. Iowa gave a popular majority of
thirty-six thousand and carried every Congressional district for the
Republicans.
Under the impulse and influence of these great victories in October the
November States recorded a like result. New York, of course, absorbed
the largest share of public interest. Two years before, Lincoln had
beaten McClellan by less than seven thousand votes. Fenton had now
double that majority over Hoffman and the Republicans carried two-thirds
of the Congressional districts. Throughout the West, Republican
victory swept every thing before it. Michigan gave thirty-nine
thousand popular majority and a unanimous Republican delegation in
Congress. Illinois gave fifty-six thousand popular majority, with
nearly all the representatives. Wisconsin gave twenty-four thousand
popular majority and elected every Republican candidate for
representative except one. Northern States which had been tenaciously
Democratic gave way under the popular pressure. New-Jersey Republicans
elected a majority of the members of Congress and a majority of each
branch of the State Legislature. Connecticut was carried by Governor
Hawley against the most popular Democrat in the State, James E.
English. California gave seven thousand majority for the Republicans,
while Oregon elected a Republican governor and Republican
representative in Congress.
The aggregate majority for the Republicans and against the
Administration in the Northern States was about three hundred and
ninety thousand votes. In the South the elections were as significant
as in the North, but in the opposite direction. Wherever Republican
or Union tickets were put forward for State or local offices in the
Confederate States, they were defeated by prodigious majorities.
Arkansas gave a Democratic majority of over nine thousand, Texas over
forty thousand, and North Carolina twenty-five thousand. The border
slave States were divided. Delaware, Maryland and Kentucky gave strong
majorities for the Democrats, while West Virginia and Missouri were
carried by the Republicans. The unhappy indication of the whole result
was that President Johnson's policy had inspired the South with a
determination not to submit to the legitimate results of the war, but
to make a new fight and, if possible, regain at the ballot-box the
power they had lost by war. The result of the whole election was to
give to the Republicans one hundred and forty-three representatives in
Congress and to the Democrats but forty-nine. The defeat was so
decisive that if the President had been wise he would have sought a
return of friendly relations with the party which had elected him, or
at least some form of compromise which would have averted constant
collision, with the certainty of defeat and humiliation. But his
disposition was unyielding. His prejudices obscured his reason.
It was well known that the President felt much cast down by the
result. He had, as is usual with Presidents, been surrounded by
flatterers, and had not been advised of the actual state of public
opinion. Political deserters, place-seekers and personal sycophants
had constantly assured the President that his cause was strong and
his strength irresistible. They had discovered that one of his
especial weaknesses was an ambition to be considered as firm and
heroic in his Administration as General Jackson had proved in the
Executive chair thirty years before. He received, therefore, with
evident welcome the constant adulation of a comparison between his
qualities and those of General Jackson, and he came to fancy that he
would prove, in his contest for the unconditional re-admission of
Southern States to representation, as mighty a power in the land as
Jackson had proved in his struggle with the Bank monopolists and with
the Disunionists of South Carolina. But those who had studied the
character of Johnson knew that aside from the possession of personal
integrity, he had few qualities in common with those which
distinguished Jackson. Johnson was bold and fluent in public speech,
irresolute and procrastinating in action: Jackson wasted no words, but
always acted with promptness and courage. Johnson was vain,
loquacious, and offensively egotistic: Jackson, on the other hand, was
proud, reserved, and with such abounding self-respect as excluded
egotism. The two men, instead of being alike, were in fact signal
contrasts in all that appertains to the talent for administration, to
the quick discernment of the time for action, and to the prompt
execution of whatever policy might be announced.
The Republicans had found an easier victory over Johnson than they had
anticipated. They were well led in the great contest of 1866. In New
England the President really secured no Republican support whatever.
Soon after his accession to the Presidency he had induced Hannibal
Hamlin, with whom he had been on terms of personal intimacy in
Congress, to accept the Collectorship of Customs at Boston, but as soon
as Mr. Hamlin discovered the tendency of Johnson's policy he made
haste, with that strict adherence to principle which has always marked
his political career, to separate himself from the Administration by
resigning the office. It was urged upon him that he could maintain his
official position without in any degree compromising his principles,
but his steady reply to earnest friends who presented this view, was
that he was an old-fashioned man in his conception of public duty, and
he would not consent to hold a political office under a President from
whose policy he instinctively and radically dissented. Mr. Hamlin's
course was highly applauded by the mass of Republicans throughout the
country, and especially by his old constituents in Maine. His action
took from Mr. Johnson the last semblance of a prominent Republican
friend in New England and gave an almost unprecedented solidity to the
public opinion of that section.
The adherence of Mr. Seward to the Administration, the loss of Thurlow
Weed as an organizer, and the desertion of the _New-York Times_, had
created great fear as to the result in New York, but the popularity of
Governor Fenton, supplemented by the support of Senator Morgan and of
the younger class of men then coming forward, of whom Roscoe Conkling
was the recognized chief, imparted an energy and enthusiasm to the
canvass which proved irresistible. In Pennsylvania the contest was
waged with great energy by both parties. The result would determine
not merely the control of the local administration, not merely the
character of the delegation in Congress, but the future leadership of
the Republican party of the State. Simon Cameron sought a restoration
to his old position of power by a return to the Senate. During the
five years that had elapsed since he retired from the War Department
Mr. Cameron's supremacy had been challenged by the political _coterie_
that surrounded Governor Curtin. They boastfully proclaimed indeed
that the sceptre of power was in their hands and could not be wrenched
from them. But the reaction against them was strong and did not cease
until Cameron had driven his leading enemies to seek refuge in the
Democratic party.
In the West the hostility to the President and the support of the
policy of Congress were even more demonstrative than in the East. All
the prominent Republicans of Ohio were on the stump and the canvass
was extraordinarily heated, even for a State which has had an animated
contest every year since the repeal of the Missouri Compromise.
Governor Morton's candidacy for the Senate gave great earnestness to
the struggle in Indiana, while Senator Chandler not only rallied
Michigan to the necessity of giving an immense majority, but with his
tremendous vitality added nerve and zeal to every contest in the
North-western States. The whole result proved to be one of commanding
influence on the future course of public events. The Republicans
plainly saw that the triumph of President Johnson meant a triumph of
the Democratic party under an _alias_, that the first-fruits of such
a victory would be the re-establishment of the late Confederate States
in full political power inside the Union, and that in a little more
than five years from the firing upon Sumter, and a little more than
one year from the surrender of Lee, the same political combination
which had threatened the destruction of the Union would be recalled to
its control.
The importance, therefore, of the political struggle of 1866 cannot be
overestimated. It has, perhaps, been underestimated. If the contest
had ended in a victory for the Democrats the history of the subsequent
years would, in all probability, have been radically different. There
would have been no further amendment to the Constitution, there would
have been no conditions of reconstruction, there would have been such
a neutralization of the anti-slavery amendment as would authorize and
sustain all the State laws already passed for the practical re-enslavement
of the negro, with such additional enactments as would have made
them cruelly effective. With the South re-admitted and all its
representatives acting in cordial co-operation with the Northern
Democrats, the result must have been a deplorable degradation of the
National character and an ignoble surrender to the enemies of the
Union, thenceforth to be invested with the supreme direction of its
government.
There was an unmistakable manifestation throughout the whole political
canvass of 1866, by the more advanced section of the Republican party,
in favor of demanding impartial suffrage as the basis of reconstruction
in the South. It came from the people rather than from the political
leaders. The latter class, with few exceptions, shunned the issue,
preferring to wait until public sentiment should become more
pronounced in favor of so radical a movement. But a large number of
thinking people, who gave more heed to the absolute right of the
question than to its political expediency, could not see how, with
consistency, or even with good conscience and common sense, the
Republican party could refrain from calling to its aid the only large
mass of persons in the South whose loyalty could be implicitly trusted.
To their apprehension it seemed little less than an absurdity, to
proceed with a plan of reconstruction which would practically leave the
State governments of the South under the control of the same men that
brought on the civil war.
They were embarrassed, however, in this step by the constantly
recurring obstacle presented by the constitutions of a majority of the
loyal States. In five New-England States suffrage to the colored man
was conceded, but in Connecticut only those negroes were allowed to
vote who were admitted freedmen prior to 1818. New York permitted a
negro to vote after he had been three years a citizen of the State and
had been for one year the owner of a freehold worth two hundred and
fifty dollars, free of all incumbrances. In every other Northern
State none but "white men" were permitted to vote. Even Kansas, which
entered the Union under the shadow of the civil war, after a prolonged
and terrible struggle with the spirit of slavery, at once restricted
suffrage to the white man; while Nevada, whose admission to the Union
was after the Thirteenth Amendment had been passed by Congress, denied
suffrage to "any negro, Chinaman or mulatto." A still more recent test
was applied. The question of admitting the negro to suffrage was
submitted to popular vote in Connecticut, Wisconsin and Minnesota in
the autumn of 1865, and at the same time in Colorado, when she was
forming her constitution preparatory to seeking admission to the Union.
In all four, under the control of the Republican party at the time, the
proposition was defeated.
With these indisputable evidences of the unpopularity of negro suffrage
in the great majority of the Northern States, there was ample excuse
for the reluctance of leading statesmen to adopt it as a condition of
reconstruction, and force it upon the South by law before it had been
adopted by the moral sense of the North. The period, however, was one
calculated to bring about very rapid changes in public opinion; and
there had undoubtedly been great advance in the popular judgment
concerning this question since the elections of the preceding year.
The question was really in the position where it would be materially
influenced by the course of events in the South. The violence and
murder at New Orleans in July had changed the views of many men; and,
while the more considerate and conservative tried to regard that
outbreak as an exceptional occurrence, the mass of the Northern people
feared that it indicated a dangerous sentiment among a people not yet
fitted to be entrusted with the administration of a State Government.
While these views were rapidly taking form throughout the North, they
were strongly tempered and restrained by the better hope that the
people of the South would be able to restore such a feeling of
confidence as would prevent the exaction of other conditions of
reconstruction and the consequent postponement of the re-admission of
the Southern States to representation. The average Republican
sentiment of the North was well expressed by the Republican State
Convention of New York, which, after reciting the provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and declaring that "That amendment commends
itself, by its justice, humanity, and moderation, to every patriotic
heart," made this important declaration: "_That when any of the late
insurgent States shall adopt that amendment, such State shall, at once,
by its loyal representatives, be permitted to resume its place in
Congress._" This view was generally concurred in by the Western
States; and, if the Southern States had accepted the broad invitation
thus given, there is little doubt that before the close of the year
they might have been restored to the enjoyment of every power and
privilege under the National Constitution. There would have been
opposition to it, but the weight of public influence, and the majority
in both branches of Congress, would have been sure to secure this result.
[(1) Petroleum V. Nasby.]