During the progress of events in the South, briefly outlined in the
preceding chapter, the Thirty-ninth Congress came together--on the
first Monday of December, 1865. The Senate and House each contained a
large majority of Republicans. In the House Mr. Colfax was re-elected
Speaker, receiving 139 votes to 36 cast for James Brooks of New York.
The address of the Speaker on taking the chair is usually confined to
thanks for his election and courteous assurance of his impartiality
and good intentions. But Mr. Colfax, instinctively quick, as he always
was, to discern the current of popular thought, incorporated in the
ceremonial address some very decisive political declarations.
Referring to the fact that the Thirty-eighth Congress has closed nine
months before, with "the storm-cloud of war still lowering over us,"
and rejoicing that "to-day, from shore to shore in our land there is
peace," he proceeded to indicate the line of policy which the people
expected. "The duties of Congress," said he, "are as obvious as the
sun's pathway in the heavens. Its first and highest obligation is to
guarantee to every State a republican form of government, to establish
the rebellious States anew on such a basis of enduring justice as will
guarantee all safeguards to the people and protection to all men in
their inalienable rights." . . . "In this great work," he said, "the
world should witness the most inflexible fidelity, the most earnest
devotion to the principles of liberty and humanity, the truest
patriotism and the wisest statesmanship."
The remarks of Mr. Colfax had evident reference to the perverse action
of the Southern rebels, and were so entirely in harmony with the
feeling of the House that at different stages of the brief address the
Republican side of the chamber broke forth into loud applause. As soon
as the election of Speaker and of the subordinate officers of the House
was completed, Mr. Thaddeus Stevens, recognized as the leader of the
majority, offered a resolution for the appointment of a "joint
committee of fifteen members--nine from the House and six from the
Senate--who shall inquire into the condition of the States which formed
the so-called Confederate States of America, and report whether they,
or any of them, are entitled to be represented in either House of
Congress, with leave to report at any time by bill or otherwise." His
resolution demanded that "until such report shall have been made and
finally acted upon by Congress, no member shall be received into either
House from any of the so-called Confederate States," and further
directed that "all papers relating to the representation of the said
States shall be referred to the said committee without debate." Mr.
Eldridge of Wisconsin objected to the introduction of the resolution,
and was met by Mr. Stevens with a motion to suspend the rules, which
was carried by 129 _ayes_ to 35 _noes_. Mr. John L. Dawson of
Pennsylvania inquired whether it would not be in order to postpone the
resolution until after the receipt of the President's message; but the
House was in no disposition to testify respect for Mr. Johnson, and the
resolution was adopted by as large a vote as that by which it had been
received.
Mr. Niblack of Indiana offered a resolution that "pending the question
as to the admission of persons claiming to have been elected
representatives to the present Congress from the States lately in
rebellion, such persons be entitled to the privileges of the floor of
the House." This was a privilege always accorded to contestants for
seats, but Mr. Wilson of Iowa now objected; and, on motion of Mr.
Stevens, the House adjourned without even giving the courtesy of a vote
to the resolution. No action of a more decisive character could have
been taken to indicate, on the threshold of Congressional proceedings,
the hostility of the Republican party, not merely to the President's
plan of reconstruction, but to the men who, under its operation in the
South, had been chosen to represent their districts in Congress.
Against a bad principle a good one my be opposed and the contest
proceed in good temper. But his is not practicable when personal
feeling is aroused. The presence in Washington of a considerable
number of men from the South, who, when Congress adjourned in the
preceding March, were serving in the Confederate Army, and were now at
the Capital demanding seats in the Senate and House, produced a feeling
of exasperation amounting to hatred. The President's reconstruction
policy would have been much stronger if the Southern elections to
Congress had been postponed, or if the members elect had remained at
home during the discussion concerning their eligibility. The presence
of these obnoxious persons inflamed minds not commonly given to
excitement, and drove many men to act from anger who were usually
governed by reason.
In the Senate the proceedings were conducted with even more disregard
of the President than had been manifested in the House. An entire
policy was outlined by Mr. Sumner, without the slightest reference to
what the President might communicate "on the state of the Union," and
a system of reconstruction proposed which was in absolute hostility to
the one that Mr. Johnson had devised. Mr. Sumner submitted resolutions
defining the duty of Congress in respect to guarantees of the National
security and National faith in the rebel States. While the conditions
were not put forth as a finality, they were significant, if not
conclusive, of the demands which would be made, first by the more
advanced Republicans, and ultimately by the entire party. These
resolutions declared that, in order to provide proper guarantees for
security in the future, "Congress should take care that no one of the
rebellious States should be allowed to resume its relations to the
Union until after the satisfactory performance of five several
conditions, which must be submitted to a popular vote, and be
sanctioned by a majority of the people in each of those States
respectively." These condition were, in some respects, marked by
Mr. Sumner's lack of tact and practical wisdom as a legislator. He
required stipulations, the fulfillment of which could not really be
ascertained.
Mr. Sumner demanded, first, "the complete re-establishment, in loyalty,
as shown by an honest recognition of the unity of the Republic, and the
duty of allegiance to it at all times, without mental reservation or
equivocation of any kind." How Mr. Sumner could determine that "the
recognition of the unity of the Republic" was _honest_, how he could
know whether there was not, after all, a mental reservation on the
part of the rebels now swearing allegiance, he did not attempt to
inform the Senate. The next or second condition was somewhat more
practical in fact, but might have been expressed in simpler form. He
demanded "the complete suppression of all oligarchical pretensions, and
the complete enfranchisement of all citizens, so that there shall be
no denial of rights on account of race or color." His third condition
was "the rejection of the rebel debt, and the adoption, in just
proportions, of the National debt and the National obligations to Union
soldiers, with solemn pledges never to join in any measure, directly
or indirectly, for their repudiation, or in any way tending to impair
the National credit." His fourth condition was "the organization of an
educational system for the equal benefit of all, without distinction of
color or race." His fifth had some of the objectionable features of
his first, demanding "the choice of citizens for office, whether State
or National, of constant and undoubted loyalty, whose conduct and
conversation shall give assurance of peace and reconciliation." The
rebel States were not to be, in Mr. Sumner's language, "precipitated
back to political power and independence, but must wait until these
conditions are, in all respects, fulfilled." In addition, he desired
a declaration of the Senate that "the Thirteenth Amendment, abolishing
slavery, has become and is a part of the Constitution of the United
States, having received the approval of the Legislatures of three-fourths
of the States adhering to the Union." He declared that "the votes
of the States in rebellion are not necessary, in any way, to its
adoption, but they must all agree to it through their Legislatures, as
a condition precedent to their restoration to their full rights as
members of the Union." With these resolutions Mr. Sumner submitted
another long series declaratory of the duty of Congress in respect to
loyal citizens in the rebel States. His first series had defined what
the lately rebellious States must agree to by popular vote, and he
now outlined quite fully what would be the duty of Congress respecting
the admission of those States to representation in the Senate and the
House. The sum of the whole, or the central fact of the whole series,
was that the color of the skin must not exclude a loyal man from civil
rights.
On the succeeding day, the President, having received notice of the
organization of the two Houses, communicated his annual message. It
had been looked for with great interest and with varying speculations
as to its character. It was expected, and as the event proved with
good reason, that it would affect the relation of parties in the
Northern States; that it would produce ill-feeling between the
President and the Republicans, who had chosen him; and that it would
lead, with equal certainty, to a tender of support from the Democrats
who had hitherto opposed him. But Mr. Johnson had evidently resolved
to exhibit a spirit of calmness and firmness in his official
communication, and, while steadily maintaining his own ground, to avoid
all harsh words that might give offense to those who differed from him.
The moderation in language and the general conservatism which
distinguished the message were perhaps justly attributed to Mr. Seward,
who had no doubt hoped, by kindly words of conciliation, to avert the
threatened break in the ranks of the Republican party. Mr. Seward had
never in his Congressional career been a compromiser, but he now worked
most earnestly to bring about an accommodation between the
Administration and Congress. His argument was the one skillfully
employed by all who seek an adjustment between those who ought to be
friends: Let each party give way a little; let a common ground of
action be established; and, above all, let the calamity of a party
division be averted.
The President in his message dwelt at some length in a tone of
moderation upon the condition of affairs in the South. He saw before
him but two modes of dealing with the insurrectionary states,--one
was "to bring them back into practical relations with the Union;" the
other was to "hold them in military subjection." . . . "Military
government," said the President, "established for an indefinite period,
would offer no security for the suppression of discontent, would divide
the people into the vanquishers and the vanquished, and would envenom
hatred rather than restore affection. . . ." The President set forth
the danger of permanent arbitrary rule. "Once established, no
precise limit to the continuance of the military governments is
conceivable. They would occasion an incalculable and exhausting
expense. Peaceful emigration would be prevented, for what emigrant
abroad, what industrious citizen at home, would willingly place himself
under military rule?"--"Besides," asked the President, "would not the
policy of military rule imply that the States whose inhabitants may
have taken part in the rebellion have, by the act of those inhabitants,
ceased to exist? whereas the true theory is, that all pretended acts of
secession were from the beginning null and void." The President then
briefly explained how he had proceeded in the appointment of
provisional governors, the calling of conventions, the election of
civil governors and Legislatures, the choosing of senators and
representatives in Congress,--compactly sketching the progress of
events from the date of his accession until the date of the message.
Discussing his proposed policy he said with great frankness, "I know
very well that for its success it requires, at least, the acquiescence
of those States which it concerns; that it implies an invitation to
those States, by renewing their allegiance to the United States, to
resume their functions as States of the Union; but it is a risk that
must be taken, and in the choice of difficulties, it is the smallest
risk." He urged very earnestly the adoption of the Thirteenth
Amendment in order that the negro should be freed, and with equal
strength maintained that, as respected the qualifications for suffrage
in each of the States "the General Government should not interfere, but
leave that matter where it was originally left,--in the Federal
Constitution." But the most partial friend of the President could
hardly claim that he frankly communicated the proceedings or the
spirit of the Southern conventions and Legislatures. He chose to
ignore that subject, to hide it by fluent and graceful phrase from
public criticism, and thus to keep from the official knowledge of
Congress the most important facts in the whole domain of
reconstruction. It was a great mistake in the President to pass over
this subject in silence. Such a course enforced one of two
impressions, either of which was hurtful to him. He must, according
to the common understanding of Congress, have thought the character
of Southern legislation so offensive that he could find no excuse for
it and therefore would not mention it; or he must have regarded it as
outside the line of his observation and beyond the pale of his power
of review. Either construction was bad, but the second and more
probable one was especially offensive.
The leading men of the Thirty-ninth Congress were mainly those of the
Thirty-eighth, though there had been a few important changes. The
eminent senator from Vermont, Jacob Collamer, died on the 9th of
November (1865); and Luke P. Poland, afterwards a member of the House
of Representatives, appeared as his successor. Mr. Solomon Foot, who
announced Judge Collamer's death, survived him but a few months. On
the 28th of March Mr. Sumner announced his death to the Senate; and
eight days later--on the 5th of April (1866)--George F. Edmunds was
sworn in as his successor. His first speech was in eulogy of his
predecessor. Mr. Edmunds rose rapidly to prominence in the Senate and
after the habit of his State has been maintained for a long period in
his position.
Honorable James Guthrie of Kentucky, who had been Secretary of the
Treasury under President Pierce, now entered the Senate as the
successor of Lazarus W. Powell. He was a man of strong parts,
possessing a steady industry and thrift not common to the South. He
had for many years occupied a commanding financial position in the
South-West. Richard Yates, the War Governor of Illinois, displaced
William A. Richardson, the intimate friend of Douglas. John P. Hale
gave way to Aaron H. Cragin. In recognition of Mr. Hale's ability and
long and faithful public service, Mr. Lincoln nominated him to the
Spanish Mission. John A. J. Creswell came from Maryland as the
successor of Anthony Kennedy. George H. Williams, a Republican, came
from Oregon to take the place of Benjamin F. Harding, a Democrat. John
P. Stockton of New Jersey, a Democrat, took the place of John C. Ten
Eyck, a Republican. Samuel J. Kirkwood entered as the successor of
James Harlan to fill his unexpired term, and performed a somewhat
unusual service in presenting the credentials of James Harlan as his
successor for the first full term, beginning March 4, 1867. This was
the first appearance of Mr. Kirkwood in the National field, though he
had long been well known for honorable and eminent service in his State.
In the House the changes were more significant than in the Senate.
Gilman Marston entered anew, having been absent serving with great
credit as a brigadier-general in the war. General Banks resumed the
seat which he had left to accept the governorship of Massachusetts in
1857. His checkered and remarkable career, both civil and military,
during the eight intervening years had greatly increased his
reputation. Henry C. Deming of Connecticut entered fresh from the
field of war, choosing a political life rather than a return to
literary labor. New York was greatly strengthened in her delegation.
Roscoe Conkling resumed the seat which he had lost in the political
reverses of 1862. Among the new members were Henry J. Raymond, the
able founder and editor of _The New-York Times_, Robert S. Hale, who
became at once distinguished in the arena of debate, and Hamilton
Ward, afterwards Attorney-General of his State. These additions gave
to the delegation a prestige which its numbers did not always secure.
John H. Ketcham, who had attained the rank of brigadier-general by
successful service in the field, took his seat in this Congress,
destined to hold it for a long period, destined also to exert large
political influence without ever once addressing the House of
Representatives or an assembly of the people. Reuben E. Fenton, after
long and able service in the House, was now transferred to the
gubernatorial chair of his State.
Three new men of note entered from Pennsylvania--John M. Broomall, an
independent thinker and keen debater, inflexible in principle,
untiring in effort; Ulysses Mercur, whose learning as a lawyer and
whose worth as a man have since received their reward in a promotion
to the Supreme Bench of his State; George V. Lawrence, one of the best
known and most sagacious political leaders of Western Pennsylvania,
inheriting his capacity from his honored father, Joseph Lawrence, who
died during his membership of the Twenty-seventh Congress. John L.
Thomas, junior, entered as the representative of the city of Baltimore;
and the venerable Francis Thomas returned from his hermitage and his
weird life in the Alleghanies.
Ohio grew even stronger than before, and her delegation was again
recognized as the leading one of the House. Samuel Shellabarger, John
A. Bingham and Columbus Delano re-entered with reputation already
established by previous service in Congress. William Lawrence, a
conscientious legislator and careful lawyer, entered from the
Bellefontaine District. Martin Welker, since promoted to the bench
in his State, came from the Wooster District. One of the Cincinnati
districts was represented by Benjamin Eggleston, a man of great force
and energy; and the other, by a modest man, without experience in
legislation, but who had been a good and true soldier in the war for
the Union and was highly esteemed by his neighbors. He did not take
an active part in Congress, but was destined to a prominence of which
he little dreamed--Rutherford B. Hayes.
The Indiana delegation was strengthened on the Democratic side by the
return of William E. Niblack, who had made a good record in the
Thirty-seventh Congress, and by the entrance of Michael C. Kerr, who
served for a long period and ultimately became Speaker of the House.
Messrs. Julian, Orth, and Dumont were again elected. The last-named had
made a reputation in the preceding Congress as a keen and able man. The
Illinois delegation, which had contained a large majority of Democrats
in the Thirty-eighth Congress, now returned strongly Republican,--Mr.
Lincoln's victory of 1864 having, with three exceptions, carried with
it every Congressional district. Four men of marked characteristics
were among the new members of the delegation, one of whom was already
widely known: the three others were destined to become so in different
degrees--John Wentworth, Shelby M. Cullom, Burton C. Cook, and Jehu
Baker. Wentworth had been in the House as a Democrat prior to the
war, having represented the Chicago District continuously from March
4, 1843 to March 4, 1851; and again from March 4, 1853 to March 4,
1855. He was endowed by nature with a mind as strong as his body, and
that was of Titanic proportions. He was an ardent partisan in behalf
of any cause he espoused; was willful, aggressive, and dominating. He
was, at the same time, genial and kindly in many relations of life, not
without gifts of both wit and humor, and courageous to the point of
absolute fearlessness. He had been well educated at Dartmouth College
in his native State, and long practice had made him a dangerous
antagonist in debate. He had been an intense Democrat, but he refused
to join Douglas in the repeal of the Missouri Compromise, and
subsequently united with the Republicans.--Shelby M. Cullom, with good
natural parts and sound education, amiable, pleasing, and endowed with
the gracious quality which attracts and holds friends, won his way
promptly in the House and gave early promise of the success which
afterwards elevated him to the governorship of Illinois, and thence
transferred him to the Senate of the United States.--Burton C. Cook was
recognized as an able lawyer from the beginning of his service. He
constantly grew in influence and strength during the eight years of
his continuous membership, and at its close returned to the bar with an
enviable reputation and with the assurance of that eminent success
which has since attended his professional career.--Jehu Baker was a man
of peculiarities, not to say oddities, of bearing; but these did not
conceal his worth and ability, nor retard the growing reputation which
has since retained him in a diplomatic position.
Missouri, then under the control of the Republican party, included in
her delegation Robert T. Van Horn, a Pennsylvanian by birth, who had
borne a conspicuous part in the contest with the disloyal elements of
the State of his adoption; and John Hogan, a genial Irish Democrat
from the St. Louis District. The Michigan delegation was the same as
in the Thirty-eighth Congress, with the exception of Thomas W. Ferry,
who now entered for the first time, and Roland E. Trowbridge, who had
served in the Thirty-seventh Congress. The Iowa delegation was the
same as in the Thirty-eighth Congress,--a very able body of men with
growing influence in the House. The Wisconsin delegation was also in
large part the same. But the new members were men of note. Among them
were Halbert E. Paine and Philetus Sawyer. General Paine had served
with distinction in the war and had lost a leg in battle. He was a
lawyer in full practice, a man of the highest integrity, without fear
and without reproach. Born in the Western Reserve, he was radical in
his views touching the slavery question and progressive in all matters
of governmental reform.--Philetus Sawyer was a native of Vermont, who,
when a young man, had emigrated to Wisconsin. Without early
advantages, either of education or fortune, he was in the best sense
of the phrase a self-made man. He engaged in the business of lumbering
and by sagacity had acquired wealth. It is easy to supply superlatives
in eulogy of popular favorites; but Mr. Sawyer, in modest phrase,
deserves to be ranked among the best of men,--honest, industrious,
generous, true to every tie and to every obligation of life. He
remained for ten years in the House, with constantly increasing
influence, and was afterward promoted to the Senate. California sent
an excellent delegation--McRuer, Higby, and Bidwell; and West Virginia
contributed a valuable member in the person of Chester D. Hubbard.
The members of the House had been elected in 1864--borne to their seats
by the force of the same popular expression that placed Mr. Lincoln in
the Presidential chair for a second term. It is scarcely conceivable
that had Mr. Lincoln lived any serious differences could have arisen
between himself and Congress respecting the policy of reconstruction.
The elections of 1865, held amid the shouts of triumph over a restored
union, went by default in favor of the Republicans, who were justly
credited with the National victory so far as any one political party
was entitled to such honor. The people had therefore given no
expression, in any official or registered form, touching the policy
outlined by Mr. Johnson. He was the duly-elected Vice-President. He
had come to the magistracy in presumed sympathy and close affiliation
with the Republicans whose suffrages he had received. All beyond these
facts was surmise or inference. No one knew any thing with precision
respecting the new President's intentions.
He undoubtedly had control of an enormous public patronage. The Peace
establishment of the Army, it was thought at that time, would not be
less than seventy-five regiments, and this, with the necessary staff,
would give to him the appointment of nearly two thousand officers
without disturbing the commissions of those already in the regular
service. A like increase was expected in the naval establishment.
The internal-revenue system, devised for the support of the war, was
all-pervasive in its character, and required for its administration a
great number of officers and agents, all removable and appointable at
the pleasure of the Executive. The customs' service was
correspondingly large, having grown immensely during the war. In
proportion to the population of the country there never had been,
there has never since been, and perhaps there will never again be,
so vast an official patronage placed at the absolute disposal of the
President.
Public opinion, which has in later years tended to restrain the
Executive Department from the personal use of the patronage of the
Government, did not at that time exert a perceptible influence in this
direction. The maxim originating with William L. Marcy, but frequently
attributed to President Jackson, that "to the victor belong the
spoils," was then held in full honor; and though it was deprecated by
many and openly opposed in Congress by a few, it was acquiesced in by
the vast majority and was the rule and practice of the National
Administration. The patronage placed a formidable weapon in the hands
of the President which could be so used as to annoy or help every
Republican representative in Congress,--so used, indeed, as to prevent
the election of many who were peculiarly offensive to Mr. Johnson. He
had been reared in the Democratic school of proscription, and had
measured the force and indulged in the use of patronage throughout all
his political life in Tennessee. Though a man of the strictest
personal integrity, he had apparently no scruples on this subject, but
believed that the patronage of the Government might be honestly used to
build up his own political power. When he entered political life he
imbibed this doctrine from the teachings of President Jackson; he
afterwards received its advantage under Van Buren; he aided in its
enforcement under Polk; and when a senator, during the Administration
of Buchanan, he witnessed its prodigious power in the overthrow of
Douglas as a Presidential candidate, though a large majority of the
rank and file of his party desired his nomination. While the
Democratic masses were, in fact, clamorous for Douglas, he was
defeated by combinations brought about through the active
instrumentality of United-States district attorneys, collectors,
marshals, and their deputies--all acting, as they had good reason to
know, in harmony with the wishes of the Administration from whose
favor they had received their places.
The Republicans of the loyal States, whose convictions and whose
prejudices were strongly developed by the controversy between the
President and Congress, had grave apprehensions as to the ultimate
issue. At various times during the fifteen years preceding the war,
they had seen men of strong anti-slavery professions, with strong
anti-slavery constituencies, "palter in a double sense" when intrusted
with the duties of a representative in Congress, and fall from the
faith, influenced by what were termed the blandishments of power, or
as was sometimes more plainly said, corrupted by the gifts of
patronage. They had seen this results brought about by an
Administration which the tempted and yielding representatives had
been specially chosen to oppose. They had now double ground to fear
that many more would prove treacherous to their professions of
principle, since they could take refuge under the protection of an
Administration chosen by their own party and still nominally professing
to be Republican. The magnitude of the patronage at the President's
disposal intensified the popular alarm; and the promptness with which
a large proportion of those holding office echoed the President's
sentiments and defended his policy, was taken as a signal that
acquiescence therein would be the one condition upon which the honors
and emoluments of public place could be enjoyed.
The great mass of loyal Republicans had descried a peculiar danger in
the gentle, persuasive, insinuating words with which the President,
in his annual message, sought to commend his policy. Phrasing of a
specious type can deceive an individual far more easily that it can
deceive a multitude of men. The quick comprehension of the people so
far transcends that of a single person as to amount almost to the
possession of a sixth sense. While the single person might be misled
by fallacious statements and suppressions of truth by the President,
the people discerned with keen precision the absolute facts of the
case. They saw that the policy of the President was at war with the
creed and the spirit of the Republican party, and that, if carried into
effect, the legitimate fruits of the bloody struggle which had
afflicted the Nation would be lost to posterity, the laws of humanity
would be violated, and a fresh rebellion against National authority
would be invited. The ancient maxim, that the voice of the people is
the voice of God, is illogical in its direct statement, and like all
adages it covers both a truth and an untruth. Its truth was now
signally vindicated, when, against the authority of those in high
places, against the instruction of those who had always before been
trusted, the mass of the Republican party stood with heroic firmness
for what they believed to be right. They stood against the seductions
of patronage in the hands of the President whom they had elected, and
against the eloquent pleadings of the Secretary of State who for ten
years before the war had been their sagacious guide, their profound
philosopher, their trusted friend.
It was this common instinct and prompt expression by the people which
rescued Congress from the danger of injurious complication. The first
test in the Senate, as to the solidity of the Republican party, was
made on the 12th of December, when the resolution to form a select
committee of reconstruction, passed by the House on the first day of
the session, came up for consideration. It was amended on the motion
of Mr. Anthony, by striking out that portion of it which provided that
no member should be received into either House from the so-called
Confederate States until the report of the committee was received and
acted upon. This was held to impinge on the power of each House to be
the judge of its own elections, and was expunged by general consent.
On the propriety of the resolution thus amended a brief debate
occurred, which to a certain extent enabled senators to define their
position; and before it was concluded it was made evident that Mr.
Cowan of Pennsylvania, Mr. Dixon of Connecticut, and Mr. Doolittle of
Wisconsin, would separate from the mass of their Republican associates,
would support the reconstruction policy of the President, and would
ultimately become merged in the Democratic party. Mr. Norton of
Minnesota not long afterwards became one of the supporters of the
President, making a net loss of four to the Republican side of the
chamber. The Senate, at that time, contained fifty members, twenty-five
States being represented. Of this number the Democrats had but
eleven. The loss of four still left the Republicans in possession of
more than two-thirds of the seats in the Senate. The House had even a
larger proportion of Republican members. These facts were destined to
exert a wide and then unforseen influence upon the legislation of
Congress and upon the political affairs of the country.
The House concurred promptly in the amendment which the Senate had
made to the resolution providing for a joint committee on the subject
of Reconstruction. It is not often that such solicitude is felt in
Congress touching the membership of a committee as was now developed
in both branches. It was foreseen that in an especial degree the
fortunes of the Republican party would be in the keeping of the fifteen
men who might be chosen. The contest, predestined and already
manifest, between the President and Congress might, unless conducted
with great wisdom, so seriously divide the party as to compass its
ruin. Hence the imperious necessity that no rash or ill-considered
step should be taken. Both in Congress and among the people the
conviction was general that the party was entitled to the services of
its best men. There was no struggle among members for positions on
the committee; and when the names were announced they gave universal
satisfaction to the Republicans. There was some complaint by the
Democrats that they had only one representative upon the committee in
the Senate and two in the House, but the relative strength of parties
in both branches scarcely justified a larger representation of the
minority.(1)
Even before the announcement of the names a great number of resolutions
were offered in the House, intended to call forth expressions of
opinion that should operate as instructions to the new committee, but
none of them were of marked importance, except one indicating the
pronounced divergence of the two parties regarding the mode of
reconstruction. Each political party, in such parliamentary
declarations, seeks to get the advantage of the other and each is in
the habit of overrating the importance of expressions in this form.
They are diligently contrived for catches and committals to be
subsequently used in political campaigns, but it may well be doubted
whether they ever produce substantial effect upon legislation or
prove either gainful or hurtful in partisan contests. The practice
is somewhat below the dignity of a legislative body, has never been
resorted to in the Senate and might with great advantage be abandoned
by the House.
The debate on Reconstruction, perhaps the longest in the history of
National legislation, was formally opened by Mr. Thaddeus Stevens on
the 18th of December (1865). He took the most radical and pronounced
ground touching the relation to the National Government of the States
lately in rebellion. He contended that "there are two provisions in
the Constitution, under one of which the case must fall." The Fourth
Article says that "new States may be admitted by the Congress into this
Union." "In my judgment," said Mr. Stevens, "this is the controlling
provision in this case. Unless the law of Nations is a dead letter,
the late war between the two acknowledged belligerents severed their
original contracts and broke all the ties that bound them together.
The future condition of the conquered power depends on the will of the
conqueror. They must come in as new States or remain as conquered
provinces." This was the theory which Mr. Stevens had steadily
maintained from the beginning of the war, and which he had asserted
as frequently as opportunity was given in the discussions of the House.
He proceeded to consider the probable alternative. "Suppose," said he,
"as some dreaming theorists imagine, that these States have never been
out of the Union, but have only destroyed their State governments, so
as to be incapable of political action, then the fourth section of the
Fourth Article applies, which says, 'The United States shall guarantee
to every State in this Union a republican form of government.'" "But,"
added he, "who is the United States? Not the Judiciary, not the
President; but the sovereign power of the people, exercised through
their representatives in congress, with the concurrence of the
Executive. It means political government--the concurrent action of
both branches of Congress and the Executive." He intended his line
of debate to be an attack, at the very beginning, upon the assumption
of the President in his attempt at Reconstruction. "The separate
action of the President, or the Senate or the House," added Mr.
Stevens, "amounts to nothing, either in admitting new States or
guaranteeing republican forms of government to lapsed or outlawed
States." "Whence springs," asked he, "the preposterous idea that any
one of these, acting separately, can determine the right of States to
send representatives or senators to the Congress of the Union?"
Though many others had foreseen and appreciated the danger, Mr. Stevens
was the first to state in detail the effect which might be produced by
the manumission of the slaves upon the Congressional representation of
the Southern States. He pointed out the fact that by counting negroes
in the basis of representation, the number of representatives from the
South would be eighty-three; excluding negroes from the basis of
representation, they would be reduced to forty-six; and so long as
negroes were deprived of suffrage he contended that they should be
excluded from the basis of representation. "If," said he, "they
should grant the right of suffrage to persons of color, I think there
would always be white men enough in the South, aided by the blacks,
to divide representation and thus continue loyal ascendency. If they
should refuse to thus alter their election laws it would reduce the
representation of the late slave States, and render them powerless for
evil." Mr. Stevens's obvious theory at that time was not to touch
the question of suffrage by National interposition, but to reach it
more effectively perhaps by excluding the entire colored population
from the basis of Congressional representation, until by the action of
the Southern States themselves the elective franchise should be
conceded to the colored population. As he proceeded in his speech, Mr.
Stevens waxed warm with all his ancient fire on the slavery question.
"We have," said he, "turned or are about to turn loose four million
slaves without a hut to shelter them or a cent in their pockets. The
diabolical laws of slavery have prevented them from acquiring an
education, understanding the commonest laws of contract, or of managing
the ordinary business of life. This Congress is bound to look after
them until they can take care of themselves. If we do not hedge them
around with protecting laws, if we leave them to the legislation of
their old masters, we had better have left them in bondage. Their
condition will be worse than that of our prisoners at Andersonville.
If we fail in this great duty now when we have the power, we shall
deserve to receive the execration of history and of all future ages."
In conclusion Mr. Stevens declared that "Two things are of vital
importance: first, to establish a principle that none of the rebel
States shall be counted in any of the Amendments to the Constitution,
until they are duly admitted into the family of States by the law-making
power of their conqueror; second, it should now be solemnly declared
what power can revive, re-create and re-instate these provinces
into the family of States and invest them with the rights of
American citizens. It is time that Congress should assert the
sovereignty and assume something of the dignity of a Roman Senate."
He denounced with great severity the cry that "This is a white man's
Government." "If this Republic," said he with great earnestness, "is
not now made to stand on solid principle, it has no honest foundation,
and the Father of all men will still shake it to its centre. If we
have not yet been sufficiently scourged for our national sin to teach
us to do justice to all God's creatures, without distinction of race or
color, we must expect the still more heavy vengeance of an offended
Father, still increasing his afflictions, as he increased the severity
of the plagues of Egypt until the tyrant consented to do justice, and
when that tyrant repented of his reluctant consent and attempted to
re-enslave the people, as our Southern tyrants are attempting to do
now, he filled the Red Sea with broken chariots and drowned horses,
and strewed the shore with the corpses of men. Sir, this doctrine of
a white man's Government is as atrocious as the infamous sentiment
that damned the late Chief Justice to everlasting fame, and I fear to
everlasting fire."
The speech of Mr. Stevens gave great offense to the Administration. He
had not directly assailed the President by name, and had even assumed
to construe one of the paragraphs of the message as referring the
question of reconstruction anew to Congress; but this assumption was
simply for effect and was well known by Mr. Stevens to be unfounded.
The Administration did not misapprehend the drift and intention of
Mr. Stevens, and its members saw that it was the first gun fired in a
determined war to be waged against its policy and its _prestige_. They
were especially anxious that its defense should not be undertaken by
Democrats, or at least that Democrats should not take the lead in
defending it. Mr. Stevens spoke on the 18th of December, and Congress
had already voted to adjourn on the 21st for the Christmas recess. The
Administration desired the Mr. Stevens's speech should not be permitted
to go unanswered to the country and thus hold public attention until
Congress should re-assemble in January. It was important that some
response be made to it at once; and Mr. Henry J. Raymond, widely known
to the political world but now in Congress for the first time, was
selected to make the reply.
In a political career that was marked by many inconsistencies, as
consistency is measured by the party standard, with a disposition not
given to close intimacies or warm friendships, Mr. Raymond had
continuously upheld the public course of Mr. Seward, and had maintained
a singular steadiness of personal attachment to the illustrious
statesman from New York. On the other hand, he was the rival of Horace
Greeley in the field of journalism and had become personally estranged
from the founder of the _Tribune;_ though in his early manhood he had
been one of his editorial assistants. The fact that the _Tribune_ was
against the Administration would of itself dispose Mr. Raymond to
support it. But aside from this consideration, the chivalric devotion
of Mr. Raymond to Mr. Seward would have great weight in determining his
position in the pending conflict. Mr. Seward's committal to the policy
and the assault upon it by the _New-York Tribune_ would therefore
through affection on the one side and prejudice on the other, naturally
fix Mr. Raymond's position. He had acquired wide and worthy fame as
conductor of the _New-York Times_, had achieved a high reputation as a
polemical writer, was well informed on all political issues and added
to his power with the pen the gift of ready and effective speech.
On the twenty-fist day of December, the last day before the recess, Mr.
Raymond, desiring the floor, was somewhat chagrined to find himself
preceded by Mr. Finck of Ohio, a respectable gentleman of the
Vallandingham type of Democrat,--representing a political school whose
friendship to the Administration at that time was a millstone about its
neck. Mr. Raymond followed Mr. Finck late in the day, and could not
help showing his resentment that the ground which the Administration
intended to occupy should be so promptly pre-empted by the anti-war
party of the country. "I have," said Mr. Raymond at the opening of his
speech, "no party feeling which would prevent me from rejoicing in the
indications apparent on the Democratic side of the House, of a purpose
to concur with the loyal Administration of the Government and with the
loyal majorities in both Houses of Congress in restoring peace and
order to our common country. I cannot, however, help wishing, sir,
that these indications in the preservation of our Government had come
somewhat sooner. I cannot help feeling that such expressions cannot
now be of as much use to the country as they might once have been. If
we could have had from that side of the House such indications of an
interest in the preservation of the Union, such heartfelt sympathy with
the friends of the Government for the preservation of the Union, such
hearty denunciations for all those who were seeking its destruction,
while the war was raging, I am sure we might have been spared some
years of war, some millions of money and rivers of blood and tears."
This utterance was sharpened and made significant by the manner and by
the accent of Mr. Raymond. No more pointed rebuke, no more keen
reproach (not intended for Mr. Finck personally, but for his party)
could have been administered. What the Administration or especially
what Mr. Seward desired, and what Mr. Raymond was to speak for, was
Republican support; and the prior indorsement of Mr. Johnson's position
by the Democracy was a hinderance and not a help to the cause he had
espoused.
Mr. Raymond's principal aim was to join issue with Mr. Stevens on his
theory of _dead States_. "The gentleman from Pennsylvania," said Mr.
Raymond, "believes that what we have to do is to create new States
out of this conquered territory, at the proper time, many years
distant, retaining them meanwhile in a territorial condition, and
subjecting them to precisely such a state of discipline and tutelage
as Congress and the Government of the United States may see fit to
prescribe. If I believed in the premises he assumes, possibly though
I do not think probably, I might agree with the conclusion he has
reached; but, sir, I cannot believe that these States have ever been
out of the Union or that they are now out of the Union. If they were,
sir, how and when did they become so? By what specific act, at what
precise time, did any one of those States take itself out of the
American Union? Was it by the ordinance of secession? I think we
all agree that an ordinance of secession passed by any State of the
Union is simply a nullity because it encounters the Constitution of
the United States which is the supreme law of the land.
"Did the resolutions of those States," continued Mr. Raymond, "the
declarations of their officials, the speeches of the members of their
Legislatures, or the utterances of their press, accomplish the result
desired? Certainly not. All these were simply declarations of a
purpose to secede. Their secession, if it ever took place, certainly
could not date from the time when their intention to secede was first
announced. They proceeded to sustain their purpose of secession by
arms against the force which the United States brought to bear against
them. Were their arms victorious? If they were, then their secession
was an accomplished fact. If not, it was nothing more than an abortive
attempt--a purpose unfulfilled. They failed to maintain their ground
by force of arms. In other words, they failed to secede."
Mr. Raymond's speech was listened to with profound attention, and
evoked the high compliment of frequent interruptions from leading men
on the Republican side of the House. Messrs. Schenck, Bingham and
Spalding of Ohio, Mr. Jenckes of Rhode Island, and Mr. Kelley of
Pennsylvania, all put pointed questions and were at once answered with
undoubted tact and cleverness. Mr. Raymond was helped to a specious
point by Mr. Niblack of Indiana, of which he made prompt and vigorous
use, to the effect that the theory of Mr. Stevens, if carried to its
legitimate consequences, would make those who resisted the Confederacy
in the insurrectionary states guilty of treason to that power; and that
therefore "we would be unable to talk of loyal men in the South. Loyal
to what? Loyal to a foreign and independent power, which the gentleman
from Pennsylvania was really maintaining the Confederacy for the
time being to represent."
Immediately after the recess the Reconstruction debate was resumed, and
an able speech made by Mr. Spalding of Ohio, reviewing the subject
generally rather than specifically replying to Mr. Raymond.
Representing one of the districts of the Western Reserve (the most
radical section of the United States), it is interesting to see what
Mr. Spalding declared would be satisfactory to the mass of his
constituents as conditions precedent to the re-admission of the rebel
States. He laid down five requirements: _First_, "to give a qualified
right of suffrage to the freedmen in the District of Columbia;"
_second_, to "so amend the Constitution of the United States that
people of color shall not be counted with the population in making up
the ratio of representation in Congress, except in those States where
they are permitted to exercise the elective franchise;" _third_, "to
insert a provision in the Constitution prohibiting nullification and
secession;" _fourth_, "to insert a provision in the Constitution
prohibiting the repudiation of the National debt and also prohibiting
the assumption of the rebel debt;" _fifth_, to provide in the
Constitution that "no person who has at any time taken up arms against
the United States shall ever be admitted to a seat in the Senate or
House of Representatives."
On the eighth day of January, two days after the re-assembling of
Congress, Mr. Shellabarger of Ohio specifically answered the speech of
Mr. Raymond. He spoke with care and preparation, as was his habit.
He wasted no words, but in clear, crisp sentences subjected the whole
question to the rigid test of logic. "I shall inquire," said Mr.
Shellabarger, "whether the Constitution deals with States. I shall
discuss the question whether an organized rebellion against a
government is an organized State in that government; whether that
which cannot become a State until all its officers have sworn
to support the Constitution, remains a State after they have all sworn
to overthrow that Constitution. If I find it does continue to be a
State after that, then I shall strive to ascertain whether it will so
continue to be a Government--a State--after, by means of universal
treason, it has ceased to have any constitution, laws, legislatures,
courts, or citizens in it."
"If, in debating this question," continued Mr. Shellabarger, "I debate
axioms, my apology is that there are not other questions to debate in
Reconstruction. If," said he with well-timed sarcasm, "in the
discussion, I make self-evident things obscure or incomprehensible, my
defense shall be that I am conforming to the usages of Congress. I
will not inquire whether any subject of this Government, by reason of
the revolt, passed from under its sovereignty or ceased to owe it
allegiance; nor shall I inquire whether any territory passed from under
that jurisdiction, because I know of no one who thinks that any of
these things did occur. I shall not consider, whether, by the
Rebellion, any State lost its territorial character or its defined
boundaries or subdivisions, for I know of no one who would obliterate
these geographical qualities of the States. These questions, however
much discussed, are in no practical sense before Congress."
"What is before Congress?" asked Mr. Shellabarger. "I at once define
and affirm it in a single sentence. It is, under our Constitution,
possible to, and the late Rebellion did in fact, so overthrow and
usurp, in the insurrectionary States, the loyal State Governments, as
that during such usurpation such States and their people ceased to
have any of the rights or powers of Government as States of the Union,
and this loss of the rights and powers of Government was such that the
United States may, and ought to, assume and exercise local powers of
the lost State Governments, and may control the re-admission of such
States to their powers of Government in this Union, subject to, and
in accordance with, the obligation to guarantee to each State a
republican form of Government."
Upon the broad proposition thus laid down by Mr. Shellabarger, he
proceeded to submit an argument which, for closeness, compactness,
consistency and strength had rarely, if ever, been surpassed in the
Congress of the United States. Other speeches have gained greater
celebrity, but it may well be doubted whether any speech in the House
of Representatives ever made a more enduring impression, or exerted
greater convincing power, upon the minds of those to whom it was
addressed. It was a far more valuable exposition of the Reconstruction
question than that given by Mr. Stevens. It was absolutely without
acrimony, it contained no harsh word, it made no personal reflection;
but the whole duty of the United States, and the whole power of the
United States to do its duty, were set forth with absolute precision of
logic. The Reconstruction debate continued for a long time and many
able speeches were contributed to it. While much of value was added
to that which Mr. Shellabarger had stated, no position taken by him
was ever shaken.
Mr. Raymond had asked repeatedly and with great emphasis _what specific
act_ had deprived these rebellious States of their rights as States of
the Union. Mr. Shellabarger gave an answer to that question, which, as
a caustic summary, is worthy to be quoted in full. "I answer him,"
said the member from Ohio, "in the words of the Supreme Court, 'The
causeless waging against their own Government of a war which all the
world acknowledge to have been the greatest civil war known in the
history of the human race.' That war was waged by these people as
States, and it went through long, dreary years. In it they threw off
and defied the authority of your Constitution, your laws, and your
Government. They obliterated from their State constitutions and laws
every vestige of recognition of your Government. They discarded all
their official oaths, and took, in their places, oaths to support
your enemies' government. They seized, in their States, all the
Nation's property. Their senators and representatives in your Congress
insulted, bantered, defied and then left you. They expelled from
their land or assassinated every inhabitant of known loyalty. They
betrayed and surrendered your arms. They passed sequestration and
other Acts in flagitious violation of the law of nations, making every
citizen of the United States an alien enemy, and placing in the
treasury of their rebellion all money and property due such citizens.
They framed iniquity and universal murder into law. For years they
besieged your Capital and sent your bleeding armies in rout back here
upon the very sanctuaries of your national power. Their pirates
burned your unarmed commerce upon every sea. They carved the bones
of your unburied heroes into ornaments and drank from goblets made
out of their skulls. They poisoned your fountains, put mines under
your soldiers' prisons, organized bands whose leaders were concealed
in your homes, and whose commissions ordered the torch to be carried
to your cities, and the yellow-fever to your wives and children.
They planned one universal bonfire of the North, from Lake Ontario
to the Missouri. They murdered, by systems of starvation and
exposure, sixty thousand of your sons as brave and heroic as ever
martyrs were. They destroyed, in the four years of horrid war,
another army so large that it would reach almost around the globe
in marching-column. And then to give to the infernal drama a fitting
close, and to concentrate into one crime all that is criminal in
crime and all that is detestable in barbarism, they murdered the
President of the United States."
"I allude to these horrid events," continued Mr. Shellabarger, "not
to revive frightful memories, or to bring back the impulses towards
the perpetual severance of this people which they provoke. I allude
to them to remind us how utter was the overthrow and the obliteration
of all government, divine and human, how total was the wreck of all
constitutions and laws, political, civil and international. I allude
to them to condense their monstrous enormities of guilt into one
crime, and to point the gentleman from New York to it and tell him
that that was the _specific act_."
Mr. Voorhees of Indiana followed on the day succeeding Mr.
Shellabarger's speech, in support of a series of resolutions which he
had offered on the same day that Mr. Raymond addressed the House, and
further embarrassing Mr. Raymond by the proffer of Democratic support,
and proportionately discouraging the Republicans from coming forward
in aid of the Administration. The resolutions of Mr. Voorhees declared
in effect that "the President's message is regarded by the House as an
able, judicious and patriotic State paper;" that "the principles
therein advocated are the safest and most practicable that can be
applied to our disordered domestic affairs;" that "no State or number
of States confederated together can in any manner sunder their
connection with the Federal Union;" and that "the President is entitled
to the thanks of Congress and the country for his faithful, wise and
successful efforts to restore civil government, law and order to the
States lately in rebellion." Mr. Voorhees made an exhaustive speech in
support of these resolutions, indicating very plainly the purpose of
the Democratic party to combine in support of the President. He was
answered promptly and eloquently, though not without some display of
temper, by Mr. Bingham of Ohio, who at the close of his speech moved
a substitute for the series of propositions made by Mr. Voorhees--simply
declaring that "this House has an abiding confidence in the President,
and that in the future as in the past, he will co-operate with Congress
in restoring to equal position and rights with the other States in the
Union, the States lately in insurrection."
Up to this period there had been no outbreak of the Republican party
against the President. There had been coolness and general distrust,
with resentment and anger on the part of many, but the hope of his
co-operation with the party had not yet been entirely abandoned. Mr.
Bingham's resolution represented this hope, if not expectation, but
the Republican members of the House were not willing to make so
emphatic a declaration of their confidence as that resolution would
imply; and when Mr. Bingham demanded the previous question he was
interrupted by Mr. Stevens, who suggested that the whole subject be
referred to the Joint Committee on Reconstruction. Mr. Bingham changed
his motion accordingly; and the roll being called, the series of
resolutions offered by Mr. Voorhees, with the substitute of Mr.
Bingham, were sent to the Committee on Reconstruction by 107 _ayes_
against 32 _noes_. Mr. Raymond and his colleague, Mr. William A.
Darling, were the only Republicans who voted with the Democrats. The
act was simple in a parliamentary sense, but its significance was
unmistakable. A House, four-fifths of whose members were Republicans,
had refused to pass a resolution expressing confidence in the President
who, fourteen months before, had received the vote of every Republican
in the Nation. From that day, January 9th, 1866, the relation of the
dominant party in Congress to the President was changed. It may not be
said that all hope of reconciliation was abandoned, but friendly
co-operation to any common end became extremely difficult.
Mr. Raymond was bitterly disappointed. Few members had ever entered
the House with greater personal _prestige_ or with stronger assurance
of success. He had come with a high ambition--an ambition justified
by his talent and training. He had come with the expectation of a
Congressional career as successful as that already achieved in his
editorial life. But he met a defeat which hardly fell short of a
disaster. He had made a good reply to Mr. Stevens, had indeed gained
much credit by it, and when he returned home for the holidays he had
reason to believe that he had made a brilliant beginning in the
parliamentary field. But the speech of Mr. Shellabarger had destroyed
his argument, and had given a rallying-point for the Republicans, so
incontestably strong as to hold the entire party in allegiance to
principle rather than in allegiance to the Administration. If any
thing had been needed to complete Mr. Raymond's discomfiture after the
speech of Mr. Shellabarger, it was supplied in the speech of Mr.
Voorhees. He had been ranked among the most virulent opponents of
Mr. Lincoln's Administration, had been bitterly denunciatory of the war
policy of the Government, and was regarded as a leader of that section
of the Democratic party to which the most odious epithets of disloyalty
had been popularly applied. Mr. Raymond, in speaking of the defeat,
always said that he could have effected a serious division in the ranks
of Republican members if he could have had the benefit of the hostility
of Mr. Voorhees and other anti-war Democrats.
Three weeks after Mr. Shellabarger's reply Mr. Raymond made a
rejoinder. He struggled hard to recover the ground which he had
obviously lost, but he did not succeed in changing his _status_ in the
House, or in securing recruits for the Administration from the ranks
of his fellow Republicans. To fail in that was to fail in every thing.
That he made a clever speech was not denied, for every intellectual
effort of Mr. Raymond exhibited cleverness. That he made the most of
a weak cause, and to some extent influenced public opinion, must also
be freely conceded. But his most partial friends were compelled to
admit that he had absolutely failed to influence Republican action in
Congress, and had only succeeded in making himself an apparent ally
of the Democratic party--a position in every way unwelcome and
distasteful to Mr. Raymond. His closing speech was marked by many
pointed interruptions from Mr. Shellabarger and was answered at some
length by Mr. Stevens. But nothing, beyond a few keen thrusts and
parries and some sharp wit at Mr. Raymond's expense, was added to the
debate.
Mr. Raymond never rallied from the defeat of January 9th. His talents
were acknowledged; his courteous manners, his wide intelligence, his
generous hospitality, gave him a large popularity; but his alliance
with President Johnson was fatal to his political fortunes. He had
placed himself in a position from which he could not with grace
retreat, and to go forward in which was still further to blight his
hopes of promotion in his party. It was an extremely mortifying fact
to Mr. Raymond that with the power of the Administration behind him
he could on a test question secure the support of only one Republican
member, and he a colleague who was bound to him by ties of personal
friendship.
The fate which befell Mr. Raymond, apart from the essential weakness
of the issue on which he staked his success, is not uncommon to men
who enter Congress with great reputation already attained. So much is
expected of them that their efforts on the floor are almost sure to
fall below the standard set up for them by their hearers. By natural
re-action the receive, in consequence, less credit than is their due.
Except in a few marked instances the House has always been led by men
whose reputation has been acquired in its service. Entering
unheralded, free from the requirements which expectation imposes, a
clever man is sure to receive more credit than is really his due when
his is so fortunate as to arrest the attention of members in his first
speech. Thenceforward, if he be discreet enough to move slowly and
modestly, he acquires a secure standing and may reach the highest
honors with the House can confer.
If, ambitious of a career, Mr. Raymond had been elected to Congress
when he was chosen to the New-York Legislature at twenty-nine years of
age, or five years later when he was made Lieutenant-governor of his
State, he might have attained a great parliamentary fame. It has long
been a tradition of the House that no man becomes its leader who does
not enter it before he is forty. Like most sweeping affirmations this
has its exceptions, but the list of young men who have been advanced
to prominent positions in the body is so large that it may well be
assumed as the rule of promotion. Mr. Raymond was nearly forty-six
when he made his first speech in the House. While he still exhibited
the intellectual acuteness and alertness which had always been his
characteristics, there was apparent in his face the mental weariness
which had come from the prolonged and exacting labor of his profession.
His parliamentary failure was a keen disappointment to him, and was not
improbably one among many causes which cut short a brilliant and useful
life. He died in 1869, in the forty-ninth year of his age.
This first debate on reconstruction developed the fact that the
Democrats in Congress would endeavor to regain the ground they had lost
by their hostility to Mr. Lincoln's Administration during the war. The
extreme members of that party, while the war was flagrant, adhered to
many dogmas which were considered unpatriotic and in none more so than
the declaration that even in the case of secession "there is no power
in the Constitution to coerce a State." They now united in the
declaration, as embodied in the resolution of Mr. Voorhees, that "no
State or number of States confederated together can in any manner
sunder their connection with the Federal Union." This was intended as
a direct and defiant answer to the heretical creed of Mr. Stevens, that
the States by their attempted secession were really no longer members
of the Union and could not become so until regularly re-admitted by
Congress. By antagonizing this declaration the Democrats strove to
convince the country that it was the accepted doctrine of their
political opponents, and that they were themselves the true and tried
friends of the Union.
The great majority of the Republican leaders, however, did not at all
agree with the theory of Mr. Stevens and the mass of the party were
steadily against him. The one signal proof of their dissent from the
extreme doctrine was their absolute unwillingness to attempt an
amendment to the Constitution by the ratification of three-fourths of
the Loyal States only, and their insisting that it must be three-fourths
of all the States, North and South. Mr. Stevens deemed this a fatal
step for the party, and his extreme opinion had the indorsement
of Mr. Sumner; but against both these radical leaders the party was
governed by its own conservative instincts. They believed with Mr.
Lincoln that the Stevens plan of amendment would always be questioned,
and that in so grave a matter as a change to the organic law of the
Nation, the process should be unquestionable--one that could stand
every test and resist every assault.
The Republicans, as might well have been expected, did not stand on the
defensive in such a controversy with their opponents. They became
confidently aggressive. They alleged that when the Union was in danger
from secession the Northern Democrats did all in their power to
inflame the trouble, urged the Southern leaders to persevere and not
yield to the Abolitionists, and even when war was imminent did nothing
to allay the danger, but every thing to encourage its authors. Now
that war was over, the Democrats insisted on the offending States being
instantly re-invested with all the rights of loyalty, without promise
and without condition. At the beginning of the war and after its
close, therefore, they had been hand in hand with the offending rebels,
practically working at both periods to bring about the result desired
by the South. Their policy, in short, seemed to have the interests of
the guilty authors of the Rebellion more at heart than the safety of
the Union. Their efforts now to clothe the Southern conspirators with
fresh power and to take no note of the crimes which had for four years
drenched the land in blood, constituted an offense only less grave in
the eyes of the Republicans than the aid and comfort given to the
Rebellion in the hour of its inception.
These were the accusations and criminations which were exchanged
between the political parties. They lent acrimony to the impending
canvass and increased the mutual hostility of those engaged in the
exciting controversy. The Republicans were resolved that their action
should neither be misinterpreted by opposing partisans nor
misunderstood by the people. They were confident that when their
position should be correctly apprehended it would still more strongly
confirm their claim to be the special and jealous guardians of the
Union of the States--of a Union so strongly based that future rebellion
would be rendered impossible, the safety and glory of the Republic made
perpetual.
[(1)NOTE.--The members of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction were as
follows:--
_On the part of the Senate_.--William P. Fessenden of Maine, James W.
Grimes of Iowa, Ira Harris of New York, Jacob M. Howard of Michigan,
George H. Williams of Oregon, and _Reverdy Johnson_ of Maryland.
_On the part of the House_.--Thaddeus Stevens of Pennsylvania, Elihu
B. Washburne of Illinois, Justin S. Morrill of Vermont, John A. Bingham
of Ohio, Roscoe Conkling of New York, George S. Boutwell of
Massachusetts, Henry T. Blow of Missouri, _A. J. Rogers_ of New Jersey,
and _Henry Grider_ of Kentucky.]