v. 20. _Woe to them that call evil good, and good evil;
that put darkness for light, and light for darkness; that
put bitter for sweet, and sweet for bitter._
Only those who have had extensive opportunities of observation, can
have any idea of the evil influence of the abuse and misapplication
of _words_ in questions of religion and morals, especially among the
young.[1] To an almost incredible degree the distinctness of our
associations and intellectual perceptions depends upon our correct
use of the machinery of words. From long usage, words become at
length identified in the mind with the things we have accustomed them
to represent. What, then, must be the effect when language is
deliberately misapplied for the express purpose of confounding the
distinctions of right and wrong! For various reasons, it is more easy
to misapply words in relation to morals, than in relation to other
subjects. 1. Ethical propositions are to a great degree incapable of
absolute proof. 2. In discussing the great topics of morals, very few
persons bring a perfectly unbiassed mind to the task. 3. Vice and
virtue, though essentially distinct as qualities, are still in many
cases nothing more than different modifications of some common
subject. The line which separates the use of a thing for its abuse is
not always strongly marked; or rather is sufficiently indistinct for
those who are determined not to see clearly to afford themselves a
plausible justification for the aberration of their choice. But on
all these accounts we should be the more careful to use accurate
language on all questions of morals, especially in society, where the
temptation to speak as others are speaking is so strong. Two things
especially lead to that perversion of language which our text
condemns. 1. Men "call evil good," _from an almost irresistible
desire to cloak and veil their vices._ It is one of ten thousand
daily recurring proofs of the strange inconsistencies of human
nature, that the same persons whose conscience will not recoil for a
moment at the actual commission of deeds of sin and atrocity, and who
even appear to defy public opinion in the conduct they are pursuing,
will still to the last shrink from the admission of those terms which
really characterise their conduct. It is the appellation and not the
actual guilt which to them constitutes the disgrace. 2. Men "call
good evil," _from a desire to defend themselves from the condemnation
passed upon them by the better example of others._ They attempt, in
the first place, by palliations and misstatements, to render vice
less odious than it really is; and secondly, by attributing to the
pious unworthy and corrupt motives, to render unamiable that goodness
in others which they want strength of mind and of principle to
imitate. From this latter species of wickedness very few stand
perfectly clear. Which of us has never felt as a reproach the example
of principles better and holier than our own, nor attempted in
consequence to restore the equilibrium of our self-respect, not by
improving our own practice, but by depreciating and ridiculing that
which as Christians it was our duty to admire? Let us be on our guard
against disparaging that sincerity of disposition, which strives to
regulate its conduct by the unbending Christian standard, by calling
it "enthusiasm," "fanaticism," "austerity." Enough difficulty, we
know from our own experience, lies in the way of every man's
spiritual improvement, without throwing in his path the additional
obstacles of ridicule, contempt, and odium, which few minds, even the
most religious, have sufficient fortitude to despise. (Matt.
xxiii. 13; Mark ix. 42.) Thus, to "call good evil" is to imitate the
Pharisees (Mark iii. 22), and comes perilously near committing the
sin against the Holy Ghost.--_P. R. Shuttleworth, D.D., Sermons,_
117-143.