2. As a means of obtaining an early and honorable peace.

3. As a means of advancing the personal and local projects of ambition

of the members of the American Cabinet.

Concerning the invasion of Canada, as a means of carrying on the

subsisting war, it is my duty to speak plainly and decidedly, not only

because I herein express my own opinions upon the subject, but, as I

conscientiously believe, the sentiments also of a very great majority

of that whole section of country in which I have the happiness to

reside. I say then, sir, that I consider the invasion of Canada as a

means of carrying on this war, as cruel, wanton, senseless, and wicked.

You will easily understand, Mr. Speaker, by this very statement of

opinion, that I am not one of that class of politicians which has for

so many years predominated in the world, on both sides of the Atlantic.

You will readily believe, that I am not one of those who worship in

that temple, where Condorcet is the High Priest and Machiavel the

God. With such politicians the end always sanctifies the means; the

least possible good to themselves perfectly justifies, according to

their creed, the inflicting the greatest possible evil upon others.

In the judgment of such men, if a corrupt ministry at three thousand

miles distance shall have done them an injury, it is an ample cause to

visit with desolation a peaceable and unoffending race of men, their

neighbors, who happen to be associated with that ministry by ties of

mere political dependence. What though these colonies be so remote

from the sphere of the questions in controversy, that their ruin or

prosperity could have no possible influence upon the result? What

though their cities offer no plunder? What though their conquest can

yield no glory? In their ruin there is revenge. And revenge to such

politicians is the sweetest of all morsels. With such men, neither I

nor the people of that section of country in which I reside hold any

communion. There is between us and them no one principle of sympathy

either in motive or action.

That wise, moral, reflecting people, which constitute the great mass

of the population of Massachusetts--indeed, of all New England--look

for the sources of their political duties nowhere else than in those

fountains from which spring their moral duties. According to their

estimate of human life and its obligations, both political and moral

duties emanate from the nature of things, and from the essential and

eternal relations which subsist among them. True it is, that a state

of war gives the right to seize and appropriate the property and

territories of an enemy. True it is, that the colonies of a foreign

power are viewed, according to the law of nations, in the light of its

property. But in estimating the propriety of carrying desolation into

the peaceful abodes of their neighbors, the people of New England will

not limit their contemplation to the mere circumstance of abstract

right, nor ask what lawyers and jurisprudists have written or said, as

if this was conclusive upon the subject. That people are much addicted

to think for themselves, and in canvassing the propriety of such an

invasion, they will consider the actual condition of those colonies,

their natural relations to us, and the effect which their conquest and

ruin will have, not only upon the people of those colonies, but upon

themselves, and their own liberties and constitution. And above all,

what I know will seem strange to some of those who hear me, they will

not forget to apply to a case occurring between nations, as far as is

practicable, that heaven-descended rule which the great author and

founder of their religion has given them for the regulation of their

conduct towards each other. They will consider it the duty of these

United States to act towards those colonies as they would wish those

colonies to act, in exchange of circumstances, towards these United

States.

The actual condition of those colonies, and the relation in which they

stood to the United States antecedent to the declaration of war, were

of this nature. Those colonies had no connection with the questions

in dispute between us and their parent State. They had done us no

injury. They meditated none to us. Between the inhabitants of those

colonies and the citizens of the United States, the most friendly and

mutually useful intercourse subsisted. The borderers on this, and

those on the other side of the St. Lawrence, and of the boundary line,

scarcely realized that they were subjects of different governments.

They interchanged expressions and acts of civility. Intermarriages took

place among them. The Canadian sometimes settled in the United States;

sometimes our citizens emigrated to Canada. After the declaration

of war, had they any disposition to assail us? We have the reverse

expressly in evidence. They desired nothing so much as to keep perfect

the then subsisting relations of amity. Would the conquest of those

colonies shake the policy of the British cabinet? No man has shown

it. Unqualified assertions, it is true, have been made, but totally

unsupported by any evidence, or even the pretence of argument. On the

contrary, nothing was more obvious than that an invasion of Canada

must strengthen the Ministry of Great Britain, by the excitement and

sympathy which would be occasioned in the people of that country in

consequence of the sufferings of the innocent inhabitants of those

colonies, on account of a dispute in which they had no concern, and of

which they had scarcely a knowledge. All this was anticipated--all this

was frequently urged to this House, at the last and preceding sessions,

as the necessary effect of such a measure. The event has justified

those predictions. The late elections in Great Britain have terminated

in the complete triumph of the friends of the British Ministry. In

effecting this change, the conduct of the United States in relation

to Canada has had, undeniably, a mighty influence, by the disgust and

indignation felt by the British people at a step so apparently wanton

and cruel.

As there was no direct advantage to be hoped from the conquest of

Canada, so also, there was none incidental. Plunder there was none--at

least, none which would pay the cost of the conquest. Glory there was

none. Could seven millions of people obtain glory by precipitating

themselves upon half a million, and trampling them into the dust? A

giant obtain glory by crushing a pigmy! That giant must have a pigmy's

spirit who could reap, or hope, glory from such an achievement.

Surely a people, with whom we were connected by so many natural and

adventitious ties, had some claims upon our humanity. Surely if

our duty required that they and theirs should be sacrificed to our

interests or our passions, some regret mingled in the execution of

our purpose. We postponed the decree of ruin until the last moment.

We hesitated--we delayed until longer delay was dangerous. Alas! sir,

there was nothing of this kind or character in the conduct of the

Cabinet. The war had not yet been declared, when General Hull had his

instructions to put in train the work of destruction. There was an

eagerness for the blood of the Canadians--a headlong precipitation

for their ruin, which indicated any thing else rather than feelings

of humanity, or visitings of nature, on account of their condition.

Our armies were on their march for their frontier, while yet peace

existed between this country and the parent State; and the invasion

was obstinately pursued, after a knowledge that the chief ground of

controversy was settled by the abandonment of the British Orders in

Council; and after nothing remained but a stale ground of dispute,

which, however important in itself, was of a nature for which no man

has ever yet pretended that for it alone war would have been declared.

Did ever one Government exhibit towards any people a more bloody and

relentless spirit of rancor? Tell me not of petty advantages--of

remote, and possibly useful contingencies which might arise from the

devastation of those colonies. Show any advantage which justifies

that dreadful vial of wrath which, if the intention of the American

Cabinet had been fulfilled, would, at this day, have been poured out

upon the heads of the Canadians. It is not owing to the tender mercies

of the American Administration, if the bones of the Canadians are not

at this hour mingled with the ashes of their habitations. It is easy

enough to make an excuse for any purpose. When a victim is destined to

be immolated, every hedge presents sticks for the sacrifice. The lamb

who stands at the mouth of the stream, will always trouble the water,

if you take the account of the wolf who stands at the source of it.

But show a good to us bearing any proportion to the multiplied evils

proposed to be visited upon them. There is none. Never was there an

invasion of any country worse than this, in point of moral principle,

since the invasion of the West Indies by the Buccaneers, or that of the

United States by Captain Kidd. Indeed, both Kidd and the Buccaneers

had more apology for their deed than the American Cabinet. They had at

least the hope of plunder; but in this case there is not even the poor

refuge of cupidity. We have heard great lamentations about the disgrace

of our arms on the frontier. Why, sir, the disgrace of our arms on the

frontier is terrestrial glory, in comparison with the disgrace of the

attempt. The whole atmosphere rings with the utterance, from the other

side of the House of this word "glory"--"glory" in connection with this

invasion. What glory? Is it the glory of the tiger, which lifts his

jaws, all foul and bloody, from the bowels of his victim, and roars

for his companions of the wood to come and witness his prowess and his

spoils? Such is the glory of Genghis Khan, and of Bonaparte. Be such

glory far, very far, from my country. Never, never may it be accursed

with such fame.

"Fame is no plant that grows on mortal soil,

Nor in the glistering foil

Set off to the world, nor in broad rumor lies,

But lives and spreads aloft, by those pure eyes,

And perfect witness of all-judging Jove,

As he pronounces lastly on each deed."

May such fame as this be my country's meed!

But the wise and thoughtful people of our Northern section will confine

their reflections to the duties which result from the actual condition

of those colonies, and their general relations to the United States;

they will weigh the duties the people of the United States owe to

themselves, and contemplate the effect which the subjugation of those

Canadians will have upon our own liberties and constitution. Sir, it

requires but little experience in the nature of the human character,

and but a very limited acquaintance with the history of man, to be

satisfied that with the conquest of the Canadas, the liberties and

constitution of this country perish.

Of all nations in the world, this nation is the last which ought to

admit, among its purposes, the design of foreign conquests. States such

as are these, connected by ties so peculiar; into whose combination

there enters necessarily numerous jealousies and fears; whose interests

are not always reconcilable; and the passions, education, and character

of whose people, on many accounts, are repugnant to each other; with

a constitution made merely for defence; it is impossible that an

association of independent Sovereignties, standing in such relations to

each other, should not have the principles of its union, and the hopes

of its constitution, materially affected by the collection of a large

military force, and its employment in the subjugation of neighboring

territories. It is easy to see that an army collected in such a state

of society as that which exists in this country, where wages are high

and subsistence easily to be obtained, must be composed, so far as

respects the soldiery, for the most part of the refuse of the country;

and as respects the officers, with some honorable exceptions indeed,

must consist, in a considerable degree, of men desperate sometimes in

fortune, at others in reputation; "choice spirits;" men "tired of the

dull pursuits of civil life," who have not virtue or talents to rise

in a calm and settled state of things, and who, all other means of

advancement or support wanting or failing, take to the sword. A body

of thirty or fifty thousand such men, combined, armed, and under a

popular leader, is a very formidable force. They want only discipline

and service to make them veterans. Opportunity to acquire these,

Canada will afford. The army which advances to the walls of Quebec, in

the present condition of Canadian preparation, must be veteran. And

a veteran army, under a popular leader, flushed with victory, each

individual realizing, that while the body remains combined, he may be

something, and possibly very great; that if dissolved, he sinks into

insignificance; will not be disbanded by vote. They will consult with

one another, and with their beloved chieftain, upon this subject; and

not trouble themselves about the advice of the old people who are

knitting and weaving in the chimney corners at Washington. Let the

American people receive this as an undoubted truth, which experience

will verify. Whoever plants the American standard on the walls of

Quebec, conquers it for himself, and not for the people of the United

States. Whoever lives to see that event--may my head be low in the

dust before it happen!--will witness a dynasty established in that

country by the sword. He will see a King or an Emperor, dukedoms, and

earldoms, and baronies, distributed to the officers, and knights' fees

bestowed on the soldiery. Such an army will not trouble itself about

geographical lines, in portioning out the divisions of its new empire;

and will run the parallels of its power by other steel than that of the

compass. When that event happens, the people of New England, if they

mean to be free, must have a force equal to defend themselves against

such an army. And a military force equal to this object will itself be

able to enslave the country.

Mr. Speaker--When I contemplate the character and consequences of this

invasion of Canada; when I reflect upon its criminality and its danger

to the peace and liberty of this once happy country; I thank the great

Author and Source of all virtue, that through His grace that section

of country in which I have the happiness to reside, is, in so great

a degree, free from the iniquity of this transgression. I speak it

with pride, the people of that section have done what they could to

vindicate themselves and their children from the burden of this sin.

That whole section has risen, almost as one man, for the purpose of

driving from power, by one great constitutional effort, the guilty

authors of this war. If they have failed, it has not been through the

want of will or of exertion, but in consequence of the weakness of

their political power. When in the usual course of Divine Providence,

who punishes nations as well as individuals, His destroying angel shall

on this account pass over this country--and sooner or later, pass it

will--I may be permitted to hope that over New England his hand will

be stayed. Our souls are not steeped in the blood which has been shed

in this war. The spirits of the unhappy men who have been sent to an

untimely audit, have borne to the bar of divine justice no accusations

against us.

This opinion, concerning the principles of this invasion of Canada,

is not peculiar to me. Multitudes who approve the war, detest it. I

believe this sentiment is entertained, without distinction of parties,

by almost all the moral sense, and nine-tenths of the intelligence,

of the whole northern section of the United States. I know that men

from that quarter of the country will tell you differently. Stories

of a very different kind are brought by all those who come trooping

to Washington for place, appointments, and emoluments; men who will

say any thing to please the ear, or do any thing to please the eye

of Majesty, for the sake of those fat contracts and gifts which it

scatters; men whose fathers, brothers, and cousins, are provided for

by the Departments; whose full-grown children are at, suck at the

money-distilling breasts of the Treasury; the little men who sigh

after great offices; those who have judgeships in hand or judgeships

in promise; toads that live upon the vapor of the palace, that

swallow great men's spittle at the levees; that stare and wonder at

all the fine sights which they see there; and most of all wonder at

themselves--how they got there to see them. These men will tell you,

that New England applauds this invasion.

But, Mr. Speaker, look at the elections. What is the language they

speak? The present tenant of the Chief Magistracy rejected, by that

whole section of country, with the exception of a single State

unanimously. And for whom? In favor of a man, out of the circle of his

own State without much influence, and personally almost unknown. In

favor of a man against whom the prevailing influence in New England

had previously strong political prejudices; and with whom, at the time

of giving him their support, they had no political understanding; in

favor of a man whose merits, whatever in other respects they might be,

were brought into notice, in the first instance, chiefly so far as that

election was concerned, by their opinion of the utter want of merit of

the man whose re-election they opposed.

Among the causes of that universal disgust which pervaded all New

England, at the Administration and its supporters, was the general

dislike and contempt of this invasion of Canada. I have taken some

pains to learn the sentiments which prevail on this subject in New

England, and particularly among its yeomanry, the pride and the hope

of that country. I have conversed with men, resting on their spades

and leaning on the handles of their ploughs, while they relaxed for

a moment from the labor by which they support their families, and

which gives such a hardihood and character to their virtues. They

asked--"What do we want of Canada? We have land enough. Do we want

plunder? There is not enough of that to pay the cost of getting it.

Are our Ocean rights there? Or is it there our seamen are held in

captivity? Are new States desired? We have plenty of those already. Are

they to be held as conquered territories? This will require an army

there. Then, to be safe, we must have an army here. And with a standing

army, what security for our liberties?"

These are no fictitious reasonings. They are the suggestions I doubt

not of thousands and tens of thousands of our hardy New England

yeomanry; men who, when their country calls, at any wise and real

exigency, will start from their native soils and throw their shields

over their liberties, like the soldiers of Cadmus, "armed in complete

steel;" yet men, who have heard the winding of your horn to the Canada

campaign, with the same apathy and indifference with which they would

hear in the streets the trilling of a jews-harp, or the twirring of a

banjo.

The plain truth is, that the people of New England have no desire for

Canada. Their moral sentiment does not justify, and they will not

countenance its invasion. I have thus stated the grounds on which they

deem, and I have felt myself bound to maintain, that this contemplated

invasion of that territory is, as it respects the Canadians, wanton

and cruel; because it inflicts the greatest imaginable evils on them,

without any imaginable benefit to us; that, as it respects the United

States, such an invasion is senseless, because, ultimately, ruinous

to our own political safety; and wicked, because it is an abuse of

the blessings of Divine Providence, and a manifest perversion of His

multiplied bounties, to the purpose of desolating an innocent and

unoffending people.

I shall now proceed to the next view I proposed to take on this

project of invading Canada, and consider it in the light of a means

to obtain an early and honorable peace. It is said, and this is the

whole argument in favor of this invasion, in this aspect, that the

only way to negotiate successfully with Great Britain, is to appeal

to her fears and raise her terrors for the fate of her colonies. I

shall here say nothing concerning the difficulties of executing this

scheme; nor about the possibility of a deficiency both in men and

money. I will not dwell on the disgust of all New England, nor on

the influence of this disgust with respect to your efforts. I will

admit, for the present, that an army may be raised, and that during

the first years it may be supported by loans, and that afterwards it

will support itself by bayonets. I will admit farther, for the sake of

argument, that success is possible and that Great Britain realizes the

practicability of it. Now, all this being admitted, I maintain that the

surest of all possible ways to defeat any hope from negotiation, is

the threat of such an invasion, and an active preparation to execute

it. Those must be very young politicians, their pin-feathers not yet

grown, and however they may flutter on this floor, they are not yet

fledged for any high or distant flight, who think that threats and

appealing to fear are the ways of producing a disposition to negotiate

in Great Britain, or in any other nation which understands what it owes

to its own safety and honor. No nation can yield to threat, what it

might yield to a sense of interest; because, in that case, it has no

credit for what it grants, and what is more, loses something in point

of reputation, from the imbecility which concessions made under such

circumstances indicate. Of all nations in the world, Great Britain

is the last to yield to considerations of fear and terror. The whole

history of the British nation is one tissue of facts, tending to show

the spirit with which she meets all attempts to bully and brow-beat her

into measures inconsistent with her interests or her policy. No nation

ever before made such sacrifices of the present to the future. No

nation ever built her greatness more systematically, on the principles

of a haughty self-respect, which yields nothing to suggestions of

danger, and which never permits either her ability or inclination to

maintain her rights to be suspected. In all negotiations, therefore,

with that power, it may be taken as a certain truth, that your chance

of failure is just in proportion to the publicity and obtrusiveness of

threats and appeals to fear.

The American Cabinet understands all this very well, although this

House may not. Their policy is founded upon it. The project of this

bill is to put at a still further distance the chance of amicable

arrangement, in consequence of the dispositions which the threat of

invasion of their colonies, and attempt to execute it, will excite in

the British nation and Ministry. I have some claim to speak concerning

the policy of the men who constitute the American Cabinet. For eight

years I have studied their history, characters, and interests. I know

no reason why I should judge them severely, except such as arise from

those inevitable conclusions, which avowed principles and distinct

conduct have impressed upon the mind. I say, then, sir, without

hesitation, that in my judgment, the embarrassments of our relations

with Great Britain, and keeping alive between this country and that

a root of bitterness, has been, is, and will continue to be, a main

principle of the policy of this American Cabinet. They want not a solid

settlement of our differences. If the nation will support them in it,

they will persevere in the present war. If it will not, some general

arrangements will be the resort, which will leave open opportunities

for discord; which on proper occasions will be improved by them. I

shall give my reasons for this opinion. I wish no sentiments of mine to

have influence any farther than the reasons upon which they are founded

justify. They are public reasons, arising from undeniable facts; the

nation will judge for itself.

The men who now, and who, for these twelve years past, have, to the

misfortune of this country, guided its councils and directed its

destinies, came into power on a tide, which was raised and supported

by elements constituted of British prejudices and British antipathies.

The parties which grew up in this nation took their origin and form at

the time of the adoption of the treaty negotiated by Mr. Jay, in 1794.

The opposition of that day, of which the men now in power were the

leaders, availed themselves, very dexterously, of the relics of that

hatred towards the British name which remained after the Revolutionary

war. By perpetually blowing up the embers of the ancient passions,

they excited a flame in the nation; and by systematically directing it

against the honorable men who at that time conducted its affairs, the

strength and influence of those men were impaired. The embarrassments

with France, which succeeded, in 1798 and 1799, were turned to the same

account. Unfortunately, those who then conducted the public affairs

attended less to the appearance of things, than to their measures; and

considered more what was due to their country than was prudent, in the

state of the prejudices and jealousies of the people, thus artfully

excited against them. They went on, in the course they deemed right,

regardless of personal consequences, and blind to the evidences of

discontent which surrounded them. The consequences are well known. The

supreme power in these United States passed into the hands which now

possess it; in which it has been continued down to the present time.

The transfer of power was effected, undeniably, principally on the

very ground of those prejudices and antipathies which existed in the

nation against Great Britain; and which had been artfully fomented by

the men now in power, and their adherents, and directed against their

predecessors. These prejudices and passions constitute the main pillar

of the power of these men. In my opinion, they never will permit it

to be wholly taken away from them. They never will permit the people

of this country to look at them and their political opponents, free

of that jaundice with which they have carefully imbued the vision of

their own partisans. They never will consent to be weighed in a balance

of mere merits; but will always take care to keep in reserve some

portion of these British antipathies, to throw as a make-weight into

the opposite scale, whenever they find their own sinking. To continue,

multiply, strengthen, and extend these props of their power, has been,

still is, the object of the daily study and the nightly vigils of

our American Cabinet. For this the British Treaty was permitted to

expire by its own limitation; notwithstanding the state of things

which the Treaty of Amiens had produced in Europe was so little like

permanent peace, that the occurrence of the fact, on which the force

of that limitation depended, might easily have been questioned, with

but little violence to the terms, and in perfect conformity with its

spirit. For this a renewal of the Treaty of 1794 was refused by our

Cabinet, although proffered by the British Government. For this the

treaty negotiated by Messrs. Monroe and Pinkney in 1807 was rejected.

For this, in 1811, fifty thousand dollars were paid out of the public

Treasury to John Henry, for the obvious purpose of enabling the

American Cabinet to calumniate their political opponents, on this very

point of British influence, upon the eve of elections, occurring in

Massachusetts, on the event of which the perpetuation of their own

power was materially dependent.

Mr. Speaker, such men as these never will permit a state of things

to pass away, so essential to their influence. Be it peace or war

arrangement or hostility, the association of these British antipathies

in the minds of the mass of the community, with the characters of

their political opponents, constitutes the great magazine of their

power. This composes their whole political larder. It is, like Lord

Peter's brown loaf, their "beef, mutton, veal, venison, partridge,

plum-pudding, and custard."

From the time of the expiration of the British Treaty of 1794, and the

refusal to renew it, the American Cabinet have been careful to precede

negotiation with some circumstances or other, calculated to make it

fail, or at least to make a successful result less certain. Thus in

1806, when, from the plunder of commerce, by British cruisers, a

negotiation, notwithstanding the obvious reluctance of the Cabinet, was

forced upon them, by the clamors of the merchants, the non-importation

law of April, in that year, was obtruded between the two countries.

In the course of the debate upon that law, it was opposed upon this

very ground, that it was an obstacle to a successful negotiation.

It was advocated, like the bill now under discussion, as an aid to

successful negotiation. It was also said by the opponents of the law

of 1806, that Great Britain would not negotiate under its operation,

and that arrangement, attempted under proper auspices, could not be

difficult, from the known interests and inclinations of that nation.

What was the consequence? Precisely that which was anticipated. The

then President of the United States was necessitated to come to this

House, and recommend a suspension of the operation of that law, upon

the openly-avowed ground of its being expedient to give that evidence

of a conciliatory disposition; really, because, if permitted to

continue in operation, negotiation was found to be impracticable. After

the suspension of that law, a treaty was formed. The merits of that

treaty, it is not within the scope of my present argument to discuss.

It is sufficient to say, it was deemed good enough to receive the

sanction of Messrs. Monroe and Pinkney. It arrived in America and was

rejected by the authority of a single individual; apparently because

of the insufficiency of the arrangement about impressment. Really

because a settlement with Great Britain, at that time, did not "enter

into the scope of the policy" of the American Cabinet. The negotiation

was indeed renewed, but it was followed up with the enforcement of the

non-importation law, and the enactment of the embargo. Both which steps

were stated at the time, as they proved afterwards, to be of a nature

to make hopeless successful negotiation.

In this State the Executive power of this nation formally passed into

new hands, but substantially remained under the old principles of

action, and subject to the former influences. It was desirable that

a fund of popularity should be acquired for the new Administration.

Accordingly, an arrangement was made with Mr. Erskine, and no

questions asked, concerning the adequacy of his powers. But, lest this

circumstance should not defeat the proposed arrangement, a clause was

inserted in the correspondence containing an insult to the British

Government, offered in the face of the world, such as no man ever gave

to a private individual whom he did not mean to offend. The President

of the United States said, in so many words, to the person at the head

of that Government, that he did not understand what belonged to his

own honor, as well as it was understood by the President himself. The

effect of such language was natural, it was necessary; it could not

but render the British Government averse to sanction Mr. Erskine's

arrangement. The effect was anticipated by Mr. Robert Smith, then

acting as Secretary of State. He objected to its being inserted, but it

was done in the President's own handwriting. As Mr. Erskine's authority

was denied by the British Government, it is well known that in fact, on

the point of this indignity, the fate of that arrangement turned. Can

any one doubt that our Cabinet meant that it should have this effect?

I send you word, Mr. Speaker, that I have agreed with your messenger,

and wish you to ratify it. I think you, however, no gentleman,

notwithstanding; and that you do not understand, as well as I, what is

"due to your own honor." What think you, sir? Would you ratify such

an arrangement if you could help it? Does a proffer of settlement,

connected with such language, look like a disposition or an intention

to conciliate? I appeal to the common sense of mankind on the point.

The whole stage of the relations, induced between this country and

Great Britain, in consequence of our embargo and restrictive systems,

was, in fact, a standing appeal to the fears of the British Cabinet.

For, notwithstanding those systems were equal in their terms, so far

as they affected Foreign Powers, yet their operation was notoriously

almost wholly upon Great Britain. To yield to that pressure, or to any

thing which should foster, in this country, the idea that it was an

effectual weapon of hostility, was nothing more than conceding that

she was dependent upon us. A concession, which, when once made by

her, was certain to encourage a resort to it by us on every occasion

of difficulty between the two nations. Reasoning, therefore, upon the

known nature of things, and the plain interests of Great Britain, it

was foretold that, during its continuance she would concede nothing.

And the event has justified these predictions. But the circumstance the

most striking, and that furnishing the most conclusive evidence of the

indisposition of the American Cabinet to peace, and their determination

to carry on the war, is that connected with the pretended repeal of the

French decrees, in November, 1810, and the consequent revival, in 1811,

of our restrictive system against Great Britain.

If ever a body of men were pledged to any thing, the American Cabinet,

its friends and supporters, were pledged for the truth of this fact;

that the French decrees of Berlin and Milan were definitively repealed

as it respects the United States, on the first of November, 1810. If

ever any body of men staked their whole stock of reputation upon any

point, our Cabinet did it on this. They and their partisans asserted

and raved. They denounced every man as a British partisan who denied

it. They declared the restrictive system was revived by the mere effect

of the proclamation. But lest the courts of law should not be as

subservient to their policy as might be wished, they passed the law of

the 2d of March, 1811, upon the basis of this repeal, and of its being

definitive. The British Government refused, however, to recognize the

validity of this repeal, and denied that the Berlin and Milan decrees

were repealed on the first of November, 1810, as our Cabinet asserted.

Thus, then, stood the argument between the British Ministry and our

Cabinet. The British Ministry admitted that if the Berlin and Milan

decrees were repealed on the 1st of November, 1810, they were bound to

revoke their Orders in Council. But they denied that repeal to exist.

Our Cabinet, on the other hand, admitted that if the Berlin and Milan

decrees were not repealed on the 1st of November, 1810, the restrictive

system ought not to have been revived against Great Britain. But they

asserted that repeal to exist. This was, virtually, the state of the

question between the two countries on this point. And it is agreed, on

all hands, that this refusal of the British Government to repeal their

Orders in Council, after the existence of the repeal of the Berlin and

Milan decrees, as asserted by the American Cabinet, was the cause of

the declaration of war between the two countries. So that in truth,

the question of the right of war depended upon the existence of that

fact; for if that fact did not exist, even the American Cabinet did

not pretend that, in the position in which things then stood, they had

a right to declare war, on account of the continuance of the British

Orders in Council.

Now, what is the truth in relation to this all-important fact,

the definitive repeal of the Berlin and Milan decrees on the 1st

of November, 1810; the pivot upon which turned the revival of the

restrictive system and our declaration of war? Why, sir, the event has

proved that in relation to that fact the American Cabinet was, to say

the least, in an error. Bonaparte himself, in a decree, dated the 28th

of April, 1811, but not promulgated till a year afterwards, distinctly

declares that the Berlin and Milan decrees were not definitively

repealed, as relates to the United States, on the 1st of November,

1810. He also declares that they are then, on that twenty-eighth of

April, for the first time, repealed. And he founds the issuing of this

decree on the act of the American Congress of the 2d of March, 1811.

That very act, which was passed upon the ground of the definitive

repeal of the Berlin and Milan decrees, on the 1st of November, 1810;

and which, it is agreed on all sides, the American Government were

bound in honor not to pass, except in case of such antecedent repeal.

Were ever a body of men so abandoned in the hour of need, as the

American Cabinet, in this instance by Bonaparte? Was ever any body of

men so cruelly wounded in the house of their friend? This, this was

"the unkindest cut of all." But how was it received by the American

Cabinet? Surely they were indignant at this treatment. Surely the air

rings with reproaches upon a man who has thus made them stake their

reputation upon a falsehood; and then gives little less than the lie

direct, to their assertions. No, sir, nothing of all this is heard from

our Cabinet. There is a philosophic tameness that would be remarkable,

if it were not, in all cases affecting Bonaparte, characteristic. All

the Executive of the United States has found it in his heart to say,

in relation to this last decree of Bonaparte, which contradicts his

previous allegations and asseverations, is, that "This proceeding is

rendered, by the time and manner of it, liable to many objections!"

I have referred to this subject as being connected, with future

conduct, strikingly illustrative of the disposition of the American

Cabinet to carry on the war, and of their intention, if possible,

not to make peace. Surely, if any nation had a claim for liberal

treatment from another, it was the British nation from the American,

after the discovery of the error of the American Government, in

relation to the repeal of the Berlin and Milan decrees, in November,

1810. In consequence of that error, the American Cabinet had ruined

numbers of our own citizens, who had been caught by the revival of the

non-intercourse law; they had revived that law against Great Britain,

under circumstances which now appeared to have been fallacious; and

they had declared war against her, on the supposition, that she had

refused to repeal her Orders in Council, after the French decrees

were in fact revoked: whereas, it now appears that they were in fact

not revoked. Surely the knowledge of this error was followed by an

instant and anxious desire to redress the resulting injury. As the

British Orders in Council were in fact revoked, on the knowledge of the

existence of the French decree of repeal, surely the American Cabinet

at once extended the hand of friendship; met the British Government

half way; stopped all farther irritation; and strove to place every

thing on a basis best suited to promote an amicable adjustment. No,

sir, nothing of all this occurred. On the contrary, the question

of impressments is made the basis of continuing the war. On this

subject, a studied fairness of proposition is preserved, accompanied

with systematic perseverance in measures of hostility. An armistice

was proposed by them. It was refused by us. It was acceded to by the

American General on the frontiers. It was rejected by the Cabinet. No

consideration of the false allegation on which the war in fact was

founded; no consideration of the critical and extremely consequential

nature to both nations of the subject of impressment; no considerations

of humanity, interposed their influence. They renewed hostilities. They

rushed upon Canada. Nothing would satisfy them but blood. The language

of their conduct is that of the giant, in the legends of infancy:

"Fee, faw, fow, fum,

I smell the blood of an Englishman;

Dead or alive, I will have some!"

Can such men pretend that peace is their object? Whatever may result,

the perfect conviction of my mind is, that they have no such intention,

and that if it comes it is contrary both to their hope and expectation.

I would not judge these men severely. But it is my duty to endeavor

to judge them truly; and to express fearlessly the result of that

judgment, whatever it may be. My opinion results from the application

of the well-known principle of judging concerning men's purposes and

motives: to consider rather what men do, than what they say; and to

examine their deeds in connection with predominating passions and

interests; and on this basis decide. In making an estimate of the

intentions of these or any other politicians, I make little or no

account of pacific pretensions. There is a general reluctance at war,

and desire of peace, which pervades the great mass of every people; and

artful rulers could never keep any nation at war any length of time,

beyond their true interests, without some sacrifice to that general

love of peace which exists in civilized men. Bonaparte himself will

tell you that he is the most pacific creature in the world. He has

already declared, by his proclamation to Frenchmen, that he has gone

to Moscow for no other end than to cultivate peace, and counteract

the Emperor of Russia's desire of war. In this country, where the

popular sentiment has so strong an impulse on its affairs, the same

obtrusive pretension must inevitably be preserved. No man or set of

men ever can or will get this country at war, or continue it long in

war, without keeping on hand a stout, round stock of gulling matter.

Fair propositions will always be made to go hand in hand with offensive

acts. And when something is offered so reasonable that no man can doubt

but it will be accepted, at the same moment something will be done of

a nature to embarrass the project, and if not to defeat at least to

render its acceptance dubious. How this has been in past time, I have

shown. I will now illustrate what is doing and intended at present.

As from the uniform tenor of the conduct of the American Cabinet,

in relation to the British Government, I have no belief that their

intention has been to make a solid arrangement with that nation; so,

from the evidence of their disposition and intention, existing abroad

and on the table, I have no belief that such is at present their

purpose. I cannot possibly think otherwise, than that such is not their

intention. Let us take the case into common life. I have demands, Mr.

Speaker, against you, very just in their nature, but different. Some of

recent, others of very old date. The former depending upon principles

very clearly in my favor. The latter critical, difficult, and dubious,

both in principle and settlement. In this state of things, and during

your absence, I watch my opportunity, declare enmity; throw myself

upon your children and servants and property, which happen to be in

my neighborhood, and do them all the injury I can. While I am doing

this, I receive a messenger from you, stating that the grounds of the

recent injury are settled; that you comply fully with my terms. Your

servants and children, whom I am plundering and killing, invite me to

stay my hand until you return, or until some accommodation can take

place between us. But, deaf to any such suggestions, I prosecute my

intention of injury to the utmost. When there is reason to expect your

return, I multiply my means of injury and offence. And no sooner do I

hear of your arrival, than I thrust my fist into your face, and say

to you--"Well, sir, here are fair propositions of settlement; come

to my terms, which are very just; settle the old demand in my way,

and we will be as good friends as ever." Mr. Speaker, what would be

your conduct on such an occasion? Would you be apt to look as much at

the nature of the propositions, as at the temper of the assailant?

If you did not at once return blow for blow, and injury for injury,

would you not at least take a little time to consider? Would you not

tell such an assailant, that you were not to be bullied nor beaten

into any concession? If you settled at all, might you not consider

it your duty in some way to make him feel the consequences of his

strange intemperance of passion? For myself, I have no question

how a man of spirit ought to act under such circumstances. I have

as little, how a great nation, like Great Britain, will act. Now, I

have no doubt, sir, that the American Cabinet view this subject in

the same light. They understand well, that by the declaration of war,

the invasion of Canada, the refusal of an armistice, and perseverance

in hostilities, after the principal ground of war had been removed,

they have wrought the minds of the British Cabinet and people to

a very high state of irritation. Now is the very moment to get up

some grand scheme of pacification; such as may persuade the American

people of the inveterate love of our Cabinet for peace, and make them

acquiescent in their perseverance in hostilities. Accordingly, before

the end of the session, a great tub will be thrown out to the whale.

Probably, a little while before the Spring elections, terms of very

fair import will be proffered to Great Britain. Such as, perhaps, six

months ago our Cabinet would not have granted, had she solicited them

on her knees. Such as probably, in the opinion of the people of this

country, Great Britain ought to accept; such perhaps as in any other

state of things, she would have accepted. But such as, I fear, under

the irritation produced by the strange course pursued by the American

Cabinet, that nation will not accept. Sir, I do not believe that our

Cabinet expect that they will be accepted. They think the present

state of induced passion is sufficient to prevent arrangement. But to

make assurance doubly sure, to take a bond of fate, that arrangement

shall not happen, they prepare this bill. A bill, which proposes an

augmentation of the army for the express purpose of conquering the

Canadas. A bill which, connected with the recent disposition evinced by

our Cabinet, in relation to those provinces, and with the avowed intent

of making their subjugation the means of peace, through the fear to

be inspired into Great Britain, is as offensive to the pride of that

nation as can well be imagined; and is, in my apprehension, as sure a

guarantee of continued war as could be given. On these grounds, my mind

cannot force itself to any other conclusion than this, that the avowed

object of this bill is the true one; that the Canadas are to be invaded

the next season; that the war is to be protracted: and that this is the

real policy of the American Cabinet.

I will now reply to those invitations to "union," which have been so

obtrusively urged upon us. If by this call to union is meant a union

in a project for the invasion of Canada, or for the invasion of East

Florida, or for the conquest of any foreign country whatever, either

as a means of carrying on this war or for any other purpose, I answer,

distinctly, I will unite with no man nor any body of men for any such

purposes. I think such projects criminal in the highest degree, and

ruinous to the prosperity of these States. But, if by this invitation

is meant union in preparation for defence, strictly so called; union

in fortifying our seaboard; union in putting our cities into a state of

safety; union in raising such a military force as shall be sufficient

with the local militia in the hands of the constitutional leaders,

the Executives of the States, to give a rational degree of security

against any invasion; sufficient to defend our frontiers, sufficient

to awe into silence the Indian tribes within our Territories; union

in creating such a maritime force as shall command the seas on the

American coasts, and keep open the intercourse, at least between

the States: if this is meant, I have no hesitation; union on such

principles you shall have from me cordially and faithfully. And this,

too, sir, without any reference to the state of my opinion, in relation

to the justice or necessity of this war. Because I will understand such

to be the condition of man, in a social compact, that he must partake

of the fate of the society to which he belongs, and must submit to the

privations and sacrifices its defence requires, notwithstanding these

may be the result of the vices or crimes of its immediate rulers. But

there is a great difference between supporting such rulers in plans of

necessary self-defence, on which the safety of our altars and firesides

especially depend, and supporting them in projects of foreign invasion,

and encouraging them in schemes of conquest and ambition, which are

not only unjust in themselves, but dreadful in their consequences;

inasmuch as, let the particular project result as it may, the general

effect must be, according to human view, destructive to our own

domestic liberties and constitution. I speak as an individual. Sir, for

my single self, did I support such projects as are avowed to be the

objects of this bill, I should deem myself a traitor to my country.

Were I even to aid them by loan, or in any other way, I should consider

myself a partaker in the guilt of the purpose. But when these projects

of an invasion shall be abandoned; when men yield up schemes which not

only openly contemplate the raising of a great military force, but also

the concentrating them at one point, and placing them in one hand;

schemes obviously ruinous to the fates of a free Republic--as they

comprehend the means by which such have ever heretofore been destroyed;

when, I say, such schemes shall be abandoned, and the wishes of the

Cabinet limited to mere defence and frontier and maritime protection,

there will be no need of calls to union. For such objects there is not,

there cannot be, but one heart and soul in this people.

Mr. ARCHER said, so great was the respect which he felt for the House,

so deep was the consciousness which he entertained of his inability

to do justice to a cause, especially one of so much magnitude and

importance, of which he might be the advocate, that he would be

doing injustice to his feelings were he not to express the weight

of the embarrassments which oppressed him. But the wide range which

the present discussion had taken, involving considerations of great

national interest, and calling forth the cruel asperities of political

intolerance, seemed to leave him no alternative in the discharge of

his duty, but to repel the unfounded insinuations which had flown in

so copious a stream from the other side of the House. Were gentlemen

to confine themselves to a temperate investigation of the propriety

of adopting measures either recommended by the Executive, or proposed

by the majority, who is there that would not listen with pleasure

and satisfaction? But when the liberty of debate was prostituted in

disseminating the most unfounded charges, in the indiscriminate abuse

of the constituted authorities of the nation, he confessed he could

not "always be a hearer, and never reply." The few observations he had

to make would be without either system or arrangement, having bestowed

no previous consideration on the subject, and should be confined not

so much to the bill for raising an additional army, as the remarks and

arguments of those gentlemen who had preceded him on the other side of

the House.

And here, he said, he hoped to be permitted first to notice the charge

which had been confidently made by a gentleman from New York (Mr. GOLD)

against the majority of the House. He had asserted (and he seemed to

dwell upon the assertion with peculiar satisfaction) that war had been

declared by Congress prematurely and without due preparation; that

to embark in a war with a powerful nation, without a large standing

army, was impolitic in the extreme. This principle, said Mr. A., in

the general might be true, but it had certainly no application to this

country. Our Government was founded on the broad basis of popular

opinion, liable to fluctuation upon the first appearance of any system

which might be calculated to destroy the liberties of the people. A

laudable jealousy of their rulers throbbed in the heart of every man

in the country, who would seize the first opportunity to change an

Administration that would raise a standing army in time of peace,

whatever might be the professed objects of such an Administration. From

this jealousy the natural result would be, that the men who raised

the army would never declare the war which it was intended to wage.

He would refer to the Administration of Mr. Adams. An army had been

then raised, or attempted to be raised, to defend the country against

an anticipated French invasion. The professed object was disbelieved,

and the people, apprehending an invasion of their rights, removed from

power the men who had voted for the army. All our institutions were

repugnant to a standing army in time of peace. Anticipated invasion

would seldom justify it, because it might be made a pretext for the

purpose at all times, and with the most dangerous views. What had

been said by the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. QUINCY) seemed to

confirm this position, for he had expressed his fears of the army, even

in a state of declared war, when that army was to be employed out of

the limits of the country; and if jealousy existed at such time, the

conclusion would naturally follow that it would exist to a greater

degree in a time of peace. The argument then of the gentleman, if it

proved any thing, proved too much, because its effect would always be

to frustrate the views of the Government, and prevent it from going

to war to avenge even the grossest insult, or to assert even its most

indisputable rights. But an appeal had been made with much confidence

to the history of all Europe, to bear him out in the charge he had

made, and it had been said that no instance of a nation's engaging in

a war without having a well-regulated and disciplined army could be

adduced. This, said Mr. A., will be admitted, but he presumed it was

incumbent upon the gentleman to show that some analogy existed between

the Governments of Europe and that of the United States, before his

argument could have any application to the subject. There the people

had no voice in the selection of their rulers. There the arbitrary

will of the monarch was the law of the land, and his decrees, however

oppressive or obnoxious, were enforced by the hand of power, without a

murmur or complaint. There each Government is surrounded by kingdoms

powerful and strong, the ambition of whose rulers prompts them to seize

upon every occasion to enlarge the boundaries of their dominions. For

one of these powers, even in the most peaceful condition of the world,

to be destitute of a powerful and permanent military force, would

evince an inattention to its own security and independence, which would

demonstrate the incapacity of its monarch to govern his subjects, or

to preserve the integrity of his possessions. But the dissimilarity

of the Government and situation of the United States would show the

inapplicability of the gentleman's maxim to this country. Here we have

no powerful neighbor whose incursions we dread. Here we are happily

removed, by a wide-extended ocean, from those nations who, upon a

declaration of war by us, could overrun the country with a military

force, or endanger its civil institutions. Here we have a people

proudly jealous of their liberties, who will put down constitutionally

every attempt in a state of peace to raise a Military Establishment.

To have delayed, then, the declaration of war against England, until

the ranks of the army authorized to be raised had been completely

filled, would have been a most certain course to have defeated the

object which Congress had in view. The jealousies and fears which

would have been the necessary consequence of such delay, would have

brought into power men of far different views; men who, if the natural

conclusion to be drawn from the arguments of some of them could be

admitted, would sooner submit to all the indignities we had received

from Great Britain, than resist her. The war was therefore not declared

prematurely, but was delayed to as late a period as the nature of

our institutions would permit. And, if what he had said would not be

sufficient to satisfy the gentleman from New York of his error, the

army that was so shamefully surrendered at Detroit, if it had been

commanded by a man of spirit and fidelity, would long before this, by

the possession which it would have given us of an important province

of the enemy, have convinced him that war was not declared without

preparation. But, for having said so much upon this point, some apology

seemed to be necessary upon his part, and he could only say that he had

been induced to do so, because, having been one of the majority who

voted for war against England, the charge seemed to be an imputation

against his character, which the duty every man owed to himself bound

him to repel.

It had been said by a gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. PITKIN) that

the nature of the war had been changed; the principal cause had been

removed by the British Order in Council of June 23d, 1812, by which

her previous orders were repealed; that it was a well-ascertained fact

that war would not have taken place if this intelligence had reached

the United States before its declaration; and that the Executive ought

to have acceded to the terms proposed through Admiral Warren, and

have terminated the contest. These were grounds which demanded some

consideration, and he trusted that he would be able to show, from

authentic documents, that his premises were erroneous, and that of

course his conclusions did not follow. But he would now admit, for

the sake of argument, (what he should hereafter prove incorrect,)

that the Orders in Council were the principal cause of the war; he

could not, for himself, see how, even then, the war ought in justice

to have terminated. Did it follow that minor considerations should

be placed out of view or yielded up entirely? Would it have been

proper for the Government to have entered into no stipulations for the

security of American seamen? Would it have been proper in them to have

claimed on behalf of our citizens no indemnity for the vast amount of

spoliations which have been made on the property of American merchants?

Unquestionably not. Until these considerations, admitting them to be

of minor importance, should have been satisfactorily adjusted, to have

made a peace, in his opinion, would have been the height of impolicy.

Sir, said he, it is not sufficient that the injury should cease, but

that ample compensation should be made for the commission of the wrong.

This was the case every day between individuals in civil society,

and why ought not the rule to apply with equal force to States, in

their relation to each other? Justice was its foundation, and that

would operate upon the one as well as the other. These considerations

alone, perhaps, ought to be deemed sufficient to show that the course

the gentlemen would have taken would have been unwise. But, supposing

them to have no weight, he thought it might be satisfactorily shown

that, to have acceded to the terms proposed by the British Government,

would have been an actual abandonment of the principal cause which

had induced hostilities. To have negotiated without entering into an

arrangement in relation to the important interest of impressment,

would unquestionably have been a relinquishment of the right which

we claimed, to be exempted from its exercise. But it was said that

was a secondary consideration. From whence was this conclusion drawn?

Were we more regardful of the property than the personal liberty of

the citizen? Was it taken from an impression which had gone abroad

in the country? or from the unofficial conversation of the members

of the House? These opinions (if the expression were allowed) he

would call extra judicial, and entitled to no consideration. But to

show that impressment was the principal cause, he would resort to

the best evidence of which the case was susceptible. He would appeal

to the archives and records of the country, which, in his opinion,

would be conclusive, to show what the opinions of Congress were upon

that subject. And, in the first place, would call the attention of

the House to the report of the committee to whom our foreign affairs

were intrusted, which was made on the 29th of November, 1811. After

commenting on the operation of the Orders in Council, they say:

"That they are not of that sect whose worship is at the shrine

of a calculating avarice, and while they are laying before the

House the just complaints of our merchants against the plunder

of their ships and cargoes, they cannot refrain from presenting

to the justice and humanity of their country the unhappy

case of our impressed seamen. Although the groans of these

victims of barbarity for the loss of (what would be dearer

to Americans than life) their liberty; although the cries

of their wives and children in the privation of protectors

and parents have of late been drowned in the louder clamors

at the loss of property; yet is the practice of forcing our

mariners into the British navy, in violation of the rights of

our flag, carried on with unabated rigor and severity. If it

be our duty to encourage the fair and legitimate commerce of

the country by protecting the property of the merchant, then,

indeed, by as much as life and liberty are more estimable than

ships and goods, so much more impressive is the duty to shield

the persons of our seamen, whose hard and honest services are

employed equally with those of the merchants, in advancing,

under the mantle of its laws, the interests of their country."

Again, the same committee, in the report which they made to the House,

detailing the causes which should induce the House to declare war, say,

(after speaking of the evils flowing from the Orders in Council:)

"That they will proceed to the consideration of another

wrong, which has been still more severely felt. This is

the impressment of our seamen, a practice which has been

unceasingly maintained by Great Britain in the wars to which

she has been a party since our Revolution. That they cannot

convey, in adequate terms, the deep sense which they entertain

of the injustice and oppression of this proceeding. Under the

pretext of impressing British seamen, Americans were seized in

British ports, on the high seas, and in every other quarter to

which the British power extends, were taken on board British

men of war, and compelled to serve there as British subjects.

In this mode our citizens were wantonly snatched from their

own country and their families; deprived of their liberty, and

doomed to an ignominious and slavish bondage; compelled to

fight the battles of a foreign country, and often to perish

in them. Our flag has given them no protection; it has been

unceasingly violated, and our vessels exposed to danger by the

loss of the men taken from them. That while this practice is

continued, it is impossible for the United States to consider

themselves an independent nation, for every case produces a new

proof of their degradation."

These reports, by the adoption of the measures they recommended, were

sanctioned by the Congress of the United States, and may be considered

as furnishing strong, if not full and complete evidence, that the

Legislative department of the Government considered the impressment of

our seamen as the principal cause which impelled them to have recourse

to the last resort of injured nations. The opinion of the Executive

had been manifested in clear and explicit terms upon the subject, in

the Message of the Chief Magistrate of the 1st of June, 1812. Thus we

have these concurrent proofs against the assertions of the gentleman

from Connecticut, (Mr. PITKIN.) If, then, as it appears clearly to

have been, from the documents before alluded to, that impressment

was the principal cause of the war, that it was an injury which no

independent nation could submit to without surrendering a portion of

its sovereignty, would it not be admitted, even on the ground which

had been taken, that, to have terminated the war by acceding to the

propositions alluded to, would have been degrading to the nation, and

have manifested the incompetency of the Executive to have conducted

with firmness the helm of State which had been submitted to his

guidance and direction? And no doubt could be entertained had such

an event taken place, but we should have heard denunciations against

the Administration proceeding from the very quarter whence they now

flow. Then they would have been made with infinitely more justice,

because they would have been supported by reason and by truth. We

should have then found the opposition appealing to the sympathies of

the people, and proclaiming that their most inestimable rights had been

surrendered by Government in the pacification; that although they were

originally opposed to a war, when it had once been declared they would

have prosecuted it until the claim had been abandoned by the British

Government. For, it cannot be concealed that unless, in the present

contest, Great Britain can be compelled to relinquish her claim to

the right of impressment, unless it be made the _sine qua non_ by the

American Government, to any arrangement of the existing differences

between the two nations, our claim to exemption from the practice must

be forever given up, and Great Britain will feel herself at liberty to

continue to exercise it with ten-fold rigor and severity.

Mr. A. declared that, notwithstanding the clamor of French influence

and French alliance, he felt no apprehensions upon that subject, as he

was well convinced it was not the intention or wish of our Government

to engulf us in the unfathomable vortex of European warfare. One word

to the gentleman from New York (Mr. GOLD) and he had done. It had been

considered by him as a most unfortunate circumstance that we should be

engaged in a war with Great Britain when Russia was struggling for her

independence. The most amicable relations existed, it was true, between

Russia and the United States; but would the gentleman have us on that

account to submit to every species of indignity from the ally of that

power? He beheld with as much detestation and abhorrence the conduct

of the French Emperor as any man could possibly do. His ambitious

progress was everywhere marked with blood. The vengeance of Heaven,

he trusted, would arrest him in his career to universal conquest and

dominion. The present condition of Russia, although her people groaned

under a despotism of the most unrelenting nature, must excite the

sympathy of every man in this country, because she was contending for

her independence, and he would wish her complete success in the war

in which she was now engaged, but that her triumph would protract the

restoration of peace to his own country.

Mr. GRUNDY.--Mr. Speaker, had this debate been confined to the bill

before you, I should certainly not have troubled the House with any

remarks of mine; but as the gentlemen opposed to the war in which we

are engaged have selected this as a fit occasion to bring before this

House and the nation a full view of all the relations which exist

between this and other countries, an apology at least is furnished for

a member of that committee, to whose examination these subjects have

been confided, to give his ideas upon the various points suggested.

This I shall endeavor to do with temper and moderation.

I will now proceed to state, as accurately and as concisely as I am

able, the manner in which the points in difference between the two

nations ought to be considered.

Upon some of the subjects in controversy, for instance, that of

impressment, negotiation had been tried unsuccessfully for twenty

years, as I will show before I sit down, from the public records of

the country; on others it had been tried for a shorter period. At the

last session of Congress, when every hope of obtaining justice in any

other way was lost, the United States declared war, not to procure

a repeal of the Orders in Council only, but to obtain redress for

the unjust spoliations which had been committed on the property of

American citizens, and to cause Great Britain to cease the practice

of impressment. Other causes of irritation existed, but these were

the prominent causes of the war. It may be taken as granted, in

this discussion, that those orders are revoked, notwithstanding the

objectionable manner of the revocation. You are now asked to lay down

the sword before you have obtained any of the objects of the war,

except the abolition of these obnoxious orders. I request gentlemen to

reflect, whether this is not, in point of fact, an abandonment of the

other points in dispute? Do you not, by ceasing to prosecute the war

which is already commenced, declare, in the strongest possible terms,

that you will not make war for the injuries which remain unredressed?

Can any man persuade himself that you will obtain that by negotiation

for which you have determined you will not fight! and that, too, from

a nation at all times disposed to depress this growing country? That

politician must have a very imperfect knowledge of the considerations

which influence all Cabinets, who does not know that the strongest

inducement which can be brought to operate in favor of an injured

nation, is the apprehension of retaliation, or fear of war, entertained

by the other party. I cannot, perhaps, establish this more clearly in

any other way than by recurring to the history of a transaction which

took place between the United States and Great Britain. Immediately

after the attack on the Chesapeake, this Government demanded

reparation. The terms proposed were reasonable, and such as a nation,

inclined to act justly, would promptly have acceded to. For five years,

or more, did the British Government refuse, or rather fail, to make

that arrangement, which, at the last session, produced a satisfactory

adjustment on that subject. Why, sir, was justice so long delayed,

and why was it at last obtained? The British Minister discovered a

determination in Congress to submit no longer. He saw that, unless

something was done, friendly relations between the two countries must

immediately cease. He saw that public sentiment called so loudly for an

opportunity of obtaining that justice by force which had been refused

to fair argument, that he granted us that reasonable satisfaction which

had been so long withheld. Sir, had he not seen the approaching storm,

no atonement for that wanton outrage on our national sovereignty had

yet been made. If you now say that you will not prosecute the war,

the enemy must view it as a decision pronounced by this Government,

that war shall not be waged by the American nation for the impressment

of her citizens, or for depredations committed on commerce. It might

as well be said, in plain, intelligible language, that the ocean is

to be abandoned by the people of the United States, except so far as

depends on the will of Great Britain. If both the property and liberty

of American citizens on the ocean are subject to her disposal, you

cease to possess the rights of a sovereign and independent nation. For

my own part, if we have the right to claim security for the liberty

and property of our citizens against that nation, of which no man dare

express a doubt, I am for asserting it until the object is attained, or

the ability of this nation fails; of the latter I have no fear.

It is pretended that this Government is not desirous of peace, and that

this is a war of conquest and ambition. I beg gentlemen to refrain

from making statements which they themselves do not believe. After the

declaration of war, what has been the conduct of the Executive? Through

Mr. Russell, our Chargé des Affaires at London, they have offered to

conclude an armistice on terms which would remove every pretext for

complaint on the part of Great Britain. He proposed that this country

should exclude from her service British seamen. It is true that Lord

Castlereagh urged Mr. Russell's want of powers, and stated that the

American Congress alone could make the necessary provisions on that

subject. If, however, sincerity had existed with the British Ministry,

a temporary arrangement could have been made, by which hostilities

would have been suspended until the legitimate authorities of this

country could have expressed an opinion. If Mr. R. had not adequate

powers to conclude an armistice, the proposition made by Mr. Monroe

to Admiral Warren was not liable to the same objection. In substance,

both propositions were the same; to the latter, no offer of compliance

has been tendered. If I have any objections to the late overtures

made by the Executive, it is that too great an anxiety for peace is

manifested; but when the nature of our institutions is consulted, a

strong propensity for domestic quiet is discovered; and, therefore, the

Administration should be indulged in any measure calculated to restore

harmony between the two countries, provided the honor and interests of

the nation are not compromitted.

I ask gentlemen in opposition to lay aside party feelings, and reflect

whether, if we now recede, points are not conceded to the enemy, which

they would not yield if in power. They affect to be the followers of

WASHINGTON. I will show them what his opinions were on the subject of

impressment. From them the pretended Washingtonians of the present day

will discover their degeneracy. Yes, sir, the Father of his Country

too well understood the value of liberty ever to consent that the most

obscure individual of his country should be deprived of it by a foreign

despot. So early as the year 1792, the British nation commenced the

practice of impressment, as now exercised by it. On the 11th day of

June, in that year, the then Secretary of State addressed a letter to

Mr. Pinkney, the American Minister at London, in which the practice

of impressment is strongly reprobated; and let it be remembered,

that although this letter was written by the Secretary, it contained

the sentiments of the President of the United States. In order that

the House may more fully comprehend what were the sentiments of that

man, whose memory we all venerate, I will read so much of the letter

referred to, as relates to this subject:

"The peculiar custom in England of impressing seamen on

every appearance of war will occasionally expose our seamen

to peculiar oppressions and vexations. It will be expedient

that you take proper opportunities in the mean time of

conferring with the Minister on this subject, in order to form

some arrangement for the protection of our seamen on those

occasions. We entirely reject the mode which was the subject

of a conversation between Mr. Morris and him; which was, that

our seamen should always carry about them certificates of their

citizenship. This is a condition never yet submitted to by any

nation--one with which seamen would never have the precaution

to comply. The casualties of their calling would expose them to

the constant destruction or loss of this paper evidence; and

thus the British Government would be armed with legal authority

to impress the whole of our seamen. The simplest rule will be,

that the vessel being American, shall be evidence that the

seamen on board her are such."

If, at so early a period, the right of search for men was objected

to by this Government, how much more forcible is the objection now?

We were then a young nation; we have since increased in resources by

which our rights can be maintained; whilst the violation of those

rights have been augmented in a greater degree. On the 6th of November,

1792, the Secretary of State wrote to the American Minister at London

a letter, in which, when speaking on the subject of impressment, the

following language is used: "It is unnecessary to develop to you the

inconveniences of this conduct, and the impossibility of letting it go

on. I hope you will be able to make the British Ministry sensible of

the necessity of punishing the past and preventing the future." I know,

Mr. Speaker, that there is danger of fatiguing the House by recurring

to documents of this sort, but my apology is a good one: those to which

I refer have never been printed for the information of the members of

this House, nor have the public had an opportunity of inspecting them.

I hope, therefore, to be indulged in pursuing the sentiments of former

Administrations further on a subject of so much interest. On the 20th

of February, 1800, Mr. Pickering, Secretary of State, addressed the

President of the United States on the subject of a proposed treaty

between the two countries, upon which occasion he makes the following

remark: "That he transmits Mr. Liston's note of the 4th of February,

together with his project of a treaty for the reciprocal delivery of

deserters; which appears to the Secretary utterly inadmissible, unless

it would put an end to impressment; which Mr. Liston seemed to imagine,

while the seventh paragraph of his project expressly recognizes the

right of impressing British subjects, and consequently American

citizens as at present." Mr. Wolcott, Secretary of the Treasury, when

giving his opinion to the President, says--"That the project of a

treaty proposed by His Britannic Majesty for the reciprocal delivery

of deserters from the land and naval service, does not sufficiently

provide against the impressment of American seamen, and is therefore

deemed inadmissible."

Mr. Stoddert, who acted as Secretary of the Navy, at that period, when

advising the President on the same subject, says--"That the Secretary

is clearly of opinion that it is better to have no article, and meet

all consequences, than not to enumerate merchant vessels, on the

high seas, among the things not to be forcibly entered in search of

deserters."

The letter of the present Chief Justice of the United States to Mr.

King, Minister at London, dated on the 20th of September, 1800, places

this subject in a strong light; he says--

"The impressment of our seamen is an injury of very serious

magnitude, which deeply affects the feelings and the honor of

the nation. This valuable class of men is composed of natives

and foreigners, who engage voluntarily in our service. No right

has been asserted to impress the natives of America. Yet they

are impressed; they are dragged on board British ships of war,

with the evidence of citizenship in their hand, and forced by

violence then to serve until conclusive testimonials of their

birth can be obtained. These must most generally be sought

for on this side the Atlantic. In the mean time acknowledged

violence is practised on a free citizen of the United States by

compelling him to engage and to continue in foreign service.

Although the Lords of the Admiralty uniformly direct their

discharge on the production of this testimony, yet many must

perish unrelieved, and all are detained a considerable time

in lawless and injurious confinement. It is the duty as well

as the right of a friendly nation to require that measures

be taken by the British Government to prevent the continued

repetition of such violence by its agents. This can only be

done by punishing and frowning on those who perpetrate it. The

mere release of the injured, after a long course of service and

of suffering, is no compensation for the past and no security

for the future. It is impossible not to believe that the

decisive interference of the Government in this respect would

prevent a practice, the continuance of which must inevitably

produce discord between two nations which ought to be friends

to each other."

In another part of the same letter, Mr. Marshall observes, "the United

States require positively that their seamen who are not British

subjects, whether born in America or elsewhere, shall be exempt from

impressment."

From these documents we clearly collect what was the view which the

first and second Presidents of the United States had on this subject,

and that of the principal officers of the Government. It appears that

this exemption from impressment is no new claim set up by men now in

power. It is as old as the Government itself, and there never has been,

nor can there be, an Administration in this country who dare surrender

this point to any foreign power. Once relinquished, we had as well

abandon the ocean altogether. If the liberty of American citizens is

to be subject to the will, not of the English Government, but what is

infinitely worse, of every petty officer that navigates a British

ship, it is in vain that we boast of freedom; we do not possess it;

and only let the British Government understand you distinctly on this

point, and you need talk no more of American commerce.

It has been said, by a gentleman from North Carolina, (Mr. PEARSON,)

that, if we exclude British seamen from our service by law, one of

two things must happen--either a peace would be the result, or the

people of this country _all_ unite in a vigorous prosecution of the

war. If I have mistaken the meaning of the gentleman, I wish him to

correct me at this time, and answer the question directly, if, in that

event, he will support the war? [Mr. PEARSON explained.] Mr. GRUNDY

proceeded: Sir, from the explanation given, it will, I fear, be as

difficult to come to an understanding with that gentleman, as it is

to accommodate the points in dispute with the British Ministry; for,

although the gentleman says he will not surrender an essential right of

the country, a question might be made by him as to what were essential

rights. I will, nevertheless, Mr. Speaker, make one more effort to

elicit the opinion of the gentleman on this subject. I ask him whether

he considers the impressment of American seamen "a violation of an

essential right of this country?" [Mr. PEARSON said he so considered

it.] Then, said Mr. GRUNDY, from the gentleman's own declaration he

is bound to support us in the war, if the principle of impressment

is not relinquished by Great Britain. I have no hesitation in saying

that, in a time of peace, I am willing British seamen, not naturalized

in this country, should be excluded from our service. I believe that

such a regulation would inflict no injury or inconvenience on the

country. Whenever, therefore, a proposition to this effect is made, so

as to take effect at the conclusion of the war, I shall vote for it.

I consider it a direct encouragement to our own seamen, calculated to

foster and cherish the enterprise and industry of that important class

of our citizens.

THURSDAY, January 7.

Mr. BLEECKER.--Mr. Chairman: I have a very few, very desultory, and I

fear very unimportant observations to make on the subject now before

the committee. They will be few, not because the subject does not

abound with various fruitful and interesting topics, but because an

indisposition of some days has unfitted me for any considerable effort

of memory.

I was opposed to the war when it was declared, because I was

confidently persuaded that the evils of which we complained were of a

nature not to be remedied by war. I thought, too, sir, that by entering

into war, we were plunging ourselves into evils a million fold greater

than those from which we sought to be relieved. I was opposed to the

war, because I thought that, notwithstanding all the decrees and orders

of the belligerents affecting our neutral rights, we might enjoy a

commerce more extensive and profitable than we could have in a time

of European peace. The war in Europe was, in fact, a blessing to this

country. I was opposed to the war, because I knew that the whole of

one of the great political parties in the Northern and Eastern, the

most commercial section of the country, which was most interested in

the avowed objects of the war, openly condemned it; and I believed

that a great portion of the other party was secretly opposed to it.

This objection was to my mind perfectly conclusive. If there had been

no other reason against the war, this was enough. What, sir, go to war

when that part of the country which has most of its wealth, strength,

and resources, is decidedly opposed to it! go to war for commercial and

maritime rights, when the people of that part of the country which is

principally interested in its commerce and navigation, openly execrate

war!

It seemed to me that it became legislators who were disposed to

exercise a paternal regard over the interests of the nation, to give up

their own opinions, their prejudices and partialities, rather than go

to war with a people thus divided. And permit me to say, sir, without

any disparagement to the members of this House, that thousands and tens

of thousands of the inhabitants of that part of the country of which I

have been speaking, are as competent to understand the true interest

and honor of the nation, as gentlemen who happen to be members of

Congress.

I was opposed to the war, because I thought it might expose our

happy form of Government--our excellent political institutions--to

a dangerous trial. I was afraid, sir, that the war might produce a

pressure upon the Government which it would not be able to sustain. I

was opposed to the war, and this was the bitter draught, because it

brought us into concert and co-operation with the great destroyer,

the grand enemy of freedom and humanity throughout the world. I was

opposed to the war, because I believed the state of things in Europe,

out of which our difficulties arose--a state of things which the United

States had no power to control--was in its nature transient. Rather

than plunge ourselves into the vortex of European politics; rather than

encounter the evils and dangers of war, I thought it would be wise and

prudent to wait until "the troubled waters should subside, and the

ancient landmarks of the world reappear above the flood;" with a living

statesman, I thought I saw in the very cloud which blackened all our

horizon, the bow which was set for a token, that the tempest would not

be forever.

But, sir, war was declared, and the doctrine has since been

promulgated, that it is now the duty of every man to support it; that

all inquiry must be hushed, and all examination of its expediency and

propriety cease. So far as this doctrine inculcates obedience to the

laws, it has my cordial approbation; but inasmuch as it denies the

right of the citizen to examine into the causes of the war, to express

and publish his opinions respecting its policy, it is an insult to

the understanding of an intelligent people, and inconsistent with the

character and spirit of the constitution. War is declared by law. How

shall the law be repealed? How can we get rid of the war, if we may

not say that it is inexpedient, impolitic, and ruinous? How abominable

the doctrine is, that the declaration of war shuts the door against

all inquiry, is manifest from the consideration, that it would enable

a wicked Administration to perpetuate its power by declaring war.

Again, sir, I would ask the advocates of the doctrine I am reprobating,

when will it be proper to show the folly and ruinous consequences of

the war? Suppose the war to have continued five or ten years, and the

country to be impoverished, its commerce annihilated, its resources

exhausted, its best blood expended in wild and fruitless projects of

conquest, the people oppressed by debts and taxes, will it then be

deemed improper to expose the absurdity and mischief of continuing

the war? Surely, sir, it will be patriotic and laudable to alarm the

people, to entreat them to put an end to that which is the cause of

their calamities. And if such conduct will _then_ be proper, it must be

laudable and patriotic _now_ to show them their evils and dangers, and

to point them to the means of escape.

But, sir, what has been the state of the country since the declaration

of war? I speak again in reference to public opinion. The people of

the North and East have poured out their feelings and opinions, their

complaints and groans, in addresses, petitions, resolutions, and

remonstrances against the war. Look, sir, at the Presidential election,

and you see all the Northern and Eastern States; with the exception

of Vermont, arrayed against the Administration. You see the people

disregarding the old line of party division and distinction. Yes,

sir, in spite of such division and distinction, "burying their mutual

animosities," their ancient prejudices, "in their common detestation"

of the policy of the Government, rising up in their might and strength

to manifest their hostility to the course of measures it has pursued.

This, Mr. Chairman, is a state of things which ought to arrest the

attention, and engage the reflection of the National Legislature, for

without that section of country our strength is weakness. I know how

ungracious and invidious topics of this kind are to some gentlemen.

But, sir, we cannot help it that the country is made up of sections. We

are legislating for such a country, and it is our business and duty to

regard the circumstances, the interests, and feelings of the people of

different parts of the Union. We declared war for commerce; the people

most interested in commerce were opposed to it. We continue the war for

sailors' rights, and three-fourths of our native American seamen belong

to New York and the Eastern States, the people of which are sighing

for peace. It ought to be remembered, too, sir, that the war itself

must have the effect of driving a vast portion of our sailors out of

the country into foreign service.

But, Mr. Chairman, whatever may have been the reasons for declaring

war, the question is not now what it was when war was declared. Our

relations with the belligerents have materially and essentially

changed. So much have they changed, that I declare, without fear of

contradiction, that had they been on the 17th of June last what they

now are, we should not have gone to war. I hope no gentleman of this

committee will deny this. But if any gentleman should deny it, the

nation will not believe him. Sir, we have received new, important,

and interesting evidence of the true state of our foreign relations

since the declaration of war. Facts which were then unknown, and

which have shed a flood of light upon the situation and policy of the

United States, have since been published to the world. The repeal of

the Orders in Council itself, by removing the principal cause of the

war, has produced a most material change; for had they been repealed

before the war was declared, there would have been no war; and let it

be remembered, that they were repealed before the war was known in

England. But this is not all to which I refer. I mean to speak of the

evidence we have received respecting our relations with France; and

I hope gentlemen will not be startled or offended by what I am about

to say. I declare confidently and boldly _that Napoleon has inveigled

us into the war_. He has cajoled and deceived us. But for his arts,

intrigues, and duplicity, the United States would not now have been at

war with Great Britain. Yes, sir, he has led us on step by step, until

he brought us to the edge of the precipice, and plunged us into the

abyss. We have been humbled and mortified. He has triumphed over our

character, our honor, our rights, our independence. I do not say these

things hastily, carelessly, or lightly. And I will add, that after the

discovery of the deceit and duplicity which the Emperor of France has

practised upon us, it became the duty of this Government to go back to

the ground it occupied before the President's proclamation of November,

1810, or to declare immediate war against France. A proper regard to

the honor, the character, and independence of the country, demanded

this of its Government.

Sir, the proof of what I have said is plain; and it is time that it be

stated here, and spread before the nation. I beg the attention of the

committee to the facts on which it rests. I need not go back farther

than to the law of May, 1810, which provided that the non-intercourse

act should cease, as to that belligerent which should _first repeal_

its decrees violating our neutral rights, and that it should operate on

the other, which should fail so to do, within three months after the

President's proclamation of the fact of such repeal. This law, and the

conduct of the President under it, are the immediate cause of the war,

and the present unhappy state of the country. On the 5th of August,

1810, the Duke de Cadore wrote his famous letter to General Armstrong,

the American Minister in Paris, stating that the Berlin and Milan

decrees would, upon certain conditions, cease on the first of November

then next. On the authority of this letter, the President of the United

States issued his proclamation, declaring the fact, that the French

decrees were repealed. But the British Government, not considering

the letter of the Duke de Cadore sufficient evidence of their repeal,

did not revoke their Orders in Council, and, in consequence, our

non-intercourse act went into operation against Great Britain the

February following. Notwithstanding the proclamation of the President,

great doubts existed in this country, whether the French decrees were

in fact repealed. To remove these doubts, to confirm the proclamation,

to prevent inquiry and investigation in the judicial tribunals of the

country, the act of March, 1811, was passed. Yet, sir, it has ever

since been denied that the decrees of Berlin and Milan were repealed.

The public prints have teemed, and the tables of this House have been

loaded with the proofs of their existence and execution. You remember,

sir, an impressive argument, in many respects original, an unanswered

and unanswerable argument of the honorable gentleman from Virginia

(Mr. RANDOLPH) on this subject in this House, towards the close of

the last session. But, sir, notwithstanding all this, this Government

persisted in declaring that the French decrees were repealed. I do not

mean to discuss that stale matter. The statement I make is necessary to

my present purpose. The question of their repeal was the subject of a

very voluminous and long-continued correspondence between Mr. Foster,

the British Minister, and our Secretary of State. The discussion, I

believe, was protracted to the last moment of peace. War was declared

on the 18th of June. Some weeks afterwards, appeared in this country

a decree of Napoleon, issued in May last, and bearing date the 28th

of April, 1811. This is an extraordinary paper, and deserves some

attention. I will read it:

"APRIL 28, 1813.

"_Napoleon, Emperor of the French, &c._

"On the report of our Minister of Foreign Relations:

"Seeing, by a law passed 2d March, 1811, the Congress has

ordered the execution of the provisions of the act of

non-intercourse, which prohibits the vessels and merchandise of

Great Britain, her colonies and dependencies, from entering the

ports of the United States.

"Considering that the said law is an act of resistance to the

arbitrary pretensions consecrated by; the British Orders in

Council, and a formal refusal to adhere to a system invading

the independence of neutral powers and of their flag; we have

ordered, and do decree, as follows:

"The decrees of Berlin and Milan are definitively, and to date,

from 1st November last, considered as not existing in regard to

American vessels."

Now, sir, did this decree exist at the time of its date? No, sir, the

date is _false_. If the decree existed in April, 1811, why was it not

communicated to this nation, the only one interested in the subject?

Why was it not communicated to Mr. Russell, who so strongly urged

upon the French Government the necessity of furnishing some evidence

of the repeal of the decrees. For the purpose of communicating some

satisfactory information on that subject to this country, he detained

the John Adams in France, in _July_, 1811. You will remember Napoleon's

decree is dated in _April_. Permit me here to read a passage of Mr.

Russell's letter to Mr. Monroe, dated the 15th of July, 1811.

"On the 14th of June, Mr. Hamilton, of the John Adams, reached

Paris, and informed me that this vessel had arrived at

Cherbourg. Unwilling to close my despatches by her, without

being able to communicate something of a more definite and

satisfactory character than any thing which had hitherto

transpired, I immediately called at the Office of Foreign

Relations, but, the Minister being at St. Cloud, I was obliged

to postpone the interview which I sought until the Tuesday

following. At this interview, I stated to him the arrival

of the frigate, and my solicitude to transmit by her to the

United States some _act_ of this Government, justifying the

expectation with which the important law which she had brought

hither had, undoubtedly, been passed."

After Mr. Russell had left Paris, he wrote from England to Mr.

Barlow, who succeeded him, "for additional proofs of the removal of

the decrees." Mr. Barlow seems to be very anxious "to get the treaty

through, carrying an unequivocal stipulation, that shall lay that

question to rest."

But it was all in vain; no authentic evidence of the repeal was

furnished. This decree did not exist; and why was it not issued? Why

was the evidence of the repeal of the decrees withheld? The answer is

obvious. _The United States were not yet committed to go to war with

Great Britain._ Napoleon knew very well that when _proper_ evidence of

the repeal of his decrees was furnished, the English Orders in Council

would be repealed, and the United States would not go to war with Great

Britain. For, sir, he knew very well, and we know very well, that for

the subject of impressments alone, this country would not go to war. It

cannot be denied, that for this cause we should not have declared war.

This Government has never been disposed to go to war on that ground

alone. The present President of the United States made an arrangement

with Mr. Erskine, which gladdened the heart of every man in the nation,

without any provision on that subject, without any mention of it; and

there was not a murmur in the country, on account of its omission. Mr.

Pinkney, too, as stated by the gentleman from Georgia, (Mr. TROUP,)

yesterday, again and again, offered to accommodate with England, on

the rescinding of the Orders in council, without any reference to

impressments.

Sir, this decree itself is an insult to this Government. It is issued

expressly, because we had taken our stand against England; it is

declared to be issued in consequence of our act of March, 1811, when,

in fact, the President's proclamation and the act of March were founded

on the repeal of the decrees. To show the correctness of my remarks on

this part of the subject; to show that Napoleon has triumphed over our

honor and character, I beg leave to call the attention of the committee

to Mr. Russell's letter to Mr. Monroe, dated the 9th of June, 1811. His

language does credit to his understanding and feelings:

"To have waited for the receipt of the proclamation, in order

to make use of it for the liberation of the New Orleans

Packet, appeared to me a preposterous and unworthy course

of proceeding, and to be nothing better than absurdly and

_basely_ employing the declaration of the President, that the

Berlin and Milan decrees _had been_ revoked, as the means of

obtaining their _revocation_. I believed it became me to take

higher ground, and without confining myself to the mode best

calculated to recover the property, to pursue that which the

_dignity_ of the American Government required.

"A crisis, in my opinion, presented itself, which, was

to decide whether the French edicts were retracted as a

preliminary to the execution of our law; or whether, by the

non-performance of one party, and the prompt performance of the

other, the order in which these measures ought to stand was

to be reversed, and the American Government shuffled into the

lead, where _national honor_ and the law required it to follow."

It would have been _base_ to have employed the President's

proclamation, that the Berlin and Milan decrees had been revoked as the

means of obtaining their revocation. But what, sir, is the price we

have at length paid for the repeal? The President's proclamation was

not enough; the act of March added to it was not enough; we could not

procure the revocation till we went to war. For, sir, the Emperor would

not issue this decree till he knew that we were pledged and committed

to go to war with Great Britain. How he knew this, sir, it is not for

me to say. We all know, however, that he had all the acts of this

Government to satisfy him of the course we were pursuing--the step we

were about to take. He had the President's Message, the report of the

Committee on Foreign Relations, the war speeches of the members of this

House, the laws for raising armies, and the embargo. In the month of

May, then, when the policy of this country in relation to Great Britain

was settled, he issued his decree, just in such time, too, sir, that

it could not reach this country till we had plunged into the war. And

well, in such a state, might he repeal his decrees, which, by the war

itself, would be superseded--would become a nullity.

Thus, sir, believing the French decrees to be repealed, we departed

from our neutral stand by enforcing the non-intercourse law against

Great Britain. We have in vain waited for such evidence of their

repeal as would have induced Great Britain to rescind her Orders in

Council--the great cause of the war. Their revocation depended upon

the repeal of the French decrees; and had they been revoked, there

would have been no war between the United States and Great Britain.

The decree, declaring the edicts of France to be revoked, is at length

issued, when the Emperor knows it is too late to prevent the war. The

decree is communicated to the English Government, the Orders in Council

are revoked on the ground of the repeal of the French decrees, but

the United States have declared war. How, sir, can I make this matter

plainer? Our whole course against Great Britain has proceeded from

the belief of the repeal of the Berlin and Milan decrees; but that

evidence of their repeal, which would have stopped our course, by means

of which the Orders in Council would have been revoked, and the war

would have been avoided, is withheld till the Emperor knows that war is

inevitable. Thus, sir, have we been duped, deceived, and inveigled.

I repeat it, sir, had we, on the 17th June, understood our foreign

relations as we now understand them, we should not have declared war.

And would it not have been just and magnanimous in this Government,

when all doubt was removed on the subject of the French decrees, to

have acknowledged its error? Did not the honor, the character, the

independence of the country require of us to go back to our original

neutral ground? I rose principally for the purpose of presenting this

view of the arts and deceit of the French Emperor to the committee. I

regret that I have not done it more fully and clearly; and I hope that

some gentleman more competent to a proper examination of the subject

will yet take it up before we get through this discussion.

Mr. TALLMADGE said he felt a peculiar embarrassment in rising to offer

to the consideration of the committee some of his own reflections on

the important subject now under debate, from a twofold consideration.

In the first place, the magnitude of the question might claim the aid

of more exalted talents than he pretended to possess, and, therefore,

to do it justice, he feared, would not be in his power. For, said

Mr. T., in the extensive range of debate which has been permitted by

the Chair, the whole field of our foreign relations has been open to

examination, and the policy of our own Government in relation to Great

Britain has been deemed fairly within the range of discussion.

In the second place, the gentlemen who had preceded have occupied the

ground so ably, and discussed the subject so extensively, that it

was somewhat difficult to present arguments entirely novel to arrest

the attention of the committee. Having a belief, however, that there

were some important considerations, in relation to the bill now

under debate, which had not yet been brought into view, he begged the

attention of the committee while he endeavored to lay before them the

views which he had taken of the subject, and which constrained him most

decidedly to oppose the passage of the bill.

Before I enter upon the merits of the subject, said Mr. T., I take

occasion to express my hearty assent to declarations made by honorable

gentlemen that this is no time to indulge the bickerings of party; and

that it is greatly to be desired that all distinctions of this sort

were entirely laid aside and forgotten. Sir, I should consider it the

most auspicious event of my life if I could see every gentleman on this

floor determined to take and maintain the true old American ground

occupied by the patriots of '76. Although it may be painful to the

feelings of an honorable mind to be assailed with odious appellations,

and charged with duplicity and falsehood, yet the mind which has virtue

for its basis, a conscious integrity for its support, and firmness

sufficient to enable the man to do his duty, may hope to pass unhurt by

such malicious darts.

Standing, as I do, in the highly-responsible situation of one of

the legislators of this extensive country, I hope to have stability

and integrity sufficient to enable me to discharge my duty to my

constituents. If, after having passed through the Revolutionary war,

and having never changed my political creed to the present day, an

odious epithet could induce me to alter my course, I should be unworthy

the confidence of my country. But whence, Mr. Chairman, proceeds this

system of slander and abuse? From the foul presses of our country. To

whom are some of the fairest characters which have ever adorned this

or any other country indebted for the odious epithets of monarchists,

foreign agents, tories, and the like? To your imported patriots,

who, weary of the dull pursuits of industry on their native soil, or

escaping from the justice of the laws of their own country, have fled

to this happy land to instruct its inhabitants in the true principles

of liberty and equality.

To this set of newly-fledged politicians, and men of a similar stamp,

is this once happy country indebted for one-half the miseries and much

of the disgrace which it suffers.

I have been led into this digression in consequence of remarks which

have fallen from the other side of the House, but will now return to my

subject.

A gentleman from New York, (Mr. STOW,) who addressed you early in this

debate, told us that he reprobated the war, and had no confidence in

the Administration to conduct it to a successful issue, but should vote

for the bill to enable them to carry it on. This is strange political

logic to my understanding. While I subscribe fully to his premises,

the reasonings of my mind bring me to a very different result. Because

I deprecate this war as pregnant with great evils, if not ruin to my

country, I will, therefore, take all constitutional measures to bring

it to a speedy and honorable close; and because I have no confidence

in the Executive department of our Government, nor in the subordinate

agents who have been appointed to vote for this bill, which, if

adopted, will enlist still greater evils on this devoted country.

In presenting the subject to this honorable committee, in its most

appropriate form, it may be proper to examine into the prominent causes

of our dispute, which has terminated in open war with Great Britain.

These I take to be three, viz: