On motion of Mr. RANDOLPH, they were referred to the Committee on Naval
Affairs, with instructions to report a suitable expression of the
Legislative approbation of the services detailed.
Mr. R. said he did not wish by this motion to limit the committee to
reporting a resolution; or to preclude them from expressing approbation
in a more substantial manner.
WEDNESDAY, December 16.
_Navy of the United States._
The House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole, on the bill
from the Senate, which had been previously twice read in the House.
Mr. SAWYER made a motion to add the word "teen" to "four," so as to
make it fourteen 74 gun ships.
Mr. S. thought it a proper occasion to try the question whether we
were to have a navy or not. He took the occasion to congratulate the
House upon the repeated victories of our little navy over the enemy;
and of the grateful prospect of a speedy termination to the despotism
of the seas. National piracy is about to be exterminated, and all
nations permitted to traverse their great highway in safety. The thing
can be done; and if we say so, with the will of God, will be done.
The experiment upon which the proof hangs has been made. British arms
cannot withstand American upon the sea. The bully has been disgraced
by an infant; and fear shall no longer restrain an abject world from
vindicating its long violated rights. Give us but a respectable fleet,
and it is all we ask. But what can we do with four seventy-fours? They
are a mere mockery. If we do mean to make a serious stand upon the
ocean, such a force must be out of all character. If we mean merely to
annoy her trade, (and he trusted we meant more,) frigates will do; but,
to make any serious impression that way, we must have a respectable
fleet; at least, in his opinion, fourteen sail-of-the-line. That would
give us a preponderance on our own coast, and enable us to bring in
our prizes with safety. Who can bear the idea of our being obliged to
burn or sink all the ships we may take away from the enemy, for fear
of their being recaptured? He thought we should save enough by the
protection they would afford to our prizes to support the expense of
them. We can easily support such a force. The expense, distributed
over our widely-extended population, would be less than a dollar a
head; and, where is the American who would grudge such a sum for such
an object? The people, I am confident, will cheerfully pay it, because
we are now at war, and a navy is found the most efficient weapon in
our hands against the enemy. He therefore trusted that if it was the
disposition of the House to have a navy, they would establish such a
one as would answer some purpose.
Mr. SEYBERT said he did not anticipate that the bill from the Senate
would have been called for to-day by the Chairman of the Naval
Committee; notwithstanding he had bestowed some attention on the
subject, he confessed his remarks would be made in a manner not
entirely satisfactory to himself; he would, however, proceed with them.
Mr. Chairman, said he, I wish it was as easy to build, equip, and man
the seventy-fours, as it will be to add the word "teen" to "four," as
is proposed by the gentleman from North Carolina. So far from adding to
the number of these ships, contemplated by the bill, he had intended to
move that no seventy-four gun ships should be, at this time, authorized
by the Legislature.
On a former occasion, Mr. S. continued, when a naval establishment was
the subject under consideration, he stated at length his reasons for
opposing the propositions before the House. The opinions which he then
advanced concerning an extensively permanent naval establishment for
the United States were still believed to be well grounded. He did not
hesitate to declare his intention, at this time, and under the pressure
of present circumstances, to yield much to general feelings, and the
sentiments of the nation; nevertheless, he should guard against being
carried too far by the current of popular opinion. It is equally my
duty, said he, to keep in view what is conceived to be the permanent
and vital national interest. He declared a uniform opposition to
that establishment, which could not be brought within the means and
resources of the nation to maintain it. We have made war, said he, to
guarantee the honor and independence of the nation, as well as for
the support of the just rights of our citizens; with these objects in
view, he had consented to authorize a regular force of 25,000 men, and
advocated one more numerous, though in principle he was opposed to
standing armies. If, then, a great portion of my fellow-citizens deem
an increase of the Naval Establishment essential to promote the great
work, why should it be refused on my part? No opposition would be made
by him to the principle or spirit of the bill before the House, though,
he confessed, he did not approve the provisions as to the kind of force
therein contemplated.
Mr. S. continued.--At this time our principal object should be, to
authorize that species of force which can be furnished in the shortest
period, and which promises to be the most efficient in the present
contest. If the views of the Government were not now confined to the
present war, he considered it inexpedient to build public ships. It
was necessary that the revenue should be cautiously applied. If it be
employed so as to carry on the war with vigor, he would not shrink
from any appropriation which could tend to produce that effect;
by protracting the contest for the want of means, expense will be
accumulated, and we should achieve nothing.
Mr. S. would not assent to an increase of the navy, with a view to
reconcile other measures to the opposition--to him that vote promised
no such result. Our political opponents, continued he, will tell us,
as regards the navy, you are doing right to add to it; thus far we
will go with you; we always maintained this to be the proper course;
as to your golden dreams in Canada, we will abandon them to yourselves
exclusively. Such were his present impressions; it would gratify him to
find himself to have been mistaken. He declared his intention to oppose
the building of 74's, or double-decked ships, and to advocate a greater
number of the largest class frigates. If, however, his statements
should not prove satisfactory to the House, he declared the failure
would not induce him ultimately to vote against that species of force
which a majority might deem expedient.
If, said Mr. S., the great reason for now laying the keels of the
double-decked ships, be (as was lately acknowledged elsewhere by
high authority) to test the intentions of the legislature as to a
permanent naval establishment, he, for one, declared, he would not thus
be tested, nor could he be thereby induced to vote in favor of the
proposition; he would always be governed by circumstances.
The declaration of the committee, that it was proper to meet "like
with like," or, in other words, because the British have seventy-four
gun ships, the United States should have them of the same class, would
have no effect on him. We might as well say, because there are ships
in the British service, which carry one hundred and twenty guns,
we should also have such. This reasoning is fallacious. No one has
attempted to advocate the latter proposition. Admitting that you had
four seventy-four gun ships on your navy list, he maintained, they
would answer no good purpose. In the course of the following year,
their number will be more than doubled and trebled on the part of the
enemy. The consequence would be, that your most expensive ships must
either combat under very unpromising circumstances, or they would
be blockaded in your harbors, and then be worse than useless; they
must be kept at a heavy expense, and their crews would deprive other
ships of the men necessary for their equipment. He said, the opinions
which he had just advanced were not the result of idle speculations
at the fireside; they were supported by intelligent commanders, and
rested upon the firm base of experience; they were confirmed by the
conversations of some whose splendid achievements adorned the pages
of our Revolutionary history, and by others, who rank as heroes of
the present war. He asked, why need we resort to other authority,
when that of the head of the Naval Department can be brought to bear
testimony in favor of the propositions laid down? In the year 1798, the
Secretary of the Navy informed the House that twelve seventy-fours, as
many frigates, and twenty or thirty smaller vessels, "would probably
be found sufficient to insure our future peace with the nations of
Europe." In 1811, it was declared that, "twelve sail of seventy-fours
and twenty well-constructed frigates, with our smaller vessels," were
necessary to annoy the commerce of the enemy, and guard our coasts. To
this he added that, in the year 1811, during a state of peace with the
United States, the British had seven ships-of-the-line on the American
stations, independent of fifties, frigates, and smaller vessels; at the
same time, they had thirty-nine ships-of-the-line on the stocks! Tell
me, said he, what is to keep a great proportion of them from your coast
in 1813?
Mr. MCKEE said, he had not expected this subject would have been taken
up to-day, or to say any thing on it when it should be taken up. But,
said he, for what purpose, I feel impelled to ask, are you going to
build these vessels? Are you to spend four or five millions of dollars,
in addition to your present extraordinary expenditures, to protect
commerce? Will this old argument, in favor of a navy, now be used,
which we have so often heard heretofore? Sir, where is your commerce
now to protect? Will you protect that clandestinely destined to Great
Britain? No, surely. Will you protect that destined to the coast of
France? Let us reflect what commerce you can carry on with France. None
worth protection, or of any moment to the great body of the American
people. Does France purchase your tobacco or cotton, which heretofore
have found a market there? She has never been a purchaser of provisions
or breadstuffs. What is the state of trade between us and France? Your
cotton, in France, is taxed with enormous duties. No man who is not
under the influence of the moon would, at this time, think of making a
shipment there. Would you ship your commerce there merely to surrender
so much property into the grasp of the Emperor? It would be the extreme
of folly. Where, then, will you protect your commerce? To the Baltic,
sir? You can carry on in that quarter no commerce at all interesting
to the great body of the American people. In what does your export to
that region consist? In articles of colonial produce; not in articles
the produce of your soil. Will you tax the great agricultural community
for the purpose of protecting this extraneous commerce? I ask if the
people of the West, of the Atlantic, of the Middle States, or any
other portion of the American people, will be content to be taxed to
support a navy for the protection of a commerce in foreign produce, by
which but few individuals in the nation can be benefited? There is no
commerce to protect, unless it be that which exchanges specie for the
production of the East Indies, and benefits no part of the community.
Having no valuable commerce now to protect, the object of adding
vessels to your navy, must be to fight your battles at sea.
If you would propose a navy as a means of carrying on war, bend your
resources to that object. We have been told that the trident of
Neptune is passing into our hands. But, sir, the sovereignty of the
ocean is not to be acquired by four ships-of-the-line and five or six
frigates. You can have no legitimate object in building such vessels
as proposed, unless it be to carry on the war. If that be your object,
make your means commensurate to the end you have in view.
Do you yet contend that the object is to protect commerce? Your
commerce is not worth the cost. And who would pay it? The merchants?
No, sir. They will pay only their proportion. I recollect, when a boy,
to have seen a little book, in which I admired the pictures more than
the reading, in which were the representations of a king, a priest, a
soldier, and a farmer; a label issuing from the mouth of each contained
these words: The king says, "I govern all;" the priest, "I pray for
all;" the soldier, "I fight for all;" and the farmer, "I pay for all."
This, sir, is perfectly true as regards the American farmers--they pay
for all. And what advantage do they derive from it? What advantage are
my constituents to derive from the expenditure of this money?
THURSDAY, December 17.
_Increase of the Navy._
The House again resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the
bill to increase the Navy of the United States.
Mr. SEYBERT moved to amend the first section of the bill by striking
out "four seventy-fours and," so as to erase the provision for building
vessels of that description.
Mr. GOLD.--The provision in the bill to introduce ships-of-the-line
into the Navy, I consider, Mr. Chairman, as fixing the great policy of
a navy under this Government. Frigates we have had, but in common with
petty nations; for the Barbary Powers have frigates; the provision now
offered rises higher and promises something worthy of the constitution,
something honorable to the Government. I rejoice, Mr. Chairman, at
the favorable circumstances, and hail the auspices under which we now
meet this question; we are no longer left to erring speculations, to
uncertain reasoning, but have under our eyes the sure and infallible
test of experience, of practice in war with a naval force. Within a few
weeks our tars have thrice grappled with the enemy, and thrice have
they triumphed in combat; the success has swelled the American bosom
with joy from Orleans to Maine--all without exception of party, vie in
demonstrations of joy and in the bestowment of honors upon the victors.
While such a scene is presented here, gloom and dissatisfaction
prevail in the metropolis of Great Britain--those who have been so
long accustomed to conquer, receive the capture of the Guerriere with
as much astonishment as they would behold a suspension of the laws of
nature. A strange event to Britons!
How often, sir, has it been echoed and re-echoed within these walls,
that it would be in vain to attempt any thing with a navy against Great
Britain, unless we could bring ship to ship and man to man--could
equal our enemy on the ocean. How much mistaken have gentlemen been;
how vain is human reason! The earliest stage of the first war under
the Government has yielded a clear, full, and incontestable refutation
of the argument. While the American arms have suffered disgrace upon
disgrace on what was deemed the natural and proper theatre for the
display of our power; while by land all is gloomy and comfortless, and
the heart sickens under the past, our little Navy, a handful of men,
has nobly sustained us upon the ocean, and banished that despondency
which our disasters by land must have otherwise produced.
If, sir, under such auspices, such overwhelming evidence of the
efficiency of a navy, this question is to be put by, I shall despair
of a navy; we may rank with Algiers in a force of frigates, but shall
do nothing worthy of a community of eight millions of souls, placed by
Heaven in a situation most favorable to commerce and naval power.
The objections, sir, to a navy are not a little amusing. Do you move
the question in peace, it is objected, that commerce flourishes and
you want not protection; at another time it is said not to be worth
the expense of a navy, and lastly a navy will draw America into the
European vortex and involve us in a war. Now that we are in war, a new
book of logic is opened, and it is objected, that you have not time
to build a navy, the war will be over before ships can be finished.
It is thus, sir, that the arguments against a navy are made to answer
and refute themselves; nay, more, the argument in war is a satire and
reproach to the objection in peace. "There is not now time to build a
navy," reproaches us for not having passed the requisite laws at the
last session.
I have always considered the great policy of a navy settled by the
constitution; need I spend time to show, that no great specific power
was delegated to the General Government unless it was deemed necessary;
not necessary for a dormitory, but to be executed for the general
protection and welfare. This was the polar star--the test and criterion
that governed in the delegation of powers by the States--powers not
necessary to be exercised for the general good were retained by the
several States. What greatly strengthens the argument is, the power to
provide a navy is not only given to the General Government, but taken
away or denied to the several States. In adopting the constitution,
this question was considered at rest, and a navy was deemed the
necessary consequence of this power; in the Virginia Convention,
where great talent and ingenuity was displayed in the debate, the
point was so considered, and the objection rested on that ground; the
consequence of adoption was supposed to be an unequal strengthening of
the commercial parts of the Union. So deeply impressed was President
WASHINGTON with the importance of a navy, and so true to his duty and
just claims of commerce for protection, that he could not consent
to quit his high station in the public councils without placing on
record his sentiments for the good of his country--this he did in his
speech to the fourth Congress (second session) in language that well
attests his wisdom and paternal care and solicitude for his country. He
recommended and urged the policy of a navy in the strongest terms, and
I will not believe that the parting lesson of that great and good man
will be lost to his country--there is certainly too much respect for
his memory to disregard his solemn advice and counsel on any subject.
In this policy Mr. JEFFERSON also concurred at a period most auspicious
to fair inquiry and dispassionate judgment; it was before the tempest
of party arose, to obscure the great luminary of truth and blacken the
political horizon.
Mr. WIDGERY.--Mr. Chairman, it will be recollected that I was last
session of Congress opposed to the building of seventy-fours, until
we had got more frigates. I have been rather opposed to them in
the Committee of Naval Affairs, not because I was opposed to an
augmentation of the Navy, but because I thought it more to the
advantage of the country to build frigates and sloops of war at
present; and if, hereafter, when we have sailors plenty to man the
large ships with, it should be thought best to have larger ships, it
may be very well to build them; but, at present, our resources are
inadequate to build the seventy-fours and the ten frigates, and say
eight or ten sloops of war, which are absolutely necessary for the
protection of our seacoast, in order to keep off the British gun-brigs
or privateers. The ships-of-the-line will not answer this purpose, when
they are at sea; they must keep deep water; they cannot, with safety,
follow in under the land those small vessels which annoy our coasters,
and capture them all along shore. Within a few days, I have accounts
of a small privateer, of eight guns, having captured twenty or thirty
sail of coasting vessels. Sir, it is a sight to see a public armed
ship of the United States anywhere on our shore to the eastward of
Boston--a seacoast of 200 miles--when the enemy can take every thing
that passes out to sea, and a country in which there are the best of
ship-harbors, where they might cruise with safety, always having a
harbor handy to run into. I cannot feel willing to build seventy-fours,
to the exclusion of the smaller ships, of which we are so much in want
at this time. If you had the money in your chest, and all ready for the
building four seventy-fours, and all the timber in the yard--which you
have not--still I should have doubts on my mind as to the propriety of
those heavy ships. Say, if you please, that you had those ships built,
could you send them to sea? I presume not, if at war with England,
because she would always blockade your harbors wherever they were; and
if you sent them out, perhaps you would never have to man them again;
not because our ships in single combat are not a match for hers, but,
because they have more ships than they know what to do with; they would
always outnumber you at sea, and they would be able to come up with
and capture your four ships. But, for what purpose are you to send
them out? Certainly, not to take merchantmen. They are not calculated
for that purpose, unless you had more than four of them. In case you
had a number sufficient to intercept their East India fleet, which,
generally, are under strong convoys of heavy ships, then it might be an
object to send them to sea. If you are to keep them in port, for the
purpose of harbor defence, you must always keep them manned; it will
be too late to man them after the enemy comes in sight. And there is,
in my mind, another difficulty: In the manning these heavy ships, you
will have to impress men to go on board of them, or raise the wages
up to what is given in a merchant ship; because the sailors will not
be willing to go on board large ships, when they have no chance for
prize money. On the other hand, they will be very willing to enter on
board cruising ships, such as frigates or sloops of war, in hopes of
taking prizes; and you have not, at present, a sufficient number of
sailors to man what smaller vessels we want. If you build frigates
and sloops of war, they can be furnished without your advancing the
money; the merchants will build them, and loan them to the Government.
The frigates and smaller vessels can be put afloat in six months from
the time they are agreed for; and your ships-of-the-line will not be
finished in less than two years; and if they do not cost 30 per cent.
more than they are calculated at, I will dare pay all I am worth
towards them for nothing. I am willing to go for almost any number of
frigates, because I know you can have them built without advancing a
dollar until they are ready for service, and because I am convinced
they are most for our interest. Popular opinion, I know, has great
weight at times; let us not be carried off on the wings of enthusiasm;
we are at present at very great expense, and we ought to act prudently
with our finances, or they will soon become low. At the same time, I
cannot agree with the gentleman from Kentucky, who says he is opposed
to any augmentation of the Navy, and asks if you are willing to tax the
planters for the building a Navy, and the protection of the merchant?
Sir, will not the same reasoning apply against the maritime towns being
taxed to support the army of 10,000 men in the West? Gentlemen say,
stay on shore, and you will be safe. Sir, may we not, in return, say to
the gentlemen who are settling the cheap lands of the interior, keep
among us; go not into the Indian country; we cannot be taxed to defend
you. This reasoning will apply with as much force against the interior
as theirs does against the Atlantic towns. Sir, we are all one people,
and, in order to remain so, we must be willing to defend at all points.
Mr. BASSETT spoke several times in the course of the debate. The
following is the substance of the whole of his remarks: He said, on
rising, that it was with no feigned diffidence that he addressed the
House. I shall, said he, have credit with every one in the assertion
that I am most anxious that the proposition I have made should succeed.
Must I not, then, deplore the feebleness of voice, the want of force,
of manner, and promptness of mind and thought, which limit me? But
I shall feel compensated if the House will, in heart, join me in
regretting that a cause worthy of the first of advocates has fallen
into such puny hands. For the _cause_, then, will they hear me, and for
their country's good will they improve each hint I may let fall, by
their better judgment. It is true, sir, we have little experience--I
cannot boast of naval knowledge in our land--but, yet, we are not quite
deficient. Let it be remembered, that it is on the first principles
that we are to decide; that we are to mark the outlines only, which
depend much on general reasoning, and, in doing which, we may resort
to the experience of others. I will follow (though with unequal step)
the course taken by my predecessor last year, and, on the question to
fill this blank, bring the whole subject before the committee. It will
be assumed, as then proved, that protection is due to every national
right, which cannot be estimated by pecuniary calculation, but must
be tested by national ability only to defend and protect them. To the
mode of effecting so desirable an object, I shall confine myself. The
report has assumed it as a principle almost of instinct to oppose like
to like, and so says the history of man, whom we find ever availing
himself of the improvements of his assailant for self-defence. Hence
has the art of war become to all nations the most interesting science,
and no citizen is more estimable than he who can direct the national
force with most efficiency. The importance of a naval force is amply
attested on record. I will first, sir, point you to the conflicts
between the rival Republics of Rome and Carthage, and ask you to
remember the agency that their vessels had in them. Had the Romans
confined themselves to the land, never had Carthage been destroyed. The
history of Europe, from Venice to Great Britain, is too familiar to all
who hear me, to require reference to particulars. It is sufficient for
me to call attention to the effect of naval power, as it passed from
nation to nation. What was the power of Venice and Genoa when they led
the van of naval power? How quickly did the sceptre of Portugal rise,
as she assumed a station on the ocean! how sink as she lost her naval
preponderance! How did a navy once support the United Provinces! and
how is it now the salvation of Great Britain! It is then a fact, that a
naval armament gives effect to the power of a nation, as do the musket
and bayonet, the cannon and the mortar. And how, sir, is it attempted
to rebut this fact? By showing a physical disability in the country to
avail itself of this force? No. For then would they be rebutted by the
extent of our coasts, by the materials for ship-building, (so ample,)
and the known habits and genius of our countrymen, as each day is
evincing. And here, sir, I wish I could follow up the beautiful figure
of my friend, who, on a former occasion, showed you our continent,
extending to either ocean, with the finger of Munificence pointing to
the goodly heritage.
We have then these facts: that a navy is a powerful means of national
operation; that our local situation is fitted for its use; and that we
have the necessary materials. To which it is objected that your infant
Navy must be opposed to one which has reached the full manhood of power
on the ocean. I admit it. But shall we therefore abandon the ocean,
yield our birthright, our goodly heritage, without a struggle? Or,
shall we not rather, deducing argument from example, like the gallant
Captain Hull, avoid their fleets and capture their single ships.
I am aware that habit impels some to be fearful on this subject, and
the experience of the past will not convince them. With diffidence,
therefore, do I refer to the efficiency of twelve ships-of-the-line
and twenty frigates, as demonstrated last session. Let me ask of
gentlemen who thus think, who thus feel, to examine the extent of their
argument. Does it not go, not only to the abandonment of the ocean,
but to the seacoast also? I shall trust to former statements for the
magnitude of this sacrifice, with the observation, that abandoning the
ocean involves the loss of one million four hundred thousand tons of
shipping; and that in giving up the coasts, you lose a valuable portion
of your soil, and some of your fairest cities. I will not dwell on the
magnitude of this sacrifice, because I cannot believe that Americans
will abandon any right which there is a prospect to maintain. I cannot,
I admit, answer as conclusively the objection, that much time will
be passed before this force can be procured; yet, I believe, that a
mind which relied on that objection, might be satisfied that late
preparation is better than none. Nor could a mind, so circumstanced,
fail to see, that, while making preparation, you come every day nearer
your object; in neglecting it, you are every day further from it,
and you are, in neglecting it, blending ultimate loss with temporary
sacrifice.
Mr. Chairman, is it for an infant nation, or a popular Government, to
be deterred by the want of preparation? What is it that the youth has
not to prepare, or when was it that a popular Government taxed itself
with previous preparation? But why this argument of despair? What were
your preparations for the Revolutionary war, and when made? After an
army was in your country. Yet were they then made and effectually
made. By the bravery of our fathers our soil was secured; on us it
rests to secure our rights on the water, common to every independent
nation, and as clearly ours as they are essential to our interests.
What is this argument of infancy? Had not the Navy of Great Britain a
beginning? Yes. There was a time when Britain had no ship. What then?
She was invaded, and more, she was conquered. At this day, her wooden
walls, as they are proverbially called, are her defence and protection.
Is it admitted that the British fleet secures her from attack? If so,
would not a fleet secure us from attack also? But we have it not. Is
it not then our duty, as guardians of the public interest, to provide
this powerful, this necessary means of defence? But some are alarmed
at the cost. Permit me to recur to the calculation of the last year.
And first, as to the information derived from British experience, whose
example may be taken as precedent on maritime subjects; at least they
make a powerful argument, where they are rejected as full proof. In
recurring to British estimates, it certainly was unexpected to the
American eye to see the same sum charged for a soldier as for a sailor,
viz: ---- dollars per month; and as unexpected, on investigating
the British expenditures for a series of years, to find that the
appropriations for the Navy are found less than those for the Army, as
will be seen by reference to the _Annual Register_. In corroboration of
this is our own history, as appears from the calculations made by my
predecessor, of which I will avail myself.
Is it not then demonstrated by foreign and domestic experience, that
a naval force is the cheapest the nation can resort to for defence
and protection? Is it not also proved, that a force believed to be
competent, might be obtained at a sum greatly within the means of the
Government--say twelve millions of dollars--or a fourth less than
the ordinary amount of revenue for a year in good times? Test this
subject in another way. The cost of your Navy, twelve millions; give
up the ocean, and you lose, for one item, one million four hundred
thousand tons of shipping, which at fifty dollars the ton, would be
worth five times the sum. Yet that would unquestionably be the least
item in the account, because that would be but one loss, while that
of your coasting, and other trade, would swell into a great annual
amount, and be as great a sacrifice of convenience as profit. Nor is
such a conclusion the less to be deprecated, because it is difficult
to foresee all the evils which must result from the abandonment of
one essential right of an independent nation. I know it may be said
by those who view this subject differently from me, that they do not
mean to abandon the ocean. It is, then, for them to show the difference
between not abandoning a right, and not defending it; for I cannot
believe that any gentleman will contend that the national defence shall
be left to privateers. They have most justly been considered an aid to
the national arm, but Heaven forbid that they should be relied on as
principal. A private arm, with power to shield the nation, is what I
could not contemplate without terror. I cannot believe it necessary to
pursue this argument.
To return then: The force adequate to the defence of our seas would
cost twelve millions. I will not say that this whole expense ought to
be incurred in one year; indeed, it ought to be remarked, that of the
twenty frigates, nearly eight are ready for service. Let the principle
be yielded, and we can then enter on the calculation as to the portion
which may be procured each year. The decision, too, would, in my
judgment, be the strongest inducement to the enemy to make peace when
they saw that you were progressing to a force which they could not
meet. If, indeed, the force which has been named was not altogether
adequate to the object of defending your own waters, you would find,
having that force, that you could make any small addition that was
requisite without difficulty. In reference to the opinions of others,
in some measure, did the select committee determine on the number of
ships, and their force, to be procured this year. Thus if the first
blanks are filled with four seventy-six gun ships, they cost, per
estimate, $333,000, and will require an appropriation of $1,332,000. If
the other blank be filled with six thirty-eight gun ships, which, by
estimate, cost $220,000, the requisite appropriation for them will be
$1,320,000. For the sloops of war, the last blank I have calculated at
$61,200, which would require an appropriation of $367,200; which, with
the necessary appropriation for the four frigates ordered to be rebuilt
last year, viz: the Philadelphia, New York, General Greene, and Boston,
will amount to $3,500,000. This would give you four seventy-sixes and
eighteen frigates, mostly of the best size. Compare the efficiency of
that force with the interest of three millions and a half, the cost,
and you cannot but be gratified with the result. I say, Mr. Chairman,
the interest; because, though it was not in the province of the select
committee to look out the ways and means, yet was it so interested as
to their object, that they could but ask how was the money to be had;
and they were satisfied that three millions and a half could, with
facility, be loaned for navy purposes. I state this with no view to
limit the ways and means, but only that until the subject is given them
to provide for, the House might not be embarrassed with the difficulty
of money.
With the humble hope that the views of the committee have been shown
to be at least most reasonable, if not most correct, I beg leave to
say a few words as to the different kinds of vessels proposed. I will
not ask that the clerk should read that excellent letter from Captain
Stewart, because I presume every gentleman who wishes information
has read it more than once. From that and the other documents, the
committee thought themselves warranted in recommending four seventy-six
gun ships. In addition to the sufficient reasons offered there, that
a large ship, with fewer men and a less cost, will be more efficient
than small ones, by the table A it is most conclusively evinced, that
a seventy-six, at one round, throws on the enemy four pounds fourteen
ounces of ball for each man; whereas, the gunboat throws only ten
ounces. I only give the extremes, that the argument may be the more
readily taken. Here, too, we have the fact, that six hundred and fifty
men are sufficient for a seventy-six, while four hundred and twenty
are required for a frigate. The annual expense is, for the large ship,
$202,110; for the frigate, $110,000. While in action, the larger ship
is equal or superior to three frigates. To support this calculation by
figures, we have the opinions of Captains Hull, Stewart, and Morris;
and Mr. Hamilton says, that all the officers in service concur in
the opinion; and I am told that such is the real history of naval
conflicts. Mr. Hamilton mentions one, and Captain Stewart mentions
another, of four French frigates attacking a British seventy-four, of
which one was sunk, two taken, and the other run off.
It is cause of some exultation to me, that our naval men, where the
opportunity is afforded them, give the example to prove our theory. As
I am told, orders were sent from Washington in September to Captain
Chauncey, then at New York, who made his preparation, took his workmen
with him to the Lakes, and some days since we had the account that
he had built and launched, before November was out, a frigate of
twenty-six guns. The gallant Chauncey enables me to present an argument
that would, could I do it justice, I am sure, have much weight. Will
any gentleman regret that this twenty-six gun ship has been built,
though the mastery of the Lakes has been acquired without it? Neither
shall we regret the building of the seventy-sixes, though peace,
which God send, should come before they are launched. There is yet
one other objection too important to be passed over, though it was on
a former occasion so ably canvassed. It is the difficulty of getting
seamen. That difficulty exists, I do admit. Yet is not the difficulty
insurmountable. Here again I avail myself of the illustrations of my
friend from South Carolina.
The gentleman has again referred to the difficulty of manning your
ships, and deems impressment indispensable. Sir, I admit the weakness
of our nation, and lament it too. Yet I cannot believe that the hard
hand of tyranny is essential to their well-being; and I regret that in
an assembly of freemen, that this, the most if not the only detestable
example England has set us as to a navy, should be so much relied on.
Look to the fact, that in five years forty-two thousand seamen deserted
from the British navy. Look to the fact, that their prisoners require
to be committed to return to their own country. It is with no little
pride that I call the attention of the gentleman and the committee to
our gallery. Did a British gallery ever exhibit such a spectacle? No,
a seaman there is a slave, and seldom puts his foot on shore but under
the guard of an officer. Let us therefore be cautious in admitting that
though Great Britain has been most successful, that she owes it to the
hard, to the iron hand of impressment. It would not be difficult to
find in her naval institutions other principles to which the mind would
delight to attribute her superiority, rather than that from which we
cannot but turn in disgust.
Mr. STOW said he should not consider the motion made by the honorable
gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. SEYBERT) as going to defeat the main
object of the bill, which was a liberal increase of the navy, because
he understood his intention to be to move a larger number of frigates
if the clause for seventy-fours should be stricken out. The question
then he should consider as simply whether it was best at present to
build any ships-of-the-line, or to confine our exertions to frigates
only? He said his own opinions had leaned pretty strongly to the latter
side till, as a member of the Navy Committee, he had been led to a
more careful examination of the subject; and he confessed that that
examination had fully convinced him of the utility, and he might say
necessity, of building some line-of-battle ships. The propriety of
building them, as well as a proportion of lighter ships, grew out of
the different objects to which they were to be applied. There could
be no doubt of the superior advantages of frigates and sloops of war
when employed in cruising against our enemy's commerce, but whenever
the object is to repel a powerful force, ships-of-the-line ought to
be resorted to. They form batteries infinitely more effective in
proportion to their expense than frigates. To illustrate this--the
cost of a seventy-four is less than one-third more than that of a
forty-four gun frigate, yet the force is as three to one, or according
to the lowest estimate I have heard, as two to one. This is easily
explained when we consider that to make a seventy-four is little more
than adding another deck to a large frigate. It would then appear
evident, that unless we resorted to this kind of force, we should fight
our enemy on the most unequal terms. She could at any time lay a few
heavy ships at the mouths of our harbors and in our narrow waters, and
thus effectually destroy not only our foreign trade, but what was of
infinitely more importance, she could destroy the whole of our coasting
trade.
Further, said Mr. S., knowing that we have no powerful ships, she
can easily protect by convoy all her valuable fleets; but if we had
four ships-of-the-line she would be driven to the enormous expense of
convoying every fleet of merchantmen sailing to any part of America by
five or six seventy-fours, or they would be exposed to capture by our
fleet.
But, said Mr. S., it is objected that they would be blockaded. This
objection was equally against frigates; but he was perfectly willing to
put it upon that ground, that Great Britain would attempt to blockade
them. What then would be the case? She must employ six blockading
ships, supported at an enormous expense, at such a distance; and as had
been fully shown by the gentleman from South Carolina, (Mr. CHEVES,)
last year, six more ships at least must be occupied in preparing and
sailing to replace the first six--thus employing twelve ships to four.
And after all, the attempt to confine our ships would frequently be
rendered abortive by storms. Again, it has been objected that we had
no harbors south of Montauk Point, in which, if pursued, our ships
could take shelter. If by this was meant barely that we had no harbor
properly fortified, he admitted it was true; and it was also equally
true as applied to our heavy frigates; but if it was meant that there
was no harbor in which ships could enter that was capable of being
properly defended, it was entirely erroneous. For many such there were,
and where sufficient works could be erected in a few months.
Mr. S. said a strong reason for building seventy-fours, and to which
he particularly requested the attention of the committee, grew out of
the state of our preparation. We have timber for four seventy-fours,
seasoned and ready for use, which could not be applied to frigates,
without great loss. And this explained the fact, that we could build
seventy-fours sooner than frigates, unless the timber thus provided
should be cut up, which, after years of deliberate preparation for
seventy-fours, would appear like children's play. He said in a case of
this kind, he thought great respect was due to experience. That many
years ago all the ships of war belonging to the nations of Europe were
small, but that, without one exception, they had resorted to a certain
proportion of heavy ships. From this circumstance, as well as from the
uniform opinion of our own officers, he inferred that these were the
most conclusive reasons in favor of them.
The question was then taken on the motion to strike out the
seventy-fours, and negatived. The committee rose and had leave to sit
again.
FRIDAY, December 18.
_Increase of the Navy._
The House again resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the
bill to increase the Navy of the United States.
Mr. CUTTS then moved to strike out the seventy-fours, with a view to
increase the number of frigates to be built to ten, and to add a number
of sloops of war.
Mr. C. spoke at considerable length in support of his motion, and in
favor of frigates and sloops of war in preference to seventy-four gun
ships.
The question was then taken on striking out the provision respecting
seventy-fours, and was carried--for the amendment 56, against it 53.
Mr. CUTTS moved an amendment authorizing the building of ten ships of
war, of forty-four guns, and ten sloops of war.--Motion lost by a
great majority.
MONDAY, December 21.
On motion of Mr. BASSETT, the petitions of J. A. Chevallie, attorney of
Amelie Eugene de Beaumarchais, presented on the 24th of December, 1805,
and 2d of April, 1806, together with all the documents concerning the
said claim, were referred to the Committee of Claims.
_Encouragement to Privateering by Public Armed and Private Armed
Vessels._
Mr. BASSETT, from the Committee on the Naval Establishment, presented
a bill relating to captures; which was read twice, and committed to a
Committee of the Whole on Wednesday next. The bill is as follows:
A Bill relating to captures.
_Be it enacted, &c._, That where any ship or vessel in the
service of the United States shall have captured, or may
hereafter capture, a ship or vessel belonging to an enemy,
of equal or inferior force, and it shall become necessary to
destroy such prize to prevent her falling into the hands of
the enemy, or for the security of such ship or vessel so in
the service of the United States, the Secretary of the Navy
is hereby required to issue his commission to one or more
fit person or persons, who, on the best evidence that can be
procured, shall proceed to estimate the value of such ship
or vessel, prize as aforesaid, in the port into which the
capturing vessel shall first enter, and make return on oath of
said estimate or valuation to the Secretary of the Navy.
SEC. 2. _And be it further enacted_, That the Secretary of the
Navy shall thereon proceed to apportion the sum, which shall
be equal to one-half the said valuation or estimate, as prize
money, among the officers and crew making such capture, and
cause the same to be paid to them accordingly.
SEC. 3. _And be it further enacted_, That each commissioned
officer shall receive six dollars per day for each day he shall
be employed in making the aforesaid estimate: _Provided_, His
compensation shall in no case exceed ---- dollars.
SEC. 4. _And be it further enacted_, That every captain or
commanding officer of any vessel in the service of the United
States immediately on his coming into port, after having
captured a ship or vessel of equal or superior force, shall
make report thereof to the Secretary of the Navy, describing
particularly the size and equipment of the ship or vessel so
destroyed, and the nature and extent of the damage done her in
the action, as also the causes and inducements for destroying
his prize, which report, in part, shall be received as evidence
by the commissioners aforesaid.
SEC. 5. _And be it further enacted_, That the Secretary of the
Navy shall cause the account of the money so by him ordered
to be paid, to be settled at the end of one year, and all the
unclaimed dividends he shall cause to be paid over to the Navy
Hospital Fund.
Mr. BASSETT, from the same committee, also presented a bill regulating
pensions to persons on board private armed ships; which was read twice,
and committed to a Committee of the Whole on Thursday next. The bill
is as follows:
A Bill regulating pensions to persons on board private
armed ships.
_Be it enacted, &c._, That the two and a half per centum
reserved in the hands of the collectors and consuls by the
act of June, eighteen hundred and twelve, entitled "An act
concerning letters of marque, prizes, and prize goods," shall
be paid into the Treasury, under the like regulations provided
for other public money, and shall constitute a fund for the
purposes of this act, and such other purposes as Congress may
direct, for the aid and comfort of the seamen of the United
States.
SEC. 2. _And be it further enacted_, That the Secretary of
the Navy be authorized and required to place on the pension
list, under the like regulations and restrictions as are used
in relation to the Navy of the United States, any officer or
seamen who, on board of any private armed ship or vessel,
bearing a commission or letter of marque, shall have been,
in the line of duty, wounded or otherwise disabled; if an
officer, allowing him one-half his monthly pay for the greater
disability, and so in proportion; and if a seaman, or acting
as a marine, the sum of six dollars per month for the greater
disability, and so in proportion; which several pensions shall
be paid, by direction of the Secretary of the Navy, out of the
fund above provided.
SEC. 3. _And be it further enacted_, That the commanding
officer of every vessel having a commission, or letters of
marque and reprisal, shall enter in his journal the name and
rank of any officer, and the name of any seamen who, during
his cruise, shall, in the line of his duty, have been wounded
or disabled, describing the manner and extent, as far as
practicable, of such wound or disability.
SEC. 4. _And be it further enacted_, That every collector shall
transmit quarterly to the Secretary of the Navy a transcript of
such journals as may have been reported to him, so far as they
give a list of the officers and crew, and the description of
wounds and disabilities, the better to enable the Secretary to
decide on claims for pensions.
_Duties on Privateer Prize Goods._
Mr. CHEVES, from the Committee of Ways and Means, to whom was referred
the bill from the Senate directing the Secretary of the Treasury to
remit certain fines, penalties, and forfeitures, reported the same
with amendments, the principal one of which is to strike out the words
"and the dependencies thereof," so as to exclude from the operation of
the bill, the cases of goods brought in from Canada, &c.--The bill was
referred to a Committee of the Whole.
Mr. C. also introduced the following report:
The Committee of Ways and Means, to whom were referred so much
of the petition of the owners and agents of sundry private
armed vessels fitted out of the port of New York, as prays the
reduction of the duties on prize goods, and the petitions of
sundry owners of private armed vessels fitted out of the port
of Boston, and of sundry owners of like vessels fitted out of
the ports of Norfolk and Portsmouth, Virginia, also praying a
reduction of the duties on prize goods, report:
That a letter from John Ferguson and John L. Laurence, agents
for the petitioners from New York, and a letter from the
Secretary of the Treasury, both addressed to the chairman of
the committee, and which accompany this report, contain all
the facts and views which will probably be found material
in the examination and consideration of this subject; and
that this committee, having maturely considered them, are of
opinion, that a reduction of the duties on prize goods, without
embracing, at the same time, all importations made in the
prosecution of the ordinary commerce of the country, cannot,
consistently with sound policy and rational legislation, be
made, and that a general reduction would diminish a revenue,
where it does not distress the consumer, and would not produce
any material increase of gain to the captors. The committee,
therefore, recommend the following resolve:
_Resolved_, That it is inexpedient to grant the prayer of the
petitioners.
_Documents referred to in the above report._
WASHINGTON, _Nov. 23, 1812_.
SIR: We take the liberty of enclosing to you, for the
inspection of the Committee of Ways and Means, sundry papers
connected with the application by the owners of privateers in
New York, for a reduction of duties on prize goods. They are as
follow:
No. 1, exhibits the proceeds of the schooner Venus and cargo,
captured by the privateer Teazer.
No. 2, is a statement of the cost of the privateers General
Armstrong and Governor Tompkins.
No. 3, contains extracts of letters from several privateer
agents.
The Committee of Ways and Means are (including the accompanying
documents) in possession of three statements of prize sales,
where the property was, in each case, of a different character
from the others. The cargo of the New Liverpool consisted
(contrary to our impressions when before the committee)
altogether of wine, amounting to 27,959 gallons, whereon
the duty was 46 cents per gallon, which consumed more than
one-half of the proceeds of vessel and cargo, and, connected
with the other charges, left the owners of the privateer about
one-sixth of the captured property. The Industry was laden
with 152 bbls. salmon; and the benevolent intentions of the
privateersmen to restore to an indigent owner the amount of
her loss, terminated, in consequence of the high duties and
charges, in an inability to present her with more than a paltry
sum, scarcely worth her acceptance. The Venus had a cargo of
rum, sugar, fruit, and preserves, which produced $17,637 68,
and was charged with duties amounting to $8,287 63. The vessel,
being well calculated for a privateer, was bought in by the
captors for that business. But, experience teaching them that
the profits of private naval warfare are by no means equivalent
to the hazard, they have abandoned that intention, and are
now offering the Venus for sale in the public newspapers, but
cannot find a purchaser.
We would respectfully suggest to the Committee of Ways and
Means that great anxiety exists in New York, that Congress
may give the question of a reduction of prize duties a speedy
decision; which, if favorable, will revive the spirit and zeal,
now expiring, with which privateering was undertaken at the
commencement of the war; and, if unfavorable, will prevent
those who have purchased vessels for warlike enterprises, in
which they cannot now dispose of any interest, from incurring
losses accumulated under fruitless expectations.
We have taken the liberty of reminding the committee that
no naval force of any efficiency can be supported by the
Government but at an expense far greater than the amount of
the duties of which we pray the remission; and that there is
probably no other species of naval armament half so destructive
as privateers to the commerce of an enemy.
The employment of a great number of experienced masters of
vessels and seamen necessarily engaged in them, whose services
could not probably be obtained in any other way, and whose
skill and intrepidity produce so much honor to the country,
forms another important consideration.
To these may be added, that, in no other way, can the
mercantile interest be so effectually united in the support
and prosecution of the war, as by offering inducements to
the investments of its otherwise unemployed capital in such
enterprises.
We are, sir, with great respect, your obedient servants,
JOHN FERGUSON,
JOHN L. LAWRENCE.