No. 6.
BOSTON, _March 5, 1809_.
SIR: I am favored with another opportunity of writing to you by
a private conveyance; and think it probable, at this season,
that the frequency of these will render it unnecessary to write
to you in cipher.
It does not yet appear necessary that I should discover to
any person the purpose of my visit to Boston; nor is it
probable that I shall be compelled, for the sake of gaining
more knowledge of the arrangements of the Federal party in
these States, to avow myself as a regular authorized agent of
the British Government, even to those individuals who would
feel equally bound with myself to preserve, with the utmost
inscrutability, so important a secret from the public eye. I
have sufficient means of information to enable me to judge
of the proper period for offering the co-operation of Great
Britain, and opening a correspondence between the Governor
General of British America, and those individuals who, from the
part they take in the opposition to the National Government, or
the influence they may possess in any new order of things that
may grow out of the present differences, should be qualified
to act on behalf of the Northern States. An apprehension of
any such state of things as is pre-supposed by these remarks,
begins to subside, since it has appeared, by the conduct of
the General Government, that it is seriously alarmed at the
menacing attitude of the Northern States. But, although it is
believed that there is no probability of an immediate war,
yet no doubts are entertained that Mr. Madison will fall upon
some new expedients to bring about hostilities. What these may
be, can only be deduced from what appears to be practicable.
A _non-intercourse_ with England and France will probably
supersede the embargo; which, by opening with the rest of
Europe a partial, legitimate commerce, and offering strong
temptations to that which is illegal, will expose the vessels
to capture, detention, and embarrassment; will justify the
present policy, and produce such a degree of irritation and
resentment as will enable the Government of this country to
throw the whole blame and responsibility of war from its own
shoulders upon those of the British Ministry. If, in this, the
party attached to France should calculate with correctness,
and the commerce of New England should greatly suffer, the
merchants, being injured and discouraged, would not only
acquiesce in the restrictive system, but even submit to war.
On the other hand, should the small traffic, permitted by a
non-intercourse law, be lucrative and uninterrupted, the people
would be clamorous for more, and soon compel the Government to
restore the friendly relations between the two countries.
While I offer my opinion upon this subject, I cannot but
express a strong hope that, if any terms should be proposed
by either Government, to which the other might think proper
to accede, that a principal motive to the adjustment of
differences should be understood to arise from the amicable
disposition of the Eastern States, particularly of the State
of Massachusetts. This, as it would increase the popularity of
the friends of Great Britain, could not fail to promote her
interests. If it could not be done formally and officially,
nor in a correspondence between Ministers, still, perhaps, the
administration in the Parliament of Great Britain might take
that ground, and the suggestion would find its way into the
papers both in England and America.
It cannot be too frequently repeated, that this country can
only be governed and directed by the influence of opinion, as
there is nothing permanent in its political institutions; nor
are the populace, under any circumstances, to be relied on,
when measures become inconvenient and burdensome. I will soon
write again, and am yours, &c.