_Injunction of Secrecy on War Measures removed._
The injunction of secrecy thereon having been removed, on motion, by
Mr. ANDERSON, twelve hundred copies of the confidential Message of
the President of the United States of the first of June instant, were
ordered to be printed for the use of the Senate.
_Certain confidential proceedings of the Senate, since first June, are
as follow, the injunction of secrecy having been removed_:
MONDAY, June 1, 1812.
A confidential Message was received from the PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES, as follows:
[For this Message, see the _Supplemental Journal_ of the Proceedings
of the House of Representatives, under the date of June 1, 1812,
_post_.]
FRIDAY, June 5.
_Declaration of War against Great Britain._
A confidential Message was received from the House of Representatives,
by Messrs. MACON and FINDLAY, two of their members--Mr. MACON, chairman:
_Mr. President_: The House of Representatives have passed a bill,
entitled "An act declaring War between Great Britain and her
Dependencies, and the United States and their Territories;" in which
they ask the concurrence of the Senate; and request that the bill be
considered confidentially.
An act declaring War between Great Britain and her
Dependencies, and the United States and their Territories.
_Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America_, _in Congress assembled_, That
war be and the same is hereby declared to exist between Great
Britain and her Dependencies, and the United States and their
Territories; and that the President of the United States is
hereby authorized to use the whole land and naval force of
the United States to carry the same into effect; and to issue
to private armed vessels of the United States commissions or
letters of marque and general reprisal, in such form as he
shall think proper, and under the seal of the United States,
against the vessels, goods, and effects of the Government of
Great Britain, of its subjects, and of all persons inhabiting
within any of its territories or possessions.
On motion, the bill was twice read by unanimous consent; and, on
motion by Mr. Leib, it was referred to the committee appointed the 1st
instant, on the confidential Message of the President of the United
States of the same date, to consider and report thereon.
TUESDAY, June 9.
On motion by Mr. ANDERSON, the bill entitled "An act declaring War
between Great Britain and her Dependencies, and the United States and
their Territories," was considered as in Committee of the Whole. Mr.
GAILLARD was requested to take the Chair; and, after debate, a motion
was made by Mr. GREGG, that the bill be recommitted, for further
amendment, to the committee who have under consideration the Message of
the President of the United States of the 1st June. And, after debate,
the President resumed the Chair, and the Senate adjourned.
WEDNESDAY, June 10.
Mr. GAILLARD was requested to take the Chair.
The Senate resumed, as in Committee of the Whole, the bill, entitled
"An act declaring War between Great Britain and her Dependencies, and
the United States and their Territories."
Mr. GREGG, by permission, amended his motion for recommitting the bill
to the committee appointed on the confidential Message of the President
of the United States, of the 1st of June, as follows:
_Resolved_, That the bill entitled "An act declaring War
between Great Britain and her Dependencies, and the United
States and their Territories," be recommitted to the committee
to whom was committed the Message of the President, of the 1st
instant, with instructions to modify and amend the same, in
such manner that the President of the United States shall have
power to authorize the public armed ships and vessels of the
United States to make reprisals upon the public and private
ships and vessels, goods, and merchandise, belonging to the
Crown of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, or
to the subjects thereof; and also to grant letters of marque
and reprisal, under suitable regulations, to be provided in the
bill, to private armed ships and vessels to make like reprisals.
THURSDAY, June 11.
Mr. GAILLARD was requested to take the Chair.
On motion by Mr. ANDERSON, the bill from the House of Representatives,
entitled "An act declaring war between Great Britain and her
Dependencies, and the United States and their Territories," was
resumed, and considered as in Committee of the Whole, together with the
motion yesterday submitted by Mr. GREGG; and on the question to agree
to the motion, it was determined in the affirmative--yeas 17, nays 13,
as follows:
YEAS.--Messrs. Bayard, Condit, Dana, German, Giles, Gilman,
Goodrich, Gregg, Horsey, Howell, Hunter, Lambert, Leib, Lloyd,
Reid, Smith of New York, and Worthington.
NAYS.--Messrs. Anderson, Bibb, Campbell of Tennessee, Crawford,
Cutts, Franklin, Gaillard, Pope, Smith of Maryland, Tait,
Taylor, Turner, and Varnum.
Whereupon, Mr. CRAWFORD resumed the Chair; and, on motion by Mr.
Anderson, it was ordered that the committee to whom this bill is
recommitted have leave to sit immediately.
FRIDAY, June 12.
_Reprisals on British Commerce._
Mr. ANDERSON, from the committee to whom was recommitted the bill,
entitled "An act declaring War between Great Britain and her
Dependencies, and the United States and their Territories," with
instructions to modify and amend the same, in such manner that the
President shall have the power to authorize the public armed ships and
vessels of the United States to make reprisals upon the public and
private ships and vessels, goods, and merchandise, belonging to the
Crown of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and to the
subjects thereof; and also to grant letters of marque and reprisal,
under suitable regulations, to be provided in the bill, to private
ships and vessels to make reprisals, agreeably to said instructions.
SATURDAY, June 13.
_Declaration of War._
Mr. GAILLARD was requested to take the Chair; and on motion, by Mr.
ANDERSON, the consideration of the bill, entitled "An act declaring
war between Great Britain and her Dependencies, and the United States
and their Territories," was resumed, as in Committee of the Whole;
and having agreed to sundry amendments, the President resumed the
Chair; and Mr. GAILLARD reported the bill with amendments, which were
considered in Senate and agreed to.
A motion was made by Mr. GERMAN, to postpone the further consideration
of the bill to the first Monday in November next.
Mr. GERMAN addressed the Chair as follows:
Mr. President: I made the motion to postpone the consideration of
the bill now before us, from a conviction that it will be extremely
injurious to the country to pass it at this time. I feel, sir, that
the State I have the honor to represent has a peculiar interest in the
event of this question; and I also feel the weight of the interest
which the nation at large has at stake, in the event of the passage of
this bill. I therefore consider it a duty I owe my constituents, to use
every reasonable exertion in my power to prevent the object of that
bill, until the country is better prepared to carry it into effect.
As I presume the war, if declared, is intended to be an offensive one,
I will, to establish the propriety of my motion, take a general view
of the situation of this country; of its means to carry on offensive
operations, as well as to defend itself, and of the situation and
relative strength also of the country we are required to make war upon.
I am ready to allow, Mr. President, that both Great Britain and France
have given us abundant cause for war; on this occasion, therefore, I
shall dispense with using any argument which might serve to show, that
if we were even in a state of preparation, and possessed the means of
insuring a favorable issue, it would be bad policy for this country,
at the present time, to enter into war with Great Britain, although
perhaps many weighty reasons might be adduced in support of such
argument.
I will first call the attention of the Senate to the ability and
strength of the nation we are about, by this bill, to declare war
against. Gentlemen ought to recollect, that Great Britain has been
almost constantly engaged in war for twenty years past against one of
the most powerful nations that ever existed; and for a considerable
part of that time, the energies of her enemy have been directed by
war's favorite genius--NAPOLEON, who has succeeded in uniting nearly
the whole force of the Continent of Europe against her: against that
very nation which we are about to assail; and what has been the
effect? Is Great Britain less powerful now, than she was twenty years
ago? No, sir, this constant warfare has increased her powers instead
of diminishing them. At the commencement of the war, France was nearly
her equal on the ocean, and several other nations of Europe maintained
a powerful naval force. But what is their situation at present? Has not
Great Britain driven them all from the ocean? And does she not remain
sole mistress? I ask gentlemen, if her ability to carry on a distant
war by land or sea, has diminished? The answer must be that it has
increased with her navy, and extended with her dominion. Great Britain
now commands the strength and resources of most of the West India
Islands, and many of the islands in the Indian Ocean. She controls the
destinies of more than thirty millions of people on the Continent of
Asia. And she has, at this time, or will have, if we engage in a war
with her, the exclusive benefit of the trade of the world; and under
these circumstances possesses the ability to carry on a war in distant
countries across the ocean, beyond any nation ever heard of.
These considerations, Mr. President, lead me to the view of our
situation and means of defence, and of our ability to carry immediate
war into the colonies of Upper and Lower Canada. I will first consider
the situation of our maritime frontier, beginning at New Orleans, and
examine the situation of that place. We learn from the War Office that
there is _little_ rising of one hundred regular troops stationed near
the city for its defence. Now I will ask any gentleman if that paltry
force is sufficient for that object; and if it will not be in the power
of the British to take possession of that city within sixty days after
your declaration of war against them? If gentlemen calculate on the
goodness and forbearance of the enemy, I think they will be deceived.
Great Britain is a wily, active nation. She has been trained to war.
She will not measure her steps and movements by ours; if we are not
prepared to defend our seaports, she will not wait until we are; and
should she get possession of New Orleans, it will cost much blood and
treasure to dislodge her. Passing northerly along our coast, let us
see what is the situation of our most valuable cities. Charleston and
Norfolk, as well as many other places of less consequence, are found
exposed to maritime attacks. And when we reach the city of New York
(the nation's great emporium of trade) do we, on viewing its situation,
and strength of the public works for its defence, find it in a perfect
state of security? No, sir, unless the greatest part of your frigates
are stationed there, to aid your fortifications, and gunboats, it will
fall a prey to the enemy. It can be assailed by a small fleet, with
every prospect of success. The only resistance they would meet with
would be in passing the fortifications on Staten Island, and perhaps
a few shots from Bedlow's and Ellis's Islands. They might soon place
themselves abreast the works at the upper end of the city, the weakest
of them all. And I have no doubt two seventy-fours might silence this
work in twenty or thirty minutes. They would then meet with no other
resistance than from travelling guns on the shore and from the docks.
The result would probably be, that the city would be set on fire, or
a contribution extorted from its inhabitants. I will now pass on to
Rhode Island. Does the prospect of security there flatter us? No,
sir. I am told by competent judges that nothing short of a force of
from three to five thousand men can defend that island. Boston, it
is said, can be defended, and is, perhaps, the only secure place of
considerable consequence on the seaboard. In viewing the situation
along the province of Maine, and our northern frontier up the river
St. Lawrence, and the Lakes to Fort Malden, and from thence to the
Mississippi, do we not find almost every point and place where there
are inhabitants, subject to the incursions of the enemy? Have they not
more troops on and near the line than we have? Yes, sir, they have ten
to our one, and a militia which the Government of Canada have been
fully vigilant in training. I understand that ever since the prospect
of war began to thicken in the political horizon, they have trained
their militia three or four times a month, and have paid them daily
wages for their services. Not so, sir, with our militia--they have,
it is true, been called into the public service to do the duty of
regular troops; and what is now their situation? Sixteen hundred of the
militia of the State of New York have been ordered into public service,
on the frontiers of that State, and have, as I am informed, marched
to their place of destination. There we find exhibiting a spectacle
that would wound the feelings of the most callous man--_without hats,
without blankets to cover them, without camp-kettles to cook the
miserable provisions furnished them by the Government contractors or
any one necessary for camp equipage_. _Their officers with the utmost
difficulty preventing their marching home for self-preservation._
Here, Mr. President, I wish to call the attention of the Senate to
the propriety and constitutionality of calling out this detachment of
militia at a time when no enemy menaced an invasion. The constitution
only authorizes the General Government to call out the militia to
suppress insurrection, enforce the laws, and repel invasion. And
I would ask whether either of these events had happened when this
corps of militia were ordered out? No. It is well known that no such
emergency existed. But they have this miserable consolation, that they
are to receive six dollars and two-thirds a month for their services,
finding their own clothes, arms and accoutrements. I do not mention
these things with a wish to discourage the militia from serving their
country when necessary, nor do I believe defending them in their
constitutional rights will have that effect, for I am fully aware that
there is no class of citizens more patriotic or willing to defend their
country than they are, and will be so found when the safety of it shall
really demand their services.
I will now resume the consideration of our situation upon the Lakes to
Detroit and Fort Malden. Here it must be remembered that the British
command the Lakes. We are told that Governor Hull is marching to the
defence of Detroit with twelve hundred militia from the State of Ohio,
together with four hundred regular troops, formed and disciplined for
action by the brave Colonel Boyd. These troops, I hope, will be better
supplied and provided for than those on the frontier of New York. It
is whispered by some of the favorites who are suffered to know the
projects of our Government, that the British have sent a part of their
regular troops, together with a number of Indians, from Fort Malden
to Fort Erie, near the Falls of Niagara; and this is taken as certain
evidence of the weakness of the garrison at Fort Malden, and that that
fort may consequently be surprised and taken by Governor Hull with
little difficulty. Now, I draw the exact contrary conclusion from this
circumstance; for the British must have known that Governor Hull was
on his march to Detroit; and if they had been weak at Fort Malden they
never would have detached part of their force and sent it to the aid of
Fort Erie. But presuming they had not heard of Governor Hull's march,
and that they had left that fort comparatively defenceless, they will
assuredly learn it soon enough to have the detachment return by water
before Governor Hull can reach Malden. And if in the attempt to take
Fort Malden, Governor Hull should meet with a defeat, the consequences
will be alarming; for no reinforcement can be sent him, nor any
assistance afforded soon enough to prevent a disastrous termination
of the expedition. In that case the British, with a partial aid from
the Indians, might cross the river and take possession of Detroit; and
if they should then obtain the assistance of the Indians generally,
it will be in their power to drive in all the frontier settlements of
Ohio; and there can be little doubt when this war is once commenced
that nearly all the Indians will flock to the British standard.
MONDAY, June 15.
The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill, entitled "An act
declaring War between Great Britain and her Dependencies, and the
United States and their Territories," together with the motion made
by Mr. GERMAN to postpone the further consideration thereof until the
first Monday in November next:
And on the question to agree to the motion, it was determined in the
negative--yeas 10, nays 22, as follows:
YEAS.--Messrs. Bayard, Dana, German, Gilman, Goodrich, Horsey,
Hunter, Lambert, Lloyd, and Reed.
NAYS.--Messrs. Anderson, Bibb, Brent, Campbell of Tennessee,
Condit, Crawford, Cutts, Franklin, Gaillard, Giles, Gregg,
Howell, Leib, Pope, Robinson, Smith of Maryland, Smith of New
York, Tait, Taylor Turner, Varnum, and Worthington.
On motion, by Mr. LEIB, to amend the bill, as follows:
[The amendment was to authorize privateering both against Great
Britain and France.]
On the question. Shall this bill pass to a third reading as amended? it
was determined in the affirmative--yeas 19, nays 13, as follows:
YEAS.--Messrs. Anderson, Bibb, Brent, Campbell of Tennessee,
Condit, Crawford, Cutts, Franklin, Gaillard, Giles, Gregg,
Leib, Robinson, Smith of Maryland, Smith of New York, Tait,
Taylor, Turner, and Varnum.
NAYS.--Messrs. Bayard, Dana, German, Gilman, Goodrich, Horsey,
Howell, Hunter, Lambert, Lloyd, Pope, Reed, and Worthington.
TUESDAY, June 16.
_Declaration of War._
The amendments to the bill from the House of Representatives, entitled
"An act declaring War between Great Britain and her Dependencies,
and the United States and their Territories," were reported by the
committee correctly engrossed.
Mr. BAYARD moved to postpone the further consideration of the bill to
the thirty-first day of October next.
The motion did not oppose or deny the sufficiency of the causes, or the
policy of the war. It went only to affirm what he trusted the course of
his observations would render very evident, that this was not a time at
which war ought to be declared.
He indulged a confidence, that upon so great an occasion the Senate
would not be impelled to act by any little passions, nor by any
considerations which did not arise out of an extended and distinct view
of the interests of the country. It is not enough that we have cause
of war; we must see that we are prepared, and in a condition to make
war. You do not go to war for the benefit of your enemy, but your own
advantage; not to give proofs of a vain and heedless courage, but to
assert your rights and redress your wrongs. If you commence hostilities
before you are prepared to strike a blow, and while your cities, your
territory, and your property on the ocean, are exposed to the mercy
of a Government possessing vast resources of war, what can you expect
but to add new distresses, defeat, and disgrace to the wrongs of which
you complain? It is a strange motive for war--a wish to gratify the
rapacity, to swell the triumphs, and to increase the insolence of the
enemy.
Mr. B. said, that neither the Government nor the people had expected,
or were prepared for war. Even at this moment, the general opinion
abroad was, that there would be no war, the mercantile and trading
world had continued to act upon that opinion. Nor could people be
persuaded that an unarmed nation was about to attack a nation armed
cap-a-pie. No man had laid out his account for this war, and every one
would be taken by surprise and unprepared for its shock.
You have at this moment an immense property abroad, a great portion
of it in England, and part floating on the ocean and hastening to
your ports. The postponement proposed might save a great portion of
this property, and bring home the seamen now absent from the country.
Gentlemen would remember the number of ships which left our ports on
the eve of an embargo. These vessels had not had time to perform their
voyages, and the greater part of them were still abroad. He knew that
some members had no commiseration for the merchant who had dared to
escape the embargo, and who had disregarded the salutary precautions,
designed, as it was said, for his security. But he did not think it
surprising, nor culpable, that those whose property consisted in ships,
should be averse to seeing them rotting at the wharves, and even
disposed to incur risks to find employment for them abroad.
Even, however, if it should be thought that the merchants had acted
with indiscretion and folly, it is the part of a parental Government,
such as this ought always to be, not to punish the citizens for their
misfortunes, but to guard them against the effect of their errors.
Besides, a loss of individual property was a loss to the State, as the
public strength was derived from individual resources.
He stated that the question of war had been doubtful till the present
moment. He did not believe that the President himself expected war
at the opening of the session, nor for a long time after. A menacing
language was held out; but the hopes of an accommodation were far
from being abandoned. Much was expected from the Prince Regent's
accession to his full powers. A change of Ministry was not doubted,
and it was thought that in the change of men, there would have been
found such a change of principles and measures, that the differences
between the two Governments might be compromised and settled. This
expectation was protracted till it became plainly evident that the
Prince did not intend to change his father's Ministers, nor to depart
from their principles or measures. When this discovery was made, the
Administration had proceeded too far to recede.
Desperate as the course was which now alone remained to be pursued,
they supposed they were obliged to advance or become the object of
reproach and scorn both to friends and foes. This necessity they had
brought upon themselves, but it was too late to consider whether the
condition might have been avoided; they were pledged in this state of
events to attempt to extort from Great Britain by force the concession
of those points which their arguments had failed in persuading her to
yield. He had no doubt but that, some months past, the Cabinet had
seriously determined upon resorting to hostilities. But the concurrence
of Congress was to be obtained, and whether a majority of both Houses
could be brought to take the daring and hazardous step, no man in
or out of the Government, without the gift of prophecy, could have
predicted.
The public mind had been so repeatedly distracted and deceived by
boisterous speeches, and bold but ephemeral resolutions, that it had
sunk into a state of apathy, and was no longer excited even by the
sound of war echoed in the ministerial paper from the proceedings of
Government. When the bill before us was first brought up from the other
House, it was the opinion of very few that it would obtain the support
of a majority of this body; and, even now, it was likely to pass,
not because it was approved by a majority, but of the differences of
opinion which existed among gentlemen as to other courses which had
been proposed.
If, with the light and information possessed in this body as to the
views and designs of the Cabinet and of Congress, it has been doubtful
among ourselves whether the Government would resort to war, how
was it to be known by our merchants, or any other class of society
unacquainted with the intentions and secret proceedings of those
exercising the powers of the Government, that the nation would be
wantonly plunged into a sudden war?
He had heard it said, that the embargo was a sufficient notice of the
design of the Government to resort to hostilities upon its expiration,
and that the people must be infatuated, who, after such warning, were
not apprised of the approaching crisis. But it is too recently and
deeply in our recollection to be forgotten, that this is not the first
embargo we have experienced, and which, though of longer duration, we
saw pass away without being followed by war.
The language held there, as to people out of doors who have doubted of
the war, is retorted by the public voice with equal confidence and on
better grounds. They rely upon your integrity and wisdom, and say that
Congress cannot be so infatuated, destitute as they are of the means of
aggression or defence, to draw upon themselves a war with one of the
most powerful and formidable nations on the globe. If a war with Great
Britain be thought unavoidable, yet, as she leaves to us the time of
commencing it, surely we ought to select that time when the first shock
shall be least disastrous, and can best be resisted. Why should we
hurry into a war from which nothing but calamity can be expected? There
is no danger that the redress of our wrongs, or the assertion of our
rights, will be barred by the limitation of time. No time has existed
for years past when we had less cause to complain of the conduct of
Great Britain. Her vessels of war had all been withdrawn from our
coast, as he presumed, in order to avoid collisions and hostility.
If the war be suspended till November, the Government and the people
will both be better prepared to sustain it. He was not a friend to the
restrictive system, but with a choice out of evils, he should prefer
the embargo to war. Postpone the war, and we will submit to the embargo
till November. This will furnish time for the return of your ships and
seamen; and if, at the same time, you will abandon the non-importation
act, you will replenish your Treasury with at least twelve millions
of dollars, and restore to your citizens sixty millions now abroad,
and in danger of being lost. It appeared to him that the course which
had been pursued was the most preposterous imaginable. For eighteen
months past, we had been sending our property out of the country, and
not suffering it to return; and, while contemplating a war with Great
Britain, we saw our effects to an immense amount accumulating in that
kingdom, liable at any moment, to fall a prey to the Government, and to
be employed in support of the war against us. He asked, why rush with
this precipitancy into the war? Are you provided with means to annoy
the enemy, or to defend yourselves? Have you an army or navy which can
make any impression? Are your exposed towns fortified and garrisoned?
Was any nation ever less prepared for war? It would require the whole
military force that you now possess to constitute an adequate defence
for New Orleans, New York, and Newport. It is very well known that the
General who will command at New Orleans has declared to the Government,
that he will not be answerable for the security of the place with
less force than ten thousand men, which is equal to all the effective
troops yet raised. It would be natural to suppose that no Government
would declare war till it was prepared to attack its enemy. In peace
we require no defence, and shall we declare war in order to defend
ourselves? But what blow are you prepared to strike? Were you able in
the summer to recruit your army of twenty-five thousand men, could it
be employed in any service in the course of this year? A soldier is not
made in a day. The authority of a foreign officer, now in this country,
of the highest military reputation, he had heard frequently cited, that
it required at least fourteen months to form a soldier of a recruit.
This remark applied to France, where the officers have generally
received a military education, and where there are so many models to
imitate, and so many instructors to teach. But here the officer is to
form as well as the soldier. The officer has to learn his lesson first,
before he can prescribe the task of the soldier. You may possibly have
a herd of men, but you can have no army to lead into service this
season; and if this herd be led against disciplined troops, you can
expect nothing but defeat and disgrace.
But you have not got, nor can you get the men during the present year.
These are not the days of Cadmus. It will require great patience and
industry, and a considerable length of time, to collect twenty-five
thousand men. Have you the least prospect, if you declare war, of
attacking Canada this season? It is impossible that you can do it with
effect. You will be sufficiently occupied in defending your frontiers
against the savages.
It is not on land then that you expect immediately to assail your
enemy. Is it on the ocean that the impression is to be made? You have
twenty vessels of war--Britain upwards of a thousand. What will avail
the activity or gallantry of your officers and seamen against such
disparity of force? Your little Navy must fall immediately, or be
driven from the ocean. Some gentlemen indulge great expectations from
privateers; but has Great Britain any unarmed or unprotected trade
which they can attack? Privateers have no other object than plunder
and booty. They avoid armed vessels--and, defended as is the British
commerce in every part of the world by her great naval force, it is
little to be expected that privateering will be attended with much
success or encouragement. But while we are searching for the means of
annoying the commerce of Britain, does it become us to overlook at this
moment the condition of our own? A valuable part of the trade from
beyond the Cape of Good Hope has not yet arrived. Of the numberless
vessels which sailed upon the eve of the embargo, few have returned.
Your merchant vessels are without convoy and utterly defenceless.
Your condition, therefore, is, that with more commerce exposed, your
adversary will possess greater means of annoyance, and the consequence
must be, that we shall lose infinitely more than we can expect to gain.
Under such circumstances, what should hurry us into the war? Are
gentlemen afraid if they wait till November the world will not last
long enough to afford them time to gratify in war their mighty
resentment against Britain? He believed, as he hoped, that there was no
honorable gentleman on the floor who would not live long enough to have
a complete surfeit of the war, though it should be postponed for a few
months.
The question on postponement was determined in the negative--yeas 11,
nays 21.
On motion, by Mr. BAYARD, to postpone the further consideration of
the bill to the third day of July next, it was determined in the
negative--yeas 9, nays 23.
On motion by Mr. BAYARD, to postpone the further consideration of the
bill to Monday next, it was determined in the negative--yeas 15, nays
17.
On motion, that the Senate adjourn, it was determined in the
affirmative--yeas 18, nays 14.
So the Senate adjourned to 11 o'clock to-morrow.
THURSDAY, June 18.
On motion, by Mr. Varnum,
_Resolved_, That the injunction of secrecy, in relation to the
confidential Message of the President of the United States of the
first instant, and also in relation to the private and confidential
proceedings of the Senate since that date, be removed.
[_End of the confidential proceedings._]
FRIDAY, June 26.
_Treasury Notes._
The amendment to the bill, entitled "An act authorizing the issuing of
Treasury Notes," was reported by the committee correctly engrossed, and
the bill was read a third time as amended.
On the question, Shall this bill pass as amended? it was determined in
the affirmative--yeas 23, nays 8, as follows:
YEAS.--Messrs. Anderson, Bibb, Bradley, Brent, Campbell of
Tennessee, Condit, Crawford, Cutts, Franklin, Gaillard, Giles,
Gregg, Howell, Lambert, Leib, Reed, Robinson, Smith of New
York, Tait, Taylor, Turner, Varnum, and Worthington.
NAYS.--Messrs. Bayard, Dana, German, Gilman, Goodrich, Hunter,
Lloyd, and Pope.
SUNDAY, July 5.
_Volunteers Bill._
The amendment to the bill, entitled "An act supplementary to the act,
entitled 'An act authorizing the President of the United States to
accept and organize certain volunteer military corps,'" having been
reported by the committee correctly engrossed, the bill was read a
third time as amended.
On the question, Shall this bill pass as amended? it was determined in
the affirmative--yeas 14, nays 6, as follows:
YEAS.--Messrs. Anderson, Bibb, Brent, Condit, Crawford,
Franklin, Gaillard, Giles, Howell, Robinson, Smith of New York,
Tait, Taylor, and Varnum.
NAYS.--Messrs. Bayard, Gilman, Goodrich, Leib, Lloyd, and Smith
of Maryland.
So it was resolved, that this bill pass with an amendment.