WASHINGTON, _January 16, 1812_.
The Message and documents enclosed were read, and referred to the
committee to whom was referred, on the 8th of November last, so much
of the Message of the President of the United States as concerns the
relations between the United States and France and Great Britain, to
consider and report thereon; and five hundred copies thereof ordered to
be printed for the use of the Senate.
FRIDAY, January 17.
_Incorporation of a Mining Company in Upper
Louisiana._
Mr. BRADLEY, from the committee appointed on the petition of Moses
Austin and John R. Jones, reported a bill to incorporate Moses Austin,
John Rice Jones, Henry Austin, and others, into a company, by the name
of the Louisiana Lead Company; and the bill was read, and passed to the
second reading.
WEDNESDAY, January 29.
The bill establishing a land office was read the second time.
_Additional Military Force._
The Senate resumed, as in Committee of the Whole, the consideration
of the bill, entitled "An act authorizing the President of the United
States to accept and organize certain volunteer military corps,"
together with the amendments reported thereto by the select committee.
Mr. GILES rose and opposed at length the bill as it came from the
House, reserving to himself the privilege of acting on the proposed
amendment according to the result of further reflections. He believed
the bill would be productive of no practical efficacy. It proposed
a force which could not be raised; and if raised, from the short
period of its service, in the event of serious hostilities, would be
utterly incompetent to effect the objects of those hostilities. The
bill would be inoperative, because, in the States of Massachusetts
and Vermont, (and he presumed in other States,) no power or provision
existed by which these volunteers could be commissioned, so as to
perform the contemplated service; and if the Government were deprived
of the volunteers in Massachusetts and Vermont, he did not know where
they could obtain volunteers for the object which he believed all
branches of the Government had in view. He presumed that the system
of volunteers was the favorite system of the Government; and this he
inferred from their having recommended to the other House the raising
of ten thousand regulars only, and from the Message of the President,
sent in after both Houses had passed the bill for raising twenty-five
thousand regulars, and communicating the correspondence between Mr.
Foster and Mr. Monroe, as a ground for urging Congress to persevere
in the preparations they were engaged in making. The President must,
therefore, have deemed a volunteer force essential for the contemplated
service. And here he observed he thought, if his correspondence with
the British Envoy, which afforded evidence of "continued hostility"
towards us, furnished matter of sufficient importance to press upon
Congress the utility of hastening their measures of preparation, that
the other business of the Department of State might have been allowed
to repose long enough for a reply to have been made to Mr. Foster,
before nearly a month had elapsed after the date of his letter. He
did not advert to this circumstance from any want of respect to this
Government: he should always treat them with the highest respect.
He should prefer the reduction of the number of the volunteers to
twenty-five thousand, rather than the retention of the fifty thousand,
because it would increase the momentum of actual force, and decrease
the expenses, about which so much has been said. Surely, he said, he
did not mean that it would not increase the momentum of force proposed
by the other House, but that proposed by the Executive. The Executive
had asked for ten thousand regulars, and fifty thousand volunteers--in
all, sixty thousand men. The other House had agreed to give him
eighty-five thousand. The proposed amendment would, therefore, bring
the quantum of force down nearly to the Executive requisition. But
the bill proposed a force which would be utterly inefficient, as all
other volunteer bills had been. The returns under the thirty thousand
volunteer law, passed two or three years ago, were so few, that the
Secretary of War did not register them. He asked, how efficient could
that species of force be, of which the Chief Magistrate did not think
it worth while to have a record kept? It was only a formidable display
of armies on paper--a tender of services--which only produced very
handsome replies from the President. He did not censure the Secretary
of War or the President; very far from it; the defect had been in the
law. He begged gentlemen to look seriously at the subject. If a war
should ensue, it must be a serious one. The responsibility attached to
Congress of placing an adequate force in the hands of the President for
the war. But if they passed a law which would give the President only
a nominal force, totally incompetent to effect any desirable object,
he, for one, should be unwilling to take any share of responsibility on
himself.
THURSDAY, February 27.
_Increase of the Navy._
The Senate resumed, as in Committee of the Whole, the consideration of
the bill entitled "An act concerning the Naval Establishment," together
with the amendments reported thereto by the select committee.
Mr. LLOYD.--Mr. President, the amendments proposed by the committee to
whom this bill has been referred, having been gone through with, I now
beg leave to offer a new one, by an additional section to the following
effect:
"_Be it further enacted_, That the President of the United
States be, and he hereby is, authorized to cause to be built as
speedily as may be, on the most approved model, ---- frigates,
not exceeding thirty-six guns each; and that a sum not
exceeding ---- dollars be, and the same is hereby appropriated
for building the said frigates, out of any moneys in the
Treasury not otherwise appropriated."
It is my intention, sir, to move for twenty new frigates; but the
number I have left blank in order, should the Senate be favorably
disposed to an increase of the Navy, and disagree with me as to the
degree of that increase, they might regulate the number at their
pleasure.
Sir, I have been induced to offer this amendment from an impulse of
duty towards my more immediate constituents, and also from a sense of
the obligation imposed upon me, however feebly I may be able to respond
to it, in the honorable station in which I am placed, to endeavor to
the extent of my ability to support the dignity, protect the rights,
and advance the best interests of the United States. Sir, I trust the
amendment under consideration, if adopted, would have a relation, and a
favorable relation, to all these objects.
If it be not the determination of the Government to engage in an
open, actual, efficient war; to place the nation in such a complete
state of preparation as to avert war, from our state of readiness to
meet it; then the measures of the present session, those of filling
up the existing Military Establishments, and thereby adding to it
between six and seven thousand men, that of enlisting a standing
army of twenty-five thousand men to serve for five years, unless
sooner discharged--of providing for the employment of fifty thousand
volunteers, and of holding in readiness one hundred thousand of the
militia, would be not only inexcusable, but nearly treasonable; as
they would in such case, without any adequate object, impose severe
and heavy burdens upon the people of the United States, from which
years of the highest degree of prosperity would not relieve them. But,
sir, I am bound to believe, that unless redress be obtained, it is the
determination of the Government of the United States to enter into an
actual, vigorous, real war, or at any rate to put the nation into a
perfect State of readiness to commence it, should it be necessary; and
in either of these cases, an efficient naval force is as indispensable,
nay much more indispensable, than a land force.
In the year 1793, when Great Britain depredated upon your commerce,
you had a man at the head of your Government who fought no battles
with paper resolutions, nor attempted to wage war with commercial
restrictions, although they were then pressed upon him. He caused it to
be distinctly and with firmness made known to Great Britain, that if
she did not both cease to violate our rights, and make us reparation
for the wrongs we had sustained--that young and feeble as we then were,
just in the gristle, and stepping from the cradle of infancy, we would
try the tug of war with her. What was the consequence? Her depredations
were stopped--we made a treaty with her, under which we enjoyed a
high degree of prosperity. Our claims were fairly heard, equitably
adjudged, and the awards were honorably and punctually paid to the
sufferers. In this instance you did something for commerce.
Next came the war with Tripoli--the Barbary States preyed upon our
commerce--you determined to resist, and despatched a small squadron to
the Mediterranean: this ought to have been considered as the germ of
your future maritime greatness: the good conduct and bravery of that
squadron, and the self-immolation of some of its officers, spread the
renown of your naval prowess to all quarters of the civilized globe.
What did you in this instance? At the moment when victory had perched
upon your standard--when you might have exhibited the interesting
spectacle of the infant Government of the United States holding in
subjugation one of the Powers of Barbary, to whom all Europe had been
subservient--at this moment when conquest was completely within your
grasp--civil agency stepped in--the laurel was torn from the brow of
as gallant a chieftain as ever graced the plains of Palestine, and we
ignominiously consented to pay a tribute, where we might have imposed
one.
After this you had the Berlin decree, the Orders in Council, the
Milan decree, the Rambouillet decree, the depredations of Spain, the
robberies even of the renegado black chief of St. Domingo, and the
unprovoked and still continued plunder of Denmark, a nation of pirates
from their origin. What cause of complaint has Denmark, or ever had
Denmark, against us? Her most fond and speculative maritime pretensions
we have willingly espoused, and yet she continues daily to capture
and condemn our vessels and cargoes, and contemptuously tells us that
the Government of the United States is too wise to go to war for a
few merchant ships. And this we bear from a people as inferior to the
United States in all the attributes of national power or greatness,
as I am inferior to Hercules. Yes, sir, commerce has been abandoned,
else why prohibit your merchants from bringing the property, to a
large amount, which they have fairly purchased and paid for, into the
ports of our country, else why, by this exclusion, perform the double
operation of adding to the resources of the enemy you are going to war
with and impoverishing your own citizens.
Yes, sir, commerce has been abandoned, "deserted in her utmost need by
those her former bounty fed." Yes, sir, she has been abandoned. She has
been left as a wreck upon a strand, or as a derelict upon the waters
of the ocean, to be burnt, sunk, or plundered, by any great or puny
assailant who could man an oar or load a swivel for her annoyance.
What was the leading object of the adoption of the Federal Constitution
in the northern parts of the Union? Most emphatically, it was for the
protection of commerce. What was the situation of some branches of our
commerce then? And what is it now? Look at the statement which was laid
upon our tables about a fortnight past, and taken from the returns of
the Treasury. What effect has it had upon our fisheries, which were so
nobly and successfully contended for by the American Commissioners who
settled the Treaty of 1783; which for a time suspended that Treaty;
and which, both the duplicity and intrigue of France and the interest
of England strove to deprive us of--of our fisheries, which were then
considered, and still ought to be considered, as a main sinew of our
strength, and a nursery for our seamen?
MONDAY, March 2.
_Increase of the Navy._
Mr. CRAWFORD.--The honorable gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. LLOYD)
thinks that nothing has been done by the Government for commerce,
whilst commerce has done every thing for the nation; that commerce
has paid into the public Treasury $200,000,000. If it is contended
that this sum has been paid exclusively by commerce, nothing can be
more incorrect. The money collected from imposts and duties is paid
by the consumer of merchandise upon which the duties are imposed. It
is collected immediately from the merchant, and ultimately from the
nation. The only money paid into the Treasury which can justly be
placed to the exclusive credit of commerce, is the sum retained by the
Government upon debentures, which is only 7-10ths of one per cent.
upon goods paying a duty of twenty per cent. ad valorem, and has never
amounted to $400,000 in any one year. The export of foreign productions
from the United States in the year 1807, exceeded $59,000,000, and the
sum paid into the Treasury that year on account of drawbacks was about
$390,000, which is the greatest amount received from that source of
revenue since the organization of the Government.
The duty upon tonnage, like the duty imposed on merchandise, is paid by
the consumer or grower of the cargoes transported by the ship-holders,
of whom this duty is immediately collected. The ultimate payment of
this duty by the grower or consumer will depend upon the relative
demand for, and supply of the articles in the market to which they are
exported. If the demand for the article is greater than the quantity
in the market, it is paid by the consumer; if the supply exceeds the
demand, it is paid by the grower, in the form of a reduction of the
price of the article equal to the duty imposed.
Who are the most interested in commerce, the growers of the articles,
the exchange and transportation of which constitute commerce, or the
factors and freighters employed in the exchange and transportation of
those articles? Can any man doubt for one moment that the growers,
the rightful owners of the articles to be exchanged, are more deeply
interested in commerce than the merchant and ship-holder, who only make
a profit from the sale and transportation of the articles exchanged?
If the profit they derive from commerce should be so enormous as
to exceed the original value of those articles in the hands of the
growers, still it can be demonstrated that the interest of the latter
is more vitally affected by a prosperous or adverse state of commerce,
than that of the merchant or ship-holder. The merchant will be
regulated in the price which he gives to the grower, by the state of
the market and the price of transportation to the market. Let the price
be what it may in foreign markets, the merchant is regulated by it, and
can only be affected by sudden changes in those markets which may be
prejudicial or advantageous to him. It is a matter of small moment to
him whether the articles in which he deals bring a high or low price
in the market to which they are sent, if that price is not variable,
because he will regulate the price he gives for them by the price which
he can obtain. But the price which those articles will bring in the
market to which they are sent, is all-important to the grower, because
it will regulate the price which he is to receive for them beyond
the power of his control. Every circumstance which tends to destroy
competition and reduce the number of markets to which our produce is
sent, vitally affects the interest of the grower. The planter, the
farmer, is, therefore, more deeply interested in the prosperity of that
commerce which finds a market for the annual surplus productions of his
industry, than the merchant or ship-holder. This direct commerce is
indispensable to the internal growth and improvement of the country,
and to the comfort and happiness of the people, and more so to the
people of the Southern and Western States than any other part of the
United States. Sir, we are not so grossly ignorant as to mistake our
interest in this matter. We know that, without commerce, without a
market for the surplus productions of our labor, we should be deprived
of many of those articles which long habit has made necessary to our
ease and comfort. If, then, we are not grossly ignorant of our true
interest, nothing can be more unfounded than the accusation of the
gentleman from New York, (Mr. GERMAN.) The charge must be the result of
ignorance or prejudice. Mr. C. said he would not follow the example of
that gentleman by saying, "perhaps this prejudice might be an honest
prejudice." No, he would not insult the feelings of that gentleman; he
would not question his veracity or integrity by stating hypothetically,
"that perhaps his opinions were honest." Whilst he repelled this
unfounded charge in the manner which its nature imperiously demanded,
he had no hesitation in admitting that the opinions of that gentleman,
whether the result of prejudice or of ignorance, were strictly honest.
Mr. C. said there was no man in the nation more friendly to that
commerce which he had described than he was, and that no part of the
nation cherished it with more ardor than that which he in part had
the honor to represent on this floor. But, sir, there is a commerce
which has been prosecuted to a very great extent by the commercial
capitalists of the United States, for the prosperity of which the
agricultural part of the nation do not feel the same solicitude.
In the year 1807, the United States exported upwards of $59,000,000 of
foreign productions. This commerce has no connection with or dependence
upon the annual surplus productions of the country, which is the only
commerce that essentially promotes domestic industry and multiplies
the domestic comforts of the great mass of the people. This commerce,
which is the legitimate offspring of war, and expires with the first
dawning of peace, is prosecuted principally by our commercial cities
to the east and north of the Potomac. The landholders, the country
people, the great mass of agriculturists in the United States, never
had, and never can have any direct interest in it. The farmer of the
Eastern and Middle States, and the planter of the Southern and Western
States, stand in the same relation to this commerce. Whether it be
prosperous or adverse, is a matter of small concern to them, and
nothing but an effort of pure, disinterested patriotism could induce
them to jeopardize the peace and happiness of the nation, and stake the
prosperity of the direct commerce of the country, for the protection of
this mushroom commerce.
The use proposed to be made of these frigates, if built, certainly
meets my approbation. The idea of protecting our commerce by a naval
force, which has been pressed with so much vehemence by some of our
navy gentlemen, is worse than visionary. A navy can injure commerce,
but cannot afford it protection, unless it annihilates the naval
force of the adverse nation. Unless, therefore, we have the means of
creating and supporting a naval force able to contend successfully
with the British navy for the empire of the seas, we must abandon all
idea of protecting our commerce against that nation. Great Britain,
with her thousand ships of war, is unable to protect her commerce
even in sight of her own coasts. According to my understanding of the
views of the honorable gentlemen, these thirty frigates are to be
employed in destroying the commerce of the enemy, and not in fighting
her public armed vessels. They are in fact to be national privateers.
In this point of view, the proposition to cashier the officer who
should strike the American flag seems to be at war with the nature of
their employment. They are to direct their efforts to the destruction
of merchant vessels, and to avoid collision with the ships of war.
It is to be apprehended that men, whose duty it is to avoid serious
conflicts with the enemy, will grow timid from habit, and will resist
but feebly when inevitably forced into them. The character of the naval
officers of the United States makes a regulation of this kind wholly
unnecessary. Their enterprise, their courage, and intrepidity, are too
well established to require a regulation of such severity. As then the
gentleman does not intend to dispute the sovereignty even of our own
seas with our expected enemy with this naval force, but intends to
employ it in the destruction of merchant vessels, an increase of that
force appears to me to be wholly unnecessary and impolitic. Individual
enterprise, directed by individual interest, will more effectually
destroy the commerce of the enemy, than any number of frigates in the
power of this Government to build and employ. The Baltimore _Federal
Republican_ states that a French privateer in the Atlantic Ocean has
captured about thirty merchant vessels, and that the impression made by
this single privateer was so serious that thirteen vessels, several of
which were frigates, were employed in cruising for her. The truth of
this statement may be relied on, because that paper is not in the habit
of exaggerating French successes, or of aggravating British sufferings.
But it is said that, although our privateers were successful at the
commencement of the Revolutionary War, before the conclusion of that
contest they were entirely destroyed. Admitting the fact to be true, it
does not necessarily follow that such will be the result of the war now
in contemplation. After the first years of that contest, the British
forces were in possession of the principal ports and harbors of the
United States, which made it extremely hazardous for our privateers to
approach our own coasts, or enter our own harbors. It is expected that
our situation will be very different in the event of war at this time.
Instead of possessing the principal ports of the United States, we
expect to expel them from the whole of their continental possessions in
our neighborhood. If this should be the result of the war, their means
of annoying our commerce, and of destroying our privateers, will be
greatly diminished, and their power of protecting their commerce from
the depredations of our privateers will suffer an equal diminution.
MONDAY, March 9.
_British Intrigues to dismember the Union._
The following Message was received from the PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES:
_To the Senate and House of
Representatives of the United States_:
I lay before Congress copies of certain documents which remain
in the Department of State. They prove that, at a recent
period, whilst the United States, notwithstanding the wrongs
sustained by them, ceased not to observe the laws of peace and
neutrality towards Great Britain, and in the midst of amicable
professions and negotiations on the part of the British
Government, through its public Minister here, a secret agent of
that Government was employed in certain States, more especially
at the seat of Government in Massachusetts, in fomenting
disaffection to the constituted authorities of the nation, and
in intrigues with the disaffected, for the purpose of bringing
about resistance to the laws, and eventually, in concert with
a British force, of destroying the Union, and forming the
eastern part thereof into a political connection with Great
Britain.
In addition to the effect which the discovery of such a
procedure ought to have on the public councils, it will not
fail to render more dear to the hearts of all good citizens
that happy Union of these States, which, under Divine
Providence, is the guaranty of their liberties, their safety,
their tranquillity, and their prosperity.