CHAPTER VIII.

THE CREATION OF A SYSTEM OF RIGHTS OF MAN AND OF CITIZENS DURING THE

AMERICAN REVOLUTION.

The seventeenth century was a time of religious struggles. In the

following century political and economic interests pressed into the

foreground of historical movement. The democratic institutions of the

colonies were repeatedly in opposition to those of the mother-country,

and the ties that bound them to her lost more and more of their

significance. The great antagonism of their economic interests began to

make itself widely felt. The economic prosperity of the colonies

demanded the least possible restriction upon free movement. Finally they

felt that they were ruled not by their old home but by a foreign

country.

Then the old Puritan and Independent conceptions became effective in a

new direction. The theory of the social compact which played so

important a role in the founding of the colonies, and had helped to

establish religious liberty, now supported in the most significant way

the reconstruction of existing institutions. Not that it changed these

institutions, it simply gave them a new basis.

The colonists had brought over the ocean with them their liberties and

rights as English-born subjects. In a series of charters from the

English kings it was specifically stated that the colonists and their

descendants should enjoy all the rights which belonged to Englishmen in

their native land.[97] Even before the English Bill of Rights the most

of the colonies had enacted laws in which the ancient English liberties

were gathered together.[98] There occurred, however, in the second half

of the eighteenth century a great transformation in these old rights.

The inherited rights and liberties, as well as the privileges of

organization, which had been granted the colonists by the English kings

or had been sanctioned by the colonial lords, do not indeed change in

word, but they become rights which spring not from man but from God and

Nature.

To these ancient rights new ones were added. With the conviction that

there existed a right of conscience independent of the State was found

the starting-point for the determination of the inalienable rights of

the individual. The theory of a Law of Nature recognized generally but

one natural right of the individual--liberty or property. In the

conceptions of the Americans, however, in the eighteenth century there

appears a whole series of such rights.

The teaching of Locke, the theories of Pufendorf[99] and the ideas of

Montesquieu, all powerfully influenced the political views of the

Americans of that time. But the setting forth of a complete series of

universal rights of man and of citizens can in no way be explained

through their influence alone.

In 1764 there appeared in Boston the celebrated pamphlet of James Otis

upon _The Rights of the British Colonies_. In it was brought forward the

idea that the political and civil rights of the English colonists in no

way rested upon a grant from the crown; even Magna Charta, old as it

might be, was not the beginning of all things. "A time may come when

Parliament shall declare every American charter void; but the natural,

inherent, and inseparable rights of the colonists as men and as citizens

would remain, and, whatever became of charters, can never be abolished

till the general conflagration."[100]

In this pamphlet definite limitations of the legislative power "which

have been established by God and by Nature" are already enumerated in

the form of the later bills of rights. As the center of the whole stood

the principal occasion of strife between the colonies and the

mother-country, the right of taxation. That the levying of taxes or

duties without the consent of the people or of representatives of the

colonies was not indeed contrary to the laws of the country, but

contrary to the eternal laws of liberty.[101] But these limitations were

none other than those enumerated by Locke, which "the law of God and of

Nature has set for every legislative power in every state and in every

form of government".

But these propositions of Locke's are here found in a very radical

transformation. They are changing namely from law to personal right.

While Locke, similar to Rousseau later, places the individuals in

subjection to the will of the majority of the community, upon which,

however, restrictions are placed by the objects of the state, now the

individual establishes the conditions under which he will enter the

community, and in the state holds fast to these conditions as rights. He

has accordingly rights in the state and claims upon the state which do

not spring from the state. In opposition to England's attempt to

restrict these rights, the idea formally to declare them and to defend

them grew all the stronger.

This formulation was influenced by a work that was published anonymously

at Oxford in 1754, in which for the first time "absolute rights" of the

English are mentioned.[102] It originated from no less a person than

Blackstone.[103] These rights of the individual were voiced in

Blackstone's words for the first time in a Memorial to the legislature,

which is given in an appendix to Otis's pamphlet.[104] On November 20,

1772, upon the motion of Samuel Adams a plan, which he had worked out,

of a declaration of rights of the colonists as men, Christians and

citizens was adopted by all the assembled citizens of Boston. It was

therein declared, with an appeal to Locke, that men enter into the state

by voluntary agreement, and they have the right beforehand in an

equitable compact to establish conditions and limitations for the state

and to see to it that these are carried out. Thereupon the colonists

demanded as men the right of liberty and of property, as Christians

freedom of religion, and as citizens the rights of Magna Charta and of

the Bill of Rights of 1689.[105]

Finally, on October 14, 1774, the Congress, representing twelve

colonies, assembled in Philadelphia adopted a declaration of rights,

according to which the inhabitants of the North American Colonies have

rights which belong to them by the unchangeable law of nature, by the

principles of the constitution of England and by their own

constitutions.[106]

From that to the declaration of rights by Virginia is apparently only a

step, and yet there is a world-wide difference between the two

documents. The declaration of Philadelphia is a protest, that of

Virginia a law. The appeal to England's law has disappeared. The state

of Virginia solemnly recognizes rights pertaining to the present and

future generations as the basis and foundation of government.[107]

In this and the following declarations of rights by the now sovereign

states of North America, by the side of the rights of liberty that had

been thus far asserted,--liberty of person, of property and of

conscience,--stand new ones, corresponding to the infringements most

recently suffered at England's hands of other lines of individual

liberty: the right of assembly, the freedom of the press and free

movement. But these rights of liberty were not the only ones therein

asserted, there were the right of petition, the demand for the

protection of law and the forms to be observed in insuring that, a

special demand for trial by an independent jury, and in the same way

with regard to other acts of the state; and the foundations of the

citizen's political rights were also declared. They thus contained

according to the intentions of their authors the distinctive features of

the entire public right of the individual. Besides these were included

the principle of the division of powers, of rotation of office, of

accountability of office-holders, of forbidding hereditary titles, and

there were further contained certain limitations on the legislature and

executive, such as forbidding the keeping of a standing army or creating

an established church,--all of which do not engender personal rights of

the individual at all, or do so only indirectly. The whole is based upon

the principle of the sovereignty of the people, and culminates in the

conception of the entire constitution being an agreement of all

concerned. In this particular one sees clearly the old Puritan-Independent

idea of the covenant in its lasting influence, of which new power was to

be significantly displayed later. When to-day in the separate states of

the Union changes in the constitution are enacted either by the people

themselves, or through a constitutional convention, there still lives in

this democratic institution the same idea that once animated the settlers

of Connecticut and Rhode Island.

Everywhere the bill of rights forms the first part of the constitution,

following which as second part comes the plan or frame of government.

The right of the creator of the state, the originally free and

unrestricted individual, was first established, and then the right of

that which the individuals created, namely, the community.

In spite of the general accord of these fundamental principles, when it

came to carrying them out in practical legislation great differences

arose in the various states, and though these differences were afterward

greatly lessened they have not entirely disappeared even to-day. Thus,

as mentioned above, religious liberty, in spite of its universal

recognition in the constitutions, was not everywhere nor at once carried

out in all of its consequences. In spite of the assertion that all men

are by nature free and equal the abolition of slavery was not then

accomplished. In the slave states in place of "man" stood "freeman".

The rights thus formally declared belonged originally to all the

"inhabitants", in the slave states to all the "whites". It was only

later that the qualification of citizenship of the United States was

required in most of the states for the exercise of political rights.

We have thus seen by what a remarkable course of development there arose

out of the English law, old and new, that was practised in the

colonies, the conception of a sphere of rights of the individual, which

was independent of the state, and by the latter was simply to be

recognized. In reality, however, the declarations of rights did nothing

else than express the existing condition of rights in definite universal

formulas.

That which the Americans already enjoyed they wished to proclaim as a

perpetual possession for themselves and for every free people. In

contrast to them the French wished to give that which they did not yet

have, namely, institutions to correspond to their universal principles.

Therein lies the most significant difference between the American and

French declarations of rights, that in the one case the institutions

preceded the recognition of rights of the individual, in the other they

followed after. Therein lay also the fatal mistake of the German

National Assembly at Frankfort which wished to determine first the

rights of the individual and then establish the state. The German state

was not yet founded, but it was already settled what this state not yet

existing dare not do and what it had to concede. The Americans could

calmly precede their plan of government with a bill of rights, because

that government and the controlling laws had already long existed.

One thing, however, has resulted from this investigation with

irrefutable certainty. The principles of 1789 are in reality the

principles of 1776.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 97: Kent, _Commentaries on American Law_, 10th ed., I, p.

611.]

[Footnote 98: _Cf._ Kent, I, pp. 612 _et seq._; Stevens, _loc. cit._,

pp. 208 _et seq._ They are universally designated to-day in America as

"bills of rights". Their example undoubtedly influenced the declarations

of 1776 and those after.]

[Footnote 99: Borgeaud, p. 27, cites a treatise by John Wyse as having

had great influence in the democratizing of ideas in Massachusetts. This

man, whose name was John Wise, has done nothing else than take

Pufendorf's theories as the basis of his work, as he himself

specifically declares. _Cf._ J. Wise, _A Vindication on the Government

of New England Churches_, Boston, 1772, p. 22.]

[Footnote 100: Bancroft, IV, pp. 145, 146.]

[Footnote 101: _Cf._ John Adams, _Works_, X, Boston, 1856, p. 293.]

[Footnote 102: _Analysis of the Laws of England_, Chap. 4.]

[Footnote 103: It formed the basis of Blackstone's later

_Commentaries_.]

[Footnote 104: _Cf._ Otis, _The Rights of the British Colonies asserted

and proved_, 1764, reprinted London, p. 106.]

[Footnote 105: _Cf._ Wells, _The Life and Public Services of Samuel

Adams_, I, Boston, 1865, pp. 502-507; Laboulaye, II, p. 171.]

[Footnote 106: The entire text reproduced in Story, _Commentaries on the

Constitution of the United States_, 3d ed., I, pp. 134 _et seq._]

[Footnote 107: The heading of the bill of rights reads: "A declaration

of rights made by the representatives of the good people of Virginia,

assembled in full and free convention; which rights do pertain to them

and their posterity, as the basis and foundation of government."]

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