PARIS, May 2, 1788.
DEAR SIR,--I am honored with your Excellency's letter by the last
packet, and thank you for the information it contains on the
communication between the Cayahoga and Big Beaver. I have ever
considered the opening a canal between those two water courses as the
most important work in that line which the State of Virginia could
undertake. It will infallibly turn through the Potomac all the commerce
of Lake Erie, and the country west of that, except what may pass down
the Mississippi; and it is important that it be soon done, lest that
commerce should, in the meantime, get established in another channel.
Having, in the spring of the last year, taken a journey through the
southern parts of France, and particularly examined the canal of
Languedoc, through its whole course, I take the liberty of sending you
the notes I made on the spot, as you may find in them something,
perhaps, which may be turned to account, some time or other, in the
prosecution of the Potomac canal. Being merely a copy from my
travelling notes, they are undigested and imperfect, but may still
perhaps give hints capable of improvement in your mind.
The affairs of Europe are in such a state still, that it is impossible
to say what form they will take ultimately. France and Prussia, viewing
the Emperor as their most dangerous and common enemy, had heretofore
seen their common safety as depending on a strict connection with one
another. This had naturally inclined the Emperor to the scale of
England, and the Empress also, as having views in common with the
Emperor, against the Turks. But these two powers would, at any time,
have gladly quitted England, to coalesce with France, as being the
power which they met everywhere, opposed as a barrier to all their
schemes of aggrandisement. When, therefore, the present King of Prussia
took the eccentric measure of bidding defiance to France, by placing
his brother in law on the throne of Holland, the two empires
immediately seized the occasion of soliciting an alliance with France.
The motives for this appeared so plausible, that it was believed the
latter would have entered into this alliance, and that thus, the whole
political system of Europe would have taken a new form. What has
prevented this court from coming into it, we know not. The unmeasurable
ambition of the Emperor, and his total want of moral principle and
honor, are suspected. A great share of Turkey, the recovery of Silesia,
the consolidation of his dominions by the Bavarian exchange, the
liberties of the Germanic body, all occupy his mind together, and his
head is not well enough organized, to pursue so much only of all this
as is practicable. Still, it was thought that France might safely have
coalesced with these powers, because Russia and herself, holding close
together, as their interests would naturally dictate, the Emperor could
never stir but with their permission. France seems, however, to have
taken the worst of all parties, that is, none at all. She folds her
arms, lets the two empires go to work to cut up Turkey as they can, and
holds Prussia aloof, neither as a friend nor foe. This is withdrawing
her opposition from the two empires, without the benefit of any
condition whatever. In the meantime, England has clearly overreached
herself. She excited the war between the Russians and Turks, in hopes
that France, still supporting the Turks, would be embarrassed with the
two empires. She did not foresee the event which has taken place, of
France abandoning the Turks, and that which may take place, of her
union with the two empires. She allied herself with Holland, but cannot
obtain the alliance of Prussia. This latter power would be very glad to
close again the breach with France, and, therefore, while there remains
an opening for this, holds off from England, whose fleets could not
enter into Silesia, to protect that from the Emperor. Thus, you see,
that the old system is unhinged, and no new one hung in its place.
Probabilities are rather in favor of a connection between the two
empires, France and Spain. Several symptoms show themselves, of
friendly dispositions between Russia and France, unfriendly ones
between Russia and England, and such as are barely short of hostility
between England and France. But into real hostilities, this country
would with difficulty be drawn. Her finances are too deranged, her
internal union too much dissolved, to hazard a war. The nation is
pressing on fast to a fixed constitution. Such a revolution in the
public opinion has taken place, that the crown already feels its powers
bounded, and is obliged, by its measures, to acknowledge limits. A
States General will be called at some epoch not distant; they will
probably establish a civil list, and leave the government to temporary
provisions of money, so as to render frequent assemblies of the
national representative necessary. How that representative will be
organized is yet uncertain. Among a thousand projects, the best seems
to me, that of dividing them into two Houses, of Commons and Nobles;
the Commons to be chosen by the Provincial Assemblies, who are chosen
themselves by the people, and the Nobles by the body of Noblesse, as in
Scotland. But there is no reason to conjecture that this is the
particular scheme which will be preferred.
The war between the Russians and Turks, has made an opening for our
Commodore Paul Jones. The Empress has invited him into her service. She
insures to him the rank of rear admiral; will give him a separate
command, and, it is understood, that he is never to be commanded. I
think she means to oppose him to the Captain Pacha, on the Black Sea.
He is by this time, probably, at St. Petersburg. The circumstances did
not permit his awaiting the permission of Congress, because the season
was close at hand for opening the campaign. But he has made it a
condition, that he shall be free at all times to return to the orders
of Congress, whenever they shall please to call for him; and also, that
he shall not in any case be expected to bear arms against France. I
believe Congress had it in contemplation, to give him the grade of
admiral, from the date of his taking the Serapis. Such a measure now
would greatly gratify him, second the efforts of fortune in his favor,
and better the opportunities of improving him for our service, whenever
the moment shall come in which we may want him.
The danger of our incurring something like a bankruptcy in Holland,
which might have been long, and even fatally felt in a moment of
crisis, induced me to take advantage of Mr. Adams' journey to take
leave at the Hague to meet him there, get him to go on to Amsterdam,
and try to avert the impending danger. The moment of paying a great sum
of annual interest was approaching. There was no money on hand, the
board of treasury had notified that they could not remit any; and the
progress of the loan which had been opened there, had absolutely
stopped. Our bankers there gave me notice of all this; and that a
single day's failure in the payment of interest would have the most
fatal effect on our credit. I am happy to inform you we were able to
set the loan a going again, and that the evil is at least postponed.
Indeed, I am tolerably satisfied, that if the measures we proposed are
ratified by Congress, all European calls for money (except the French
debt) are secure enough, till the end of the year 1790; by which time,
we calculated that the new government might be able to get money into
their treasury. Much conversation with the bankers, brokers and money
holders, gave me insight into the state of national credit there, which
I had never before been able satisfactorily to get. The English credit
is the first, because they never open a loan, without laying and
appropriating taxes for the payment of the interest, and there has
never been an instance of their failing one day, in that payment. The
Emperor and Empress have good credit, because they use it little, and
have hitherto been very punctual. This country is among the lowest, in
point of credit. Ours stands in hope only. They consider us as the
surest nation on earth for the repayment of the capital; but as the
punctual payment of interest is of absolute necessity in their
arrangements, we cannot borrow but with difficulty and disadvantage.
The moneyed men, however, look towards our new government with a great
degree of partiality, and even anxiety. If they see that set out on the
English plan, the first degree of credit will be transferred to us. A
favorable occasion will arise to our new government of asserting this
ground to themselves. The transfer of the French debt, public and
private, to Amsterdam, is certainly desirable. An act of the new
government, therefore, for opening a loan in Holland for the purpose,
laying taxes at the same time, for paying annually the interest and a
part of the principal, will answer the two valuable purposes, of
ascertaining the degree of our credit, and of removing those causes of
bickering and irritation, which should never be permitted to subsist
with a nation, with which it is so much our interest to be on cordial
terms as with France. A very small portion of this debt, I mean that
part due to the French officers, has done us an injury, of which, those
in office in America, cannot have an idea. The interest is unpaid for
the last three years; and these creditors, highly connected, and at the
same time needy, have felt and communicated hard thoughts of us.
Borrowing, as we have done, three hundred thousand florins a year, to
pay our interest in Holland, it would have been worth while to have
added twenty thousand more to suppress those clamors. I am anxious
about everything which may affect our credit. My wish would be, to
possess it in the highest degree, but to use it little. Were we without
credit, we might be crushed by a nation of much inferior resources, but
possessing higher credit. The present system of war renders it
necessary to make exertions far beyond the annual resources of the
State, and to consume in one year the efforts of many. And this system
we cannot change. It remains then, that we cultivate our credit with
the utmost attention.
I had intended to have written a word to your Excellency on the subject
of the new Constitution, but I have already spun out my letter to an
immoderate length. I will just observe, therefore, that according to my
ideas, there is a great deal of good in it. There are two things,
however, which I dislike strongly. 1. The want of a declaration of
rights. I am in hopes the opposition of Virginia will remedy this, and
produce such a declaration. 2. The perpetual re-eligibility of the
President. This, I fear, will make that an office for life, first, and
then hereditary. I was much an enemy to monarchies before I came to
Europe. I am ten thousand times more so, since I have seen what they
are. There is scarcely an evil known in these countries, which may not
be traced to their king, as its source, nor a good, which is not
derived from the small fibres of republicanism existing among them. I
can further say, with safety, there is not a crowned head in Europe,
whose talents or merits would entitle him to be elected a vestryman, by
the people of any parish in America. However, I shall hope, that before
there is danger of this change taking place in the office of President,
the good sense and free spirit of our countrymen, will make the changes
necessary to prevent it. Under this hope, I look forward to the general
adoption of the new Constitution with anxiety, as necessary for us
under our present circumstances. I have so much trespassed on your
patience already, by the length of this letter, that I will add nothing
further, than those assurances of sincere esteem and attachment with
which I have the honor to be, your Excellency's most obedient, and most
humble servant.