PARIS, November 3, 1787.
SIR,--My last letters to you were of the 8th and 27th of October. In
the former, I mentioned to you the declaration of this country, that
they would interpose with force, if the Prussian troops entered
Holland; the entry of those troops into Holland; the declaration of
England, that if France did oppose force, they would consider it as an
act of war; the naval armaments on both sides; the nomination of the
Bailli de Suffrein as Generalissimo on the ocean; and the cold
reception of Mr. Granville here, with his conciliatory propositions, as
so many symptoms which seemed to indicate a certain and immediate
rupture. It was indeed universally and hourly expected. But the King of
Prussia, a little before these last events, got wind of the alliance on
the carpet between France and the two empires; he awaked to the
situation in which that would place him; he made some applications to
the court of St. Petersburg, to divert the Empress from the proposed
alliance, and supplicated the court of London not to abandon him. That
court had also received a hint of the same project; both seemed to
suspect, for the first time, that it would be possible for France to
abandon the Turks, and that they were likely to get more than they had
played for at Constantinople, for they had meant nothing more there,
than to divert the Empress and Emperor from the affairs of the west, by
employing them in the east, and at the same time, to embroil them with
France as the patroness of the Turks. The court of London engaged not
to abandon Prussia: but both of them relaxed a little the tone of their
proceedings. The King of Prussia sent a Mr. Alvensleben here expressly
to explain and soothe: the King of England, notwithstanding the cold
reception of his propositions by Granville, renewed conferences here
through Eden and the Duke of Dorset. The Minister, in the affection of
his heart for peace, readily joined in conference, and a declaration
and counter-declaration were cooked up at Versailles, and sent to
London for approbation. They were approved, arrived here at one o'clock
the 27th, were signed that night at Versailles, and on the next day, I
had the honor of enclosing them to you, under cover to the Count de
Moustier, whom I supposed still at Brest, dating my letter as of the
27th, by mistake for the 28th. Lest, however, these papers should not
have got to Brest before the departure of the Count de Moustier, I now
enclose you other copies. The English declaration states a notification
of this court, in September, by Barthelemy, their Minister at London,
"that they would send succours into Holland," as the first cause of
England's arming; desires an explanation of the intentions of this
court, as to the affairs of Holland, and proposes to disarm; on
condition, however, that the King of France shall not retain any
hostile views in any quarter, for what has been done in Holland. This
last phrase was to secure Prussia, according to promise. The King of
France acknowledges the notification by his Minister at London,
promises he will do nothing in consequence of it, declares he has no
intention to intermeddle with force in the affairs of Holland, and that
he will entertain hostile views in no quarter, for what has been done
there. He disavows having ever had any intention to interpose with
force in the affairs of that republic. This disavowal begins the
sentence, which acknowledges he had notified the contrary to the court
of London, and it includes no apology to soothe the feelings which may
be excited in the breasts of the Patriots of Holland, at hearing the
King declare he never did intend to aid them with force, when promises
to do this were the basis of those very attempts to better their
constitution, which have ended in its ruin, as well as their own.
I have analyzed these declarations, because, being somewhat wrapped up
in their expressions, their full import might escape, on a transient
reading; and it is necessary it should not escape. It conveys to us the
important lesson, that no circumstances of morality, honor, interest,
or engagement, are sufficient to authorize a secure reliance on any
nation, at all times, and in all positions. A moment of difficulty, or
a moment of error, may render forever useless the most friendly
dispositions in the King, in the major part of his ministers, and the
whole of his nation. The present pacification is considered by most as
only a short truce. They calculate on the spirit of the nation, and not
on the agued hand which guides its movements. It is certain, that from
this moment the whole system of Europe changes. Instead of counting
together England, Austria, and Russia, as heretofore, against France,
Spain, Holland, Prussia, and Turkey, the division will probably be,
England, Holland, and Prussia, against France, Austria, Russia, and
perhaps Spain. This last power is not sure, because the dispositions of
its heir apparent are not sure. But whether the present be truce or
peace, it will allow time to mature the conditions of the alliance
between France and the two empires, always supposed to be on the
carpet. It is thought to be obstructed by the avidity of the Emperor,
who would swallow a good part of Turkey, Silesia, Bavaria, and the
rights of the Germanic body. To the two or three first articles, France
might consent, receiving in gratification a well-rounded portion of the
Austrian Netherlands, with the islands of Candia, Cyprus, Rhodes, and
perhaps lower Egypt. But all this is in embryo, uncertainty known, and
counterworked by the machinations of the courts of London and Berlin.
The following solution of the British armaments is supposed in a letter
of the 25th ultimo, from Colonel Blachden of Connecticut, now at
Dunkirk, to the Marquis de La Fayette. I will cite it in his own
words:--"A gentleman who left London two days ago, and came to this
place to-day, informs me that it is now generally supposed that Mr.
Pitt's great secret, which has puzzled the whole nation so long, and to
accomplish which design the whole force of the nation is armed, is to
make a vigorous effort for the recovery of America. When I recollect
the delay they have made in delivering the forts in America, and that
little more than a year ago, one of the British ministry wrote to the
King a letter, in which were these remarkable words, 'if your Majesty
pleases, America may yet be yours;' add to this, if it were possible
for the present ministry in England to effect such a matter, they would
secure their places and their power for a long time, and should they
fail in the end, they would be certain of holding them during the
attempt, which it is in their power to prolong as much as they please,
and, at all events, they would boast of having endeavored the recovery
of what a former ministry had abandoned--it is possible." A similar
surmise has come in a letter from a person in Rotterdam to one at this
place. I am satisfied that the King of England believes the mass of our
people to be tired of their independence, and desirous of returning
under his government; and that the same opinion prevails in the
ministry and nation. They have hired their news writers to repeat this
lie in their gazettes so long, that they have become the dupes of it
themselves. But there is no occasion to recur to this, in order to
account for their arming. A more rational purpose avowed, that purpose
executed, and when executed, a solemn agreement to disarm, seem to
leave no doubt that the re-establishment of the Stadtholder was their
object. Yet it is possible, that having found that this court will not
make war in this moment for any ally, new views may arise, and they may
think the moment favorable for executing any purposes they may have, in
our quarter. Add to this, that reason is of no aid in calculating their
movements. We are, therefore, never safe till our magazines are filled
with arms. The present season of truce or peace, should, in my opinion,
be improved without a moment's respite, to effect this essential
object, and no means be omitted, by which money may be obtained for the
purpose. I say this, however, with due deference to the opinion of
Congress, who are better judges of the necessity and practicability of
the measure.
I mentioned to you, in a former letter, the application I had made to
the Dutch ambassadors and Prussian envoy, for the protection of Mr.
Dumas. The latter soon after received an assurance, that he was put
under the protection of the States of Holland; and the Dutch Ambassador
called on me a few days ago, to inform me, by instruction from his
constituents, "that the States General had received a written
application from Mr. Adams, praying their protection of Dumas; that
they had instructed their _greffier_, Fagel, to assure Mr. Adams, by
letter, that he was under the protection of the States of Holland; but
to inform him, at the same time, that Mr. Dumas' conduct, out of the
line of his office, had been so extraordinary, that they would expect
_de l'honnêteté_ de Mr. Adams, that he would charge some other person
with the affairs of the United States, during his absence."
Your letter of September the 8th, has been duly received. I shall pay
due attention to the instructions relative to the medals, and give any
aid I can in the case of Boss' vessel. As yet, however, my endeavors to
find Monsieur Pauly, _avocat au conseil d'état, rue Coquilliere_, have
been ineffectual. There is no such person living in that street. I
found a Monsieur Pauly, _avocat au parlement_, in another part of the
town; he opened the letter, but said it could not mean him. I shall
advertise in the public papers. If that fails, there will be no other
chance of finding him. Mr. Warnum will do well, therefore, to send some
other description by which the person may be found. Indeed, some friend
of the party interested should be engaged to follow up this business,
as it will require constant attention, and probably a much larger sum
of money than that named in the bill enclosed in Mr. Warnum's letter.
I have the honor to enclose you a letter from O'Bryan to me, containing
information from Algiers, and one from Mr. Montgomery, at Alicant. The
purpose of sending you this last, is to show you how much the
difficulties of ransom are increased since the Spanish negotiations.
The Russian captives have cost about eight thousand livres apiece, on
an average. I certainly have no idea that we should give any such sum;
and, therefore, if it should be the sense of Congress to give such a
price, I would be glad to know it by instruction. My idea is, that we
should not ransom, but on the footing of the nation which pays least,
that it may be as little worth their while to go in pursuit of us, as
any nation. This is cruelty to the individuals now in captivity, but
kindness to the hundreds that would soon be so, were we to make it
worth the while of those pirates to go cut of the Straits in quest of
us. As soon as money is provided, I shall put this business into train.
I have taken measures to damp at Algiers all expectations of our
proposing to ransom, at any price. I feel the distress which this must
occasion to our countrymen there, and their connections; but the object
of it is their ultimate good, by bringing down their holders to such a
price as we ought to pay, instead of letting them remain in such
expectations as cannot be gratified. The gazettes of France and Leyden
accompany this.
I have the honor to be, with sentiments of the most perfect esteem and
respect, Sir, your most obedient humble servant.
[_The annexed are translations of the declaration and
counter-declaration, referred to in the preceding letter._]