THE HAWAIIAN TREATY AND RECIPROCITY

In January, 1875, Mr. Fish negotiated a treaty with the representatives

of the Hawaiian Islands by which there was to be a free exchange of

specified products and manufactures.

By the fourth article the King agreed not to dispose of any port or

harbor in his dominions or create a lien thereon in favor of any other

government. When the treaty came to the Senate it had no original

friends, and it met with determined opposition, especially from Sherman

of Ohio, and Morrill and Edmunds of Vermont. The reciprocity feature

annoyed them, they fearing that it might be used as a precedent for

reciprocity with Canada.

I was early impressed with the importance of securing a foothold in the

islands and I considered the exclusion of other nations as a step in

the right direction. The trustworthy estimates showed that the

reciprocity feature would work a loss to the Treasury of the United

States of more than half a million dollars a year. This the supporters

of the treaty were compelled to admit, but after argument the requisite

majority ratified the treaty and upon the theory that the political,

naval and commercial advantages were an adequate compensation. Upon the

renewal of the treaty the King ceded Pearl River Harbor to the United

States. After the expiration of the fixed period of seven years during

which the two nations were bound mutually, there was a class of men who

were anxious to abrogate the treaty, and at each session of Congress

for several years a proposition was introduced for that purpose. By

something of argument and something of art, the scheme was defeated.

The opposition, led usually by Holman, of Indiana, consisted largely of

Democrats. Their reason was loss of revenue. That fact was always

admitted by the friends of the treaty. It was claimed also that there

was no advantage gained by the country from the introduction of rice

and sugar from the islands duty-free. It was asserted by the

combinations the prices were as high on the Pacific Coast as on the

Atlantic. On the other hand the Louisiana sugar planters opposed the

treaty on the ground that they were unfavorably affected. As the

importations from the islands never exceeded four per cent of the

consumption of the country, the treaty had no perceptible effect upon

prices. The sugar and rice interests were reinforced by the delegations

from Michigan, Ohio and Vermont, who opposed the treaty under an

apprehension that it would operate as a precedent for a revival of the

system of reciprocity with Canada.

The fact of the annexation of Canada to the United States, whether the

event shall occur in a time near or be postponed to a time remote,

depends probably on our action upon the subject of reciprocity.

Canada needs our markets and our facilities for ocean transportation,

and, as long as these advantages are denied to her, she can never attain

to a high degree of prosperity. England may furnish capital for

railways, but railways are profitable only where there is business and

production on the one hand, and markets on the other. The system of

qualified intercourse tends to make the Canadian farmer dissatisfied

with his condition, and as long as there are cheap lands in the United

States he will find relief in emigration.

The time, however, is not far distant, when the Canadian farmer will be

unable to sell his lands in the Dominion and with the proceeds purchase

a home in the States. When that time arrives he will favor annexation

as a means of raising his own possessions to a value corresponding to

the value of land in the States. The body of farmers, laborers, and

trading people will favor annexation, ultimately, should the policy of

non-intercourse be adhered to on our part, and they will outnumber the

office-holding class, and thus the union of the two countries will be

secured. It is apparent also that a policy of free intercourse would

postpone annexation for a long time, if not indefinitely. Give to the

Canadian farmer and fisherman free access to our markets and there will

remain only a political motive in favor of annexation. The English

government is pursuing a liberal policy in its dealings with the

Dominion, and there is no reason for anticipating a retrograde course

of conduct on the part of the home government.

Reminiscences of Sixty Years in Public Affairs, Vol. 2 · 第 41 / 54 题