Mr. Stewart said: "Tell him to come to me; I will sell him carpets
as cheap as anybody."
When I repeated Mr. Stewart's message to the President he made no
reply, and he gave no indication that he was hearing what I was saying.
In regard to Judge Hoar's relations to President Grant, the public has
been invited to accept several errors, the appointment to the bench of
the Supreme Court of Justices Bradley and Strong, by whose votes the
first decision of the court in the Legal Tender cases was overruled,
and the circumstances which led to the retirement of Judge Hoar from
the Cabinet. First of all I may say that President Grant was attached
to Judge Hoar, and, as far as I know, his attachment never underwent
any abatement. Whatever bond there may be in the smoking habit, it
was formed without delay at the beginning of their acquaintance. While
General Grant was not a teller of stories, he enjoyed listening to good
ones, and of these Judge Hoar had a large stock always at command.
General Grant enjoyed the society of intellectual men, and Judge Hoar
was far up in that class. General Grant had regrets for the retirement
of Judge Hoar from his Cabinet, and for the circumstances which led to
his retirement. His appointment of Judge Hoar upon the Joint High
Commission and the nomination of Judge Hoar to a seat upon the bench of
the Supreme Court may be accepted as evidence of General Grant's
continuing friendship, and of his disposition to recognize it,
notwithstanding the break in official relations.
Judge Hoar's professional life had been passed in Massachusetts, and
he had no personal acquaintance with the lawyers of the circuit from
which Justices Strong and Bradley were appointed. Strong and Bradley
were at the head of the profession in the States of New Jersey and
Pennsylvania, and in truth there was no debate as to the fitness of
their appointment. Judge Hoar was not responsible for their
appointment, and I am of the opinion that the nomination would have
been made even against his advice, which assuredly was not so given.
Judge Strong, as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
had sustained the constitutionality of the Legal Tender Act, and it
was understood that Bradley was of the same opinion. As the President
and Cabinet were of a like opinion, it may be said that there could
have been no "packing" of the Supreme Court except by the exclusion
of the two most prominent lawyers in the circuit and the appointment
of men whose opinions upon a vital question were not in harmony with
the opinion of the person making the appointment.
As to myself, I had never accepted the original decision as sound law
under the Constitution, nor as a wise public policy, if there had
been no Constitution. By the decision the Government was shorn of a
part of its financial means of defence in an exigency. When the
Supreme Court had reached a conclusion, Chief Justice Chase called
upon me and informed me of that fact, about two weeks in advance of
the delivery of the opinion. He gave as a reason his apprehension of
serious financial difficulties due to a demand for gold by the
creditor class. Not sharing in that apprehension, I said: "The
business men are all debtors as well as creditors, and they cannot
engage in a struggle over gold payments, and the small class of
creditors who are not also debtors will not venture upon a policy in
which they must suffer ultimately." The decision did not cause a
ripple in the finances of the country.
Pursuing the conversation, I asked the Chief Justice where he found
authority in the Constitution for the issue of non-legal-tender
currency. He answered in the power to borrow money and in the power
given to Congress to provide for the "general welfare of the United
States." I then said, having in mind the opinion in the case of
MacCulloch and Maryland, in which the court held that where a power
was given to Congress, its exercise was a matter of discretion unless
a limitation could be found in the Constitution: "Where do you find
a limitation to the power to borrow money by any means that to Congress
may appear wise?" The Chief Justice was unable to specify a
limitation, and the question remains unanswered to this day.
When the case of Hepburn and Griswold was overruled in the Legal Tender
cases, the Chief Justice was very much disturbed, and with the
exhibition of considerable feeling, he said: "Why did you consent to
the appointment of judges to overrule me?" I assured him that there
was no personal feeling on the part of the President, and that as to
my own unimportant part in the business, he had known from the time of
our interview in regard to the former action of the court that I
entertained the opinion that the decision operated as a limitation of
the constitutional powers of Congress and that its full and final
recognition might prove injurious to the country whenever all its
resources should be required. At the time of the reversal, the Chief
Justice did not conceal his dissatisfaction with his life and labors
on the bench, and at the interview last mentioned he said that he
should be glad to exchange positions with me, if it were possible to
make the exchange.
Various reasons have been assigned for the step which was taken by
President Grant in asking Judge Hoar to retire from the Cabinet. Some
have assumed that the President was no longer willing to tolerate the
presence of two members from the same State. That consideration had
been passed upon by the President at the outset, and he had overruled
it or set it aside. In my interview with Mr. Washburne the Sunday
before my nomination, I had said to him that Judge Hoar and I were not
only from the same State, but that we were residents of the same
county, and within twenty miles of each other. Moreover, any public
dissatisfaction which had existed at the beginning had disappeared.
In the meantime the President had become attached to Judge Hoar. Nor
is there any justifying foundation for the conjecture that a vacancy
was created for the purpose of giving a place in the Cabinet to another
person, or to another section of the country. General Grant's
attachment to his friends was near to a weakness, and the suggestion
that he sacrificed Judge Hoar to the low purpose of giving a place to
some other person is far away from any true view of his character.
Judge Hoar had had no administrative experience on the political side
of the government, and he underestimated the claims, and he undervalued
the rights, of members of Congress. As individuals the members of
Congress are of the Government, and in a final test the two Houses may
become the Government. More than elsewhere the seat of power is in the
Senate, and the Senate and Senators are careful to exact a recognition
of their rights. They claim, what from the beginning they have
enjoyed, the right to be heard by the President and the heads of
departments in their respective States. They do not claim to speak
authoritatively, but as members of the Government having a right to
advise, and under a certain responsibility to the people for what may
be done.
It was claimed by Senators that the Attorney-General seemed not to
admit their right to speak in regard to appointments, and that
appointments were made of which they had no knowledge, and of which
neither they nor their constituents could approve. These differences
reached a crisis when Senators (I use the word in the plural) notified
the President that they should not visit the Department of Justice
while Judge Hoar was Attorney-General. Thus was a disagreeable
alternative presented to the President, and a first impression would
lead to the conclusion that he ought to have sustained the Attorney-
General. Assuming that the complaints were well founded, it followed
that the Attorney-General was denying to Senators the consideration
which the President himself was recognizing daily.
President Grant looked upon members of his Cabinet as his family for
the management of civil affairs, as he had looked upon his staff as
his military family for the conduct of the army, and he regarded a
recommendation for a Cabinet appointment as an interference. His
first Cabinet was organized upon that theory somewhat modified by a
reference to locality. Mr. Borie who became Secretary of the Navy
was a most excellent man, but he had had no preparation either by
training or experience for the duties of a department. Of this he
was quite conscious, and he never attempted to conceal the fact. He
often said:
"The department is managed by Admiral Porter, I am only a figure-head."
In a few months he resigned. His associates were much attached to him.
He was a benevolent, genial, well informed man. His successor, Mr.
Robeson, was a man of singular ability, lacking only the habit of
careful, continuous industry. This failing contributed to his
misfortunes in administration and consequently he was the subject of
many attacks in the newspapers and in Congress. After his retirement
he became a member of the House of Representatives, and it was a
noticeable fact, that from that day the attacks in Congress ceased.
As a debater he was well equipped, and in reference to his
administration of the Navy Department, he was always prepared with an
answer or an explanation in every exigency.
The appointment of Governor Fish to the Department of State, gave rise
to considerable adverse comment. The chief grounds of complaint were
that he was no longer young and that recently he had not been active
in political contests. He had been a Whig when there was a Whig Party,
and he became a Republican when the Republican Party was formed. As a
Whig he had been a member of the House of Representatives and of the
Senate of the United States, but he had not held office as a
Republican, nor was he known generally as a speaker or writer in
support of the policies or principles of the party. His age, then
about sixty, was urged as a reason against his appointment. His
selection as Secretary was extremely fortunate for General Grant and
his administration. Governor Fish was painstaking in his office,
exacting in his demands upon subordinates, without being harsh or
unjust, diligent in his duties, and fully informed as to the traditions
and usages of his department. Beyond these administrative qualities
he had the capacity to place every question of a diplomatic character
upon a foundation at once reasonable and legal. If the failure of Mr.
Stewart led to the appointment of Governor Fish the change was
fortunate for General Grant and the country. After the failure of Mr.
Stewart, Mr. Washburne spoke of his appointment to the State
Department, as only temporary, but for a few days he acted as though
he expected to remain permanently. If his transfer to France was an
afterthought, he and the President very carefully concealed that fact.
It is not probable that the President at the outset designed to take
the Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Treasury from New York
City. Hence I infer that the failure of Mr. Stewart worked a change
in the headship of the State Department, and hence I am of the opinion
that the failure of Mr. Stewart was of great advantage to the
administration and to the country, and that without considering whether
there was a gain or loss in the Treasury Department. There can be no
doubt that Governor Fish was a much wiser man than Mr. Washburne for
the management of foreign affairs and there can be as little doubt that
Mr. Washburne could not have been excelled as Minister to Paris in the
troublous period of the years 1870 and 1871.
Mr. Fish had no ambitions beyond the proper and successful
administration of his own department. He did not aspire to the
Presidency, and he remained in the State Department during General
Grant's second term, at the special request of the President.
Mr. Sumner's removal from the chairmanship of the Committee on Foreign
Relations was due to the fact that a time came when he did not
recognize the President, and when he declined to have any intercourse
with the Secretary of State outside of official business. Such a
condition of affairs is always a hindrance in the way of good
government, and it may become an obstacle to success. Good government
can be secured only through conferences with those who are responsible,
by conciliation, and not infrequently by concessions to the holders of
adverse opinions. The time came when such a condition was no longer
possible between Mr. Sumner and the Secretary of State.
The President and his Cabinet were in accord in regard to the
controversy with Great Britain as to the Alabama Claims. Mr. Sumner
advocated a more exacting policy. Mr. Motley appeared to be following
Mr. Sumner's lead, and the opposition to Mr. Sumner extended to Mr.
Motley. It had happened that the President had taken on a prejudice
to Mr. Motley at their first interview. This I learned when I said
something to the President in the line of conciliation. The President
said: "Such was my impression of Motley when I saw him that I should
have withheld his appointment if I had not made a promise to Sumner."
My acquaintance with Mr. Motley began in the year 1849, when we were
members of the Massachusetts House of Representatives, and I had a
high regard for him, although it had been charged that I had had some
part in driving him from politics into literature.
When we consider the natures and the training of the two men, it is
not easy to imagine agreeable co-operation in public affairs by Mr.
Sumner and General Grant. Mr. Sumner never believed in General Grant's
fitness for the office of President, and General Grant did not
recognize in Mr. Sumner a wise and safe leader in the business of
government. General Grant's notion of Mr. Sumner, on one side of his
character, may be inferred from his answer when, being asked if he
had heard Mr. Sumner converse, he said: "No, but I have heard him
lecture."
As I am to speak of Mr. Sumner in our personal relations, which for
thirteen years before his death were intimate, I shall use some words
of preface. Never on more than two occasions did we have differences
that caused any feeling on either side. Mr. Sumner was chairman in the
Senate of the Committee on the Freedmen's Bureau, and Mr. Eliot was
chairman of the Committee of the House. A report was made in each
House, and each bill contained not less than twenty sections. Each
House passed its own bill. A committee of conference was appointed.
Its report was rejected. I was appointed a member of the second
committee.
I examined the bills, and I marked out every section that was not
essential to the working of the measure. Four sections remained.
I then added a section which provided for the lease and ultimate sale
of the confiscated lands to the freedmen and refugees. President
Johnson's restoration of those lands made that section non-operative.
The committee, upon the motion of General Schenck, transferred the
jurisdiction of the Bureau from the Treasury to the War Department.
The bill was accepted by the committee, and passed by the two Houses.
When within a few days I was in the Senate Chamber, Mr. Sumner came to
me, and said in substance: "The Freedmen's Bureau Bill as it passed is
of no value. I have spent six months upon the bill, and my work has
gone for nothing. You and General Schenck cannot pretend to know as
much as I know about the measure."
With some feeling, which was not justifiable, I said: "I have not
spent six hours upon the measure, but after what you have said I will
say that the fifth section is of more value than all the sections which
you have written." I did not wait for a reply. The subject was not
again mentioned; our friendly relations were not disturbed, and it is
to Mr. Sumner's credit on the score of toleration that he passed over
my rough remarks, even though he had given some reason for a retort.
My next difference from Mr. Sumner was a more serious difference, but
it passed without any break in our relations. He had not acquired the
church-going habit, or he had renounced it, and my church-going was
spasmodic rather than systematic. Thus it became possible and
agreeable for me to spend some small portion of each Sunday in his
rooms. The controversy over Mr. Motley and his removal from the post
of minister to Great Britain excited Mr. Sumner to a point far beyond
any excitement to which he yielded, arising from his own troubles or
from the misfortunes of the country. To him it was the topic of
conversation at all times and in all places. That habit I accepted at
his house with as much complacency as I could command. Indeed, I was
not much disturbed by what he said to me in private, and certainly not
by what he said in his own house, where I went from choice, and without
any obligation to remain resting upon me. In all his conversation he
made General Grant responsible for the removal of Motley, accompanied,
usually, with language of censure and condemnation. On two occasions
that were in a measure public, one of which was at a dinner given to me
by Mr. Franklin Haven, a personal friend of twenty years' standing,
when he insisted upon holding the Motley incident as the topic of
conversation. On one of these occasions, and in excitement, he turned
to me and said: "Boutwell, you ought to have resigned when Motley
was removed."