The empire of the Athenians consisted of five provinces, the Thracian,

Hellespontine, Insular, Ionian, and Carian, with a total population

of perhaps, 2,000,000. It formed a complex of islands, peninsulas,

and estuaries, the most remote extremities of which were distant two

hundred or two hundred and fifty miles from Athens. The highways of

this empire were the land-locked channels and lakes which make up the

Ægean Archipelago. Their greatest length in normal circumstances was

a continuous voyage of about eight days. On the other hand, no land

way of more than a single day's march need be traversed by an Athenian

expedition aimed at any of its subject cities. Without the control

of the sea the empire was, accordingly, unthinkable. This absent,

the district fell at once into more than four hundred fragments, the

thousand "cities" from which, according to the comedian Aristophanes,

the Athenians gathered tribute.

The Athenian sphere of naval operations and of political and commercial

interests reached far beyond the frontiers of the empire. It included

points like Sicily, Egypt, Phoenicia, and the Euxine, distant over six

hundred miles from the Piræus. An Athenian fleet might thus require the

best part of a month to reach its destination. The world which had to

take careful account of the Athenian naval power in all its political

and military calculations, the world which Athens under Pericles sought

to dominate, must have had a population of over 20,000,000.

If, then, we take into account the ratio of dominant, subject, and

foreign elements, and also the time consumed in reaching with ships,

orders, or explanations, the outer limits of authority, the magnitude

of Athens's imperial undertaking will stand comparison with that of

England in modern times.

* * * * *

In Sparta the gravestone of a citizen was inscribed regularly with his

name alone. No epitaph was needed there to tell the tale of a life; for

the life of one citizen was the well-known life of all. If, however, a

man had died for his country, two words, ἑνπολἑμω, "in war," expressed

with laconic brevity his ground of distinction.

For those who fell in battle Athens set apart a public cemetery near

the Dipylon Gate, and at the end of every campaign a commemorative

service was held there in honor of the year's crop of martyrs. A

man high in public esteem voiced the nation's gratitude for the

sacrifice. On such an occasion, at the end of the first year of the

Peloponnesian War, Pericles reversed the normal procedure, and, instead

of expatiating on the merits of the fallen, he explained in an eloquent

speech why Athens was worthy of loyalty unto death. Thucydides heard

his words, and, perhaps many years afterwards, reproduced them as best

he could in the famous _Funeral Oration_.

The statesman did not linger long over the legendary glories of Athens.

Her alleged boons to humanity--grain, the norms of civilized life, the

drama; the services, that is to say, upon which the later Athenians

dwelt with special pride--had no meaning for him. Two things their

ancestors had done: they had defended their country successfully,

and had transmitted to their descendants a free state. "And if these

were worthy of praise,"[20] proceeds his splendid exordium, "still

more were our fathers, who added to their inheritance, and after

many a struggle transmitted to us their sons this great empire. And

we ourselves assembled here to-day, who are still most of us in the

vigor of life, have chiefly done the work of improvement, and have

richly endowed our city with all things, so that she is sufficient for

herself both in peace and war. Of the military exploits by which our

various possessions were acquired, or of the energy with which we or

our fathers drove back the tide of war, Hellenic or Barbarian, I will

not speak; for the tale would be long and is familiar to you. But ... I

should like to point out by what principles of action we rose to power,

and under what institutions and through what manner of life our empire

became great."

In these words of Pericles I should like you to find stated the theme

of my second chapter. And were it not that Pericles left unexplained,

what the Athenians whom he addressed knew without explanation, the

social and political forms by which they realized their ideals, I might

absolve my task by one long quotation. I might transcribe the whole

_Oration_ and have done with it.

That being inexpedient, I cannot do better than present, using again

Pericles's own words as a sort of text, the main principles of Athenian

policy. But in passing I may be permitted to observe that were our

knowledge of Athens dependent solely upon the _Funeral Oration_; had we

to form our idea of political life in fifth-century B.C. Greece from it

alone, we might still infer a unique epoch in the history of mankind.

Fortunately, that is not the case. The "tooth of time and razure of

oblivion" have spared the Parthenon and its matchless sculptures, the

noble tragedies of Æschylus and Sophocles, and the undying charm of

Herodotus. Ideals are always grounded in some measure in realities. At

the least they stand to them as the "perfect round" to the "broken

arc." Even in Plato's psychology the mind needs to be sharpened by

observation and reflection before, as in a flash of light, the glimpse

of the divine idea suddenly appears. Hence, were the affirmations of

the _Funeral Oration_ unsupported by contemporary monuments of similar

spirit, they would still be helpful revelations of Athenian democracy.

And this conclusion, as I hope to show, rests not upon logical

inference alone, but also upon the evidence of minute research.

* * * * *

"It is true," said Pericles,[21] "we are called a democracy, for the

administration is in the hands of the many and not of the few. But

while the law secures equal justice to all alike in their private

disputes, the claim of excellence is also recognized, and when a

citizen is in any way distinguished, he is preferred to the public

service, not as a matter of privilege, but as the reward of merit.

Neither is poverty a bar, but a man may benefit his country whatever be

the obscurity of his condition. There is no exclusiveness in our public

life, and in our private intercourse we are not suspicious of one

another, nor angry with our neighbor if he does what he likes; we do

not put on sour looks at him which, though harmless, are not pleasant.

While we are thus unconstrained in our private intercourse, a spirit

of reverence pervades our public acts; we are prevented from doing

wrong by respect for authority and for the laws, having an especial

regard to those ordained for the protection of the injured as well as

to those unwritten laws which bring upon the transgressor of them the

reprobation of the general sentiment.... Wealth we employ not for talk

and ostentation, but when there is a real use for it. To avow poverty

with us is no disgrace: the true disgrace is in doing nothing to avoid

it. An Athenian citizen does not neglect the state because he takes

care of his own household; and even those of us who are engaged in

business have a very fair idea of politics. We alone regard a man who

takes no interest in public affairs, not as a harmless but as a useless

character; and if few of us are originators, we are all sound judges

of a policy. The great impediment to action is, in our opinion, not

discussion but the want of that knowledge which is gained by discussion

preparatory to action. For we have a peculiar power of thinking before

we act and of acting too.... And we have not forgotten to provide for

our weary spirits many relaxations from toil; we have regular games

and sacrifices throughout the year; at home the style of our life is

refined; and the delight which we daily feel in all these things helps

to banish melancholy. Because of the greatness of our city the fruits

of the whole earth flow in upon us; so that we enjoy the goods of other

countries as freely as of our own.... We are lovers of the beautiful,

yet simple in our tastes, and we cultivate the mind without loss of

manliness.... To sum up: I say that Athens is the school of Hellas,

and that the individual Athenian in his own person seems to have the

power of adapting himself to the most varied forms of action with the

utmost versatility and grace. This is no passing and idle word, but

truth and fact; and the assertion is verified by the position to which

these qualities have raised the state.... And we shall assuredly not

be without witnesses; there are mighty monuments of our power which

will make us the wonder of this and of succeeding ages; we shall not

need the praises of Homer or of any other panegyrist whose poetry may

please for the moment, although his representation of the facts will

not bear the light of day. For we have compelled every land and every

sea to open a path for our valor, and have everywhere planted eternal

memorials of our friendship and of our enmity."

* * * * *

Such were the proud claims of the great Athenian statesman. Of art

there was said no word except in so far as art was embodied in the

monuments of empire. Music and the drama are alluded to, but in the

same breath with athletic contests, as the relaxation of overworked

men. The speaker has no apology to make for democracy. He gloried in

imperialism. Had he met Plato in Elysium--Plato who was born in the

year after Pericles's death, and both embodied and expressed the higher

ideals of a later generation of Athenians--he would have disdained to

reply to the philosopher's accusation that he had filled the city with

traders and shops and ships and dockyards and such rubbish, instead of

with righteousness and justice.

* * * * *

Taking the _Funeral Oration_ as my text, I should like to explain at

this point by what institutions the principles of Periclean democracy

and imperialism were converted into facts.

It was in the _ecclesia_, or general assembly, and in the _heliæa_,

or popular courts of justice, that sovereign power was vested in

Athens.[22] The heliæa demanded of its jurors only that they should

be citizens in good standing, but each year it drew according to need

from a specially constituted list of 6000. So, too, of the 50,000

citizens who might attend the ecclesia, 6000 were regarded as a quorum

when a quorum was required, and commonly an even smaller number was

present. Meetings of the ecclesia were held either in the city or at

the harbor; hence the urban element tended to dominate. Stated meetings

occurred four times a month, but others might be called by the generals

or the council. Various panels of from 401 to 2001 jurymen each might

be allotted to tribunals on every day of the year which was not set

aside for a public festival or preëmpted by a meeting of the ecclesia.

Usually poor men of advanced years, such as were unsuited for more

active work and were satisfied with the indemnity of two obols[23] per

day, volunteered for registration among the 6000 jurors.

The work of Parliament was divided between the ecclesia and the heliæa;

for legislation in the strict sense of the term could be enacted only

by the joint action of the two bodies.[24] Administrative decrees,

moreover, by means of which the ecclesia disposed of all important

public business, and which might differ from laws only in a formal

way, could be suspended at the initiative of individuals and were

incontestable only when passed on, as to constitutionality or public

expediency, by the heliæa. The men who sat in the heliæa were but

common citizens like those who voted in the ecclesia; but they came to

sit in judgment on both laws and decrees by the accident of the lot

and not because of any particular interest in the questions concerned.

In other words, the courts could not be packed with partisans as the

meetings of the ecclesia commonly were. This fact, together with the

delay which necessarily occurred, protected the state against the

verdict of a chance majority, which was in fact usually a minority

of all the citizens. There was no such thing in Athens as the final

settlement of controversial matters by a single popular vote.

The heliæa acted as sovereign in one further particular. Upon it

devolved the duty of determining whether the magistrates and

councilors observed the laws and conducted themselves honestly during

their years of office. It was to the sworn assembly of the Athenians,

accordingly, that all those engaged in civil administration were

responsible. The ecclesia, on the other hand, had the right to impeach

and dismiss those officials who, being given discretionary powers,

abused them.

The main work of the heliæa was of course to settle domestic and

imperial litigation. As we shall see, the judicial power of the heliæa

gave it a large measure of political control over all the subject

cities of Athens.

The heliæa was the brake on the democratic machine: the ecclesia

was the dynamo. The intent of the Athenians was that all political

decisions of importance should be reached, after full debate, by the

ecclesia. It was, however, obvious that an assembly of from five to

fifty thousand men would proceed with disastrous slowness if all

matters, great and small, were laid before it, or even if it considered

only significant affairs, but considered them without previous

examination and formulation. Perversion of modern democracies results

most notably from the usurpation of power on the part of those who sift

proposals for popular reference. Athens had to guard against a similar

danger. Hence the harbinger of democracy, Clisthenes, created for it

one of the most peculiar _probuleutic_, or deliberative, bodies which

ever had the handling of large affairs. This was the council of the

Five Hundred.

It was constituted anew each year and was made an exact miniature of

the ecclesia which it was to serve. Every ward and township of Attica,

to the number of one hundred and over, first eliminated such of its

members as had not yet reached their thirtieth year or had already

served two terms in the council, and then selected by lot from among

the rest the councilor or councilors to which it was entitled on the

basis of population. Accordingly, each successive council had from

two hundred and fifty to five hundred new and inexperienced members.

Not desire or fitness but pure chance determined its personnel. Every

section, interest, and class of Attica--if we exclude young men between

eighteen and thirty--was adequately represented in it. There was,

therefore, a general presumption that it would take the same view of

public questions as the ecclesia; that it would do a disservice to its

own members should it foster their temporary rights as councilors at

the expense of their lifelong rights as members of the ecclesia; that

it would, in other words, labor to the best of its ability to present

to the ecclesia a well-considered and sufficiently inclusive programme

of business. Otherwise, the heliæa had to be faced at the end of the

twelve months.

A committee of five hundred impresses us as little less unwieldy than

an assembly of five thousand. Clisthenes was of the same opinion.

Hence he divided his council into ten sections, or prytanies, of fifty

members each, and arranged that each prytany should act for the

whole for thirty-six days in an order determined by lot at the latest

possible moment. The prytany was constituted in such a way that it was

a miniature of the council, just as the council was a miniature of

the ecclesia. The lot, again applied at the latest possible moment,

determined, furthermore, which of its fifty members should be its

chairman, and be present with one third of his colleagues in the

council chamber for the single twenty-four hours for which he served.

The same man was chairman of the council at its daily session, and

he also presided at the ecclesia, should a meeting of the citizens

be held on his day of office. A chance nomination for a single day's

service, at a time not previously known, was, Clisthenes thought,

a sufficient safeguard of council and ecclesia against successful

scheming, conspiracy, collusion, or other interference with the popular

will on the part of the chairman. He was mistaken; and the later

democracy took the further precaution of requiring the chairman to

relinquish the presidency at the meetings of the council and ecclesia

to a board of nine men chosen by lot for that specific purpose from the

non-officiating prytanies of the council. One of the nine, designated

likewise by lot, was given the special honor and responsibility of

putting the motions and declaring the votes.

Only proposals which originated in a council thus organized came before

the ecclesia; but there they might be discussed _ad libitum_, emended,

accepted, rejected, or referred back to the council; and it was even

possible during their consideration to substitute for the resolution

of the council an entirely different bill, or to move that the council

bring in a proposition at the next meeting on an altogether irrelevant

matter. It was the deliberate intention of the Athenians that the

ecclesia should consider everything it wanted to consider.

The management of civil administration, subject to the constant

direction of the ecclesia and the watchful supervision of the

council,--which in this matter also acted for the body of which it

was a miniature,--was entrusted to a multitude of committees, each

composed normally of ten members. Aristotle, in his _Constitution of

the Athenians_, specifies the duties of twenty-five such committees

and estimates at seven hundred the number of citizens engaged annually

in domestic administration. The work of each committee was definitely

circumscribed by law and formed a small bundle of routine matters. The

committees may be thought of as standing drawn up in a long line for

the council to inspect. Had they been placed one behind the other in

files, the rear committee being responsible to the one before it and so

on down to the front, the council would have come into direct contact

only with a few powerful committees. Such committees, however, must

have proved impossible for inexperienced councilors to manage. Besides,

while the councilors, as agents of the ecclesia, and subject to its

commands, might properly hold all the civil magistrates to a monthly

accounting, it was not thought in accord with democracy that one group

of citizens who happened to hold one civil office should have under

their direction another group of citizens also engaged temporarily on

public work. Though all the committees were thus on the same plane, and

recognized only the council as their common superintendent, the work

that they did was by no means of equal dignity or importance. It ranged

all the way from managing the scavengers to managing the Great Dionysia.

All committees were reconstituted annually. No man could be a member of

the same committee twice in his lifetime. At the end of his year each

magistrate was required to render an indescribably minute accounting

of his public acts, first to specially appointed auditing committees,

and finally to the heliæa. It was an easy matter to get an office in

Athens, but a very difficult task to get honorably rid of it. For

the lot was used to select the requisite number of members for each

committee from among the citizens thirty years old or older who had

not disqualified themselves by earlier service. The theory that one

citizen was as competent as another for public office was thus put into

practice. Every office was refilled annually by a chance group of new

and necessarily inexperienced men.

While defining constitutions Aristotle lays down the condition

for a thorough-going democracy that all citizens should hold

governmental positions in turn. On this theory, there should have

been an approximate agreement between the number of places in Athens

and the number of citizens reaching their thirtieth year annually.

That, however, was not the case. Even if we assume that men were

councilors only once and held only one magistracy in their lifetime,

we need to include some of the seven hundred (?) imperial posts in our

calculation, and regard them, too, as subject to the conditions of

tenure assumed for domestic positions, in order to reach the required

total of about thirteen hundred. This is, naturally, an unwarranted

and unworkable series of assumptions. It is, however, reasonable to

suppose that the majority of Athenian citizens, and practically all

of those who made a habit of attending the meetings of the ecclesia

held a _deme_, or municipal, position, let us say, in their youth; a

post in the council or in the domestic or imperial administration in

their maturity; and a place in the register of the six thousand jurors

in their advancing years. Recall, now, that three hundred and sixty

of the five hundred councilors had to preside at meetings of fifty

and five hundred men, and, if chance willed, at one of from five to

fifty thousand also; observe that magistrates had not only to know the

duties of their office,--which included the reception and preparation

of some kind of cases for submission to a panel of jurors, over which

they had, moreover, to preside,--but had also to keep accounts which

they must defend in a law court; reflect that jury service involved

acting as judge and jury in both domestic and imperial litigation,

and it will appear that the knowledge of reading and writing which

Clisthenes presupposed in all citizens would not have carried a man

far in the age of Pericles; he must then have had a working knowledge

of parliamentary forms, he must have had the view of administration

which comes of being on the inside of the wicket; he must have been so

conversant with the law and legal procedure that he could assume heavy

personal responsibility for the legality of all bills proposed by him

and could argue his own cases when acting as plaintiff or defendant in

a law suit. It was a proverb in Athens that "office will show the man."

We may be sure that most men took some pains in advance that it did not

show them wholly incompetent. It must have left them with a new insight

into public affairs. It is fair to say that, as a consequence of all

this, the normal town meeting of the Athenians was, from one point of

view, an assembly of experts, while viewed differently it possessed

simply a high level of amateur attainment, comparable, perhaps, with

that Mr. H.G. Wells postulates in his socialistic Utopia.

* * * * *

The office assigned by Pericles to this assembly of high-class amateurs

was to choose the best among divergent policies proposed to it by

citizens of exceptional endowment. The ecclesia by no means closed

the door in the face of such real experts as it possessed. Thus it

did not leave it to the council to draw up the specifications for the

construction of the naval arsenals or any similarly technical job, but

it could and did delegate such tasks to men of special competence. Nor

was it so doctrinaire as to entrust the command of its expeditions or

the conduct of its diplomacy to chance persons; but it both elected

its generals, reëlected them as often as it cared to, and gave them

special rights of calling and canceling meetings of the ecclesia and

of laying proposals directly before them. It was, accordingly, aware

of the difficulty and danger which it faced in settling questions of

foreign policy, where the elements involved, being the resources,

aims, sentiments, and traditions of other states, far transcended the

knowledge of the common citizen; and where error might mean irreparable

disaster; where, in fact, error _did_ mean irreparable disaster.

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