THE CORINTH CAMPAIGN--BATTLE OF DAVIS' BRIDGE ON THE HATCHIE RIVER--
BOLIVAR--DEATH OF COL. HOGG--WATER VALLEY--FIGHT AT HOLLEY SPRINGS
--COWARDICE OF COL. MURPHY--FORAGING.
"The brave make danger opportunity;--
The waverer, paltering with the chance sublime
Dwarfs it to peril. * * *"
--_Lowell._
The severe losses at Shiloh resulted in a reorganization of a
considerable portion of our army. Many fragmentary regiments were
consolidated in order to make full ones. Much time was consumed in this
process and we remained at Pittsburg Landing until its completion.
On the eleventh of April, four days after the battle, Major General
Henry Wagner Halleck appeared and assumed command in person. This was
the beginning of a campaign in extraordinary contrast to that which had
been so brilliantly prosecuted by Grant, whose methods and plans were
held in contempt by his superior.
Halleck was a man from whom the people had expected much. They
believed, largely upon his own authority, that he was a great general,
for his unqualified statement about anything was presumed to close
discussion.
Halleck had written a book upon military science which was generally
supposed to contain the last word upon that subject. He was
self-centered and opinionated to a degree and his arrogance was only
equaled by his excessive caution, which nobody at that time was
presumptuous enough to hint might have been called by another name.
This general's policy, constantly impressed upon his officers, was to
"do nothing to bring on an engagement." With an army of one hundred and
twenty thousand men opposed to one whose effective force was
considerably less than half that number, he instructed his generals
that it was "better to retreat than to fight." This rule was strictly
observed and upon different occasions important advantages were waived
and reverse movements made in conformity to it. The result was an
elaborate underground campaign in which the spade was the only
aggressive factor. Except at the very outset, the army literally
burrowed its way into Corinth. While the pioneer corps toiled beneath
the surface, the others watched, not so much as guards but rather as
sentinels to give the alarm. The vicinity of Corinth was a veritable
labyrinth with complex runways such as might have been made by gigantic
field-mice. This harmless procedure must have been quite as amusing to
the Rebels as it was irksome to us. But even they grew tired of the
farce and considerately exploded a magazine as a hint that they had
marched out and would not hurt us if we had really set our hearts upon
marching in.
[Illustration: ILLINOIS MONUMENT AT SHILOH TO SPECIAL COMMANDS
THE FRONT TABLET IS TO COMPANIES A AND B.]
At last Corinth was "captured." The army did not start upon its advance
until April 30th, when the men, burrowing through the ground like
gophers, moved at an average rate of about 1700 feet per day. A month
was consumed in this process. Trenches, rifle-pits and bomb-proofs were
constructed to shelter one hundred thousand men; and all this to
capture another lot of trenches, rifle-pits and bomb-proofs that were
empty. It was a bloodless victory, and the countless hills and holes
that cost so much labor and so many lives incident to the use of
polluted surface-water and exposure under unsanitary conditions, will
remain indefinitely as monuments to the caution and timidity of that
unique general whose conception of prosecuting the war seemed to have
been to treat the entire South as an immense garrison to be captured
only after complete investment and a prolonged, careful and strictly
methodical siege. Halleck's "caution" would appear to have been the
result of a fevered imagination rather than the outgrowth of well
considered military conditions which he should and might have known but
did not; for, on the day following the evacuation of Corinth, when the
Rebels were many miles away in full retreat, he caused his whole army
to be drawn up in preparation for battle, announcing in orders that
there was "every indication that our left was to be attacked that
morning." The "indications" proved to be as humiliating as the
preparations to meet them were preposterous; but their significance was
entirely obscured by the cloud of egotism which seemed to envelop the
personality of this overrated commander who might have been more
successful had he possessed a sense of humor. In the light of Halleck's
experience, it is refreshing to recall General Grant's opinion of what
might have been:
"For myself, I am satisfied that Corinth could have been captured
in a two days' campaign commenced promptly on the arrival of
re-enforcements after the battle of Shiloh." Memoirs, V. 1, pg.
381.
During the Corinth campaign Companies A and B acted as escort to
Brigadier General T. A. Davies. After the evacuation an order was
issued directing them to report to the regiment but Captain Hotaling,
who was originally responsible for their detachment, because he
believed that he could do more effectual work with them separately,
succeeded, through the influence of General Oglesby, in having the
order changed to include Company B; whereupon Company A was, at the
request of General O. A. C. Ord, who commanded the post at Corinth,
assigned to his staff.
I had previously been detailed to act as orderly to Colonel Baker of
the Second Iowa regiment, who was then in command of a brigade. He was
succeeded by General Thomas Sweeney and I was with the latter until he,
in turn, was succeeded by General Hackelman with whom I remained until
the battle of Iuca, just before the second fight at Corinth, when I
returned to my company which was ordered to Jackson, Tennessee.
The time spent at Corinth was dull and monotonous but the monotony
ceased upon our arrival at Jackson. We remained in camp about seven or
eight days until the battle of Corinth, where General Hackelman,
Colonel Baker and Lieutenant Brainard, all good friends of mine, were
killed. After the battle, General Ord, in command of Logan's and
Hurlbut's Divisions, the latter of which had been sent ahead from
Bolivar, Tennessee, attempted to intercept Price and Van Dorn at Davis'
Bridge on the Hatchie River.
About six o'clock in the evening orders were given to pack haversacks
with two days' rations and be in the saddle in forty minutes. We
marched to the depot, loaded our horses in box-cars, mounted the deck
with our saddles and were off. The road was rough and the cars swayed
like ships in a storm. By lying down and holding fast to the deck we
were enabled to stay in place until our arrival at Bolivar, which we
reached at about half past twelve that night. As soon as possible we
commenced our march for Davis' Bridge which was about twenty miles
away. Just as the sky began to redden in the east we arrived at
Hurlbut's headquarters and found his command in line of battle near the
bridge. We were none too soon. The battle began soon after our arrival
and raged until afternoon. The enemy fought persistently but was slowly
driven back and finally retreated up the stream. One of our men
captured a rebel officer upon one of General Van Dorn's horses. W. B.
Cummins was in command of the company in the absence of Captain
Hotaling who was upon staff duty.
General Ord was wounded in this battle which caused his retirement for
a considerable time from active service. In his report of the battle he
paid a high compliment to the men of our company, whom he commended for
their rare intelligence and skill.
At the beginning of General Ord's retirement he requested General Grant
to reserve Company A as his personal guard but he was gone so long that
the company was ordered to report to General Logan, with whom it had
been but a short time when Captain Hotaling was appointed Senior Aid
upon Logan's staff with the title of Major, in which capacity he served
with distinction until the close of the war. Our company continued to
act as escort for General Logan until after the surrender of Vicksburg.
After the battle at Davis' Bridge I was detailed as hospital assistant
to help in holding sponge and to assist in amputating legs and arms. It
was a grewsome experience and my first of the kind. Between forty and
fifty men were brought in in varying conditions and among them General
Ord, who was wounded in the leg.
The next morning we moved back to Bolivar where we were the guests of
our regiment. It was a joyous reunion and we slept but little that
night. Our joy was marred however, by the absence of our beloved
Colonel Harvey Hogg, who met his death a few days previous in a heroic
charge at the battle of Bolivar. His death was said to have occurred
within sight of his mother's house. On the day of the battle, those of
the regiment who were detailed to bury the dead, found the Colonel's
body stripped of all clothing, and were told by the rebels that "the
hogs did it." The statement is proof of its absurdity and of the
unbelievable hatred which existed at the time against southerners who
fought for the Union. The details of Colonel Hogg's death have been
embodied in a separate sketch and need not be enlarged upon here.
Our visit ended in the morning when we marched back to Jackson where we
were engaged in picket duty and foraging until the weather began to get
chilly. From Jackson we marched by way of Bolivar to Water Valley,
Mississippi, about sixty miles south of Holly Springs. The latter place
had been chosen as a secondary base of supplies for that portion of the
army located south of there. General Grant, in what he regarded as an
almost hopeless endeavor to fit his plans to those of Gen. Halleck and
the orders resulting from the latter, was compelled to scatter his
forces and to guard as best he could, a number of widely separated
points in order to maintain railway communication with the North. Under
the conditions existing, they could not all be adequately protected.
Colonel R. C. Murphy, of the eighth Wisconsin, with about fifteen
hundred men, including companies C, F, G, H, I and K, of the Second
Illinois Cavalry, was left to guard the post. The companies mentioned
were under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Quincy McNeil.
Believing that the destruction of the munitions and stores accumulated
there would greatly cripple our army, Van Dorn undertook to capture the
place. He was especially anxious to secure the horses of our regiment
which had the reputation of being one of the best mounted in the
service. So, on the 20th of December, with a force of mounted infantry
and cavalry outnumbering that of the Union troops more than ten to one,
he made a dash to capture the place. Murphy had been notified of his
approach but made no preparations to meet him nor did he take the
trouble to inform his command. Van Dorn had no difficulty in
"surprising" him and less in inducing him to surrender. Before the
troops knew of the situation the town was surrounded by several
thousand confederates and the post with stories and troops had been
formally surrendered by Murphy. The six companies of our regiment were
encamped upon the fair-grounds, over all parts of which they were
scattered. Lieutenant Colonel McNeil, with Captains Jones and Higgins
were upon the east side of the Camp, Captain Marsh upon the north and
Majors Mudd and Bush upon the west and south sides respectively. The
men were told that the Second had been surrendered with the other
troops. "Not by a damned sight," was the reply, "If they want the
Second, they must fight for it." At this instant the rebels rushed in
upon the east side and immediately began shooting down those who were
saddling their horses. McNeil rallied the men nearest to him and
advanced to the attack. Captains Jones and Higgins seconded McNeil.
There was no time to form. McNeil was pressed by overwhelming numbers,
surrounded and captured. At the same time Marsh was rallying the men at
the north and the conflict or series of conflicts, became an
indiscriminate struggle to the death. Just then the enemy in still
larger numbers poured into the camp and captured the stragglers and
convalescents. Captain Jones' horse was shot under him, Lieutenant
Garrett was wounded and both were made prisoners. Marsh ordered a saber
charge and broke through the line at the north, followed by Captain
Higgins and the men who had been with McNeil. Marsh charged west and
then south in the hope of supporting Major Bush. Major Mudd, who had
been ordered to Oxford by rail and was preparing to go, knew nothing of
the situation until he heard of the surrender. He rallied a few men
nearest to him and ordered a saber charge. The same order was
simultaneously executed by Marsh and Bush, all of whom broke through
the lines at different points. The several detachments were separated.
Those of Marsh and Bush joined upon the south and charged through the
town fighting desperately. The enemy swarmed like locusts but, unable
to withstand the terrific onset, gave way at every point. Realizing
that a considerable number of their comrades must have been captured,
Major Bush charged back like a whirlwind, recaptured the camp and
released the captives. Those behind seemed to realize that their
comrades would return. Some were found crouched upon the ground behind
their dead and dying horses which they used for breastworks, still
fighting with coolness and desperation. When the rescue came, these men
hurriedly mounted behind their comrades or captured loose horses and
went on with them. The charge was scarcely halted. Turning to the west,
they again broke through the line and escaped to Coldwater, a town
about twenty miles distant. Captain Marsh received three severe wounds
but kept on through the fight.
In the meantime, Major Mudd, with a small detachment, succeeded in
breaking through the western line, but in doing so, lost a number of
his men. The fact of escape was not enough to satisfy his soldierly
instinct. Seeing a band of rebels in front of him he gave chase,
although at the time he was pursued by a much larger number.
Twenty-four prisoners were captured, including one major; but being
unable to take care of them, twelve were released. Whether these were a
part of the detachment pursued, I have not been able to ascertain.
Major Mudd with his detachment also escaped to Coldwater where he aided
in preparations for the defense of that place which was threatened by
the enemy.
On the following Sunday, this officer, under orders from Colonel
O'Meara, commanding at Coldwater, went back to Holly Springs under a
flag of truce, but finding the place deserted and being joined by
Lieutenant Stickel with a few men, took possession of the town and held
it until the arrival of Colonel Marsh on the same day.
Another detachment of men, numbering about seventy, broke through the
rebel lines and escaped towards Memphis. They bivouacked that night
several miles away from Holly Springs, without fire, food or shelter
and reached Memphis in due time hungry, cold, exhausted and destitute.
The loss in killed, wounded and missing was about one hundred and
fifty; but, aside from prisoners captured, it was believed that the
enemy's loss was much greater.
In a general order issued on December 23rd, 1862, General Grant, after
severely censuring Murphy and a part of the garrison, said:
"It is gratifying to note in contrast with this, the conduct of a
portion of the command; conspicuous among whom was the Second
Illinois Cavalry, which gallantly and successfully resisted being
taken prisoners. Their loss was heavy but the enemy's was much
greater. Such conduct as theirs will always insure success, &c."
The descendants of those men may be proud to read these words; but how
about the descendants of Colonel Murphy? Here is their bequest:--
Headquarters, Department of the Tennessee.
Holly Springs, Miss.,
Jan. 8th, 1863.
General Orders
No. 4.
Colonel R. C. Murphy was dismissed from the service, to take effect
from the 20th day of December, 1862, the day of his cowardly and
disgraceful conduct.
By order of
Major General U.S. Grant.
John A. Rawlins,
Assistant Adjutant General.
A large sum of money had been sent to Holly Springs for the army
pay-roll. This was captured and diverted to a like use by the
confederates.
The men who escaped to Memphis, being without money or rations and
having lost their camp equipage, following the motto that "all is fair
in love or war," fixed upon a ruse whereby they might recoup in part
from the rebel citizens. Good arms at high prices were in active demand
throughout the South. A standard revolver was valued at from fifty to
seventy-five dollars in "greenbacks." Southern citizens were always
ready to buy arms from any of our men who were willing to sell. Knowing
this, one of the officers sent out several men to sell their arms and
with each was sent a guard to watch. Upon the completion of a sale the
guard would arrest the citizen and confiscate his purchase. In this way
they collected about one thousand dollars, which was credited against
losses at Holly Springs.
At the time our comrades were undergoing the experiences described,
Company A was at Water Valley wading in mud and snow in an effort to
rebuild the bridges which had been destroyed by the enemy.
The appearance of Forrest upon the line of railroad between Jackson,
Tennessee, and Columbus, Kentucky, cut off communication from the North
for more than a week. This, in conjunction with the loss of supplies at
Holly Springs, compelled the entire army to subsist upon the country.
Our company was sent out with wagon-trains and detachments of infantry
who loaded the wagons while we fought bushwhackers. Sometimes it was
necessary to go fifteen or sixteen miles and we were invariably late in
returning. Our diet was corn roasted or burnt, usually the latter,
inasmuch as we were constantly harassed by the enemy and were given no
chance to forage for other things. We soon became so worn and exhausted
from this onerous work and meager diet that our haggard appearance was
noted by those of the army who were in position to fare better. One
night when we came in unusually late and had eaten our corn and turned
in, there was an unusual commotion in the camp which at once aroused
the entire company. We were not long in realizing and appreciating the
cause of the disturbance. The 45th Illinois, knowing our scarcity and
that we had been fighting constantly to protect the train, had brought
over four fine porkers which they hung up at our headquarters with an
invitation to make the most of the opportunity. In an incredibly short
time each man had a piece of pork impaled upon a stick and was roasting
it by the embers of his camp-fire. No chef ever prepared a more savory
banquet and no hungry men ever appreciated one more than we did that.
Tired and worn as we were, it was four o'clock in the morning before
the camp became quiet.
In the morning we received marching orders and started through mud and
rain for Memphis. Our clothes were wet and our boots so sodden and
shrunken that we dared not take them off for fear we could not get them
on again. In a few days we reached Memphis and went into camp in the
eastern part of the town. Mud was omnipresent. It was not only the
quintessence of that well known compound, but the most persistent in
its attachments of any that I have ever seen outside of Carrollton,
Louisiana, which is second to no place in the universe in the quantity
and quality of that annoying material.
Our move to Memphis was the beginning, upon entirely new lines, of a
second campaign for the capture of Vicksburg.
[Illustration: JOSEPH SHEAFF]