THROUGH FOREIGN EYES
Praise enough
To fill the ambition of a private man,
That Chatham’s language was his mother tongue
And Wolfe’s great name compatriot with his own.
COWPER.
TRAVELLING about the world before the Great War, no one could fail to
notice that the name of Mr. Lloyd George had already become an ensign.
Men had begun to apply it to that particular type of statesman, becoming
happily less rare, who take risks on behalf of the “common people.” It
had become a way of classifying a statesman to speak of him as “Our
Lloyd George.” This was especially the case with little nations. In
Norway, for instance, during the winter of 1913-14, I found that that
remarkable social reformer, Mr. Castberg, was generally spoken of as the
“Norwegian Lloyd George”; and on meeting him I was surprised to find how
closely he was modelling his policy on that of the British statesman.
His chief aspiration was to meet Mr. Lloyd George and discuss with him
his own schemes for simplifying and enlarging Norwegian social insurance
and reforming their land system.
This was but one example of a very general tendency. There was another
remarkable fact. Those who met and talked with Socialists either in
France or in Germany during 1912-14, must have been astonished to
discover that, in speaking of Great Britain, their thoughts were
concerned not with any British Socialist leader, but almost always with
Mr. Lloyd George. The reason of this was simple, but illuminating.
European Socialism had for half a century been hand-cuffed to an
impracticable idealism. Here was a man who achieved things. He might be
an opportunist and a compromiser. Well, then, there was something to be
said for opportunism and compromise. For the great thing was that, while
all the idealists were still dreaming, this man was awake and
doing.[146]
Apart from the Socialists, there was one European statesman who, long
before the war, already realised Mr. Lloyd George as a possible European
force. That was the great Cretan Greek, M. Venizelos. The instinctive
mutual regard and respect of these two men is one of the most remarkable
things in latter-day politics. There was telepathy in it. Across the
length of Europe they seemed to have caught some message from one
another even before they were acquainted. It was Mr. Lloyd George who
especially urged on the Greek Government that M. Venizelos should come
to the London Conference of 1912. It was on that visit that they met at
the house of a friend and had a long conversation. They found much in
common—a common hope for the little nations, a common belief in the
unity and federation of the Balkan States as the one hope of the Near
East.
It was after this that M. Venizelos said to a friend—“Mr. Lloyd George
will save Europe.”
It was only gradually that Mr. Lloyd George emerged in Western Europe as
a commanding figure in the world war. It was the French who first among
European nations discovered him as a European. This was partly, no
doubt, from some instinctive sympathy between the Gaul and the Celt; for
very large numbers of Frenchmen—the Bretons—are actually still
Celtic—even Welsh—both in thought and language.
It was also that Mr. Lloyd George, in his great munitions campaign, took
so many ideas from the French and realised in a moment, across the gulf
of language, the extraordinary swiftness and power of the French mind,
their amazing courage and capacity in enterprise and organisation. We
have seen how, early in the war, he sat at the feet of the French
Socialist Minister, M. Albert Thomas; and how, at the Boulogne
Conference of June, 1915, he learned from the French gunners. It would
be foolish to pretend that Mr. Lloyd George talks French very well. But
he has learnt to understand their spoken language when it is uttered by
masters like M. Briand and M. Thomas.
But it was not till 1916 that Mr. Lloyd George stood out to the French
with a bright, particular light of his own. Amid the doubts and
hesitations of their own politicians they caught a glimpse of a man
across the Channel who dared to lead—who ventured to tell the people
the unpleasant truths, and to direct them to unpleasant duties.
“A speaker full of free and generous inspiration,” says M.
Georges Leygues in the _Evènement_ of July 7th, 1916, greeting
his appointment to the Ministry of War, “he never fails in his
perception of realities, and he goes straight to the fact.
Passionate interpreter of the soul of his people, which he knows
so well in all its phases—living incarnation of the ardent
Welsh race, he enjoys a real ascendency over the masses. He can
make them understand and accept the length of the effort
necessary to shake that which most offends the proud people of
the West—that boastful and brutal barrack-yard spirit under
which the German military caste designed to bring the free mind
of the world.”
In December, 1916, during the great ministerial crisis which led to the
Lloyd George Premiership, these French writers saw far more clearly than
the journalists of London what was at stake. In London, on both sides,
the writers and politicians were too much absorbed in the personal and
party issue—they regarded it too much as a conflict of newspaper
“combines.” In France, on the other hand, the journalists all realised
that the difference turned round great issues—great questions of method
in the conduct of the war. Here is what that great journal, _Le Temps_,
wrote on December 7th, 1917:
“The English ministerial crisis is just a conflict, at an acute
stage, of two principles and methods of government. One
represents the normal maintenance of traditions, or rather of
conventions, which have stood the proof of long
administration—the ordinary march of the governmental machine.
According to this view, that machine can give us its full value,
if only all its wheels are strengthened without being modified.
The other view holds that there must be new simplifications of
the machinery. The driving power must be organised and
concentrated in one control—and that a control of energy. The
time of good intentions has passed. This is no longer an affair
of ‘Wait and see.’ Mr. Lloyd George takes his stand clearly and
simply on the side of decisive action.”
The _Temps_ was not alone. Philippe Millet, writing in _L’Œuvre_ on the
same day, showed that he had a glimpse of the same issue:
“It is necessary to look beyond the conflict of persons. Then
one discovers a practically unanimous desire to constitute at
last a true War Government. What England has in her mind is the
formation of a sort of Committee of Public Safety.”
England, he perceived, had become more revolutionary than France.
“Conscription had made a greater change in England because it
was in itself a revolution. Beginning later than ourselves, the
English have taken on the habit of changing their political
organisation at great speed and as fast as the war compels them;
and their acquired pace is probably in this stage superior to
ours. It is in England rather than in France that one sees at
this moment the spirit of Carnot reviving.”
Here surely was a very profound political observation. With the same
keenness of insight M. Clemenceau, writing on July 1st, 1917, in
_L’Homme Enchaîné_, saw in Mr. Lloyd George a great political
experimentalist adapting his course always to the actual events of the
war:
“The English Prime Minister is, above all things, a man of
action—one of those who, under the active impulse of living
thought, apply themselves to one task only—and that is to bring
order and method into the plans and resolves which come to them
from a rigorous scrutiny of realities.”
Other French journalists, still seeing these incidents more clearly from
across the water, rejoiced at the change on the broadest possible lines.
“The state of war,” wrote M. Gustave Téry, “demands that all
deliberations should be brief and decisions prompt. Now how can they
possibly be so, if all power is exercised by two dozen Ministers who
pass half their time in discussion and the other half in deploring their
impotence?” Gustave Hervé was even more outspoken in _La Victoire_
(December 7th, 1916):
“Roughly the veils are torn aside in all the allied countries;
and from Petrograd to Paris, from London to Rome, the whole
world turns anxiously towards their Governments, crying, ‘We
want leaders!’
“Lloyd George has been the first in our great countries of the
West to hear the cry of the people.”
M. Fitzmaurice, in the _Figaro_, foresaw how the crisis would end:
“Perhaps he will not have the support of all his colleagues of
to-day, some of whom are precisely those whose delays and
decisions he was arraigning, and from whose hands he wished to
take the War Council; but he will have with him all the men of
action of all the parties who recognise in him a true leader
because they have seen him at work and they know that they can
count on him. He will have with him all the English people and
all the Allies.”
The _Matin_ on the same day (December 7th) analysed the position as
follows:
“In reality the conflict which divides the English political
world is nothing new in the history of peoples. In moments of
great gravity, even of less gravity than the present time, there
has often been felt this imperious necessity to trust the
management of affairs to men of energy. Even revolutions have
arisen, in England itself, and several times, from the
discontent created by Ministers who were excellent in moments of
calm but feeble in serious crises.”
The _Journal_ wrote thus:
“One element dominates the situation. It Is the preponderating
position of Mr. Lloyd George. No Prime Minister could govern
to-day without asking not so much for his collaboration as for
his directions. Lloyd George is the soul of England at war, and
the principal combative arm of Great Britain. Why keep him then
in the second political place? The brain that conceives ought
also to be the will that directs.”
It is, indeed, a remarkable proof of the interest taken by Frenchmen
to-day in the personality of Mr. Lloyd George that perhaps the best of
all the shorter sketches of his career has been written by M. Paul Louis
Hervier and published by that enterprising magazine, _Je Sais Tout_, in
its issue of April 15th, 1917.
To-day, indeed, it is scarcely too much to say that in France Mr. Lloyd
George is the best known and loved of all European statesmen—not even
excluding the statesmen of France itself.
Or turn to another splendid European Ally—Italy. There, too, Mr. Lloyd
George is well appreciated as a leader in the Entente Alliance. Here is
a passage from the _Secolo_ in December, 1916:
Once more we see Lloyd George, the watchful, the innovator, the
inaugurator of new ideas. He has known how, in the country
classic for its individualism, to strengthen and enlarge the
sphere of State action. His first political experiments from
1906 to 1914 were all directed to destroy the _laissez-faire_
system, and to substitute for it the direct and co-ordinated
action of the State, especially when the action of the State
attacked the privileges of the rich classes. To-day Lloyd George
seeks to bring into being a veritable “War Socialism.”
The _Giornale d’Italia_ took the same line:
In comparison with the preceding administration, the new
Government is distinguished for its firmness of decision.
England takes another step along the path of warlike
evolution. . . . Lloyd George’s power is the power of a warrior,
who is determined to subordinate every private interest, that
the interest of the whole nation may prevail. . . . He voices
the conscience of the whole British Empire, which fully realises
that every barrier must be overturned, every obstacle overcome,
that stands in the way of the development of those resources for
war without which it is impossible to beat the enemy.
The _Idea Nazionale_ echoed the same view:
There is a new feeling among the Governments of the Entente—a
new determination to conquer “without the aid of time.” The old
Governments were characterised by their conviction that time was
a substantial ally. This constituted an element of weakness. The
speech of Lloyd George, however, is an authentic interpretation
of the signs of the times. . . .
In an interview with the _Morning Post_ in December, 1916, that
remarkable Italian, Signor Bissolato, expressed these views:
“You ask me what I think of Lloyd George? That is tantamount to
asking me what I think of England. It is rare in history that a
nation has found itself as perfectly identified with one man as
England is to-day with Lloyd George. The world, enemies and
friends included, stands amazed by the energy Lloyd George
displays in dealing with the huge difficulties that the war has
raised. But few know that in the energy of this one man is
apparent the energy of the whole English nation. What is
particularly fortunate is his decisive arrival to power at this
juncture. I say this because if a nation at such critical times
as these does not find the man who is destined to lead it, it
runs the danger of remaining like the giant who cannot find a
weapon to fight with in a conflict which is to decide his
fate. . . . England’s good fortune in having found Lloyd George
is the good fortune of the whole Entente.”
Let us cross from Europe to our new and splendid Ally, the United
States. There the career of Mr. Lloyd George has always been followed
with the closest interest. There was a touch of enterprise—a salt
savour—about his Budget that took the fancy of a country always in love
with daring. The quick and observant journalists who watch affairs in
England on behalf of the American democracy were already warning their
people that Mr. Lloyd George was putting them out of date. In a very
remarkable sketch of Mr. Lloyd George’s land proposals sent to the
American Press in April of 1912 by Mr. James Creelman, he told them that
England was on the verge of a revolution that would make America look
old-fashioned.
“These are stirring and epoch-making times in Old England.
“The old and powerful order of things is about to pass away.”
And in his bright American way he depicted the English aristocracy
crying out:
“Oh! for a way to get rid of the grey-eyed, smiling little Welsh
demon who sits at the Imperial Treasury planning new taxes on
wealth and land; who puts evil ideas of social justice into the
head of the calm, keen, adroit Prime Minister and all the rest
of the Cabinet, and who has bewitched the once humble and
contented British people until they no longer reverence or
respect orthodoxy or the nobility and upper classes!”
Mr. Lloyd George has always been fully as interesting to the leading men
of America. When they visit England, it is he whom they most desire to
see and to meet. President Wilson looks at the world with a slower,
calmer gaze, and arrives at his conclusions very much more gradually.
But President Roosevelt always held Mr. Lloyd George in a fierce
admiration, not unmingled with envy for his success in carrying with him
a militant democracy. Mr. Roosevelt wrote shortly before his death as
follows to a public man in his country:
“Give my heartiest regards to Lloyd George. Do tell him I admire
him immensely. I have always fundamentally agreed with his
social programme, but I wish it supplemented by Lord Roberts’s
external programme. Nevertheless, my agreement with him in
programme is small compared with the fact that I so greatly
admire the character he is now showing in this great crisis. It
is often true that the only way to render great services is by
willingness on the part of the statesman to lose his future, or,
at any rate, his present position in political life, just
exactly as the soldier may have to pay with his physical life in
order to render service in battle.”
As to our own far-flung Empire, there never has been much doubt about
their views in regard to Mr. Lloyd George.
There are enough Welshmen in Canada to see to that Dominion. Sir Wilfrid
Laurier, in a letter of introduction written a year before his death,
wrote:
“Mr. M. is one of your most ardent admirers; and if you do not
know it let me tell you that their number in this country is
legion.”
There he certainly spoke the truth.
Sir Richard Flavelle, the famous Canadian financier, was present in
London during the great financial crisis. On returning to Canada, in a
speech at Ottawa on September 26th, 1916, he spoke as follows:
“During those days the men who met the Chancellor (Mr. Lloyd
George) in Committee were struck with one or two personal
characteristics. One of the noted ones was the man’s
self-effacement. He sought for no glory for himself. He sought
for no recognition for himself. One of the early evidences of
the measure which he had taken of the situation was found, by
the gentlemen who waited upon him, that Mr. Austen Chamberlain
sat by his side. He crossed over to the other side of the House,
and he said—‘I need your assistance.’”
Less expected than the praise of Canada is the admiration of India. Mr.
Lloyd George has never visited India, and he would not claim any special
knowledge of India. But India is the country of the poor man; and the
poor man all over the world has heard in his speeches a new call of
hope. To him Mr. Lloyd George seems a light in great darkness, the
glimmering of a new dawn. Writing before the war, the _Indian Patriot_
said:
“Of all the statesmen at the head of affairs in England to-day
no one exercises the imagination of India so much as Mr. Lloyd
George. He is not known as ‘Mr.’ here, but has gone over to the
ranks of greatness, and is called simply ‘Lloyd George.’ His
force and his earnestness always appeal to the imagination. His
speech is carefully read and treasured up. The cry of India
is—‘When shall we have a Lloyd George over here?’ and the story
of his pensions for the old, his insurance for the sick has
become a legend from the West.
“When will he come as our Viceroy?” is what a poor man asked the
writer. And he was disappointed to be told that he may not come
at all. ‘But then Mr. Lloyd George has many followers, and any
one of them, trained as he is, may come!’ And here was
consolation!”
“They all love him, and are ready to lay down life for him; and all
because he has done so much for the poor.” That is the verdict of India,
where kindness to the poor is a first call on all religions, and not a
pious aspiration controlled by the Poor Law.
Then there are the little “Neutrals.” They ought, by all the rules, to
have seen the best of the game. There is a remarkable article in the
_Journal de Genève_ of May 15th, 1917, which seems to embody the
judgment of the most cautious and level-headed of all the neutral
observers of the war:
“Mr. Lloyd George has been called ‘the Prime Minister of
Europe.’ There is truth in that utterance. Of all the statesmen
who exercise to-day an influence over the destinies of the
world, Mr. Lloyd George is the most attractive, the most
personal, the most wilful, the most audacious. More than all the
others, he sees the future and prepares for it.
“He has two talents which complete his outfit. He knows how to
will, and he knows how to speak.”
Finally, there is one tribute that comes from abroad to Mr. Lloyd George
which certainly ought not to be omitted from this survey:
Of all British statesmen, he was, during the war, the best abused in the
enemy Press.
-----
[146] A remarkable instance of this comes to hand. Prince Kropotkin, in
addressing the Moscow Conference (August 1917), told the Russian
Socialists that there was more Socialism in Mr. Lloyd George’s speeches
than in all their dreams.
APPENDIX A
PRINCIPAL DATES IN MR. LLOYD GEORGE’S LIFE
Birth of David Lloyd George January 17, 1863.
Death of his father June 7, 1864.
Is taken to Llanystundwy August, 1864.
Enters the village school 1869.
Passes Law Preliminary 1877.
Enters solicitor’s office at Portmadoc 1878.
Family moves to Criccieth May 1880.
Visits Houses of Parliament November 1881.
Speech on Egyptian War at Portmadoc November 1882.
Passes Law Finals 1884.
Starts practice at Criccieth 1884.
Starts practice at Portmadoc 1885.
Speaks at Michael Davitt’s meeting 1886.
Llanfrothen case 1888.
Marries Miss Maggie Owen January 24, 1888.
Adopted as Liberal candidate in Carnarvon
Boroughs December 1888.
Elected Alderman for Carnarvonshire County
Council 1889.
Returned M.P. at By-election (majority, 18) April 10, 1890.
Fight over Clergy Discipline Bill 1892.
Second election (majority, 196) July 8, 1892.
Revolt over Welsh Disestablishment Bill 1895.
Third election (General Election—majority,
194) 1895.
Opposes Agricultural Rating Bill 1896.
Opposes Voluntary Schools Bill 1897.
Opposes Tithes Bill 1899.
Speaks against South African War October 27, 1899.
Opposes South African War 1900.
Fourth election at Carnarvon Boroughs
(majority, 296) October 6, 1900.
Mobbed at Birmingham December 18, 1901.
Fights Education Bill 1902.
Welsh Education Revolt 1903.
Defies Schools Coercion Act 1904.
President of the Board of Trade 1905.
Fifth election at Carnarvon Boroughs
(majority, 1224) 1906.
Settles Railway Strike 1907.
Becomes Chancellor of the Exchequer April 12, 1908.
Passes Old Age Pensions Act July 1908.
Visits Germany August 1908.
Introduces Budget April 29, 1909.
Thrown out by Lords November, 1909.
Sixth election at Carnarvon Boroughs
(majority, 1,078) January 1910.
Passes Budget April 28, 1910.
Becomes member of Party Conference June-November 1910.
Seventh election at Carnarvon Boroughs
(majority, 1,208) December 1910.
Introduces Insurance Bill May 4, 1911.
Carries Insurance Bill December 1911.
Land Campaign 1912-1913.
Great War opens August 4, 1914.
Becomes Premier December 1916.
Armistice November 11, 1918.
General Election December 14, 1918.
Peace Conference opens January 18, 1919.
Peace ratified by Parliament July 21st, 1919.
Peace ratified at Versailles January 10, 1920.
APPENDIX B
THE CRISIS OF DECEMBER, 1916
THE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN MR. ASQUITH AND MR. LLOYD GEORGE
_Memorandum of Mr. Lloyd George to Prime Minister, December 1st, 1916._
WAR OFFICE, WHITEHALL, S.W.
1. That the War Committee consist of three members—two of whom must be
the First Lord of the Admiralty and the Secretary of State for War, who
should have in their offices deputies capable of attending to and
deciding all departmental business—and a third Minister without
portfolio. One of the three to be Chairman.
2. That the War Committee shall have full powers, subject to the supreme
control of the Prime Minister, to direct all questions connected with
the war.
3. The Prime Minister, in his discretion, to have the power to refer any
question to the Cabinet.
4. Unless the Cabinet, in reference by the Prime Minister, reverses
decision of the War Cabinet, that decision to be carried out by the
Department concerned.
5. The War Committee to have the power to invite any Minister and to
summon the expert advisers and officers of any Department to its
meetings.
10 DOWNING STREET, WHITEHALL, S.W.
_January 1st, 1916._
_Secret_
MY DEAR LLOYD GEORGE,
I have now had time to reflect on our conversation this
morning, and to study your memorandum.
Though I do not altogether share your dark estimate and forecast
of the situation, actual and perspective, I am in complete
agreement that we have reached a critical situation in the war,
and that our methods of procedure, with the experience which we
have gained during the last few months, call for reconsideration
and revision.
The two main defects of the War Committee, which has done
excellent work, are:
(1) That its numbers are too large.
(2) That there is delay, evasion, and often obstruction
on the part of the Departments in giving effect to its
decisions.
I might with good reason add (3) that it is often kept in
ignorance by the Departments of information, essential and even
vital, of a technical kind, upon the problems that come before
it: and (4) that it is overcharged with duties, many of which
might well be relegated to subordinate bodies.
The result is that I am clearly of opinion that the War
Committee should be reconstituted, and its relation to and
authority over the Departments be more clearly defined and more
effectively asserted.
I come now to your specific proposals.
In my opinion, whatever changes are made in the composition and
functions of the War Committee, the Prime Minister must be its
Chairman. He cannot be relegated to the position of an arbiter
in the background or a referee to the Cabinet.
In regard to its composition, I agree that the War Secretary and
the First Lord of the Admiralty are necessary members. I am
inclined to add to the same category the Minister of Munitions.
There should be another member, either without portfolio or
charged only with comparatively light departmental duties. One
of the members should be appointed Vice-Chairman.
I purposely do not in this letter discuss the delicate and
difficult question of personnel.
The Committee should, as far as possible, sit _de die diem_, and
have full power to see that its decisions (subject to appeal to
the Cabinet) are carried out promptly and effectively by the
Departments.
The reconstitution of the War Committee should be accompanied by
the setting up of a Committee of National Organisation, to deal
with the purely domestic side of war problems. It should have
executive powers within its own domain.
The Cabinet would in all cases have ultimate authority.
Yours very sincerely,
(Sd.) H. H. ASQUITH.
10 DOWNING STREET, S.W.
_December 4th, 1916._
_Secret_
MY DEAR LLOYD GEORGE,
Such productions as the first leading article in to-day’s
_Times_, showing the infinite possibilities for misunderstanding
and misrepresentation of such an arrangement as we considered
yesterday, make me at least doubtful as to its feasibility.
Unless the impression is at once corrected that I am being
relegated to the position of an irresponsible spectator of the
war, I cannot possibly go on.
The suggested arrangement was to the following effect. The Prime
Minister to have supreme and effective control of War Policy.
The agenda of the War Committee will be submitted to him; its
Chairman will report to him daily; he can direct it to consider
particular topics or proposals; and all its conclusions will be
subject to his approval or veto. He can, of course, at his own
discretion attend meetings of the Committee.
Yours sincerely,
(Sd.) H. H. ASQUITH.
WAR OFFICE, WHITEHALL, S.W.
_December 4th, 1916._
MY DEAR PRIME MINISTER,
I have not seen the _Times’_ article. But I hope you will
not attach undue importance to these effusions. I have had these
misrepresentations to put up with for months. Northcliffe
frankly wants a smash. Derby and I do not. Northcliffe would
like to make this and any other rearrangement under your
Premiership impossible. Derby and I attach great importance to
your retaining your present position—effectively. I cannot
restrain, or, I fear, influence Northcliffe. I fully accept in
letter and in spirit your summary of the suggested
arrangement—subject, of course, to personnel.
Ever sincerely,
(Sd.) D. LLOYD GEORGE.
10 DOWNING STREET, WHITEHALL, S.W.
_December 4th, 1916_
_Secret_
MY DEAR LLOYD GEORGE,
Thank you for your letter of this morning.
The King gave me to-day authority to ask and accept the
resignation of all my colleagues, and to form a new Government
on such lines as I should submit to him. I start therefore with
a clean slate.
The first question which I have to consider is the constitution
of the new War Committee.
After full consideration of the matter in all its aspects, I
have come decidedly to the conclusion that it is not possible
that such a Committee could be made workable and effective
without the Prime Minister as its Chairman. I quite agree that
it will be necessary for him, in view of the other calls upon
his time and energy, to delegate from time to time the
Chairmanship to another Minister as representative and _locum
tenens_; but (if he is to retain the authority, which
corresponds to his responsibility as Prime Minister) he must
continue to be, as he always has been, its permanent President.
I am satisfied, on reflection, that any other arrangement (such
as, for instance, the one which I indicated to you in my letter
of to-day) would be found in experience impracticable and
incompatible with the retention of the Prime Minister’s final
and supreme control.
The other question, which you have raised, relates to the
personnel of the Committee. Here again, after deliberate
consideration, I find myself unable to agree with some of your
suggestions. I think we both agree that the First Lord of the
Admiralty must, of necessity, be a member of the Committee.
I cannot (as I told you yesterday) be a party to any suggestion
that Mr. Balfour should be displaced. The technical side of the
Board of Admiralty has been reconstituted, with Sir John
Jellicoe as First Sea Lord. I believe Mr. Balfour to be, under
existing conditions, the necessary head of the Board.
I must add that Sir Edward Carson (for whom personally and in
every other way I have the greatest regard) is not, from the
only point of view which is significant to me (namely, the most
effective prosecution of the war) the man best qualified among
my colleagues present or past to be a member of the War
Committee.
I have only to say, in conclusion, that I am strongly of opinion
that the War Committee (without any disparagement of the
existing Committee, which in my judgment is a most efficient
body, and has done and is doing invaluable work) ought to be
reduced in number: so that it can sit more frequently, and
overtake more easily the daily problems with which it has to
deal. But in any reconstruction of the Committee, such as I
have, and have for some time past had in view, the governing
consideration to my mind is the special capacity of the men who
are to sit on it for the work which it has to do.
That is a question which I must reserve for myself to decide.
Yours very sincerely,
(Sd.) H. H. ASQUITH.
_December 5th, 1916._
MY DEAR PRIME MINISTER,
I received your letter with some surprise.
On Friday I made proposals which involved not merely your
retention of the Premiership, but the supreme control of the
war, whilst the executive functions, subject to that supreme
control, were left to others. I thought you then received these
suggestions favourably. In fact, you yourself proposed that I
should be the Chairman of this Executive Committee, although, as
you know, I never put forward that demand. On Saturday you wrote
me a letter in which you completely went back on that
proposition. You sent for me on Sunday, and put before me other
proposals; these proposals you embodied in a letter written on
Monday:
“The Prime Minister to have supreme and effective
control of war policy.
“The agenda of the War Committee will be submitted to
him; its Chairman will report to him daily; he can
direct it to consider particular topics or proposals;
and all its conclusions will be subject to his approval
or veto. He can, of course, at his own discretion,
attend meetings of the Committee.”
These proposals safeguarded your position and power as Prime
Minister in every particular. I immediately wrote you accepting
them “in letter and in spirit.” It is true that on Sunday I
expressed views as to the constitution of the Committee, but
these were for discussion. To-day you have gone back on your own
proposals.
I have striven my utmost to cure the obvious defects of the War
Committee without overthrowing the Government. As you are aware,
on several occasions during the last two years I have deemed it
my duty to express profound dissatisfaction with the
Government’s method of conducting the war. Many a time, with the
road to victory open in front of us, we have delayed and
hesitated whilst the enemy were erecting barriers that finally
checked the approach. There has been delay, hesitation, lack of
forethought and vision. I have endeavoured repeatedly to warn
the Government of the dangers, both verbally and in written
memoranda and letters, which I crave your leave now to publish
if my action is challenged; but I have either failed to secure
decisions or I have secured them when it is too late to avert
the evils. The latest illustration is our lamentable failure to
give timely support to Roumania.
I have more than once asked to be released from my
responsibility for a policy with which I was in thorough
disagreement, but at your urgent personal request, I remained in
the Government. I realise that when the country is in the peril
of a great war, Ministers have not the same freedom to resign on
disagreement. At the same time I have always felt—and felt
deeply—that I was in a false position, inasmuch as I could
never defend in a whole-hearted manner the action of a
Government of which I was a member. We have thrown away
opportunity after opportunity, and I am convinced, after deep
and anxious reflection, that it is my duty to leave the
Government in order to inform the people of the real condition
of affairs, and to give them an opportunity, before it is too
late, to save their native land from a disaster which is
inevitable if the present methods are longer persisted in. As
all delay is fatal in war, I place my office without further
parley at your disposal.
It is with great personal regret that I have come to this
conclusion. In spite of mean and unworthy insinuations to the
contrary—insinuations which I fear are always inevitable in the
case of men who hold prominent but not primary positions in any
administration—I have felt a strong personal attachment to you
as my Chief. As you yourself said on Sunday, we have acted
together for ten years and never a quarrel, although we have had
many a grave difference on questions of policy. You have treated
me with great courtesy and kindness: for all that I thank you.
Nothing would have induced me to part now except an overwhelming
sense that the course of action which has been pursued has put
the country—and not merely the country, but throughout the
world, the principles for which you and I have always stood
throughout our political lives—in the greatest peril that has
ever overtaken them.
As I am fully conscious of the importance of preserving national
unity, I propose to give your Government complete support in the
vigorous prosecution of the war; but unity without action is
nothing but futile carnage, and I cannot be responsible for
that. Vigour and vision are the supreme need of this hour.
Yours sincerely,
(Sd.) D. LLOYD GEORGE.
10 DOWNING STREET, S.W.
_December 5th, 1916._
_Private_
MY DEAR LLOYD GEORGE,
I need not tell you that I have read your letter of to-day
with much regret.
I do not comment upon it for the moment, except to say that I
cannot wholly accept your account of what passed between us in
regard to my connection with the War Committee.
In particular, you have omitted to quote the first and most
material part of my letter of yesterday.
Yours very sincerely,
(Sd.) H. H. ASQUITH.
In the meantime, I feel sure that you will see the obvious
necessity, in the public interest, of not publishing, at this
moment, any part of our correspondence.
WAR OFFICE, S.W.
_December 5th, 1916._
MY DEAR PRIME MINISTER,
I cannot announce my resignation without assigning the
reason. Your request that I should not publish the
correspondence that led up to and necessitated it places me
therefore in an embarrassing and unfair position. I must give
reasons for the grave step I have taken. If you forbid
publication of the correspondence, do you object to my stating
in another form my version of the causes that led to my
resigning?
Yours sincerely,
(Sd.) D. LLOYD GEORGE.
As to the first part of your letter, the publication of the
letter would cover the whole ground.
10 DOWNING STREET, S.W.
_December 5th, 1916._
MY DEAR LLOYD GEORGE,
It may make a difference to you (in reply to your last
letter) if I tell you at once that I have tendered my
resignation to the King. In any case, I should deprecate in the
public interest the publication in its present form at this
moment of your letter to me of this morning.
Of course, I have neither the power nor the wish to prevent your
stating in some other form the causes which led you to take the
step which you have taken.
Yours very sincerely,
(Sd.) H. H. ASQUITH.
APPENDIX C
THE PEACE CONFERENCE
THE CRITICAL RUSSIAN DEBATE OF JANUARY, 1919
_Bullitt Exhibit No. 14_
McD. I.C. 114. Secretaries’ notes of a conversation held in M. Pichon’s
room, at the Quai D’Orsay, on Tuesday, January 21st, 1919, at 15 hours
(3 p.m.).
_Present:_
_United States of America._—President Wilson, Mr. R. Lansing, Mr. A. H.
Frazier, Colonel U. S. Grant, Mr. L. Harrison.
_British Empire._—The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, the Right Hon. A. J.
Balfour, Lieut.-Col. Sir M. P. A. Hankey, K.C.B., Major A. M. Caccia,
M.V.O., Mr. E. Phipps.
_France._—M. Clemenceau, M. Pichon, M. Dutasta, H. Berthelot, Captain
A. Potier.
_Italy._—Signor Orlando, H. E. Baron Sonnino, Count Aldrovandi, Major
A. Jones.
_Japan._—Baron Makino, H. E. M. Matsui, M. Saburi.
_Interpreter._—Prof. P. J. Mantoux.
_Situation in Russia_
M. Clemenceau said they had met together to decide what could be done in
Russia under present circumstances.
President Wilson said that, in order to have something definite to
discuss, he wished to take advantage of a suggestion made by Mr. Lloyd
George, and to propose a modification of the British proposal. He wished
to suggest that the various organised groups in Russia should be asked
to send representatives, not to Paris, but to some other place, such as
Salonika, convenient of approach, there to meet such representatives as
might be appointed by the Allies, in order to see if they could draw up
a programme upon which agreement could be reached.
Mr. Lloyd George pointed out that the advantage of this would be that
they could be brought there from Russia through the Black Sea without
passing through other countries.
M. Sonnino said that some of the representatives of the various
Governments were already here in Paris, for example, M. Sazonoff. Why
should not these be heard?
President Wilson expressed the view that the various parties should not
be heard separately. It would be very desirable to get all these
representatives in one place, and still better, all in one room, in
order to obtain a close comparison of views.
Mr. Balfour said that a further objection to M. Sonnino’s plan was that
if M. Sazonoff was heard in Paris it would be difficult to hear the
others in Paris also, and M. Clemenceau objected strongly to having some
of these representatives in Paris.
M. Sonnino explained that all the Russian parties had some
representatives here, except the Soviets, whom they did not wish to
hear.
Mr. Lloyd George remarked that the Bolshevists were the very people some
of them wished to hear.
M. Sonnino continuing, said that they had heard M. Litvinoff’s
statements that morning.
(That was the statement that Litvinoff had made to Buckler, which the
President had read to the council of ten that morning.)
The Allies were now fighting against the Bolshevists, who were their
enemies, and therefore they were not obliged to hear them with the
others.
Mr. Balfour remarked that the essence of President Wilson’s proposal was
that the parties must all be heard at one and the same time.
Mr. Lloyd George expressed the view that the acceptance of M. Sonnino’s
proposals would amount to their hearing a string of people, all of whom
held the same opinion, and all of whom would strike the same note. But
they would not hear the people who at the present moment were actually
controlling European Russia. In deference to M. Clemenceau’s views they
had put forward this new proposal. He thought it would be quite safe to
bring the Bolshevist representatives to Salonika, or perhaps to Lemnos.
It was absolutely necessary to endeavour to make peace. The report read
by President Wilson that morning went to show that the Bolshevists were
not convinced of the error of their ways, but they apparently realised
the folly of their present methods. Therefore they were endeavouring to
come to terms.
President Wilson asked to be permitted to urge one aspect of the case.
As M. Sonnino had implied, they were all repelled by Bolshevism, and for
that reason they had placed armed men in opposition to them. One of the
things that was clear in the Russian situation was that, by opposing
Bolshevism with arms, they were in reality serving the cause of
Bolshevism. The Allies were making it possible for the Bolsheviks to
argue that Imperialistic and Capitalistic Governments were endeavouring
to exploit the country and to give the land back to the landlords, and
so bring about a reaction. If it could be shown that this was not true,
and that the Allies were prepared to deal with the rulers of Russia,
much of the moral force of this argument would disappear. The
allegations that the Allies were against the people, and wanted to
control their affairs, provided the argument which enabled them to raise
armies. If, on the other hand, the Allies could swallow their pride and
the natural repulsion which they felt for the Bolshevists, and see the
representatives of all organised groups in one place, he thought it
would bring about a marked reaction against Bolshevism.
M. Clemenceau said that in principle he did not favour conversation with
the Bolshevists, not because they were criminals, but because we would
be raising them to our level by saying that they were worthy of entering
into conversation with us. The Bolshevist danger was very great at the
present moment. It had invaded the Baltic provinces and Poland, and that
very morning they received bad news regarding its spread to Buda-Pesth
and Vienna. Italy, also, was in danger. The danger was probably greater
there than in France. If Bolshevism, after spreading to Germany, were to
traverse Austria and Hungary, and so reach Italy, Europe would be faced
with a very great danger. Therefore, something must be done against
Bolshevism. When listening to the document presented by President Wilson
that morning, he had been struck by the cleverness with which the
Bolshevists were attempting to lay a trap for the Allies. When the
Bolshevists first came into power, a breach was made with the Capitalist
Government on questions of principle, but now they offered funds and
concessions as a basis for treating with them. He need not say how
valueless their promises were, but, if they were listened to, the
Bolshevists would go back to their people and say, “We offered them
great principles of justice, and the Allies would have nothing to do
with us. Now we offer money, and they are ready to make peace.”
He admitted his remarks did not offer a solution. The great misfortune
was that the Allies were in need of a speedy solution. After four years
of war, and the losses and sufferings they had incurred, their
populations could stand no more. Russia also was in need of immediate
peace. But its necessary evolution must take time. The signing of the
world’s peace could not await Russia’s final avatar. Had time been
available, he would suggest waiting, for eventually sound men
representing common sense would come to the top. But when would that be?
He could make no forecast. Therefore they must press for an early
solution.
To sum up, had he been acting by himself, he would temporise and erect
barriers to prevent Bolshevism from spreading. But he was not alone, and
in the presence of his colleagues he felt compelled to make some
concession, as it was essential that there should not be even the
appearance of disagreement amongst them. The concession came easier
after hearing President Wilson’s suggestions. He thought they should
make a very clear and convincing appeal to all reasonable peoples,
emphatically stating that they did not wish in any way to interfere in
the internal affairs of Russia, and especially that they had no
intention of restoring Czardom. The object of the Allies being to hasten
the creation of a strong Government, they proposed to call together
representatives of all parties to a conference. He would beg President
Wilson to draft a paper, fully explaining the position of the Allies to
the whole world, including the Russians and the Germans.
Mr. Lloyd George agreed, and gave notice that he wished to withdraw his
own motion in favour of President Wilson’s.
Mr. Balfour said that he understood that all these people were to be
asked on an equality. On these terms he thought the Bolshevists would
refuse, and by their refusal they would put themselves in a very bad
position.
M. Sonnino said that he did not agree that the Bolshevists would not
come. He thought they would be the first to come, because they would be
eager to put themselves on an equality with the others. He would remind
his colleagues that, before the Peace of Brest-Litovsk was signed, the
Bolshevists promised all sorts of things, such as to refrain from
propaganda, but since that peace had been concluded they had broken all
their promises, their one idea being to spread revolution in all other
countries. His idea was to collect together all the anti-Bolshevist
parties, and help them to make a strong Government, provided they
pledged themselves not to serve the forces of reaction, and especially
not to touch the land question, thereby depriving the Bolshevists of
their strongest argument. Should they take these pledges, he would be
prepared to help them.
Mr. Lloyd George enquired how this help would be given.
M. Sonnino replied that help would be given with soldiers to a
reasonable degree or by supplying arms, food and money. For instance,
Poland asked for weapons, and munitions; the Ukraine asked for weapons.
All the Allies wanted was to establish a strong Government. The reason
that no strong Government at present existed was that no party could
risk taking the offensive against Bolshevism without the assistance of
the Allies. He would enquire how the parties of order could possibly
succeed without the assistance of the Allies. President Wilson had said
that they should put aside all pride in the matter. He would point out
that for Italy, and probably for France also, as M. Clemenceau had
stated, it was in reality a question of self-defence. He thought that
even a partial recognition of the Bolshevists would strengthen their
position, and, speaking for himself, he thought that Bolshevism was
already a serious danger in his country.
Mr. Lloyd George said he wished to put one or two practical questions to
M. Sonnino. The British Empire now had some 15,000 to 20,000 men in
Russia. M. de Scavenius had estimated that some 150,000 additional men
would be required, in order to keep the anti-Bolshevist Governments from
dissolution. And General Franchet d’Esperey also insisted on the
necessity of Allied assistance. Now Canada had decided to withdraw her
troops, because the Canadian soldiers would not agree to stay and fight
against the Russians. Similar trouble had also occurred amongst the
other Allied troops. And he felt certain that, if the British tried to
send any more troops there, there would be mutiny.
M. Sonnino suggested that volunteers might be called for.
Mr. Lloyd George, continuing, said that it would be impossible to raise
150,000 in that way. He asked, however, what contributions America,
Italy, and France would make towards the raising of this army.
President Wilson and M. Clemenceau each said none.
M. Orlando agreed that Italy could make no further contributions.
Mr. Lloyd George said that the Bolshevists had an army of 300,000 men,
who would, before long, be good soldiers, and to fight them at least
400,000 Russian soldiers would be required. Who would feed, equip, and
pay them? Would Italy, or America, or France do so? If they were unable
to do that, what would be the good of fighting Bolshevism? It could not
be crushed by speeches. He sincerely trusted that they would accept
President Wilson’s proposal as it now stood.
M. Orlando agreed that the question was a very difficult one for the
reasons that had been fully given. He agreed that Bolshevism constituted
a grave danger to all Europe. To prevent a contagious epidemic from
spreading, the sanitarians set up a _cordon sanitaire_. If similar
measures could be taken against Bolshevism, in order to prevent its
spreading, it might be overcome, since to isolate it meant vanquishing
it. Italy was now passing through a period of depression, due to war
weariness. But Bolshevists could never triumph there, unless they found
a favourable medium, such as might be produced either by a profound
patriotic disappointment in their expectations as to the rewards of the
war, or by an economic crisis. Either might lead to revolution, which
was equivalent to Bolshevism. Therefore, he would insist that all
possible measures should be taken to set up this cordon. Next, he
suggested the consideration of repressive measures. He thought two
methods were possible: either the use of physical force or the use of
moral force. He thought Mr. Lloyd George’s objection to the use of
physical force unanswerable. The occupation of Russia meant the
employment of troops for an indefinite period of time. This meant an
apparent prolongation of the war. There remained the use of moral force.
He agreed with M. Clemenceau that no country could continue in anarchy,
and that an end must eventually come; but they could not wait—they
could not proceed to make peace and ignore Russia. Therefore, Mr. Lloyd
George’s proposal, with the modifications introduced after careful
consideration by President Wilson and M. Clemenceau, gave a possible
solution. It did not involve entering into negotiations with the
Bolshevists; the proposal was merely an attempt to bring together all
the parties in Russia with a view to finding a way out of the present
difficulty. He was prepared, therefore, to support it.
President Wilson asked for the views of his Japanese colleagues.
Baron Makino said that after carefully considering the various points of
view put forward, he had no objections to make regarding the conclusions
reached. He thought that was the best solution under the circumstances.
He wished, however, to enquire what attitude would be taken by the
representatives of the Allied Powers if the Bolshevists accepted the
invitation to the meeting, and there insisted upon their principles. He
thought they should under no circumstances countenance Bolshevist ideas.
The conditions in Siberia east of the Baikal had greatly improved. The
objects which had necessitated the despatch of troops to that region had
been attained. Bolshevism was no longer aggressive, though it might
still persist in a latent form. In conclusion, he wished to support the
proposal before the meeting.
President Wilson expressed the view that the emissaries of the Allied
Powers should not be authorised to adopt any definite attitude towards
Bolshevism. They should merely report back to their Governments the
conditions found.
Mr. Lloyd George asked that that question be further considered. He
thought the emissaries of the Allied Powers should be able to establish
an agreement if they were able to find a solution. For instance, if they
succeeded in reaching an agreement on the subject of the organisation of
a Constituent Assembly, they should be authorised to accept such a
compromise without the delay of a reference to the Governments.
President Wilson suggested that the emissaries might be furnished with a
body of instructions.
Mr. Balfour expressed the view that abstention from hostile action
against their neighbours should be made a condition of their sending
representatives to this meeting.
President Wilson agreed.
M. Clemenceau suggested that the manifesto to the Russian parties should
be based solely on humanitarian grounds. They should say to the
Russians, “You are threatened by famine; we are prompted by humanitarian
feelings, we are making peace; we do not want people to die. We are
prepared to see what can be done to remove the menace of starvation.” He
thought the Russians would at once prick up their ears, and be prepared
to hear what the Allies had to say. They would add that food cannot be
sent unless peace and order were re-established. It should, in fact, be
made quite clear that the representatives of all parties would merely be
brought together for purely humane reasons.
Mr. Lloyd George said that in this connection he wished to invite
attention to a doubt expressed by certain of the delegates of the
British Dominions, namely, whether there would be enough food and credit
to go round, should an attempt be made to feed all Allied countries, and
enemy countries, and Russia also. The export of so much food would
inevitably have the effect of raising food prices in Allied countries,
and so create discontent and Bolshevism. As regards grain, Russia had
always been an exporting country, and there was evidence to show that
plenty of food at present existed in the Ukraine.
President Wilson said that his information was that enough food existed
in Russia, but either on account of its being hoarded or on account of
difficulties of transportation, it could not be made available.
It was agreed that President Wilson should draft a proclamation, for
consideration at the next meeting, inviting all organised parties in
Russia to attend a meeting to be held at some selected place such as
Salonika or Lemnos, in order to discuss with the representatives of the
Allied and Associated Great Powers the means of restoring order and
peace in Russia. Participation in the meeting should be conditional on a
cessation of hostilities.
APPENDIX D
THE “FOURTEEN POINTS”
IN view of the fact that the Armistice negotiations started from the
acceptance of President Wilson’s Fourteen Points by the Germans, and
that the Peace Conference pivoted round those points as modified by the
Allies at the Versailles Council of October, 1918, it is of interest to
attach a full and complete version of the original Fourteen Points, as
set forth by President Wilson in his great speech of January 8th, 1918:
I. OPEN COVENANTS of peace openly arrived at, after which there shall be
no private international understandings of any kind, but diplomacy shall
proceed always frankly and in the public view.
II. ABSOLUTE FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION upon the seas outside the territorial
waters, alike in peace and in war, except as the seas may be closed in
whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of
international covenants.
III. THE REMOVAL, SO FAR AS POSSIBLE, of all economic barriers, and the
establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations
consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its maintenance.
IV. Adequate guarantees given and taken that NATIONAL ARMAMENTS WILL BE
REDUCED TO THE LOWEST POINT consistent with domestic safety.
V. A free, open-minded, and absolutely IMPARTIAL ADJUSTMENT OF ALL
COLONIAL CLAIMS, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in
determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the
populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims
of the Government whose title is to be determined.
VI. =The evacuation of all Russian territory, and such a settlement
of all questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest
co-operation of the other nations= of the world in obtaining for
her an unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent
determination of her own political development and national policy, and
assure her of a sincere welcome into the society of free nations under
institutions of her own choosing; and more than a welcome assistance
also of every kind that she may need and may herself desire. The
treatment accorded to Russia by her sister nations in the months to come
will be the acid test of their good-will, of their comprehension of her
needs as distinguished from their own interests, and of their
intelligent and unselfish sympathy.
VII. =Belgium, the whole world will agree, must be evacuated and
restored= without any attempt to limit the sovereignty which she
enjoys in common with all other free nations. No other single act will
serve as this will serve to restore confidence among the nations in the
laws which they have themselves set and determined for the government of
their relations with one another. Without this healing act, the whole
structure and validity of international law is for ever impaired.
VIII. ALL FRENCH TERRITORY SHOULD BE FREED, and the invaded portions
restored, and the wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 in the matter
of ALSACE-LORRAINE, which has unsettled the peace of the world for fifty
years, SHOULD BE RIGHTED in order that peace may once more be made
secure in the interests of all.
IX. A READJUSTMENT OF THE FRONTIERS OF ITALY should be effected along
clearly recognisable lines of nationality.
X. THE PEOPLES OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY, whose place among the nations we wish
to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the first opportunity
of AUTONOMOUS DEVELOPMENT.
XI. Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro should be evacuated, occupied
territories restored, Serbia accorded free and secure access to the sea,
and the relations of the several Balkan States to one another determined
by friendly counsel along historically established lines of allegiance
and nationality, and international guarantees of the political and
economic independence and territorial integrity of the several Balkan
States should be entered into.
XII. THE TURKISH PORTIONS of the present Ottoman Empire should be
ASSURED A SECURE SOVEREIGNTY, but the OTHER NATIONALITIES which are
under Turkish rule should be ASSURED AN UNDOUBTED SECURITY OF LIFE, and
an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and the
DARDANELLES should be PERMANENTLY OPENED as a free passage to the ships
and commerce of all nations under international guarantees.
XIII. =An Independent Polish State should be erected=, which
should include the territories inhabited by INDISPUTABLY POLISH
POPULATIONS, which should be assured a free and secure access to the
sea, and whose political and economic independence and territorial
integrity should be guaranteed by international covenant.
XIV. A GENERAL ASSOCIATION OF NATIONS must be formed under specific
covenant for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political
independence and territorial integrity to great and small States alike.
NOTE.—Point II was practically cut out of the terms by the Versailles
Council. Note the comprehensiveness of Point XIII, which explains the
largeness of the Polish claims. Point XIV is the germ of the League of
Nations idea, and is carried out in the famous clause 10 of the Covenant
since rejected by the Senate of the United States.
Note that there is no mention of indemnities; but the Council of
Versailles opened the door by insisting on compensation to civilian
populations. The £5,000,000,000 claimed in the Treaty represents an
instalment of that claim which is estimated as likely to amount to
£8,000,000,000.
INDEX
Acland, Sir Arthur, 81, 168
Addison, Dr., speech on Munitions, 218;
Introduces Housing Bill, 314
Agadir Speech at Mansion House, 159
Agricultural Rates Bill (1896), 108
Aisne, the, 280
Albert, 274
American Army reinforcements, 1918, 276
Amiens, 151;
German attempt to capture, 277, 281
Arabi Pasha, 48
Armentières, 278
Armistice, conditions of, 283;
declared, 284
Arnold, Matthew, 50, 147
Asquith, Mr., and Welsh Disestablishment, 105;
successor to Campbell-Bannerman, 112;
and South African War, 115;
in opposition (1902), 129, 134;
and Tariff Reform, 136;
Premier, 149;
evidence on Bulgaria, 191;
munition speech, Newcastle, 213;
reconstruction of Government (1915), 214;
interview of December 1916, 236;
negotiations with Mr. Lloyd George, 237;
downfall of Government, 242;
refuses Woolsack, 242;
and Maurice incident, 267
Athens, 184
Aubers Ridge, attack on, 214
Austria, strength in 1915, 198;
Italy declares war on, 200;
surrenders, 283
Bailleul 278
Balfour, Mr., weakening of his Government, 130, 133;
Budget (1910), 164;
and conference of 1910, 165;
attends Peace Conference, 287, 299
Balkans, the, proposal to combine, 179, 181;
German intrigue in, 184;
suggestion to send Mr. Lloyd George, 196;
attempt to bring together, 192
Bangor, part of constituency, 78;
speech during South African War, 117, 123
Bar le Duc, 151
Barnes, Mr. G., attends Peace Conference, 287;
remains in Government, 308
Berlin, 154;
visit to Central Insurance Office, 158
Bethmann-Hollweg, Herr, entertained by, 154, 155
Birmingham, speech on South African War, 117, 322
Bissolati, Signor, _Morning Post_ interview, 353
Blunt, Mr. Wilfrid, 48
Board of Education, 134
Board of Trade, Mr. Lloyd George appointed President, 138;
work at, 139
Bolshevists, _coup d’état_ (1917), 272;
peace with Germany, 272;
proposed Conference, 295
Bonar Law, Mr., unable to form Government, 242;
attends Peace Conference, 287;
acts as leader of Government, 313
Booth, Mr. Charles, 167
Borden, Sir R., and Peace Conference, 287
Botha, General, 118, 119, 180;
conquers South-West Africa, 200;
and Peace Conference, 287
Brace, Mr. W., leaves Coalition, 316
Brecon, 133
Breese, Jones and Casson, Messrs., solicitors, 41, 43, 54, 95
Brest-Litovsk, 200; peace negotiations, 272
Briand, M., 347
British Columbia, visit to, 114
Brockdorff-Rantzau, Herr, Treaty presented, 302
“Brutus,” pen-name (1880), 46
Budget (1890), compensation for licences, 88;
Conference of Party Leaders, 165;
(1909), 162;
thrown out by Lords, 164, 337
Budget League, 163
Bukovina, invasion by Russians, 176;
Russians driven from, 197
Bulgaria, divided in counsel, 179;
Greek conditions of joining war, 186;
refuges promise of neutrality, 189;
pledged to Central Powers, 190;
offers to lend troops, 191;
President Wilson leans towards, 300
Bullitt, Mr. W. C., evidence before American Senate, 296;
Mission to Russia, 296
Burial Act (1880), case at Llanfrothen, 66
Burke, Edmund, 124;
Mr. Lloyd George’s opinion of, 342
Butler, Sir Wm., 115
Buxton, the Brothers, journey to Sofia, 184;
proposals from Sofia, 187
Byron, Mr. Lloyd George’s admiration of, 339
Cadbury, Mr. George, 121
Cadorna, General, Conference July (1917), 262
Caine, Mr. W. S., 53
Camber-Williams, Canon, 25
Campbell-Bannerman, Sir H., Premier, 112;
self-government for South Africa, 118;
in opposition, 129;
Premier (1905), 138;
resignation, 149
Cannes, 328
Carnarvon Boroughs, first aspirations to Parliament, 75;
adopted candidate, 78;
first election, 84
_Carnarvon and Denbigh Herald_, 50, 72, 80, 84
Carpathians, German advance in, 197
Castberg, Mr., Norwegian Prime Minister, 345
Castlereagh, Lord, 300
Casson, Mr., solicitor, 42, 95
Catechism, revolt against, 271
Cecil, Lord Robert, League of Nations Committee, 298
Central Powers, division amongst, 223
Châlons-sur-Marne, 151
Chamberlain, Mr. Joseph, Radical programme of, 53;
defence of, 56;
liquor compensation, 90;
Kynoch debate, 125;
Tariff Reform, 136;
admiration of, 232;
party machine and, 336
Champagne, attack in, 252
Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. Lloyd George appointed, 149
Churchill, Lord Randolph, 53, 90
Churchill, Mr. Winston, 163;
Minister of Munitions, 226
City Temple, speech at, 202
Cividale, 253
Clemenceau, M., 270, 275;
discussion of Armistice terms, 282;
and Peace Conference, 288;
leanings to Turkey, 300;
after-war problems, 304;
in _L’Homme Enchaîné_, 350
Clergy Discipline Bill, opposition to, 102
Clynes, Mr. J. R., leaves Coalition, 308
Coalition Government formed, 308
Coleridge, Chief Justice, Llanfrothen case, 68
Compiègne, 151
Conferences, Allied (1915), 186;
Rome (1917), 248;
Allied Generals (1916), 251;
Rapallo (1917), 254
Congress of Vienna, 300
Conscription, conversion to, 200
Constantine, King, frustration of Entente, 184;
unfriendly to British, 190;
attempt to build up absolute monarchy, 193;
exiled, 194
Cook, Sir Edward, 121
County Councils, creation of, 80
Courland, invaded by Russians, 196
Creelman, Mr. J., 354
Criccieth, 11, 41, 73, 95, 98, 123
Cromer, Lord, 48
_Daily News_, 85;
transfer of, 121;
attacks on Government, 309
Daniel, D. R., 76
Danube, proposed diversion along line of, 179
Dardanelles Report of Commission, 178;
campaign opens, 190;
in progress, 195;
composition of committee, 196;
failure of naval attack, 202;
meetings of committee, 203
Davitt, Michael, 52-53
Derby Scheme, 202
Denikin, General, 297
De Wet, General, 116, 119
Dillon, John, 110
Disciples of Christ, religious sect 17, 340
Disestablishment, Welsh, resolution at meeting of National Council (1889),
speech at Met. Tabernacle, 93;
production of Bill (1893), 82;
speech at Cardiff (1907), 146, 104;
Defaulting Authorities Act (1904), 133
Downing Street, speech on Armistice Day, 285
Du Cane, Lieut.-Gen. Sir J. P., Munitions Conference (1915), 219
Dunajec, 199
Durazzo, 180
Eastern Prussia, Russian invasion of, 176
Eastern Galicia, Russian invasion of, 176
Ebert, Herr, appointed German Chancellor, 284
Education Bill (1902), opposition to, 129
Edwards, Sir Frank, 98, 132
Elections, parliamentary, (1885), 56;
financial arrangements for, 94;
(1900), 127;
(1910), 164;
(2nd 1910), 166;
(1918), 286, 306, 309;
figures, 328
Ellis, “Tom,” 60, 77, 98
Estimates, criticism of (1890), 92
European War, menace of, 170;
declared, 171
Evans, David, schoolmaster of Llanystumdwy, 23, 38
Evans, Sir Samuel, 65, 97
Explosives Committee, formation of, 208
Extension of Rents Act, passed, 316
Fairbairn, Principal, 341
Falkenhayn, General, 269
Finland, surrendered to Germany, 292
Fitzmaurice, M., in _Figaro_, 351
Fiume, question at Peace Conference, 292
Flavelle, Sir Richard, 356
Foch, Marshal, Conference (July, 1917), 262;
appointed Generalissimo, 268;
exercises powers of disposition, 275;
conditions of Armistice, 282
Fontainebleau, 302
Fourteen Points, President Wilson declares them, 282
Franchise, extension of, 307
French, Viscount, and shell crisis (1915), 213
Galicia, German preparations, 193;
fighting in, 196
Gallipoli, 179;
evacuation of, 205
Geddes, Sir Eric, appointed Director of Transport, France, 233;
defends Transport Bill, 323
Gee, Thomas, and Anti-Tithe Campaign, 62, 83
George, Right Hon. D. Lloyd, for principal dates in life _see_ Appendix I.
359
George, Gwilym Lloyd (son), 302
George, Mair Lloyd (daughter), 98;
death of, 149
George, Mary (sister), 13, 18
George, Megan Lloyd (daughter), 302
George, Olwen Lloyd (daughter), 98
George, Richard Lloyd (son), 94, 100, 122
George, William (father), 13, 16
George, Mrs. William (mother), 13, 16, 18, 21, 36
George, William (brother), 18, 29, 55, 56, 94
German Navy League, 156
Germany, tour in, 150;
relations with England (1908-14), 160;
strength (in 1915), 197;
advance (in March, 1918), 274;
mutiny of Fleet, 284
Gladstone, Mr., Government of 1880, 51;
in debate (1884), 53;
letter at by-election (1890), 84;
at Hawarden, 90;
and Clergy Discipline Bill, 102;
resignation of (1894), 104
Glasgow, speech at, during South African War, 117
Glyndwr, Owen, 69
Goffey, Thomas, 37
Gorizia, 246, 253
Gray’s Inn, first London home, 95
Greece, as neutral, 179;
Entente frustrated by King, 184;
agrees to join in war, 186;
refuses, 197;
offers troops and fleet for Dardanelles, 189;
offers again to enter war, 192
Grey, Lord, and South African War, 115;
evidence on Dardanelles, 200
Haig, F.-M. Lord, agreement with Foch, 275
Hamburg, visit to, 156
Handel, 339
Hankey, Sir M., at Peace Conference, 289
Harcourt, Sir Wm., approval of maiden speech, 91;
leader of House of Commons, 105
Health Ministry Bill, introduced and passed 315
Henry, Sir Charles, 150
Henry of Prussia, Prince, criticism of estimates providing for and
expenditure on, 92
Hertling, Count, resignation of, 273
Hervier, Paul Louis, in _Je Sais Tout_, 352
“Highgate,” 18, 36, 40
Hobhouse Miss E. and South African Concentration Camps, 120
Home Rule (1885-6), 52, 84, 103;
speech to exclude Ulster (1910), 351;
for Wales, 82, 101, 106
House, Colonel, 287;
and Bullitt Mission, 296
House of Commons, suspension from, 111;
scene over Defaulting Authorities Bill, 133
Housing Bill introduced and passed, 314
Hughes, Mr., at Peace Conference, 288
Indemnities, telegram from M.P.’s, 300
India, extension of self-government, 316
_Indian Patriot_, article in, 357
Industrial Courts Act passed, 316
Insurance, National, investigation of German system, 150;
preparation of Bill, 167;
passing of Bill, 168;
inspiration of, 332
Ireland, conscription extended to, 279;
outline of new proposals, 316
Isonzo, 246, 253
Italian Press, opinions of, 352
Italy, declares war on Austria, 200;
situation (in 1917), 245;
German advance (1917), 252;
British reinforcements for, 255
Ivangorod, 200
Johnson, Dr., 50
Jones, “Bobby,” 20
Jones, J. R., of Ramoth, 17
Jones, Miss, niece of Richard Lloyd, 21
Jones, Michael of Bala, 59
Jones, Rev. Richard, Llanfrothen, 68
_Journal de Genève_, 358
Kaiser, the, part played in politics by (1908), 156;
abdication of, 284
Kavalla, fear of Bulgarians seizing, 189
Kemmel, 278
Kerensky, M., destroyed by Lenin, 272
Kieff, 272
King Edward VII, 149;
visit to Czar, 154;
death of, 164
King George V, Conference of Party Leaders (1910), 164;
formation of Government of Mr. Lloyd George, 242;
friendship of, 343
Kitchener, Lord, view of length of war, 172, 178;
troops for Greece, 185;
at the War Office, 210;
Munition Committee, 213;
shell crisis (1915), 214;
death, 232, 262, 265
Koltchak, Admiral, 297
Kovno, 200
Kropotkin, Prince, 346
Kruger, President, 114
Labour Conference, Central Hall, 309
Labour Party, joins Government, 243;
leaves Coalition, 307;
in opposition, 309
Land Acquisition Act passed, 316
Land, appointment of Committee of Inquiry, 168;
preparation of Bills (1914), 170
Lansdowne, Lord, 163
Lansing, Mr., and Committee of League of Nations, 298
Laurier, Sir Wilfrid, 356
League of Nations, conception of scheme, 298
Lemnos, 295
Lenin, destroys Kerensky Government, 272, 279
Lens, 252
_Le Journal_, 351
_L’Œuvre_, 349
_Le Temps_, 349
Lewis, Mr. Herbert, 98, 110, 111
Leygues, Georges, in _Evènement_, 347
Licensing Act (1905), 136
Lithuania, surrendered to Germany, 272
Llanystumdwy, 11, 20, 23, 39, 42, 169
Llanfrothen, 66
Lloyd, Richard (uncle), 24, 31, 35, 39, 45, 72, 93, 101
Lloyd, David (grandfather), 20
Local Veto, resolution at meeting of National Liberal Federation, 81
London, first visit, 49;
commencement of practice, 97
Loucheur, M., 287
Lowther, Right Hon. J. W., 133
Ludendorff, General, attack on Italy, 252, 270;
waning of hopes of, 278;
suggestion for armistice by, 281
Macedonia, Allies to occupy, 192
Maddocks, A., 41
Manchester, birthplace, 14;
meeting of National Liberal Federation, 81;
speech (1918), 281
_Manchester Guardian_, Mr. Lloyd George writes for, 98
Manisty, Mr. Justice, and Llanfrothen, 68
Marconi Controversy, 169
Markham, Sir Arthur, 166
Marlborough, the Duke of, 163
Marne, the, 280
Martineau, Henry, 14
Maurice, Major-General Sir F., Letter to Press and retirement, 267
Max of Baden, Prince, overtures to President Wilson, 282;
resignation of, 284
Merchant Shipping Act (1906), 142
Meredith, George, admiration of, 339
Merionethshire, 133
Messines, 278
Metropolitan Tabernacle, speech on Welsh Disestablishment at, 26
Mezières, 274
Milan, 247, 253
Military control, effect of divided, 249;
need for unification, 250;
unity of command decided on, 254;
speech at Paris on (1917), 258
Military Service Acts (1916), effect of, 231;
(1917) introduced, 272;
raising of age, 278
Millet, Philippe, 349
Milner, Lord, 114;
attends Peace Conference, 287
Miners’ crisis, Sankey Commission appointed, 311
Minsk, 272
Mons, 175, 284
Montagu, Mr. E., Munition Statement (1916), 221, 224, 229;
joins Government (1916), 243;
attends Peace Conference, 287
Morley, Lord, 112, 149, 197
_Morning Post_, attacks on Government, 309;
interview with Signor Bissolati, 353
Morvin House, Criccieth, 45, 55
Moulton, Lord, and Committee on Munitions, 230
Munitions, need for, 206;
committee appointed, 213;
Mr. Lloyd George becomes Minister of, 216;
formation of Department, 218;
trades unions and “leaving certificates,” 225;
organisation of volunteer workers, 228
Mynydd Ednyfed, home of Mrs. Lloyd George, 69, 72
Nancy, 151
Nanney, Sir Ellis Hugh, opponent at election (1890), 83, 87, 105
Nantlle, Lake, prosecution of quarrymen for fishing, 64
Nansen, Dr., proposed Russian expedition, 297
Neuve Chapelle, 199
Nevin, speech on South African War, 123
Newcastle Programme (1891), 103
Newman, Cardinal, 50
Nivelle, General, 245;
Champagne attack, 252;
replaced by Pétain, 252
Norman, Sir Henry, 163
Northcliffe, Lord, and communications on, the Eastern Front, 240
_North Wales Observer_, article on Mr. Chamberlain, 51
Novo-Georgievsk, 200
Old Age Pensions, passing of Act, 150, 161;
increase in, 316
Orlando, Signor, and question of Fiume, 294
Owen, D. Lloyd, 42
Owen, Rev. John, 72
Owen, Miss Maggie (Mrs. Lloyd George), 59;
marriage of, 71
Owen, Mrs., of Dolgelly (Llanfrothen), 66
Owens, Rev. Owen, 25
Oxford, impressions of, 326
Palace Mansions, Kensington, second London home, 95
Paris, speech on unity of control at, 258;
German attack towards, (1918), 280;
social life during Peace Conference in, 300
Parry, John, and Anti-tithe Campaign, 62, 83
Passchendaele, 252
Patents Act, 144
Peace Conference, preliminaries, 286;
first meeting, 288;
correspondents at, 289;
proposed Bolshevist Conference, 295
Peace Treaty, presented and ratified, 303
Pedigree of Mr. Lloyd George, 13
Pencaenewydd, place of marriage, 72
Penrhyn, 55
Pétain, General, 245
Phillimore Report, basis of League of Nations, 298
Philippi, Philippo, 246
Pichon, M., 287
Platt, Colonel, opponent at election (1900), 95
Poisoned arrow incident, 324
Portmadoc, 11, 41, 46, 55, 94, 96, 122;
Debating Society, 47
Poland, surrendered to Germany, 273;
question of Peace Conference, 292, 303
Port of London Act, 145
Prime Minister, Mr. Lloyd George sent for by the King, 242
Prinkipo, 295
Puleston, Sir John, opponent at second election, 105
Pwllheli, 14, 123
Queen Victoria, 80
Railway strikes, threat of (1907), 146;
(1919), 311
Rapallo Conference, 254
Reinforcements, situation, March (1918), 276
Religious tendencies, 340
Rendel, Lord, 337
Repington, Lieut.-Colonel C. A’C., _Times_ shell despatch, 214
Rheims, 151
Ritchie, Lord, and creation of County Councils, 80
Roberts, A. Rhys, professional partner in London, 97, 122
Roberts, Mr. G. H., remains in Government, 308
Robertson, Sir Wm., Allied Conference (1917), 262;
opposition to Versailles Council, 264;
refuses position on Versailles Council, 267
Rome, Allied Conference (1917), 248
Roosevelt, President, 336, 355
Rosebery Government, fall of, 105;
resignation, 112
“Rose Cottage,” boyhood home, 18
Rothschild Pensions Committee, 138
Routh Road, Wandsworth, London home, 119
Rue Nitot, residence in Paris during Peace Conference, 301
Rumania, 179, 184;
Greek conditions of joining war, 186;
less friendly, 188;
success of Germans, 196;
declares war, 235
Russia, situation, opening of (1915), 178;
fearful of Greece, 191;
diverts Germans from Serbia, 192;
collapse, 272;
proposed Bolshevist Conference, 295
Saar Valley, 292, 303
St. Asaph, Bishop of, 132
St. Quentin, 268, 275
Salisbury, Lord, 248
Salonika, 179, 180, 295
Samsonoff, General 175
Samuel, Mr. Herbert, refuses office, 243
Sanitorium benefit, creation, 333
Sankey Commission, inquiry into condition of miners, 311
Sarn Melltcyrn, debate with curate (1887), 62
_Sartor Resartus_, 46
Schools Act (1904-6), 136
Scotland Yard, 319
Scott, Sir Walter, 50
Serbia, question of saving, 187;
Bosnia and Herzegovina to be given to, 192;
plan to assist, 202
Shelley, Percy Bysshe, 41
Shortt, Mr., Transport Bill, 313
Sidebotham, Herbert, 120
Siedlce, 200
Silesia, Plébiscite, 293, 303
Smuts General, 119;
Memo. on League of Nations, 298
Sofia, 187
Soissons, 151
Somerset House, investigation of system of working, 329
Sorel, M., 312
South African War, outbreak, 114;
opposition to, 116, 117
Strassburg, 151
Stavridi, Sir John, suggests Mr. Lloyd George should go to the Balkans,
190
Stuttgart, 153;
conversation at, 327
Suffragettes, in favour of leniency, 325
Sullivan, Donald, 110
Swetenham, Mr. Q.C., M.P., Carnarvon Boroughs (1886), 77;
death, 82
Tagliamento, 253
Tannenberg, 175
Tariff Reform, fight against (1903-6), 137
Tariff Reform League, 164
Tardieu, M., 287
Temple, The, London home, 95
Tennant, Mr. H. J., and shell crisis (1915), 214
Téry, Gustave, in _La Victoire_, 350
Thomas, M. Albert, friendship with, 187;
rearming of France, 211;
Munitions Conference, 220, 347
Thomas, Mr. D. A. (Lord Rhondda), 107
Thomas, Mr. J. H., and railway strike, 313
Thomasson, Mr. F., Transfer of _Daily News_, 121
Ticino, 246
_Times, The_, attack on Asquith Government (1916), 240
Tithes Bill (1899), 112
Transport Bill, introduced and passed, 313
Treasury, habits of work at, 329
Trevelyan, Sir George, 53
Trotsky, M., attempts to declare peace, 272
_Trumpet of Freedom_ (1888), 76
Tube strike, 309
Turkey, strength (in 1915), 198;
surrenders, 283;
forfeited right to rule over Christians, 300
Turnin, 247, 253
Udine, 253
Ukraine, surrendered to Germans, 273
Ulster, crisis (1914), 170;
speech to exclude (1910), 337
Valenciennes, 284
Venice, 253
Venizelos, M., Greece agrees to join Allies, 186;
refuses, 188;
Bulgaria pledged to Central Powers, 190;
resignation of, 193;
resumes office, 194;
mainstay of alliance in Near East, 300, 346
Verdun, 302
Versailles Council, set up, 255;
functions, and opposition to, 258;
defence in House of Commons, 262;
meetings of, 280
Vienna, 248
Villa Murat, Parisian residence of President Wilson, 301
Villers Bretonneux, 278
Vitry, 151
Voluntary Schools Bill (1897), 109-111
Voluntary system of recruiting, doubts as to, 199
Von Below, General, attack on Italy, 252
Von Tirpitz, Admiral, 269
Vosges, The, 151
War, Secretary of State for, Mr. Lloyd George appointed (1916), 233
War Cabinet, formation (1916), 244
War Committee, suggested daily sittings, 178
Warsaw, 176, 200
Watkins, Sir Edward, 100
White, Mr. Henry, 287
Williams, Llewellyn, 98
Williams, William, boyhood friend, 24, 29
Wilson, President, 158;
organises reinforcements (1918), 276;
overtures from Prince Max, 282;
arrives at Paris, 286;
at Peace Conference, 290;
League of Nations scheme, 298, 299;
return from America of, 303;
contrast, 355
Ypres, 199, 252
Zeppelin, Count, 153
TRANSCRIBER NOTES
Misspelled words and printer errors have been corrected. Where multiple
spellings occur, majority use has been employed.
Punctuation has been maintained except where obvious printer errors
occur.
Some illustrations were moved to facilitate page layout.