INVENTION IN ROME: ITS RISE AND FALL
We have noted, up to a time approximately that of Archimedes, a
continual succession of inventions of many kinds, that formed
stepping-stones to civilization so large and plain, that we can see
them even from this distance.
We now come to a period lasting more than a thousand years, in
the first half of which there was a gradually decreasing lack of
inventiveness shown, and in the latter half a cessation almost complete.
The nation that followed Greece as the dominant nation of the world was
Rome. She became more truly a dominant nation than Greece ever was; but
her civilization was built on that of Greece, and her success even in
war and government was due largely to following where Greece had led.
That Rome in her early days should have followed the methods of Greece
was natural of course; for the two countries were close together, and
the methods of Greece had brought success. The early religion of Rome
was so like that of Greece that even to this day the conceptions of
most of us regarding Zeus and Jupiter, Poseidon and Neptune, Aphrodite
and Venus are apt to become confused.
Like the Greeks, the Romans first were gathered in city-states that
were governed by kings; and as with the Greeks, more republican forms
were adopted later. In one important particular, the Roman practice
diverged from the Greek, and that was in incorporating conquered
states into the parent state, and granting their inhabitants the
privileges of citizenship; instead of keeping them in the condition
of mere subject states. The Roman system was somewhat like the system
of provinces established by the Assyrians. It forms the basis of the
"municipal system" of the free states of the present day, in which
local self-government is carried on, under the paramount authority of
the state.
It may be pointed out here that the conception of such an idea and its
successful development into an effective machine of government by the
Romans constituted an invention; though in view of what had been done
before by Assyria and Greece, it cannot be called a basic invention.
The early Romans were very different in their mental characteristics
from the Greeks; for they were stern, warlike, intensely practical, and
possessed of an extraordinary talent for what we now call "team work."
As a nation they were not so inventive as the Greeks; but the Roman,
Cæsar, was the greatest military inventor who ever lived.
As might be expected, their early endeavors pertained to war, and their
first improvements were in warlike things. One improvement that was
marked by considerable inventiveness was in changing the phalanx into
the legion. The phalanx, the historian Botsford tells us, was "invented
by the Spartans, probably in the eighth century B. C.," and consisted
of an unbroken line of warriors, several ranks deep. The Thebans
improved on this; and from the Theban, Philip developed the Macedonian
phalanx with which Alexander fought his way through Asia. The Romans
under Servius Tullius developed this into the Roman phalanx, which was
different only in detail. The essential characteristic of the phalanx
was strength. This was gained by the close support given by each man
to his neighbor, the personal strength of each man and the trained
co-operation of all. A tremendous blow was given to an enemy's line
when a phalanx struck it.
In the early wars among the hills of Italy, the Romans found the
phalanx too rigid for such uneven country; and it was in endeavoring
to invent a substitute that they finally developed the legion. This
machine was much more flexible, the individual soldiers had more
room for their movements, and yet the machine seemed to possess the
necessary rigidity when the shock of impact came. The heavy infantry
was in three lines, and each line was divided into ten companies, or
"maniples." The burden of the first attack was borne by the first
line. If unsuccessful, the first line withdrew through gaps in the
second line, and the second line took up the task;--and then the third,
composed of the most seasoned troops. The attack usually began with the
hurling of javelins, and was followed at once by an assault with the
Roman strong short swords.
Now the legion was just as truly an invented machine as a steam engine
is; and it had a greater influence on history than the steam engine has
ever had thus far. It was by means of their legions that the Romans
passed outside of the walls of Rome, and conquered all of Italy. It
was by means of their legions that the Romans conquered all the coast
peoples that bordered the Mediterranean Sea, subdued Gaul, Europe and
Egypt and Asia, and became the greatest masters of the world that the
world has ever seen.
The first war of the Romans that history calls great was their war
against the splendid and wealthy city of Carthage, situated on the
opposite side of the Mediterranean, inhabited by descendants of the
Phoenicians. They were an aggressive and energetic people, but only
commercially. They were not of the warlike cast, and delegated the work
of national defense to hired soldiers and sailors. They had one great
advantage over the Romans in the possession of an excellent navy.
The Romans resolved to create a navy. With characteristic energy
and practical ability, they devoted themselves at once to both the
acquisition of the personnel and the material, and the adequate
training of the crews. It is stated that within two months from the
time of starting, Rome possessed a hundred quinqueremes, the largest
galleys of those days, having five tiers of rowers; though they had had
none when the war broke out. The first naval battle took place near the
promontory of Mylæ. Naturally, the Romans were at a great disadvantage
as compared with the experienced officers and sailors in the
Carthaginian fleet; for though the Roman soldier was far better than
the Carthaginian, the Roman sailor was inexperienced and unskilful.
To remedy the difficulty, the Romans made a simple but brilliant
invention. They provided each quinquereme with a "corvus," that
consisted essentially of a drawbridge that could be lowered quickly,
and that carried a sharp spike at its outer end; and then arranged a
plan whereby each quinquereme should get alongside of a Carthaginian,
drop the drawbridge at such a time that the spike would hold the outer
end of the drawbridge in place on the Carthaginian deck, and Roman
soldiers should then rush across the drawbridge and attack the inferior
Carthaginian soldiers.
Few more brilliant inventions have ever been made; few have been more
successful and effective. The battle ended in a perfect victory for the
Romans, and constituted the initial step in the subjugation of Carthage
by Rome.
There were three wars in all, called Punic Wars. The great Carthaginian
General, Hannibal, invaded Italy by land in the Second War, and after
a campaign marked with a high order of daring and ability, threatened
Rome herself after a brilliant victory near Lake Trasimene. Another
victory followed at Cannæ, but a decisive disaster later on the
Metaurus River. So the Second War was won by Rome. But Carthage still
existed, and menaced the commercial, naval and military dominance of
Rome. Therefore war was brought about at last by Rome, and Carthage
destroyed completely.
The conduct of Rome toward Carthage cannot be justified on any grounds
of any system of morality accepted at the present day; and yet it
cannot reasonably be denied that it was better for human progress that
Rome should prevail than Carthage. The Romans, harsh and ruthless
as they were, were less so than the Carthaginians; and they had an
element of strong manliness and a comprehensive grasp of things beyond
mere commerce and money-getting and ease and comfort that the Semitic
Carthaginians wholly lacked. The effect of the conquest of Carthage by
Rome was a little like that of the conquest of Persia by Alexander.
During the same year (146 B. C.) when Rome destroyed Carthage, she also
destroyed Corinth in Greece, and brought Greece and Macedonia under her
sway. She had previously (190 B. C.) defeated Antiochus the Great, and
taken from him nearly all his territory in Asia Minor.
By the year 58 B. C., Rome had become the most powerful nation in the
world and still preserved a republican form of government. In that
year, 58 B. C., the man who probably is the most generally regarded
as the greatest man who has ever lived, appeared upon the stage of
history. His name was Julius Cæsar.
He appeared in that year, because he went then from Rome to Gaul,
and started on those brilliant and in many respects unprecedented
campaigns which have had so profound an effect on history, and which
for originality in conception and execution have had no rivals since.
At this time, Italy and the lands of Africa and Asia on which
Alexander had impressed the civilization of Greece, were prosperous
and well-governed; but beyond those countries only barbarous customs
prevailed, and only a primitive civilization reigned. The lands that
lay north and northwest of Italy, throughout all Gaul, were inhabited
by savage tribes that were in a state of continual war with each other.
In the southern and middle parts the effects of Roman civilization
might be dimly seen; but in the southwestern part, and in the north,
especially among the German tribes on the Rhine, and the Belgæ near the
North Sea, a condition of virtually pure savagery prevailed.
Into such a country Cæsar marched, at the head of a body of men wholly
inferior in numbers to those they were to meet, not superior to them
in courage or physical strength, but considerably superior to them
in discipline, and vastly superior in the weapons and methods that
had gradually been invented, with the progress of civilization. Thus,
while the Roman machine was superior as a machine to any that the
Gauls could bring to bear, it was smaller; so that the question to be
decided was whether the superior excellence of the Roman machine was
great enough to balance its inferiority in size. Looking back from our
vantage ground on the history of the campaigns that followed, we feel
inclined to answer the question in the negative, unless we consider
Cæsar himself a part of the machine. It is true that the campaigns were
decided in favor of the Roman machine; but there seems little ground
for doubting that they would not have been so decided, if the genius
of Cæsar had not managed the Roman machine and made improvements from
time to time.
Cæsar had had little experience as a soldier, but his habits of life
and traits of character were of the military kind. As the campaigns
progressed, his courage, equanimity and rapidity of thought and action
were continually displayed;--yet not to such a degree as to put him
in a higher class than many other generals of history, or to account
wholly for his marvellous successes. One peculiar ability, however,
he possessed and exercised in a degree greater than any other general
of history: and it was by the exercise of that ability that his most
extraordinary victories were achieved, and his generalship especially
distinguished from the generalship of others. That ability was
inventiveness.
His first contact was with the Swiss (Helvetii), who were about to
leave the barrenness of their mountain lands, and march west to the
fertile lands beyond. As this would take them through Roman territory
and tend to drive the Gauls into Italy, open Switzerland to occupation
by the Germans, and point a road thence for them also into Italy,
Cæsar hastened to the Rhône River, destroyed the bridge which they
would naturally go over, and forbade the Swiss to attempt to cross the
river. The Swiss pleaded with Cæsar to permit them to cross. As Cæsar
realized that the Swiss were too greatly superior in force to be kept
back, unless he could strengthen himself in some way, he asked time
for reflection, and told them to return in two weeks. When the Swiss
returned at the end of that time, their astonished eyes disclosed to
them the fact that Cæsar had constructed walls and trenches and forts
at every point where a passage could reasonably be attempted.
It may be objected that walls and trenches and forts were not new, and
that therefore Cæsar invented nothing. This may be admitted as an
academic proposition; but nevertheless, it was clearly the ingenious
and wholly unexpected construction of certain appliances by Cæsar that
opposed the barbarous Swiss with barriers which they could not pass. It
may even be argued with much reason that the conception and successful
execution of Cæsar's plan as a whole constituted an invention, even
though the material used was old. Certain it is that a situation was
created which did not exist before, and that it was the creation of
this situation, and not the exercise of strength or courage, that was
_the determining factor_ in stopping the Swiss. Froude says of Cæsar,
"He was never greater than in unlooked-for difficulties. He never
rested. He was always inventing some new contrivance."
Cæsar realized fully the value in war of mechanical appliances,
and took careful measures before he left Italy to supply his army
adequately with them, and also with men trained to use them. Besides
the fighting men strictly considered, Cæsar took a considerable number
of engineers with him, and expert men for building bridges, and doing
mechanical work of many kinds. The ingenious and frequent use that
Cæsar made of these men and of mechanical appliances was the most
powerful single factor that contributed to his success.
The Swiss departing from Switzerland by another route, Cæsar pursued
them, and defeated a fourth of them in a battle on the banks of a river
which the other three-fourths had crossed. He then built a bridge
over the river and sent his army across. This feat alarmed the Swiss
more than their defeat; because Cæsar had built the bridge and sent
his army across in one day, whereas they had consumed twenty days in
merely crossing. The Swiss pleaded to be allowed to proceed; but Cæsar
was obdurate. A battle followed, in which the Swiss, though greatly
superior in numbers and reinforced by 15,000 allies, were decisively
beaten; not because of inferior courage or warlike skill, but by reason
of inferior equipments, mechanical appliances and weapons.
Cæsar's next battle was with the Germans. It was won, if not precisely
with inventiveness, at least with "brains." He learned that the
German matrons had declared, after certain occult proceedings, that
Heaven forbade them to fight before the new moon. Apprehending his
opportunity, he advanced his forces right up to the German camp,
thereby forcing them as valiant soldiers to come out and fight. Fight
they did, but under an obvious psychological disadvantage, and with the
natural result.
In this battle, as in others between the Romans and the barbarians,
it was noticeable that although their first onslaught was fine, the
barbarians seemed to be at a loss afterwards,--if anything unexpected
occurred, or if any reverse was sustained; whereas the Romans--and
especially Cæsar himself--never behaved so well as when threatened
with disaster. This may be expressed by saying that the barbarians, as
compared with the Romans, were wholly inferior in the inventiveness
needed to devise a new plan quickly.
Not long afterward, Cæsar advanced against the town of Noviodunum. He
soon saw that he could not take it by storm; and so he brought forward
his mechanical siege appliances. The psychological effect of these on
the barbarians was so tremendous that they at once pleaded for terms of
surrender.
After a battle with the Nervii, in which Cæsar defeated them
disastrously, largely because of his resourcefulness in emergency and
their lack of it, he advanced against a great barbarian stronghold
that looked down on steep rocks on three sides, and was protected by
a thick, high double wall on the fourth side. Cæsar made a fortified
rampart around the town, pushed his mantlets (large shields on wheels
protected on the sides and top) close up to the wall, and built a
tower. The barbarians laughed at this tower; seeing it so far away
that, they thought, no darts thrown from it could reach them. But when
they saw the tower actually moving toward them they were struck with
terror and began at once to sue for peace.
During the following winter the Veneti, a large tribe on the
northwestern coast, the most skilful seamen and navigators of Gaul,
stirred up a revolt that quickly and widely spread. The situation at
once became serious for Cæsar, for the reason that the Veneti could not
be subdued, except on the sea; and neither the Roman sailors nor the
Roman vessels were as good as were those of the Veneti. Nevertheless,
Cæsar ordered war-vessels to be built on the Loire River, and seamen
and rowers to be drafted from the Roman Province.
When the improvised fleet of the Romans and the thoroughly prepared
fleet of the Veneti came together, the latter was superior even in
numbers. Furthermore, the Romans were at a great disadvantage in the
matter of throwing projectiles, from the fact that the Veneti's decks
were higher than theirs.
But Cæsar had prepared a scheme that gave him victory. In accordance
with it, the Roman galleys rowed smartly against the Veneti ships, and
Roman sailors raised long poles on which were sharp hooks which they
put over the halliards that held up the sails. Then each Roman galley
rowed rapidly away, the halliards were cut, and down came the sails.
The Veneti ships became helpless at once and were immediately boarded;
with the result that, of all the number, only a few made their escape.
Somewhat later, Cæsar decided to cross the Rhine into the country of
the Sueves, and to impress them with the power of Rome by building a
bridge and marching his army across. This bridge and the quickness and
thoroughness with which it was built are still models for engineers;
for in ten days after he had decided to build it, at which time the
material was still standing in the forest, a bridge 40 feet wide had
been constructed. Across this Cæsar at once marched his legions. The
effect on the barbarous Germans can be imagined. It made them realize
that the Romans were a race superior to themselves in ways that they
could not measure or even understand; and it impressed them with that
fear which is the most depressing of all fears, the fear of the unknown.
Did Cæsar make an invention? This depends on the meaning of the word
invention. Cæsar did not invent the bridge; but he did conceive and
carry into execution a highly original, concrete and successful scheme.
By it he accomplished as much as a victorious campaign would have
accomplished, and without shedding any blood. _He devised means which
created a state of thought in the minds of his enemies that destroyed
their will to fight._ Therein lay his invention.
Cæsar then conceived the idea of going across the water to the island
of Britain, about which little was known. After having a survey made
of the coast, he took his legions across in about eighty vessels. He
had to fight to make a landing, of course; but he succeeded, and then
formed his camp. A Roman camp, we may now remind ourselves, was so
distinctly a Roman conception, and so distinctly a part of the Roman
system of conducting war, that it almost constituted an invention.
Whenever a Roman army halted, even for one night, they intrenched
themselves within a square enclosure, surrounded with a ditch and
a palisade of stakes, and made a temporary little city, laid with
streets. In such a camp they were reasonably safe against any attack
that barbarians could make.
But a storm arose that drove some of Cæsar's ships ashore and some out
to sea. In this emergency, Cæsar's resourcefulness and energy directed
the work of recovery and repair, and enabled the Romans to collect and
put into good condition nearly all their ships. Cæsar returned shortly
afterward to Gaul; arrived there, he gave directions for building and
equipping another and larger fleet.
In the following July (54 B. C.), he started again for Britain. This
time he took five legions and some cavalry and had about 800 vessels.
He landed and formed his camp, and then advanced inland;--but another
storm arose that scattered his ships. He returned at once to the coast,
and instituted such prompt and resourceful measures that in ten days he
was able to resume his march. On this march, which took him far inland,
he was able to overcome all opposition; largely because, after the
first onset, the barbarians seemed to be without any plan of action,
while Cæsar was at his best.
_Cæsar had the ability to invent under circumstances of the utmost
danger and excitement._
Cæsar's remaining campaigns in Gaul were marked with the same
resourcefulness and originality on his part, and the same lack of
resourcefulness and originality on the part of the barbarians. Cæsar
would continually do something that the barbarians had not expected him
to do. True, they gradually learned some of his schemes and methods
from him; but only to find that he had then some newer schemes and
methods.
Cæsar at one time remarked that wise men anticipate possible
difficulties, and decide beforehand what they will do, if certain
possible occasions arise. Does not this process involve invention,
in cases where the possible occasions are not of the ordinary and
expectable kind? In such cases, does it not require imagination to
foresee the possible occasions, and form a correct picture on the mind
of the resulting situations? This being done, does it not require the
exercise of the constructive faculty afterwards, to make a concrete and
effective plan to meet them?
If it be so, then we may reasonably declare that, of all the factors
that contributed to the successes in Gaul of Cæsar, the most powerful
single factor was his inventiveness.
The final crisis came when Cæsar besieged Alesia, and Vercingetorix,
who had taken refuge in it, sent out a call for succor, that was
eagerly and promptly responded to; for it was plain to the barbarians
that Cæsar, being held in position fronting a fortress that he could
not successfully storm, would be in a precarious condition if attacked
vigorously in his rear. Attacked vigorously he was; for the barbarians
came in his rear with about 250,000 men; Cæsar having only 50,000, and
the enemy in front having 80,000.
But it required somewhat more than a month for the barbarians to unite
and reach Alesia. With his wonted energy and resourcefulness, Cæsar had
by this time cast up siege works all around the fortress, placed camps
at strategic points, and constructed twenty-three block-houses. He dug
a trench twenty feet deep around the place, and back of this began his
other siege works. These included two parallel trenches fifteen feet
broad and fifteen feet deep. Behind these he built a palisade twelve
feet high, and to this he added a breastwork of pointed stakes; while
at intervals of eighty feet he constructed turrets. In addition, he
had branches cut from trees and sharpened on the ends; and these he
fastened at the bottom of the trenches, so that the points projected
just above the ground. In front of these he dug shallow pits, into
which tapering stakes hardened in the fire were driven, projecting
four inches above the ground. These pits were hidden with twigs and
brushwood. Eight rows of these pits were dug, three feet apart; and
in front of all stakes with iron hooks were buried in the ground at
irregular intervals. When all this had been done on the side toward the
fortress, Cæsar constructed parallel entrenchments of the same kind, to
protect his rear; the two sets being so arranged with respect to each
other that the same men could man both. Having constructed all these
material appliances, he instituted a comprehensive system of drills, so
that his men would know exactly how to utilize them under all probable
contingencies.
In the battle that followed the barbarians showed their wonted courage
and dash; but an unexpected situation arose when Cæsar attacked a
separated part in their rear. Then they were seized with panic, and the
natural rout and disaster followed.
This battle decided the fate of Gaul; though its actual subduing,
especially in the southwestern part was not accomplished immediately.
The last major act was taking a strong fortress. This was accomplished
by cutting a tunnel, by which the spring was tapped that supplied
the garrison with water. As Vercingetorix said, the Romans won their
victories, not by superior courage, but by superior science.
Cæsar's later passage across the Rubicon, the flight of the Senate,
and his later operations by land and sea against Marseilles (Massilia)
and hostile forces in northern Spain, are well known, and were
characterized by the same high order of inventiveness. His later
operations against Pompey, and later still against Pharnaces and
Scipio, were conducted under conditions that gave him less opportunity
to utilize the quality of inventiveness in such clear ways; but they
were marked with the kindred qualities of foresight, skilful adaptation
of means to ends, and presence of mind in emergencies.
In the minds of some, Cæsar's greatest influence on history has been
due to his improvement of the Calendar, and especially his reforms of
the public morals and the laws of Rome, after his campaign against
Pharnaces. This subject has been the theme of jurists and scholars to
such a degree that it might seem presumptuous in a navy officer to
do more than mention it. At the same time it may be pointed out that
Cæsar's work was not in any matters of detail, or in contributing any
legal or juridical skill or knowledge, but in conceiving the idea of
creating the _Leges Juliæ_, and then creating them.
Julius Cæsar was murdered in the year 44 B. C. He was followed in power
by his grandnephew Octavius, one of the most fortunate occurrences in
history; for Octavius possessed the ability and the character to carry
on the constructive work that Julius Cæsar had begun. Under Octavius
and his successors, the Roman Empire became increasingly large and
strong, until the reign of Trajan in the second century, A. D., when it
acquired its greatest territorial extent.
During the time when Rome was increasing in extent and power, the
wealth of cities and of individuals increased also, and enormous public
works of all kinds were constructed, many of which are still the
admiration of the world. Material prosperity reached its highest point.
But the creative period had passed. Youth, with its dreams and vigor
of doing had gone, and maturity, with the luxury of prosperity and
the consequent dulling of the imagination, had assumed its place.
Senescence followed in due course. Then the empire was divided into
two parts, the Empire of the West and the Empire of the East. Finally,
in 476 A. D., Rome died and with it the Empire of the West.
[Illustration: Triumphal Procession from the Arch of Titus]
But the Eastern Empire stood, and Constantinople was its capital. And
it stood, alone and unassisted, as the sole bulwark of Christianity and
civilization for nearly 1000 years, until it finally fell before the
Ottoman Turks in 1543. It could not have done this, if in the latter
part of the seventh century when it was beleaguered by a Turkish fleet,
much greater than its own, it had not suddenly received unexpected
aid in the shape of a new invention. This was "Greek fire," which
seems to have been a pasty mixture of sulphur, nitre, pitch, and other
substances, which when squirted against wood set it on fire with a
flame that water could not quench. In the very first attack, the Turks
were so demoralized by the Greek fire that they fled in panic. They
never learned the secret and were never able to stand up against it.
On one occasion, fifteen Christian ships, using Greek fire, actually
put to rout a Turkish fleet numbering several hundred.
* * * * *
During all the countless centuries before the dawn of recorded history,
and during the approximately forty centuries that elapsed from the
beginning of recorded history until the fall of Rome, we have observed
the coming of many inventions of both material and immaterial kinds,
and noted the influence of those inventions in causing civilization,
and therefore in directing the line that history has followed.
It may be objected that a perfectly natural inference from what has
been written would be that the only thing which had influenced the
direction of movement of history was invention. To this, the answer
may very reasonably be made that this book does not pretend to be a
history, or to point out what have been the greatest factors that
have influenced its line of movement; it attempts merely to emphasize
the influence of one factor, invention, and to suggest that maybe its
influence has not hitherto been estimated at its proper value.
Another objection like that just indicated might be made to the effect
that all the progress of the world up to the fall of Rome is attributed
in this book to inventors only; that all the work of statesmen,
scientists, generals, admirals, explorers, jurists, men of business,
etc., etc., is ignored.
Such an objection would be natural and reasonable; but to it an answer
like the previous one may be made, to the effect that the purpose of
this book is not to compare the benefits conferred by any one class of
men with those conferred by any other, but merely to point out, in a
very general way, what inventors have done.
Nevertheless, it does seem clear that inventors did more to map out
the direction of the progress just traced than any other single class
of men. If we will fix our attention on any one invention about which
we know enough--say, the water-clock--we can see that the original
inventor of the water-clock (no matter who he was) had more influence
on the history of the clock than any other man has had; and that the
inventors of clocks who followed him had more influence on the clock
than any other equal number of men had. This does not mean that the
men who risked their money in making novel clocks did not influence
the history of the clock materially; and it does not mean that the men
who made good materials for them did not influence the history of the
clock greatly; and it does not mean that the engineers and mechanics
who operated them successfully did not influence its history. It would
be absurd to pretend that each one of these men did not influence
the history of the clock; for without them there would have been no
successful clock. Nevertheless, in the nature of things, the original
inventors must be credited with influencing the history of the clock
more than any other equal number of men did, just as a father must
be credited with influencing the history of his children more than
any other man can, from the mere fact of his having caused them to be
born. The inventors of clocks were the fathers of the clocks that they
invented, and also the forefathers of all the inventions that proceed
directly or indirectly from them.
What has been said about the clock applies with equal force to every
other invented thing. Therefore, it can hardly be gainsaid that, so
far as invented things are concerned, their inventors have had more
influence on the history that has resulted from them than any other men
have had.
If anyone will glance through any book of ancient history, he will
realize that it is mainly a record of wars; the political changes
caused by wars, or rendered possible by their means; the growth of
nations and other organizations; the invention of certain mechanisms,
arts and sciences; and the construction of certain structures such
as temples, palaces and ships. All these agencies influenced ancient
history, of course; but it is clear that the agency that influenced it
the most obviously and immediately was the wars.
Yet let us remind ourselves that the real effect on history of any war
was not exerted by the war itself, so much as by the result of the war.
Let us also remind ourselves that the result of any war was because of
the material forces engaged and the skill with which they were handled.
Now the material forces put onto the field of battle on each side
in any of the wars were the product of the material resources of
the country, of its wealth, its ability to manufacture weapons
and transport troops; that is, of its utilization of invented
mechanisms, processes and methods. The skill with which they were
handled--(especially when supreme skill was exerted, as in the cases of
Alexander and Cæsar)--was the outcome not of mere laborious training,
not of mere knowledge, or courage, or carefully detailed arrangement,
but of plans so conceived, developed and produced (invented) as to
confront the enemy with unexpected situations that they were not
prepared to meet. So the influence of even the wars seems to have been
due fundamentally to invention.
As to the other agencies that influenced the course of ancient history,
they seem to owe their influence even more obviously to invention than
war does. Every department of ancient civilization seems traceable back
to some invention or inventions. The whole of ancient civilization
seems to rest primarily on inventions.
As inventions were made by inventors, we seem forced to the conclusion
that inventors influenced ancient history more than any other one class
did. This does not mean that the inventor of a child's toy influenced
history more than did any one of the millions of wise and good men in
each generation who helped to keep the machine of civilization working
smoothly; for it refers to inventors as a class, and not to inventors
as individuals.