FURTHER STATEMENT OF THE DIFFICULTY.
1. We have attempted to show that if the discoveries made by the
Telescope should excite in any one's mind, difficulties respecting those
doctrines of Natural Religion,--the adequacy of the Creator to the
support and guardianship of all the animal life which may exist in the
universe,--the discoveries of the Microscope may remove such
difficulties; but we have remarked also, that the train of thought which
leads men to dwell upon such difficulties does not seem to be common.
But what will be the train of thought to which we shall be led, if we
suppose that there are, on other planets, and in other systems, not
animals only, living things, which, however different from the animals
of this earth, are yet in some way analogous to them, according to the
difference of circumstances; but also creatures analogous to
man;--intellectual creatures, living, we must suppose, under a moral
law, responsible for transgression, the subjects of a Providential
Government? If we suppose that, in the other planets of our solar
systems, and of other systems, there are creatures of such a kind, and
under such conditions as these, how far will the religious opinions
which we had previously entertained be disturbed or modified? Will any
new difficulty be introduced into our views of the government of the
world by such a supposition?
2. I have spoken of man as an Intellectual Creature; meaning thereby
that he has a Mind;--powers of thought, by which he can contemplate the
relations and properties of things in a general and abstract form; and
among other relations, moral relations, the distinction of _right_ and
_wrong_ in his actions. Those powers of thought lead him to think of a
Creator and Ordainer of all things; and his perception of right and
wrong leads him to regard this Creator as also the Governor and Judge of
his creatures. The operation of his mind directs him to believe in a
Supreme Mind: his moral nature directs him to believe that the course of
human affairs, and the condition of men, both as individuals and as
bodies, is determined by the providential government of God.
3. With regard to the bearing of a merely _intellectual_ nature on such
questions, it does not appear that any considerable difficulty would be
_at once_ occasioned in our religious views, by supposing such a nature
to belong to other creatures, the inhabitants of other planets, as well
as to man. The existence of our own minds directs us, as I have said, to
a Supreme Mind; and the nature of Mind is conceived to be, in all its
manifestations, so much the same, that we can conceive minds to be
multiplied indefinitely, without fear of confusion, interference, or
exhaustion. There may be, in Jupiter, creatures endowed with an
intellect which enables them to discover and demonstrate the relations
of space; and if so, they cannot have discovered and demonstrated
anything of that kind as true, which is not true for us also: their
Geometry must coincide with ours, as far as each goes:--thus showing how
absurdly, as Plato long ago observed, we give to the science which deals
with the relations of space, a name (_geometry_), borrowed from the art
of measuring the earth. The earth with its properties is no more the
special basis of geometry, than are Jupiter or Saturn, or, so far as we
can judge, Sirius or Arcturus and their systems, with their properties.
Wherever pure intellect is, we are compelled to conceive that, when
employed upon the same objects, its results and conclusions are the
same. If there be intelligent inhabitants of the Moon, they may, like
us, have employed their intelligence in reasoning upon the properties of
lines and angles and triangles; and must, so far as they have gone, have
arrived, in their thoughts, at the same properties of lines and angles
and triangles, at which we have arrived. They must, like us, have had to
distinguish between right angles and oblique angles. They may have come
to know, as some of the inhabitants of the earth came to know, four
thousand years ago, that, in a right-angled triangle, the square on the
larger side is equal to the sum of the squares on the other two sides.
We can conceive occurrences which would give us evidence that the Moon,
as well as the Earth, contains geometers. If we were to see, on the face
of the full moon, a figure gradually becoming visible, representing a
right-angled triangle with a square constructed on each of its three
sides as a base; we should regard it as the work of intelligent
creatures there, who might be thus making a signal to the inhabitants of
the earth, that they possessed such knowledge, and were desirous of
making known to their nearest neighbors in the solar system, their
existence and their speculations. In such an event, curious and striking
as it would be, we should see nothing but what we could understand and
accept, without unsettling our belief in the Supreme and Divine
Intelligence. On the contrary, we could hardly fail to receive such a
manifestation as a fresh evidence that the Divine Mind had imparted to
the inhabitants of the Moon, as he has to us, a power of apprehending,
in a very general and abstract form, the relations of that space in
which he performs his works. We should judge, that having been led so
far in their speculations, they must, in all probability, have been led
also to a conception of the Universe, as the field of action of a
universal and Divine Mind; that having thus become geometers, they must
have ascended to the Idea of a God who works by geometry.
4. But yet, by such a supposition, on further consideration, we find
ourselves introduced to views entirely different from those to which we
are led by the supposition of mere animal life, existing in other worlds
than the earth. For, not to dwell here upon any speculations as to how
far the operations of our minds may resemble the operations of the
Divine Mind;--a subject which we shall hereafter endeavor to
discuss;--we know that the advance to such truths as those of geometry
has been, among the inhabitants of the earth, gradual and progressive.
Though the human mind have had the same powers and faculties, from the
beginning of the existence of the race up to the present time, (as we
cannot but suppose,) the results of the exercise of these powers and
faculties have been very different in different ages; and have gradually
grown up, from small beginnings, to the vast and complex body of
knowledge concerning the scheme and relations of the Universe, which is
at present accessible to the minds of human speculators. It is, as we
have said, probably about four thousand years, since the first steps in
such knowledge were made. Geometry is said to have had its origin in
Egypt; but it assumed its abstract and speculative character first among
the Greeks. Pythagoras is related to have been the first who saw, in the
clear light of demonstration, the property of the right-angled triangle,
of which we have spoken. The Greeks, from the time of Socrates,
stimulated especially by Plato, pursued, with wonderful success, the
investigation of this kind of truths. They saw that such truths had
their application in the heavens, far more extensively than on the
earth. They were enabled, by such speculations, to unravel, in a great
degree, the scheme of the universe, before so seemingly entangled and
perplexed. They determined, to a very considerable extent, the relative
motions of the planets and of the stars. And in modern times, after a
long interval, in which such knowledge was nearly stationary, the
progress again began; and further advances were successively made in
man's knowledge of the scheme and structure of the visible heavens; till
at length the intellect of man was led to those views of the extent of
the Universe and the nature of the stars, which are the basis of the
discussions in which we are now engaged. And thus man, having probably
been, in the earliest ages of the existence of the species, entirely
ignorant of abstract truth, and of the relations which, by the knowledge
of such truth, we can trace in nature, (as the barbarous tribes which
occupy the greater part of the earth's surface still are;) has, by a
long series of progressive steps, come into the possession of knowledge,
which we cannot regard without wonder and admiration; and which seems to
elevate him in no inconsiderable degree, towards a community of thought
with that Divine Mind, into the nature and scheme of whose works he is
thus permitted to penetrate.
5. Now the knowledge which man is capable, by the nature of his mental
faculties, of acquiring, being thus blank and rudimentary at first, and
only proceeding gradually, by the steps of a progress, numerous, slow,
and often long interrupted, to that stage in which it is the basis of
our present speculations; the view which we have just taken, of the
nature of Intellect, as a faculty always of the same kind, always
uniform in its operations, always consistent in its results, appears to
require reconsideration; and especially with reference to the
application which we made of that view, to the intelligent inhabitants
of other planets and other worlds, if such inhabitants there be. For if
we suppose that there are, in the Moon, or in Jupiter, creatures
possessing intellectual faculties of the same kind as those of man;
capable of apprehending the same abstract and general truths; able, like
man, to attain to a knowledge of the scheme of the Universe; yet this
supposition merely gives the capacity and the ability; and does not
include any security, or even high probability, as it would seem, of the
exercise of such capacity, or of the successful application of such
ability. Even if the surface of the Moon be inhabited by creatures as
intelligent as men, why must we suppose that they know anything more of
the geometry and astronomy, than the great bulk of the less cultured
inhabitants of the earth, who occupy, really, a space far larger than
the surface of the Moon; and, all intelligent though they be, and in the
full possession of mental faculties, are yet, on the subjects of
geometry and astronomy, entirely ignorant;--their minds, as to such a
knowledge, a blank? It does not follow, then, that even if there be such
inhabitants in the Moon, or in the Planets, they have any sympathy with
us, or any community of knowledge on the subjects of which we are now
speaking. The surface of the Moon, or of Jupiter, or of Saturn, even if
well peopled, may be peopled only with tribes as barbarous and ignorant
as Tartars, or Esquimaux, or Australians; and therefore, by making such
a supposition, we do little, even hypothetically, to extend the dominion
of that intelligence, by means of which all intelligent beings have some
community of thought with each other, and some suggestion of the working
of the Divine and Universal Mind.
6. But, in fact, the view which we have given of the mode of existence
of the human species upon the earth, as being a progressive existence,
even in the development of the intellectual powers and their results,
necessarily fastens down our thoughts and our speculations to the earth,
and makes us feel how visionary and gratuitous it is to assume any
similar kind of existence in any region occupied by other beings than
man. As we have said, we have no insuperable difficulty in conceiving
other parts of the Universe to be tenanted by animals. Animal life
implies no progress in the species. Such as they are in one century,
such are they in another. The conditions of their sustentation and
generation being given, which no difference of physical circumstances
can render incredible, the race may, so far as we can see, go on
forever. But a race which makes a progress in the development of its
faculties cannot thus, or at least cannot with the same ease, be
conceived as existing through all time, and under all circumstances.
Progress implies, or at least suggests, a beginning and an end. If the
mere existence of a race imply a sustaining and preserving power in the
Creator, the progress of a race implies a guiding and impelling power; a
Governor and Director, as well as a Creator and Preserver. And progress,
not merely in material conditions, not merely in the exercise of bodily
faculties, but in the exercise of mental faculties, in the intellectual
condition of a portion of the species, still more implies a special
position and character of the race, which cannot, without great license
of hypothesis, be extended to other races; and which, if so extended,
becomes unmeaning, from the impossibility of our knowing what is
progress in any other species;--from what and towards what it tends. The
intellectual progress of the human species has been a progress in the
use of thought, and in the knowledge which such use procures; it has
been a progress from mere matter to mind; from the impressions of sense
to ideas; from what in knowledge is casual, partial, temporary, to what
is necessary, universal, and eternal. We can conceive no progress, of
the nature of this, which is not identical with this; nothing like it,
which is not the same. And, therefore, if we will people other planets
with creatures, intelligent as man is intelligent, we must not only give
to them the intelligence, but the intellectual history of the human
species. They must have had their minds unfolded by steps similar to
those by which the human mind has been unfolded; or at least, differing
from them only as the intellectual history of one nation of the earth
differs from that of another. They must have had their Pythagoras, their
Plato, their Kepler, their Galileo, their Newton, if they know what we
know. And thus, in order to conceive, on the Moon or on Jupiter, a race
of beings intelligent like man, we must conceive, there, colonies of
men, with histories resembling more or less the histories of human
colonies; and indeed resembling the history of those nations whose
knowledge we inherit, far more closely than the history of any other
terrestrial nation resembles that part of terrestrial history. If we do
this, we exercise an act of invention and imagination which may be as
coherent as a fairy tale, but which, without further proof, must be as
purely imaginary and arbitrary. But if we do not do this, we cannot
conceive that those regions are occupied at all by intelligent beings.
Intelligence, as we see in the human race, in order to have those
characters which concern our argument, implies a history of intellectual
development; and to assume arbitrarily a history of intellectual
development for the inhabitants of a remote planet, as a ground of
reasoning either for or against Religion, is a proceeding which we can
hardly be expected either to assent to or to refute. If we are to form
any opinions with regard to the condition of such bodies, and to trace
any bearing of such opinions upon our religious views, we must proceed
upon some ground which has more of reality than such a gratuitous
assumption.
7. Thus the condition of man upon the earth, as a condition of
intellectual progress, implies such a special guidance and government
exercised over the race by the Author of his being, as produces
progress; and we have not, so far as we yet perceive, any reason for
supposing that He exercises a like guidance and government over any of
the other bodies with which the researches of astronomers have made us
acquainted. The earth and its inhabitants are under the care of God in a
special manner; and we are utterly destitute of any reason for believing
that other planets and other systems are under the care of God in the
same manner. If we regarded merely the existence of unprogressive races
of animals upon our globe, we might easily suppose that other globes
also are similarly tenanted; and we might infer, that the Creator and
Upholder of animal life was active on those globes, in the same manner
as upon ours. But when we come to a progressive creature, whose
condition implies a beginning, and therefore suggests an end, we form a
peculiar judgment with respect to God's care of that creature, which we
have not as yet seen the slightest grounds to extend to other possible
fields of existence, where we discern no indication of progress, of
beginning, or of end. So far as we can judge, God is mindful of man, and
has launched and guided his course in a certain path which makes his lot
and state different from that of all other creatures.
8. Now when we have arrived at this result, we have, I conceive, reached
one of the points at which the difficulties which astronomical discovery
puts in the way of religious conviction begin to appear. The Earth and
its human inhabitants are, as far as we yet know, in an especial manner
the subjects of God's care and government, for the race is progressive.
Now can this be? Is it not difficult to believe that it is so? The
earth, so small a speck, only one among so many, so many thousands, so
many millions of other bodies, all, probably, of the same nature with
itself, wherefore should it draw to it the special regards of the
Creator of all, and occupy his care in an especial manner? The teaching
of the history of the human race, as intellectually progressive, agrees
with the teaching of Religion, in impressing upon us that God is mindful
of man; that he does regard him; but still, there naturally arises in
our minds a feeling of perplexity and bewilderment, which expresses
itself in the words already so often quoted, What is man, that this
should be so? Can it be true that this province is thus singled out for
a special and peculiar administration by the Lord of the Universal
Empire?
9. Before I make any attempt to answer these questions, I must pursue
the difficulty somewhat further, and look at it in other forms. As I
have said, the history of Man has been, in certain nations, a history of
intellectual progress, from the earliest times up to our own day. But
intellectual progress has been, as I have also said, in a great measure
confined to certain nations thus especially favored. The greater part of
the earth's inhabitants have shared very scantily in that wealth of
knowledge to which the brightest and happiest intellects among men have
thus been led. But though the bulk of mankind have thus had little share
in the grand treasures of science which are open to the race, their life
has still been very different from that of other animals. Many nations,
though they may not have been conspicuous in the history of intellectual
progress, have yet not been without their place in progress of other
kinds--in arts, in arms, and, above all, in morals--in the recognition
of the distinction of right and wrong in human actions, and in the
practical application of this distinction. Such a progress as this has
been far more extensively aimed at, than a progress in abstract and
general knowledge; and, we may venture to say, has been, in many nations
and in a very great measure, really effected. No doubt the imperfection
of this progress, and the constant recurrence of events which appear to
counteract and reverse it, are so obvious and so common as to fill with
grief and indignation the minds of those who regard such a progress as
the great business of the human race; but yet still, looking at the
whole history of the human race, the progress is visible; and even the
grief and the indignation of which we have spoken are a part of its
evidences. There has been, upon the whole, a moral government of the
human race. The moral law, the distinction of right and wrong, has been
established in every nation; and penalties have been established for
wrong-doing. The notion of right and wrong has been extended, from mere
outward acts, to the springs of action, to affection, desire, and will.
The course of human affairs has generally been such, that the just, the
truthful, the kind, the chaste, the orderly portion of mankind have been
happier than the violent and wicked. External wrong has been commonly
punished by the act of human society. Internal sins, impure and
dishonest designs, falsehood, cruelty, have very often led to their own
punishment, by their effect upon the guilty mind itself. We do not say
that the moral government which has prevailed among men has been such,
that we can consider it complete and final in its visible form. We see
that the aspect of things is much the contrary; and we think we see
reasons why it may be expected to be so. But still, there has existed
upon earth a moral government of the human race, exercised, as we must
needs hold, by the Creator of man; partly through the direct operation
of man's faculties, affections, and emotions; and partly through the
authorities which, in all ages and nations, the nature of man has led
him to establish. Now this moral progress and moral government of the
human race is one of the leading facts on which Natural Religion is
founded. We are thus led to regard God as the Moral Governor of man; not
only his Creator and Preserver, but his Lawgiver and his Judge. And the
grounds on which we entertain this belief are peculiarly the human
faculties of man, and their operation in history and in society. The
belief is derived from the whole complex nature of man--the working of
his Affections, Desires, Convictions, Reason, Conscience, and whatever
else enters into the production of human action and its consequences.
God is seen to be the Moral Governor of man by evidence which is
especially derived from the character of Man, and which we could not
attempt to apply to any other creature than man without making our words
altogether unmeaning. But would it not be too bold an assumption to
speak of the Conscience of an inhabitant of Jupiter? Would it not be a
rash philosophy to assume the operation of Remorse or Self-approval on
the planet, in order that we may extend to it the moral government of
God? Except we can point out something more solid than this to reason
from, on such subjects, there is no use in our attempting to reason at
all. Our doctrines must be mere results of invention and imagination.
Here then, again, we are brought to the conviction that God is, so far
as we yet see, in an especial and peculiar manner, the Governor of the
earth and of its human inhabitants, in such a way that the like
government cannot be conceived to be extended to other planets, and
other systems, without arbitrary and fanciful assumptions; assumptions
either of unintelligible differences with incomprehensible results, or
of beings in all respects human, inhabiting the most remote regions of
the universe. And here, again, therefore, we are led to the same
difficulty which we have already encountered: Can the earth, a small
globe among so many millions, have been selected as the scene of this
especially Divine Government?
10. That when we attempt to extend our sympathies to the inhabitants of
other planets and other worlds, and to regard them as living, like us,
under a moral government, we are driven to suppose them to be, in all
essential respects, human beings like ourselves, we have proof, in all
the attempts which have been made, with whatever license of hypothesis
and fancy, to present to us descriptions and representations of the
inhabitants of other parts of the universe. Such representations, though
purposely made as unlike human beings as the imagination of man can
frame them, still are merely combinations, slightly varied, of the
elements of human being; and thus show us that not only our reason, but
even our imagination, cannot conceive creatures subjected to the same
government to which man is subjected, without conceiving them as being
men of one kind or other. A mere animal life, with no interest but
animal enjoyment, we may conceive as assuming forms different from those
which appear in existing animal races; though even here, there are, as
we shall hereafter attempt to show, certain general principles which run
through all animal life. But when in addition to mere animal impulses,
we assume or suppose moral and intellectual interests, we conceive them
as the moral and intellectual interests of man. Truth and falsehood,
right and wrong, law and transgression, happiness and misery, reward and
punishment, are the necessary elements of all that can interest us--of
all that we can call _Government_. To transfer these to Jupiter or to
Sirius, is merely to imagine those bodies to be a sort of island of
Formosa, or new Atlantis, or Utopia, or Platonic Polity, or something of
the like kind. The boldest and most resolute attempts to devise some
life different from human life, have not produced anything more
different than romance-writers and political theorists have devised _as_
a form of human life. And this being so, there is no more wisdom or
philosophy in believing such assemblages of beings to exist in Jupiter
or Sirius, without evidence, than in believing them to exist in the
island of Formosa, with the like absence of evidence.
11. Any examination of what has been written on this subject would show
that, in speculating about moral and intellectual beings in other
regions of the universe, we merely make them to be men in another place.
With regard to the plants and animals of other planets, fancy has freer
play; but man cannot conceive any moral creature who is not man. Thus
Fontenelle, in his _Dialogues on the Plurality of Worlds_, makes the
inhabitants of Venus possess, in an exaggerated degree, the
characteristics of the men of the warm climates of the earth. They are
like the Moors of Grenada; or rather, the Moors of Grenada would be to
them as cold as Greenlanders and Laplanders to us. And the inhabitants
of Mercury have so much vivacity, that they would pass with us for
insane. "Enfin c'est dans Mercure que sont les Petites-Maisons de
l'Univers." The inhabitants of Jupiter and Saturn are immensely slow and
phlegmatic. And though he and other writers attempt to make these
inhabitants of remote regions in some respects superior to man, telling
us that instead of only five senses, they may have six, or ten, or a
hundred, still these are mere words which convey no meaning; and the
great astronomer Bessel had reason to say, that those who imagined
inhabitants in the Moon and Planets, supposed them, in spite of all
their protestations, as like to men as one egg to another.[1]
12. But there is one step more, which we still have to make, in order to
bring out this difficulty in its full force. As we have said, the moral
law has been, to a certain extent, established, developed, and enforced
among men. But, as I have also said, looking carefully at the law, and
at the degree of man's obedience to it, and at the operation of the
sanctions by which it is supported, we cannot help seeing, that man's
knowledge of the law is imperfect, his conviction of its authority
feeble, his transgressions habitual, their punishment and consequences
obscure. When, therefore, we regard God, as the Lawgiver and Judge of
man, it will not appear strange to us, that he should have taken some
mode of promulgating his Law, and announcing his Judgments, in addition
to that ordinary operation of the faculties of man, of which we have
spoken. Revealed Religion teaches us that he has done so: that from the
first placing of the race of man upon the earth, it was his purpose to
do so: that by his dealing with the race of man in the earlier times,
and at various intervals, he made preparation for the mission of a
special Messenger, whom, in the fulness of time, he sent upon the earth
in the form of a man; and who both taught men the Law of God in a purer
and clearer form than any in which it had yet been given; and revealed
His purpose, of rewards for obedience, and punishments for disobedience,
to be executed in a state of being to which this human life is only an
introduction; and established the means by which the spirit of man, when
alienated from God by transgression, may be again reconciled to Him. The
arrival of this especial Messenger of Holiness, Judgment, and
Redemption, forms the great event in the history of the earth,
considered in a religious view, as the abode of God's servants. It was
attended with the sufferings and cruel death of the Divine Messenger
thus sent; was preceded by prophetic announcements of his coming; and
the history of the world, for the two thousand years that have since
elapsed, has been in a great measure occupied with the consequences of
that advent. Such a proceeding shows, of course, that God has an
especial care for the race of man. The earth, thus selected as the
theatre of such a scheme of Teaching and of Redemption, cannot, in the
eyes of any one who accepts this Christian faith, be regarded as being
on a level with any other domiciles. It is the Stage of the great Drama
of God's Mercy and Man's Salvation; the Sanctuary of the Universe; the
Holy Land of Creation; the Royal Abode, for a time at least, of the
Eternal King. This being the character which has thus been conferred
upon it, how can we assent to the assertions of Astronomers, when they
tell us that it is only one among millions of similar habitations, not
distinguishable from them, except that it is smaller than most of them
that we can measure; confused and rude in its materials like them? Or if
we believe the Astronomers, will not such a belief lead us to doubt the
truth of the great scheme of Christianity, which thus makes the earth
the scene of a special dispensation.
13. This is the form in which Chalmers has taken up the argument. This
is the difficulty which he proposes to solve; or rather, (such being as
I have said the mode in which he presents the subject,) the objection
which he proposes to refute. It is the bearing of the Astronomical
discoveries of modern times, not upon the doctrines of Natural Religion,
but upon the scheme of Christianity, which he discusses. And the
question which he supposes his opponent to propound, as an objection to
the Christian scheme, is:--How is it consistent with the dignity, the
impartiality, the comprehensiveness, the analogy of God's proceedings,
that he should make so special and pre-eminent a provision for the
salvation of the inhabitants of this Earth, where there are such myriads
of other worlds, all of which may require the like provision, and all of
which have an equal claim to their Creator's care?
14. The answer which Chalmers gives to this objection, is one drawn, in
the first instance, from our ignorance. He urges that, when the objector
asserts that other worlds may have the like need with our own, of a
special provision for the rescue of their inhabitants from the
consequences of the transgression of God's laws, he is really making an
assertion without the slightest foundation. Not only does Science not
give us any information on such subjects, but the whole spirit of the
scientific procedure, which has led to the knowledge which we possess,
concerning other planets and other systems, is utterly opposed to our
making such assumptions, respecting other worlds, as the objection
involves. Modern Science, in proportion as she is confident when she has
good grounds of proof, however strange may be the doctrines proved, is
not only diffident, but is utterly silent, and abstains even from
guessing, when she has no grounds of proof. Chalmers takes Newton's
reasoning, as offering a special example of this mixed temper, of
courage in following the evidence, and temperance in not advancing when
there is no evidence. He puts, in opposition to this, the example of the
true philosophical temper,--a supposed rash theorist, who should make
unwarranted suppositions and assumptions, concerning matters to which
our scientific evidence does not reach;--the animals and plants, for
instance, which are to be found in the planet Jupiter. No one, he says,
would more utterly reject and condemn such speculations than Newton,
who first rightly explained the motion of Jupiter and of his attendant
satellites, about which Science _can_ pronounce her truths. And thus,
nothing can be more opposite to the real spirit of modern science, and
astronomy in particular, than arguments, such as we have stated,
professing to be drawn from science and from astronomy. Since we know
nothing about the inhabitants of Jupiter, true science requires that we
say and suppose nothing about them; still more requires that we should
not, on the ground of assumptions made with regard to them, and other
supposed groups of living creatures, reject a belief, founded on direct
and positive proofs, such as is the belief in the truths of Natural and
of Revealed Religion.
15. To this argument of Chalmers, we may not only give our full assent,
but we may venture to suggest, in accordance with what we have already
said, that the argument, when so put, is not stated in all its
legitimate force. The assertion that the inhabitants of Jupiter have the
same need as we have, of a special dispensation for their preservation
from moral ruin, is not only as merely arbitrary an assumption, as any
assertion could be, founded on a supposed knowledge of an analogy
between the botany of Jupiter, and the botany of the earth; but it is a
great deal more so. There may be circumstances which may afford some
reason to believe that something of the nature of vegetables grows on
the surface of Jupiter; for instance, if we find that he is a solid
globe surrounded by an atmosphere, vapor, clouds, showers. But, as we
have already said, there is an immeasurable distance between the
existence of unprogressive tribes of organized creatures, plants, or
even animals, and the existence of a progressive creature, which can
pass through the conditions of receiving, discerning, disobeying, and
obeying a moral law; which can be estranged from God, and then
reconciled to him. To assume, without further proof, that there are, in
Jupiter, creatures of such a nature that these descriptions apply to
them, is a far bolder and more unphilosophical assumption, than any that
the objector could make concerning the botany of Jupiter; and therefore,
the objection thus supposed to be drawn from our supposed knowledge, is
very properly answered by an appeal to our really utter ignorance, as to
the points on which the argument rests.
16. This appeal to our ignorance is the main feature in Chalmers'
reasonings, so far as the argument on the one side or the other has
reference to science. Chalmers, indeed, pursues the argument into other
fields of speculation. He urges, that not only we have no right to
assume that other worlds require a redemption of the same kind as that
provided for man, but that the very reverse maybe the case. Man maybe
the only transgressor; and this, the only world that needed so great a
provision for its salvation. We read in Scripture, expressions which
imply that other beings, besides man, take an interest in the salvation
of man. May not this be true of the inhabitants of other worlds, if such
inhabitants there be? These speculations he pursues to a considerable
length, with great richness of imagination, and great eloquence. But the
suppositions on which they proceed are too loosely connected with the
results of science, to make it safe for us to dwell upon them here.
17. I conceive, as I have said, that the argument with which Chalmers
thus deals admits of answers, also drawn from modern science, which to
many persons will seem more complete than that which is thus drawn from
our ignorance. But before I proceed to bring forward these answers,
which will require several steps of explanation, I have one or two
remarks still to make.
18. Undoubtedly they who believe firmly both that the earth has been
the scene of a Divine Plan for the benefit of man, and also that other
bodies in the universe are inhabited by creatures who may have an
interest in such a Plan, are naturally led to conjectures and
imaginations as to the nature and extent of that interest. The religious
poet, in his Night Thoughts, interrogates the inhabitants of a distant
star, whether their race too has, in its history, events resembling the
fall of man, and the redemption of man.
Enjoy your happy realms their golden age?
And had your Eden an abstemious Eve?
Or, if your mother fell are you redeemed?
And if redeemed, is your Redeemer scorned?
And such imaginations may be readily allowed to the preacher or the
poet, to be employed in order to impress upon man the conviction of his
privileges, his thanklessness, his inconsistency, and the like. But
every form in which such reflections can be put shows how intimately
they depend upon the nature and history of man. And when such
reflections are made the source of difficulty or objection in the way of
religious thought, and when these difficulties and objections are
represented as derived from astronomical discoveries, it cannot be
superfluous to inquire whether astronomy has really discovered any
ground for such objections. To some persons it may be more grateful to
remedy one assumption by another: the assumption of moral agents in
other worlds, by the assumption of some operation of the Divine Plan in
other worlds. But since many persons find great difficulty in conceiving
such an operation of the Divine Plan in a satisfactory way; and many
persons also think that to make such unauthorized and fanciful
assumptions with regard to the Divine Plans for the government of God's
creatures is a violation of the humility, submission of mind, and spirit
of reverence which religion requires; it may be useful if we can show
that such assumptions, with regard to the Divine Plans, are called forth
by assumptions equally gratuitous on the other side: that Astronomy no
more reveals to us extra-terrestrial moral agents, than Religion reveals
to us extra-terrestrial Plans of Divine government. Chalmers has spoken
of the _rashness_ of making assumptions on such subjects without proof;
leaving it however, to be supposed, that though astronomy does not
supply proof of intelligent inhabitants of other parts of the universe,
she yet does offer strong analogies in favor of such an opinion. But
such a procedure is more than rash: when astronomical doctrines are
presented in the form in which they have been already laid before the
reader, which is the ordinary and popular mode of apprehending them, the
analogies in favor of "other worlds," are (to say the least) greatly
exaggerated. And by taking into account what astronomy really teaches
us, and what we learn also from other sciences, I shall attempt to
reduce such "analogies" to their true value.
14. The privileges of man, which make the difficulty in assigning him
his place in the vast scheme of the Universe, we have described as
consisting in his being an _intellectual_, _moral_, and _religious_
creature. Perhaps the privileges implied in the last term, and their
place in our argument, may justify a word more of explanation. Religion
teaches us that there is opened to man, not only a prospect of a life in
the presence of God, after this mortal life, but also the possibility
and the duty of spending this life as in the presence of God. This is
properly the highest result and manifestation of the effect of Religion
upon man. Precisely because it is this, it is difficult to speak of this
effect without seeming to use the language of enthusiasm; and yet
again, precisely because it is so, our argument would be incomplete
without a reference to it. There is for man, a possibility and a duty of
bringing his thoughts, purposes, and affections more and more into
continual unison with the will of God. This, even Natural Religion
taught men, was the highest point at which man could aim; and Revealed
Religion has still more clearly enjoined the duty of aiming at such a
condition. The means of a progress towards such a state belong to the
Religion of the heart and mind. They include a constant purification and
elevation of the thoughts, affections, and will, wrought by habits of
religious reflection and meditation, of prayer and gratitude to God.
Without entering into further explanation, all religious persons will
agree that such a progress is, under happy influences, possible for man,
and is the highest condition to which he can attain in this life.
Whatever names may have been applied at different times to the steps of
such a progress;--the cultivation of the divine nature in us;
resignation; devotion; holiness; union with God; living in God, and with
God in us;--religious persons will not doubt that there is a reality of
internal state corresponding to these expressions; and that, to be
capable of elevation into the condition which these expressions
indicate, is one of the especial privileges of man. Man's soul,
considered especially as the subject of God's government, is often
called his _Spirit_; and that man is capable of such conformity to the
will of God, and approximation to Him, is sometimes expressed by
speaking of him as a _spiritual creature_. And though the privilege of
being, or of being capable of becoming, in this sense, a spiritual
creature, is a part of man's religious privileges; we may sometimes be
allowed to use this additional expression, in order to remind the
reader, how great those religious privileges are, and how close is the
relation between man and God, which they imply.
15. We have given a view of the peculiar character of man's condition,
which seem to claim for him a nature and place unique and incapable of
repetition, in the scheme of the universe; and to this view astronomy,
exhibiting to us the habitation of man as only one among many similar
abodes, offers an objection. We are, therefore, now called upon, I
conceive, to proceed to exhibit the answer which a somewhat different
view of modern science suggests to this difficulty or objection.
For this purpose, we must begin by regarding the Earth in another point
of view, different from that hitherto considered by us.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] Populaere Vorlesungen ueber Wissenschaftliche Gegenstaende, p. 31.