_On the application of the comparative method to this problem._
It is impossible to deny that the comparative method is not only of use
but also absolutely indispensable in dealing with a subject of this
kind. In order to discover the origin of property in land among mankind
it is plain that every nation must be studied; at any rate every nation
that has left any trace behind it. Some part of this work of comparison
had already been attempted by Maurer; but he had limited himself to the
Slavonic and Scandinavian countries. A great and powerful writer, Sir
Henry Maine, has applied the comparative method to India. But the first
to attempt what I may call “universal comparison,” is, if I mistake
not, M. Emile de Laveleye, in his work, “On Property and its Primitive
Forms,” published in 1874. His theory is that the agricultural groups
of the whole world, from India to Scotland, for a long time cultivated
the soil in common, and that “the history of all lands reveals to us a
primitive condition of collectivity.” M. de Laveleye is an economist;
but it is by historical evidence that he endeavours to support his
thesis, and it is this evidence that I shall now proceed to test. His
reputation either as economist or moralist can receive no injury from a
purely historical discussion.
He passes in review one after the other (I am following the order of
his chapters) the Slavs of Russia, the island of Java, ancient India,
the German Mark, the Arabs of Algeria, the ancient Moors of Spain,
the Yoloffs of the coast of Guinea, the Afghans, the ancient Greeks,
the ancient Romans, England, the Southern Slavs, Switzerland and the
Netherlands. Here we have peoples of every race, every degree of
latitude, and every age; yet this list does not include all nations. To
mention only some of the ancient world, we do not find here the ancient
Egyptians, the ancient Jews, or the ancient Assyrians, peoples which,
nevertheless, are much better known than the Yoloffs, the Javanese, or
the ancient Germans. Why are they not here? Can it be because all the
documents concerning them, however far back we may go, bear witness to
the custom of private ownership, and do not show a trace of community
in land? It is certain that the history of Egypt shows the existence
of property from the remotest times. It is certain that contracts
for the sale of land have been discovered upon Babylonian bricks. It
is certain, also, that the sacred books of the Jews refer to property
and the sale of land as far back as the time of Abraham (Genesis
XXIII.). Was it for this reason that they were omitted in the universal
comparison of all nations? But as our author was seeking a general rule
for the whole human race, and says that he has found it, he ought not
to pass over a single people of whom we know anything. When one seeks
to construct a general system, the facts which contradict it must be
presented as well as those in its favour. This is the first rule of the
comparative method.
Having insisted on this omission, of which every one will see the
importance, I shall consider one by one the nations spoken of by our
author, and verify his assertions.
1. Among the Slavs of Russia M. de Laveleye observes the _mir_,
_i.e._, a village dividing its soil annually or every few years among
its members. In this _mir_ he recognises an association with common
ownership of the soil. “The _mir_ alone,” he says, “owns the land,
and individuals have nothing more than the enjoyment of it, turn and
turn about.” On this I have two observations to make. In the first
place, the Russian _mir_ is only a village and a small village, the
population rarely exceeding two hundred souls; it always cultivates
the same land; so that if this be a communistic group it is at any
rate one which is confined to a narrow radius. The _mir_ by no means
represents a “tribal community,” still less a “national community.” One
cannot conclude from the _mir_ that the Russian nation follows a system
of agrarian communism, or that the soil is the property of the whole
nation, or that the soil is common to everyone; so that the example
departs widely from the thesis that is sought to be maintained.
In the second place, if we examine the _mir_ as it was before the
reforms of the last Czar but one, we discover that the _mir_ is not
owner of the soil, but is itself owned by some one else. In the _mir_,
lands and men alike belong to a lord; and lord and landowner are one.
M. de Laveleye does not deny this fact; he even recognises “that the
_mir_ pays the rent to the lord collectively.” This single fact makes
the whole theory fall to the ground. Since the soil belongs not to the
_mir_, but to some one else, the _mir_ does not represent agrarian
communism. It is a village, like all our villages of the Middle Ages,
which is the private property of a single individual; the peasants are
only tenants or serfs; the only peculiarity about it is, that these
peasants who pay rent for the land collectively also cultivate it
collectively.
It is true that there are certain theorists who say: “It is probable
that there was a time when the landlord did not exist, and when the
land was possessed in common by the peasants.” This is precisely what
would have to be proved. They ought first to prove that the landowner
or lord at one time did not exist, and next that the peasants then
possessed the land in common. Now these are two propositions in support
of which no one has ever been able to bring forward proof or even an
appearance of proof. On the contrary, according to M. Tchitchérin and
other writers who have studied the subject, it has been proved that the
association of the _mir_ has only been in existence for three hundred
years; that it was created in the year 1592; and that far from being
the result of a spontaneous and ancient growth, it was instituted
by the act of a despotic Government, by an ukase of the Czar Fédor
Ivanovitch. Before this epoch land in Russia was an object of private
property; so one is led to believe by the documents of donation and
bequest quoted by M. Tchitchérin. I am aware that the question is still
warmly discussed and remains obscure; but so long as documents proving
the existence of the _mir_ before the 16th century are not produced, we
must continue to doubt whether the _mir_ is an ancient institution at
all. So far as we know at present, it only came into existence with the
feudal period; it forms one of the wheels of the feudal organisation in
Russia--a group of serfs, which the Government requires to cultivate
its land in common, so as to be more sure of the payment of the rent.
Far from being collective ownership, the _mir_ is collective serfdom.
That, at any rate, is what appears from the material in our possession.
Theorists are at perfect liberty to hope that new documents will come
to light which will show the contrary. Till then, it is impossible to
bring forward the _mir_ as a proof that the human race once practised
agrarian communism.
2. M. de Laveleye passes on to the island of Java, and describes the
condition of things there in a chapter full of interest; in some places
the soil is cultivated in common, it is in others annually divided. But
I cannot help noticing that throughout he is speaking of the present
time. He describes the condition of things as they are now. He makes
use of the regulations of the Dutch Government, of laws of 1853, of
parliamentary reports of 1869. The furthest date to which he goes back
is to certain regulations of 1806. And yet, since he is dealing with
the problem of the origin of property, what one wants to hear about is
the ancient state of things. I am aware that some people will at once
say “such a system must be old;” but a student who has any critical
instinct will rather say that the present existence of such a system
proves nothing at all in relation to earlier times. And, indeed, we
read in one of the reports on which M. de Laveleye relies, that “this
system began with the cultivation of indigo, sugar and coffee for the
benefit of the Dutch Government.”[227] The sort of communism we are now
considering would in this case be but a recent institution, a creation
of the European conquerors. It is true that others make it commence
earlier, with the cultivation of rice.[228] This is easily explained:
“Rice growing in water requires a system of irrigation, which would
be impossible without association; and this necessity gives rise to
the practice of common cultivation.” It has been ascertained how these
villages arose. “Several families agree to establish a system of
irrigation in common. As the water has been brought by the co-operation
of all, the result is that the land irrigated by it is cultivated
by all.”[229] But it is apparent that the soil does not belong to
the nation or the tribe; it belongs to a group, an association. An
association of proprietors is not communism; it is one of the forms of
property.
We must also observe that private property does exist in Java. In six
out of the twenty provinces of the island that alone is to be found,
and association is unknown; in eight the two methods are practised side
by side; in six association is only practised on the rice fields and
irrigated lands, and the rest of the land is held entirely as private
property. From these facts I cannot draw the conclusion that community
in land was a primitive and natural institution in the island of Java.
We meet with it only under modern circumstances, and even here we must
recognise that it is less a community than an association.
3. Our author next devotes a few words to ancient India, and here I
shall imitate his brevity. He gives but one reference; a sentence from
Nearchus, the officer of Alexander the Great. I shall give it first
as translated by M. de Laveleye, and then as it really is. “Nearchus
informs us that in certain districts of India the land was cultivated
in common _by tribes_, which, at the close of the year, divided the
crop among them.” Now the Greek signifies: “In other parts the work of
agriculture is carried on _by each family_ in common, κατὰ σνγγένειαν
κοινῇ; and when the crops have been gathered each person takes his
share for his support during the year.”[230] We see that M. de Laveleye
had overlooked the words κατὰ σνγγένειαν. He has mistaken a community
of the family for a community of the tribe. I know that many people
only too readily identify the two things; but a little attention will
show that they are essentially different. When a family, even though
it may form a large group of persons, cultivates its land in common,
this is not agrarian communism; it is merely an undivided family and
undivided family property.
4. M. de Laveleye next speaks of the Germanic mark. Here he does not
do more than reproduce Maurer’s theory, on which he relies without
apparently having verified a single one of his references.
5. Then follows a chapter on agrarian communities amongst the Arabs
of Algeria, the Moors of Spain, the Yoloffs of the coast of Guinea,
the Mexicans, the Caribeans, the Afghans and the Tchérémisses. A
story or sentence from some traveller is quoted about each of these
nations. As to this I have one remark to make: there is nothing rarer
or more difficult than an accurate observation. This truth, which is
recognised in all other sciences, ought also to be recognised by every
one who is dealing with history; for history is precisely that one of
all the sciences in which observation is most difficult and demands
the greatest attention. A traveller makes the general statement that
amongst the Caribeans or the Yoloffs he has seen a partition of land,
or has been told that such a thing was customary. But has he observed
between whom the partition took place? Was it amongst the members of
the same family, or amongst all the inhabitants of the same village, or
between the villages and all the various parts of the tribe or nation?
These are shades of differences that a hasty traveller cannot notice,
and that an historian equally hasty refrains from inquiring into. And
yet, the character and consequences of the partition depend altogether
upon the answer to this question. The study of a social system is a
serious undertaking, and one not often to be met with in travellers’
tales.
And then we must ask whether, side by side with certain facts reported
by travellers, there are not others which contradict them. You see
common land among certain Arab tribes; but it must also be noticed that
the Koran recognises private property, and that it has existed among
the Arabs from time immemorial.[231] There are other nations where you
may meet with examples of land held in common, but where, nevertheless,
it must be acknowledged that private property greatly preponderates.
In Spain, for instance, we are told that “in certain villages the land
is divided anew each year amongst the inhabitants.”[232] In how many
villages? Two ardent inquirers, whose only desire was to find proofs of
this community in land, M. Oliveira Martins and M. de Azcarate, found
it in only four villages in the whole Iberian peninsula.[233] Perhaps
you will think that these are vestiges of an earlier state of things
that may once have been general. Not at all. It has been proved that in
these four villages the system of common ownership did not appear until
the twelfth or thirteenth century, A.D.; and the particular causes
which led to its appearance are well known. This kind of community was,
therefore, neither general nor ancient. M. de Laveleye also mentions
a village community in Italy; but it is one which was only created in
1263. A certain estate of about 5000 acres had till that date belonged
to a private owner; that is, it had been precisely the opposite of
common property. In 1263 the owner, who happened to be a bishop, gave
it to the tenants, on condition that they held it in common. Can a few
isolated facts like this prove that mankind used to hold land in common
in primitive times?
6. M. de Laveleye’s theory would be incomplete and insecure if he did
not manage to bring in the Greeks and Romans. He does little more than
repeat the authorities used by M. de Viollet. Like him, he believes
that the legend of a golden age--of an age, that is, when man did not
till the soil (for this is the distinctive and essential point in all
these legends),--is a proof that nations held land in common at a
period when they did till the soil; he even adds that “he is _forced_
to arrive at the conclusion that the ancient poets depicted in the
golden age a state of civilisation (sic) of which the recollection
had been handed down to later times.”[234] Like M. Viollet, he quotes
the passages from Virgil, Tibullus and Trogus Pompeius without looking
to see whether these passages describe a condition of civilisation
or one of barbarism. He tells us what Porphyrus says about the 2000
disciples gathered together by Pythagoras in his phalanstery. He quotes
the sentence from Diodorus about the Lipari isles; without seeing that
it distinctly describes the institution of private property. Trusting
in M. Viollet, he borrows his pages on the _copis_ and the Spartan
συσσίτια; for, like him, he believes that these common meals, from
which Aristotle tells us that the poorer Spartans were excluded, were
“a communistic institution.”[235]
M. de Laveleye also believes that the division of land at the founding
of each city implies an earlier stage in which the city cultivated the
land in common. He does not notice that this division, taking place
at the very moment when the city is founded, is not the result of an
earlier state of communism. It is the earliest fact to which we can go
back. So soon as a band of emigrants have made themselves masters of
a territory, they parcel it out in lots with complete and hereditary
ownership. With very rare exceptions, a Greek city did not hold or
cultivate land in common for a single year.
These lots were called κλῆρος in Greek, _sortes_ in Latin, because
they were originally drawn by lot. M. de Laveleye, noticing these two
words, at once concludes that the drawing by lot took place every
year (p. 85). This is a mistake. Out of all the cases where you find
mention of a partition, you will not find one in which it was annual or
periodical. In every case the division referred to takes place once and
for all, in perpetuity.[236] Each portion is henceforward hereditary in
the family to which it has fallen by lot; and this is the reason why
κλῆρος had the meaning of inheritance and _sors_ signified patrimony.
The prohibition against selling the land, _i.e._, against separating
it from the family in order to transfer it to another family or even
to bestow it on the State, appears to M. de Laveleye a proof that
the land belonged to the State (p. 166). It is merely a proof that
according to the ideas of the ancients it ought always to belong to the
same family. M. de Laveleye reproaches me with having, in the _Cité
Antique_, attributed this prohibition of sale “to the influence of
ancient religion.” The phrase gives an incorrect idea of my meaning.
What I showed was that family property was closely bound up with family
religion. Sale outside the family was not permitted because ancient
law and ancient belief connected the land with the family. The land
belonged to the family, not to the individual. It was the same, in my
opinion, amongst the ancient Germans and the Slavs; and hence it was
that amongst all these nations ancient law did not permit the sale of
land.
For the same reason bequest was prohibited among the Greeks, Italians,
Germans, and Slavs in the early period of their law. The land must
pass to the son or the nearest relations. For the same reason, again,
the daughter did not inherit; because by her marriage she would have
carried the land out of the family. All these facts, which it is now
impossible not to admit, are unmistakable signs of a condition in which
property belonged to the family. They are all directly contrary to a
condition of communism.
M. de Laveleye also lays great stress upon Sparta; only he omits to
mention that private property was established there from the first
beginning of the city, and that every κλῆρος remained attached to the
same family down to the revolution of Cleomenes, _i.e._, for eight
centuries.[237] To make up for that, he tells us of certain imaginary
brotherhoods, “which must have played an important part in the social
body;” a statement for which there is no authority. He adds that
Sparta “had a wide extent of common land;” for which also there is
no evidence: and that “this common land was used to provide for the
public meals;” which is directly opposed to the definite evidence we do
possess.
He accumulates quotations, but they are inexact. He refers to Aristotle
(_Polit._ vii., 10); but all Aristotle says is that men began by
being hunters and shepherds; does that imply that when they became
agriculturists they held the soil in common? He quotes Virgil, who in
the Æneid (xi. 315) says that “the Aurunci tilled the land in common;”
turn to the passage; the expression “in common” is not there; M. de
Laveleye has unconsciously added it himself. Every writer does this
who is under the influence of a fixed idea.[238] Speaking of Rome, he
declares “that he sees a proof of primitive community in the common
meals of the _curiæ_;” and he does not notice that these repasts of the
_curia_ only took place on certain festivals, and that they were sacred
feasts, as we are expressly told by Dionysius of Halicarnassus, who
witnessed them. “The _curiæ_,” he says, “with their priests, perform
sacrifices and eat together on feast days.” This is not an agrarian
community; it is a religious communion. Suppose that a stranger, seeing
a number of good Christians communicating in our churches, declared
that he saw in this a proof that the French held their land in common!
A little farther we read: “The law of the Twelve Tables preserves a
trace of common ownership; for in default of the _proximus agnatus_
the _gens_ is preferred to the other agnates.” There is nothing
resembling this in what we have of the law of the Twelve Tables; the
gens was never preferred to the agnates. Our author quotes, it is true,
the following sentence, which he attributes to Gaius: _in legitimis
hereditatibus successio non est: gentiles familiam habento_, which is
said to be in Gaius iii., 12; but look in Gaius for this extraordinary
sentence, and you certainly will not find it. Thus, alike for Greece
and for Rome, M. de Laveleye has got together a number of authorities;
but there is not a single quotation that is exact, or that has the
meaning he attributes to it.
7. We now come to the Southern Slavs, _i.e._, the Bosnians, Servians,
and Bulgarians, who, in their turn, have to furnish arguments in
support of the theory.[239] This chapter of M. de Laveleye’s is the
most interesting in the book, the most curious, and, in my opinion,
the most exact. Only I do not see how it bears upon the problem with
which we are occupied. It is very true that the Servian or Bosnian
village often cultivates its land in common. But this village is
composed of a small group of from twenty to sixty persons, who dwell
in four or five houses built within a single enclosure; and the land
belonging to it seldom exceeds sixty acres. Look at it closely, and you
will see that this little village is nothing more than a family. M.
de Laveleye recognises this (p. 204). The brothers as a rule keeping
together and the family continuing to form one undivided body, the
property remains united like the family. The land is cultivated in
common and the produce is consumed in common, under the direction
of the head of the family. This is described by M. de Laveleye with
zest and ability; but it is not community in land; it is the common
ownership of the family. We have seen it amongst the ancient Greeks;
in the most ancient Roman law; amongst the Germans; and now we find
it amongst the Servians. The family forms a small village; it keeps
to itself on its own land; and this land is a common possession which
has belonged to it from time immemorial. It must be added that all the
characteristics which accompany family ownership amongst the Greeks and
Germans are to be found here. The custom of bequest does not exist,
nor does that of gift or sale. All the members of a family are common
owners of the soil, and consequently they alone are the heirs. Anyone
leaving the family loses his rights over the land; anyone entering it
by adoption has the same rights as those who were born into it. Except
that the chief is no longer the eldest member or the son of the eldest,
but the one whom the rest elect--a change which naturally came about in
the course of time--this family resembles in every other respect the
ancient Greek family. But that the soil belongs to the nation or the
tribe there is not the slightest evidence.
8. M. de Laveleye now comes to the _allmenden_ of Switzerland. He
tells us “that never was there a more radical democracy than that
which was to be found in primitive Switzerland,” and he describes the
_landgemeinde_, “which goes back to the earliest times” (pages 270 _et
seq_). “The _Allmend_,” he says again, “presents the ancient type of
true justice, which ought to serve as the basis for the society of the
future” (p. 282).
I should like to learn, however, whether these _allmenden_ really
do come down from remote times. Our author tells us so, but without
bringing forward any kind of proof. He declares “that they go back to
the patriarchal period” (p. 291), “that they have lasted for thousands
of years” (p. 281). It is easy to say this; but on what evidence does
it rest? Private property exists in Switzerland, and our author cannot
point to any epoch in which it did not exist. If we examine the law of
the Burgundians and of the Alamanni, by which the country was first
governed, it is private property we find, not common ownership. If we
examine the charters down to the 12th century, we still find private
property. The _allmenden_ of to-day certainly date back some six or
seven centuries. Can they be traced farther back than that?
And what exactly are these _allmenden_? Do we see in them a system of
non-division of land, a system, that is, under which the land, being
considered the common property of the whole people, is not supposed
to belong to anyone individually? By no means. Private property is
in full force in Switzerland, side by side with the _allmenden_. The
_allmenden_ are only a part of the land of each village and indeed the
smallest part, a tenth, or, at most, a fifth. They are usually forests,
mountain pastures, or marshes, and include very little land capable of
cultivation. Private property is accordingly the dominant fact; common
ownership only concerns accessories.
The _allmenden_ are just what is to be found in every country; they
are the village commons. It would be interesting and instructive if we
could discover their origin, just as it is interesting to inquire into
the origin of the commons in France. But village commons do not in any
way prove a general system of common ownership; and no one has yet
been able to prove that they are the outcome of such a system. We know
that when the Romans founded a colony, they instituted private property
from the very first; but at the same time they reserved a portion of
the soil, which was to be the common possession of the new city. And
to go farther back, we know that Rome herself, from the time she first
appears in history, had an _ager publicus_ at the same time as _agri
privati_, and that the Greek cities also had a γῆ δημοσία. This public
land was in no way an indication that the people lived a single day
without individual estates. The _allmenden_ of Switzerland are commons
of the same character as we find everywhere else. Each village has its
own; and they are the property of the village, which sometimes sells
them, lets them to the highest bidder, or sells the wood upon them, to
defray the expenses of its school or church. Frequently the commons
are left for the inhabitants to use as they like; and they get wood
from them, graze their cattle there, or cultivate small portions. But
it is important to notice that only those who own land in the village
have any rights of enjoyment over the _allmend_. I refer chiefly to
the condition of things before the last forty years; for only quite
recently have such rights been extended to mere residents and the
inhabitants generally. In essential characteristics the _allmend_ is
not common property; it does not belong to all; it is held in common
by people who are already owners of land. It is an appendage of private
property.
M. de Laveleye has written some beautiful passages on the usefulness
of these commons, on the mistake which has been made in France in
their general alienation, and on the happy results produced by them in
Switzerland, both in almost entirely preventing the growth of absolute
destitution and in attaching the poorest peasant to his native soil.
These considerations are just, profound, and inspired by generous
feeling, although but little applicable to modern society. But we are
now considering them in relation to the supposed common ownership of
land; with that the _allmenden_ have nothing to do, and they prove
nothing as to its earlier existence.
9. M. de Laveleye finally refers to the Scotch townships as a proof
of primitive community.[240] In the more distant parts of Scotland,
especially in certain islands lying to the north-west, we find groups
of people who hold the land of a village in common and divide it
amongst themselves in separate lots every year. Is this a system of
land communism, or, as it is called, collective ownership? At the first
glance one would think so. But if you are not satisfied with a first
glance and look further, you will observe that the village belongs to
a single person, the landlord. The peasants are nothing more than the
cultivators. M. de Laveleye cannot help recognising this: “The land
of the village,” he says, “is let to them by the owner.” Again: “The
land does not belong to them; it is the property of a landlord to whom
they pay rent for it.” The cultivators act together as an association
“with the consent of the landlord;” and there are villages in which the
landlord does not allow this collective system of occupation. “They
have a head who is generally appointed by the landlord.” The rent is
paid collectively. We have a description of the _township_ in a work
published recently. The house of the lord, the _domus dominica_ of
our charters, stands in the centre of the village, by the side of the
church.[241] It is built of stone; and around it, at a little distance,
stand the dwellings of the “villeins,” built of mud and thatched with
straw. The villeins owe their lord rent and certain personal services.
We see from this that the Scotch or English township is not a community
which owns its own land; it is the property of an individual owner,
and the only thing about it which is collective is the cultivation.
The township is really a private estate; and the group of peasants
who till it in common are the tenants. Ownership and tenancy are two
distinct things, which must not be confused. To be owners in common is
very different from being tenants in common under a landlord. We find
in France also, throughout the Middle Ages, instances of tenancies in
common; and I know that there are writers who are quick to identify
them with ownership in common.[242] But this is a mistake which no
one can make who has any accuracy of thought; for it is quite evident
that whilst the land was cultivated by a common group of peasants, it
belonged to a lord who stood above them. The Scotch township has no
connection whatever with an ancient system of community in land.
M. de Laveleye puts forward an hypothesis; he supposes that there
was an earlier period in which the township belonged to the peasants
themselves, and the lord, whom we find in later times, did not exist.
But this is a mere hypothesis unsupported by a single document or a
single fact. He goes further and maintains that this system of village
communities was in force throughout the whole of England in the Saxon
period. But there is no evidence for this in the Anglo-Saxon laws;
they give not the slightest indication of it. The _tuncipesmot_ is not
community in land; nor is the _folcland_. We must never lose sight of
the fact that history is based upon documents, and not upon hypotheses
or flights of the imagination. When M. de Laveleye says that “the
English manor has destroyed the old village community,” he makes an
entirely hypothetical generalisation. To imagine the manorial lord
of the Middle Ages as a warrior who has forcibly set himself over
a community of free men, is to show that one knows nothing of the
documents from the fifth to the tenth centuries, and that one has an
altogether childish idea of the origin of feudalism.
To come back to the comparative method. I believe that it is infinitely
fruitful; but only on condition that the facts which are compared have
a real resemblance to one another, and that things which are widely
different are not confused. When you bring together the Scotch township
which is nothing more than an association of tenants, the Russian
_mir_ which seems to have long been only an association of serfs, the
Servian village which, on the other hand, is a household community, and
the _allmend_ or commons which are a consequence and accompaniment of
private property, you confuse things which are absolutely different,
and which, moreover, are very far removed from the system of community
in land that you are anxious to prove.
It is needful to come to an understanding as to what the “comparative
method” really is. I have observed that, during the last fifteen
years or so, there has been a strange misapprehension on this point.
Some writers maintain that to compare any facts, no matter what, is
to apply the comparative method. They search all over the world for
peculiar usages; they cite the legend of the golden age amongst the
ancients as if it were an historical fact; they seize upon a trifling
circumstance which occurred in the Lipari Isles as if it related to
the entire Greek world; they seize upon some custom, such as public
repasts or the festivals of the curia; thence they pass to the Russian
_mir_ and talk of it as if they knew all about it; then they describe a
township or an _allmend_; and, in short, whenever they find an instance
of anything that is done in common, at once they suppose that they have
discovered community in land. They pretend they have discovered the
most widespread institutions of the human race by the help of some few
instances that they have sought for far and wide, and that they do not
take the trouble to observe accurately. And, what is a more serious
matter, they omit and leave out of their consideration facts which are
constant, normal, well-authenticated, which are engraven in the laws
of all peoples, and which have made up their historical life. They
give us a few isolated facts and turn our thoughts away from permanent
institutions. This is not the comparative method.
If you wished to employ the comparative method it would first of all
be needful to study each nation in itself, to study it throughout its
history, and above all in its law. Should you wish to know if the
ancient Greek cities held their land in common, you must study Greek
law. For the Romans, you must go over the whole history of Rome; for
the Germans, you must take German law. M. Viollet and M. de Laveleye
make frequent references to ancient India; why do they not mention
that in all the ancient Hindoo law that has come down to us the rights
of private property are sanctioned, although, of course, the holding
of property in common by co-heirs is also recognised? Why has no one
quoted the old maxim: “The land belongs to the man who first clears
it, as the deer belongs to the man who first wounds it”? They prefer
to quote certain customs, whose importance they enormously exaggerate,
rather than present to us the rules which were constant and normal.
The comparative method does not consist in discovering amongst fifteen
different nations fifteen little facts, which, if interpreted in a
certain manner, unite in the construction of a system; it consists
in studying a number of nations in regard to their law, their ideas,
all the circumstances of their social life, and in discovering what
they have in common and wherein they differ. I greatly fear that this
comparative method, when it shall be seriously applied, will give very
different results than those that MM. Viollet and de Laveleye believe
they have obtained from the comparative method as they understand it.
[227] M. de Laveleye, _De la propriété collective du sol_, in the
_Revue de Belgique_, 1886, p. 50 of the reprint.
[228] _Ibidem_, p. 49.
[229] _Ibidem_, p. 65.
[230] Strabo, xv., 1., 66, edit. Didot, p. 610: παρ’ ἄλλοις δὲ κατὰ
συγγένειαν κοινῇ τοὺς καρποὺς ὲργασαμένονς, ἐπὰν συγκομίσωσιν, αἴρεσθαι
ἔκαστον εἰς διατροφὴν τοῦ ἔτους. If one reads the whole chapter, one
sees that Nearchus, who distinguishes between general and exceptional
institutions, νόμους, τούς μὲν κοινοὺς, τούς δὲ ἰδίους, includes this
among the exceptional.
[231] See the work of M. Eug. Robe, _Origines de la propriété
immobilière en Algérie_, 1883--a volume which is full of facts.
[232] Em. de Laveleye, _De la propriété_, p. 105.
[233] _Id._, _La propriété collective_, in the _Revue de Belgique_,
1886, pp. 2-24 of the reprint.
[234] Em. de Laveleye, _De la propriété_, p. 152.
[235] _Ibidem_, p. 161.
[236] Save in the exceptional case described by Diodorus in the Lipari
islands.
[237] This is shewn by Heraclides of Pontus in the _Fragmenta hist.
græc._, of Didot, vol. II., p. 211; and by Plutarch, _Life of Agis_,
5. To this can be added the other texts cited in my _Étude sur la
propriété à Sparte_, 1880. See also the work of M. Claudio Jannet.
[238] In the same way he cites Ælian, V. 9, as saying that the
inhabitants of Locri and Rhegium cultivated the land in common. What
Ælian says is that “the cities of Locri and Rhegium have made a
treaty which permits the inhabitants of the one town to settle on the
territory of the other.” Of common cultivation there is not a word.
These authorities are given in the article by M. de Laveleye, in _Revue
de Belgique_, 1886, pp. 9 _et seq._ of the reprint.
[239] _De la propriété et de ses formes primitives_, p. 201.
[240] _La propriété collective du sol_, in the _Revue de Belgique_,
1886. He repeats the argument in the _Revue socialiste_, 1888, p. 452,
and in the _Revue d’économie politique_, July, 1888.
[241] Isaac Taylor, in the _Contemporary Review_, Dec., 1886, referred
to by M. de Laveleye.
[242] _E.g._, M. P. Viollet in all the latter part of the article
already referred to.