_infallibly_ indicate to us the mechanism to which it belongs, nor
anything conclusive as to whether the whole had only one or more makers.
So of the universe, no part can shadow forth the whole of that, nor
inform us conclusively whether it had a creator or creators. And here
it is to be observed the difficulty is greater than with machines--for
a pivot or wheel is a finite part of a finite whole, and _both
comprehensible_; but with the universe, all we can take cognisance of is
but a very finite part of an _infinite_ whole, and that whole to all
men acknowledged _incomprehensible_. Moreover, _creation_ can have no
analogy--no one ever saw or can conceive of anything being created. So
that this mode of learning the existence of a God fails. The Rev. Hugh
M'Neile, M.A., minister of St. Jade's Church, Liverpool, in a lecture
delivered to above four hundred of the Irish clergy, at the Rotunda in
Dublin, said in reference to this part of the question, 'I am convinced,
I say, that, from external creation, no right conclusion can be drawn
concerning the _moral_ character of God. Creation is too deeply and
disastrously blotted in consequence of man's sin, to admit of any
satisfactory result from an _adequate_ contemplation of nature.
The authors of a multitude of books on this subject, have given an
inadequate and partial induction of particulars. Already aware (though
perhaps scarcely recognising how or whence) that "God is love," they
have looked on nature for proofs of this conclusion, and taken what
suited their purpose. But they have not taken nature _as a whole_, and
collected a conclusion fairly from impartial premises. They expatiate on
the blessings and enjoyments of life, in the countless tribes of earth,
air, and sea. But if life be a blessing, death is a curse. Nature
presents the universal triumph of death. Is this the doing of a God of
love? or are there two Gods--a kind one, giving life; and an unkind one
taking it away; and the wicked one invariably the victor? In external
creation, exclusively and adequately contemplated, there is no escape
from Manichaeism. It is vain to say that the death of the inferior
creatures is a blessing to man; for why, in the creation of a God of
love, should any such necessity exist? And how would this account for
the death of man himself?' So far the argument of analogy.
5. _Revelation_.--We have _none_. If others ever had, we can only
determine it by human reason, and for this purpose Leslie has furnished
his well-known rules. Therefore, as revelation means something
superadded to reason, we cannot be said to possess it, for reason has to
determine what is, and what is not revelation, and therefore is superior
to it. Also, it is contended by divines that, but for the Bible we
should know nothing of a God, which shows the unsatisfactory nature of
the four methods of learning his existence we have gone through. And
Lord Brougham contends that but for natural theology, or the analogy
argument, which has been shown to be no argument at all, the Bible would
have no other basis than mere tradition.
So you see, gentlemen, the philosophical difficulties besetting the path
of a young inquirer into sacred things. These difficulties are to me
insuperable, and hence I find myself incapable of employing language you
are more fortunate in being able to adapt to your conscience.*
* The object of this passage was to show the jury the
intellectual difficulties belonging to this subject, and the
passage formed but an episode among the moral issues I
raised. A friend of mine asking an eminent divine at one of
Dr. Elliotson's seances, and who afterwards entered
parliament, what he thought of my defence. 'Oh it turned
upon that eternal conundrum the existence of God,' was the
answer. But I hope the reader will see something more in my
defence than the frivolity that employs itself on riddles.
But it has been stated I said I would put the Deity on half-pay. After
first stating that I did not believe there was a Deity, is it likely
I should say I would put him on half-pay? Would you put a servant on
half-pay whom you never hired or had? All my expressions went to prove
that I referred to the expenses of religion. I could not suppose that
there is a being capable of governing the world, and consider him good
and kind, and yet have any intention of bringing him into contempt. I
had no personal reference to the Deity. I made use of that figure of
speech because I thought they would understand it better, and they
did understand it. I was saying we had many heavy burdens to pay to
capitalists and others, and that I thought it hung like a millstone
round us. Sir R. Peel said, when he introduced the income-tax, that
the poor man could bear no more. I said there were twenty-four millions
taken from us for the support of religion, and that they would do well
to reduce that one-half. Suppose, gentlemen, that I did refer to the
Deity, was my notion a dishonourable one? What man of you who had enough
and to spare, and seeing the people around him in poverty, would not
willingly relinquish part of his income to give them a bare subsistence?
Who will deny that in England there are honest, industrious,
hard-working men, honourable women, and beautiful children, who have not
the means of obtaining food? Did I do him a disgrace if I thought he,
who is called our Father, the Most High, would have dispensed with
one-half of the lip-service he receives in order to give his creatures
necessaries!
[It being nearly four o'clock the Jury asked leave to retire, to which
Mr. Holyoake consenting, they left the Court for a short time. Some
ladies who represented themselves as wives of clergymen, came round the
dock offering Mr. Holyoake confections and refreshment, and expressing
their regret at the treatment he had received, and the position in which
he was placed.]
Mr. Holyoake, on resuming, said--According to a calculation that has
never been disputed, the
'Pay to their Clergy.
Catholics, numbering... 124,672,000... L6,106,000
Protestants " ... 54,046,000... 11,906,000
Greek Church " ... 41,000,000... 760,000
Total of Christians 219,718,000 L18,762,000
'Of which England, for twenty-one millions of people, pays more than
one-half.'* Thus the English pay five times more according to their
numbers--I proposed a reduction of only one-half.
* 'Cheap Salvation.' By Henry Hetheringten.
Mr. W. J. Fox has told us--'If the government of the country disposed of
the mismanaged funds of the clergy, they would have sufficient for their
annual needful expenditure.'
Mr. Justice Erskine. If you can convince the jury that you only meaning
was that the incomes of the clergy ought to be reduced, and that you
did not intend to insult God, I should tell the jury you ought not to be
convicted. You need not go into a laboured defence of that.
Mr. Holyoake. It was stated by one of the witnesses at Cheltenham that I
said Christians are worshippers of Mammon. I thought it necessary for me
to refer to it.
Mr. Justice Erskine. There is no evidence of that.
Mr. Holyoake. Then turn to the question _What is blasphemy?_ In the case
of Mr. Southwell, one of the witnesses for the prosecution stated his
opinion that the crime was '_bringing a scandal on the religion of the
magistrates_.' Perhaps this is as correct a definition as can be given.
It has been said to be 'an injury to God,' Men who could not string
six sentences together grammatically, have told me they would defend
God--men whom I should be ashamed to have defending me. But blasphemy is
impossible in the sense of annoyance to God. Jonathan Edwards says--'The
following things may be laid down as maxims of plain truth and
indisputable evidence:--
'1. That God is a perfectly happy being, in the most absolute and highest
sense possible.
'2. It will follow from hence, that God is free from everything that is
_contrary to happiness_: and so that in strict propriety of speech there
is no such thing as any pain, grief or trouble in God.
'3. Where any intelligent being is really crossed and disappointed, and
things are contrary to what he truly desires, he is less pleased, or
has the less pleasure, his pleasure and happiness are diminished, and he
suffers what is disagreeable to him, or is the subject of something that
is of a nature contrary to joy and happiness, even pain and grief.
'From this last maxim it follows, that if no distinction is to be
admitted between God's hatred of sin, and his will with respect to the
event and existence of sin, as the all-wise determiner of all events,
under the view of all consequences through the whole com pass and series
of things; I say, then, it certainly follows, that the coming to pass of
every individual act of sin is truly, all things considered, contrary
to his will, and that his will is really crossed in it, and that in
proportion as he hates it. And as God's hatred of sin is infinite, by
reason of the infinite contrariety of his holy nature to sin; so his
will is infinitely crossed in every act of sin that happens. Which is
as much as to say:--he endures that which is infinitely disagreeable to
him, by means of every act of sin he sees committed--and so he must be
infinitely crossed and suffer infinite pain every day, in millions of
millions of instances, which would be to make him infinitely the most
miserable of all beings.'*
But _blasphemy_ is an antiquated accusation. In a work** by Col.
Feyronnet Thompson, it is remarked--'what a turmoil, what a splutter,
was in this land, when men first announced that they would not eat fish,
they would not bow down, they would not confess but when they liked, and
this because the secret had got wind that these things were either
not in the priests' own rule, or were against it! What threats of hell
flames, what splashing about of fire and brimstone, what registration
of judgments on men choked with a beef-steak on Friday! Look at one
of those simple men in the present day, who shock themselves with the
barouches, the cigars, the newspapers, and the elephants of a London
Sunday, and occasionally digress to Paris, for the keener excitation of
seeing Punch upon the Boulevards, and wondering where heaven reserves
its thunder. And put the parallel case; that a good Austrian or
Navarrese Catholic came here, and grieved his heart with our weekly
doings on a Friday, to say nothing of our more wholesale offences for
forty days together in Lent. "Such frying; such barbecuing; in no place
did I see anybody having the smallest notion of a red herring! All are
involved in one flood of sin and gravy! How fathomless the patience of
heaven, that such an island is not swallowed up of the deep!" We have
looked into the rule he professes to go by; and we declare it is not
there, but the contrary. We know we must appear in the next world with
all our mutton on our heads. But we have done our best to look at the
rule with the light that God has given us; and in spite of Austria
or Navarre, we will take the risk of His not being angry with us, for
seeing no prohibition of mutton there.' Thus we see that _mutton-eating_
was at one period blasphemous.
* Quoted from 'A Commentary on the Public Discussion on the
subjects of Necessity and Responsibility,' &c By Jonathan
Jonathan, late of the United States.
** 'The Question of Sabbath Observance, tried by the
Church's own rule,' &c. By Col. Peyronnet Thompson, F.R.S,
of Queen's College, Cambridge.
Mr. Sergeant Talfourd told the jury, in the case of Hetherington
v. Moxon, that if the government were consistent in carrying out
prosecutions for blasphemy--Shakspere, Milton, Byron, Shelley,
Southey--might be prohibited. This perhaps would be an agreeable result
to a reverend gentleman well known in this court and county, who says
all science should be destroyed; but I trust you entertain no such
feelings, and that if I can show that my sentiments cannot be productive
of harm, you will feel called upon to acquit me. I claim no inherent
right of expressing my opinions, I only contend for liberty of
expression because required for the public good. A doctrine was laid
down by Lord John Russell upon the occasion of the presentation of the
National Petition, which I will quote as a view of the subject of human
rights well expressed.
'I am aware,' he said, 'that it is a doctrine frequently urged, and I
perceive dwelt upon in this petition, that every male of a certain age
has a right, absolute and inalienable, to elect a representative to take
his place among the members in the Commons' House of Parliament. Now,
sir, I never could understand that indefeasible right. It appears to
me that that question, like every other in the practical application
of politics, is to be settled by the institutions and the laws of the
country of which the person is a native. I see no more right that a
person twenty-one years of age has to elect a member of parliament than
he has to be a juryman. I conceive that you may just as well say that
every adult male has a right to sit upon a jury to decide the most
complicated and difficult questions of property, or that every man has
a right to exercise the judicial functions, as the people did in some of
the republics of antiquity. These things, as it appears to me, are not
matters of right; but if it be for the good of the people at large, if
it be conducive to the right government of the state, if it tend to the
maintenance of the freedom and welfare of the people, that a certain
number, defined and limited by a reference to a fixed standard of
property, should have the right of electing members of parliament, and
if it be disadvantageous to the community at large that the right of
suffrage should be universal, then I say that on such a subject the
consideration of the public good should prevail, that legislation must
act upon it as on every other, and that no inalienable right can be
quoted against that which the good of the whole demands.'
If Lord Russell did not, I do see a difference between the claim of an
elector and the right of a juryman. The elector is chiefly concerned
with his own interests, the juryman with other people's--one is simple,
the other complex. But with the measure of right laid down by his
lordship in the sentiments I have quoted, I perfectly accord, and if it
could be shown that freedom of expression produced public harm, then
I would give it up. But I believe such a right would produce good, and
therefore I claim it at your hands upon the ground of public good.
In what I urge, it is not faith but reason, as far as I understand it,
that I take for my guide--a rule of argument I trust you will accept.
'Reason contents me,' was inscribed as the motto on the seal of
the letter from Sir James Graham, acknowledging the receipt of the
Cheltenham memorial. If reason 'contents' the Secretary of State, and
'fountain of justice,' surely it ought to 'content' the channels through
which such justice is diffused over society. Reason would always be
preferred by us were we not differently instructed. 'Bewildered,' says
Diderot, 'in an immense forest during the night, and having only one
small torch for my guide, a stranger approaches and thus addresses me:
"_Friend, blow out thy light if thou wouldst make sure of the right
path_" The "forest" was the world--the "light" was my reason---the
"stranger" was a priest.'
After several quotations showing the dubious and often pernicious
influence of sacred authority, Mr. Holyoake observed---Religious
sanctions are regarded only by the ignorant, whom they confirm in folly.
The good find their sanction in the satisfaction ef a virtuous act
performed. In an address of the Rev. F. Close, delivered a short time
since at the Church of England Tradesmen and Working Men's Association
of Cheltenham, he said, 'that the more a man is advanced in human
knowledge, the more is he opposed to religion, and the more deadly
enemy he is to the truth of God.' If this Christian minister is to
be believed, then may you burn your books--forsake all mental
refinement--and be equal in piety and ignorance. If Christianity is
opposed to human improvement, then should all systems of ignorance be
patronised by Christians. Sentiments like these would lead us to give up
Boyle, Locke, and Newton, and regard them, with the Rev. Mr. Close, with
detestation.
Mr. Justice Erskine. Let me see the discourse of Mr. Close from which
you are quoting.
The book was handed to his lordship.
Mr. Holyoake. If the correctness of that report be doubted, I may state
that the sentiments of Mr. Close were replied to by Mr. G. Berkeley.
Permit me now to draw your attention strongly to what has been said by
men in authority of the impolicy of these prosecutions--that even if you
were justified in inflicting punishment on me, it would not be wise to
do so, Lord Brougham, three or four years ago, said, 'I may underrate
the power of truth opposed to error, and I may overrate the good
sense of my fellow country men in rejecting it, but one thing I do not
overrate--the power of persecution to spread that which persecution only
can spread.' When I walk through any of those ancient places, as I did
yesterday through your beautiful cathedral, I feel the majesty they ever
present, and think of the manner in which our Catholic ancestors acted
on the minds of men. There were sublimity and pageantry and pomp to
create awe. We have none now of that beauty of architecture in our
meagre churches and more meagre chapels. They had a service more
imposing than we ever had. Recollecting all these things, I have
wondered how anything could be found sufficiently powerful to shake them
off. I have wondered how Luther, with his rude vulgarity, could have
effected so much. I can only account for it in this way--that when
the Catholics dragged his followers to gaol, it was found that human
feelings were stronger than human creeds.
These prosecutions are entirely in opposition to the sentiments
promulgated by yourselves, as appears from a book given me in gaol
called the 'Manual of Devotion.' I amused myself by contracting the
profession contained in it with the practice of my opponents. It is
published by the 'Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge.' In
the 'Discourse concerning Prayer,' it is laid down that the 'second
qualification for prayer is charity or love. There is nothing so
contrary to the nature of God, nothing so wide of the true spirit of a
Christian, as bitterness and wrath, malice and envy; and therefore it
is vain to think that even our prayers can be acceptable to God, till we
have put on, as the elect of God, bowels of mercy, kindness, humbleness
of mind, meekness, long-suffering, forbearing one another, and
forgiving one another, as St. Paul commands.' Gentlemen, where are these
sentiments evinced in this prosecution?
The 'third qualification--Is faith. If any of you lack wisdom, says St.
James, let him ask of God, but let him ask in faith.' My prosecutors
have asked Mr. Bubb, have had faith in policemen, and confidence only in
the 'common law.'
The 'fourth qualification is--That in all things of a temporal concern,
we must exercise an entire submission to the will of God. A good
Christian will be sure to leave the issue in God's hands.' In my case
not the will of God, but the will of bigots was done, and the 'issue'
left in the turnkey's hands.
The 'fifth qualification--Is that the person praying hath a good
intention; that he asks for a good end. We must not pray as the
revengeful man when he prays for authority, that he may have the more
power to effect his evil designs.' What can be more wholly condemnatory
of these proceedings than these instructions of the 'Manual of
Devotion?'
When the 'Life of Christ,' by Dr. Strauss, appeared in Berlin, contrary
to usages in such matters, the Prussian government consulted the clergy
to ascertain from them whether it would not be prudent to prohibit this
extraordinary production. The celebrated Bishop Neander was commissioned
by the ecclesiastical body of Berlin, to peruse the book and to
return an answer. Neander did so, and declared in reply, that the work
submitted to his examination threatened, it was true, the demolition of
all creeds; nevertheless, he requested that full liberty should not be
denied to his adversary, in order that full and free discussion might
be the only judges between truth and error. And when asked whether it
should be prosecuted, said, 'No, I will answer it.'
Mr. Justice Erskine. That work was temperately written.
Mr. Holyoake. Neander did reply to it, and Strauss had the manliness to
acknowledge that it had corrected many of his errors. Would that have
been done had he been prosecuted? Dr. Strauss's work on the scriptures
got him a professor's chair in Germany. In this country it would have
made him amenable to the common law, and to one, two, or three years'
imprisonment.
Gentlemen, in the pertinacity of my open reply to Maitland, you may find
something objectionable, but I happen to be an admirer of that sentiment
expressed by the honest 'Vicar of Wakefield'--'In all human institutions
a smaller evil is allowed to procure a greater good; as in politics, a
province may be given away, to secure a kingdom; in medicine, a limb may
be lopt off, to preserve the body. But in religion, the law is written
and inflexible, _never_ to do evil.' Then, gentlemen, I ought to be
tolerated in the truthfulness of my answer. Milton, in his Prose Works,*
in reference to an incident in his travels, says:--
* Milton's Prose Works, pp. 933-4, 8vo edit. Edited by
Fletcher.
'While I was on my way back to Rome, some merchants informed me that
the English Jesuits had formed a plot against me, if I returned to Rome,
because I had spoken too freely of religion; for it was a rule which I
laid down to myself in those places, never to be the first to begin
any conversation on religion--but, if any questions were put to me
concerning my faith, to declare it without any reserve or fear.'
This is the rule which I myself have followed in this case.
Since his lordship--with more liberality than is customary, and with
more philosophy than I expected on matters of religion (on which I hear
his lordship thinks very devoutly)--has said, that any religion may be
discussed in temperate language, it is not necessary for me to prove, as
I should have done, that it would be useless liberty for me to entertain
opinions without permission to publish them. The only question is
whether, in the expression of these opinions, I used a proper kind of
language. I think I have proved that I was far from having any of those
'malicious' feelings the indictment presupposes. Many figures of speech
have been used in this court from which my feelings revolted as much
as those of any person could from what I said. No allowance is made
for this, and too much importance is attached to what is assumed to be
ridicule. A short time ago it was argued, that if the political squibs
which are seen in shop windows were permitted to be published, they
would bring government into contempt, and you would soon have no
government. Their publication has been permitted. Have we no government
now? I feel the utility of a government, and no force of ridicule could
shake my belief in the importance of good government. So it is with
religion. Nothing that is uttered, however contemptuous, can bring it
into contempt, if it really is useful and beneficial. We might defy all
the wits and caricaturists in the world to bring the problems of Euclid
into contempt. No man can bring into contempt that which is essential
and true.
The counsel who opened the case did not state whether the indictment was
at statute or common law.
Mr. Justice Erskine. Common law.
Mr. Holyoake. Then, gentleman of the jury, I shall draw your attention
to that, and I hope I shall be able to explain the law bearing on my
case.
Mr. Justice Erskine. The jury must take the law from me. I am
responsible for that.
Mr. Holyoake. I know, my lord; but still I may refer to it. A friend of
mine consulted the works bearing upon the law of this case.* I have here
the results of his labours, and, if I am wrong, your lordship will, in
summing up, correct me.
* I was indebted to Mr. J. Homffrey Parry, barrister, for
the revision of the argument I employed.
Gentleman of the jury, the common law is a judge-made law. A judge
laid down, some years ago, that to say anything against the Christian
religion was an indictable offence. Another judge followed him and said
the same; and at last it came not to be doubted. If I show there is no
law properly made in parliament assembled, you ought to acquit me.
The offence with which I am charged is an offence at common law. There
is no statute which punishes a man simply for denying the existence
of God. There is a statute (9 and 10 Wm. III., c. 32) directed against
those who denied the Trinity and who renounced Christianity. But the
former part has been repealed in favour of Unitarians, by the 53rd Geo.
III., e. 160; and the words I am charged with having spoken cannot be
brought within the latter. There is a statute against profane cursing
and swearing (19 Geo. II., c. 21), but it takes no cognisance of this
offence. Human beings have also been put to death for witchcraft (33
Hen. VIII., c. 8; and 1 James I., c. 12), under the merciless statutes
which were enacted in times of the grossest ignorance and superstition;
but those statutes have been repealed (9 Geo. II., c. 5). This offence,
therefore, is an offence against the common law, if it is an offence at
all. It is to be found in the recorded decisions of the judges, if it is
to be found anywhere; and the punishment for it is in their discretion.
Had it been an offence under a statute, it would have been impossible
for me to have denied the authority of the statute; but, as it is an
offence at common law, it is quite competent for me to show that the
authorities which have been supposed to constitute the offence do not
warrant such a construction. Should your lordship even declare that you
had no doubt upon the subject, it would still be competent for me to
bring before you the decisions of former judges, to argue upon those
decisions, and to show, if I could, that there was some mistake or error
running throughout the whole of them. Your lordship, I am sure, will
admit that judges are fallible, and that a blind, unreasoning submission
to them no man should give. As some excuse for presuming to doubt the
decision of some of your lordship's predecessors, I shall quote
the following passage from the preface to Mr. Watkin's treatise on
Conveyancing, allowed to be a master-piece of legal sagacity and method.
'I believe,' writes that gentleman, 'it will be found, on examination,
that an implicit submission to the assertions of our predecessors,
whatever station those predecessors may have held, has been one of the
most certain sources of error, Perhaps there is nothing which has so
much shackled the human intellect, nothing which has so greatly promoted
whatever is tyrannic, preposterous, and absurd, nothing perhaps which
has so much degraded the species in the scale of being as the implicit
submission to individual dicta.' And he then goes on in vigorous terms
to reprobate the practice of allowing 'authority to shoulder out common
sense, or adhering to precedent in defiance of principle.' Upon the
principle contained in this passage I shall act, in claiming the
attention of your lordship, and you, gentlemen of the jury, whilst I
examine the authorities for the doctrine which brings the offence with
which I am charged within the jurisdiction of the temporal courts. Your
lordship will, perhaps, refer to these books.
Mr. Justice Erskine, No need of that. If it is not an offence at common
law, this indictment is worth nothing. You can take it before the
fifteen judges on a writ of error. I sit here, not to correct the law,
but merely to administer it.*
* I have been told by a legal friend of great experience,
that at this point I might have taken the judge at his word,
and have carried the case before the judges for decision;
but I was unacquainted with the forms of law in such cases,
and I moreover distrusted the judge.
Mr. Holyoake resumed. In the fourth volume of 'Blackstone's
Commentaries,' p. 59, in speaking of offences against God and religion,
that writer says, 'The fourth species of offences, therefore, more
immediately against God and religion, is that of blasphemy against
the Almighty, by denying his being or providence, or by contumelious
reproaches of our saviour, Christ. Whither also may be referred all
profane scoffing at the holy scripture, or exposing it to contempt
and ridicule. These are offences punishable at common law by fine and
imprisonment, or other infamous corporal punishment; _for Christianity
is part of the laws of England_.' Blackstone quotes, in support of the
first species, a volume of 'Ventris' Reports,' p. 298; and the second
from the second volume of 'Strange's Reports,' p. 834. Mr. Christian,
the commentator upon Blackstone, adds, in a note, a passage from the
'Year Book' (34 Henry VI.), folio 43.
The earliest case is that from the year book, in the 34th year of Henry
VI. (1458). Mr. Christian quotes from it this passage--'Scripture
est common ley, sur quel toutes manieres de leis sont fondes' (i.e.,
Scripture is common law, upon which all descriptions of laws are
founded). Were this quotation correct, and did the word scripture here
mean 'holy scripture,' or what is generally understood by the Bible,
then I admit this passage would be a good foundation to build up Mr.
Judge Blackstone's law. But it is no such thing. The case in the year
book is a case of _quare impedit_, and, in the course of the argument
the question arose whether, in a matter of induction to a benefice by
the ordinary (i.e., the bishop) the common law would take notice of,
or be bound by, the law or practices of the church. Where-. upon, Chief
Justice Prisot says--'To such laws, which they of the holy church have
in "ancient writing," it becomes us to give credence, for such is common
law, upon which all descriptions of laws are founded. And therefore,
sir, we are obliged to recognise their law of the holy church--likewise
they are obliged to recognise our law. And, sir, if it appears to us now
that the bishop has done as an ordinary should do in such a case, then
we ought to judge it good--if otherwise, bad.'
In this passage, then, there is not one word about scripture in the
sense of 'holy scripture.' Judge Prisot says, 'To such laws as the
church has in ancien scripture (t. e.9 ancient writing) we ought to
give credence.' And what does he mean by 'laws which the church has in
ancient writing?' not any laws that are to be found in the Bible, but
the canon or ecclesiastical laws by which the temporal concerns of the
church are guided. And the reason he uses the phrase 'ancien scripture,'
or ancient writing, is that the laws were not then printed; the only
record of them was in writing. Printing had not been introduced into
England, and was only just discovered on the continent, the laws
therefore of the spiritual and temporal courts were only to be seen in
writing. And as though there should be no doubt as to his meaning, he
goes on to say, 'And as we are obliged to recognise their laws (that is
the ecclesiastical laws, or laws of the spiritual courts), so they
are obliged to recognise our laws (that is, the laws of the temporal
courts).' It must therefore be evident that this quotation of Mr.
Christian is a perversion or mistake, a judicial forgery or a judicial
blunder, and in either case its authority is of no value. It must be
dismissed altogether from our minds in considering what the law is upon
this point--that is, whether Christianity is or is not a part and parcel
of the law of England. Unfortunately, however, we shall find that this
case is actually made the substratum of the law. In proving, therefore,
that it cannot warrant such a law, surely I prove that at common law, at
least to speak against Christianity, is not an offence.
The next case is that in Ventris' Report, vol. 1, p. 293. It is called
Taylor's case, and Chief Justice Hale certainly declares explicitly in
this case, 'that Christianity is parcel of the laws of England.' But he
cites no authority whatever.
In the case analysed from the year book, it is expressly said, that the
common law is to be found in 'ancient writings,' and the unsupported
dictum of a judge in the middle of the seventeenth century cannot be
construed as a part of the ancient writings of the common law. Either
the law already existed or it did not. If it did, the question is--where
is it? If it did not, Chief Justice Hale could not then make it for the
first time; and this case in Ventris' cannot be said to lay down the
law. The case in the second volume of Strange is the King v. Woolston.
The defendant had been convicted of writing four blasphemous discourses
against the divinity and character of Christ; and upon attempting to
move in arrest of judgment, the court declared they would not suffer it
to be debated whether to write against Christianity in general was an
offence punishable in the temporal courts of common law. And they cited
Taylor's case, which has been shown to be an insufficient authority, or
rather no authority at all, and the King v. Hale, in the same volume of
Strange, p. 416, but which was an indictment under the statute (9 & 10
Wm. HI.) for speaking against the Trinity, and therefore cannot in any
way support the common law doctrine.
The first person who called attention to the utter want of authority in
the common law for the dictum 'that Christianity was part of the common
law,' was Jefferson, the second president of America--himself a
profound lawyer, and to his references I am indebted for the foregoing
authorities, which, however, have been carefully verified. Mr.
Jefferson, in a letter to Major Cart-wright, to be found in vol. ii., p.
272, of his 'Memoirs,' exposes the mode in which this law was created.
Alluding to the case of Prisot, he says, 'Finch in his first book, c. 3,
is the first who afterwards quotes this case. He misstates it thus:
"To such laws of the church as have warrant in holy scripture, our law
giveth credence," and cites Prisot, mistranslating "ancien scripture"
into holy scripture. This was in 1613, a century and a half after the
dictum of Prisot. Wingate, in 1658, erects this false translation into a
maxim of the common law, copying the words of Finch, but citing Prisot.
Shephard, title "Religion," in 1675, copies the same mistranslation,
quoting the year book, finch, and Wingate. Hale expresses it in these
words, "Christianity is parcel of the laws of England," but quotes no
authority. Wood, 409, ventures still to vary the phrase, and says, "that
all blasphemy and prophaneness are offences by the common law," and
Blackstone repeats the words of Hale.' In the case of the the King v.
Carlile, decided since Mr. Jefferson wrote this letter, there was
no argument as to the common law. The question was as to whether the
statute (9 & 10 Wm. III.) had superseded the common law. But the common
law itself was not called in question, which I submit it should be, and
by a wise example superseded.
But let us see what Christianity is according to common law? We may
remark--
1. Its inconsistency.--It calls blasphemy the greatest crime man
can commit. Yet in the case of Hetherington v. Moxon, it permits the
_respectable_ blasphemer to go free. Blasphemy in guinea volumes it
allows, but exhibits the holiest horror at it when in penny pamphlets.
2. Its barbarity, as in Peter Annet's case.--In Michaelmas term, M. 3.
G. 3. Peter Annet was convicted on an information for writing 'a most
blasphemous libel,' in weekly papers called the _Free Inquirer_, to
which he pleaded guilty; in consideration of which, and of his poverty,
of his having confessed his errors in an affidavit, and of his being 74
years old, and some symptoms of wildness that appeared on his inspection
in court, the court declared they had mitigated his punishment to the
following: To be imprisoned in Newgate for one month; to stand twice
in the pillory with a paper on his forehead, inscribed Blasphemy; to be
sent to the House of Correction to hard labour for a year; to pay a fine
of 6s. 8d., and to find security himself in L100, and two sureties in
L50 each for his good behaviour during life.*
3. Its capriciousness.--The common law before the time of Henry VIII.
was one thing, but afterwards it was another. The language which
was blasphemy at the first period, was not so in the other. Those
expressions which insulted God before Henry the Eighth was born, did not
insult him afterwards. Henry the Eighth's opinion made the difference.
Lord Commissioner White-locke (5 Howell's State Trials, p. 826), in
Debate whether James Nayler the quaker should suffer death, remarked,
'I remember a case in our book H. 7, where the bishop committed one to
prison for a heretic, and the heresy was denying that tythes were due to
the parson. This at that time was a very great heresy.'
4. Its disregard of equal justice.--A British subject would be punished
for firing into a Turkish vessel; but he is not punishable for attacking
the captain and sailors with Bibles and tracts, which, if they read
and believe, will make them apostates from the faith of Mahomet, and
blasphemers of the Koran. While on terms of amity with the Sublime
Porte, the laws of England restrain us from despoiling them of their
property, but not from despoiling them of their religion.**
* Blackstone's Reports, p. 305.
** Vide Freethinker's Information for the People.
5. It debases religion as best set forth.--'Religion (says Miss
Martineau) is, in its widest sense, "the tendency of human nature to the
infinite;" and its principle is manifested in the pursuit of perfection
in any direction whatever. It is in this widest sense that some
speculative atheists have been religious men; religious in their efforts
after self-perfection; though unable to personify their conception of
the infinite. In a somewhat narrower sense, religion is the relation
which the highest human sentiments bear towards an infinitely perfect
being. There can be no further narrowing than this. Any account of
religion which restricts it within the boundaries of any system, which
connects it with any mode of belief, which implicates it with hope
of reward, or fear of punishment, is low and injurious, and debases
religion into superstition.' How much more is religion degraded that is
made the subject of reward and punishment here?
Thus speaks the common law upon these points, and thus, as part of the
common law, speaks Christianity. Will you, by a verdict of guilty this
day, send forth to the world this card of credentials of the religion of
Jesus?
The intention of a libel constitutes its criminality. It is for you,
gentlemen, to say whether I knowingly, wickedly, and maliciously
offended the law? Malice is necessary to a libel--conscientious words
are allowable, 'Contumely and contempt are what no establishment can
tolerate: but on the other hand it would not be proper to lay any
restraint upon rational and dispassionate discussions of the rectitude
and propriety of the established mode of worship.' 4 Bla. Com. 51; 1
Pmp. 219. And Mr. Starkie, on the subject, says 'that it may not be
going too far from the principles and decisions, that no author or
preacher who fairly and conscientiously promulgates the opinions with
whose truth he is impressed for the benefit of others, is for so doing
amenable as a criminal, that a malicious and mischievous intention is in
such case the broad boundary between right and wrong; and that if it can
be collected from the offensive levity with which so serious a subject
is treated, or from other circumstances, that the act of the party was
malicious, then, since the law has no means of distinguishing between
different degrees of evil tendency, if the matter published contain any
such tendency, the publisher becomes amenable to justice.'*
* Starkie on Libel, pp. 496-7.
As to the duty of the jury, I have Lord Chief Justice Abbott's opinion,
in his charge to the jury in summing up the evidence against Mr. Joseph
Russell at the Warwick Summer Assizes, on Friday, August 13, 1819, for
a political libel, being Mr. Hone's 'Parody on the litany.' Mr. Russell
argued that as Hone had been acquitted for publishing it, he also ought
to be. 'No one,' says his lordship, 'is more inclined than myself to
speak reverently of the decision of juries. But, gentlemen, you cannot,
under the sanction of an oath, take the verdict of those juries either
directly or indirectly as your guide in the verdict you are called upon
to give in this case. Those juries, no doubt, returned their verdicts
honestly and conscientiously according to the evidence that was layed
before them. What that evidence was you can know nothing of. You are to
try the question by your own consciences and by your own reason. They
might have been right in their decision, and you should be careful that
you are right in yours.'
After this, you will see it is clear that though a jury had before
found a person guilty of the offence I am charged with, it will be no
justification of your doing so too. Here Mr. Holyoake, perceiving that
he would be heard fairly, and that no attempts to put him down were
practised, laid aside a handful of notes, and said:--
I have to thank your lordship, and you, gentlemen of the jury, for the
courtesy and attention with which I have been heard. Gentlemen, if I
have occupied you long you will find my apology in the circumstance that
your verdict against me will occupy me longer. I could wish that justice
to me and your convenience had permitted brevity. The length of my
defence has originated with the charge against me, and not with myself.
It is said, that when Southey was asked if he were not ashamed of having
written _Wat Tyler_, he answered, no more ashamed than I am of having
been young. Meaning, any man may err in youth. So I erred in being
religious in my early days. If I am not religious now, deem me not
criminal. Religion never did me a service, how then should I love it?
But it assailed my youth with gloomy dogmas, now it assails my liberty.
Gentlemen, if during my address to you I have offended by the frankness
of my avowals, it has not proceeded from a disregard of your feelings,
but from the belief that, as men, you would prefer independence to
servility of speech.
Of the nature of the charge against me I add no further word. My
only crime has been the discharge of what I considered a duty. For my
difference in opinion with you upon the question of Deity, I offer no
apology. I have made no contract to think as you do, and I owe you no
obligation to do it. If I commanded you to abjure your belief, you would
disregard it as impertinence, and if you punish me for not adjuring
mine, how will you reconcile it with 'doing as you would wish to be done
unto?'
Had I said, that there is no God, still I should not deserve the
penalties of the law. If I point to the wrong I see in this Christian
country, and ask, is this Christianity? you would reply, 'No; what you
refer to results from men who live without God in the world.' Then,
gentlemen, would you punish me for simply saying that which other men,
unpunished, are every day doing?
If I have said that religious revenues should be reduced one half,
I spoke only the dictates of humanity at this season of national
suffering. Surely it is not blasphemous to argue that human misery
should be alleviated at the expense of spiritual pride.
I ask not equal rights with yourselves. You, as Christians, can imprison
those who differ from you. I do not offend your pride by asking to be
admitted your equals here. I desire not such privileges. I claim merely
the right to speak my convictions; to show a man the right path when I
think he takes the wrong one.
It is a melancholy maxim in these courts of law, that the greater the
truth the greater the libel; and so it would be with me this day could
I demonstrate to you that there is no Deity. The more correct I am the
severer would be my punishment, because the law regards the belief in
a God to be the foundation of obedience among men. But I trust I have
convinced you that my views of this question are compatible with the
practice of all our duties to our fellow-men, borne out by eminent
authority and long experience.
Setting aside the reprobation of persecution by Middleton, by Clarke, by
Latimer, and other divines I have quoted; Leslie, Reid, and Bulwer
have contended that the objections of the sceptic merely strengthen
the fabric of piety they pretend to assail. Gentlemen, which is to be
believed, divines and philosophers, or the common law? These persons
speak as though they believed Christianity to be true; the common law
punishes as though it knew it to be false.
If the state religion be true, my opinion can never overcome it; and by
convicting me you publish your consciousness of error in the cause you
are placed there to defend as truth. If God be truth you libel him and
his power, and publish the omnipotence of error.
When in gaol, I one day opened the rules drawn up by the judges. The
167th opens thus: 'No prisoner shall lie.' Now, gentlemen, how is a man
to act under these circumstances in which I am placed? If you find me
guilty upon the indictment before you, my case stands in this manner--if
I do not lie you imprison me, and if I do you punish me. Turning back to
the morality of ancient days, and meditating with delight on their noble
sincerity and love of truth, am I to count it a misfortune to live in
modern times and among a Christian people?
In your churches, as I have read to you, you implore that truth and
justice may descend among men, and: the supplication is a noble one.
Gentlemen, will you pray for truth in your churches and brand it in your
courts?
The atmosphere of your gaols as little assimilates with my taste as
their punishments will accord with my constitution, I seek not these
things, I assure you, but when they lie in the path of duty I trust I
shall ever prefer them to a dereliction from it.
But, gentlemen, supposing that they are my sentiments that you are
requested to punish; you should first do yourselves the justice to
reflect what has been said about them and insinuated in this court.
Learned divines, and sage writers on atheism, agree that it is too
absurd to need refutation--too barren to satisfy, too monstrous to
attract, too fearful to allure, too dumb to speak, and too deathly not
to appal its own votaries. It is styled too grave to entertain youth,
and too devoid of consolation for the trembling wants of age--too
abstract for the comprehension of the ignorant, and too unreasonable
to gain the admiration of the intelligent. That it is alarming to the
timid, and disquieting to the brave-that it negatives everything, and
sets up nothing, and is so purely speculative that it can never have a
practical bearing on the business of life. Gentlemen, will you disturb
the harmony of these conclusions by a verdict against me, and attack
that which never existed, and place upon the grave records of this court
a slaying of the self-slain? Will you thus draw attention to a subject
you perhaps think had better be forgotten, and create a conviction
that it must be a greatly important one, since you erect it into public
notice by directing the thunders of the law at young and comparatively
inexperienced believer in its principle?
Would you test my opinions by my emotions on the bed of death? Let me
assure you, that if men can expect to die in peace who can send their
fellow men to a gaol because of honest difference of opinion, I have
nothing to fear.
I am told I may hold opinions, but must keep them to myself--which
means, I may know and feel what is right, but must never do it. I must
see my fellow-men in error, but never put them right. Must live every
day below the standard of right my sense of duty and conscience sets
up, and all my life long 'prove all things' and never 'hold fast to the
good.'
The indictment charges me with having 'wickedly, maliciously, and with
evil design,' against the peace of the Queen, uttered certain
words. What shadow of evidence has been adduced to substantiate this
extravagant charge?
Will you suffer this court to proclaim the sacred nature of an oath, and
openly violate it in the same hour and under the same roof? I might ask
in the spirit of that Christianity you sit there to administer, how do
you propose to answer to your God in that day when the secrets of all
hearts are to be opened, when all dissembling is to be exposed, and all
perjury punished; how do you pro-pose to answer for having invoked the
name of God in this assembly only to disregard it, on the poor plea of
precedent--that others have done so before? For, gentlemen, there is
nothing else that even the subtlest sophistry can conjure up to justify
you. But I best prefer appealing to you as honest men, in the spirit of
my own reasoning, and thinking; as men with an eye to the improvement of
mankind, who would break the unjust shackles that bind them, who would
discard prejudice in order to be just, who will not condemn me because I
am not rich, and who will listen to humanity rather than to bigotry, and
respect truthfulness wherever you may find it. I believe that in every
honest heart there is a sense of rectitude that rises superior to
creeds, that respects all virtue and protects all truth, that asks for
no names and seeks no precedents before resolving to do rightly, that
fears no man's frowns, and dares to be just without custom's permit.
To this feeling, gentlemen, only do I appeal, and by its verdict I am
willing to abide.
Mr. Justice Erskine: Gentlemen of the jury, although the lengthened
address of the defendant has demanded from you so long endurance, in
this vitiated atmosphere, I still trust we shall have enough of power
left to direct our minds to the parts of this case which are important.
The greater part of the time has been wasted on subjects with which you
have nothing to do. We are not sitting here as a deliberative assembly
to consider whether in respect of such cases as this it is politic or
wise to imprison for opinions--whether men ought to be punished for
uttering such sentiments--and I shall have nothing to say to you on
that point. We have to decide on the law as we find it. I shall make no
law--the judges made no law, but have handed it down from the earliest
ages. I should have no more power to alter this than to say the eldest
son is not the heir of his father. Allusion has been made to some
expressions of mine, when in the course of my duty I directed the
attention of the grand jury to these cases. Certainly the printed report
was highly incorrect. I said nothing to prejudice them. Inasmuch as
this offence directly tended to take away that foundation on which
real morality can alone be safely based, I told them what I feel,
that without religion there is no morality. I recommended that that
foundation may be made by early education and habits of thought, but
in so doing I did not mean to prejudge, nor do I seem to have been
considered as doing so, I am not going to lay down as law that no man
has a right to entertain opinions opposed to the religion of the state,
nor to express them. Man is only responsible for his opinions to God,
because God only can judge of his motives, and we arrogate his duties if
we judge of men's sentiments. If men will entertain sentiments opposed
to the religion of the state we require that they shall express them
reverently, and philosophers who have discussed this subject all agree
that this is right Mr. Archdeacon Paley has stated this in language
so plain, far better than any words I could supply myself. 'Serious
arguments are fair on all sides. Christianity is but ill-defended by
refusing audience or toleration to the objections of unbelievers. But
whilst we would have freedom of inquiry restrained by no laws but those
of decency, we are entitled to demand, on behalf of a religion which
holds forth to mankind assurances of immortality, that its credit
be assailed by no other weapons than those of sober discussion and
legitimate reasoning.' Our law has adopted that as its rule, and men are
not permitted to make use of indecent language in reference to God
and the Christian religion, without rendering themselves liable to
punishment. You have had a great number of books read to you, arguing
whether it was politic to prosecute in such cases. One of the sentiments
was a dignitary's reply, 'I will answer it.' That points out the
difference in these cases.
Sober argument you may answer, but indecent reviling you cannot, and
therefore the law steps in and punishes it. You have been told you have
to consider what is blasphemy. He asked the witness what he considered
blasphemy, and he gave him a very sensible answer. What you have to try
is, whether the defendant wickedly and devisedly did intend to bring the
Christian religion into contempt among the people, by uttering words
of and concerning Almighty God, the holy Scriptures, and the Christian
religion. The charge is, that he uttered these words with the intention
of bringing Almighty God, the Christian religion, and the holy
Scriptures, into contempt. You are not called upon to say whether in
your judgment the opinions of the defendant are right or wrong--whether
it is right or wrong that words like these should be punished,
but whether he uttered these words with the intent charged in the
indictment. These words were proved by a witness who admits that others
were used, that they did not follow consecutively, and that other words
were interspersed. It is right that you should have the whole set before
you, for a man is not to be judged for what is partly set before you,
and therefore it was necessary you should have the whole of what was
said. The way in which the witness related the statements made by
defendant was this: He said he had been lecturing on 'Home Colonisation,
Emigration, and Poor-Laws superseded.' After the lecture had been
closed, some man whose name he did not then know, said the lecturer had
been speaking of our duty to our fellow-men, but he had not spoken of
our duty to our God, and it is important that you should notice that the
words were not the subject of the lecture, but uttered in answer to a
question put to him. There is no evidence that he intended to have said
anything--there is no evidence that this person is a friend of the other
person, or that this question was asked so as to give him an opportunity
of uttering these sentiments,* If that had been the case it would have
made it worse than if he had introduced it. This challenge having been
made by this person, whoever it was, the defendant said--'I am of no
religion at all; I do not believe in such a thing as a God.' There is
nothing in the introduction of the word 'thing' to show that he intended
to-treat the subject with levity and contempt. You might take it that he
said he did not believe there is such a being as a God.
* The artifice which Mr. Justice Erskine here suggested to
the jury never entered into my imagination. The evidence
could not have given the jury any such idea, and I was
pained and astonished to hear the judge employ it.
The witness went on: 'He said the people of this country are too poor
to have any religion, he would serve the Deity as the government did the
subaltern officers--place him on half-pay; I was near the door; you said
the reason was the expense of religion. And then he was asked as to his
opinion of blasphemy. He is then cross-examined as to his knowledge of
some report made by another person. You did not lay any emphasis on the
word thing; you said the word in the ordinary tone of voice.' There
is something which defendant has alleged himself to have stated* which
gives a stronger sting than that which was given by the witness--'I flee
the Bible as a viper.' The question is whether these words were uttered
with the intention of bringing God and the Christian religion into
contempt. Then the charge is made out, for I tell you that it is an
offence at common law. If it is not an offence, the indictment is not
worth the parchment it is written upon--if there is no such authority
as that which I have laid down. Any man who treats with contempt the
Christian religion, is guilty of an indictable misdemeanour. You have
to consider the language and a passage read to you from a charge of a
learned judge. 'It may not be going too far to state, that no author or
preacher is forbidden stating his opinions sincerely. By maliciously is
not meant malice against any particular individual, but a mischievous
intent. This is the criterion, and it is a fair criterion, if it can be
collected from the offensive levity in which the subject is treated, if
the matter placed in the indictment contains any such tendency.' If
the words had appeared in the course of a written paper you would have
entertained no doubt that the person who had uttered these words had
uttered them with levity. The only thing in his favour is, that it
was not a written answer. The solution given by the defendant is, that
although his opinions are unhappily such that he has no belief in a God,
he had no intention of bringing religion into contempt. He went on
to state that he considered it the duty of the clergymen of the
establishment to have reduced their incomes one-half. If he had meant
this, he ought to have made use of other language. You will dismiss from
your minds all statements in newspapers, or other statements made out
of court, and consider it in reference to the evidence. If you are
convinced that he uttered it with levity, for the purpose of treating
with contempt the majesty of Almighty God he is guilty of the offence.
If you think he made use of these words in the heat of argument without
any such intent, you will give him the benefit of the doubt. If you
are convinced that he did it with that object you must find him guilty,
despite of all that has been addressed to you. If you entertain a
reasonable doubt of his intention, you will give him the benefit of it.
* In the report of my original speech to Maitland, which I
read to the court from the Oracle.
The jury, after a very brief deliberation, returned a verdict of
_Guilty_.
[One of the jury was a Deist, a professed friend of free speech, and who
had said that he never could convict me, but he wanted courage when the
hour of the verdict came, and gave in against me. For myself, I never
for a moment expected an acquittal. During the few moments of the jury's
consultation, I took my watch from my neck and gave it, with my keys, to
my friend, Mr. Knight Hunt. My papers I consigned to my friend Mr. W. B.
Smith, as for all I knew they might the next moment become the property
of the court by virtue of the sentence.]
Mr. Justice Erskine. George Jacob Holyoake, if you had been convicted as
the author of that paper which Adams has been convicted of publishing,
my sentence must have been very severe. But, although the name is the
same, there is no evidence of it.* You have been convicted of uttering
language, and although yom have been adducing long arguments to show
the impolicy of these prosecutions, you are convicted of having uttered
these words with improper levity. The arm of the law is not stretched
out to protect the character of the Almighty; we do not assume to be
the protectors of our God, but to protect the people from such
indecent language. And if these words had been written for deliberate
circulation, I should have passed on you a severer sentence. You uttered
them in consequence of a question--I have no evidence that this question
was put to draw out these words. Proceeding on the evidence that has
been given, trusting that these words have been uttered in the heat
of the moment, I shall think it sufficient to sentence you to be
_imprisoned in the Common Gaol for Six calendar months_.
* This is another of those unwarranted suppositions in which
the judge ought not to have indulged. 'That paper' was
written by my friend Mr. Chilton, Editor of the Oracle in my
absence, and signed with his initials. The judge might have
known that I was in Gloucester Gaol when it was written and
published. I should have stopped the judge and corrected
him, but I feared by seeming to separate myself from Adams,
to be thought capable of saving myself at his expense, or
exposing him to new rigour.
Mr. Holyoake. My lord, am I to be classed with thieves and felons?
Mr. Justice Erskine. No; thieves and felons are sentenced to the
Penitentiary, you to the Common Gaol.
The court adjourned at ten o'clock.
What was advanced by the counsel and the judge has been rendered in full
in the foregoing report, but I have contented myself with an abstract
of what I urged myself. The _Times_ said I quoted from more than thirty
authors, which is very likely; but it was not because I was not sensible
of the good taste of brevity that I occupied the bench so long. I was
standing that day in court fourteen hours, and, including the cross
examinations, I was speaking more than eleven hours. I prepared notes
to last me two days; and after the first six hours, my voice, usually
shrill and weak, became full and somewhat sonorous. I could have spoken
all night, and I should have done it had the judge attempted to put me
down. But I willingly acknowledge that, on the whole, the conduct of
the judge was fair to me, and patient to a degree that inspired me with
great respect for the dignity of the bench, and I dedicated my 'Short
and Easy Method with the Saints' to Mr. Justice Erskine, as an actual
expression of my respect. The governor of the gaol one day said to me,
that I ought not to regret six months' imprisonment after occupying
the court and public so many hours. I did not regret it. Indeed, I more
deserved the sentence for the length of my defence than for the words
for which I was indicted. But it was the menace of the magistrates
(before recounted) that I should not be heard, that did me the harm,
and exposed me to the imputation of wanting good sense, which is a worse
imputation than that of wanting orthodoxy. This came of inexperience in
imprisonment. The menaces of magistrates will not so mislead me another
time.
When I now read the notices of these proceedings which I furnished to
the _Oracle_ at the time, I smile at the juvenility of comment in which
I indulged. When similarly-worded reports reach me for the _Reasoner_,
my practice is to extract the simple facts--and, of course, the writers
remonstrate with me; but how grateful should I be now if some one had
done the same by me then. The principle on which we proceeded with our
_Oracle_ was that every man should express himself in his own words and
in his own way, and we thought it a crime against freedom to distinguish
between weak comment and the report of essential facts, or the
expression of vital principle. The report of the proceedings rendered
in these pages is given in some measure upon the rule of discrimination
which I have described. But, in this, I have been impartial to others,
and have omitted many things on the part of my opponents which I
believe they would not repeat, and which I, therefore, have no wish to
perpetuate. The remaining variations between this report and that which
formerly appeared will be found to be partly on the side of greater
accuracy in some respects, and more fulness in others. The original
report presented most of the quotations, calling them a string of
pearls, but left in a very unravelled state the string which tied
them--and hence they read like abrupt interpolations. I have now given
the connecting observations, the spirit of the extracts, and, in cases
where the extracts have not since that time grown familiar to the public
ear, I have given them also.
The influence of my defence upon the public at Gloucester and
Cheltenham, notwithstanding the difficulties under which I laboured, was
in my favour beyond my expectation. The newspapers stated that the court
and jury were attentive throughout, and the numbers who thronged the
court behaved in the most decorous manner, testifying their interest in
the proceedings by a uniform silence, manifesting neither approbation
nor disapprobation.' Several newspapers gave nine or ten columns of
the proceedings, which was valuable propagandism. And it is due to the
_Cheltenham Examiner_ (whose parallel between me and Francis the reader
will not have forgotten), to state that it gave an effective rendering
of my defence, and added these compensatory words to its report:--'The
defendant spoke throughout in a temperate manner, and his defence
appeared to tell in his favour, so far as regarded the honesty of his
motives.'
Let me say here that my grateful acknowledgments are due to the editor
of the _Cheltenham Free Press_. That paper reported whatever concerned
my liberty, my conscience, or my character. It risked much in defending,
alone among its local contemporaries, the freedom of speech violated in
my person. It opened its columns to Goodwyn Barmby's proclamations, to
Catherine Barmby's letters, to Richard Carlile's defences, and to the
numerous communications of my friends on my behalf.
My acknowledgments are also due to the _Weekly Dispatch_. On my visiting
London 'Publicola,' then Captain Williams, invited me to call upon him,
and inform him of my position with respect to the pending trial; and his
able Letters to Justice Erg-kine, after my conviction, produced great
uneasiness at the gaol, and each number of the _Dispatch_ was awaited
for some weeks by the authorities around me, as I learned from the
gaolers, with anxiety.
My defence, considered as a defence of the wide and momentous question
of atheism, was crude enough. No one can be more sensible of that than I
am. On the moral aspects of atheism and its relation to public polity
I feared to enter, lest in my own newness to the study of so large
a subject I should compromise it by unskilfulness of statement;
I therefore confined myself to pleading that the right of public
expression was the sequence of the right of private judgment--that
the right of expression was consonant to the common law as well as to
reason, and that the right of expression being necessary to private
morality, it could not be incompatible with the public peace.