SECTION I.

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[Transcriber's Note: The spelling inconsistencies of the original have

been retained in this etext.]

A

GENERAL

HISTORY AND COLLECTION

OF

VOYAGES AND TRAVELS,

ARRANGED IN SYSTEMATIC ORDER:

FORMING A COMPLETE HISTORY OF THE ORIGIN AND PROGRESS OF NAVIGATION,

DISCOVERY, AND COMMERCE, BY SEA AND LAND, FROM THE EARLIEST AGES TO THE

PRESENT TIME.

* * * * *

BY ROBERT KERR, F.R.S. & F.A.S. EDIN.

* * * * *

ILLUSTRATED BY MAPS AND CHARTS.

VOL. V.

MDCCCXXIV.

CONTENTS

OF

VOL. V.

* * * * *

PART II. BOOK II. CONTINUED.

CHAP. VII. _Continued_. Continuation of the early history of Peru, after

the death of Francisco Pizarro to the defeat of Gonzalo Pizarro, and the

reestablishment of tranquillity in the country; written by Augustino

Zarate,

SECT. III. Continuation of the Viceroyalty of Blasco Nunnez Vela, to his

deposition and expulsion from Peru,

SECT. IV. History of the usurpation of Gonzalo Pizarro, from the

expulsion of the Viceroy to his defeat and death,

V. Continuation of the Usurpation of Gonzalo Pizarro, to the arrival of

Gasca in Peru with full powers to restore the Colony to order,

VI. History of the Expedition of Pedro de la Gasca, the death of Gonzalo

Pizarro, and the Restoration of Peru to Tranquillity,

VII. Insurrection of Ferdinand and Pedro de Contreras in Nicaragua, and

their unsuccessful attempt upon the Royal Treasure in the Tierra Firma,

CHAP. VIII. Continuation of the early history of Peru, from the

restoration of tranquillity by Gasca in 1549, to the death of the Inca

Tupac Amaru; extracted from Garcilasso de la Vega,

SECT. I. Incidents in the History of Peru, from the departure of Gasca,

to the appointment of Don Antonio de Mendoza as Viceroy,

II. History of Peru during the Viceroyalty of Don Antonio de Mendoza,

III. Narrative of the Troubles in Peru, consequent upon the Death of the

Viceroy Mendoza,

IV. Continuation of the Troubles in Peru, to the Viceroyalty of the

Marquis de Cannete,

V. History of Peru during the Viceroyalty of the Marquis del Cannete,

VI. Incidents in the History of Peru, during the successive Governments

of the Conde de Nieva, Lope Garcia de Castro, and Don Francisco de

Toledo,

CHAP IX. History of the Discovery and Conquest of Chili,

SECT. I. Geographical View of the Kingdom of Chili,

II. Of the Origin, Manners, and Language of the Chilese,

III. State of Chili, and Conquests made in that Country by the

Peruvians, before the arrival of the Spaniards,

IV. First Expedition of the Spaniards into Chili under Almagro,

V. Second Expedition into Chili, under Pedro de Valdivia, to the

commencement of the War between the Spaniards and Araucanians,

VI. Narrative of the War between the Spaniards and Araucanians, from

the year 1550, to the Defeat and Death of Pedro de Valdivia on the 3d of

December 1553,

SECT. VII. Continuation of the War between the Spaniards and

Araucanians, from the death of Valdivia, to that of Caupolican,

VIII. Continuation of the Araucanian War, after the Death of Caupolican,

to the Reduction of the Archipelago of Chiloe by the Spaniards,

IX. Continuation of the Araucanian War to the Destruction of all the

Spanish Settlements in the territories of that Nation,

X. Farther Narrative of the War, to the Conclusion of Peace with the

Araucanians,

XI. Renewal of the War with the Araucanians, and succinct Narrative of

the History of Chili, from 1655 to 1787,

XII. State of Chili towards the end of the Eighteenth Century,

XIII. Account of the Archipelago of Chiloe,

XIV. Account of the native tribes inhabiting the southern extremity of

South America,

CHAP. X. Discovery of Florida, and Account of several ineffectual

Attempts to Conquer and Settle that Country by the Spaniards,

SECT. I. Discovery of Florida, by Juan Ponce de Leon,

II. Narrative of a Disastrous attempt by Panfilo de Narvaez to conquer

Florida; together with some account of that Country,

III. Adventures and wonderful escape of Cabeza de Vaca, after the loss

of Narvaez,

Sect. IV. Narrative of a new attempt to Conquer Florida, by Ferdinand

de Soto,

V. Continuation of the Transactions of Ferdinand de Soto in Florida,

VI. Conclusion of the Expedition to Florida by Ferdinand de Soto,

[Illustration: VICEROYALTY OF NEW GRANADA]

A

GENERAL HISTORY

AND

COLLECTION

OF

VOYAGES AND TRAVELS.

* * * * *

PART II. BOOK II. CONTINUED.

* * * * *

CHAPTER VII _Continued_.

CONTINUATION OF THE EARLY HISTORY OF PERU, AFTER THE DEATH OF FRANCISCO

PIZARRO, TO THE DEFEAT OF GONZALO PIZARRO, AND THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF

TRANQUILITY IN THE COUNTRY; WRITTEN BY AUGUSTINO ZARATE.

SECTION III.

_Continuation of the Viceroyalty of Blasco Nunnez Vela, to his

deposition and expulsion front Peru_.

The viceroy received immediate intelligence of the revolt of Puelles, as

mentioned in the foregoing section, which; was brought to him by a

Peruvian captain named Yllatopa; and, though he considered it as a very

unfortunate incident, he took immediate measures to counteract their

intentions of joining the enemy, by sending a detachment to occupy the

passes of the valley of Jauja, through which they must necessarily march

on their way from Guanuco to join Gonzalo. For this purpose, he

immediately ordered his brother Vela Nunnez to march in all haste with

a detachment of forty light armed cavalry, and thirty musqueteers under

the command of Gonzalo Diaz, besides whom ten of the friends and

relations of Nunnez went as volunteers on this expedition. On purpose to

expedite the march of this detachment as much as possible, the viceroy

caused thirty-six mules to be purchased, which cost 12,000 ducats, the

money being taken from the royal treasury. Being thus excellently

equipped, they set out from Lima, and marched to Guadachili[1], about

twenty leagues from Lima on their way to the valley of Jauja. At this

place a plot was formed by the soldiers for killing Vela Nunnez and

deserting to the army of Gonzalo, which was revealed by the following

incident. Certain scouts who preceded the detachment about four leagues

beyond Guadachili in the district of Pariacaca, met the friar Thomas de

San Martino, provincial of the Dominicans, who had been sent by the

viceroy to Cuzco to try if it were possible to come to some agreement

with Gonzalo; on this occasion one of the soldiers secretly informed the

provincial of the particulars of the conspiracy, begging him to take

immediate means of prevention, as it was to be executed on the following

night. The provincial accordingly hastened his journey to Guadachili,

taking all the scouts he could meet with along with him, as he told them

their present expedition was entirely useless, as Puelles and his troops

had passed through Jauja two days before, and it was now impossible to

intercept them. On his arrival in Guadachili, the provincial immediately

informed Vela Nunnez of the danger to which he was exposed, who

accordingly consulted with some of his friends and relations on the

means of escape. In the evening, they ordered out their horses, as if

for the purpose of sending them to water, and mounting them immediately,

they saved themselves by flight under the cloud of night, being guided

on their way by the provincial.

[Footnote 1: The place mentioned in the text is probably what is now

named Guarochiri, which is in the direction of the march, and nearly at

the distance indicated.--E.]

When the flight of Vela Nunnez and his friends was known, Juan de la

Torre, Pedro Hita, Jorge Griego, and the other soldiers who had formed

the conspiracy, went immediately to the main guard, where they compelled

all the other soldiers, under threats of instant death, to promise going

off along with them to join Gonzalo. Almost the whole of the detachment

promised compliance, and even the captain Gonzalo Diaz was of the

number; but he was apparently more harshly treated by the conspirators

than the others. They tied his hands as if fearing he might use measures

against them; yet he was not only believed to have been a participator

in the plot, but was even supposed to be its secret leader. Most of the

inhabitants of Lima expected Diaz to act in the way he did, as he was

son-in-law to Puelles against whom he was sent, and it was not to be

supposed he would give his aid to arrest his father-in-law. The whole

party therefore, immediately set out in search of Gonzalo, mounted on

the mules which had cost so high a price, and joined him near the city

of Guamanga, where Puelles had arrived, two days before them. At that

time of their junction, the adherents of Gonzalo were so much

discouraged by the lukewarmness of Gaspard Rodriguez and his friends,

that in all probability the whole army under Gonzalo would have

dispersed if they had been three days later in arriving. But the arrival

of Puelles gave the insurgents great encouragement, both by the

reinforcement which he brought of forty horse and twenty musketeers, and

by his exhortations; as he declared himself ready to proceed against the

viceroy even with his own troops, and had no doubt of being able to take

him prisoner or to drive him out of the country, he was so universally

hated. The encouragements derived by the insurgents from the junction of

Puelles, was still farther strengthened by the arrival of Diaz and his

companions.

Vela Nunnez got safe to Lima, where he informed the viceroy of the

unfortunate result of his expedition, who was very much cast down on the

occasion, as his affairs seemed to assume a very unpromising aspect.

Next day Rodrigo Ninno, and three or four others who refused to follow

the example of Diaz, arrived at Lima in a wretched condition, having

suffered a thousand insults from the conspirators, who deprived them of

their horses and arms, and even stripped them of their clothes. Ninno

was dressed in an old doublet and breeches, without stockings, having

only a pair of miserable pack-thread sandals, and had walked all the way

with a stick in his hand. The viceroy received him very graciously,

praising his loyalty, and told him that he appeared more nobly in his

rags than if clothed in the most costly attire.

When Balthasar de Loyasa had procured the safe conduct from the viceroy

for his employers, he set out without loss of time for the army of

Gonzalo Pizarro. As his departure and the nature of his dispatches were

soon known in Lima, it was universally believed there that the troops

under Pizarro would soon disperse of their own accord, leaving the

viceroy in peaceable and absolute command of the whole colony, upon

which he would assuredly put the ordinances in force with the utmost

rigour to the utter ruin of every one: For this reason, several of the

inhabitants, and some even of the soldiers belonging to the viceroy,

came to the resolution of following Loyasa and taking his dispatches

from him. Loyasa left Lima in the evening of a Saturday, in the month of

September 1545, accompanied by Captain Ferdinand de Zavallos. They were

mounted on mules, without any attendants, and had no baggage to delay

their journey. Next night, twenty-five persons set out from Lima on

horseback in pursuit of them, determined to use every possible

expedition to get up with Loyasa that they might take away his

dispatches. The chiefs in this enterprize were, Don Balthasar de Castro,

son of the Conde de la Gomera, Lorenzo Mexia, Rodrigo de Salazar, Diego

de Carvajal usually called the gallant, Francisco de Escovedo, Jerom de

Carvajal, and Pedro Martin de Cecilia, with eighteen others in their

company. Using every effort to expedite their journey, they got up with

Loyasa and Zavallos about forty leagues from Lima, and found them asleep

in a _tambo_ of palace of the Incas. Taking from them the letters and

dispatches with which they were entrusted, they forwarded these

immediately to Gonzalo Pizarro by means of a soldier, who used the

utmost diligence in travelling through bye ways and short cuts through

the mountains, with all of which he was well acquainted. After this, de

Castro and the rest of the malecontents continued their journey towards

the camp of Gonzalo, taking Loyasa and Zavallos along with them under

strict custody.

Upon receiving the intercepted dispatches which were brought to him by

the soldier, Gonzalo Pizarro secretly communicated them to Captain

Carvajal, whom he had recently appointed his lieutenant-general, or

maestre de campo, in consequence of the sickness of Alfonzo de Toro, who

held that commission on commencing the march from Cuzco. After

consulting with Carvajal, he communicated the whole matter to the

captains and those other chiefs of the insurgent-army who had shewn no

intentions of abandoning him, as they had not participated in applying

for the safe conduct from the viceroy. Some of these, from motives of

enmity against individuals, others from envy, and others again from the

hope of profiting by the forfeiture of the lands and Indians belonging

to the accused, advised Gonzalo to punish these persons with rigor, as a

warning to others not to venture upon similar conduct. In this secret

consultation, it was determined to select the following from among those

who were clearly implicated in taking part with the viceroy, by their

names being contained in the safe conduct taken from Loyasa: Captain

Gaspard Rodriguez; Philip Gutierrez, the son of Alfonso Gutierrez of

Madrid who was treasurer to his majesty; and Arias Maldonado, a

gentleman of Galicia, who had remained along with Gutierrez at Guamanga,

two or three days march in the rear of the army, under pretence of

having some preparations to make for the journey. Accordingly, Gonzalo

sent off Pedro de Puelles to Guamanga accompanied by an escort of

cavalry, who arrested these two latter gentlemen and caused them to be

beheaded.

Gaspar Rodriguez was in the camp, where he commanded a body of near two

hundred pikemen; and as Gonzalo and his advisers dared not to put him to

death openly, as he was a very rich man of considerable influence and

much beloved, they had to employ a stratagem for his arrestment. Gonzalo

ordered a hundred and fifty musqueteers of the company commanded by

Ceremeno to hold themselves in readiness around his tent, near which

likewise he caused his train of artillery to be drawn up ready for

service, and then convened all the captains belonging to his troops in

his tent, under pretence of communicating some dispatches which he had

received from Lima. When the whole were assembled, and Rodriguez among

them, he became alarmed on seeing that the tent was surrounded by armed

men and artillery, and wished to have retired under pretext of urgent

business. At this time, and in presence of the whole assembled officers,

the lieutenant-general Carvajal, came up to Rodriguez as if without any

premeditated intention, caught hold of the guard of his sword, and drew

it from the scabbard. Carvajal then desired him to make confession of

his sins to a priest, who was in attendance for that express purpose, as

he was to be immediately put to death. Rodriguez used every effort to

avoid this sudden and unlooked for catastrophe, and offered to justify

himself from every accusation which could be brought against him; but

every thing he could allege was of no avail, as his death was resolved

upon, and he was accordingly beheaded.

The execution of these three leaders astonished every one, being the

first which were ventured upon since the usurpation of Gonzalo; but they

more especially terrified those other persons who were conscious of

having participated in the same plot for which their chiefs were now put

to death. A few days afterwards, De Castro and his companions arrived at

the camp of the insurgents, with their prisoners Loyasa and Zavallos. It

has been reported that, on the very day of their arrival, Gonzalo sent

off his lieutenant-general Carvajal to meet them on the road by which

they were expected, with orders to have Loyasa and Zavallos strangled:

But, fortunately for them, their conductors had left the ordinary road,

taking a circuitous and unfrequented path, so that Carvajal did not fall

in with them; and, when they were brought before Gonzalo, so many of his

friends and accomplices interceded for their pardon, that he agreed to

spare their lives. Loyasa was commanded immediately to quit the camp, on

foot and without any provisions. Zavallos was detained in the camp as a

prisoner; and, rather more than a year afterwards, was appointed

superintendent of those who were employed in digging for gold in the

province of Quito. While in that employment, it was represented to

Gonzalo that Zavallos had become so exceedingly rich, that he must have

purloined a great proportion of the gold which was drawn from the mines.

Being predisposed against him by his former conduct in the service of

the viceroy, Gonzalo was easily persuaded to believe him guilty, and

ordered him to be hanged.

The departure of De Castro and his companions from Lima, as already

mentioned, though conducted in great secrecy, was soon discovered. On

the same night, as Diego de Urbina, the major general of the army

belonging to the viceroy, was going the rounds of the city, he happened

to visit the dwellings of several of those who had accompanied De

Castro; and finding that they were absent, and that their horses, arms,

servants, and Indians were all removed, he immediately suspected that

they were gone off to join Gonzalo. Urbina went directly to the viceroy,

who was already in bed, and assured him that most of the inhabitants had

fled from the city, as he believed that the defection was more general

than it turned out to be. The viceroy was very justly alarmed by this

intelligence, and ordered the drums to beat to arms. When, in

consequence of this measure, all the captains and other officers in his

service were assembled, he gave them orders to visit the whole houses of

the city, by which means it was soon known who had deserted. As Diego

and Jerom de Carvajal, and Francisco Escovedo, nephews of the commissary

Yllan Suarez de Carvajal were among the absentees, the viceroy

immediately suspected Yllan Suarez of being a partisan of Gonzalo

Pizarro, believing that his nephews had acted by his orders, more

especially as they dwelt in his house, and could not therefore have gone

away without his knowledge; though assuredly they might easily have

escaped by a different door at a distance from the principal entrance.

Actuated by these suspicions, the viceroy sent his brother, Vela Nunnez,

with a detachment of musqueteers, to bring Suarez immediately to the

palace for examination. On arriving at his house, Suarez was in bed, but

was brought immediately before the viceroy, who was now dressed is his

armour, and reposing on a couch. It is reported by some who were

present, that the viceroy addressed Suarez on entering the following

words. "Traitor! you have sent off your nephews to join Gonzalo

Pizarro." "Call me not traitor, my lord," replied Suarez, "I am as

faithful a subject to his majesty as you are." The viceroy was so much

irritated by the insolent behaviour of Suarez, that he drew his sword

and advanced towards him, and some even allege that he stabbed him in

the breast. The viceroy, however, constantly asserted that he did not

use his sword against Suarez; but that the servants and halberdiers who

were in attendance, on noticing the insolent behaviour of the commissary

to their master, had put him to death, without allowing him time for

confession, or even for speaking a single word in his own defence. The

body was immediately carried away for interment; and as the commissary

was very universally beloved, it was thought dangerous to take his dead

body through the great court of the viceregal palace, where there were

always a hundred soldiers on guard during the night, lest it might

occasion some disturbance. For this reason, it was let down from a

gallery which overlooked the great square, whence some Indians and

negroes carried it to a neighbouring church, and buried it without any

ceremony in his ordinary scarlet cloak.

Three days after this tragical event, when the judges of the royal

audience made the viceroy a prisoner, as shall be presently related,

among their first transactions, they made a judicial examination

respecting the circumstances attendant upon the death of Suarez. It was

ascertained in the first place, that he had disappeared since the time

when he was carried before the viceroy at midnight; after which, the

body was dug up, and the wounds examined[2]. When the intelligence of

the death of Suarez spread through Lima, it gave occasion to much

dissatisfaction, as every one knew that he had been always, favourable

to the interest and authority of the viceroy, and had even exerted his

whole influence in procuring him to be received at Lima, in opposition

to the sentiments of the majority of the magistrates of that city. His

death happened on the night of Sunday the 13th of September 1544. Early

next morning, Don Alfonzo de Montemayor was sent by the viceroy with a

party of thirty horse, in pursuit of De Castro and the others who had

gone after Loyasa and Zavallos. When Montemayor had travelled two or

three days in the pursuit, he learnt that De Castro and his companions

were already so far advanced in their journey that it would be utterly

impossible to get up with them. He accordingly turned back, and

receiving information on his return towards Lima, that Jerom de Carvajal

had lost his companions during the night, and, being unable to discover

the road by which they were gone, had concealed himself in a marsh among

some tall reeds, where Montemayor found him out, and carried him

prisoner to Lima, on purpose to give him up to the viceroy. Fortunately

for Carvajal, the viceroy was himself a prisoner when Montemayor

returned to Lima.

[Footnote 2: This judicial examination, so formally announced, is left

quite inconclusive by Zarate.--E.]

When the anger of the viceroy had somewhat subsided, he used great pains

to justify himself, in regard to the death of Suarez, explaining the

reasons of his conduct in that affair to all who visited him, and

endeavouring to convince them that he had just reasons of suspicion,

giving a detailed account of all the circumstances respecting the arrest

and death of Suarez. He even procured some judicial informations to be

drawn up by the licentiate Cepeda, respecting the crimes which he laid

to the charge of the commissary, of which the following is an abstract.

"It appeared reasonable to suppose that Suarez must have been privy to

the desertion of his nephews, as they lived in his house and could not

have gone off without his knowledge. He alleged that Suaraz had not

exerted all the care and diligence that were necessary and proper, in

several affairs connected with the present troubles which had been

confided to him. It was objected to him, that he was particularly

interested in opposing the execution of the obnoxious regulations;

since he would have been obliged, along with the rest, to give up the

lands and Indians he then held as an officer of the crown, which he had

not done hitherto on account of the subsisting disturbances in the

country. Lastly, the viceroy charged against him, that having entrusted

Suarez at the very beginning of the troubles with certain dispatches for

his brother, the licentiate Carvajal, who then dwelt at Cuzco, intended

for procuring intelligence by his means of what was going on in that

city, he had never given or procured any answer on that subject;

although it must certainly have been easy for him to have procured

intelligence from his brother, by means of the Indian vassals of both,

and by those belonging to the king who were at his disposal officially,

all of whom dwelt on the road between Lima and Cuzco." Besides that all

these allegations carry very little weight in themselves, as evidences

of the presumptive guilt of Suarez, none of them were ever

satisfactorily established by legal proof.

As the viceroy found that all his affairs had turned out unfortunate,

and that every person seemed much discontented in consequence of the

death of Suarez, he changed his intention of waiting for Gonzalo Pizarro

at Lima, which he had caused fortify in that view with ramparts and

bastions. He now resolved to retire to the city of Truxillo, about

eighty leagues from Lima, and entirely to abandon and even to dispeople

the city of Lima; in the execution of this project he meant to send the

invalids, old persons, women, children, and all the valuable effects and

baggage belonging to the inhabitants by sea to Truxillo, for which

purpose he had sufficient shipping, and to march all who were able to

carry arms by land, taking along with him all the European inhabitants

of every settlement in the plain between Lima and Truxillo; and sending

off all the Indian population of the plain to the mountainous region. By

these decisive measures, he hoped to reduce the adherents of Gonzalo

Pizarro to such straits, by depriving them of every possible succour and

refreshment, after the fatigues of a long and painful march, encumbered

with baggage and artillery, as might constrain them to disband their

army, when they might find the whole way between Lima and Truxillo

reduced to a desert entirely devoid of provisions. The viceroy

considered himself under the necessity of employing these strong

measures, as some of his people deserted from him almost daily to the

enemy, in proportion as the insurgents approached towards Lima.

In pursuance of this resolution, on Tuesday the 15th of September, two

days after the slaughter of the commissary Suarez, the viceroy gave

orders to Diego Alvarez de Cueto, with a party of horse, to convey the

children of the late Marquis Pizarro on board ship, and to remain in

charge of them and the licentiate Vaca de Castro. On this occasion, he

gave the command of the fleet to Cueto, being afraid lest Don Antonio de

Ribera and his wife, who then had the charge of young Don Gonzalo and

his brothers, children of the late marquis, might conceal them and give

them up to their uncle. This measure occasioned much emotion among the

inhabitants of Lima, and gave great offence to the oydors or judges of

the royal audience, particularly to the licentiate Ortiz de Zarate, who

made strong remonstrances to the viceroy against sending Donna Francisco

Pizarro among the sailors and soldiers, where she could not reside in

decent comfort. This young lady, who was both beautiful and rich, was

now almost grown a woman, and the conduct of the viceroy towards her on

this occasion was considered as harsh, tyrannical, and unnecessary.

Ortiz was unable to prevail on the viceroy to recall his orders

respecting the children of the late marquis; and he even openly declared

that he had come to the resolution of abandoning Lima in the way already

mentioned. All the oydors considered these intended steps as highly

improper and ruinous to the colony; and declared, that as they had been

ordered by his majesty to take up their residence in Lima, they were

determined not to quit that place without a new royal order for the

express purpose. As the viceroy found that every thing he could say was

quite ineffectual to bring over the oydors to his sentiments, he

resolved to gain possession of the _royal seal_, and to carry it off

with himself to Truxillo, by which measure the oydors would be reduced

to the state of private persons in Lima, and unable to hold any sitting

of the royal audience, unless they chose to accompany him to Truxillo.

When this resolution of the viceroy was communicated to the oydors, they

called the chancellor before them, from whom they took the seal, which

they committed to the custody of the licentiate Cepeda, the senior

oydor. This was done by three of the oydors, Cepeda, Texada, and

Alvarez, Ortiz being absent at the time.

On the same evening, all the four oydors assembled in the house of

Cepeda, and agreed to present a formal requisition to the viceroy to

bring back the family of the late marquis from the fleet in which he had

embarked them. After this resolution had been engrossed in the register,

the licentiate Ortiz retired to his own house, being indisposed. The

other three oydors continued in consultation on the measures which were

proper to be adopted, for defending themselves against the power of the

viceroy, in case he should persist in his plans, and endeavour to make

them embark by force, which they publickly asserted was his intention.

On this occasion, they drew up an ordinance or public act, by which, in

the name and authority of the king "they commanded all the inhabitants

of the city of Lima, captains, soldiers, and others, civil and military,

in case the viceroy should give orders to remove them, the oydors of the

royal audience, by force and violence from Lima, that they should aid,

assist, and defend them, in opposition to such a measure, as illegal and

unjust, and contrary to the orders of his majesty, clearly expressed in

the new regulations, and in the commission granted to them as oydors of

the royal audience."

Having formally extended and authenticated this _act_, they communicated

it in secret to Captain Martin de Robles, whom they desired to hold

himself and his soldiers in readiness to defend them in case of need. De

Robles engaged to stand by them; for though one of the captains in the

troops, he was not on good terms with the viceroy. Several other persons

of importance in the city, to whom the oydors communicated the

resolutions which they had formed, promised likewise to stand by them

against the tyranny of the viceroy. That same evening, all who were in

concert with the oydors held themselves in readiness, anxiously waiting

the event of an open breach between the viceroy and the judges of the

royal audience. However secret the steps taken by the oydors might have

been, they became known to the viceroy, or at least he entertained

violent suspicions of their nature and tendency. At night-fall, Martin

de Robles went privately to the house of the oydor Cepeda, to whom he

communicated his opinion that the viceroy was already informed of all

their proceedings, and that, unless prompt measures were taken for their

security, they would all be put to death. Cepeda sent immediately for

Alvarez and Texada, two others of the oydors; and these three came

immediately to the determination of openly defending themselves against

the viceroy, if he should attempt their arrest. For this purpose,

several of their friends, and some of the soldiers of the company,

commanded by De Robles, assembled in arms at their residence. While this

was going on, Urbina the maestre de campo or major-general, when going

his rounds met several of these soldiers in the street, and immediately

suspected the truth. He went, therefore, straight to the viceroy, to

whom he communicated the suspicious circumstances he had observed, that

some prompt measures might be concerted for counteracting the

machinations of the oydors. The viceroy desired him to fear nothing, as

they had only civilians to deal with, who had not sufficient courage to

concert any enterprize against his authority. Urbina went away

accordingly to continue his round; but as he still continued to meet

several armed horsemen in the streets, all of whom were going towards

the house of Cepeda, he returned again to the palace, and remonstrated

with the viceroy on the absolute necessity of taking instant measures of

defence. The viceroy immediately put on his armour and ordered to sound

an alarm, after which he went out into the great square before the

palace, accompanied by his nightly guard of a hundred soldiers and all

his domestic establishment, meaning to have proceeded to the house of

Cepeda, to arrest the oydors, to chastise the mutineers, and to

re-establish order in the city. While in the great square near the gate

of the palace, he noticed that it was impossible to prevent the soldiers

from going to join the oydors, as the horsemen who filled all the

streets constrained them to take that direction. If, however, the

viceroy had persisted in his first design, he could hardly have found

much difficulty or considerable resistance, as he then had a greatly

superior force to what had assembled with Cepeda and the other judges.

He was disuaded from executing these intentions by Alfonzo Palomino,

alcalde or police-judge of Lima, who asserted that a great majority of

the troops were assembled at the house of Cepeda, and were about to

attack him; for which reason, the best measure was to fortify himself in

the palace, which could easily be defended; whereas he had not a

sufficient force to assail the oydors and their adherents. Influenced by

this advice, the viceroy retired into the palace, accompanied by his

brother Vela Nunnez, Paul de Meneses, Jerom de la Cerna, Alfonso de

Caceres, Diego de Urbina, and others of his friends and followers, with

all his relations and servants. The hundred soldiers of the nightly

guard were posted at the great gate of the palace, with orders to

prevent any one from going in.

While these vacillatory measures were going on at the viceregal palace,

information was brought to the oydors, that the viceroy had drawn out

his troops in the great square, with the intention of attacking them.

Having as yet collected only a small force for their protection, they

resolved to go out into the street; believing, if the viceroy should

come to blockade them, and should occupy the streets leading to the

house of Cepeda, that all those who were disposed to aid them would be

intercepted. They advanced therefore by the streets which led towards

the great square, and were soon joined by others of their adherents, to

the number of about two hundred men. To justify their conduct on this

occasion, they caused the act which they had drawn up to be publickly

read; but so great was the noise and confusion, that very few of those

present were able to hear its tenor. On the arrival of the judges and

their partizans in the great square, day began to dawn. At this time,

the troops attached to the viceroy fired a few musket-shots, from the

corridore of the palace, and began to extend themselves in front of the

main gate. The soldiers who accompanied the oydors were much displeased

at this procedure, and proposed to assault the palace, and to slay all

that resisted them; but the oydors restrained and appeased them. The

oydors then deputed Gaspard de Carvajal, the superior of the Dominicans,

and Antonio de Robles, to inform the viceroy, that their only demand

from him was an assurance that they should not be compelled to embark

against their will and contrary to the express orders of his majesty,

which fixed their residence at Lima. They farther required, that,

without proceeding to hostilities, the viceroy should come to the great

church, where they proposed, going to meet him, and where all their

differences might be amicably settled; as otherwise he would put both

himself and all who were with him in extreme danger. While these envoys

were in the palace in the execution of their commission, the hundred

soldiers who formed the guard of the viceroy went over in a body to the

oydors; by which, as the entrance to the palace was left entirely

unguarded, several of the malecontents got admission to the chambers

belonging to the officers of the viceroy in the outer court, which they

pillaged. At this time, the licentiate Ortiz de Zarate went from his

house towards the palace, meaning to have joined the viceroy; but

meeting the other oydors on his way, and seeing that it was impossible

for him to prosecute his original design, he accompanied them to the

church.

When the viceroy received the message of the oydors from Carvajal and

Antonio de Robles, considering at the same time that his palace was

already in possession of the insurgents, and that his own troops had

abandoned him, he determined to proceed to the church, and to give

himself up to the oydors who there waited for him. They carried him

directly, in his coat of mail and cuirass, to the house of Cepeda;

where, seeing Ortiz along with the other judges, he exclaimed: "Is it

possible that you, in whom I had so much confidence as one of my best

friends, have joined with the rest in making me a prisoner." To this the

licentiate replied, "Whoever has told you so spoke falsely, as it is

known to every one who those are that have caused you to be arrested,

and that I have no share in the matter." The three other judges gave

immediate orders to convey the viceroy on board ship, that he might be

sent to Spain; justly fearing, if Gonzalo Pizarro should find him in

custody on his arrival at Limn, that he would put him to death, or that

the relations and friends of the commissary Suarez might kill him in

revenge for the murder of that officer; as in either of which cases the

blame might be imputed to them, the judges were much embarrassed how

best to act in this delicate emergency, considering that if they merely

sent the viceroy on board the fleet which lay at anchor off the harbour

of Calao, he might be soon in condition to return in force against them.

In this dilemma, they appointed Cepeda, one of their number, to act as

captain-general of the colony; who, with a strong guard, conducted the

deposed viceroy to the sea side on purpose to put him on board one of

the ships. They found some difficulty in executing this measure, as

Diego Alvarez de Cueto, who commanded the fleet, on seeing the

assemblage of people on the shore, and learning that they had the

viceroy among them as a prisoner, sent Jerom de Zurbano, one of his

captains in an armed boat to collect all the boats of the fleet, with

which, accompaniment he approached the shore and demanded the liberation

of the viceroy from the judges. This measure was altogether ineffectual,

as the judges refused to listen to the demands of Cueto; who, after

exchanging a few shots with those on shore, went back to his ships.

After this, the judges sent off a message to Cueto, by means of Friar

Gaspard de Carvajal, in which the deposed viceroy concurred, ordering

him to surrender the command of the fleet, and to give up the children

of the late marquis, in return for which they would place the viceroy

under his charge, who would otherwise be in great peril of his life. On

getting aboard ship, Friar Gaspard presented his commission to Cueto and

gave him a full account of the state of affairs, in presence of the

licentiate Vaca de Castro, who still remained a prisoner in that vessel.

In consideration of the danger to which the viceroy was exposed, Cueto

sent the children of the marquis on shore together with Don Antonio de

Ribera and his wife who had the care of them. The judges still insisted

that Cueto should surrender the fleet to their command, threatening to

behead the viceroy if he refused; and though Vela Nunnez, brother to the

viceroy, went several times with messages to induce compliance, the

captains of the ships would not consent to that measure, so that the

judges were constrained to return to Lima with the viceroy still in

custody.

Two days afterwards, the commanders of the ships were informed that the

judges and their partizans had come to the resolution of sending a

strong force of musqueteers in boats to make themselves masters of the

ships by force. They might perhaps have easily persuaded Cueto to give

up the fleet, of which in reality Jerom de Zurbano had more the command

than he, as all the soldiers and sailors who were attached to the

deposed viceroy were at his disposal; but Zurbano, to whom the judges

made great offers, was quite inflexible. The captains of the fleet came

even to the resolution of quitting the port of Lima, to cruise upon the

coast of Peru, till such time as they might receive orders from his

majesty how to conduct themselves in the present crisis. They believed

that the viceroy had many friends and adherents in Lima and other parts

of Peru; as many persons who had not taken any share in the deposition

and imprisonment of the viceroy, and several of those who were best

disposed to the royal service continued almost daily to make their

escape on board the fleet. The ships were tolerably well armed and

appointed, having ten or twelve iron cannon, and three or four of brass,

besides forty quintals of powder. As to provisions, they had above four

hundred quintals of biscuit, five hundred bags of maize, and a large

store of salt meat; so that they were victualled sufficiently for a

considerable time, and they could easily procure water on any part of

the coast. Their force however was very small, as they had only twenty

five soldiers, and by no means a sufficient number of mariners for the

ten ships which composed their fleet. They resolved therefore to abandon

four of the smallest vessels, which they were unable to man; and not

thinking it right to leave these behind, lest they might have been

employed against themselves by the partizans of the judges, they set

these small vessels on fire the day after the imprisonment of the

viceroy, as likewise two fishing barks which were in the harbour, and

then set sail. The four small ships were entirely destroyed, but the two

fishing vessels were saved after sustaining very little damage.

The fleet went into the harbour of Guavra, which is eighteen leagues

_below_[3] the port of Lima, where they took in a supply of wood and

water. They carried the licentiate Vaca de Castro along with them, and

resolved to wait at Guavra to see what consequences might follow from

the imprisonment of the viceroy. When this came to the knowledge of the

judges, who believed the ships might not go to any considerable distance

from Guavra, on account of the attachment of their commanders to the

viceroy whose life was in danger, they determined to send a force both

by sea and land to attempt acquiring possession of the ships almost at

any risk. For this purpose, they gave orders to Diego Garcias de Alfaro,

an inhabitant of Lima who was versant in maritime affairs, to repair and

fit out the two barks which had drifted on shore. When that was done,

Alfaro embarked in them with thirty musqueteers, and set sail towards

Guavra. At the same time, Don Juan de Mendoza and Ventura Beltran,[4]

were sent off by land with a party of soldiers in the same direction. On

coming to Guavra in the night, Garcias de Alfaro concealed his two barks

behind a light house[5], in the harbour very near the ships, where he

could not be seen. At the same time, the party which went by land began

to fire off their muskets, and the people in the ships believed they

were some friends of the viceroy who wished to embark. Vela Nunnez was

sent accordingly in a boat to the shore, to learn what was meant by the

firing, on which Diego Garcias pushed on his barks between Vela Nunnez

and the ships, firing upon him and obliged him to surrender.

Intelligence of this event was immediately sent to Cueto, with a message

assuring him that both the viceroy and his brother would be immediately

put to death unless he surrendered his ships to the judges. Cueto[6]

accordingly submitted, being afraid lest the threat might be executed;

but had certainly not been allowed to do so if Zurbano had been present,

who had sailed from Guavra with his ships, two days before the arrival

of Diego Garcias, with the intention of going all along the coast

between Lima and Tierra Firma to take possession of every ship he might

fall in with, to prevent them from being employed by the oydors.

[Footnote 3: The expression in the text _below_, is probably an error in

the French translator in rendering _barlovento_ which signifies to

leeward. Accordingly, to the north of Lima, and about the indicated

distance, there is a sea-port or coast town named Huaura, certainly the

place meant by Zarate. _Hua_ and _Gua_ are often inchanged by the

Spaniards in the names of places in America, probably from the g having

a guttural sound, or strong aspiration.--E.]

[Footnote 4: Garcilasso names this person Ventura Veltran.--E.]

[Footnote 5: In Garcilasso de la Vega, obviously copying this part of

the story from Zarate, Garcias is said to have concealed his barks

behind a rock.--E.]

[Footnote 6: This person is always named Cuero, by Garcilasso; who

likewise informs us that he was brother-in-law to the viceroy.--E.]

Immediately after the departure of the fleet under Cueto from the port

of Lima, the judges became apprehensive lest the relations of the

commissary might put the viceroy to death, which they actually

threatened; on which account they came to a resolution, to transport him

to an island about two leagues from the coast. For this purpose he was

embarked along with a guard of twenty men in one of those barks or

floats made of dried reeds which the Indians call _henea_. When the

judges learnt the surrender of the fleet under Cueto, they determined

upon sending him as a prisoner to Spain, with a formal memorial of all

that had passed, and deputed the licenciate Alvarez, one of their number

to take charge of him thither, and to support their memorial at the

court of Spain, giving him 8000 crowns to defray the expences of the

voyage. For this purpose all the necessary dispatches were prepared,

which were signed by all the judges of the royal audience, excepting

Ortiz de Zarate, who refused his concurrence. Alvarez went by land to

Guavra, to which place the viceroy was transported in one of the barks

fitted out by Diego Garcias, and given into the custody of Alvarez, who

immediately set sail with three ships that had been placed at his

disposal, without waiting even for the dispatches from his brother

judges. At this time, Vaca de Castro was carried back to the port of

Lima, still a prisoner.

SECTION IV.

_History of the usurpation of Gonzalo Pizarro, from the expulsion of the

Viceroy to his defeat and death_.

While the viceroy remained in the small island, as formerly mentioned,

Alfonso de Montemayor and those who had gone along with him to succour

Loyasa and Zavallos, returned to Lima, upon which the judges caused them

to be arrested and disarmed, ordering them, and several of the captains

who were attached to the viceroy, to be detained as prisoners in the

house of Martin de Robles, and in the houses of several of the citizens

of Lima. These prisoners were persuaded, if the viceroy could regain his

liberty, that he would still be able to prevent the arrival of Gonzalo

Pizarro at Lima, and to avert the disorders and evils which must flow

from his successful usurpation, prejudicial to the rights of the crown

and the interest of the colony. With this view, therefore, they

concerted to unite together under arms, to bring back the viceroy from

the place of his confinement, and to reinstate him in his authority;

resolving in the execution of this project, to make the judges

prisoners, or even to kill them if necessary, and to take possession of

the city in the name of his majesty. They had assuredly executed their

project, had they not been betrayed by a soldier, who discovered the

whole plot to Cepeda. Immediately on receiving notice of this

conspiracy, Cepeda in concert with the other judges apprehended all the

leaders, namely Alfonso de Montemayor, Paolo de Meneses, Alfonso de

Caceres, Alfonso de Barrionuevo, and some others. Several of these when

put to the torture, had sufficient resolution to refuse confession; but

Barrionuevo confessed partly, in hopes of satisfying the judges, and

that they might not continue his torments. Upon his confession, he was

at first condemned to lose his head; but in the sequel the judges

satisfied themselves with causing his right hand to be cut off; and all

the other leaders of the conspiracy, who persisted in refusing to

confess, were banished from Peru.

After all these revolutionary events, information of every thing that

had occurred in Lima, was transmitted to Gonzalo Pizarro, the judges and

their friends being in hopes that, he would now be induced to dismiss

his army. They were however quite mistaken in this expectation; for he

believed that every thing, even the imprisonment of the viceroy, was a

false rumour, or a mere concerted trick to force him to lay down his

arms, and that they would put him to death when left without support.

In the mean time the licentiate Alvarez, as already mentioned, set sail

from Guavra having charge of the viceroy and his brothers.

Notwithstanding that this judge had been the chief promoter of every

thing that had been done against the viceroy, having even especially

contributed to make him a prisoner, and been most active in punishing

those who had conspired to restore him to the government; yet, on the

very first day of the voyage, he went into the cabin which had been

appointed for the captive viceroy, declaring his repentance for all that

he had done against him, and his earnest desire for a reconcilement. He

assured him, that, in accepting the charge of his conveyance as a

prisoner, he had been entirely actuated by the desire of serving him,

that he might get him from under the power of Cepeda, and prevent him

from falling into the hands of Gonzalo Pizarro, who was expected to

arrive shortly at Lima. To satisfy the viceroy of his sincerity, Alvarez

assured him that he was from that moment at full and perfect liberty,

and that he now surrendered the command of the vessel into his hands;

humbly beseeching him to forgive all that was passed, and declaring

himself ready to obey his commands in all things. Alvarez then gave

orders to the ten men who had been given him as guards over the viceroy,

that they were now to obey the viceroy and not him. The viceroy

expressed his entire satisfaction at this conduct in Alvarez, and took

the command accordingly; yet in a very short time he treated Alvarez

very ill, often calling him villain, traitor, mutineer, and other

opprobrious names, and threatening that, though he spared his life for

the present because he had occasion for his service, he would certainly

have him hanged in the sequel. Yet they continued together till their

arrival at Truxillo, as shall be related in the sequel.

It was soon suspected at Lima that Alvarez had entered into terms with

the viceroy, from certain circumstances which had transpired before he

embarked, but more especially from his having set sail without waiting

for the dispatches of the royal court of audience, which had been

delayed a day in waiting for the consent of Ortiz. While they were still

in some degree of uncertainty on this subject, and waiting anxiously to

know the whole truth, they judged proper to send a representation on

the state of affairs to Gonzalo Pizarro, of which the following was the

tenor. "That, in consequence of their commissions, and of the express

powers confided to them by his majesty of doing every thing which might

be necessary for the due administration of justice, and to place the

country in good order, they had suspended the execution of the obnoxious

regulations, as demanded by the colonists, and had even sent off the

viceroy to Spain, which was more than had been required or could have

been reasonably asked. As, therefore, there now remained no call or

pretence for the military preparations which he had set on foot, they

commanded him immediately to dismiss his troops: But, if he were

inclined to come to Lima, he must come there as a man of peace, without

warlike array; yet, if he considered it necessary to his safety to have

an escort, they granted him permission to bring fifteen or twenty

horsemen along with him."

When these orders were prepared, the judges were desirous of sending

some of the inhabitants of Lima to carry them to Gonzalo Pizarro; but no

one would undertake the commission, which they considered as extremely

hazardous. They represented to the judges, that Gonzalo and his officers

would reproach them for opposing the just measures in which they were

engaged; as they had associated for the general interest of the colony.

On this refusal of the inhabitants, the judges gave orders to Augustino,

the royal treasurer of Peru[7], and Don Antonio de Ribeta, one of the

citizens of Lima, to carry this order to Gonzalo. To these messengers

they gave formal letters of credence, with which they set out upon their

journey for the valley of Jauja, in which Gonzalo Pizarro was then

encamped with his army. Gonzalo had already received notice of this

intended embassy; and was afraid, if the envoys should give a public

notification of the message with which they were entrusted, that his

troops might mutiny; as he knew they were exceedingly desirous of

marching to Lima in full force, that they might be in condition to

pillage that city on the first pretext that offered. To prevent this, he

sent Jerom de Villegas with thirty mounted musqueteers to intercept the

two messengers now on their way to the army. According to his

instructions, Villegas allowed Ribera to continue his journey to the

camp; but made Augustino de Zarate a prisoner, and deprived him of his

dispatches. Zarate was carried back by Villegas to the province of

Pariacaca[8], where he was detained a prisoner for ten days, and every

means were employed to intimidate him that he might not execute the

commission with which he was entrusted.

[Footnote 7: The author of the History of the Discovery and Conquest of

Peru, which forms the subject of the present article; who accordingly,

might justly say of these events, _quorum pars magna fui_. His associate

on this occasion was the person who had charge of the family of the late

marquis Don Francisco Pizarro, and had married the widow of Francisco

Martin de Alcantara, as we learn from Garcilasso.--E.]

[Footnote 8: No such province is now to be found in the best maps of

Peru; but seventy or eighty miles to the north of Jauja, there is a

district called the valley of Pari, with a town of the same name on the

_Chinchay Cocha_, or lake of Chinchay, which may then have been called

Pari-cocha, or Pari on the lake. From this circumstance, it appears the

messengers had been obliged to make a great circuit towards the north,

on purpose to get a passage across the main western ridge of the

Andes.--E.]

At the end of that period Gonzalo Pizarro arrived with his army at

Pariacaca, and called Zarate into his presence to give an account of the

subject of his mission: Zarate had been already made to understand that

his life would be in danger if he attempted to execute the orders he had

received literally: For which reason, after having explained the whole

distinctly to Gonzalo in private, on being taken into the tent where all

the insurgent captains were assembled, he proceeded, as instructed by

Gonzalo, to discharge his commission with prudent reserve. Gonzalo

desired him to repeat all that he had already communicated to him, but

Zarate, understanding distinctly what was expected of him by Gonzalo, in

addressing the assembled officers in the name of the judges of the royal

audience, used considerable address, and availed himself of the full

powers contained in his credentials. He was silent therefore regarding

the dismissal of the troops, which was the point of delicacy, and

confined himself to such other matters as seemed proper for the service

of his majesty and the good of the colony. In this view, he represented

to them, "that, since the viceroy was deported, and their demand for

suspending the obnoxious ordinances was granted, it seemed just that

they should repay the sums which Blasco Nunnez Vela had taken from the

royal treasury, as they had promised. That they should forgive those

inhabitants of Cuzco who had deserted from their camp to join the late

viceroy, since it could not be denied that these men had substantial

reasons for what they had done; and that they ought to send a humble

deputation to his majesty, to excuse and exculpate themselves from the

measures in which they had been engaged." Zarate added several things of

a similar nature; to all of which the only answer given by the council

of officers, which he was directed to carry back to the judges was,

"that it was indispensably necessary for the well being of the colony,

that they should appoint Gonzalo Pizarro governor of Peru. After which

every thing that was required should be done: But if this were refused,

the military council was determined to give up Lima to be plundered by

the soldiers."

Zarate would willingly have excused himself from bearing this answer;

but as no other could be procured, he was obliged to return to Lima,

where he reported it to the judges, to whom it gave much uneasiness and

dissatisfaction. Gonzalo Pizarro had not hitherto carried his

pretensions so high, having only insisted for the departure of the

viceroy from Peru, and the suspension of the obnoxious regulations, and

the judges were much at a loss how to conduct themselves under this new

and unexpected demand. After mature deliberation, they sent to inform

the insurgent officers, "that they were unable to grant their demand, or

even to take it into consideration, unless some person should appear

before them authorised to present the request according to the

accustomed forms." Upon this message, all the procurators or deputies of

the cities who were in the insurgent army repaired to Lima; where, in

conjunction with such other deputies of the cities as were resident in

that place, they presented a formal request in writing, demanding the

same thing which had been formerly done by a verbal message. The

auditors, considering this affair as exceedingly delicate, and that they

neither had any right to grant what was now demanded, nor sufficient

power to refuse it, as Gonzalo was now very near Lima which he held

strictly blockaded; they resolved to submit the whole to the

consideration of the principal persons of the city, that they might

receive their sentiments and advice in the present crisis. For this

purpose, they drew up a formal instrument of the whole matter, which was

communicated to Don Jerom de Loyasa archbishop of Lima, Don Juan Solano

archbishop of Cuzco, Don Garcia Diaz bishop of Quito, Fray Thomas de San

Martino provincial of the Dominicans, Augustino de Zarate the treasurer,

and to the royal accountant and controller general[9]. This

extraordinary council was desired to consider maturely the demands of

the deputies, and to give their opinion freely on what was proper to be

done in consequence. In this instrument, the judges explained at full

length the reasons which induced them to require advice on this

important subject, openly avowing that this measure was not resorted to

in the view of following what the council might judge best, since

neither the judges nor the council had any power in the present

situation of affairs to act otherwise than as prescribed by Gonzalo

Pizarro and his officers; but that the judges had called in this manner

on the members of this extraordinary council, as recorded witnesses of

the constraint and oppression under which they all now acted.

[Footnote 9: By Garcilasso, Zarate is represented as holding all the

three offices, Treasurer, accountant, and controller.--E.]

While these deliberations were going on in Lima, Gonzalo Pizarro drew

nigh with his army and encamped about a quarter of a league from the

city, drawing up his numerous train of artillery in readiness for

service. As a whole day elapsed without the formal appointment as

governor being transmitted to him, he became impatient; and dispatched

thirty musqueteers into the city under the command of his

lieutenant-general, who made prisoners of twenty-eight persons, among

whom were those who had formerly deserted him at Cuzco, and others who

were most obnoxious for having taken part with the viceroy. Among these

were Gabriel de Roias, Garcilasso de la Vega, Melchior Verdugo, the

licentiate Carvajal, Pedro de Barco, Martin de Florencia, Alfonso de

Caceres, Pedro de Manjares, Luis de Leon, Antonio Ruys de Guevara, and

some others of highest consideration in the colony. These were committed

to the common prison, of which the lieutenant-general took possession,

taking away the keys from the alcalde or keeper. The judges were utterly

unable to make the smallest opposition to this strong measure, and dared

not even to express their disapprobation, as there did not now remain

fifty soldiers in the city; all those who had been formerly attached to

them or to the viceroy having gone over to the camp of Gonzalo, who had

now a force of twelve hundred men completely armed, including his

original troops and those who deserted to him on this occasion.

Next morning, several of the insurgent officers came into the city, and

required the judges to make out the commission for Gonzalo, and to

proclaim him governor-general of Peru without delay, otherways

threatening to give up the city to plunder, and to massacre the

inhabitants, in which case they would begin by putting the judges to

death. The judges endeavoured to excuse themselves, alleging that they

had neither right nor authority to do what was desired. Whereupon

Carvajal, the lieutenant-general under Pizarro, caused four of his

prisoners to be brought from the prison, and ordered three of them to be

hanged on a tree near the city. These unfortunate men were Pedro de

Barco, Martin de Florencia, and Juan de Saavedra. Carvajal only allowed

them a short half hour to confess their sins and to prepare for death,

adding insult and mockery to his cruelty. He particularly indulged in

raillery against Pedro de Barco, who was last executed; saying, as he

was a brave commander who had made several conquests, and was one of the

most considerable and richest men in Peru, he was inclined to allow him

some distinction in his death, and that he therefore granted him the

high and honourable privilege of choosing which branch of the tree he

preferred for being hanged upon. Luis de Leon escaped at the

intercession of his brother who served under Gonzalo.

On seeing these arbitrary proceedings, and being threatened by Carvajal

with a similar treatment of all the other prisoners, and that the city

should be given up to pillage if they did not execute the required

commission without delay, the judges sent to the members of the

extraordinary council formerly mentioned, desiring them to give their

undisguised sentiments: upon what was proper to be done. They

accordingly agreed unanimously that it was necessary to comply with the

demands of Gonzalo; and the judges immediately made out a commission

appointing Gonzalo Pizarro governor-general of Peru, until his majesty

might give orders to the contrary, and without prejudice to the rights

and authority of the royal audience, to which Gonzalo was required to

make oath that he would renounce his authority whenever it might please

his majesty or the audience to demand it from him, and likewise engaging

to submit to their authority in the event of any complaints against him,

either as an individual, or in the execution of his high office.

On receiving his commission, Gonzalo Pizarro made his public entry into

Lima, with all his troops in martial order. Captain Bachicao marched at

the head of the vanguard with the artillery, consisting of twenty field

pieces, which with all their ammunition, carriages, and other

equipments, were carried on the shoulders of six thousand Indians, who

completely filled all the streets through which they had to pass. The

artillery was accompanied by a guard of thirty musqueteers and fifty

canoneers. The company of two hundred pikemen commanded by Diego de

Gumiel followed next. Then two companies of musqueteers, commanded by

the Captains Guevara and Pedro Cermeno, the former consisting of 150,

and the latter of 200 men. After these followed three companies of

infantry who preceded Gonzalo Pizarro as his body guards, who followed

on horseback in his coat of mail, over which he wore a robe of cloth of

gold. He was followed by three captains of cavalry: Don Pedro de Porto

Carrero in the middle carrying the royal standard belonging to his

troop, having Antonio de Altamirano on his right with the standard of

Cuzco, and Pedro de Puelles on his left with a standard of the arms of

Gonzalo Pizarro. The whole cavalry of the army brought up the rear in

regular order. In this array, the whole column of march moved towards

the house of the oydor Ortiz de Zarate, where the other judges were

assembled. Ortiz had feigned sickness, on purpose to avoid attending the

royal court of audience at the reception of Gonzalo, but his brethren

adjourned the sitting to his house on the occasion.

Leaving his cavalry drawn up in the great square, Gonzalo made his

appearance before the assembled judges, who received him in form, and

administered to him the oath as governor. From thence he proceeded to

the town house, where all the magistrates of the city were assembled,

and where he was received with all the usual solemnities. Having gone

through all the ceremonies, he retired to his own house, and the

lieutenant-general Carvajal dismissed the army to its quarters upon the

citizens, who were ordered to entertain them at free quarters. Gonzalo

Pizarro continued to reside in Lima, exercising his authority as

governor in all things pertaining to military affairs, without

interfering in the administration of justice, which he confided entirely

to the oydors, who held their sittings for that purpose in the house of

the treasurer Alfonso Riquelme. Immediately after assuming the office of

governor, Gonzalo sent Alfonso de Toro as his lieutenant to Cuzco, Pedro

de Fuentes to Arequipa, Francisco de Almendras to La Plata, and others

in the same quality to the other cities of Peru[10].

[Footnote 10: According to Garcilasso, the entry of Gonzalo Pizarro into

Lima was in October 1544, forty days after the deposition and

imprisonment of the viceroy. In the History of America, II. 373, this

event is dated on the 28th October.--E.]

As in the sequel of this history we shall have much to say respecting

Gonzalo Pizarro and his lieutenant-general Francisco de Carvajal, it may

be proper in this place to give a short account of the age, qualities,

and characters of these two men. At this period, Gonzalo Pizarro was

about forty years of age, large made and tall, well proportioned, of a

dark brown complexion, with a long black beard. He was well versant in

military affairs and took great delight in war, of which he endured the

labours and privations with much patient fortitude. He was an excellent

horseman; and though his genius was rather confined, and his language

vulgar, he could express his sentiments with sufficient clearness. He

was exceedingly remiss in keeping his secrets to himself, by which

weakness he often suffered much prejudice in his affairs and military

transactions. He was rather avaricious, and disliked much to give away

money; owing to which want of liberality his affairs frequently suffered

material injury. He was exceedingly amorous, not confining himself like

his brother the marquis to the native women, but gave much offence by

his intrigues among the Spanish ladies in Peru.

Francisco de Carvajal was a man of low descent, the son of a person

employed in collecting the tax on salt, and was born in the village of

Ragama near Arevala. He had served long in the wars of Italy under Count

Pedro de Navarre, having been in the battle of Pavia, where the king of

France was taken prisoner. On his return to Spain he was accompanied by

a lady of a good family, Donna Catalina de Leyton, to whom he was said

to be married; though most people believed otherwise, and some even

alleged she had been a nun. After his return to Spain, he lived for some

time at the commandry of Heliche, in the capacity of a steward; and went

afterwards into New Spain with the lady who passed for his wife. He was

for some time employed in Mexico, where he held some office; whence he

was sent by the viceroy of that kingdom to Peru, along with

reinforcements to the marquis Pizarro, at the time when the Indians

revolted, as formerly related. On this occasion, the marquis gave him

some lands and Indians at Cuzco, where he resided till the arrival of

the viceroy; when he was about to have returned into Spain with a

considerable sum which he had amassed from the Indians of his

repartimiento; but not being able to procure an opportunity, he had

remained in the country. When Gonzalo Pizarro assumed the government of

Peru, Carvajal was said to be eighty years of age. He was of the middle

stature, but very gross, full-faced, and high-complexioned. He was

skilled in warlike affairs, having had long experience, and was able to

undergo fatigue infinitely better than could have been expected at his

advanced age. He hardly ever quitted his armour, either by day or night;

and scarcely ever slept, except on a chair, leaning his head on his

hand. He was so much addicted to wine, that when he could not procure

such as was brought from Spain, he used to content himself with the

strong liquors made by the Indians, of which he drank more freely than

any other Spaniard. His disposition was addicted to cruelty, insomuch

that he frequently put people to death upon very slight grounds,

sometimes even without any reason at all, except merely under pretence

of keeping up proper military discipline. Even when ordering any

unfortunate persons to condign punishment, he was wont to crack his

jokes, and to pay them ironical compliments. He was a bad Christian, and

much addicted to impiety, as was manifest in all his words and actions;

and was prodigiously avaricious in the acquisition of money, for which

purpose he pillaged many of their wealth, by threatening to put them to

death, and then letting them free for a good round sum. He ended his

days in a miserable manner, with small hope of salvation, as will appear

in the sequel.

To return to the incidents of our history: Our readers may recollect

that Luis de Ribera, lieutenant governor in La Plata, and Antonio

Alvares alcalde or judge ordinary of that city, with most of its

inhabitants, had taken the field with the purpose of joining the

viceroy. After journeying a long way in the deserts without receiving

any intelligence of the events which were passing at Lima, they at

length learnt that the viceroy was deposed and that Gonzalo Pizarro had

usurped the government of Peru. As Ribera and Alvarez were the chief

leaders and instigators of the citizens of La Plata, they did not dare

to return to that city in the present situation of affairs, and took

therefore the resolution of seeking refuge among the Indians in the

inaccessible mountains. Some of their associates, however, ventured to

return to their city, while others went to Lima, where they obtained

pardon from Gonzalo; but he forfeited their lands and Indians, and sent

Francisco de Almendras to take possession of their repartimientos in his

name, as funds for reimbursing the expences of the war.

We must now advert to the deposed viceroy. After he had been set at

liberty by the oydor Alvarez, as has been already related, and the two

other vessels which carried his brother, friends, and servants, had

likewise submitted to his authority, he continued his voyage with all

the three ships to the port of Tumbez, where he and Alvarez landed,

leaving proper persons to take charge of the ships. Immediately on

landing, the viceroy and oydor began to exercise their respective

authorities, by constituting a royal audience, and proclamations were

dispersed through every part of the country, giving an account of the

illegal deposition and imprisonment of the viceroy and the usurpation of

Gonzalo, and commanding all faithful subjects of his majesty to join the

standard of the viceroy. He issued these orders to the cities of Quito,

San Miguel, Puerto Viejo, and Truxillo; and commissioned captains to go

to different places to raise troops; sending, among others, Jerom de

Pereira on this errand into the province of Bracamoras. In consequence

of these proceedings, many persons came to Tumbez to join his standard.

He applied himself likewise to collect provisions and ammunition,

strengthening his party as much as possible; and issued orders to

transmit to him all the money which was contained in the royal coffers,

which was obeyed in many places. Some of the inhabitants however, fled

into the mountains, being unwilling to attach themselves to either of

the parties which now divided the unhappy colony, while others went to

join Gonzalo Pizarro. Intelligence was soon carried to Gonzalo of the

arrival of the viceroy at Tumbez, and of his preparations for recovering

his authority, and some even of the proclamations and orders of the

viceroy were brought to him at Lima. Gonzalo was by no means negligent

in endeavouring to counteract the proceedings of the viceroy; for which

purpose he sent orders to Ferdinand de Alvarado, his lieutenant at

Truxillo, and the captains. Gonzalo Diaz and Jerom Villegas, to collect

as many soldiers as possible in that part of the country, lest they

might have gone to Tumbez to join the party of the viceroy. He commanded

these officers to give every possible interruption to the preparations

of the viceroy, yet ordered them on no account to risk coming to a

battle with the royalists, however powerful and numerous they might

conceive their troops to be in comparison with those of the viceroy.

It had been long proposed to send a deputation from Gonzalo and the

communities of Peru into Spain, to lay an account before his majesty of

all that had occurred in the colony; and many of the principal

insurgents insisted on the necessity of this measure, to justify their

conduct. Others again, among whom the principal persons were the

lieutenant-general Carvajal and Captain Bachicao, were of an opposite

opinion; insisting that it were better to wait till his majesty might

think proper to send out persons to inquire into the cause of his

revenues being detained. They alleged that the viceroy must have already

fully informed his majesty upon all the late transactions, and would

doubtless be listened to in preference to any thing which they could say

in defence of their conduct. On this account, the leaders of the

insurgents regretted that they had not at the first sent over the judges

of the royal audience into Spain, to give an account of their reasons

for having made the viceroy a prisoner. And, after many deliberations on

this subject, it was at length determined to send home the Doctor

Texada, one of the oydors, in the name of the royal audience, to lay an

account of the whole before the king. It was at the same time resolved,

that Francisco Maldonado, who was master of the household of Gonzalo

Pizarro, should accompany Texada, carrying justificatory letters from

his master; but without any title, credence, or powers whatever. By

these measures, two purposes were served at the same time, both of which

were deemed useful: In sending a deputation to the king to justify their

proceeding, those of their party who pressed that measure were

satisfied; and by employing Texada on this errand, the court of royal

audience was virtually broken up, as Ortiz de Zarate could not then hold

sittings by himself[11]. When this proposal was communicated to Texada,

he readily consented to undertake the office, on condition that he were

furnished with 6000 crowns to defray the expences of his voyage.

Accordingly, Cepeda and he composed all the memorials and dispatches

which were deemed necessary, which were signed by these two judges only,

as Ortiz refused his concurrence.

[Footnote 11: Zarate seems to forget the existence of Cepeda, one of the

judges; but he seems to have entirely devoted himself to the party of

the usurper, while Ortiz affected at least to retain a sense of

loyalty.--E.]

When all was in readiness for the dispatch of Texada and Maldonado, a

ship which lay in the harbour of Lima was ordered to be fitted out for

their reception, of which Captain Bachicao was to have taken the

command, with a sufficient number of cannon, and twenty soldiers; having

orders to take possession of all the ships he might fall in with along

the coast. At this time, Vaca de Castro, the ex-president, who still

remained a prisoner in this ship, contrived to gain over a majority of

the seamen belonging to the vessel, with the assistance of his friend

Garcia de Montalva who occasionally visited him. By these means he

acquired the command of the vessel, which was already provided with

every thing needful for the voyage, and immediately set sail. This

untoward incident gave much uneasiness to Gonzalo Pizarro, both because

it delayed the departure of Texada, and because he judged that it could

not have happened without the concurrence of several concealed enemies

to the present state of affairs. On this the troops were ordered under

arms, and all the principal persons who were suspected of disaffection

to the party of Pizarro were taken into custody and committed to the

common prison of the city, both those who had fled from Cuzco, and those

belonging to other cities who had not joined his party. One of the

persons committed to prison on this occasion was the licentiate

Carvajal, to whom the lieutenant-general Carvajal sent a message,

desiring him to confess and make his will, as he was immediately to be

put to death. The licentiate did accordingly what he was desired, and

prepared himself to die with much firmness and resolution; yet he was

urged to be more expeditious, and the executioner was present, provided

with cords for tying his hands and strangling him. Every one believed

the last hour of the licentiate was come; more especially as,

considering his rank and quality, it was not thought possible that he

could be treated in this manner merely to frighten him. It was likewise

universally believed, that the execution of the licentiate would be

speedily followed by that of all the other prisoners; which it was

conceived would prove of material detriment to the colony, as they

consisted of the very principal people of the country, and of those who

had always evinced the most zealous loyalty to the service of his

majesty.

While matters seemed fast tending to this extremity, several of the most

judicious persons went to Gonzalo Pizarro, and requested of him to

reflect that the licentiate Carvajal was one of the principal persons in

the country, and that his brother had been already unjustly put to

death by the viceroy, under pretence of the licentiate having joined the

party of Pizarro. They urged that it was exceedingly imprudent at this

time to put the licentiate to death, as that would necessarily renew the

discontents which had formerly taken place on the death of his brother

the commissary. They even added, that much good service might be

expected from the licentiate, were it only in pursuit of revenge for the

death of his brother. They insisted that neither the licentiate nor any

of the other prisoners had any hand in the flight of Vaca de Castro; but

that it might easily be seen that the slightest pretexts were resorted

to on purpose to accuse them, who were already under suspicion as

disaffected to the ruling party. Teased and fatigued by these

solicitations, Gonzalo Pizarro refused to be spoken to on the subject;

so that the licentiate and his friends were induced to try another

expedient for his release. They conveyed to the lieutenant-general an

ingot of gold weighing forty marks[12], with a promise of a much larger

present if he would save the life of the licentiate. The

lieutenant-general accepted their offers, delayed the execution of the

licentiate, and prevailed on Gonzalo Pizarro to set him and all the

other suspected persons at liberty.

[Footnote 12: The weight of this is 820 ounces, which at L. 4 an ounce

comes to L. 1280, and was then worth as much as L. 7680 is in efficient

value.--E]

After the conclusion of this business, measures were taken for the

dispatch of Texada and Maldonado; and at this time there happened to

arrive a brigantine from Arequipa, which was fitted out along with some

other vessels, and armed with a part of the artillery which had been

brought down from Cuzco. In these vessels Bachicao embarked along with

the deputies, accompanied by sixty musqueteers, who were all that could

be prevailed upon to undertake the voyage. They proceeded on their

voyage along the coast to the northwards, and arrived one morning early

at Tumbez, where they understood the viceroy then resided. Immediately

on their being perceived making for the coast, the adherents of the

viceroy gave the alarm and stood on their defence: But as the viceroy

believed that Gonzalo Pizarro was on board in person accompanied by a

formidable body of troops, he retired in all haste from Tumbez

accompanied by an hundred and fifty men, taking the road for Quito.

Several of his people however did not think fit to accompany his flight,

and preferred giving themselves up to Bachicao, who likewise took

possession of two ships which happened to be in the port of Tumbez. From

thence, Bachicao went to Puerto Viejo and other places, where he drew

together about an hundred and fifty men, all of whom he took along with

him in the ships of his squadron. Among these were Bartholomew Perez,

and Juan Delmos, respectable inhabitants of Puerto Viejo.

Continuing his voyage towards Panama, Bachicao put in at the Isle of

Pearls, about twenty leagues from Panama to procure refreshments. While

at that place, the inhabitants of Panama received notice of his arrival,

and sent two deputies to learn his intentions, requesting at the same

time that he would not come into their boundaries with his troops.

Bachicao sent back word, that although he happened to be accompanied by

armed men, it was merely on purpose to defend himself against the

viceroy, and that he had not the most distant intention of injuring or

even displeasing the inhabitants of Panama. He informed them, that he

was entrusted with the transport of the Doctor Texada, one of the royal

judges, who was charged with a commission from the court of audience to

give an account to his majesty of the events which had occurred in Peru.

He farther declared that he should only land in Panama to provide

necessaries for his voyage back to Peru, and would reimbark without

delay. Lulled into security by these assurances, the inhabitants of

Panama took no measures for defence. On coming into the port, two ships

which happened to be there, made sail to go away; one of which was taken

possession of by one of the brigantines belonging to Bachicao, and

brought back to the harbour, with the master and chief mate hanging from

the yard arms. This sad spectacle gave great uneasiness to the

inhabitants, who judged from this tragical event, that the purposes of

Bachicao were very different from his words and promises. But it was not

now time to think of defence, and they were constrained to submit,

though filled with terror and dismay, leaving their lives and properties

entirely at the discretion of Bachicao, who was no less cruel than the

lieutenant-general Carvajal, or even more so if possible; being at the

same time exceedingly addicted to cursing and blasphemy, and among all

his vices not a single spark of virtue could be found to relieve the

picture.

At this time Captain Juan de Gusman was in Panama raising soldiers for

the service of the viceroy; but he found it advisable to retire on the

arrival of Bachicao, with whom all these soldiers now inlisted. Bachicao

likewise got possession of the artillery which had belonged to the

vessel in which Vaca de Castro escaped from Lima. Seeing himself master

of Panama, Bachicao who was a brutal passionate fellow, exercised the

command there in a cruel and tyrannical manner, disposing at his will of

the goods and properties of every one, violating every rule of law and

justice, oppressing the liberties of the community, and holding every

individual under such slavish constraint, that no one dared to act

otherwise than as he pleased to dictate. Learning or suspecting that two

of his captains had formed the design of putting him to death, he

ordered them both to be beheaded without any form of trial; and in

similar acts of injustice, and in every transaction, he used no other

formality than ordering it to be intimated by the public crier, "That

Captain Ferdinand Bachicao had ordained such and such to be done." He

thus usurped supreme and absolute authority, paying not the smallest

regard to the laws, or even to the external forms of justice.

The licentiate Vaca de Castro, who was at Panama when Bachicao arrived,

fled immediately across the isthmus to Nombre de Dios on the Atlantic,

where he embarked accompanied by Diego Alvarez de Cueto and Jerom

Zurbano. Doctor Texada and Francisco Maldonado escaped likewise to the

same port, where they all embarked together for Spain. Texada died on

the voyage while passing the Bahamas. On their arrival in Spain,

Moldonado and Cueto went directly to Germany, where the emperor Don

Carlos then was, where each gave an account of the business with which

they were entrusted. Vaca de Castro remained for some time at Tercera in

the Azores; whence he went to Lisbon, and afterwards to the court of

Spain; alleging that he did not dare to go by way of Seville, on account

of the influence in that place of the brothers relations and friends of

Juan Tello, whom he had put to death after the defeat of the younger

Almagro. On his arrival at court, De Castro was put under arrest in his

own house by order of the council of the Indies. He was afterwards

brought to trial on a variety of accusations, in the course of which he

was kept prisoner for five years in the citadel of Arevalo. He was

afterwards removed to a private house in Simanca, from which he was not

permitted to go out: And in consequence of a subsequent revolution in

the court of Spain, he was allowed to remain a prisoner at large in the

city and territory of Valladolid, till his cause was finally adjuged

[13].

[Footnote 13: We learn from Garcilasso, that Vara de Castro was in the

end honourably acquitted, and that in the year 1461, when Garcilasso was

at Madrid, De Castro was senior member of the council of the Indies. His

son, Don Antonio, was made knight of St. Jago, and had a grant of lands

and Indians in Peru to the extent of 20,000 pieces of eight yearly.--E.]

On the flight of the viceroy from Tumbez with an hundred and fifty men,

as before related, in consequence of the arrival of Bachicao, he retired

to Quito, where he was honourably received. In this place he increased

his force to two hundred men, and finding the country fertile and

abounding in provisions, he determined to remain there till he might

receive ulterior orders from his majesty, in reply to the informations

he had transmitted by Diego Alvarez de Cueto. In the mean time he

appointed strong guards to defend the passes in the mountains, and

stationed spies on the different roads, that he might have early

intimation of the procedure of Gonzalo Pizarro at Lima, which is three

hundred leagues from Quito. About this time four soldiers belonging to

Gonzalo deserted on account of some injurious treatment, and seized a

small bark in the port of Lima, in which they sailed northwards to a

place where they landed, and whence they travelled by land to Quito. On

their arrival, they represented to the viceroy, that the inhabitants of

Lima and other places were exceedingly discontented by the conduct of

Gonzalo, who subjected them to the most harassing and vexatious tyranny,

driving them from their houses, and despoiling them of their goods, so

that many of the colonists were reduced to depend on other persons for

their subsistence. That Gonzalo imposed such burthensome contributions

on the whole inhabitants, that they were unable to endure them; and that

all were so weary of his tyranny, that they would gladly join any person

who might come among them in the name of the king, to relieve them from

the cruel oppression and tyrannous violence of the usurper. In

consequence of this statement, the viceroy was induced to march from

Quito towards San Miguel, appointing to the command of his troops one

Diego de Occampo, an inhabitant of Quito, who had joined him on his

arrival at Tumbez, and had expended large sums in his service from his

own private fortune.

The licentiate Alvarez always accompanied the viceroy, and these two

established themselves as the court of royal audience, in virtue of a

commission from his majesty which the viceroy still held. By this royal

order, the viceroy was authorised after his arrival at Lima, to hold

audience in conjunction with two or one of the oydors who might first

arrive, or even in case that any two or three of them should chance to

die. In pursuance of this authority, the viceroy ordered a new seal to

be made, which he committed to the custody of Juan de Leon, alcalde or

police judge of Lima, who had been nominated by the Marquis of Camarosa,

grand-chancellor of the Indies, as his deputy or chancellor of the

audience of Lima. De Leon had fled from Gonzalo Pizarro, and had joined

the viceroy at Quito. In consequence of this arrangement, the viceroy

issued such orders and proclamations as seemed needful or expedient, in

the name of the emperor Don Carlos; authenticating them with the royal

seal, and by the signatures of himself and the licentiate Alvarez. By

these means there were two royal audiences in Peru, one at the city of

Lima, and the other wherever the viceroy happened to reside; so that it

frequently happened that two opposite and contradictory decrees were

pronounced and promulgated, in one and the same cause.

On taking the resolution of marching from Quito, the viceroy sent his

brother-in-law, Diego Alvarez de Cueto, to inform his majesty of the

state of affairs, and to solicit such reinforcements as might enable him

to re-establish his authority in Peru, by waging war against Gonzalo

Pizarro. Cueto went accordingly to Spain in the same fleet with Vaca de

Castro and Texada, as already related. The viceroy advanced southwards

to San Miguel, which is an hundred and fifty leagues from Quito,

determining to remain at that place till he might receive farther orders

from his majesty. The inhabitants of San Miguel gave him the best

reception in their power, and furnished him as far as they were able

with every thing he was in want of. He continually kept his small army

on foot, to preserve the honour and reputation of his character as

viceroy, and that he might be in a convenient situation for receiving

such reinforcements as might come from Spain or from any of the American

colonies; as every one coming by land from these quarters must

necessarily pass by the way of San Miguel, especially if accompanied by

horses or beasts of burthen. He expected therefore to be able in this

place to collect reinforcements to his army, so as to be in condition to

renew the war, and employed himself to collect men, horses, and arms, so

that he was soon at the head of five hundred men, tolerably equipped.

Some of these indeed were in want of defensive armour, which they

endeavoured to supply by fabricating cuirasses of iron, and of hard

leather.

At the time when Gonzalo Pizarro sent Bachicao with the brigantines to

get possession of the ships belonging to the viceroy, he dispatched

Gonzalo Diaz de Pinera and Jerom de Villegas to collect the soldiers who

dwelt in Truxillo and San Miguel, that they might make head against the

viceroy in the north of Peru. These officers remained in San Miguel with

about eighty men whom they had drawn to their party, till they heard of

the approach of the viceroy; on which, not being in sufficient force to

oppose him, they retreated towards Truxillo, and established themselves

in the province of _Collique_, about forty leagues[14] from San Miguel.

From thence they sent intimation to Gonzalo of the advance of the

viceroy, and that his army increased daily in numbers, insomuch that it

behoved him to think of some appropriate measures to avert the

threatened danger. Diaz and Villegas were likewise informed that the

viceroy had sent Juan de Pereira, one of his officers, into the province

of Chachapoyas, in which there were very few Spanish settlers, to

endeavour to collect reinforcements. As they believed that Pereira and

his followers entertained no suspicions of their being in the

neighbourhood, Diaz and Villegas determined on attempting to surprize

them, which they did so effectually one night, that they made the whole

party prisoners without resistance. Having beheaded Pereira and two of

his principal followers, they obliged the rest of the party, about sixty

horsemen, to enter into the service of Gonzalo, by threats of putting

them all to death if they refused; after which they returned to their

post.

[Footnote 14: The distance in the text is probably a mistake for

_fourteen_ leagues, as about that distance to the S.E. of San Miguel

there is a river named _Chola_, which may have given name to the

district or valley in which it runs.--E.]

The viceroy was greatly incensed by this untoward event, and determined

to seek an opportunity of revenge. With this view he departed secretly

from San Miguel with a body of an hundred and fifty horse, and took such

judicious measures that he arrived one night undiscovered at _Collique,_

where he surprized the enemy, and obliged them to fly in all directions.

Diaz made his escape almost alone into a district inhabited by hostile

Indians, who assailed him and put him to death. Villegas and Ferdinand

Alvarado were more fortunate in their escape, as they were able to

collect some of their dispersed troops, with whom they took up a new and

more secure position not far from Truxillo, and at a safer distance from

San Miguel.

As Gonzalo Pizarro was informed that the viceroy augmented his army

from time to time, more especially after this successful enterprize, he

resolved to march against him without delay; as hardly a day passed in

which the viceroy was not joined by soldiers, horses, and arms from

Spain, or some of the American colonies, all of which were landed at the

port of Tumbez. He was likewise in dread lest some dispatch might arrive

from the emperor, favourable to the viceroy, by which his own adherents

might be intimidated, and numbers might be induced to change sides. With

this view he assembled his army, determined to march in person against

the viceroy, and if possible to bring him to action. He issued therefore

the proper orders to all his officers, reviewed and mustered his troops,

advanced them the necessary funds for taking the field, and sent off the

baggage, artillery, ammunition and provisions, with the main body of the

army towards Truxillo, remaining behind at Lima with some of his

principal officers, to follow in proper time. About this time a vessel

arrived from Arequipa with a very seasonable supply of 100,000 crowns;

and another vessel from Tierra Firma, belonging to Gonzalo Martel, sent

by his wife to enable him to return home. The arrival of these two

vessels was very opportune for Gonzalo Pizarro, as they served to

transport great quantities of musquets, pikes, ammunition, and other

implements of war, together with a guard of an hundred and fifty men,

and greatly facilitated the intended expedition against the viceroy.

On quitting Lima, Gonzalo Pizarro thought proper to take the oydor

Cepeda and Juan de Caceres the accountant-general along with him, both

to give the more eclat and appearance of legal authority to his

measures, and on purpose to break up the court of royal audience, as

Ortiz de Zarate would then be the only judge remaining at Lima, who was

not thought of much importance, as he was in bad health. Besides, Blas

de Soto, his brother, had married the daughter of that judge; and

although that marriage had been effected contrary to the wish of Ortiz,

it was considered as some tie upon his conduct. For greater security,

however, Gonzalo used the precaution of carrying the royal seal along

with him. Gonzalo Pizarro chose to go by sea; and on leaving Lima, he

appointed Lorenzo de Aldana as lieutenant-governor of that city, with a

garrison of eighty soldiers, to preserve tranquillity during his

absence. This small number was considered sufficient to prevent any

attempt towards a revolutionary movement, as most of the inhabitants of

Lima accompanied the expedition. Gonzalo embarked in March 1545, and

landed at the port of Santa, fifteen leagues south from Truxillo, at

which city he arrived on Palm Sunday. He remained at this place for some

time, waiting the junction of his troops, sending messages in various

directions to expedite their march. After some time, he marched from

Truxillo into the province of Collique, where the whole of his army

assembled. At this place he reviewed his army, which amounted to above

six hundred horse and foot. The troops under the viceroy were nearly as

numerous; but those under Gonzalo were much better armed, and better

supplied with every thing requisite for war, as well as being all

veteran soldiers, accustomed to war and discipline, and well acquainted

with all the difficult passes of the country. The troops of the viceroy

on the contrary, had for the most part come recently from Spain, were

quite unaccustomed to war, and ill armed; besides which their powder was

bad in quality.

Gonzalo used every effort to collect provisions and all kinds of

necessaries for his army, more especially as he had to pass through a

desert country which intervened between the province of Motupe[15] and

the city of San Miguel, a distance of twenty-two leagues without any

inhabitants, and entirely destitute of water or other means of

refreshment, consisting every where of burning sands without shelter

from the heat of the sun and almost under the equinoctial line. As this

march was necessarily attended with much inconvenience and difficulty,

Gonzalo used every proper precaution that his troops might be supplied

abundantly with water and other necessaries. For this purpose all the

neighbouring Indians were ordered to bring a prodigious quantity of jars

and other vessels calculated to contain water. The soldiers were ordered

to leave at Motupe all their clothes and baggage of which they were not

in immediate want, which were to be brought forward by the Indians.

Above all things, it was taken care that a sufficiency of water should

accompany the army, both for the troops, and for the horses and other

animals. Every thing being in readiness, Gonzalo sent forwards a party

of twenty-five horsemen by the ordinary road through the desert, that

they might be observed by the scouts belonging to the viceroy, and that

he might be led to believe the army came in that direction. He then took

a different route through the same desert with the army, marching as

expeditiously as possible, every soldier being ordered to carry his

provisions along with him on his horse. By these precautions, and the

rapidity of the march, the viceroy was not informed of the approach of

Gonzalo and his army, till they were very near San Miguel. Immediately

on learning their approach, he sounded the alarm, giving out that he

intended to meet and give battle to the insurgents; but as soon as his

army was drawn out from the city, he took a quite opposite course,

directing his march with all possible expedition towards the mountain of

Caxas.

[Footnote 15: Named Morrope in modern maps. The desert in the text is of

great extent, reaching from the river Leche to the Piura, a distance of

above eighty English miles.]

Gonzalo Pizarro got notice of the retreat of the viceroy about four

hours afterwards, in consequence of which he made no halt at San Miguel,

except to procure guides to direct him in the road which the viceroy had

taken. In the first night of this pursuit, the army of Gonzalo marched

eight Spanish leagues, or near thirty English miles, and several of the

royalists who had lagged behind the rest, together with the whole

baggage belonging to the retreating army fell into his hands. Gonzalo

hanged such of his prisoners as were most obnoxious to him, and

continued the pursuit of the flying royalists with the utmost diligence,

through difficult and almost impracticable roads, where no provisions

could be procured, always coming up with some of the hindmost of the

enemy. Gonzalo likewise sent on several Indians with letters to the

principal officers who served under the viceroy, urging them to put him

to death, and offering them their pardons for the past and to give them

high rewards. He continued the pursuit above fifty leagues or two

hundred miles, till at length the horses were no longer able to carry

their riders, and the men were incapable of proceeding, both from

excessive fatigue and by the failure of provisions. The insurgent army

at length arrived at Ayabaca[16], where the hot pursuit of the viceroy

was discontinued, and the troops of Gonzalo halted for rest and

refreshment. Besides the difficulty of overtaking the royalists, Gonzalo

had received assurances from some of the principal followers of the

viceroy that they would either put him to death, or deliver him up as a

prisoner; and, as this came afterwards to the knowledge of the viceroy,

he put several of these officers and gentlemen of his army to death.

After Gonzalo had supplied his army with such provisions as could be

furnished at Ayabaca, he resumed the pursuit, but with less rapidity

than before, and keeping his army always in compact order; yet at this

time some of his troops remained behind, partly owing to extreme

fatigue, and partly from discontent. Leaving the viceroy to continue

his retreat to Quito, and Gonzalo in pursuit, it is proper to mention

some events that occurred at this time in other parts of Peru.

[Footnote 16: Notwithstanding the distance mentioned in the text,

Ayabaca is only about 60 miles, or fifteen Spanish leagues in a straight

line N.N.E. from San Miguel.--E.]

In this march, Gonzalo did not think proper to carry along with his army

any of the soldiers belonging to the viceroy whom he had taken during

the pursuit, both because he could not confide in them, because he had

already a sufficient force in proportion to the enemy, and because

provisions were very difficult to be procured, as the viceroy had

stripped every place through which he passed as much as possible. For

this reason, Gonzalo Pizarro sent back all his prisoners to Truxillo,

Lima, or such other places as they thought proper, having in the first

place put to death such of their chiefs as he considered most strongly

attached to the viceroy. As these soldiers were dispersed over several

parts of the country, they began to declaim in favour of the viceroy and

against the tyrannical conduct of Gonzalo, and found many persons

abundantly disposed to listen to their harangues; both because what they

alleged was true in itself, and because most of the Spanish inhabitants

of Peru were much inclined to revolution and change of party, especially

the soldiery and those who were lazy and unoccupied. The real settlers

and principal inhabitants of the cities were quite of an opposite

description, being friends of peace and order, as most conducive to

their interest and happiness, and necessary to the preservation of their

properties, and being more exposed in time of civil war than even the

soldiers to be harassed and tormented in many ways, as the ruling party

was apt on the slightest pretexts to put them to death on purpose to

seize their effects, with which to gratify and reward the partizans of

their tyranny and injustice. These seditious discourses were so openly

indulged in, that they reached the knowledge of the lieutenants of

Gonzalo; who, each in his peculiar jurisdiction, punished the authors as

they deemed right. At Lima, to which most of these prisoners had gone,

Pedro Martin de Cecilia the provost marshal was a violent partizan of

Gonzalo, and caused several of these malecontents to be hanged. Lorenzo

de Aldana, who had been left by Gonzalo as lieutenant-governor of Lima,

was a prudent man, and conducted himself in a quite different manner,

being disinclined from acting with such violence as might occasion

displeasure to either party in the sequel; for which reason he used all

his influence to prevent putting any one to death, or from injuring any

person in any manner. Although he held his office from Gonzalo, he never

exerted himself zealously in his service, so that the partizans of that

usurper considered him as secretly gained by the other party, more

especially as he always behaved well to the known friends of the

viceroy. On this account, all these men flocked to Lima, where they

believed themselves in greater security than anywhere else. The

partizans of Gonzalo, on the other hand, made loud complaints against

the favourable behaviour of Aldana to the royalists; and in particular

one of the alcaldes of Lima, named Christopher de Burgos, spoke of it so

openly that Aldana thought it necessary to give him a public reprimand,

and even committed him to prison for some time. Several even went so far

as to communicate their suspicions of the fidelity of Aldana to Gonzalo

Pizarro by letters, and even persuaded him of the truth of their

allegations: But he refrained from manifesting his want of confidence in

the lieutenant-governor, considering it dangerous to deprive him of his

office while the army was at so great a distance, more especially as

Aldana had a respectable military force, and was much esteemed by the

citizens of Lima.

We have formerly mentioned that several inhabitants of the city of La

Plata in the province of Las Charcas, on receiving orders to that effect

from the viceroy, had set out from that city on purpose to offer him

their services against Gonzalo; but having learnt his imprisonment while

on their way to Lima, they returned to their habitations. Gonzalo

Pizarro was particularly displeased with these men, as he expected to

have been especially favoured by the inhabitants of his own peculiar

district, and sent therefore a person named Francisco de Almendras as

lieutenant-governor to La Plata, a coarse brutal fellow without feeling

or humanity, and one of the most cruel satellites of his tyrannical

usurpation; whom he instructed to be peculiarly watchful of the

behaviour of those who had shewn an intention of joining the viceroy,

and to make them feel on every opportunity how much he was dissatisfied

with their conduct on that occasion. In pursuance of his instructions,

Almendras deprived the principal persons among these loyalists of their

lands and Indians, and exacted heavy contributions from them towards

defraying the expences of the war. He likewise affronted and used them

ill on all occasions, and even on very frivolous pretences. One Don

Gomez de Luna, a principal person among the loyalists of La Plata,

happened one day to observe in conversation at his own house, that the

emperor Don Carlos must assuredly at length recover the command over

Peru. This loyal sentiment was reported to Almendras, who immediately

ordered De Luna to be arrested and thrown into the common prison. The

magistrates of the city went in a body to supplicate Almendras either to

liberate De Luna, or at least to confine him in a place more conformable

to his rank; and as Almendras refused to give a satisfactory answer to

their representation, one of the magistrates declared publicly, that, if

he would not liberate de Luna, they would do so in spite of him.

Almendras dissembled his sentiments at the time, but went next night to

the prison, whence he caused De Luna to be taken out to the public

square and beheaded.

The inhabitants of the city were exceedingly disgusted by this cruel act

of tyranny, which they considered as an outrage against the whole

community; and particularly one Diego Centeno was most sensibly

affected, as he and De Luna had been extremely intimate. At the

commencement of the troubles respecting the obnoxious regulations,

Centeno had attached himself to Gonzalo Pizarro, whom he had accompanied

to Cuzco, in the capacity of procurator from the province of Las

Charcas, being one of the principal persons of his party. Having noticed

the bad intentions of Pizarro, and that he did not limit his designs to

those objects which he at first proposed, Centeno abandoned the party of

Gonzalo and returned to his own house. He now determined to use his

utmost endeavours to revenge the cruel death of his friend De Luna, that

he might save himself and others from the tyrannous rule of Almendras,

and on purpose to restore the country to obedience to its legitimate

sovereign. With this view, he communicated his sentiments to some of the

principal settlers, among whom were Lopez de Mendoza, Alfonso Perez de

Esquivel, Alfonzo de Camargo, Fernando Nunnez de Segura, Lopez de

Mendiera, Juan Ortiz de Zarate, and several others whom he believed to

have loyal intentions, all of whom he found disposed to second him in

executing the enterprize which he had in view. In the prosecution of

this purpose, they all assembled one Sunday morning, according to

custom, at the house of Almendras, under pretence of accompanying him

to church. When all were assembled, although Almendras had a

considerable guard, Ceuteno went up to him as if to converse on some

affair of moment, and stabbed him repeatedly with his dagger. The

conspirators then dragged him out to the public square and cut off his

head, declaring him a traitor, and proclaiming that they had done so for

the service of the king.

Considering that Almendras was universally detested, the conspirators

had not thought it necessary to use any precautions for conciliating the

people; yet all the inhabitants declared for the king, and took

immediate measures to support his authority and to defend themselves

against the resentment of Gonzalo and the insurgents. For this purpose,

they elected Centeno as commander in chief of the province; in which

capacity he appointed proper persons to be captains of cavalry and

infantry under his authority, and used every effort to inlist a body of

troops, which he paid out of his own funds, being one of the richest men

in the country; but in this he was assisted by the other inhabitants of

the province, who contributed towards the expence. Centeno was of an

honourable family, being descended from Hernan Centeno who had made

himself illustrious in the wars of Castillo. He was about thirty-five

years of age, of very agreeable manners, of a liberal disposition,

personally brave, of an excellent character and universally respected.

At this time he enjoyed a revenue exceeding 80,000 crowns; but about two

years afterwards, on the discovery of the famous mines of Potosi, he

became possessed of above 100,000 crowns of annual rent by means of his

Indians, as his estate lay very near these mines.

Having assembled a body of troops, Centeno used every effort to provide

them with arms and all other necessary equipments. He placed guards at

all the passes, to prevent any intelligence from being conveyed to the

enemy till his affairs were in proper order. He sent likewise Lopez de

Mendoza one of his captains, first to Porco and thence to Arequipa to

collect as many men as possible, and to endeavour to arrest Pedro do

Puentes the lieutenant of Gonzalo at Arequipa. But Puentes fled

immediately from Arequipa on receiving intelligence of the events which

had occurred at Las Charcas. Mendoza therefore took possession of

Arequipa without resistance; whence he reinforced himself with all the

men, arms, and horses, he could procure, and carried off all the money

he could find, with which and his reinforcement he returned to Centeno

at La Plata.

On the return of Mendoza, Centeno found himself at the head of two

hundred and fifty men well equipped for war, to whom he explained his

sentiments and views, and gave an account of the criminal usurpation of

Gonzalo Pizarro, in the following terms. "You know that Gonzalo, on

leaving Cuzco, pretended merely to present the humble remonstrances of

the colonists respecting the obnoxious regulations; and you have been

informed that, even at the outset, he put to death Gaspard de Roias,

Philip Gutierrez, and Arias Maldonado. You have learnt how he conspired

with the judges of the royal audience and other inhabitants of Lima, to

arrest and depose the viceroy, both of which were done accordingly.

After this, while at the very gates of Lima, and before his public entry

into that city, he sent in his lieutenant-general, who arrested many of

the most considerable and richest inhabitants of the country, under the

eyes of the judges, merely because these men had joined the viceroy, and

even hanged three of them without any form of trial, Pedro de Barco,

Martin de Florencia, and Juan Saavedra. He in the next place has broken

up the royal court of audience, sending off its judges to different

places, having in the first place obliged them to appoint him to the

government. He has since, as you well know, caused many others to be put

to death, merely on suspicion that they were favourable to the viceroy,

and intended to join his party. Not satisfied with all this, he has

seized all the treasure belonging to his majesty in the different

receipts of the colony, and has imposed excessive contributions on the

inhabitants, from whom he has exacted above 150,000 ducats by means of

taxes imposed at his own pleasure. Adding crime to crime, he has again

levied forces against the authority of his majesty, with which he has

marched against the viceroy, and has carried insubordination and

confusion into every part of the country; permitting and encouraging

many to hold public discourse contrary to the respect and obedience

which is due to his majesty. They were likewise aware, that Gonzalo had

token away the repartimientos, or allotments of lands and Indians from

many persons, and had converted them to his own emolument. Finally, he

laid before them the strong obligations by which they were all bound, as

faithful subjects, to exert their utmost endeavours in the service of

their sovereign, lest they should draw upon themselves the imputation of

being rebels and traitors." By these representations, and others which

it were tedious to repeat, he disposed his auditors to concur in his

loyal sentiments, and willingly to obey his orders. After this, Centeno

sent one of his captains with a detachment to Chicuito, a place

belonging particularly to the king, between Orcaza and Las Charcas, with

orders to guard the passes with the utmost vigilance, till he and the

royalists were in full readiness to execute their principal enterprize,

as will be related in the sequel.

Notwithstanding every precaution employed by Centeno to conceal his

operations and intentions, it was impossible to prevent intelligence

from spreading in various directions, more especially after the

expedition of Mendoza to Arequipa. Every thing he had already done, even

the number of his troops, and of the musquets and horses he had

collected, was fully known, by means of Indians and Spaniards who had

escaped from La Plata, in spite of the guards which had been set, to

watch the passes of the mountains. Alfonso de Toro, who acted as

lieutenant governor of Cuzco under Gonzalo Pizarro, happened at this

time to be a hundred leagues to the northward of that city, keeping

guard in one of the passes of the mountains, as by letters from Gonzalo

the viceroy was reported to have gone into the mountainous country, and

was supposed to have directed his march by that road toward the south of

Peru. On receiving notice of the late revolution at La Plata, De Toro

returned in all diligence to Cuzco, where he levied forces to oppose

Centeno; and, having assembled the magistrates and principal inhabitants

of Cuzco, he informed them of what had occurred at Las Charcas, and as

there was a sufficient force in Cuzco to suppress the royalists, he

thought it incumbent on him to march to La Plata for that purpose. To

gain them over to his purpose, he represented that Centeno had revolted

without any just cause, and had usurped authority in Las Charcas for his

own private ends, under pretence of serving the king; whereas Gonzalo

Pizarro, being actual governor of the kingdom of Peru, ought to be

obeyed as such till his majesty sent orders to the contrary. That the

revolt of Centeno, being both criminal in itself and contrary to the

law, every one was bound to resist him, and to punish his temerity. He

recalled to their remembrance, that Gonzalo Pizarro was engaged in

serving the general interest of the colonists, to procure the revocation

of the obnoxious ordinances, in which common cause he had exposed his

fortune and personal safety to every hazard, as it was well known that

every inhabitant of Peru would be stripped of his property if the

regulations were put in force. That besides the general advantage

procured by Gonzalo in setting aside the obnoxious regulations, for

which all were infinitely indebted to him, it was obvious that he had

not in any respect conducted himself contrary to the royal orders, and

had not in any manner set himself against the authority of the

sovereign; since, on his arrival at Lima for the purpose of presenting

their remonstrances, the judges of the royal audience had already

arrested the viceroy and sent him out of the kingdom, of which these

judges had appointed Gonzalo interim governor; and that in marching in a

warlike manner against the viceroy, he had acted at the request and by

the orders of the royal audience; as was manifest by his being

accompanied by Cepeda, one of the royal judges and chairman of the

audience. He asserted that no person in Peru could take upon him to

determine whether the audience had acted right or otherwise in

conferring the government on Gonzalo; and that it was the duty of all to

support him in that office, till they received the ulterior orders of

the sovereign.

At the close of this discourse, every one acknowledged the justice of

what he had represented, and voluntarily offered to support Gonzalo with

their lives and fortunes; although in reality most of them did so more

from fear than good will, as they stood in great awe of De Toro, who had

hanged several persons in a summary manner, and had made himself

universally dreaded by his cruel and ferocious disposition and conduct,

so that no one dared to oppose or contradict him in any thing. After a

short deliberation, a set of resolutions were entered into, in which the

transactions of Centeno in Las Charcas were recited as seditious and

unlawful, and he was declared to have assassinated Francisco de

Almendras, the lieutenant governor, to have levied forces in rebellion

against the legitimate government, and to have passed the boundaries of

the province of Las Charcas in hostile manner; for all which reasons it

was just and proper to make war upon him, and to reduce him to

obedience. All this was done principally to satisfy or to amuse the

people, and to make them believe that the partizans of Gonzalo acted

reasonably and lawfully, as all those who signed these resolutions were

perfectly aware of the real state of affairs. In reality, although

matters were thus represented in the popular assemblages, in

justification of the measures of the insurgent party, or at least to

excuse their actions under specious pretences, those who took an active

part on the present occasion, used often to declare, both in the

presence and absence of Gonzalo, that the king would certainly give, or

ought to give him the government of Peru, as they were resolved not to

receive any other person in that capacity, such being the resolution of

Gonzalo in which they all concurred.

Alfonso de Toro now proceeded to levy an army, of which he declared

himself captain general and commander in chief, and appointed captains

and other officers to command under his authority. In all his

proceedings he carried himself with a high hand, employing force and

violence, instead of persuasion and good treatment. He protested

publickly and with many oaths, that he would hang up every one who did

not assist and contribute to the cause; and even had several persons

carried to the foot of the gallows, whose lives he was induced to spare

by dint of solicitations. He abused and maltreated others, using

everyone in the most outrageous manner who did not give way to him in

all things. By this violent procedure he completed his warlike

preparations at very small expence; insomuch that it appeared afterwards

by his accounts, that he had not expended above twenty thousand crowns

in this expedition, as he took away gratuitously all the horses that

were to be found in Cuzco, and constrained all the inhabitants who were

able to carry arms to accompany him in the expedition against Centeno.

By these means De Toro collected three hundred men, tolerably armed and

equipped, with which he marched from Cuzco to a place named Urcos, about

six leagues from that city, where he remained three weeks in anxious

expectation of intelligence from Las Charcas: But all the roads and

passes between and La Plata, were so well guarded by the Indians, who

were entirely disposed to favour Centeno, that he was unable to learn

any thing of the movements or intentions of the royalists in Las

Charcas, so that he was constrained to remain continually on the alert

lest he might have been surprized. Besides these military precautions,

he rigorously punished all who presumed to show the slightest

disinclination towards the interest of the Pizarrian faction, or to

express their sentiments in any respect in disapprobation of his own

designs; insomuch that all were constrained from dread of punishment to

appear heartily attached to the cause in which he was engaged.

After remaining three weeks encamped at Urcos, he determined to march in

search of Centeno, and advanced for that purpose to the village named

Del Rey. As the troops of Centeno happened to be a good deal scattered

at this time, he was under the necessity of retreating on the approach

of De Toro. These hostile chiefs being encamped at the distance of about

twelve leagues, entered into a negotiation to endeavour to form an

accommodation; but, as they were unable to agree upon any terms, De Toro

advanced for the purpose of attacking Centeno; who, on the other hand,

was unwilling to risk the chance of an engagement, owing to the

inferiority of his force, and because a defeat might have dispirited his

own party and have been of great advantage to the cause of the

insurgents. On this account he retired in proportion as De Toro

advanced, accompanied by a great number of large Peruvian sheep loaded

with provisions and ammunition, and carrying along with him all the

principal _curacas_ or native chiefs, to prevent De Toro from being able

to avail himself of the assistance of the Indians. In this manner

Centeno continued to retreat across a desert and uninhabited country of

forty leagues extent, till he arrived at a place named _Casabindo_,

through which Diego de Roias had formerly descended from the elevated

region of Peru into the eastern plain of the Rio de la Plata. Alfonso de

Toro continued the pursuit as far as the city of La Plata, which is an

hundred and eighty leagues to the south of Cuzca. Finding that place

abandoned and entirely stript of every thing which might contribute to

the subsistence of his troops, and being unable to procure provisions on

account of the absence of all the curacas or caciques, he was under the

necessity to discontinue his pursuit of Centeno, and even found himself

compelled to return towards Cuzco. In this retreat, De Toro took the

command of the advanced guard of fifty men, ordering the main body to

march at leisure, and left a rear-guard of thirty of his best mounted

cavalry under Alfonso de Mendoza, with orders to use every possible

means of procuring intelligence of the motions of Centeno; that, in case

of his following, the troops might be collected together in good order

to rejoin the van.

The departure of De Toro from La-Plata on his return to Cuzco was soon

communicated to Centeno by means of the Indians. He was astonished at

this sudden alteration of affairs; and, as he understood that De Toro

marched in great hast, without keeping his troops in close array, he

supposed that circumstance to have been occasioned by De Toro

entertaining suspicions of the fidelity of his followers, and that he

had found them ill-disposed towards the party of the Pizarrians. On

these considerations, Centeno resolved to pursue in his turn, in hope of

drawing some advantage to the cause in which he was engaged from this

measure, and even expecting that several of the followers of Toro might

come over to his side. He sent off therefore the captain Lope de Mendoza

with fifty light armed cavalry in pursuit of the enemy. Mendoza got in a

short time to Collao; and, although de Toro and most of his troops had

already passed beyond that place, he made prisoners of about fifty who

remained behind, whom at first he deprived of their horses and arms.

Soon afterwards, however, he returned these to his prisoners, and even

distributed some money among them, receiving their engagements upon oath

to join him when required; but he hanged a few of them who were

suspected of being particulary attached to De Toro. After this

successful exploit, Lope returned in great haste to La Plata, in hope of

being able to cut off Alfonzo de Mendoza and his small party, who still

occupied that place. But Alfonzo had received intelligence of what had

happened at Collao, and had already quitted La Plata in great haste,

taking a different road from that pursued by Lope, by which means he got

safe to Cuzco.

Centeno arrived soon afterwards at La Plata with the remainder of his

troops, where he assembled all the force under his command, and where he

made every possible preparation for continuing the war to advantage, and

in particular caused a number of musquets to be made. De Toro continued

his retreat to Cuzco, dreading much to be pursued, and lest Centeno

might have acquired possession of Cuzco, which he might easily have

accomplished in the present situation of affairs; but Centeno thought it

more prudent to remain at La Plata, where he augmented the number of his

troops and collected treasure which was found in great plenty in the

province of Las Charcas.

The events which had taken place in Las Charcas were soon known at

Lima; and as several of the soldiers in that city were attached to the

party of the viceroy, they spoke almost openly of going away to join

Centeno; and, from the small attention paid by Lorenzo de Aldana to

repress these men, he was even suspected of favouring the same cause.

Antonio de Ribera likewise, although the brother-in-law of Pizarro, was

strongly suspected of being secretly devoted to the royal interest, as

indeed his conduct in the sequel evinced; and several other persons of

consideration lay under suspicions of the same nature. All this gave

much uneasiness to the friends of Pizarro: Yet those persons at Lima who

wished well to the interests of his majesty, did not think it prudent at

this time to make any open attempt, being satisfied that it was better

to wait a more favourable opportunity, and that De Aldana would prepare

matters for that purpose, as he seemed clearly favourable to the same

cause. His abilities were universally acknowledged, and his good

intentions were not doubted, so that all were satisfied that he would

conduct matters with much prudence to a favourable issue.

At this time it became known at Lima that the viceroy had retreated with

a small body of troops into the province of Popayan; and that during his

retreat he had put to death several of the officers and other persons of

consideration in his army; among whom were Rodrigo de Ocampo, Jerom de

la Cerna, Gaspard Gil Olivarez and Gomez Estacio; some of these because

they were inclined to abandon him, and others for corresponding with

Gonzalo Pizarro, and conspiring to put the viceroy to death. On the

communication of this intelligence at Lima, it produced different

effects according to the different inclinations and views of the

inhabitants. It occasioned more reserve among those who were of loyal

dispositions; whereas the partizans of the Pizarrian tyranny considered

themselves more at liberty to avow their sentiments to Aldana. They went

therefore to him in a body, and represented that there were many persons

in Lima who were strongly suspected of being hostile to Gonzalo Pizarro,

and only waited a favourable opportunity to take up arms against him;

and that it was incumbent therefore on the lieutenant governor to punish

these men for the scandalous freedoms in which they had indulged, or at

least to banish them from the city. They offered to furnish sufficient

proof of these facts, and urged him to exert his authority on the

occasion. Aldana assured them that none of these things had ever come

to his knowledge; and that if he knew who those were against whom they

complained, he would take such measures as were necessary on the

occasion.

The partizans of Pizarro became at length so bold that they arrested

fifteen of those whom they most strongly suspected of attachment to the

deposed viceroy, among whom was Diego Lopez de Zuniga. Having thrown

these men into prison, the Pizarrians were inclined to have given them

the torture to extort confession, and afterwards to have procured their

condemnation by Pedro Martin the provost marshal of the city; so that

they were in imminent danger of being put to death, if Lorenzo de Aldana

had not exerted himself promptly and effectually to take them out of the

hands of the Pizarrians. For this purpose, he caused them all to be

brought to his own residence, on pretence that they would be there in

more safe custody, and provided them with every thing of which they

stood in need, even secretly furnishing them with a vessel in which they

embarked and saved themselves from their enemies. This transaction gave

much dissatisfaction to the friends of Pizarro, both on account of the

escape of the prisoners, and because Aldana refused to allow of any

formal investigation into the circumstances of their escape; on which

account the Pizarrians firmly believed that Aldana was in secret league

with the opposite party. They wrote therefore to Gonzalo Pizarro, giving

him an account of all these events, and urging him to give proper orders

on the occasion. But Gonzalo did not think it prudent at this time to

make any change in affairs at Lima, or to attempt any thing against

Aldana; because, as it has been reported, he was afraid of matters

taking an unfavourable issue while he was at so great a distance.

When Gonzalo Pizarro was informed of what had been done by Centeno in

the province of Las Charcas against his interest and authority, he

believed it necessary to use prompt measures for reducing that country

to subjection, and not to give his enemies time and opportunity for

strengthening themselves and increasing the number of their partizans;

as he flattered himself that he would become absolute master of the

whole kingdom of Peru, if he were able to get rid of Centeno. After

several consultations with the principal officers of his army, on the

measures necessary to be pursued on this emergency, in which Gonzalo

could not act in person as he had still to oppose the viceroy in the

north, it was determined to confide the care of an expedition against

Centeno to the lieutenant-general Carvajal. For this purpose all the

necessary orders and commissions were made out immediately in the name

of Gonzalo Pizarro, by which Carvajal was authorized to levy what men

and money he might deem necessary. This employment was very acceptable

to Carvajal, as he believed he might derive considerable profit to

himself in its execution; and he set out from Quito accompanied only by

twenty persons, in whom he had great confidence. The council of Gonzalo

Pizarro had other and secret motives for recommending the employment of

Carvajal on this occasion, besides those which they publickly avowed.

Some were desirous of acquiring by his absence a greater share in the

management of affairs; while others were anxious to send him to a

distance, from the terror inspired by his cruel and ferocious conduct,

and his passionate temper, owing to which he used often to put people to

death on the most trifling offences or the slightest suspicions. But all

the leaders in the army disguised their real sentiments on this

occasion, pretending that the importance of the affair required the

talents and experience of Carvajal to bring it to a successful issue.

Leaving Quito, Carvajal went, directly to San Miguel, where the

principal inhabitants went out to meet him, and conducted him with much

respect to the house which was prepared for his reception. On arriving

there, he desired six of the most considerable persons belonging to the

city to dismount and accompany him into the house, under pretence that

he had something of importance to communicate to them from the governor.

Having caused the doors to be shut, and posted centinels to prevent any

communication with the rest of the inhabitants, he represented to these

men, that Gonzalo was much incensed against them for having always taken

part with his enemies, and more especially on account of having received

and favoured the deposed viceroy, and of having readily supplied his

army with every thing of which they stood in need. On this account it

had been his first intention to have destroyed the city with fire and

sword, without sparing a single inhabitant. But, on reflecting that the

magistrates and principal inhabitants only were to blame, the people at

large having been constrained by force or fear, he was now determined to

punish only the most guilty and to pardon the rest. Yet, having certain

private reasons for dissembling for the present with some of the

principal persons of the place, he had selected the six who were now

present, as principal inhabitants, to punish them as they richly

deserved, that they might serve as a warning to all Peru. For this

reason, therefore, he desired them to confess their sins in preparation

for death, as he was resolved to have them all executed immediately.

They used every argument to exculpate themselves from the crimes kid to

their charge, but all they could say was without avail; and Carvajal

even caused one of them to be strangled, against whom he was

particularly incensed, as he had been principally instrumental in

constructing the royal seal which the viceroy employed in his

dispatches. In the mean time, a rumour of what was going forward at the

residence of Carvajal spread over the city, and came to the knowledge of

the wives of the prisoners. These ladies immediately implored the

priests and monks who dwelt in San Miguel to accompany them to the place

where their husbands were in so great danger. They all went there

accordingly, and got in by a private door which had not been noticed by

the people belonging to Carvajal, and which had consequently been

omitted to be guarded. Coming into the presence of Carvajal, the wives

of the prisoners threw themselves at his feet, and implored mercy for

their husbands. He pretended to be softened, and granted pardon to the

prisoners, so far as their lives; yet reserving to himself to punish

them in such other manner as he might see fit. Accordingly, he banished

them from the province, depriving them of their lands and Indians, and

condemned them in the payment of heavy fines towards defraying the

expences of the war.

From San Miguel Carvajal went to Truxillo, collecting every where on his

route all the soldiers, horses, arms, and money he could find. Carvajal

had resolved to have put one Melchior Verdugo to death, who dwelt in

Truxillo; but as Verdugo got intimation of this intention, he fled to

the province of Caxamarca, where his repartimiento of Indians was

situated. The bussiness on which Carvajal was engaged was of too great

importance to admit of pursuing Verdugo; wherefore, after having got

possession of as much money as possible under pretence of a loan, he

went on to Lima, always collecting all the soldiers he could procure. He

gave no money to his recruits, only supplying them with horses and arms,

which he took wherever they could be found. He kept all the money he

could find for his own use, every where pillaging the royal coffers and

public funds, and even searching for treasure among the ancient tombs.

After arriving at Lima, he completed his military preparations, and

departed for Cuzco by way of the mountain and the city of Guamanga, at

the head of two hundred men well equipped, and carrying with him a great

sum of money which he had collected during his march; and at Guamanga he

conducted himself in the same rapacious manner as in other places.

Seven or eight days after the departure of Carvajal from Lima, a

conspiracy was detected among those who were well affected to the royal

cause, in consequence of which fifteen of the principal persons of that

city were committed to prison. Among these were, Juan Velasquez, Vela

Nunnez nephew to the viceroy, Francisco Giron another gentlemen of his

household, and Francisco Rodriguez. By means of the torture, these

unhappy persons were made to confess that they had concerted with Pedro

Manxarres, an inhabitant of Las Charcas, to kill the lieutenant-governor

Aldana, the provost marshall Pedro Martin, and other friends and

partizans of Gonzalo Pizarro, after which they proposed to induce the

citizens of Lima to declare for his majesty, confidently expecting that

all those who now followed Carvajal by constraint would join their

party; and they intended finally to have gone off with all the strength

they could muster to join Centeno. Upon this forced confession, Giron

and one other of these prisoners were strangled. By the intercession of

several respectable persons the life of Juan Velasquez was spared, but

his right hand was cut off. All the rest of these prisoners were so

severely tortured that they continued lame for the rest of their lives.

Manxarres saved himself by flight, and continued to conceal himself

among the mountains for more than a year; but fell at last into the

hands of one of the officers in the interest of Gonzalo, who caused him

to be hanged.

As Pedro Martin, the provost-marshal, strongly suspected that some of

those who accompanied Carvajal had participated in this plot; he

endeavoured to discover this by torturing Francisco de Guzman, one of

the prisoners. Finding that Guzman made no confession on this head, he

interrogated him particularly respecting a soldier along with Carvajal

named Perucho de Aguira, and some of his friends, demanding to know

whether these men were in the secret. On purpose to free himself from

the torture, Guzman said they were. After this confession, Guzman was

formally condemned to become a monk in the convent belonging to the

order of mercy, in which he accordingly assumed the habit. After this,

Martin demanded from the registrar a certificate of the confession of

Guzman, by which Aguira and others were implicated in the plot, and

Martin immediately sent off this writing by an Indian messenger to

Carvajal who was then at Guamanga. On the receipt of this paper,

Carvajal ordered Aguira and five others to be hanged, without any

further proof or examination. A short time afterwards, the registrar

being sensible of the error he had committed in supplying the

certificate, sent off a full copy of the confession made by Guzman, in

which was an ample revocation of all he had said under torture,

declaring that he had falsely charged Aguira and the others, merely to

get free from torture. This was however of no avail, as it arrived too

late, Aguira and the others having been already executed, although they

asserted their innocence to the last moment of their lives, as was

certified by the confessors who attended them at their execution; but

Carvajal was inexorable.

Learning while at Guamanga, that Centeno had retired through the desert

to Casabindo as he was unable to cope with Toro, Carvajal was satisfied

that the affaire of the insurgent party were in a fair train in Las

Charcas, where his presence was not now needed, and determined therefore

to return to Lima. He was besides induced to take this step in

consequence of a difference which subsisted between Toro and himself,

occasioned by the charge of lieutenant general under Gonzalo having

originally belonged to Toro, of which he had been deprived in favour of

Carvajal. He feared therefore, lest Toro, on his victorious return from

Las Charcas, being at the head of a much stronger force, might renew

their former quarrel. Carvajal had likewise received letters from some

inhabitants of Lima, remarking the lukewarmness of Aldana to the cause

of Gonzalo Pizarro, and requesting his presence to place affairs at that

city on a more secure footing. He returned therefore to Lima; but

learning shortly afterwards the successful return of Centeno against De

Toro, he again collected his troops and prepared to march against

Centeno. With this view, he had his standards solemnly consecrated, not

forgetting to impose fresh exactions on the inhabitants of Lima. On this

occasion, he designated his army, _The happy army of Liberty, against

the Tyrant Centeno._

Before leaving Lima, he sent off messengers to Cuzco by way of the

mountain, but chose to march by the route of the plain or low country of

Peru to Arequipa, exacting money from the inhabitants wherever he

passed. At Arequipa he received letters from the magistrates of Cuzco

and De Toro, earnestly requesting his immediate presence in that city;

whence, as being the capital of the kingdom, it was proper that the army

should march against the rebels. They assured him of being there

provided with considerable reinforcements of men arms and horses, and

that all the principal persons of the city were ready to accompany him

on the expedition: adding, that being himself a citizen of Cuzco it

seemed reasonable he should honour that city by his presence. By these

and other considerations he was induced to march for Cuzco, though still

entertaining some distrust and even fear of Toro, who he was informed

had often spoken against him in his absence. When De Toro was informed

of the approach of Carvajal to Cuzco, he made every necessary

preparation for reinforcing the army, and providing for the intended

expedition against Centeno; yet could not conceal his dissatisfaction,

that he who had begun the war, and had already suffered great fatigues,

and even had gained material advantages, should be superseded by another

commander whom he must now obey, and more especially that it should be

Carvajal who was put over him, with whom he had been already engaged in

disputes. He dissembled however as much as possible, and concealed his

resentment, saying publickly that his only wish was for the fortunate

management of affairs, whoever might command. Yet with all his caution,

he could not so carefully conceal his sentiments, but that he

occasionally dropped expressions of resentment.

The discontent of De Toro was well known to the inhabitants of Cuzco,

yet they were in hopes that Carvajal would set every thing to rights on

his arrival. Carvajal having arrived in the neighbourhood of the city,

which he was to enter next day at the head of two hundred men, part

cavalry and part musqueteers, De Toro was very anxious to muster all

that were able to carry arms; and from this measure, and the precautions

he took that every one should be in the most perfect equipment, and the

troops steady in their ranks, it was suspected that he entertained some

evil design. De Toro was thus posted with his troops, as if in ambush,

in the way by which Carvajal had to march into the city. As these

circumstances were made known to Carvajal, he ordered his troops to

march in close array, and even ordered their arms to be loaded with

ball, prepared for whatever might happen. On entering the city, De Toro

and his troops were seen on one side, as if ready to dispute the

passage. Carvajal halted his men, and the two parties remained for some

time observing each other with mutual distrust. At length, as neither

side seemed inclined to commence hostilities, both parties broke their

ranks, and intermingled as friends.

Carvajal was exceedingly irritated against De Toro for his conduct on

this occasion, but dissembled till he had entered into Cuzco, where he

was received in the most honourable manner. A few days afterwards, he

caused four of the principal inhabitants to be arrested, and ordered

them to instant execution, without consulting De Toro, or even assigning

any reason for this cruel and arbitrary proceeding. Some of those whom

he put to death were among the most intimate friends of De Toro, who

deemed it prudent and necessary to be silent on the occasion. The

unexpected cruelty of Carvajal occasioned much astonishment and

consternation among the inhabitants of Cuzco, insomuch that none of them

dared to refuse accompanying him on the expedition, and he was enabled

to leave Cuzco at the head of three hundred well appointed soldiers with

which he marched by Collao in the way towards the province of Las

Charcas in search of Centeno. As the latter had a considerably stronger

force, it was believed by many that Carvajal would be unsuccessful in

this expedition, more especially as most of his followers acted more

from force than good will, because he allowed them no pay and treated

them with much severity. In his whole conduct and deportment Carvajal

acted in a brutal and passionate manner, evincing himself on all

occasions the enemy of good men; for he was a bad Christian, constantly

addicted to blasphemy, and of a cruel and tyrannical disposition,

insomuch that it was generally expected his own people would put him to

death to rid themselves of his tyrannous and oppressive conduct. Besides

all this, it was obvious to many, that right and justice were on the

side of Centeno, who was a man of honour and probity, and, being

exceedingly rich, had both the power and inclination to reward his

followers. It is necessary to quit Carvajal and his expedition for the

present, that we may relate the events which took place at Quito.

We have already mentioned that Gonzalo Pizarro pursued the viceroy from

San Miguel to Quito, a distance of 150 leagues or 600 miles, with much

perseverance and rapidity, insomuch that almost every day the light

armed men belonging to the two armies had opportunities of speaking with

each other. During the whole of that long march, neither party had an

opportunity to unsaddle their horses. Those belonging to the viceroy,

owing to the necessity they were under of escaping from a force so much

superior, were even more alert than their pursuers. When at any time

they stopped to take a short rest during the night, they slept on the

ground in their clothes, holding their horses by the halters, without

wasting time in fixing up piquets, or making any of the usual

preparations for accommodating themselves and horses during the night.

It is true that piquets are seldom used in the sands of Peru for the

horses, as it would be necessary to drive these very deep to take

sufficient hold; and as there are no trees to be met with in many parts

of that country for making piquets, necessity has introduced a

substitute in some measure equivalent: For this purpose each horseman

has a small bag, which he fills with sand and burries in a hole of

sufficient depth, having one end of the halter fixed to the bag, the

hole being afterwards filled up and pressed well down to prevent the bag

from being drawn up by the efforts of the horse. But on this urgent

occasion, the troops of the viceroy did not take time for this measure,

but held the halters in their hands, that they might be ready to mount

and set out the moment it was necessary by the approach of their

pursuers.

In this long march, both the pursuers and the pursued suffered

exceedingly from want of provisions; more especially the Pizarrians, as

the viceroy used the precaution of removing the curacas and Indians from

all the country through which he passed, that his enemy might find every

part of the country deserted and unprovided with any means of

subsistence. During this precipitate retreat, the viceroy carried along

with him eight or ten of the best horses he had been able to procure,

which were led by Indians for his own particular use; and when any of

these became so tired as to be unable to proceed, he ordered them to be

hamstrung, to prevent them from being useful to the enemy. While on this

march in pursuit of the viceroy, Gonzalo Pizarro was joined by Captain

Bachicao, who now returned from Tierra Firma with a reinforcement of

three hundred and fifty men and a large quantity of artillery, having

disembarked, from twenty vessels which he had procured, on a part of

the coast as near as possible to Quito, and had made his way in such a

manner across the mountains that he got to Quito rather before Gonzalo.

On the junction of Bachicao, Gonzalo found himself at the head of more

than eight hundred men, among whom were many of the principal people in

South America, both townsmen or burgesses, planters, and soldiers. Owing

to this large reinforcement, Gonzalo Pizarro found himself in such a

state of tranquil security at Quito as hardly any usurper or tyrant had

ever before enjoyed; as besides that this province abounded in

provisions of every kind, several rich mines of gold had been recently

discovered; and as most of the principal people of the province were

either now along with the viceroy, or had attached themselves to him

while at Quito, Gonzalo Pizarro appropriated all their Indians to

himself, employing them in the collection of gold. From the Indians

belonging to the treasurer, Rodrigo Nunnez de Bonilla, he procured about

800 marks [17] of gold in the course of eight months; besides that there

were other repartimientos of greater value, and that he appropriated all

the revenues and rights belonging to the crown, and even pillaged the

tombs of the ancient sovereigns of Quito in search of treasure.

[Footnote 17: Eight hundred marks of gold, or 6400 ounces, at L.4 an

ounce; are worth L.25,600: and at six for one, the value put upon

bullion in those days by the Historian of America, are now worth at

least L.153,600, perhaps a quarter of a million. As there were other

repartimientos of more value than those of the treasurer, besides others

not so valuable, it is not beyond bounds to suppose that Gonzalo may

have acquired as much treasure at Quito as was equal to a million of our

present money: A prodigious sum, considering that his army did not

exceed 800 men; being equal to L.1250 for each soldier.--E.]

After a short stay at Quito, Gonzalo learnt that the viceroy had halted

at the city of Parto, about forty leagues from thence, at the frontiers

of the government of Benalcazar. Resolving to follow him, Gonzalo pushed

on as he had done from San Miguel, and the light troops of the hostile

parties had some interference at a place called Rio Caliente. When the

viceroy was informed of the approach of Gonzalo, he hastily quitted

Parto and retired to the city of Popayan at a greater distance from

Quito, and was pursued by Gonzalo for twenty leagues beyond Parto. As

Gonzalo found that he would have to march through a desert country,

altogether destitute of provisions, he here discontinued the pursuit,

and returned to Quito. Perhaps this was the longest and hottest pursuit

ever made in war; as, counting from La Plata whence Gonzalo first set

out, to Parto where the pursuit was discontinued, the distance is not

less than 700 large Spanish leagues, or 2800 miles.

On his return to Quito, Gonzalo Pizarro was so puffed up with the

success which had hitherto attended him, that he frequently spoke of his

majesty with much disrespect; alleging that the king would be reduced to

the necessity of granting him the government of Peru, and even went so

far as to say, if this favour were denied him, he would throw off his

allegiance. For the most part indeed, he concealed these ambitious

sentiments, pretending that he was always ready to submit to the orders

of his majesty; but all his officers were satisfied that he meant to

assert an independent dominion, and publickly avowed these absurd and

criminal pretensions. On returning from Parto, he remained a long while

at Quito, continually feasting and rejoicing; he and his adherents

abandoning themselves to every degree of licence and debauchery,

particularly in regard to the sex. It is even asserted that Gonzalo

caused a citizen of Quito to be assassinated, whose wife he publickly

lived with, and that he hired a Hungarian soldier, named Vincente Pablo

to execute this infamous deed. This man was afterwards hanged at

Valladolid, in the year 1551, by a sentence of the royal council of the

Indies.

As Pizarro found himself in the command of a strong body of excellent

troops, which appeared entirely attached to his service, some of their

own accord and others by constraint, he persuaded himself that no one

could oppose him, or prevent him from enjoying his present elevation in

peace and tranquillity. He was even convinced that the emperor would be

obliged to treat him with cautious respect, and must find himself under

the necessity of entering into a compromise. It was at this time, when

Gonzalo considered himself as unresisted master of all Peru, that

Centeno revolted from his tyrannical usurpation in the province of Las

Charcas, and that he dispatched Carvajal for the reduction of that loyal

officer, as has been already mentioned.

Having continued a long time at Quito without receiving any intelligence

of the measures which were taken by the viceroy, Gonzalo became anxious

to learn what was become of him. Some alleged that he would return to

Spain by way of Carthagena, while others gave it as their opinion that

he would retire to Tierra Firma, to keep possession of the isthmus, to

assemble troops, arms, ammunition, and provisions, and to wait for

orders from his majesty; and a third opinion was that he would wait for

these orders in Popayan, where he now was. No one suspected that he

would be able to collect a sufficient number of troops in that place to

enable him to undertake any enterprise for recovering his authority in

Peru; yet it seemed advisable to Gonzalo and his officers to take

possession of the Tierra Firma, on purpose to occupy the only direct

passage between Spain and Peru. For this purpose, Gonzalo Pizarro

appointed Pedro Alfonzo De Hinojosa to command the fleet which Bachicao

had collected, giving him a detachment of two hundred and fifty men to

enable him to occupy the isthmus, and directed him while on his voyage

to Panama to coast along the province of Buenaventura and the mouth of

the river of San Juan.

Hinojosa set out immediately on this expedition, dispatching a single

vessel, commanded by Captain Rodrigo de Carvajal direct for Panama, with

letters from Gonzalo to some of the principal inhabitants of that city

urging them to favour his designs. In these letters, he pretended that

he was exceedingly displeased on hearing of the violence and rapacity

with which Bachicao had conducted himself towards the inhabitants of

Panama, in direct contradiction to his orders, which were to land the

Doctor Texada without doing injury to any one. He informed them that

Hinojosa was now on his way to their city, for the express purpose of

indemnifying all those who had been injured by Bachicao; and desired

them not to be under any apprehension of Hinojosa, although accompanied

by a considerable force, as it was necessary for him to be on his guard

against the viceroy and some of his officers, who were understood to be

then in the Tierra Firma levying soldiers for their master. On the

arrival of Rodrigo Carvajal at a place named Ancona about three leagues

from Panama, he learnt that two officers belonging to the viceroy, Juan

de Guzman and Juan Yllanez, were then in Panama, having been sent to

that place to procure recruits and to purchase arms, with which they

were to have gone to Popayan. They had already enrolled above an hundred

soldiers, and had procured a considerable quantity of arms, among which

were five or six small field-pieces; but, instead of going with these to

join the viceroy, they remained to defend Panama against Gonzalo

Pizarro, who they expected might send a force to occupy that important

station.

As Rodrigo Carvajal had only fifteen men along with him, he did not

think it prudent to land in person; but sent secretly by night one of

his soldiers to deliver the letters with which he was entrusted. The

soldier accordingly delivered them to the inhabitants for whom they were

addressed, who immediately communicated them to the magistrates and the

officers of the viceroy. The soldier was taken into custody, from whom

they learnt the coming of Hinojosa, and the orders with which he was

entrusted. Upon this intelligence, they armed the whole population of

Panama, and fitted out two brigantines which were sent off on purpose to

capture Rodrigo Carvajal; but, as his messenger did not return, Carvajal

suspected what had actually taken place, and set sail for the Pearl

Islands to wait the arrival of Hinojosa, by which means he escaped from

the brigantines. Pedro de Casaos was then governor of the Tierra Firma;

and to be in readiness to defend his province against Hinojosa, he went

immediately to Nombre de Dios, where he collected all the musquets and

other arms he could procure, arming all the inhabitants of that place

who were fit for service, whom he carried along with him to Panama,

making every preparation in his power for defence. The two captains

belonging to the viceroy, Guzman and Yllanez, likewise put their troops

in order for resistance, and at first there was some jealousy between

them and Casaos as to the supreme command; but it was at length agreed

that Casaos should command in chief, as governor of the province, while

they retained the immediate authority over their own men, and bore their

own standards. Differences had subsisted for some time between these

officers and the governor, because he had repressed some disorderly

conduct in which they had indulged, and had advised them to set off with

their men to the assistance of the viceroy for whom they were employed

to levy troops; while they were averse from that measure, and finding

themselves at the head of a respectable force, they made light of the

orders of Casaos, and refused to obey him: But the necessity they were

now under of providing for their mutual defence, occasioned them to

enter into an accommodation of their disputes.

After the dispatch of Carvajal to Panama, as already mentioned, Hinojosa

set sail with ten vessels, and continued along the coast to the north

till he arrived at Buenaventura, a small sea port at the mouth of the

river San Juan which forms the southern boundary of Popayan, the

government of Benalcazar. He proposed to learn at this place the

situation and intentions of the viceroy, and to have seized any vessels

that might be at this harbour, to prevent them from being employed by

the viceroy for returning to Peru. On arriving at Buenaventura, Hinojosa

sent some soldiers on shore, who brought off eight or ten of the

inhabitants, from whom he learnt that the viceroy remained at Popayan,

engaged in assembling troops and military stores for attempting to

return into Peru; and that finding Yllanez and Guzman delayed their

return from Panama, he had sent off his brother Vela Nunnez with several

corporals on their way to Panama, to expedite the transmission of such

reinforcements as could be procured, and had supplied him for that

purpose with all the money belonging to the king at Popayan. Hinojosa

was likewise informed that Vela Nunnez had the charge of a bastard son

of Gonzalo Pizarro of twelve years old, who was found by the viceroy at

Quito, and was now sent away to Panama, in the hope that the merchants

of Panama might ransom him at a high price to acquire the good will of

Gonzalo. The individual who communicated all this information added that

the viceroy had employed a number of Indians to cut down a quantity of

timber, which was to be conveyed to Buenaventura, on purpose to build a

small vessel for the accommodation of Vela Nunnez; who must now be

within a short distance of Buenaventura, and had sent this person before

to inquire if he might come in safety to that place.

On receiving this intelligence, Hinojosa landed two confidential

officers with a party of soldiers, giving them orders to take two

several routes into the interior, as pointed out by the informant, on

purpose to take Vela Nunnez. Accordingly, one of these officers came up

with Vela Nunnez, and the other got hold of Rodrigo Mexia and Saavedra

with the son of Gonzalo Pizarro [18]. Both of these parties carried

considerable sums of money, which was pillaged by the soldiers of

Hinojosa; and the prisoners were brought on board the vessels, where

great rejoicings were made for the happy success of this enterprize, by

which their acquisition of Panama must be facilitated, and because they

had done especial good service to Gonzalo by the liberation of his son.

[Footnote 18: By Garcilasso de la Vega, this son of Gonzalo Pizarro is

named Rodrigo Mexia; but Zarate could hardly be mistaken in giving that

name to one of his conductors.--E.].

Hinojosa now resumed his voyage, in the course of which he fell in with

Rodrigo de Carvajal, who gave him an account of the situation of affairs

at Panama, and recommended the propriety of using judicious measures

against that place, as it was provided for defence. Hinojosa accordingly

appeared before Panama with eleven ships and two hundred and fifty

soldiers. At this time there were more than five hundred men in Panama,

all tolerably well armed, who were drawn, out under the command of

Casaos to oppose the landing of the Pizarrians. But among these there

were many merchants and tradesmen, little adapted for war, who hardly

knew how to use their weapons, and many of whom were even unable to fire

off a musquet. Many among them had no intention of fighting or of

opposing the descent of the insurgents of Peru, whose arrival they were

disposed to consider as more advantageous than prejudicial. The

merchants expected to be able to sell their commodities, and the

tradesmen were in hope of procuring profitable employment, each

according to his occupation. Besides, the rich merchants had partners or

factors who resided in Peru, and had charge of their most valuable

effects; and were afraid, if they concurred in opposing Hinojosa, that

Gonzalo Pizarro might revenge himself by seizing their goods and

maltreating their partners and factors. Those who were principally

inclined to oppose the landing of Hinojosa, were Pedro Casaos the

governor, Guzman and Yllanez the captains belonging to the viceroy,

Arias de Azevedo, Juan Fernandez de Rebollido, Andrew de Arayza, Juan de

Zabala, Juan Vendrel, and some other considerable inhabitants of Panama;

some from principles of loyalty, others from fear of future evils, lest

Hinojosa might act with the same violence as had been done by Bachicao.

Finding himself resisted, Hinojosa landed with two hundred men about two

leagues from Panama, towards which place he marched close along the

shore, being, protected on one flank by a range of rocks from the attack

of cavalry, and on the other by the boats of his squadron armed with

some pieces of artillery. Fifty of his soldiers were left on board for

the defence of the ships, and orders were given to hang up Vela Nunnez

and the other prisoners whenever the enemy were seen to attack him.

Casaos marched with all his troops from Panama to meet Hinojosa, with

the determination of giving battle: But when the hostile parties were

almost within musquet shot and ready to engage, the whole priests and

monks of Panama interposed between in procession, having their

crucifixes veiled and every other demonstration of mourning, and

prevailed on both sides to agree to a truce for that day, that

endeavours might be used to bring about an accommodation. For this

purpose negotiators were appointed on both sides; Don Balthasar de

Castilia, son of the Conde de Gomera, was named by Hinojosa, and Don

Pedro de Cabrera on the part of Casaos, and hostages were mutually

interchanged.

The deputy of Hinojosa affected to be astonished at the opposition of

the governor and inhabitants of Panama, since he not only meant no harm

to any one, but had come expressly to repair the injuries which had

formerly been done by Bachicao, to purchase such provisions and clothing

as they wanted, and to repair their ships; declaring that their only

object was to oblige the deposed viceroy to return to Spain, pursuant to

the orders of the royal audience, as his continuance in the country

occasioned perpetual discord in Peru. But, as the viceroy was not there,

Hinojosa intended to make only a short stay in the place, having orders

from Gonzalo to offer no injury to any one unless attacked, in which

case he must defend himself as he best could. The opposite party alleged

that the presence of Hinojosa in warlike guise was sufficient to excite

suspicion; since, even allowing the government of Gonzalo in Peru to be

legitimate as they pretended, he had no jurisdiction in Panama, and had

no right to direct the proceedings of any one at that place. That

Bachicao had formerly come among them under pretence of peace, yet had

committed all those violences and injuries, which Hinojosa now pretended

he was come to repair. After a long conference, it was at length agreed

that Hinojosa should be permitted to take up his residence in Panama for

thirty days, accompanied by fifty soldiers to serve as a guard for his

personal safety; but that the fleet and all the other soldiers of his

party should repair to the Pearl Islands, where workmen and all

necessaries for the reparation of the ships could be procured; and that

at the expiry of these thirty days, Hinojosa and his armament were to

return to Peru.

On the conclusion of this convention, which was confirmed by mutual

oaths and the interchange of hostages, Hinojosa took up his residence in

Panama with a guard of fifty picked men, and hired a house in which he

kept open table for every one who pleased to visit him, all of whom he

allowed to divert themselves in play or otherwise as they pleased. By

this procedure, he gained over most of the soldiers of Yllanez in a few

days, and many other idle fellows joined themselves secretly to his

party. It was even said that all these men had previously engaged by

letter to have gone over to him if he and the governor had come to a

battle on the former occasion. Indeed the governor and other principal

persons of Panama had been chiefly induced to agree to the present

accommodation by distrust of their soldiers, who were all eager for an

opportunity of getting to Peru. By the above-mentioned means, Hinojosa

soon saw himself at the head of a considerable body of troops, while the

captains Yllanez and Guzman were almost deserted by all their men. As

they saw likewise that the convention was in other respects ill

observed, they secretly withdrew with fifteen men who yet remained, and

endeavoured to get to Carthagena. Yllanez was taken soon afterwards by

one of Hinojosas officers; on which he entered into the service of

Gonzalo Pizarro, and was afterwards engaged on that side in the

engagement at Nombre de Dios against Verdugo, to be afterwards related.

Hinojosa continued to reside in Panama, where no one dared to oppose

him. He increased the number of his troops from day to day, and kept

them under excellent discipline, without allowing them to do injury to

any of the inhabitants; neither did he intermeddle in any thing whatever

except what concerned his troops. At this time Don Pedro de Cabrera and

his son-in-law Hernan Mexia de Guzman, who had been banished from Peru

by the viceroy, resided in Panama; and these two gentlemen were sent by

Hinojosa, with a party of soldiers, to keep possession of the port of

Nombre de Dios, which was of great importance to his security, and

whence he might receive early intelligence from Spain and other places.

Melchior Verdugo, an inhabitant of the city of Truxillo, was one of the

richest men in Peru, being proprietor of the entire province of

Caxamarca. On the arrival of the viceroy Blasco Nunnez Vela, Verdugo,

who was originally from the same city in Spain, engaged heartily in his

service, and continued in his suite at Lima, till the time when the

viceroy proposed to dismantle that city and retire to Truxillo. At that

period he commanded Verdugo to go before, that he might secure

possession of Truxillo, with orders to levy soldiers and provide arms;

and Verdugo accordingly embarked all his baggage and effects, intending

to have set sail on the very day when the viceroy was imprisoned. As all

the vessels at the port of Lima were then detained, Verdugo was unable

to proceed; and, as Verdugo was particularly obnoxious to Gonzalo and

his partizans, on account of his known attachment to the viceroy, he was

one of the twenty-five who were committed to prison by Carvajal on his

arrival at Lima, when De Baro and several others were hanged, as

formerly related. For a long while afterwards he was in continual danger

of being put to death; but at length Gonzalo granted him a pardon,

though he still entertained suspicions of his conduct, but had no

convenient opportunity of getting rid of him, till the departure of

Carvajal against Centeno, when it was proposed by the lieutenant-general

to have surprised him while at Truxillo, as formerly mentioned: But

having some suspicions of his intention, Verdugo saved himself by

flight, and concealed himself among his Indians in the province of

Caxamarca.

After Carvajal quitted Truxillo, Verdugo returned to that city; but as

he expected Gonzalo might soon become master of that place, and would

make him feel the effects of his displeasure, he resolved to abandon the

country, yet wished to do it in such a manner as might distress Gonzalo

as much as possible. While waiting a favourable opportunity for this, he

made every preparation in his power for his intended enterprize,

collecting as many men in his service as he possibly could, and employed

workmen secretly to construct musquets, iron chains, fetters, and

manacles. At this time a vessel arrived from Lima in the harbour of

Truxillo, on which Verdugo sent for the master and pilot, under pretence

of purchasing some of their commodities; and on their arrival at his

house he confined them in a deep dungeon which he had previously

prepared. After this, he returned to his chamber, causing his legs to be

swathed with bandages, under pretence of certain malignant warts or

ulcers to which he was subject, and sat down at one of his windows which

looked towards the public square in which the magistrates and principal

inhabitants used to assemble every day. When the magistrates came as

usual to the square, he requested them to come into his house, as he

wished to execute certain deeds in their presence, and the disorder in

his legs rendered him unable to go out. Immediately on entering, he

caused them to be carried into the dungeon, where they were deprived of

their badges of office and put in chains. Leaving them under the guard

of six musqueteers, he returned to the window of his chamber, whence he

gradually enticed about twenty of the principal citizens into his house,

all of whom he put in chains and fetters. He then went out into the city

accompanied by a guard of soldiers, and proclaimed the king with much

loyal solemnity, making prisoners of all who presumed to oppose him;

which were very few, as Gonzalo had carried off most of the inhabitants

on his expedition to Quito. Having thus made himself master of the city,

and returned to his house, he addressed his prisoners, whom he reviled

for having embraced the party of Gonzalo, and declared that he was

resolved to withdraw from under the usurpation of the tyrant to join the

viceroy, and meant to take along with him all the men and arms he was

able to procure. For this purpose, he demanded that all his prisoners

should contribute in proportion to their abilities, as it was quite

reasonable they should give assistance to the royal cause, having

frequently made large contributions to the usurper. He insisted

therefore that every one of them should instantly subscribe for such

sums as they were able to furnish, all of which were to be paid

immediately, as he was otherwise resolved to carry them all along with

him as prisoners. Every one of them accordingly agreed to advance such

sums of money as they were able to procure, which were all instantly

paid.

Having brought this contrivance to a favourable issue, Verdugo made an

agreement with the master and pilot of the vessel, and had every thing

that could be useful or necessary carried on board. He then carried all

his prisoners in irons in carts or waggons to the shore, and embarked

with about twenty soldiers, and a considerable sum of money, partly

exacted from the inhabitant, partly from the royal funds belonging to

the city, and partly, from his own extensive revenues. Leaving his

prisoners still in fetters on the carriages, to be liberated as they

best might, he set sail along the coast to the northwards. In the course

of his voyage he fell in with and captured a vessel belonging to

Bachicao, containing a great deal of valuable articles which that

officer had acquired by plunder in Tierra Firma, all of which Verdugo

divided among his soldiers. He at first inclined to have landed at

Buenaventura, on purpose to join the viceroy; but considering the small

amount of his force, and the danger of falling in with the fleet of

Gonzalo Pizarro, he directed his course for the province of Nicaragua,

where he landed and applied to the principal persons there for

assistance against the usurper. Finding small encouragement in that

quarter, he addressed himself to the royal audience, which was

established on the frontiers of Nicaragua, who promised him protection

and aid, and sent for that purpose one of their number, the oydor

Ramirez de Alarcon to Nicaragua, with orders to the inhabitants of that

city to hold themselves in readiness to march with their arms and

horses.

Intelligence was soon received at Panama of the exploit of Verdugo at

Truxillo, and his having gone to Nicaragua; and as Hinojosa suspected he

might increase his force in that province so as to be enabled to disturb

him in the possession of the Tierra Firma, he sent Alfonso Palamino with

two ships and an hundred and eighty musqueteers to endeavour to dislodge

Verdugo. Palamino easily took possession of the ship belonging to

Verdugo; but as the inhabitants of Grenada and Leon, the two principal

cities in the province of Nicaragua assembled in arms, under Verdugo and

the licentiate Ramirez, to oppose his landing, and were much superior in

number to his troops and provided with cavalry, he found himself unable

to land with any prospect of success. After waiting some time in vain,

he was obliged to sail back to Panama, taking several vessels along with

him which he had captured on the coast, and burning several others which

he could not carry away.

On the departure of Palomino, Verdugo levied about an hundred well armed

men, with whom he resolved to give as much interruption as possible to

the schemes of the insurgents in the Tierra Firma. With this view he

determined to make an attempt on Nombre de Dios, which he learnt was

occupied only by a small detachment, which had no suspicion of being

attacked. For this purpose, he fitted out three or four small vessels,

in which he embarked his troops on the lake of Nicaragua, whence he

descended into the gulf of Mexico by the river Chagre, which discharges

the waters of that lake into the Atlantic. Finding some trading vessels

at the mouth of that river, he received accurate information from their

commanders of the state of affairs in Nombre de Dios, the number of the

soldiers which occupied that place, and the different quarters in which

they were lodged. Taking some of these mariners along with him as

guides, he contrived to arrive at Nombre de Dios undiscovered about

midnight, and went immediately to the house of Juan de Zabala, in which

the captains Pedro de Cabrera and Hernan Mexia were quartered with some

soldiers; who, roused by the noise, put themselves in a state of

defence. Verdugo and his people set the house on fire, so that Mexia and

his soldiers, who defended the staircase, were constrained to rush from

the house to save themselves from the flames; and as the night was

exceedingly dark, they escaped unseen, and saved themselves in the woods

near Nombre de Dios, whence they escaped across the isthmus to Panama.

Hinojosa was much chagrined at this exploit, and determined on revenge;

but as he wished to give his conduct on the occasion some appearance of

justice, he directed some of the inhabitants of Nombre de Dios to enter

a regular accusation before the Doctor Ribera, the governor of that

place, giving an exaggerated account of the insolent invasion of his

government by Verdugo, who without any just pretence, had levied

contributions, imprisoned the magistrates, and invaded the town of

Nombre de Dios on his own private authority. They were likewise

instructed to request Ribera to march in person to chastise the

insolence of Verdugo, and Hinojosa offered to accompany him on this

expedition with his troops. Ribera, who appears to have been then

resident in Panama, agreed to all that was desired, and, accepted the

proffered military aid to drive Verdugo from his government; on which

Hinojosa and his officers swore to obey his orders as their commander on

this expedition, and the troops were put in motion to march across the

isthmus. On receiving notice of the approach of Hinojosa, Verdugo

disposed his troops to defend the place, and caused the inhabitants of

Nombre de Dios to take up arms, in addition to his own men. But as it

was obvious that the inhabitants shewed no inclination for fighting,

Verdugo suspected they might abandon him while engaged, and came

therefore to the resolution of abandoning the town, and took post on the

shore near his small barks. He waited for Hinojosa in that situation,

having some boats in his rear, which he had seized to enable him to

secure his retreat in case of necessity. Immediately on his arrival,

Hinojosa attacked Verdugo, and several persons were killed at the first

brunt. As the inhabitants of Nombre de Dios who were along with Verdugo,

observed their governor acting as commander of the adverse party, they

withdrew on one side from the engagement into an adjoining wood; by

which the soldiers belonging to Verdugo were thrown into disorder, and

they were forced to take to their boats and retreat on board their

barks.

After this repulse, Verdugo took possession of several ships that lay at

anchor near Nombre de Dios, the largest of which he armed with some

pieces of artillery and endeavoured to cannonade the town. But finding

that he could do very little injury to the place, which was situated in

a bottom, and as he was in want of provisions, and most of his soldiers

had been left on shore, he retired with his small vessels and the ship

he had seized to Carthagena, to await a more favourable opportunity of

annoying the insurgents. Having restored Nombre de Dios to order, Ribera

and Hinojosa left a sufficient garrison in the place, under the command

of Don Pedro de Cabrera and Hernan Mexia, and returned to Panama, where

they proposed to wait for such orders as might be sent from Spain

respecting the troubles in Peru.

On arriving at Popayan, as formerly related, the viceroy collected all

the iron which could be procured in the province, erected forges, and

procured workmen, so that in a short time he got two hundred musquets

constructed, besides other arms both offensive and defensive, and

provided every other species of warlike stores. Learning that the

governor, Benalcazar, had detached a brave and experienced officer,

named Juan Cabrera, to reduce some refractory Indians, with an hundred

and fifty soldiers; the viceroy wrote a letter to Cabrera, in which he

gave a detailed account of the insurrection and usurpation of Gonzalo

Pizarro, and of his own determination to restore the kingdom of Peru to

allegiance whenever he could collect a sufficient number of troops for

that purpose. He earnestly intreated therefore, that Cabrera would

immediately join him at Popayan with all his men, that they might

commence their march together for Quito, to punish the rebellious

usurper. To induce compliance, he represented in strong colours to

Cabrera, the great and signal service which he had in his power to

perform for the sovereign on this occasion; which likewise would be far

more advantageous to his own personal interests, than any which could

accrue from the expedition in which he was now engaged; as, on the

defeat of Pizarro, he would be entitled to partake in the distribution

of the lands belonging to Gonzalo and his partizans, and he might

depend on being gratified with ample possessions for himself and his

followers in the best districts of Peru. Farther to encourage Cabrera,

the viceroy informed him of the events which had lately occurred in the

south of Peru, where Centeno had erected the royal standard at the head

of a respectable force; so that the present conjuncture was extremely

favourable for an attack on Gonzalo, who could hardly resist when

pressed from both extremities of the kingdom at once; and besides, that

the inhabitants of Peru were now quite weary of the tyrannical violence

and extortion of Gonzalo, and would doubtless revolt against him on the

first favourable opportunity. As an additional inducement to Cabrera to

join him, the viceroy sent him an order by which he was authorized to

take from the royal coffers at Carthagena, Encelme, Cali, Antiochia, and

other places, to the extent of 30,000 pesos for the pay and equipment of

his troops; and as Cabrera acted under the orders of Benalcazar, he

procured letters to him from that governor by which he was commanded

immediately to obey the requisition of the viceroy. On receiving these

dispatches, Cabrera immediately secured the funds which he was

authorized to take, which he divided among his men, and set out with all

possible expedition to join the viceroy at Popayan with an hundred well

appointed soldiers. The viceroy had likewise sent orders for

reinforcements from the new kingdom of Grenada, the province of

Carthagena, and other places, so that his troops daily increased; and

having learnt the capture of his brother Vela Nunnez, and the loss of

Yllanez and his troops, he had no expectation of procuring any

additional reinforcements.

At this time, Gonzalo Pizarro was very anxious to devise some stratagem

for inveigling the viceroy into his hands, as he considered his

usurpation unsafe so long as that officer remained alive and at the head

of a military force. With this view, that the viceroy might return into

Peru where he might have it in his power to bring him to action, Gonzalo

gave out that he intended to proceed to Las Charcas at the southern

extremity of Peru, to repress the disorders occasioned by Centeno,

leaving Captain Pedro de Puelles at Quito with three hundred men to

oppose the viceroy. He proceeded even ostensibly to take such measures

as were proper for executing this design; selecting such troops as were

to accompany himself to the south, and those who were to remain at

Quito; even distributing money to both divisions, and set off on his

march for the south after a general muster and review of his army.

Gonzalo contrived that intelligence of these proceedings should be

conveyed to the viceroy, by means of a spy in the employment of that

officer, who had betrayed his trust, and had even communicated to

Gonzalo the cypher which he used in corresponding with his employer.

Gonzalo made this person send intelligence to the viceroy of these

pretended motions; and Puelles wrote likewise to some friends in

Popayan, as if privately to inform them that he was left in the command

at Quito with three hundred men, with which he believed himself able to

resist all the force the viceroy might be able to bring against him; and

these letters were sent purposely in such a manner that they might fall

into the hands of the viceroy. Gonzalo likewise took care to spread

these reports among the Indians who were present at the review, and who,

having seen Gonzalo set off on his march to the south, were perfectly

acquainted with the number of troops which accompanied him on the march,

and of those which remained under Puelles at Quito. To give the greater

appearance of truth to these reports, Gonzalo actually set out on his

march; but halted at two or three days journey from Quito, under

pretence of falling sick.

On receiving intelligence of these circumstances, which he implicitly

believed, the viceroy determined to march from Popayan to Quito,

satisfied that he should be easily able to overpower the small force

left there under Puelles, who had no means of being reinforced. He

accordingly began his march, during which he was unable to procure any

intelligence whatever respecting Gonzalo and his troops, so carefully

were all the passes guarded to prevent either Christians or Indians from

conveying advices on the road towards Popayan. While, on the contrary,

Gonzalo procured regular notice of every step taken by the viceroy, by

means of the Indians called _Cagnares_, a cunning and intelligent race.

Accordingly, when the viceroy was arrived within a few days march of

Quito, Gonzalo returned thither with his troops to join Puelles, and

they marched together to meet the viceroy, who was then at Oravalo about

twelve leagues from Quito. Although the viceroy was at the head of eight

hundred men, and his force increased daily on his approach to Quito,

Gonzalo confided in the valour and experience of his troops, among

which were many of the principal persons in Peru, his soldiers being

inured to war, accustomed to hardships and fatigue, and full of

confidence in themselves from the many victories they had gained.

Gonzalo did every thing in his power to satisfy his troops of the

justice of the cause in which he and they were engaged; representing to

them that Peru had been conquered by him and his brothers; recalling to

their remembrance the cruelties which had been exercised by the viceroy,

particularly in putting to death the commissary Yllan Suarez and several

of his own captains. In the next place, he gave an exaggerated picture

of the tyrannical conduct of the viceroy during the whole period of his

government, owing to which he had been deposed by the royal audience,

and sent out of the country to give an account to the king of his

conduct: Instead of which, he now endeavoured to disturb the colony by

sowing dissensions and encouraging insurrections, and had even levied an

army in other provinces, with which he intended to reduce the country

under his tyrannous rule, and to ruin all its inhabitants. After a long

speech, by which he endeavoured to animate his troops with resentment

against the viceroy, they all declared their readiness to march against

him and bring him to battle. Some were actuated by interested motives,

to prevent the enforcement of the obnoxious regulations; others by a

desire of avenging private injuries; and others again by the fear of

punishment for having taken up arms. But it is not to be concealed, that

the majority acted from dread of the severity of Gonzalo and his

officers, who had already put several persons to death, merely for

having shewn some degree of coldness or disinclination towards the cause

of the insurgents.

On reviewing and mustering his force, Gonzalo found himself at the head

of 130 well mounted cavalry, 200 musqueteers, and 350 armed with pikes,

or near 700 in all, with abundance of excellent gun-powder[19]. Learning

that the viceroy had encamped on the banks of the river about two

leagues from Quito, Gonzalo advanced to meet him. Juan de Acosta and

Juan Velez de Guevara were his captains of musqueteers, Hernando

Bachicao commanded the pikemen, and the horse were led by Pedro de

Puelles and Gomez de Alvarado. On this occasion there was no person

appointed to the office of major-general, the duties of which Gonzalo

chose to execute in person. He detached seventy of his cavalry to occupy

a ford of the river, by which he meant to cross over towards the camp

of the viceroy, over whom he expected to gain an easy victory. It was

now Saturday the 15th of January 1546, and the two armies remained all

night so near each other that the advanced posts were able to converse,

each calling the other rebels and traitors, those on each side

pretending that they only were loyal subjects to the king.

[Footnote 19: According to Garcilasso, the army of Gonzalo on this

occasion amounted to 700 men, 200 of whom were armed with firelocks, 350

with pikes, and 150 were cavalry. In the History of America, II. 375,

the force under the viceroy is only stated at 400; but both in Zarate

and Garcilasso the royalists are mentioned as 800 strong.--E.]

At this time, Gonzalo Pizarro was accompanied by the licentiate Benedict

Suarez de Carvajal brother to the commissary Yllan Suarez de Carvajal

who had formerly been put to death at Lima in presence of the viceroy.

At that former period Benedict was on his journey from Cuzco to Lima,

intending to have joined the viceroy against Gonzalo, and had arrived

within twenty leagues of Lima when he learnt the murder of his brother,

after which he dared not to trust himself in that city until the viceroy

had been deposed and sent on board ship. He was afterwards made prisoner

by Gonzalo, who was even on the point of putting him to death; but on

setting out for Quito, Gonzalo took him into favour. Carvajal now

followed him with good will against the viceroy, upon whom he was eager

to take signal vengeance for the unmerited death of his brother; and was

even followed on this occasion by about thirty of his friends and

relations, who formed a separate company under his immediate command.

The viceroy had arrived at a village called Tuza, about twenty leagues

from Quito, when he learnt that Gonzalo Pizarro was returned to that

city, and was now at the head of about seven hundred men. Believing

himself however in sufficient force to attempt the recovery of his

authority in Peru, the viceroy communicated this intelligence to his

principal officers, whom he commanded to have every thing in readiness

for battle. On his arrival at the river within two leagues of Quito, and

in presence of the enemy who occupied the slope of a hill on the other

side, he determined to endeavour to get into their rear, for which

purpose he advanced with his troops by a road in a different direction

from that on which the insurgents were posted, expecting to derive great

advantages from this measure, as the whole infantry of Gonzalo, which

formed his principal force, were posted on the slope of the hill

directly in front, and his rear-guard of cavalry could have no

suspicion of being liable to attack. The viceroy accordingly began his

march on the night of the 15th January, leaving his camp standing with

all his Indians and dogs, and with fires burning in many places, to

deceive the enemy into a belief that he still remained in the camp.

Marching therefore in perfect silence by the road which had been pointed

out to him for gaining the rear of the insurgents, he expected to have

attained his object before day: But as the road, had not been frequented

for a long time, he encountered so many obstructions and difficulties,

in consequence of the road being broken up in many places, that when day

broke he was still a league from the enemy, by which all hope or

opportunity of surprizing them was entirely lost. In this dilemma, he

came to the resolution of marching straight upon Quito, in which there

were very few to oppose him, and which was in no situation to give any

resistance. He was in hopes of finding several loyal subjects in that

place, who might have contrived to elude following the usurper to the

field, and might now join his army, and he expected to find some arms

and military stores left there by Gonzalo. On arriving at Quito, the

soldiers of the viceroy learnt that Gonzalo was present with all his

troops, which circumstance had hitherto been carefully concealed from

their knowledge.

In the morning of the 16th, the scouts of Gonzalo were surprised to hear

so little noise in the camp of the viceroy; and having cautiously

advanced, they learnt from the Indian followers of the royalist army in

what manner the viceroy had passed the insurgents during the night. The

scouts therefore made haste to apprize Gonzalo of this event, who learnt

soon afterwards by messengers from Quito that the viceroy had taken

possession of that city. Gonzalo therefore immediately marched for

Quito, determined to give battle to the viceroy without delay; and

although the viceroy was perfectly aware of the advantages possessed by

Pizarro in the superior discipline and equipment of his troops, he

courageously resolved to run the risk of battle, and even to expose

himself personally to all its dangers. In this determination, he boldly

marched from the city of Quito directly towards the enemy, as if assured

of gaining a victory. To Don Alfonzo de Montemayor, who commanded his

first company with the royal standard, he assigned the office of

lieutenant-general, commanding every one to obey him in that capacity.

Cepeda and Bazan led the cavalry, and Ahumada carried the great

standard. Sancho Sanchez de Avila, Hernandez Giron, Pedro Heredia, and

Rodrigo Nunnez de Bonilla were captains of infantry, over which Juan de

Cabrera commanded as major-general. The viceroy was earnestly requested

by all his officers not to engage in the front of battle as he intended,

but to take post in the rear with fifteen horsemen, whence he might send

succours to wherever they might be required; yet, when the engagement

was about to commence, the viceroy rode up to the vanguard, and took his

place beside the lieutenant-general, Don Alfonzo, in front of the royal

standard. On this occasion the viceroy was mounted on a grey horse,

dressed in an upper garment of white muslin, with large slashes, shewing

an under vest of crimson satin fringed with gold. Just before beginning

the engagement, he addressed his troops to the following effect: "I do

not pretend, my loyal friends, to encourage you by my words and example,

as I rather look for an example of bravery from your courageous efforts,

and am fully convinced you will do your duty as brave and faithful

subjects of our gracious sovereign. Knowing therefore your inviolable

fidelity to the king our common master, I have only to say that we are

engaged in the cause of God." These last words he repeated several

times, exclaiming, "It is the cause of God! It is the cause of God!"

After this short exhortation, the viceroy with Don Alfonzo and Bazan

advanced to the charge, being opposed on the other side by the

licentiate Carvajal. Gonzalo Pizarro had likewise intended to have taken

post in the front of battle, but his officers insisted upon his

remaining in the rear with eight or ten horsemen. In the first charge

the cavalry shivered their lances, after which they continued to fight

obstinately with swords, battle-axes and war-clubs or maces. In this

part of the battle the cavalry of the viceroy were much galled by a line

of musqueteers of the adverse army which plied them in flank. While

fighting bravely, the viceroy beat down one of the insurgents named

Montalva; but immediately afterwards received so severe a blow on the

head with a battle-axe from Ferdinand de Torres, that he fell stunned

from his horse. Indeed, both he and his horse had been so excessively

fatigued by the difficult march of the preceding night, in which they

had neither been able to take food or rest, that they were both easily

overthrown. While this was passing with the cavalry of the van, the

infantry on both sides advanced to engage, setting up such loud shouts,

that one would have believed them much more numerous than they were in

reality. Juan de Cabrera was slain at the very commencement of this part

of the battle. Sancho de Avilla, advanced boldly at the head of his

company to attack the enemy, brandishing a two-handed sword, which he

employed with so much strength and address that he soon broke through

and defeated half of the company by which he was opposed. But as the

soldiers of Pizarro were more numerous in this part of the field than

those who followed Avilla, he was surrounded on all sides, and he and

most of his men slain. Until the death of the viceroy was known, the

battle was very bravely contested by his infantry; but as soon as the

knowledge of that unfortunate event had spread through their ranks, they

lost heart and relaxed in their efforts, and were soon entirely defeated

with considerable slaughter. At this time, the licentiate Carvajal

observed Pedro de Puelles about to end the life of the unfortunate

viceroy, already insensible and almost dead in consequence of the blow

he had received from De Torres and a wound from a musquet ball: Carvajal

immediately dismounted and cut off his head, saying, "That his only

object in joining the party of Gonzalo was to take vengeance for the

death of his brother."

When the victory was completely decided, Gonzalo Pizarro ordered a

retreat to be sounded to recal his troops who were engaged in pursuit of

the enemy. In this battle, the royalists lost about two hundred men,

while only seven were slain on the side of the victors. Pizarro ordered

the slain to be buried on the field of battle, and caused the bodies of

the viceroy and Sancho de Avilla to be carried to Quito, where they were

buried with much solemn pomp, attending himself at the funeral and in

mourning[20]. He soon afterwards ordered ten or twelve of the principal

royalists to be hanged, who had taken shelter in the churches of Quito,

or had concealed themselves in other places. The oydor Alvarez,

Benalcazar governor of Popayan, and Don Alfonzo de Montemayor, were

wounded and made prisoners in the battle. Gonzalo intended to have

ordered Don Alfonzo to be beheaded; but as he had many friends among the

insurgents who interceded for his life, and who assured Gonzalo that he

could not possibly recover from his wounds, he was spared. Some time

afterwards, Gomez de Alvarado sent notice to Benalcazar that it was

intended to administer poison to these three prisoners in the dressings

applied to their wounds or in their food; and accordingly he and Don

Alfonzo took great precautions to avoid this treachery. As the oydor

Alvarez was lodged in the same house with his brother judge Cepeda, he

had not in his power to use similar precautions, and died soon after;

and every one believed that he was poisoned in some almond soup.

[Footnote 20: This authentic circumstance by no means agrees with the

assertion in the History of America, II. 376, that the head of the

viceroy was affixed on the public gibbet in Quito. From the text of

Zarate, this battle appears to have been fought on the 16th January

1546. In the History of America, it is dated on the 18th; but the

difference is quite immaterial.--E.]

Finding that he could not get secretly rid of Don Alfonzo as he wished,

and having no hope of gaining him over to his party, Pizarro resolved to

banish him into Chili, above a thousand leagues from Quito, and to send

to the same place Rodrigo de Bonilla the treasurer of Quito, and seven

or eight other persons of importance, who had always faithfully

accompanied the viceroy under every change of fortune. Gonzalo did not

put these men to death, as several of his own partizans interceded for

their lives; and he did not deem it prudent to keep them near his

person, or to permit them to remain in Peru. These exiles were

accordingly sent off for Chili, under the charge of Antonio de Ulloa

with a party of soldiers. After a march of more than four hundred

leagues, mostly on foot, although their wounds were not entirely healed,

these prisoners determined to make an effort to recover their liberty,

or to lose their lives in the attempt. They accordingly rose against

Ulloa and his men with so much courage and resolution that they

succeeded in making him and most of his men prisoners. Being near a

sea-port, they contrived by great address to gain possession of a

vessel, in which were several soldiers and others of the insurgent party

whom they overpowered; and leaving all their prisoners, they embarked

without either sailors or pilot, and though none of them were in the

least acquainted with navigation, they had the good fortune to reach New

Spain.

Not satisfied with wreaking his vengeance on those of his enemies who

had fallen into his hands in consequence of the victory of Quito,

Gonzalo sent Guevara to the city of Parto to apprehend some of his

enemies who resided in that place, one of whom only was put to death,

and all the rest sent into exile. He pardoned Benalcazar, who promised

faithfully to become attached to his party, and sent him back to his

government of Popayan, with part of the troops he had brought from

thence in the service of the viceroy. He likewise assembled all the

fugitive troops of the viceroy, to whom he in the first place urged the

many causes of displeasure which he had for their past conduct, yet

pardoned them as he knew they had either been misled or forced to act

against him, and promised, if they served him faithfully in the sequel,

that he would treat them as well as those who had been on his side from

the beginning, and would reward them equally when the country was

restored to peace. He sent off messengers in every direction, to

announce the victory he had obtained, and to encourage his partizans, so

that his usurpation seemed established in greater security than ever.

Captain Alarcon was sent to Panama, to communicate the intelligence to

Hinojosa, with orders to bring back along with him Vela Nunnez and the

others who had been made prisoners in that quarter.

SECTION V.

_Continuation of the Usurpation of Gonzalo Pizarro, to the arrival of

Gasca in Peru with full powers to restore the Colony to order._

At this period, some of Gonzalo's adherents advised him to send his

fleet to scour the coasts of Nicaragua and New Spain, on purpose to take

or burn all the vessels which might be found in these parts, by which he

would effectually secure himself from any attack by sea. By this means,

they alleged, when the dispatches and orders from his majesty should

arrive in the Tierra Firma, finding no means of sending these into Peru,

the ministers of the crown would be under the necessity of granting him

favourable terms of accommodation almost equal to his wishes. Pizarro

however had great confidence in the fidelity and attachment of Hinojosa

and those who were with him, believing that he might trust implicitly to

their vigilance, and refused to follow the measures proposed, as tending

to evince too much weakness and want of confidence in the goodness of

the cause in which he was engaged. He was besides so puffed up by the

victory which he had gained over the viceroy, that he believed himself

able to resist any power which could now be brought against him.

Alarcon went accordingly to Panama, whence he brought back to Peru the

prisoners who had been taken at that place by Hinojosa, and was

accompanied on his return by the son of Gonzalo. When near Puerto Viejo

on his voyage back, Alarcon ordered Saavedra and Lerma, two of his chief

prisoners, to be hanged on account of some words they were said to have

spoken against the insurgents. He was disposed to have put Rodrigo

Mexia, another of these prisoners, to death at the same time; but the

son of Gonzalo pleaded strongly to save his life, by representing how

kindly he had been used by Mexia while in his custody. Vela Nunnez was

conducted to Quito, where he was pardoned by Gonzalo, yet admonished to

behave very carefully for the future, as the slightest suspicion would

be fatal. Cepeda, one of the oydors of the royal audience, always

continued to accompany Gonzalo, so that Ortiz de Zarate, the only judge

who remained in Lima was unable to act in the absence of all the other

judges. Indeed he was now less feared, ever since Gonzalo Pizarro had

almost by force procured a marriage between one of the daughters of that

judge and his brother Blas Soto[21]. Still however this judge retained

every proper sentiment of loyalty to the king, although constrained by

the exigency of the times to conceal his principles, and to seem in some

measure reconciled to the usurper.

[Footnote 21: Of this brother of the Pizarro family, no other notice

occurs in Zarate.--E.]

While these transactions were going on in the north of Peru, the

lieutenant-general Carvajal continued his operations in the south

against Centeno. As formerly related, he departed from Cuzeo with three

hundred men, well provided with horses, musquets and other arms,

marching by way of the Collao for the province of Paria, in which

Centeno then was with about two hundred and fifty men, determined to

await the arrival of the enemy and to run the chance of battle. When

Carvajal was come within about two leagues of that place, Centeno

retired a short space to the other side of the city, taking post on the

side of a river in what appeared to him strong ground, and Carvajal took

possession of the _tambo_ of Paria, about a league from the camp of

Centeno. Next day, Centeno sent fifteen well mounted musqueteers to bid

defiance to Carvajal, and to challenge him to battle. On arriving within

a stones throw of the tambo, they required a conference with Carvajal,

to whom they delivered the following message: "That Centeno was ready to

give battle in the cause of his majesty; but if Carvajal, who had grown

old in the royal service, would return to his duty and abandon the

service of the usurper, Centeno and all his followers would be happy to

serve under his command." To this message Carvajal only returned abusive

language, and the two parties mutually reproached each other as rebels

and traitors. After some time spent in this manner, the fifteen

royalists discharged their musquets and returned to Centeno, to whom

they gave an account of the number and disposition of the enemy. This

occurrence took place on Holy Friday in the year 1546.

Immediately after this defiance, Carvajal put his troops in motion to

attack the royalists, but Centeno thought proper to retire to a more

advantageous post, not deeming it prudent to run the risk of a pitched

battle, and meaning rather to harass the enemy by means of skirmishes

and night attacks. He was likewise in hopes that a good many of those

who followed Carvajal might come over to his side as opportunity

offered, as he understood many of them were much discontented with the

harsh and brutal behaviour of the lieutenant-general, whom they served

from fear and constraint, not from attachment. Besides, Centeno was

unwilling to run the risk of battle, as Carvajal though inferior in

cavalry to the royalist party was greatly superior in point of fire

arms. In fact this resolution of retreating was much against the

inclination of Centeno, who wished to have given battle to Carvajal; but

as all the inhabitants of La Plata on his side opposed that measure, he

was obliged to conform to their wishes, yet always determined to give

battle on the first favourable opportunity. Centeno accordingly

retreated fifteen leagues that day, and was followed by Carvajal with

great diligence, insomuch that the hostile parties encamped at night

very near each other, on which occasion Carvajal confided the guard of

his camp to such of his followers as he could most surely depend upon.

Towards midnight, Centeno detached eighty horsemen to assault the camp

of the insurgents, which they did accordingly with much spirit, making

several discharges of their fire arms, but without any favourable

impression; as Carvajal drew up his troops in order of battle, and kept

them all night in their ranks, strictly forbidding any one to quit their

post on any pretence, lest some might desert over to the enemy. At break

of day, Centeno decamped and resumed his march, and was followed by

Carvajal with equal diligence always very near. In this second day of

the retreat the two parties marched ten leagues, or near forty miles;

and towards evening Camijal came up with one of the soldiers belonging

to Centeno, who had lagged behind owing to extreme fatigue. Carvajal

ordered him immediately to be hanged, swearing that he would treat every

one of the enemy who fell into his hands in the same manner.

Centeno continued always to retreat, and Carvajal to pursue close in his

rear, both parties using the utmost possible diligence, insomuch that

they every day marched twelve or fifteen long leagues, almost always

within sight of each other. After some days, Centeno made a countermarch

upon Paria by taking a different road, and even directed his march,

towards the Collao, always followed by Carvajal. At Hayohayo[22]

Carvajal came up with twelve soldiers belonging to Centeno, who had

fallen behind, all of whom he ordered to be hanged. In consequence of

these continued rapid marches, several of the soldiers of both sides

used daily to lag behind from excessive fatigue, all of whom endeavoured

to hide themselves as well as they could to avoid being made prisoners.

Finding his force daily diminishing, Centeno complained loudly of his

officers and followers for having prevented him from fighting; and as he

found the whole country through which he now marched attached to the

enemy, he determined to direct his march towards the coast intending to

escape if possible by sea. For this purpose he took the direction of

Arequipa, and sent off one of his officers named Ribadeneyra to

endeavour to procure a ship somewhere on the coast, which he was to

bring to Arequipa, that it might be in readiness to embark the whole

remnant of the retreating party immediately on their arrival[23].

Ribadeneyra fell in with a ship on the coast which was ready to sail for

Chili, of which he easily took possession, and found it well adapted for

his purpose.

[Footnote 22: The Callao is a district at the north end of the great

lake of Titicaca. Paria and Hayohayo are two towns on the east side of

the Rio Desaguadero, which flows from the south into the lake of

Titicaca.--E.]

[Footnote 23: Arequipa is not less than twenty-five miles from the

nearest coast, at which place there is a bay or port named La

Guata.--E.]

"In the course of this pursuit, it happened, one day that Centeno had to

pass a deep dell or narrow valley between two mountains, as often

happens in that country, the descent to which was about a league from

the top to a stream of water in the bottom, yet the hills were so

precipitous and close together that their tops hardly exceeded a musquet

shot. As Carvajal was well acquainted with this pass, he was confident

of catching his enemy at this place as in a trap; believing that while

Centeno was descending to the bottom, he should be able to gain the top

of the hill, whence he might greatly annoy Centeno and his men while

clambering up the opposite hill. Centeno was however fully aware of his

danger, and was accordingly very careful to provide against the mischief

which he foresaw might occur. He therefore placed six of his best

mounted cavalry in ambush near the top of the first mountain, with

directions to assail the rear of Carvajal's troops after the van and

main body were past, so as to make a diversion and oblige Carvajal to

return to succour his people, by which he and his men would be enabled,

to get beyond the pass in safety. The ambush accordingly remained

concealed until Carvajal and the best part of his troops were gone past;

after which they sallied forth, and fell with great resolution on the

rear which was marching on in disorder, consisting of a mixed multitude

of Indians, Negroes, and straggling Spaniards, with horses mules and

other beasts of burden, all in confusion and disorder, among whom they

did great execution. Although he heard the noise occasioned by this

unexpected assault, Carvajal continued his march for some time,

believing it only a false alarm. The six horsemen therefore continued

their assault almost unopposed, carrying all before them, and doing

incredible mischief. Among the rest they overthrew a loaded mule which

carried several quintals of gun-powder, which they blew up with so

violent a noise that Carvajal was convinced of the serious nature of the

assault, and found it necessary to desist from the pursuit of Centeno,

and to return for the protection of his rear. When the six horsemen

belonging to Centeno observed the approach of the troops of Carvajal,

they immediately fled by cross ways and bye paths, under the guidance of

some friendly Indians, and rejoined Centeno six or seven days

afterwards. By this successful stratagem Centeno was enabled to escape

across the dangerous pass, and even gained considerably in the retreat,

as Carvajal was obliged to remain on the top of the first mountain all

the rest of that day and the following night. Carvajal was much

displeased at being thus foiled by one so much less experienced than he

in the art of war, and observed to his officers, that during forty years

service in the wars of Italy, where he had seen many fine retreats,

accomplished by the king of France, by Antonio de Leyva, Count Pedro de

Navarro, Mark Antony Colona, and other famous captains, he had never

seen one so excellently contrived as this by Centeno[24]."

[Footnote 24: This paragraph, marked by inverted commas, is inserted

from Garcilasso de la Vega in the text, as too long for a note.--E.]

Centeno arrived soon afterwards at Arequipa, and in less than two days

Carvajal arrived there in pursuit. As the vessel procured by Ribadeneyra

was not come to that part of the coast, and Centeno had not even

received notice of its capture, he determined to dismiss his followers,

now reduced to eighty men, that they might endeavour to escape

separately, being utterly unable to make head against the enemy who was

fast approaching. Centeno, accompanied only by two friends, withdrew,

into the mountains, where he remained concealed in a cave till the

arrival of the licentiate Gasca, being all the time supplied with

provisions by a friendly cacique. On arriving at the coast of Arequipa,

Carvajal was informed that Centeno and his people were dispersed; and

hearing that Lope de Mendoza was at no great distance with eight or ten

of the royalists, he detached one of his officers with twenty mounted

musqueteers in pursuit. Mendoza however fled with so much diligence,

that although followed for more than eighty leagues, his pursuers were

unable to overtake him, and were at last obliged to return. Mendoza

continued his retreat beyond the ridge of the Andes, into the eastern

plain of the Rio Plata, where we must leave him for the present to

continue the narrative of events in Peru.

Soon after the arrival of Carvajal in Arequipa, the ship which, had been

seized by Ribadeneyra appeared on the coast, and Carvajal was informed

by some of the soldiers of Centeno who remained at Arequipa of the

intention of this vessel, and of the signal which had been agreed, upon

between Centeno and Ribadeneyra. Wishing to gain possession of the

vessel, Carvajal concealed twenty musqueteers near the coast, and made

the appointed signal. Ribadeneyra at first believed that the signal was

made by order of Centeno and sent the boat on shore; but having some

suspicions of the actual state of affairs, he directed the people in the

boat to be extremely cautious against surprize before venturing on

shore. They accordingly, refused to land, unless Centeno himself made

his appearance; and as this of course could not be complied with, they

returned to the ship, with which Ribadeneyra immediately set sail for

Nicaragua. As no part of the late force under Centeno remained in the

field, Carvajal resolved to take up his residence for some time in the

city of La Plata, as he was informed that Centeno and his friends had

concealed a large quantity of treasure at that place, and that he might

both endeavour to discover that deposit, and might draw as large a sum

as possible from the rich mines in that neighbourhood. Carvajal was

willing to communicate to Gonzalo a portion of the wealth he expected to

acquire in that district, for defraying the expences of the war; but he

proposed especially to enrich himself on this occasion, being

exceedingly covetous, as has been already remarked. He accordingly went

to La Plata, which submitted without resistance, and remained there for

a considerable time amassing wealth, till obliged to take the field

against Mendoza.

Lope de Mendoza, as already mentioned, made his escape from Arequipa

with a small number of followers, and was pursued for a long way. He for

some time followed the line of the coast, and after he had eluded the

pursuit of the party sent after him by Carvajal, he and his companions

resolved so endeavour to penetrate into the government of Diego de Roias

on the Rio Plata, as all the country of Peru had universally submitted

to the domination of Gonzalo. For this purpose Mendoza followed the same

route which Centeno had formerly taken when retreating from Alfonso de

Toro; both because he thought his enemies would not pursue him by that

road and because the Indians belonging to Centeno and himself dwelt in

that part of the country, and he expected to procure provisions and

other assistance from them. While travelling across these deserts,

Mendoza met with Gabriel Bermudez, who had accompanied Diego de Roias on

his expedition into the country on the Rio Plata. From this person

Mendoza was informed of the events which had occurred to the expedition

under De Roias, of which the following is an abstract:

Diego de Roias, Philip Gutierrez and Pedro de Heredia, who went upon

this expedition, had to fight their way among hostile Indians, in the

course of which De Roias was slain. After his death, violent disputes

arose between Francisco de Mendoza who succeeded in the command and the

other officers engaged in the expedition, in the course of which

Gutierrez was cashiered and banished. They continued after this to

prosecute their discoveries all the way to the Rio Plata, receiving

information that great riches were to be found in some districts in the

neighbourhood, in which there were certain Spaniards who had penetrated

into the country by ascending the Rio Plata from the Atlantic, and had

formed establishments in the interior. In prosecuting the exploration,

of that great river, they had fallen in with some forts which were built

by Sebastian Gabota; and reported many other surprizing and wonderful

things which they had seen in that country. In the course of their

proceedings, Francisco de Mendoza was assassinated by Pedro Heredia,

owing to which violent disputes had taken place among them, by which and

the smallness of their force they had been rendered unable to proceed in

conquering the country, so that at length they had come to the

resolution of returning into Peru, that his majesty or the viceroy of

that kingdom might nominate a new commander. They were likewise

persuaded, when the riches of the country in which they had been came to

be known, that they would be able to procure a considerable accession of

new adventurers, so as to enable them to atchieve the conquest.

In the course of their expedition they asserted that they had penetrated

six hundred leagues to the eastwards of La Plata, through a champaign

country of very easy access, and tolerably abounding in provisions and

water. Bermudez added, that within a very few days they had learnt, from

some Indians who occasionally traded into the province of Las Charcas,

of the revolt which had taken place in Peru, but had been unable to

procure information respecting the causes of this insurrection or as to

who were chiefly engaged in it; for which reason he had been sent on

before to inquire into these circumstances, and had received orders from

the captains and other principal persons in the expedition, to offer

their services to the party that acted for the royal interests, in which

cause they might be of material importance, as they had a considerable

number of excellent horses and plenty of arms. After the conclusion of

this narrative, Mendoza gave Bermudez an account of all the late events

in Peru; on which, in, virtue of the commission with which he had been

entrusted, Bermudez promised in the name of all his companions to march

against the lieutenant-general.

Lope Mendoza and Bermudez went after this to meet the troops which were

returning from the Rio Plata, which were at no great distance. When they

were informed of the situation of affairs in Peru, they received Lope

with every demonstration of respect, and confirmed the offers of

assistance which Bermudez had already made in their name, declaring

their resolution to devote themselves heartily to the service of the

king. Lope de Mendoza gave them hearty commendations for their loyalty,

and represented to them how honourable and praiseworthy it was to exert

their utmost endeavours in the cause of their lawful sovereign; assuring

them that they might all depend upon being amply provided for, when the

country was restored to obedience. Lope de Mendoza was unanimously

received as their chief, and conducted them to the village of Pocona,

about forty leagues to the north-east of La Plata; whence he sent some

confidential persons to certain secret places where he and Centeno had

hidden above a thousand marks of silver under ground. On recovering this

treasure, he proposed to divide it among those persons who had so nobly

offered to follow his orders; but most of them refused his preferred

bounty, either because they were already sufficiently rich, or because

hitherto the soldiers who had been engaged in the wars of Peru had been

unused to any regular pay, and only accepted money to answer their

immediate wants, and to provide themselves with horses and arms. Even

the lowest soldier, in those days expected, when the enterprizes of

their leaders succeeded, to be rewarded for his services in repartitions

or advantageous establishments in the country, by which they flattered

themselves to acquire riches, so great was the reputation of the

richness of Peru. By means of these men from the Rio Plata, Lope Mendoza

found himself unexpectedly at the head of an hundred and fifty well

mounted cavalry; all excellently armed and equipped for service. It was

a great misfortune to the royal cause, that Centeno was now concealed,

instead of having retreated into the interior along with Mendoza as he

had done formerly; as if he had now been at the head of the royalists,

with this important reinforcement, affairs might have taken a better

turn than they actually did.

While Carvajal was on his way from Arequipa for the city of La Plata, he

received intelligence of the success of Gonzalo Pizarro at Quito, and

that all Peru was entirely reduced under his command. He resolved

therefore to repair to La Plata, as formerly mentioned, intending to

regulate the affairs of the province of Las Charcas, and to collect

treasure. On his arrival however at Paria on his way to La Plata he

received intelligence of the arrival of the troops from the Rio Plata

and of their junction with Lope Mendoza. Being informed at the same time

that these unexpected opponents were by no means united among

themselves, and that they marched very carelessly in separate and

unconnected detachments, most of which refused to acknowledge any one as

their commander, he determined to set out against them with the utmost

diligence, that he might fall upon them in their present divided state.

Being rejoined by the detachment which had pursued Lope Mendoza, and

having put his men in order for a fresh expedition, Carvajal set out

from La Plata and marched towards the enemy with the utmost possible

speed, encouraging his troops by the assurance of an easy and bloodless

victory, even asserting that he had received letters from the principal

officers among the enemy in which they offered their services to him, so

that they would only have the trouble of marching, without any danger of

fighting.

During this march Carvajal was joined by thirty men in addition to his

former force, so that he was now at the head of two hundred and fifty

men. At length he came in sight of Pocona, which is eighty leagues from

Paria, about four o'clock of an afternoon, and made his appearance in

good order, on the top of a rising ground within view of Lope de

Mendoza, who was then making a distribution of money among such of his

new companions as were willing to accept his bounty: Mendoza had already

got some intimation of the approach of Carvajal; and as his own force

consisted entirely of cavalry, most of whom were persons of some

consideration, remarkably well mounted and armed, he drew up his men in

good order in a plain at some distance from the village, in which he

left the baggage and his money; saying, that he trusted through their

bravery to be soon able to recover both, and even to increase their

store by that belonging to their enemies. Carvajal immediately descended

from the hill he had first taken possession of, and took post in the

place which Mendoza had just quitted, which was an inclosare of

considerable extent surrounded with walls, in which there were openings

in several places. Carvajal chose this as a convenient post for the

night, in which the enemy would not be able to attack with their

cavalry. On learning that Lope de Mendoza and his men had left their

baggage in the town of Pocona, the troops of Carvajal immediately

quitted their ranks to go in search of plunder, insomuch that Carvajal

was left in his camp with hardly eight men. If Mendoza had availed

himself of this opportunity to attack Carvajal, he might have gained an

easy victory, and might have boasted of having left his baggage exposed

to plunder as a stratagem of war, which on similar occasions had often

been the cause of signal victories. On purpose to recall his troops to

their duty, Carvajal ordered a false alarm to be sounded, which

occasioned the return of the greater part of his men; but so strong was

their avidity for spoil that most part of the night was spent before

they all returned to the camp.

At this time there was a secret conspiracy entered into by many of

Carvajal's followers, with the intention of putting him to death out of

revenge for his harsh and tyrannical conduct towards them, and one Pedro

de Avendano, his secretary, in whom he reposed entire confidence was the

principal ringleader of the conspirators. To facilitate the execution of

this enterprize, Avendano, sent a message by a clever fellow of an

Indian to give Mendoza notice of the intentions of the conspirators, and

to request he would make an attack upon Carvajal's camp in the course of

the night, in the confusion attendant upon which he and the other

conspirators might have an opportunity of executing their intended plot.

Mendoza had previously determined upon withdrawing about four or five

leagues from Pocona, to a level plain in which his cavalry would be able

to act with much advantage. But on receiving the message of Avendano, he

ordered his men to hold themselves in readiness to attack the camp of

Carvajal at the going down of the moon, preferring the obscurity of

night in order to avoid the danger of the more numerous firearms of the

enemy. At that time he advanced in good order towards the enemy, sending

some scouts in advance, who made prisoner of one of Carvajal's soldiers.

After interrogating this man, they advanced to the openings of the wall

which surrounded the camp, which they found guarded by some musqueteers

and pikemen. Mendoza made a brisk attack, but was bravely resisted by

the enemy, and so great was the confusion and noise that it was

impossible to enter upon any parley, as no one could be heard by reason

of the continual firing and the shouts of the combatants.

Immediately on the alarm, Carvajal used his utmost efforts to get his

troops into order and to animate and encourage them to exert themselves

against the enemy. At this period, Avendano pointed out Carvajal to a

musqueteer who was one of the conspirators, and encouraged him to take a

steady aim at the lieutenant-general; but owing to the darkness, the

shot missed of its intended effect; and only wounded him in one of his

thighs. Finding himself wounded, and being satisfied it had been done by

one of his own people, Carvajal deemed it prudent to conceal the

circumstance for the present; and retired along with Avendano, of whose

fidelity he had no suspicion, on purpose to disguise himself in an old

brown coat-and a shabby hat, that he might not be conspicuous, after

which he returned to animate his men to defend the camp. Avendano again

pointed him out to another conspirator, who fired a second time at

Carvajal, but entirely missed his aim. In the meantime the assailants

frequently called out to know if Carvajal were dead; but receiving no

answer, and finding that all the avenues to the camp were bravely

defended, Lope de Mendoza drew off his men. In this night engagement

about fourteen were slain on both sides, and several wounded. Carvajal

got his wound secretly dressed, so that none of his people knew that

such a thing had happened.

After the cessation of the engagement, one Placentia deserted from

Carvajal's camp, and informed Mendoza that all the baggage belonging to

Carvajal and his troops had been left at a place which he described

about five or six leagues from Pocona, among which was a large quantity

of gold and silver, several horses, and some musquets and powder. On

this information, Meodoza set off immediately with his troops for that

place, guided by the deserter; and marching diligently all the remainder

of the night, he arrived quite unexpectedly at the place where Carvajal

had secured his baggage; but as the night was exceedingly dark, above

seventy of his men lost their way and fell behind. Yet, with such of his

people as had kept up with him, Mendoza took possession of the whole

without any resistance. After this, being sensible that he was not in

sufficient force to cope with Carvajal, Mendoza resolved to retreat by

way of the desert in which Centeno had formerly taken shelter, which he

did accordingly with about fifty men, all the rest of his troops having

fallen behind during the night, as already mentioned. In the prosecution

of this plan of retreat, Mendoza and his people reached a certain river

about two leagues and a half from Pocona, where they halted to take some

rest and refreshment after the excessive fatigues of the past night.

Carvajal was soon apprised of the capture of his baggage and the route

which Mendoza had taken, and immediately set off in pursuit with about

fifty of his best mounted troops; and, using every possible diligence,

he came to the place where Mendoza had halted, about noon of the next

day, and immediately attacked the royalists, some of whom were asleep,

while others were taking food. Thus unexpectedly assailed, and believing

that Carvajal was followed by his whole force, the royalists made a

feeble resistance, and very soon took to flight, dispersing themselves

in every direction. Lope de Mendoza and Pedro de Heredia, with a good

many others, were made prisoners and Carvajal immediately ordered these

two chiefs, and six or seven other principal persons among the royalists

to be beheaded.

On this occasion Carvajal recovered the whole of his own baggage, and

got possession of all that had belonged to the enemy, with all of which

and the prisoners he had made, he returned to Pocona, engaging to do no

injury to those who had escaped from the soldiers in the late attack,

and even restored their horses arms and baggage to his prisoners, most

of whom he sent off to join Gonzalo Pizarro. On leaving Pocona, he took

Alfonso de Camargo and Luis Pardamo along with him, who had formerly

fled along with Mendoza, and whose lives he now spared, as they gave him

information respecting a considerable treasure which Centeno had

concealed under ground near Paria, and where in fact he discovered above

50,000 crowns. After this, he went with his troops to the city of La

Plata, where he proposed to reside for some time. At this place he

appointed persons in whom he could confide to the offices of judges and

magistrates, and dispatched intelligence of the success of his arms over

the whole kingdom of Peru. He remained for some time at La Plata, where

he collected treasure from all the surrounding country, under pretence

of supplying Gonzalo Pizarro, but in reality he retained much the larger

share for himself.

Having thus succeeded, in all his enterprizes and established his

authority in the south of Peru on such firm foundations that no

opposition remained in the whole country, fortune seemed to determine to

exalt him to the summit of his desires by the discovery of the richest

mines which had ever been known. Some Indians who belonged to Juan de

Villareal, an inhabitant of La Plata, happening to pass over a very high

isolated mountain in the middle of a plain, about eighteen leagues from

that city, named Potosi, noticed by some indications that it contained

mines of silver. They accordingly took away some specimens of the ore

for trial, from which they found that the mineral was exceedingly rich

in pure silver; insomuch that the poorest of the ore produced eighty

marks of pure silver from the quintal of native mineral[25], being a

more abundant production than any that ever had been heard of before.

When this discovery became known in the city of La Plata, the

magistrates went to the mountain of Potosi, which they divided among the

inhabitants of their city, setting up boundary marks to distinguish the

allotments or each person in those places which appeared eligible for

workings. So great was the resort to these new mines, that in a short

time there were above seven thousand _Yanaconas_, or Indian labourers,

established in the neighbourhood, who were employed by their Christian

masters in the various operations of these mines. These men laboured

with so much industry, that each Indian, by agreement, furnished two

marks or sixteen ounces of silver weekly to their respective masters;

and so rich was the mine, that they were able to do this and to retain

an equal quantity to themselves[26]. Such is the nature of the ore

extracted from the mineral veins of this mountain, that it cannot be

reduced in the ordinary manner by means of bellows, as is customary in

other places. It is here smelted in certain small furnaces, called

_guairas_ by the Indians, which are supplied with a mixed fuel of

charcoal and sheeps dung, and are blown up by the wind only, without the

use of any mechanical contrivance.

[Footnote 25: This produce is most extraordinarily large, being equal to

_four_ parts of pure silver from _ten_ of ore, or 640 ounces of silver

from the quintal or 1600 ounces of ore. At the present time, the silver

mines in Mexico, which are the most productive of any that have ever

been known, are remarkable for the poverty of the mineral they contain.

A quintal or 1600 ounces of ore affording only at an average 3 or 4

ounces of pure silver. The profit therefore of these must depend upon

the abundance of ore, and the facility with which it is procured and

smelted.--E.]

[Footnote 26: The gross amount of this production of silver, on the data

in the text, is 11,648,000 ounces yearly; worth, at 5s. 6d. per ounce,

L. 3,203,200 sterling; and, estimating silver in those days, at six

times its present efficacy, worth L. 19,219,200 of modern value. In the

present day before the revolutionary troubles, Humboldt estimates the

entire production of gold and silver from Spanish and Portuguese America

at L. 9,787,500; only about three times the quantity said to have been

at first extracted from Potosi alone, and only about half the effective

value.--E.]

These rich mines are known by the name of Potosi, which is that of the

district, or province in which the mountain is situated. Owing to the

easy labour and great profit experienced by the Indians at these mines,

when any of the Yanaconas was once established at this place it was

found almost impossible to induce them to leave it or to work elsewhere;

and indeed, they were here so entirely concealed from all dangers, and

so much exempted from their usual severe drudgery and the unwholesome

vapours they had been subjected to in other mines, that they preferred

working at Potosi to any other situation. So great was the concourse of

inhabitants to Potosi, and the consequent demand for provisions, _that

the sack of maize was sold for twenty crowns, the sack of wheat for

forty, and a small bag of _coca_ for thirty dollars; and these articles

rose afterwards to a higher price. Owing to the astonishing

productiveness of these new mines, all the others in that part of Peru

were speedily abandoned. Even those of Porco, whence Ferdinand Pizarro

had formerly procured great riches, were left unwrought. All the

Yanaconas who had been employed in searching for gold in the province of

Carabaya, and in the auriferous rivers in different parts of southern

Peru, flocked to Potosi, where they were able to make vastly more profit

by their labour than in any other place. From various indications, those

who are most experienced in mining believe that Potosi will always

continue productive and cannot be easily exhausted[27].

[Footnote 27: It has however become very much exhausted, and has been in

a great measure abandoned. The mines of Lauricocha, in a different part

of Peru, are now in greater estimation. But those of Guanaxuato and

Zacatecas in Mexico, notwithstanding the poverty of their ore, have been

long the most productive of the American mines.--E.]

Carvajal did not fail to take advantage of this favourable discovery,

and immediately set about the acquisition of treasure for himself by

every means which his present uncontroulable power afforded. In the

first place, he appropriated to his own use all the Yanaconas, or Indian

labourers in the mines, which had belonged, to such of the inhabitants

as had opposed him, or to those who had died or fled from the province.

He likewise appropriated to his own use above 10,000 Peruvian sheep,

belonging to the Yanaconas of the crown or to individuals, which were

employed in transporting provisions for the miners. By these means, he

amassed in a short time near 200,000 crowns, all of which he retained to

his own use. His soldiers were so much dissatisfied with his conduct, as

he gave them no share of his exactions, that they plotted together

against him. Luis Pardamo, Alfonso de Comargo, Diego de Balsameda, and

Diego de Luxan, with thirty others, who had entered into this

conspiracy, had determined to put him to death about a month after his

arrival in La Plata from his expedition against Mendoza; but, owing to

some obstacles, they had been induced to deter the execution of their

enterprize to a future period. By some unknown means the circumstances

of this plot came to the knowledge of Carvajal, who put to death the

before-mentioned leaders of the conspiracy, and ten or twelve others,

and banished all the rest. By these merciless executions, in which he

indulged on all occasions, Carvajal inspired so much terror that no one

dared in future to make any similar attempt; as he not only punished in

the severest manner all who evinced any intention of revolt, but put

people to death on the slightest suspicion. Owing to this the loyal

servants of his majesty may assuredly be exculpated from the blame which

has been imputed to them, for not putting Carvajal to death: In reality,

there were many persons sufficiently anxious to have done so, on purpose

to escape from the cruel tyranny under which they groaned in secret; and

four or five conspiracies were entered into for the purpose, which were

all discovered, and occasioned the destruction of at least fifty

individuals. By these means every one was terrified from attempting any

thing against him, more especially as he gave high rewards to all who

communicated any intelligence of the kind, so that all were forced to

temporize and to wait in anxious hope of some favourable opportunity to

deliver them from his cruel tyranny. Carvajal continued to remain at La

Plata, frequently publishing accounts of the successes of Gonzalo

Pizarro, to whom he often sent large remittances; derived from his own

resources, from the royal fifths which he appropriated, and from the

confiscated estates of those whom he put to death, all of which he

seized upon, under pretence of supplying funds for prosecuting the war.

From the 18th of January 1546, the day on which he defeated the viceroy,

Gonzalo Pizarro continued to reside at Quito till the middle of July of

that year, accompanied by a force of about five hundred men, occupied in

almost continual feastings and revelry. Various reasons were assigned

for his long residence in that place; some alleging that it was on

purpose to be more at hand for receiving early intelligence from Spain;

while others attribute it to the great profits he derived from the gold

mines which had been recently discovered in that neighbourhood; and

others again alleged that he was detained by attachment to the lady

formerly mentioned, whose husband he had procured to be assassinated by

Vincente Pablo. That woman was delivered, after the death of her

husband, of a child which was put to death by her father; for which

inhuman action he was ordered to be hanged by Pedro de Puelles.

During his residence in Quito, Gonzalo Pizarro sent off several

detachments of soldiers to different places, giving commissions and

instructions to their commanders in his own name as governor of Peru.

Among these, the lieutenant Benalcazar was sent back to his former

government; having been pardoned and even taken into favour by Gonzalo.

A reinforcement was also sent to Pedro de Valdivia who commanded in

Chili, under the command of Captain Ulloa, whom he had sent to ask

assistance to enable him to continue and maintain his conquests in that

country. Other officers and soldiers were sent to other parts, which are

unnecessary to be particularized. At length Gonzalo determined to leave

Quito, and to establish his residence in Lima; and it has been alleged

that he was principally induced to take this step from suspicion of the

fidelity of Lorenzo de Aldana, his lieutenant at Lima, who was so much

beloved by all the inhabitants of that city as to be almost in condition

to have revolted to the royal cause. Gonzalo is said likewise to have

been somewhat suspicious of his lieutenant-general Carvajal, being

afraid lest he might be so puffed up by the many victories he had

gained, and by his immense distance, as to be induced to set up for

himself. He accordingly left Quito under the command of Pedro de

Puelles, whom he appointed his lieutenant and captain-general in that

province, with a force of three hundred men, having great confidence in

his attachment ever since he had succoured him when in straits on his

march from Cuzco to Lima, and when his army was on the point of

abandoning him. He reposed so entirely on Puelles, that he believed, if

the king were to send any force against him by the route of the province

in which Benalcazar commanded, that Puelles would prevent them from

being able to penetrate into Peru.

While on his progress from Quito towards Lima, Gonzalo assumed in

everything the deportment and authority of governor of Peru, and was

treated in every respect as such by all the inhabitants of the country.

He seemed to believe that his authority was so well and firmly

established that he had nothing to fear from the attempts of his

enemies, and that even the king would be obliged to grant him any terms

he might require. All his officers soldiers and dependents obeyed and

respected him entirely, as if satisfied that they were always to be

subject to his authority, and to depend upon him alone for advancement

and reward. In the exercise of his usurped authority, he made many

grants or repartitions of lands and Indians, all of them for long

periods, which every one considered as secure of being continued. He and

his principal officers pretended that they frequently received letters

from some of the highest of the nobles in Spain, praising his conduct

and approving of every thing he had done, which these pretended letters

justified on account of the infringements which had been made on the

rights and privileges of the colonists. In these letters likewise, the

pretended Spanish grandees were made to engage their favour and credit

at court to support his interest and authority with the sovereign. The

well informed among the followers of Gonzalo Pizarro saw clearly that

these letters were mere fabrications to impose upon the vulgar, and had

no foundation whatever in truth.

On his arrival at the city of San Miguel, Gonzalo learned that there

were a considerable number of Indians in that neighbourhood who had not

been reduced under subjection; for which reason he gave orders to

establish a military post in the province of _Garrochamba[28]_, the

command of which he conferred on Captain Mercadillo, with a force of an

hundred and thirty men, and gave him instructions for completing the

conquest of that district, and for dividing the lands and Indians into

repartitions like the rest of the country. At this time likewise, he

detached Captain Porcel with sixty soldiers to complete the conquest of

the Bracamoros. In these proceedings, he wished it to be believed that

his sole object was for the advantage of the colony; but his real

purpose was to keep his troops on foot and in employ, in case of needing

them at a future period for his own defence in support of his

usurpation. Before leaving Quito, Gonzalo sent off the licentiate

Carvajal by sea with a party of soldiers, in the ships which Juan Alonzo

Palomino had brought from Nicaragua after his pursuit of Verdugo.

Carvajal was ordered to proceed along the coast towards Lima, and to

settle all the maritime towns in his way in good order.

[Footnote 28: No such province or district is now found in the maps of

Peru; but it appears to have been on the confines between the northern

part of Peru Proper and the southern extremity of Quito, where

Valladolid now stands.--E.]

The licentiate Carvajal after executing the before-mentioned orders,

came to Truxillo to meet Gonzalo Pizarro, whence they went together to

Lima, accompanied by a force of two hundred men. On approaching Lima,

there was a diversity of opinions among the followers of Pizarro,

respecting the ceremonies with which he should be received into the

capital of Peru. Some of his officers were desirous that the magistracy

should come out to meet him with a canopy, under which he should make

his entry after the manner usually practised with kings. Some even

proposed that a breach should be made in the walls, and some of the

houses of the city thrown down, so as to make a new entrance on purpose

in memory of his victory over the viceroy, as used to be done anciently

in Rome for the reception of triumphant generals. In this, as in all

other important affairs, Gonzalo was guided by the advice of the

licentiate Carvajal, and entered the city on horseback, preceded by all

his captains on foot leading their horses by the bridles. On this

occasion he was accompanied by the archbishop of Lima, the bishops of

Cuzco and Quito, and the bishop of Bogota, who had come into Peru by way

of Carthagena on purpose to receive consecration. He was likewise

accompanied by Lorenzo de Aldana, his lieutenant-governor of Lima, and

by all the magistrates and inhabitants of the city; no one daring to

remain at home lest they might be suspected of disaffection. The streets

were all ornamented with green herbs and flowers; all the bells of the

churches and monasteries were kept ringing; and the cavalcade was

preceded by a numerous band of trumpets kettle-drums and other warlike

instruments of music. In this pompous manner, Pizarro was conducted in

the first place to the great church, and thence to his own residence.

From this time, Gonzalo Pizarro conducted himself with much more pride

and haughtiness than formerly, conceiving high ideas of his own

importance from these public ceremonials of respect, as usually happens

to men of feeble minds on any sudden elevation. He had a guard for his

person of eighty halberdiers, besides several horsemen, who acompanied

him wherever he went. No person whatever was permitted to be seated in

his presence; and there were very few persons whom he designed to honour

so far as to return their salute. By these haughty manners, and still

more by his frequent disobliging and even abusive manner of speaking, he

displeased every one and became universally disliked. It must likewise

be mentioned, that the soldiery, to whom he owed everything, became

exceedingly discontented with him, as he gave them no pay. All this had

a powerful influence on his downfall in the sequel; though for the

present every one concealed their real sentiments, waiting for a more

favourable opportunity.

* * * * *

"Following Garcilasso de la Vega and other authors, the Historian of

America[29] alleges that Gonzalo Pizarro was urged by several of his

adherents, and in particular by Carvajal, to assume the sovereignty of

Peru; to attach the Spaniards to his interest by liberal grants of lands

and Indians, and by the creation of titles of nobility similar to those

in Europe; to establish military orders of knighthood, with privileges

distinctions and pensions, resembling those in Spain, as gratifications

to the officers in his service; and to gain the whole body of natives to

his service, by marrying the Coya, or Peruvian princess next in relation

to the reigning Inca. Thus at the head of the ancient inhabitants of the

country and of the colonists, he might set the power of Spain at

defiance, and could easily repel any force that might be sent from Spain

to such a distance. These counsellors who urged Pizarro to adopt this

plan, insisted that he had already gone too far to expect pardon from

the emperor; and endeavoured to convince him that all the founders of

great monarchies had risen by their personal merit and their own valour,

without any pretensions to ancient lineage or valid rights of

sovereignty; and that, besides, his family had a strong title to the

dominion of Peru, founded on the rights of discovery and conquest. But

the inferior talents of Gonzalo circumscribed his ambition within more

narrow bounds, and confined his views to the obtaining a confirmation of

the authority which he now possessed from the emperor; for which purpose

he sent an officer of distinction to Spain, to give such a

representation of his conduct and the state of the country, as might

induce the court, from inclination or necessity, to continue him as

governor of Peru for life. Although Garcilasso de la Vega gives full

warrant for this account of the proposals of the insurgents, Zarate, who

was then resident in a public character in Peru, makes no mention of any

such plan having been agitated, which could hardly have happened

without his knowledge: It is probable therefore that these additional

circumstances were invented by the enemies of Gonzalo after his fall, on

purpose to blacken his memory by the imputation of even deeper crimes

than those he was actually guilty of."--E.

[Footnote 29: History of America, II. 378.]

SECTION VI.

_History of the Expedition of Pedro de la Gasca, the Death of Gonzalo

Pizarro, and the Restoration of Peru to Tranquillity._

While these things were transacting in Peru, the emperor Charles V. was

residing in Germany, where he had gone on purpose to overthrow the party

of the Lutherans and others who had separated from the church of Rome.

The emperor was desirous to receive an account of the disturbances in

that distant and valuable colony from Diego Alvarez Cueto, the

brother-in-law of the late viceroy, and Francisco Maldonado the

messenger of Gonzalo Pizarro, both of whom went into Germany for that

purpose. At this time, however, though acquainted with the revolt of

Peru, the imprisonment of the viceroy, and the usurpation of the

government by Pizarro, the court necessarily remained ignorant of the

death of the viceroy. Frequent deliberations were held for devising

proper remedies to restore tranquillity to Peru; but the matter lay over

for some considerable time, in consequence of the absence of the emperor

from Spain, and because he was at this time frequently attacked by

illness. At length it was determined to send over into Peru the

licentiate Pedro de la Gasca, at that time a counsellor of inquisition.

The prudent and intelligent character of this man was already well

known, from the skill and success with which he had already conducted

several affairs of consequence with which he had been entrusted, and

particularly by the excellent dispositions and preparations which he had

made, only a few years before, to defend the kingdom of Valencia against

an expected invasion of the Turks and Moors, and in various matters

respecting the new converts in that kingdom, which he took the

management of while occupied in some of the affairs of the holy office

on which he had been sent thither by the emperor.

The title granted to Gasca on occasion of going into Peru, was only that

of president of the royal court of audience. But, by his commision, he

was invested with full powers in every thing respecting the government

of the country; to pacify the troubles and restore peace; and to pardon

as he might see proper all crimes, whether committed before his arrival

or during his residence in the country. Along with Gasca, the

licentiates Ganas and Renteria went out to Peru, as judges or oydors of

the supreme tribunal or royal court of audience. Gasca was likewise

furnished with full powers to raise troops in case of necessity, and to

do every thing that the exigency of affairs might require, without

waiting for orders or instructions from Spain. His powers and orders

however were kept secret, as it was wished to attempt the restoration of

order by gentle means; for which reason nothing was spoken of but pardon

and indemnity, and he was desired to endeavour to restore the colony to

peace and tranquillity by means of clemency if possible.

Gasca embarked from Spain in the month of May 1546, on purpose to quell

the formidable rebellion which had long subsisted in Peru, without

either money or troops, and merely accompanied by such servants and

officers of his household as were requisite to support the dignity of

his office as president of the high court of audience. On arriving at St

Martha, he received information of the defeat of Melchior Verdugo,

formerly mentioned, and that Verdugo waited for him at Carthagena with

the small remnant of his men who had escaped on that occasion. Knowing

that Hinojosa and his people were exceedingly irritated against Verdugo,

Gasca resolved to go by way of Nombre de Dios, to prevent the insurgents

from entertaining any suspicions of his pacific intentions, as he

believed they would prevent him from having any access into the country

if he held any intercourse with Verdugo, and still more if he were

joined by that obnoxious person. Gasca cast anchor in the harbour of

Nombre de Dios on the 27th of July 1546, where Hernan Mexia had been

posted by Hinojosa with an hundred and eighty men, to protect that place

and neighbourhood against Melchior Verdugo. The president sent on shore

Alfonzo de Alvarado, who had accompanied him from Spain, to notify his

arrival and the purposes of his mission to Mexia. After some conference,

they separated without communicating their real sentiments to each

other, as both were suspicious and kept up much reserve. On the return

of Alvarado to the ship, Mexia sent to request the president to

disembark, which he did accordingly. On this occasion Mexia went to meet

him, in a barge attended by twenty musqueteers, leaving the rest of his

troops drawn up on the beach. Mexia immediately left his own barge, and

accompanied the president in his boat to the shore, where he caused him

to be received with every mark of respect, under a salute from the

troops.

After landing, the president, in a private conference, gave Mexia an

account of the object of his voyage to Peru; on which Mexia expressed

his determined resolution to yield implicit obedience to the royal

orders, and to devote his services accordingly to the president. He

declared, that he had long and anxiously waited the arrival of some

person possessing authority to put an end to the troubles; and that,

fortunately, circumstances were now extremely favourable for this

purpose, without any one to oppose, as he was now the sole commander of

most of the troops belonging to Gonzalo Pizarro in that neighbourhood,

the greater part of which were now in Nombre de Dios. Mexia said farther

that, Hinojosa and the other captains having gone to Panama, he found

himself at liberty to declare himself openly for his majesty, if that

were judged proper by the president; and that they might then go in

company to Panama, where they would easily become masters of the fleet

in that port, by means which he explained; and that he was likewise

convinced that, when Hinojosa and the other captains were informed of

the powers and intentions of the president, they would receive him with

all submission. The president thanked Mexia for his good intentions,

observing that it was necessary to use lenient measures on this

occasion, as his majesty was very desirous to restore the country to

peace and good order, without having recourse to warlike measures, if it

could possibly be accomplished. As it was obvious to every one, that the

chief cause of the disturbances was owing to the inflexible rigour of

the late viceroy, he wished, therefore, that it might be known by all,

that his majesty wished to remedy all grievances in the most gracious

manner; and he trusted, therefore, when it was publickly known that all

might expect safety and pardon by returning to their duty, that all the

colonists would evince their respectful loyalty by tendering their

services, rather than continue in rebellion against the sovereign. The

president concluded by declaring his resolution to refrain from any

endeavour to use force, till all the colonists were apprized of his

intentions as now expressed.

Mexia assured the president, that he was ready to obey his orders in

all things; yet considered it proper for him to observe, that although

he was now able to command the soldiers then at Nombre de Dios; matters

might assume a very different aspect on proceeding to Panama, where the

soldiers would be under the orders of Hinojosa. The president expressed

his determination, however, to proceed in his enterprize, to which Mexia

consented; and they mutually agreed to keep their intentions secret till

affairs should take a favourable turn, as will be seen in the sequel.

When Hinojosa, who acted as general under Pizarro in the Tierra Firma,

learnt the reception which the president had met with from Mexia, he was

much dissatisfied, both because he was ignorant of the orders and

instructions under which the president acted, and because Mexia had not

communicated his intentions. Hinojosa wrote therefore to Mexia in a

harsh and peremptory manner, reflecting bitterly on his conduct, and, at

the same time, some friends of Mexia, who were then resident in Panama,

wrote to dissuade him from coming to that place, as Hinojosa was much

irritated against him for the friendly reception he had given to the

president. Notwithstanding this, it was agreed upon in a conference

between the president and Mexia, that the latter should go immediately

to Panama to confer with Hinojosa, lest the minds of the soldiery should

take any adverse turn by delay. Despising the dangers with which he was

threatened, and the suspicions that had been endeavoured to be instilled

into his mind, Mexia set out for Panama, confiding in the friendship

which subsisted between him and Hinojosa, and in his knowledge of the

character and dispositions of that officer. In an interview with

Hinojosa, he fully explained the reasons of his conduct in receiving the

president; adding, that whatever party they might choose ultimately to

favour, all that had hitherto been done could do no harm. Hinojosa was

entirely satisfied with this explanation, and allowed Mexia to return to

Nombre de Dios.

After the return of Mexia, the president went across the isthmus to

Panama, where he held separate conferences with Hinojosa and the

different captains, which he conducted with so much prudence and

secrecy, that he gained them all over to the royal cause, without any of

them having any communication with the others on the subject, so that he

was soon in condition to speak with them publickly on the objects of

his mission, having brought them all over to his sentiments and engaged

them to second his intentions. By supplying the soldiers with every

thing of which they were in need, he brought them all easily into his

measures, believing that the most effectual means of succeeding in his

mission, was by acting gently and in a conciliating manner with every

one: yet in all this he acted without meanness or servility, constantly

preserving the dignity becoming his rank and authority. In all his

negociations, the president was ably and faithfully seconded by his

major-general Alfonzo de Alvarado, who was exceedingly serviceable on

every occasion, both in consequence of having many friends among the

officers, and because those even who were not among the number were much

influenced by his authority and character. At first Hinojosa hesitated

about declaring for the president, and even notified his arrival to

Gonzalo Pizarro. Some of the captains and other principal persons at

Panama had likewise written to Gonzalo, even before the arrival of the

president at Panama, giving it as their advice that he ought not to be

allowed to enter Peru; but in the sequel these persons changed their

opinion by the persuasion of Gasca. During his residence at Panama, the

president contrived to manage so judiciously with Hinojosa, whom he

frequently visited, that he procured his consent to send Pedro Hernandez

Paniagua, a gentleman who had accompanied him from Spain, with letters

to Gonzalo Pizarro apprizing him of his arrival in Tierra Firma, and the

object of his mission. Among these letters was one from the king, to the

following effect:

THE KING, TO GONZALO PIZARRO.

"Gonzalo Pizarro, from your letters and the information of other

persons, we have been informed of the commotions and disorders which

have arisen in all the provinces of Peru, since the arrival of the

viceroy Blasco Nunnez Vela and the judges of the royal audience. We are

convinced that these troubles have been produced by endeavouring to

establish and enforce, in their utmost rigour, the new laws and

regulations which we had judged proper for the government of that

country, and for insuring good treatment to the native inhabitants. We

are satisfied that you, and those who have acted along with you during

these troubles, have not been actuated by any disinclination to your

obedience and loyalty towards us, but merely in opposition to the

extreme rigour and inexorable obstinacy of the viceroy, who refused to

listen to the supplications and remonstrances which were made to him on

the new regulations."

"Being well informed in regard to all these affairs, and having heard

every thing that Francisco Maldonado had in charge to say on the subject

from you and the inhabitants of these provinces, we have thought proper

to send over as our president the licentiate De la Gasca, a member of

our council of the holy inquisition, to whom we have given full power

and authority to do every thing that he may deem proper and necessary

for restoring tranquillity and good order in the country, to replace its

affairs on a proper footing, and to introduce such regulations as may

tend to the good of our service and the glory of God, and the advantage

of the country and its inhabitants, both such as are our natural

subjects and the original inhabitants. For this reason we will and

command, and expressly desire, that you may be punctually obedient to

every thing which the said Gasca shall order you in our name, in the

same manner as if his commands were from ourselves; and that you give

him every assistance in your power in every thing which he may require,

and which may be necessary for executing the orders which we have given

him, according as he may inform you, or shall require in our name,

conform to the confidence we repose in your fidelity. On our part, we

assure you that we entertain a just estimation of the services which you

and your brother the marquis have done, and that we shall reward the

same in time and place convenient to his children and brothers by

effective marks of our good will. Given at Venlo, this sixteenth of

February in the year of grace one thousand five hundred and forty-six."

I THE KING. _By order of his Majesty,_ FRANCISCO DE ERASO.

Along with this letter from the emperor, the president wrote to Gonzalo

Pizarro, dated on the 26th of September 1546 from Panama, and addressed

to the illustrious senior Gonzalo Pizarro, in the city of Lima, of which

the following is the substance.

"I have delayed sending the letter of his imperial majesty, which

accompanies this present communication, till now, in the hope of being

able to set out for Peru immediately after my arrival in this country,

and because it appeared more conformable to the respect and obedience

which I owe to his majesty to have delivered his royal letter in person

than to allow it to be preceded by any writing from myself. Finding,

however, that my voyage is necessarily delayed, and being informed that

you have called a meeting of the colonists at Lima to consult upon the

past transactions, and on what may be proper in the present situation of

affairs, I have thought it improper any longer to delay sending his

majestys letter, together with this from myself which I transmit by

Pedro Hernandez Paniagua, a person of honour and merit, who professes to

be your friend and servant."

"After the most mature and careful deliberations respecting all that has

occurred in Peru, since the arrival of the late viceroy in that country,

his majesty is satisfied that the commotions have not been excited by a

spirit of rebellion and disobedience in the Spanish inhabitants, but

through the inflexible rigour with which the viceroy endeavoured to

enforce the regulations, in spite of the supplications of the colonists

and their appeal to his majesty, by which they were justified in

defending themselves against so great severity, at least until they

should learn the royal will on the subject in answer to their

remonstrances. All this appears from the letter which you addressed to

his majesty, in which you declared that the principal reason which had

induced you to accept the situation of governor of Peru, was that it had

been given to you by the royal audience, in the name and under the seal

of his majesty; by the acceptance of which employment you were enabled

to do good service to the royal interests, which might otherwise have

suffered much prejudice; and as you have declared these to be your

motives for assuming the government, until his majesty might think

proper to issue his commands, which you were ready to obey like a good

and loyal subject."

"Therefore, his majesty, having seen and duly considered all these

things, and heard the opinions of his councillors thereupon, has sent me

for the express purpose of restoring peace, tranquillity, and good order

to the country, by the revocation of the obnoxious regulations, with

full power to extend his royal pardon for all that has already

occurred, and to take the opinion and advice of the colonists upon those

measures that may be most proper and advantageous for the royal service,

the glory of God, the good of the country, and the benefit of its

inhabitants. In respect to such Spaniards as cannot be provided in the

country with repartitions of lands and Indians, I have orders to employ

them in new discoveries, where they may acquire honour and riches, as

has already been done by so many other persons. I earnestly entreat you

therefore, as a Christian, and a wise and prudent gentleman of honour,

to reflect seriously on all these things. As you have hitherto always

evinced much affection and attachment to the welfare of the country and

its inhabitants, you certainly have great reason of thankfulness to the

Almighty, that in so important and delicate an affair, neither his

majesty nor his councillors have been disposed to consider your past

conduct in the light of revolt and rebellion against the legitimate

authority of the sovereign, but have rather been pleased to view it in

the light of a just and necessary defence of your own rights, and those

of the Spanish inhabitants of Peru, until the decision of his majesty

upon your supplications and remonstrances might be made manifest.

Therefore, since his majesty has been graciously pleased to grant to you

and the other colonists all that you required by your supplications, by

abrogating the obnoxious regulations, it is incumbent upon you, as an

obedient and loyal subject, to evince a respectful and prompt obedience

to the royal orders[30]."

[Footnote 30: In translating this letter the substance has been

materially compressed; omitting much loose and declamatory

argumentation, with several instances of the irresistible power of the

emperor, to convince Pizarro of the absolute necessity of submission.

Among other arguments, Gasca quotes with approbation an instance of a

Spaniard who had assassinated his brother in the midst of the German

Lutherans for deserting the religion of his country; and threatens him

with the vengeance of his brother Ferdinand if he should persist in

rebellion against his sovereign.--E.]

"I have represented all these things to you, that you may not flatter

yourself by a false confidence of being able to resist the power of his

majesty, who is able if it should so please him to employ irresistible

force in repressing the commotions and disorders of Peru, instead of

those measures of clemency, which it has pleased God that he should now

resort to; and that if reduced to the necessity of using force, it will

be necessary for his majesty to take care not to ruin the country by

sending too great a number of troops, instead of being under any

difficulty as to sending a sufficient power to overcome all possibility

of resistance. You ought likewise to reflect that matters will

necessarily take a quite different turn than they have hitherto done.

Hitherto your followers have been influenced by their own self-interest,

not only considering the late viceroy as your enemy and your cause as

good, but all of them looked upon him as their personal enemy, who

wished to deprive them of their properties, and to put to death every

one who opposed his designs. Under these circumstances your followers

were necessarily impelled to adhere to your party in the defence of

their own lives and properties. But as both are now secured, by the

revocation of the obnoxious regulations, and the amnesty granted by his

majesty, the Spanish inhabitants of Peru have now their legitimate

sovereign as their friend and protector, to whom we all owe the most

entire loyalty and obedience. I entreat you to reflect seriously on

these things, and to consider that, in the present situation of affairs,

and the turn which they must assuredly take in the sequel, you cannot

count upon the adherence of any one, if you unfortunately choose to

follow wrong measures. By contributing your assistance to put an end to

the commotions which have distracted the kingdom of Peru, the whole

inhabitants of that country will remain indebted to your exertions for

the maintenance of their rights and privileges, in having opposed the

execution of the obnoxious regulations, and having procured a favourable

attention to their supplications and remonstrances; insomuch that his

majesty has been pleased to send me with an express commission to listen

to and redress all grievances. Should you unfortunately resolve upon

refusing submission to the royal authority, you will obliterate all the

merit you derive from your past conduct; as by endeavouring to continue

the troubles and commotions, you will shew yourself actuated by motives

of personal interest and ambition, instead of any regard for the good of

the public. Instead of serving the interests of the Spanish inhabitants

of Peru, you will become the cause of infinite injury to all, and will

be considered as the enemy of the kingdom, by perpetuating the troubles,

and occasioning the destruction of the lives and fortunes of your

friends and adherents. You ought likewise to consider that, by

continuing the war, you will render it necessary to bring over a

numerous army into Peru, so that you will become accountable to God and

man for all the miseries and disorders which may follow, and for the

entire ruin of the country and its inhabitants, by which you will incur

the hatred of all the principal colonists, merchants, and other rich

persons."

"To conclude, I pray God to take you and all your followers under his

most holy protection, and that he may inspire you with proper sentiments

on this occasion, for the good service of his majesty, the eternal

welfare of your souls, and the preservation of your lives, honours, and

estates; and I remain; illustrious Sir, yours, &c.

PEDRO DE LA GASCA."

Gonzalo had only been a few days in Lima on his return from Quito, when

he received letters from Hinojosa informing him of the arrival of the

president. He was much disturbed by this intelligence, which he

immediately communicated to the captains and other principal persons of

his party, and with whom he consulted upon the steps necessary to be

taken in this conjuncture of affairs. Some were of opinion that it was

necessary to get rid of the president, either openly or by secret

assassination; while others recommended that he should be invited into

Peru, where it would be easy to oblige him to agree to all their

demands; or where at least they could draw their negociations with him

to a great length, by insisting on convening an assembly of deputies and

procurators from all the cities of the kingdom at Lima, to deliberate on

the subject of his reception, and to determine whether he should be

received or not; and, as Peru was of vast extent, it would be easy to

put off the meeting of that assembly for two years, during which period

the president might be kept in the isle of Puna under a confidential

guard, by which he might be prevented from writing to Spain that the

country was in rebellion; more especially as they could keep him in

continual suspense, by representing that the general assembly could not

meet sooner on account of the vast distance of some of the cities. Even

the most moderate were for obliging the president to return into Spain.

In this council of the leaders of the insurrection, it was likewise

proposed to send deputies from all parts of Peru to his majesty, to

explain the state of the colony, and the events which had occurred; and

particularly to exculpate their conduct in regard to the battle of Quito

in which the viceroy was slain, by throwing the whole blame upon him as

the aggressor. It was likewise proposed that these deputies should

humbly implore his majesty to invest Gonzalo Pizarro in the government

of Peru, for which especial purpose they should be so instructed and

empowered by all the cities. They were also to be instructed, during

their residence at Panama on their way into Spain, carefully to learn

what were the powers and instructions of the president; and to endeavour

to prevail upon him to delay proceeding to Peru, until they had informed

his majesty of the true state of the kingdom, that ulterior orders might

be issued in consequence. It was proposed at the same time, if the

president persisted in coming into the country, to take him into

custody. Some even proposed to put him to death during the journey,

while others proposed to have him poisoned at Panama and likewise to put

Alonzo de Alvarado to death. Many other proposals of a similar nature

and tendency are said to have been made at this time; but as all these

transactions took place in the secret meetings of the chief of the

insurgents, it is difficult or impossible to ascertain the precise

nature of their deliberations. It was besides resolved, that the

messengers who were to be sent to the president should be charged to

deliver him letters from the principal inhabitants of Lima, strongly

urging him to refrain from coming into Peru, even in terms of insolence

and implied threatening.

After long deliberations respecting the persons who should be sent into

Spain to lay their representations before the emperor, Don Jerom de

Loyasa archbishop of Lima, Lorenzo de Aldana, Friar Thomas de San

Martino provincial of the Dominicans, and Gomez de Solis were chosen for

that purpose. The provincial was much suspected by the insurgents of

being inimical to their party, by several expressions of his opinion,

both in his sermons and in private conversations: Yet they thought

proper to employ him and the others in this commission, although they

were almost equally suspicious of the rest; both to give weight to their

representations through the respectability of their messengers, and

because no other persons of any consequence in the country dared to

appear before his majesty on this occasion, being afraid of punishment

for the share they had taken in the past commotions. They considered

likewise, if these deputies should declare against them while in Spain,

as they actually suspected, that it was better to have them out of the

country; as, if matters should assume an unfavourable aspect for Gonzalo

and his adherents, these persons might have done them much injury by

remaining, as they were much respected in Peru, both on account of their

rank and character. Gomez de Solis, who was major domo to Gonzalo

Pizarro, was the only one of these commisioners in whom he reposed

confidence; though indeed some alleged that he was only intended to

proceed to Panama with a supply of money and provisions for Hinojosa and

his troops, while others believed he was to have accompanied the other

deputies into Spain. Besides these persons, the bishop of St Martha was

likewise requested to accompany the deputation; and they were all

supplied with the necessary funds for the expences of their voyage.

Lorenzo de Aldana set off by sea for Panama in all haste, while the

other deputies were making preparations for their voyage, being

commissioned by Gonzalo to send him intelligence as quickly as possible

as to the true state of affairs in the Tierra Firma. As Lorenzo set out

from the port of Lima in October 1546, Gonzalo confidently expected to

receive dispatches from him from Panama by the ensuing Christmas, or

early in January 1547; and for this purpose, he appointed a set of

couriers to remain in waiting all along the coast of Peru to the

northward of Lima, to be in readiness to forward the dispatches as

quickly as possible. The two bishops and the provincial embarked a few

days after Aldana, and all of them arrived safely at Panama.

Vela Nunnez, the brother of the late viceroy, who had long remained a

prisoner at large, being allowed to go out on hunting parties, and to

ride about unarmed, yet under strict injunctions to take care of his

conduct, was drawn about this time into a private engagement with a

soldier named Juan de la Torre, by means of which he lost his life. De

la Torre was one of those who had deserted from the viceroy to Gonzalo,

along with Gonzalo Diaz and others, when on the expedition against Pedro

de Puelles and the inhabitants of Guanuco. He had afterwards the good

fortune to discover a concealed treasure of gold and silver in the

valley of Hica, which had been consecrated by the Indians to their

idols, and which was said to have contained to the value of 60,000

crowns in the precious metals, besides a great quantity of emeralds and

turquoises. De la Torre placed all this treasure in the hands of the

father guardian of the Franciscans; to whom he one day revealed in

confession that he wished to return into Spain, that he might enjoy his

riches in quiet; but, having followed the party of Gonzalo, and

consequently incurred the displeasure of his majesty, he wished to be

able to perform some acceptable service to the king before his

departure, on purpose to merit pardon for his past offences. For this

purpose, he intended to embark with his treasure from the port of Lima

for Nicaragua, where he proposed to enlist a party of soldiers, and to

fit out one or two vessels with which to cruize for some time along the

coast of Peru against Gonzalo and his confederates, by landing, and

pillaging in such places as were unprovided with troops: But, as he had

not sufficient knowledge or experience for conducting such an

enterprize, he wished to find a person properly qualified to act as

commander on this occasion, and had a strong desire to induce Vela

Nunnez to undertake the direction of the enterprize, as a gentleman

experienced in war, and who was besides in a great measure bound to seek

an opportunity of being revenged upon Gonzalo for the death of his

brother the viceroy and many others of his friends and relations. With

this view, therefore, it was his intention to place himself and his

treasure at the disposal of Vela Nunnez, whom he wished to consult on

this subject with some adherents of the late viceroy who dwelt in Lima,

that these persons might likewise be induced to join in the enterprize.

De la Torre, therefore, requested the father guardian to converse on the

subject with Vela Nunnez.

At first Vela Nunnez was on his guard, lest it might be a false

confidence devised for his ruin. But De la Torre satisfied his doubts in

presence of the father guardian, by a solemn oath on a consecrated

altar, and Vela Nunnez agreed to take charge of the enterprize,

immediately using his endeavours to engage the adherents of the late

viceroy in the plot. It is not known how this affair came to be

divulged, which it certainly was to Gonzalo, who immediately caused Vela

Nunnez to be arrested and brought to trial as a traitor and rebel

against the king, and had him publickly beheaded. Vela Nunnez was a

brave and honourable gentleman, much esteemed by all, and was

exceedingly regretted by the whole inhabitants of Peru.[31]

[Footnote 31: From the sequel, it would appear that Juan de la Torre

escaped entirely on this occasion; at least a person of exactly the same

name appears afterwards as an officer in the service of Gonzalo.--E]

About this time likewise, Alfonzo de Toro, who was lieutenant-governor

of Cuzco under Gonzalo Pizarro, was assassinated by his own

father-in-law, in consequence of some dispute. Gonzalo was much grieved

by the death of this person, from whom he expected to have derived

important services in the approaching crisis. He appointed Alfonzo de

Hinojosa to succeed as lieutenant-governor of Cuzco, who had in fact

been elected to the vacant charge by the magistrates of that city. Under

his administration some tumults were excited in Cuzco by Lope Sanchez de

Valenzuela and Diego Perez Bezerra; but by the exertions of Hinojosa and

Pedro de Villacastin the tumults were happily quelled; Valenzuela and

Bezerra were put to death as the ringleaders, and some others who had

been particularly active on the occasion were banished.

It is well known that Lorenzo de Aldana, who has been already mentioned

as dispatched by Gonzalo to Panama, carried several letters from Gonzalo

and the other leaders of the insurrection which were couched in very

disrespectful terms: But Aldana, anxious to prevent the present troubles

from becoming even more serious than they were, prudently destroyed

these letters, so that they were not delivered. On his arrival at

Panama, he went to lodge with Hinojosa, with whom he was extremely

intimate, there being likewise some relationship between them. He went

likewise without delay to pay his respects to the president; but at this

first visit they both confined themselves to conversation on general

topics, so that Aldana did not reveal his sentiments for some days,

wishing, like a prudent person, to learn in the first place what were

the sentiments and intentions of the officers who then resided at

Panama. When he found that they were disposed to act for the service of

his majesty, he revealed his real sentiments to the president, offering

his best services in any manner that might be most conducive to the

royal interest. From the confidence which was reposed in Aldana, it was

at length resolved to treat openly with Hinojosa, with whom hitherto the

president and Mexia had acted with much reserve. Accordingly, Mexia

represented to him, that the affairs of Peru were now in such a

situation that it was requisite to restore them to order, which might

easily be done by agreeing to offer the services of all the faithful

subjects of his majesty resident in Panama to the president; and if the

present favourable opportunity for this purpose were neglected, another

might not occur for a long time. Hinojosa replied, that he was entirely

disposed to serve the president, to whom, he had already declared, if

his majesty were not disposed to grant the demands of Gonzalo, he was

ready in all things to yield obedience to the commands of the

sovereign, being resolved to give no just cause of reproach as a

rebellious subject.

In reality Hinojosa, although an excellent soldier and experienced in

every thing relative to warlike affairs was exceedingly ignorant in

political matters. He had always believed that every thing which had

been done by the insurgents was founded in justice, and that the authors

of the supplications and remonstrances had a right to use their utmost

efforts to succeed in procuring all that they had demanded; having even

been so assured by several learned men. Yet in all the past

transactions, he had conducted his own actions with much prudent

reserve, so as not to go beyond the original and avowed purposes of the

remonstrants, having never put any one to death or confiscated the

wealth of any of the royalists, as had been done by the other insurgent

commanders. On perceiving the erroneous sentiments by which he was

deluded, Mexia strongly represented to him, that, as the pleasure of his

majesty had been clearly expressed, by means of the commission and

instructions given to the president, there was no room now to wait for

any new declaration of the royal will. That all the officers and

soldiers in the Tierra Firma Were resolved to obey the president, and

that Hinojosa must determine without delay on the part he chose to

embrace as a loyal subject, without allowing himself to be misled by

these ridiculous sentiments of pretended men of learning. Hinojosa

requested to be allowed one day to consider what answer he should give

to these representations; and accordingly the very next day he

determined to follow the advice of his friend Mexia, whom he accompanied

to the president, and engaged to obey him in all things conformable to

the royal orders. After this, all the captains of the troops and other

principal persons in Panama were convened; who all pledged their

obedience to the president, engaging to keep the matter a profound

secret till farther orders. Yet the soldiers began to suspect the real

situation of affairs, as they noticed that the president gave orders on

every affair of importance that occurred, and that all their officers

visited him very frequently, and always behaved to him in public as

their superior.

As president considered that any farther delay might be prejudicial to

the royal cause, he resolved to dispatch Aldana with the command of

about three hundred men in three or four vessels, with orders to proceed

to the port of Lima, to assemble at that place all who were well

affected to his majesty. By this measure, he wished to prevent Gonzalo

from having time to learn the actual situation of matters in the Tierra

Firma, and from placing his own affairs in perfect order; and was in

hopes likewise by these means to prevent him from putting several of the

principal loyalists to death, as had been often threatened by the

insurgents. Accordingly, four vessels were fitted out with all

expedition, of which the command was given to Aldana, having under his

orders the captains Mexia, Palomino, and Yllanez. On this occasion, in a

general review of the troops, all the colours were publickly resigned

into the hands of the president; who immediately restored them to the

respective officers, in his majestys name, and reappointed Hinojosa as

general of the army. After this, the three hundred men above mentioned

were embarked under Aldana, pay and equipments, being advanced to such

of the soldiers as were in need. Aldana immediately set sail on his

expedition, being accompanied by the provincial of the Dominicans, a

person of merit and influence, whose authority and example were expected

to confirm those who might be indetermined to follow the party which he

espoused. Aidaria carried along with him several copies of the amnesty

and of the royal orders for restoring peace and order to Peru; and was

expressly enjoined not to land on any part of the coast if possible,

till he got to the port of Lima, that he might endeavour to surprise

Gonzalo.

About this time, the archbishop of Lima and Gomez de Solis arrived at

Panama; both of whom expressed their satisfaction on learning the turn

which affairs had taken at that place, and openly declared themselves

for the royal party, offering their best services to the president. At

this, time likewise, the president sent Don Juan de Mendoza to Mexico,

with letters for the viceroy of that kingdom, Don Antonio de Mendoza,

requiring the aid of all the soldiers that could be spared from that

country. Don Balthazar de Castille was sent at the same time to

Guatimala and Nicaragua on a similar mission; and other persons were

dispatched to San Domingo, to procure every possible assistance for

prosecuting the war in Peru, if that measure should ultimately be

necessary.

It has been already mentioned that Pedro Hernandez Paniagua was

dispatched by the president with letters for Gonzalo Pizarro. Paniagua

arrived at Tumbez about the middle of January 1547, whence he went to

San Miguel, where Villalobos then commanded for Gonzalo. Paniagua was

immediately arrested by Villalobos, who took from him his dispatches and

forwarded them with all speed to Gonzalo at Lima, by means of Diego de

Mora the commandant of Truxillo. On learning the arrest of Paniagua,

Gonzalo sent a confidential person to conduct him to Lima, with strict

orders not to permit any person to converse with him by the way. On his

arrival at Lima, Gonzalo, in presence of all his confederate officers,

restored to Paniagua his credentials and dispatches, desiring him to

declare every thing that had been confided to him by his employer, and

assuring him of entire personal safety in regard to every thing

connected with his commission: But, if he should presume to converse

either publickly or privately with any other person on any subject

connected with the president, he might rest assured of losing his head.

Accordingly, Paniagua boldly explained the subject of his mission. When

he had withdrawn from the council of officers, some were for putting him

to death, alleging that he had previously communicated his sentiments to

some confidential persons. Gonzalo Pizarro did not communicate to his

officers either of the two letters formerly mentioned, which were

addressed to himself, by the king and the president. In this

consultation, it was the universal opinion of the insurgent leaders,

that they ought on no account to admit the president into Peru; many of

the officers, in expressing their sentiments on this occasion, spoke of

the president in a very abusive manner, and even mentioned his majesty

with very little respect, at which Gonzalo seemed well pleased.

At this time, Gonzalo Pizarro wrote to his lieutenant-general Carvajal,

who still remained in La Plata, directing him to come immediately to

Lima, and bring thither along with him all the treasure he could

procure, and all the musquets and other arms that were in that place.

These orders did not proceed from any idea that these were necessary for

defence, as the transactions at Panama were still unknown in Peru; but

on account of the many complaints which had been made of the continual

murders and confiscations which were perpetrated by Carvajal. Some

alleged that he was summoned to the capital to receive deserved

punishment for his cruel and tyrannical conduct; while others said it

was on purpose to strip him of more than 150,000 crowns which he had

amassed by pillage. At this time Lima was so entirely occupied with

suspicions, that no one dared to confide in any other, or to speak a

single word respecting the present state of affairs; as the slightest

misplaced word, or the most trifling pretext or suspicion, was

sufficient to place the life of any one in imminent danger. Gonzalo took

the greatest possible precautions for his safety, of which the following

is a remarkable instance. He had noticed on many occasions that the

oydor Zarate was by no means attached to his interests, although his

daughter was married to the brother of Pizarro: And though Zarate was

sick, it was confidently asserted that Gonzalo procured him to be

poisoned, by means of certain powders which he sent him under pretence

of a remedy. In the sequel this rumour was confirmed by the testimony of

several persons who were in the service of Pizarro at the time. Whether

Pizarro were really guilty of this crime or innocent, it is a certain

fact that he expressed much satisfaction on learning the death of

Zarate.

In the mean time, Paniagua procured permission, through the

intermediation of the licentiate Carvajal, to return to Panama, though

contrary to the opinion of the other insurgent officers, who were clear

for detaining him; and he may assuredly be reckoned fortunate in having

got away from Lima before intelligence arrived there that the fleet and

army at Panama had submitted to the president. Although this

circumstance had not reached the knowledge of the insurgents, it began

to be vehemently suspected, in consequence of receiving no reports from

that place for so long a time; insomuch that Gonzalo sent off orders to

Pedro de Puelles, who commanded in Quito, and all his other captains, to

keep themselves vigilantly on their guard, and to hold all their troops

in continual readiness for taking the field.

At this period the lieutenant-general Carvajal arrived at Lima from Las

Charcas accompanied by an hundred and fifty soldiers, and bringing with

him three hundred musquets and treasure to the value of more than

800,000 crowns. He was received at Lima with extraordinary pomp, Gonzalo

going out to meet him with all the inhabitants of the city, accompanied

with bands of music and every demonstration of rejoicing. Just at this

time intelligence was received from Puerto Viejo, that four ships had

been seen near the coast, as if reconnoitering, which had stood out

again to sea without coming to anchor or sending on shore for water or

provisions, as was usual with ships navigating in these seas. This was

looked upon as a sign of hostile intentions. It was a considerable time

after this, before Gonzalo was entirely certified of the intention of

these four ships, which in fact were those under Aldana, both because

they were exceedingly cautious of coming near the land, and because

Diego de Mora, his lieutenant at Truxillo, detained certain letters

which had been sent through his hands on the subject. Yet their

suspicious appearance on the coast gave great uneasiness to Gonzalo, and

occasioned him to take every means of precaution for his security;

ordering continual watch to be kept up day and night, both by the

soldiers and the inhabitants, all of whom appeared to do so with much

care and satisfaction. Some time after the appearance of the ships off

Puerto Viego, they arrived at the harbour of Malabrigo, five or six

leagues to the northwards of Truxillo, and Diego de Mora learnt their

arrival by the same messenger who was charged with the news of their

appearance at Puerto Viejo. As he was quite ignorant of the persons who

were embarked in these ships, and of their intentions, he went on board

a vessel in the harbour of Truxillo, accompanied by several inhabitants

of that city, intending to seek for these four vessels wherever they

might happen to be, and carried along with him a considerable supply of

provisions and warlike stores. He considered it quite safe to board

these strange vessels; as, if they belonged to the partisans of Gonzalo,

it was easy for him to allege that he came in quest of news, and to

supply them with refreshments; whereas if they should be of the royal

party, so much the better, as he was resolved to join them with all his

followers. He fortunately came up with Aldana on the very day in which

he left the harbour of Truxillo; and, having entered into mutual

explanations, joined company to the reciprocal satisfaction of both,

supplying Aldana with such refreshments as were needed for his ships.

Next night, Aldana and De Mora with all the ships came to anchor in the

harbour of Truxillo, where it was not deemed proper to land the troops;

but it was agreed that De Mora and all the inhabitants of Truxillo

should retire into the province of Caxamarca, in which place they could

remain in safety till their assistance might be required, and where they

might endeavour to assemble all that were favourable to the royal cause.

At the same time messengers were dispatched with letters and orders from

the president in the kings name, to Chachapoyas, Guanuco, and Quito, and

to the frontier posts commanded by Mercadillo and Porcel, inviting all

who were inclined to serve his majesty to declare themselves.

Intelligence of these proceedings at Truxillo were speedily carried to

Gonzalo by a monk of the order of Mercy, who had always favoured the

Pizarrian faction; but who could only relate the departure of De Mora

and the inhabitants of Truxillo, without being able to give any distinct

account of their intercourse and agreement with those on board the

fleet. Accordingly, Gonzalo concluded, from the information brought by

the monk, that De Mora and the inhabitants of Truxillo had gone off for

Panama to join the president. Gonzalo therefore sent off the licentiate

Garcias de Leon, who had always accompanied him hitherto, with the

commission of lieutenant-governor of Truxillo, accompanied by fifteen or

twenty soldiers, to whom he gave grants of the lands and Indians which

had belonged to the citizens of Truxillo who had gone off with De Mora.

Along with De Leon, Gonzalo sent the superior of the order of Mercy,

with orders to embark the wives of all the inhabitants of Truxillo who

had gone off, and to carry them to their husbands at Panama, whither he

supposed they were gone; and he sent at the same time proper persons to

be married to the widows who remained in Truxillo, commanding that such

of these widows as refused compliance should be deported along with the

married women to Panama. Various and specious pretexts were alleged for

this procedure; but the true reason was, that Gonzalo wished to be

entire master of the country, and to dispose at his pleasure of the

lands, Indians, houses, and properties of all who had fled from his

usurped power.

As Garcias de Leon was sent on this expedition by sea, he fell in, a few

days after his departure, with the four ships commanded by Aldana, and

joined himself to them with all his followers, embracing the party of

his majesty. On this occasion, the superior of the order of Mercy was

sent by land to Lima, with directions to inform Gonzalo of what had

happened, and the purpose of these four ships making their appearance on

the coast. He was likewise desired to communicate the intelligence to

several of the loyal inhabitants of Lima; and to tell them, if they were

at any time able to go to the port belonging to that city, they would

find boats ready to carry them on board the ships. On receiving this

news, Gonzalo sent orders to the superior to keep out of the way, and on

no account to have intercourse with any person whatever, either

publickly or privately, as he valued his life. Gonzalo complained

loudly against Aldana for deserting him; saying that if he had followed

the advice of his principal officers, he would have put him to death

long before.

When the arrival and intention of the fleet was certainly known and

understood, by which it appeared necessary to prepare for war, Gonzalo

began immediately to put every thing in proper order, and to assemble

his troops; having hitherto believed himself in perfect security against

any hostile attack. He appointed the licentiates Carvajal and Cepeda to

be captains of cavalry, as persons in whose attachment he could confide,

considering the weighty obligations they had received from him. Juan de

Acosta, Juan Velez de Guevara, and Juan de la Torre were made captains

of musqueteers; and Ferdinand Bachicao, Martin de Robles, and Martin de

Almendras captains of pikemen. Francisco de Carvajal, who had hitherto

enjoyed that office, was nominated lieutenant-general, having an hundred

of the musqueteers he had brought with him from Las Charcas appointed

for his guard. It was proclaimed by beat of drum, that all the

inhabitants of Lima, and all strangers residing there, of whatever

quality or condition, were to enrol themselves among the troops under

pain of death; and money was issued to the several captains for the pay

and equipment of their companies. The two captains of horse received

50,000 crowns, with which they were each ordered to levy and equip fifty

horsemen; besides which, several merchants and others, very unfit for

warfare, enrolled themselves. It was well known that these men were

quite unfit for being soldiers; but they were constrained to enlist on

purpose to exact money from them for their discharge, which in fact they

purchased by furnishing horses, arms, and money to such as were in want.

Martin de Robles received 25,000 crowns with which he was to enlist and

equip a company of 130 pikemen. Ferdinand Bachicao had 20,000 to raise

120 pikemen; and Juan d'Acosta a similar sum for an equal number. Martin

de Almendras had 12,000 crowns to raise 45 pikemen; and Juan de la Torre

12,000, to levy 50 musqueteers, who were to form the ordinary guard of

Gonzalo. Antonio Altamirano, one of the principal inhabitants of Cuzco

was appointed to carry the grand standard, with a troop of 80 horse; and

he received 12,000 crowns for some particular purpose, as his men had no

need of pay or equipments, being all chosen from among the rich

inhabitants of the country.

On this occasion the several captains had standards or colours painted

according to their respective fancies, the grand standard alone carrying

the royal arms. Among these, Bachicao had the letters G.P. or the cypher

of Gonzalo Pizarro, interlaced upon his colours, surmounted by a royal

crown. Every thing being in order, posts were assigned to each officer,

of which they were to take especial care by day and night. Gonzalo

Pizarro made liberal donations to several soldiers who were unfit for

service, as well as to those who took the field; giving them, besides

what they were entitled to for their equipment, considerable sums

according to their respective merits and occasions. In a general review,

he mustered a thousand men, as well armed and equipped and furnished

with all necessaries, as any that had been seen in the most prosperous

campaigns in the Italian war. Besides their arms, which were all

excellent, most of the soldiers were clothed in silken hose and

doublets, and many had theirs of cloth of gold, or embroidery of gold

silver or silk, with gold embroidery on their hats, their ammunition

pouches, and the covers of their musquets. The army was well supplied

with excellent powder; and Gonzalo gave orders that every soldier should

have either a horse or a mule to ride upon during a march. In the

equipment of this army, Gonzalo expended above half a million of crowns.

Besides these preparations, Gonzalo sent Martin Silveira to the city of

La Plata, to bring from thence all the men and money that could be

procured in that quarter. Antonio de Robles was sent to Cuzco, to

conduct to Lima all the troops that were there under the charge of

Alfonzo de Hinojosa, the lieutenant-governor of that city. He wrote to

Lucas Martinez, his lieutenant at Arequipa, desiring him to join him

immediately with all the soldiers he could raise. He sent orders to

Pedro de Puelles, his lieutenant at Quito, to join him as soon as

possible with all the troops from that province; and likewise ordered

Mercadillo and Percel to abandon the passes of which they had the

charge, bringing all their men along with them to Lima, and sent similar

orders to Saavedra the lieutenant-governor of Guamanga. By these means

Gonzalo exerted himself to the uttermost to collect a respectable force;

and he particularly enjoined all his officers not to leave behind them

any horses or arms, or any other conveniencies for those who remained to

enable them to join the president. He endeavoured to justify his present

conduct, by representing that Aldana, whom he had sent to give an

account to the king of all that had occurred in Peru, had leagued with

the president, and now employed against himself and the colony those

vessels which had been confided to his charge, and which had cost more

than 80,000 crowns in their equipment. He alleged that the president,

who had been sent expressly by his majesty to restore peace and

tranquillity to the kingdom, had raised troops of his own authority, and

now proposed to come in arms into Peru, to punish all who had taken part

in the late commotions, so that all were equally interested in opposing

him. That no one ought therefore to reckon upon the pardon and amnesty

with which the president was said to be entrusted, and which it was

reported he was to extend to all who joined him; but rather that this

ought to be considered as a fraudulent contrivance to divide and ruin

the colonists. Even admitting the truth of the reported amnesty; it

could only refer to the original opposition to the obnoxious regulations

and tyrannical conduct of the viceroy, and could have no reference to

those who were engaged in the battle of Quito, and the consequent death

of the viceroy; as these transactions could only be known in Spain after

the departure of the president, and nothing respecting them could

therefore be included in his instructions and powers. Therefore, until

his majesty were fully informed of the whole series of events, and had

issued new orders on the subject, it became necessary to prevent the

president from coming into Peru, more especially as Gonzalo Pizarro was

informed by letters from Spain, that the president was not authorized by

his majesty to deprive Gonzalo of the government, but merely to preside

in the royal court of audience. He pretended to be perfectly assured of

this circumstance, by letters from Francisco Maldonado, whom he had sent

to the king, and that the president had even in some measure

acknowledged this in the letter which was brought from him by Paniagua.

He alleged farther, that the captains in his own employment, who had

been sent into the Tierra Firma for the defence of Peru, having revolted

to the president, had now persuaded him to change his tone and to invade

Peru by force of arms; at which procedure his majesty would be assuredly

much displeased, when informed. By these and other arguments of a

similar nature, Gonzalo endeavoured to demonstrate that the president

was highly to blame in detaining those persons whom he, Gonzalo, had

sent to Spain, and that it was justifiable on these grounds to oppose

him by force of arms.

Gonzalo, by the advice of his lieutenant-general and other confidential

officers, took additional measures to justify their conduct, and to

satisfy the soldiers and inhabitants in the goodness of their cause. In

an assembly of all the men learned in the law who were then in Lima,

they arraigned the president as having acted criminally, in taking

possession of the ships belonging to the colony, and by invading the

country in a warlike manner, contrary to the tenor of the commission and

instructions he had received from the king; endeavouring at the same

time to convince the assembly, that it was just and proper to proceed

judicially against the president, and those captains and others who

adhered to him and abetted him in these proceedings, and that they ought

to be proceeded against in a formal manner, by legal process. The

persons composing this assembly of men of learning, dared not to

contradict Gonzalo on this occasion or to oppose his will in any

respect: A process was accordingly instituted in due form, informations

taken and recorded, and judgment pronounced in the following tenor:

"Considering the crimes established by the judicial informations given

against the licentiate De la Gasca and those captains who adhere to him;

they are found guilty and deserving of condemnation; wherefore, the said

licentiate De la Gasca is hereby adjudged to be beheaded, and the

captains Aldana and Hinojosa to be quartered." The other captains and

officers serving under the president, were at the same time condemned to

various punishments, according to the measure of guilt which Gonzalo and

the leaders of his faction were pleased to charge against them; and the

sentences were ordered to be signed in due form by the oydor Cepeda, and

other men of letters at Lima.

Among these persons of the law who were desired to sign on the present

occasion, was a licentiate from Valladolid named Polo Hondegardo, who

had the boldness to wait upon Gonzalo, and to represent to him, that the

promulgation of such a sentence was by no means advisable or politic; as

it might possibly happen hereafter that those officers who were now in

the service of the president might incline to revert to his party, which

they would not dare to do when once this cruel sentence was pronounced

against them. He represented farther, that it was necessary to keep in

mind the sacred character of the president as a priest; in consequence

of which circumstance all who might sign a sentence of death against

him would incur the pains and penalties of the greater excommunication.

By this remonstrance, these strong measures were arrested in their

progress, and the intended sentence was not promulgated.

About this time, intelligence was brought to Pizarro, that the squadron

under Lorenzo de Aldana had quitted the port of Truxillo and was

approaching along the coast towards Lima. On this intelligence, Gonzalo

sent off Juan d'Acosta with fifty mounted musqueteers, with orders to

keep in view of the ships, to prevent the royalists from being able to

land for provisions or water. On arriving at Truxillo, Acosta only

ventured to remain one day at that place, being afraid that Diego de

Mora might bring a superior force against him from Caxamarca. He learnt

likewise, that the royalists squadron had gone to the port of Santa, to

which place he accordingly marched. Aldana got notice of his coming from

some Spanish inhabitants of that place, and laid an ambuscade for him,

consisting of an hundred and fifty musqueteers, in a place overgrown

with tall reeds on the side of the road by which Acosta had to march in

his way to Santa. Acosta had certainly fallen into the snare, if he had

not fortunately made prisoners of some spies who had been sent on shore

from the squadron, whom he was about to have hanged, when they prevailed

on him to save their lives by giving him notice of the ambushment, and

by farther informing him that he might make prisoners of some sailors

who were taking in fresh water for the ships, by quitting the common

road and going nearer the shore. He accordingly took that road and made

the sailors prisoners, whom he sent to Gonzalo at Lima. Those belonging

to Aldana, who were in ambush, learnt this transaction; but, being all

on foot, and the insurgent party all horsemen, they could not attempt to

rescue the prisoners from Acosta, as that part of the country consisted

of very deep sands. Acosta returned to the port of Guavera, where he

waited fresh orders from Lima.

Gonzalo treated the prisoners sent to him by Acosta with much kindness,

supplying them with clothes and arms, and gave them their choice of any

of the companies of his troops in which they might think proper to

serve. From these men, he received exact information of all the late

events which had occurred at Panama, of the succours which the president

expected to receive from different parts of America, and of the force

which accompanied Aldana on the present expedition. They informed him

likewise that Aldana had set on shore Pedro de Ulloa, a Dominican friar,

disguised in a secular habit, who had orders to distribute copies of the

amnesty in every direction. In consequence of this information, he was

sought for and soon found; and Gonzalo had him confined in a dungeon

near the fish-ponds in his garden, which was infested with toads and

vipers, where he remained till he recovered his liberty on the arrival

of the fleet some time afterwards.

About this time, it was determined to dispatch the licentiate Carvajal

with three hundred mounted musqueteers, together with the detachment

under Juan d'Acosta, to scour the coast to the northwards, and to attack

Diego de Mora who had withdrawn into the province of Caxamarca. When

every thing was in readiness for this expedition, the lieutenant-general

Carvajal went one morning early to Gonzalo, and represented to him, that

it was by no means safe to entrust so important a command to the

licentiate, as a person in whom they could not repose implicit

confidence. That although he had hitherto attached himself to their

party, it was obviously for the sole purpose of being revenged of the

late viceroy; and, as that purpose was now accomplished, it did not

appear that his fidelity could be depended upon. It was proper to

recollect, he added, that all the brothers of the licentiate were

greatly attached to his majesty, particularly the bishop of Lugo who

enjoyed several high employments; so that it was not to be imagined the

licentiate would act cordially in the interest of a party which was

diametrically opposed to that in which all his nearest relations were

engaged. Besides all which, this person had formerly been made a

prisoner by themselves, without any just foundation, and had even been

so nearly punished capitally, that he had been ordered to make his

testament and to confess himself in preparation for death, which

injurious treatment he could not be supposed to have forgotten. Gonzalo

was so much convinced by these arguments, that he countermanded the

order given to the licentiate Carvajal, and sent off Juan d'Acosta on

the expedition to Caxamarca, with a force of two hundred and eighty men.

D'Acosta accordingly set out on this intended service, taking the road

for Truxillo; but on arriving at Baranza, about twenty four leagues from

Lima, he halted at that place for reasons which will appear in the

sequel.

At this period, the Captain Saavedra, who was lieutenant-governor of

Guanuco for Gonzalo, received letters from Aldana urging him to quit the

insurgent party and to declare for his majesty. He accordingly

determined to do so; and under pretence of obeying the orders he had

received from Gonzalo of joining his army at Lima, along with Hernando

Alonzo, he assembled all the soldiers he could procure in that province,

with whose assistance he fortified the city of Guanuco, and informed

them of his resolution to exert his best endeavours in the service of

the king. All his soldiers agreed to follow his example, except three or

four who fled and informed Gonzalo of the defection of their governor.

Saavedra retired immediately to Caxamarca, with forty horsemen, where he

joined Diego de Mora and those who had withdrawn along with him from

Truxillo, where both declared themselves for the royalist party. On

learning the defection of Saavedra and the principal inhabitants of

Guanuco, Gonzalo sent an officer to that place at the head of thirty

soldiers; with orders to pillage and destroy the city: But the Indians

of the neighbourhood, having armed themselves and taken possession of

the place by the orders of their masters, made so resolute a defence

that the insurgent detachment was beaten off, and constrained to return

to Lima, being unable to procure any other plunder except some mares

cattle and other animals belonging to the settlers.

On the arrival of Antonio de Robles at Cuzco, whom Gonzalo had sent to

take the command in that city and province, Alfonso de Hinojosa, who had

hitherto been lieutenant-governor there, resigned the command of the

city and troops, but as was believed with much dissatisfaction. De

Robles immediately collected as much money as he could procure, and

enlisted all the soldiers that were to be found in that neighbourhood,

with whom he marched to Xaquixaguana, about four leagues from Cuzco. At

that place he learned that Diego Centeno; who had concealed himself for

more than a year in a cave among the mountains, had recently left his

concealment, on learning the arrival of the president, and had collected

several of his former partisans, who had hidden themselves from the fury

of Gonzalo in various parts of the woods and mountains. By this time

Centeno had collected about forty men, mostly on foot, though some of

them still had the horses with which they had made their escape.

Although these men were neither so well armed or equipped as they could

have wished, Centeno resolved to make an attempt upon Cuzco, shewing as

much confidence as if he had been at the head of five hundred well armed

troops. His principal followers were Luis de Ribera, Alfonso Perez de

Esquival, Diego Alvarez, Francisco Negral, Pedro Ortiz de Zarate, and

Friar Dominic Ruiz, commonly called Father Viscayno. With this small

band of followers, Centeno drew nigh to Cuzco, being doubtless invited

to that step by some of the principal inhabitants, for the purpose of

freeing them from the tyranny of De Robles, a young man of low origin

and little ability. It was even said that Alfonso de Hinojosa, from

resentment against Gonzalo for superseding him in the government, had

sent privately to offer his assistance to Centeno. Both of these reports

are highly probable; as otherwise it would have been a most inexcusable

rashness in Centeno, to call it no worse, to have presumed upon

attacking Cuzco with the small number of men he had collected; as,

besides the inhabitants of the city, there were more than five hundred

soldiers there and in the environs, while he had only forty ill armed

men, most of whom had swords or daggers fastened to poles, instead of

pikes or lances.

On learning the approach of Centeno, De Robles returned to Cuzco, where

he made such preparations as seemed necessary; and, on hearing that

Centeno was within a days march, he took the field with three hundred

men, sending forwards Francisco de Aguira to procure intelligence. This

person was brother to one Peruchio de Aguira who had formerly been put

to death by the lieutenant-general Carvajal, and was consequently a

secret enemy to the insurgent party. Instead therefore of executing the

commission confided to him by De Robles, he went immediately to join

Centeno, whom he informed of every thing that was going on at Cuzco and

of the state of affairs in that city. In the night before the festival

of Corpus Christi of the year 1547, Centeno advanced toward the city of

Cuzco, by a different road from that in which De Robles and his troops

were posted; and, having turned one of his flanks, made an unexpected

assault with great resolution, as resolved to conquer or die. Completely

surprised and thrown into confusion, the troops of De Robles were unable

to get into any order for defence, and even in several instances turned

their arms against each other, insomuch that a good many of them were

slain by their own comrades. On this occasion Centeno used the

following stratagem, which succeeded admirably: Having taken off the

saddles and bridles from the horses belonging to his small band of

followers, he ordered them to be driven by his attendant Indians along

the road which led to the front of the enemies camp, to call off their

attention from his real attack on their flank and rear. By this means,

as the horses were urged on by the Indians behind, they threw the troops

of De Robles into confusion, and enabled Centeno to penetrate into the

camp unperceived and unopposed, where he and his men exerted themselves

so courageously that the insurgents were completely defeated and put to

flight.

[Illustration: Map: VICEROYALTY OF PERU]

By this successful exploit Centeno acquired great honour; it having been

seldom seen that so small a number had defeated so disproportioned a

force of infinitely better armed troops. It has been reported that, on

this occasion, some men belonging to Alfonso de Hinojosa were the first

to fly, in consequence of secret orders for that purpose: But these men

never acknowledged the truth of this allegation, as disgraceful to

themselves; and Centeno denied the story, as detracting from the glory

of his victory.

After the derout of De Robles, Centeno took possession of Cuzco, where

he was immediately elected captain-general of that city and province for

his majesty. Next day, he caused Antonio de Robles to be beheaded, and

distributed 100,000 crowns, which he found in that city belonging to

Gonzalo, among his followers. He in the next place took measures for

raising a respectable force; appointing Pedro de Rios and Juan de

Vargas, the brother of Garcilasso de la Vega, captains of infantry, and

Francisco Negral captain of Cavalry; Luis de Ribera being named

major-general. Having armed and equipped about four hundred men, he set

out for La Plata, with the intention of persuading Alfonso de Mendoza,

who commanded at that place for Gonzalo, to declare for the king, or

otherwise to take possession of that place by force.

About this time, Lucas Martin, who had been sent by Gonzalo to conduct

the troops of Arequipa to Lima, set out from Arequipa with 130 men for

that purpose; but when he had proceeded about four leagues on his march,

his people mutinied and made him prisoner, electing Jerom de Villegas

as their commander, and immediately marched off to join Centeno, who

was then in the Collao waiting the issue of some negotiations in which

he had employed Pedro Gonzalo de Zarate, schoolmaster at Cuzco. While in

the Collao, Centeno was informed that Juan de Silveira, the Serjeant

major of the army of the insurgents, had been sent by Gonzalo to conduct

the troops of that province to Lima, and had made prisoners of five or

six of the royalists whom he met with on his march. Silveira had

collected about three hundred men on this occasion, and we shall relate

what befel them in the sequel.

On learning the success of Centeno at Cuzco and the death of De Robles,

and being likewise informed that the people of San Miguel had declared

for his majesty, and that the captains Mercadillo and Porcel had joined

Diego de Mora at Caxamarca; Gonzalo Pizarro saw that he had now only to

depend on the force which was along with himself at Lima, and those

under Pedro de Puelles, on whose fidelity he reposed entire confidence.

In this predicament, he determined to alter the destination of Juan

d'Acosta and to send him against Centeno with a respectable force,

resolving to follow d'Acosta in person with all his army if necessary,

then amounting to nine hundred men, among whom were many of the

principal inhabitants of Peru. In forming this new resolution, his

object was in the first place to reduce all the upper or mountainous

provinces to subjection, and afterwards to make war on every other part

of the country which had withdrawn from his authority. It has likewise

been conjectured, that Gonzalo proposed to himself, in case of any

reverse, to endeavour to make some new discovery and conquest, towards

the Rio Plata, or Chili, or in some other place to the south and east of

Peru. He certainly never avowed this intention openly, nor is it alleged

that he communicated it to any of his confidents, as this would have

indicated a want of confidence in his cause; so that this idea rests

only on conjecture. In consequence of this new plan, Gonzalo recalled

D'Acosta to Lima with all his troops, to the great mortification of that

person and his followers; insomuch that seven or eight of them deserted,

choosing Jerome de Soria as their commander. Many others would certainly

have followed this example, if it had not been for the severe

precautions exercised by D'Acosta on the occasion, who put to death

Lorenza Mexia, son-in-law to the Conde de Gomera, and another soldier,

whom he suspected of intending to desert. He likewise arrested several

others who were suspected of similar intentions, whom he carried

prisoners to Lima.

A few days before the arrival of D'Acosta at Lima, Gonzalo took some

suspicion of the fidelity of Antonio Altamarino, his standard bearer,

who appeared to conduct himself with a degree of coldness in the present

emergency; and, without any direct proof or even any strong suspicious

circumstances being alleged against him, he caused him to be arrested

and put in irons as a criminal, had him strangled in prison during the

night, and ordered his dead body to be suspended upon the public gibbet.

Altamarino was one of the richest colonists in Peru, and Gonzalo, having

confiscated all his wealth, distributed it among his most attached

followers. After this, he gave the charge of the royal standard to Don

Antonio de Ribera, who had just joined with thirty men from Guamanga,

whence also he had brought some arms and cattle which he had taken from

the inhabitants of that place. At this time Gonzalo found his affairs

much embarrassed and growing every day worse, insomuch that he could

only count upon the force which accompanied him in Lima; whereas a short

time before he seemed absolute master of the whole kingdom of Peru. He

was in great fear, if the new royal orders, the general amnesty, and the

revocation of the obnoxious regulations, all of which had been brought

out from Spain by the president, should come to the knowledge of his

remaining followers, that they would all abandon him. In this state of

uncertainty and dread, he assembled all the principal inhabitants and

citizens of Lima at his house, to whom he represented, "That he had

brought himself into a very embarrassing and even dangerous situation by

his exertions in their service, during which he had endured much labour

and danger in the wars he had carried on for their benefit, and for the

protection of their property and rights, for all which they were

indebted to the genius and valour of his brother the marquis. That, in

the present situation of affairs, the whole colonists ought to consider

their honour and interests as identified with his own, the conduct of

both being sufficiently justified in sending deputies to inform the king

of all that had occurred during the troubles and commotions. That the

president had arrested these deputies at Panama, had seduced his

officers, and had taken possession of his ships. That the president

certainly had done all these things to advance his own private interest;

as, if he had received orders from his majesty to make war against the

kingdom, he would assuredly have given intelligence of this circumstance

through Paniagua. That not satisfied with these outrages, the president

now invaded the government to which he, Gonzalo, had been lawfully

appointed, and disseminated numerous libels against him throughout the

kingdom, as was well known to them all. That consequently, he was

determined to use his utmost efforts to oppose the president, who

treated him as an enemy without any legitimate cause. That the general

interests of all the colonists and his own were obviously identified;

as, should the president carry matters to extremity as every thing

seemed to indicate, they would all be brought to a severe account for

the consequences of the late wars and disorders, and would be held

responsible for the murders and plunders which had been perpetrated

during their continuance. He requested them therefore to reflect

maturely on all these things; and, as he had hitherto exerted his utmost

efforts in defence of their rights, it still remained not only to

continue to defend the same, but even to preserve their lives and

honours. For these purposes, therefore, he had now assembled them, and

to lay before them a clear state of the present situation of affairs;

and he requested of them to declare freely and openly their undisguised

sentiments; engaging, on the faith and honour of a gentleman and a

knight, which he was ready to confirm by a solemn oath, that he would

not injure any one in person or estate for the opinion or advice they

might now give; but should leave every one at full liberty to declare

for either party in the present troubles, and even to retire wherever

they might judge proper. Therefore, he expected that all who were

disposed to adhere to him on the present occasion should declare

themselves without reserve, as he would demand of them to confirm their

promise by a written and signed engagement. He advised them accordingly

to look well to their promises when once made; as if any one should

violate the same, or should appear lukewarm or feeble in their efforts

in the approaching crisis, he would immediately order them to be put to

death even upon very slight circumstances of suspicion."

Every person in the assembly answered unhesitatingly, that they were

ready to obey his orders in every thing to the utmost of their power and

abilities, and to devote their lives and fortunes in his cause. Some

even went so far in their pretended attachment, as to say that they

would willingly risk their eternal salvation in his service. Many of

them emulously strove to find out arguments for justifying the war

which was now about to commence, and to enhance the obligations which

the whole country lay under to Gonzalo for undertaking the management of

the enterprize. Some even carried their base and scandalous flattery to

such a pitch of extravagance, to conciliate the tyrant, that it were

improper to contaminate our pages with a repetition of their words.

After they had all expressed their attachment to the cause, Gonzalo drew

out a paper in which the proposed engagement was already engrossed at

full length; at the bottom of which he caused the licentiate Cepeda to

write a solemn promise of executing all which that paper contained, and

to obey Gonzalo in every thing he should command; after which, he made

Cepeda sign that promise, and take a solemn oath to observe all its

conditions. After Cepeda, all who were present in the assembly were made

to sign and swear to the engagement in a similar manner.

After the conclusion of this affair, Juan d'Acosta was ordered to

prepare for marching to Cuzco by way of the mountain, at the head of

three hundred men. Paez de Sotomayor was appointed his major-general on

this expedition, Martin d'Olmos captain of cavalry, Diego de Gumiel

captain of musqueteers, Martin de Almendras captain of pikemen, and

Martin de Alarzon standard-bearer. The whole of this detachment being

well provided with arms and all necessary equipments, left Lima taking

the mountain road for Cuzco, on purpose to recover that important city

from Centeno. At the same time Gonzalo received notice that the squadron

commanded by Lorenzo de Aldana had been seen at the distance of about

fifteen leagues from the port of Lima. It was determined therefore in a

council of war, to encamp the whole insurgent army between Lima and the

sea; as it was feared, if the ships got possession of the port, it might

occasion great confusion and disturbance in the city, especially as in

that case the necessary orders would have to be hastily issued and

executed; by which means the malcontents might have an opportunity of

withdrawing during the battle, and might even escape on board the ships

to join the enemy; while, at the same time, there would be no leisure to

watch the behaviour of the wavering, and to compel them to join the

army. Orders were issued accordingly for the army to take the field, and

it was publickly proclaimed throughout the city, that every one fit to

carry arms, of every age and condition, was to join the troops, on pain

of death. Pizarro gave notice that he would behead every person who

acted contrary to these orders; and, while he marched in person at the

head of the troops, he should leave the lieutenant-general in charge of

the city, to execute rigorous punishment on all who lagged behind. All

the inhabitants were so confounded and terrified by these threats, that

no one dared to converse with another, and none had the courage either

to fly or to determine what was best to be done in this emergency. Some

however contrived to conceal themselves in places overgrown with tall

reeds, or in caves, and many concealed their valuable effects under

ground.

On the day preceding that which had been fixed upon by Gonzalo for

marching from Lima, news was brought that three ships had entered the

port of Lima, which occasioned universal consternation. The alarm was

sounded, and Gonzalo marched out with all the men who could be collected

on a sudden, taking up his encampment about midway between the city and

the port, at the distance of about a league or four miles from each,

that he might at the same time make head against his enemies if they

attempted to land, and might prevent the inhabitants of Lima from having

any communication with the vessels. He was at the same time unwilling to

abandon the city, and wished to know exactly the intentions of Aldana,

before going to a greater distance, and if possible to gain possession

of the vessels by some contrivance or negociation, having no means of

preventing them from gaining possession of the port, as one of his own

captains, contrary to the opinion of the other officers, had lately sunk

five vessels in the harbour. On this occasion Gonzalo mustered five

hundred and fifty men, cavalry and infantry included; and, after

encamping in the situation already mentioned, he placed eight horsemen

in ambush close to the sea, with orders to prevent any person landing

from the vessels to deliver or to receive letters, or to converse with

any one. Next day, Gonzalo sent Juan Hernandez, an inhabitant of Lima,

in a boat on board the ships, with orders to say in his name, if Aldana

chose to send any of his people on shore to explain the object of his

coming into Peru, that Hernandez would remain on board as an hostage for

the safety of his messenger. Hernandez was conducted on board the

admiral where Aldana retained him as proposed, and sent on shore the

captain Penna to wait upon Gonzalo.

Penna was not conducted to camp till night, that he might have no

opportunity of conversing with any one; and on being introduced to

Gonzalo in his tent, he delivered to him a writing, containing the

orders and instructions which the president had received from his

majesty, the general amnesty granted by his majesty to all the colonists

of Peru, and the revocation of the obnoxious regulations. He then

expatiated, as instructed by Aldana, on the universal and great

advantages which would accrue to all by giving a prompt and entire

obedience to the commands of his majesty, who had not judged it

convenient to continue Gonzalo in the government of Peru. That his

majesty, being fully informed of all that had occurred in that country,

had sent out De la Gasca as president, with instructions and full powers

to provide a remedy for all the existing evils. Gonzalo proudly

answered, that he would severely punish all who were on board the fleet,

and would chastise the audacity of the president for the outrage he had

committed in detaining his envoys and seizing his ships. He complained

loudly against Aldana, for coming now against him as an enemy, after

receiving his money, and accepting his commission to go into Spain on

purpose to give an account of his conduct to the king.

After some farther discourse, all the officers belonging to Gonzalo left

the tent, leaving him and Penna alone together. Gonzalo made him a long

discourse, endeavouring to justify his conduct in regard to his past and

present conduct; and concluded by making him an offer of 100,000 crowns,

if he would contrive to put him in possession of the galleon commanded

by Aldana, which composed the principal force of the hostile fleet.

Penna rejected his proposal with disdain, declaring himself dishonoured

by the offer, and that nothing whatever would induce him to be guilty of

such treacherous conduct. At the conclusion of this conference, Penna

was committed to the custody of Antonio de Ribeira, with strict

injunctions that he should not be allowed to have the smallest

intercourse with any individual whomsoever; and was sent back next day

to the fleet, when Juan Fernandez returned to camp, having in the

interval promised and resolved to use his utmost efforts in the service

of his majesty on every favourable opportunity.

Aldana had rightly judged, that the surest means for succeeding in the

mission on which he had been entrusted by the president, was to

communicate the knowledge of the general pardon among the soldiers. For

this purpose, therefore, he devised exceedingly proper measures to

diffuse the intelligence among the troops, but which were at the same

time exceedingly dangerous for Juan Hernandez. Aldana gave him copies of

all his dispatches in duplicate, and entrusted him with letters for

several principal persons in the camp of Gonzalo. Fernandez concealed

such of these papers as he judged necessary in his boots, giving all the

rest to Pizarro. Taking Gonzalo afterwards aside, he told him secretly

that Aldana had endeavoured to prevail upon him to publish the royal

pardon in the camp; and that accordingly he had thought it prudent to

pretend compliance, and had taken charge of that general amnesty among

his other dispatches, both to blind Aldana by the expectation of, doing

what he wished, and on purpose to get these from him for the information

of Gonzalo; pretending to be ignorant that Gonzalo knew of any such

thing existing. Gonzalo thanked him for his prudent conduct, and

considered him as a person worthy of entire confidence and much attached

to the cause. He then received the papers which Fernandez offered,

threatening the severest punishment against Aldana. Having thus craftily

deceived Gonzalo, Fernandez contrived to deliver some of the letters he

had in charge, and allowed some of them to fall on the ground, as if

lost, yet so as they might be found by those to whom they were

addressed.

When Gonzalo quitted Lima to encamp on the road towards the sea-port of

Calao, he left Pedro Martin de Cicilia in charge of the city as

provost-marshal. This man, who had attached himself to Gonzalo with much

zeal from the very commencement of the troubles, was now about seventy

years of age, yet healthy and vigorous, of a rough and cruel

disposition, and entirely destitute of piety towards God or of loyalty

to the sovereign. Gonzalo had given him orders to hang up every person

he might find loitering in the city with out a written permission, or

who might return thither from camp without a pass. Martin executed these

rigorous orders with so much exactitude, that, meeting a person who came

under the foregoing predicament, he had not sufficient patience to have

him hanged, but dispatched him directly with his poignard. He generally

went about the streets followed by the hangman, carrying a parcel of

ropes, and loudly declared that he would hang up every one whom he found

in the city without permission from Ganzalo.

One day several of the citizens came from the camp to the city, under

the authority of a pass, to procure such provisions and other articles

as they stood in need of, the principal persons among whom were Nicolas

de Ribeira, who was alcalde or police judge of the city, Vasco de

Guevara, Hernando Bravo de Lagunas, Francisco de Ampuero, Diego Tinoco,

Alfonzo Ramirez de Sosa, Francisco de Barrionueva, Alfonzo de

Barrionuevo, Martin de Menezes, Diego d'Escobar, and some others. After

they had collected the articles of which they were in want, they left

the city with their horses arms and servants; but, instead of returning

towards the camp, they went off in the road for Truxillo. Being noticed

by some spies, who gave immediate notice to Gonzalo, he caused them to

be pursued by Juan de la Torre with a party of mounted musqueteers. At

the distance of eight leagues from Lima, De la Torre came up with Vasco

de Guevara and Francisco Ampuero, who had fallen behind with the

intention of acting as a kind of rear guard, to give notice to the rest

in case of a pursuit. They defended themselves courageously, and as

their enemies could not take any certain aim, it being under night, they

contrived to make their escape unwounded. De la Torre and his men found

themselves unable to continue the pursuit with any chance of success, as

their horses were already completely tired with their rapid march from

camp. They returned, therefore, believing that, even if they were to get

up with the fugitives, they would be unable to take them by force, as

they were all men of quality, who would rather be slain than surrender.

On their way back to camp, they fell in with Hernando Bravo, who had

fallen behind his companions, and on bringing him a prisoner to Gonzalo

he was ordered to immediate execution. Donna Ynez Bravo, who was sister

to the prisoner and wife to Nicolas de Ribeira, one of the fugitives, on

hearing the situation of her brother, hastened to the camp accompanied

by her father, and threw herself at the feet of Gonzalo, whom she

earnestly implored to spare the life of her brother. Being one of the

most beautiful women of the country, and of the highest rank, and being

seconded by most of the officers who served under Gonzalo, he at length

allowed himself to be prevailed on to pardon her brother, who was the

only person, during the whole subsistence of his usurpation, whom he

forgave for a similar offence. On granting this pardon, Alfonzo de

Caceres, one of the captains under Gonzalo, kissed his hand saying:

"Illustrious prince! accursed be he who abandons you, or hesitates to

sacrifice his life in your service." Yet, within three hours afterwards,

Hernando Bravo and several others made their escape from the camp. Among

these who now deserted were several persons of consideration who had

attached themselves to Gonzalo from the very commencement of the

troubles, so that their defection gave him infinite vexation and alarm,

insomuch that hardly any one dared to speak to him, and he issued

peremptory orders to put to death every person who might be found beyond

the precincts of the camp.

On the same night, Captain Martin de Robles sent a message to Diego

Maldonado, who had been alcalde of Cuzco, usually called the rich,

intimating that Gonzalo had resolved in a consultation with his officers

to put him to death. Maldonado very readily believed this information,

as he had formerly been one of the inhabitants of Cuzco who made offer

of their services to the late viceroy. Likewise, although then pardoned

by Gonzalo, whom he accompanied in the march to Quito against the

viceroy, he had fallen under new suspicions, and had even been put to

the torture, on account of a letter which was dropt near Gonzalo,

containing some very unpleasant truths; and although the real authors of

that letter had been afterwards discovered, Maldonado could never forget

the treatment he had suffered at that time. Besides this, he was the

intimate friend of Antonio Altamirano, whom Gonzalo had recently put to

death. Considering all these circumstances, Maldonado was so thoroughly

convinced of the imminent danger in which he stood, that he immediately

quitted his tent with only his sword and cloak, not even taking time to

saddle a horse, though he had several good ones, or speaking to any of

his servants. Though a very old man, he walked as fast as possible all

night in a direction towards the sea, and concealed himself in the

morning among some tall reeds near the shore about three leagues from

where the ships of Aldana lay at anchor. As he was much afraid of being

pursued, he revealed his situation to an Indian who happened to be near;

and whom he prevailed upon to construct a float of reeds and straw, on

which the Indian carried him on board one of the ships.

In the morning, Martin de Robles went to the tent of Maldonado; and

finding him withdrawn as he expected, he immediately waited on Gonzalo,

whom he informed of the circumstance, adding, "As the army was

diminishing daily by the number and quality of the fugitives, he begged

leave to advise that they should quit the present camp, and march into

the interior provinces, as formerly agreed upon, without granting

permission to any one to go into the city of Lima, lest many more might

use that pretence for an opportunity to desert. Several of his own

company, he said, had applied for leave to go into the city, to procure

provisions; but he considered it better for himself to go therewith a

detachment of soldiers to collect the provisions and necessaries

required, that he might keep all his men in sight, and that he proposed

on this occasion to take Maldonado from the Dominican convent, where he

understood he had taken refuge, and to bring him a prisoner to the camp,

where he ought to undergo condign punishment, as a warning to others."

Gonzalo approved all that was said on this occasion by De Robles, in

whom he had great confidence as a person who had taken part with him in

all the past troubles, and desired him to act in the way he proposed. De

Robles accordingly, taking all his own horses and attendants and those

belonging to Maldonado, took along with him to Lima all the soldiers of

his company in whom he could confide. After collecting such provisions

and other necessaries as might serve his purpose, he set off for

Truxillo with thirty armed horsemen, declaring publickly that Gonzalo

was a tyrant and usurper, that all good subjects were bound to obey the

orders of his majesty, and that he was resolved to join the president.

When this serious defection became known in the camp, it was universally

believed that the army would soon disperse, and that Gonzalo would be

massacred. Gonzalo endeavoured to restore order and confidence among his

troops, pretending to care little for those who had deserted him; yet

resolved to decamp next morning. That very night, Lope Martin, an

inhabitant of Cuzco, deserted almost in sight of the whole army. Next

morning Gonzalo quitted his present camp, and marched about two leagues

to a new camp near an aqueduct, taking every precaution to prevent his

people from deserting; believing that his principal danger on that

account would be got over if he were once ten or twelve leagues from

Lima. The licentiate Carvajal was appointed to take charge of the night

guard, with strict injunctions to prevent desertion: But even he, in the

middle of the night, quitted the camp accompanied by Paulo Hondegardo,

Marco de Retamoso, Pedro Suarez d'Escovedo, Francisco de Miranda,

Hernando de Vargas, and several others belonging to his company. These

men went in the first place to Lima, whence they took the road towards

Truxillo. A few hours afterwards, Gabriel de Roias left the camp,

accompanied by his nephews Gabriel Bermudez and Gomez de Roias and

several other persons of quality. These men left the camp unseen by any

one, as they went through the quarter which had been confided to the

charge of the licentiate Carvajal.

In the morning, Gonzalo was much distressed on learning the events of

the past night, and more especially by the desertion of the licentiate

Carvajal, whom he had disobliged by superseding him in the command which

had been conferred on Juan d'Acosta, and by refusing him his niece Donna

Francisca in marriage. The departure of the licentiate had a very bad

effect on the minds of the troops; as they knew he was entrusted with

all Gonzalos secrets, and had been greatly in his confidence ever since

the death of the viceroy whom he had slain in the battle of Quito.

Carvajal left to the value of more than 15,000 crowns in the camp, in

gold silver and horses, all of which was immediately confiscated and

divided among the soldiers: But the army was convinced he would not have

abandoned so much valuable property, unless he had been satisfied that

the affairs of Gonzalo were in a very bad condition, both in regard to

power of resisting the president, and in respect of the right and

justice of his pretensions. So great was the defection in the camp, that

the greater part of the troops had resolved to disperse; and next

morning, when the army had begun its march, two cavaliers, named Lopez

and Villadente, quitting the ranks and causing their horses to vault in

sight of the whole army, they cried, out aloud, "Long live the king, and

let the tyrant die!" These men trusted, to the speed of their horses;

and Gonzalo was so exceedingly suspicious of every one, that he

expressly forbid these men to be pursued, being afraid that many might

use that pretence for joining them. He continued his march accordingly,

in all haste by the road of the plain country, leading towards Arequipa;

in which march several of his musqueteers and others deserted, although

he hanged ten or twelve persons of consideration in the course of three

or four days. At length his force was reduced to two hundred men, and he

was in continual dread that in some false alarm all his remaining men

might disperse. Continuing his march, he at length came to the province

of Nasca, about fifty leagues from Lima.

After Gonzalo had gone to a considerable distance from Lima, Don Antonio

de Ribeira, Martin Pizarro, Antonio de Leon, and some other inhabitants

of Lima, who as old and infirm had been allowed by Gonzalo to remain

behind the army on giving up all their horses and arms, erected the

standard of the city, and, assembling the small number of inhabitants

that remained in the great square, they publickly declared for his

majesty in their own names and in the names of all the loyal citizens of

the city. After proclaiming the new regulations and orders of the

president, the general amnesty granted by the king, and the abrogation

of the obnoxious regulations, they sent notice of all the recent events

to Aldana, who still remained on the coast to receive and protect all

who were inclined to quit the party of the insurgents. At the same time,

and for the same purpose, Juan Alfonso Palamino had landed with fifty

men, yet keeping his boats always in readiness to reimbark, in case of

the return of Gonzalo. Aldana likewise placed an advanced picket of

twelve horsemen, of those who had deserted from the insurgents, on the

road towards Arequipa, to bring him timely notice of any thing that

might occur in that quarter, with orders to return with all speed in

case of the enemy making a countermarch, or of any important event.

Aldana likewise gave orders to Captain Alfonzo de Caceres to remain at

Lima, to collect any of the deserters from Pizarro that might come

there; and he dispatched Juan Yllanez in one of his vessels along the

coast, with orders to land a monk and a soldier in some secure place, to

carry dispatches to Centeno, announcing the events that had occurred at

lima, and to furnish him with copies of the royal orders and general

amnesty, and to communicate similar intelligence at Arequipa. He sent

likewise several intelligent persons by land to Arequipa, with letters

to different persons of consideration, and to carry orders and

instructions to the captains Alfonzo de Mendoza and Juan de Silveira at

La Plata. By means of the Indians of Jauja, who belonged to him, Aldana

transmitted letters and copies of the amnesty to several of those

persons who accompanied Juan d'Acosta, that the royal clemency might be

made known in all parts of Peru. Most of these measures succeeded, and

produced material advantages as will appear in the sequel. In the mean

time, Lorenzo de Aldana remained on board ship, with about an hundred

and fifty men, issuing such orders as seemed necessary in the present

state of affairs.

It was soon learnt that Gonzalo received regular advices of ever thing

that occurred, and great care was likewise taken by Aldana to procure

intelligence of all that passed in the camp of the insurgents; so that

every day messengers went and came between both parties, and both were

continually endeavouring to mislead each other by false reports.

Accordingly it was reported one day that Gonzalo and his troops Were in

full march for Lima, which occasioned much confusion and dismay in that

city; but it was known afterwards that this rumour had been purposely

spread by Gonzalo and his lieutenant-general, on purpose to prevent

Aldana from pursuing them, a measure of which they were much afraid. In

this unpromising state of his affairs, great numbers of the adherents of

Gonzalo abandoned him, believing that he could not resist the power of

his enemies. Such of them as had horses took the road to Truxillo; and

all the rest endeavoured to reach the ships of Aldana, concealing

themselves as well as they could in retired places till they might

ascertain that Gonzalo had proceeded farther on his march, which indeed

he continued to do with much precipitation. When he had proceeded to a

considerable distance from Lima, all those who had abandoned him flocked

to that city, and every day some fresh deserters came there, by which

means Aldana got accurate intelligence of the proceedings of Gonzalo,

who was reported to be in continual dread of being put to death by his

own men. After the flight of the licentiate Carvajal and Gabriel de

Roias, Gonzalo made no farther use of the royal standard, only

displaying that which contained his own arms. His cruelty increased with

his disappointment, insomuch that not a day passed in which he did not

put some one to death. He took extraordinary precautions for his own

personal safety, which were so far effectual, but every effort to

prevent desertion was unavailing.

Lorenzo de Aldana sent intelligence of all these matters to the

president, by means of messengers dispatched both by sea and land,

earnestly urging him to come into Peru as quickly as possible, as the

insurgent party seemed at so low an ebb that nothing was wanting but his

presence to make it fall entirely in pieces and submit without a

struggle. On the 9th. of September 1547, when assured that Gonzalo had

retreated eighty leagues from Lima, Aldana landed with all his officers

and all the inhabitants of Lima that had taken shelter on board his

ships. He was received on shore with every demonstration of joy and

respect, every one who was able appearing in arms to do him honour.

Having appointed Juan Fernandez to the command of the ships, he took

charge of the vacant government of Lima, where he made every possible

preparation for carrying on the war, collecting arms ammunition and all

other necessaries.

Some time after the departure of Juan d'Acosta from Lima for Cuzco by

the mountain road, as already mentioned, at the head of three hundred

men well armed and equipped, he got notice that Gonzalo Pizarro had

abandoned that city; on which he sent Fra Pedro, a monk of the order of

Mercy, to Gonzalo, to demand instructions for his ulterior proceedings.

Pizarro sent back the monk with directions for Acosta to join him at a

certain place. On his return to Acosta, accompanied by a person named

Gonzalo Muquos, after delivering his dispatches, Friar Pedro gave him an

account of all that had happened in the army of Gonzalo, and in

particular of the great number of men that had deserted from him; which

Acosta had not before learnt, though several of his soldiers had

received the intelligence by letters brought to them by the Indians who

frequented the camp, but which they dared not to communicate to each

other. On the present occasion, the messengers from Gonzalo recommended

to Acosta to keep this matter as secret as possible till such time as he

should join Gonzalo. Acosta therefore, gave out that he had received

favourable intelligence from the monk, and that Gonzalo had been

successful on several occasions, being daily joined by many additional

soldiers; and, as he had found it convenient and necessary to send off

many confidential persons in various directions, these persons pretended

to have deserted from Gonzalo by way of stratagem, on purpose, to gain

possession of the ships commanded by Aldana. All this however was

insufficient to disguise the truth from many of the followers of Aldana,

particularly Paëz de Sotomayor, his major-general, and Martin d'Olmos

one of his captains; who, coming to a knowledge of the real state of

affairs, entered into a resolution of putting D'Acosta to death. They

formed this resolution unknown to each other, as no one at this time

dared to avow his sentiments to any other person, for fear of being put

to death; yet, from certain indications, they began to suspect each

other of entertaining similar sentiments, and at length opened

themselves reciprocally, and communicated their purposes to several

soldiers in whom they confided. Just when they were about to have put

their enterprize into execution, Sotomayor got notice that D'Acosta was

holding a secret conference in his tent with two of his captains, and

that he had doubled his ordinary guard. From these circumstances,

Sotomayor concluded that their conspiracy, having been revealed to

several persons, had been betrayed to Acosta. He took therefore prompt

measures to inform all his confederates, and both he and they took horse

without delay, and left the camp in sight of all the army, to the number

of thirty-five in all; among whom, besides Sotomayor and D'Olmos, the

principal persons were Martin d'Alarzon who carried the grand standard,

Hernando de Alvarado, Alfonzo Regel, Antonio de Avila, Garcias Gutierrez

d'Escovedo, and Martin Monje; who, with all who went off on this

occasion, were men of consideration and of much experience in the

affairs of Peru. These men took immediately the road for Guamanga, and

used such expedition that, though Acosta sent off sixty mounted

musqueteers to pursue them, they made their escape in safety.

Acosta caused immediate investigations to be made in regard to such as

had participated in this plot, and ordered several persons to be hanged

who were proved to have known its circumstances: some others in the same

predicament he detained prisoners, and dissembled with the rest who had

been implicated, pretending not to know that they had participated in

the conspiracy: Yet, during his march towards Cuzco, he put to death

several of those of whom he was suspicious, and others who endeavoured

to desert. On his arrival at Cuzco, he displaced all the magistrates who

had been appointed by Centeno, nominating others in their stead in whom

he thought he could confide, and appointed Juan Velasquez de Tapia to

take the chief direction of affairs in that city and province; and

having regulated every thing to his mind, he resumed his march for

Arequipa to join Gonzalo, according to his directions. In this latter

part of his march, about thirty of his men deserted from him, by two or

three at a time, all of whom went directly to Lima where they joined

Lorenzo de Aldana. Besides these, when Acosta had got about ten leagues

beyond Cuzco, Martin de Almandras abandoned him with twenty of the best

soldiers of his small army, and returned to Cuzco, where he found a

sufficient number of the inhabitants disposed to join him in returning

to their duty, and in concurrence with whom he deposed the magistracy

appointed by Acosta, one of whom he sent away prisoner to Lima, and

established a new set in the name of his majesty. Finding that the

number of his followers diminished from day to day, Acosta accelerated

his march as much as possible, both for his own security and to serve

the insurgent cause in which he was engaged. Out of three hundred well

armed and excellently equipped men, with whom he had set out from Lima,

only one hundred remained with him on his arrival at Arequipa. He found

Gonzalo Pizarro at that place, with only about three hundred and fifty

men, who a very short while before had a fine army of fifteen hundred,

besides all those who were dispersed in different parts of Peru under

various captains, all of whom were then under his orders. Gonzalo was

now exceedingly irresolute as to his future proceedings; being too weak

to wait the attack of the royalists, who continually augmented in their

numbers, and yet deeming it dishonourable to fly or to endeavour to

conceal himself.

In the mean time Centeno remained in the Collao, waiting an answer from

Captain Mendoza to the message he had sent by Gonzalo de Zarate as

formerly mentioned. While there he received dispatches from the

president, which were forwarded by Aldana, and accounts of the events

which had occurred at Lima, particularly the flight of Gonzalo Pizarro

to Arequipa, and the junction of Acosta with the insurgents at that

place. On receiving this intelligence he sent a new message to Mendoza

by means of Luis Garcias, giving him an account of all these events, and

particularly informing him of the orders and instructions given to the

president, the general amnesty, the revocation of the obnoxious

regulations, and the determination of his majesty that Gonzalo Pizarro

was not to continue in the government of Peru. He apprized him likewise,

that most of the gentlemen and persons of consideration, who had

hitherto followed Gonzalo, had now abandoned him on account of his

tyrannical conduct, in murdering and plundering all the principal

colonists, and more especially because of his rebellion against the

sovereign, and refusal to submit to his royal orders, and to the

authority of him who had been appointed to regulate the affairs of the

kingdom. Wherefore, although all that had been done hitherto might in

some measure be excused, he urged Mendoza to consider that in continuing

to obey Gonzalo he could no longer avoid the reproach of acting as a

rebel against the king. It was now necessary and proper therefore, to

forget all individual interests or past disputes, and to devote himself

entirely to his majesty, to whom he was enabled by his present situation

to render important service.

Alfonzo de Mendoza was already well disposed to act the part of a loyal

subject in the present situation of affairs, yet uncertain how best to

conduct himself for that purpose; but by this message from Centeno, he

was completely determined as to the regulation of his conduct on the

present emergency, and immediately declared for his majesty. By

agreement between him and Centeno, each was to retain the chief command

of the troops now under their orders, and Mendoza departed from La Plata

with his men to join Centeno in the Collao. The union of these leaders

and their troops occasioned great joy to all their followers, now

exceeding a thousand men; and they resolved to march immediately against

Gonzalo, taking up a position at a certain pass to prevent him from

escaping, and were likewise induced to remain at that place for the

convenience of procuring provisions.

At this time the whole extent of Peru from Quito to Lima had declared

for his majesty. Juan d'Olmos, who commanded under Gonzalo at Puerto

Viejo, on observing the vessels under Aldana passing the port of Manta

in that province, had sent an express to Gonzalo giving his opinion that

these vessels seemed hostile, as they had not called at the port for

refreshments. He at the same time sent some Indians on board, in their

ordinary rafts or flat boats, to inquire the purpose of their voyage; by

means of which Indians Aldana transmitted letters to D'Olmos, urging him

to quit the insurgent party, with copies of all the papers connected

with the mission of the president. After perusing these papers, D'Olmos

transmitted them to Gomez Estacio who was lieutenant-governor of the

province for Gonzalo at St Jago de Guyaquil, usually called Culata. On

learning that his majesty did not approve of continuing Gonzalo in the

government, and had sent out Gasca as president, Gomez wrote back to

D'Olmos, that when the president arrived in the country he should know

better how to act, and might probably join him; but in the present

situation of affairs, he thought it best for both to remain quiet. Juan

d'Olmos went immediately to visit Gomez, accompanied by seven or eight

friends, under pretence of communing with him on the state of affairs;

but, taking his opportunity, one day when Gomez was off his guard, he

stabbed him with his poniard, and immediately got the people to declare

for his majesty, after which he did the same at his own government of

Puerto Viejo.

When Pedro de Puelles, the governor of Quito, became acquainted with

these proceedings of D'Olmos, and that the fleet and army at Panama had

declared for the president, he became exceedingly anxious as to the

measures proper for him to pursue. At this time D'Olmos sent Diego de

Urbina to Quito to endeavour to prevail on Puelles to declare for the

royal party. Puelles declared he was ready to receive and obey the

person sent out by the king, when once he was satisfied that his majesty

had no intention of continuing Gonzalo in the government, but would make

no alteration in the mean time; and with this indecisive answer Urbina

returned to D'Olmos. A few days afterwards, Rodrigo de Salazar, in whom

Puelles reposed entire confidence, entered into a conspiracy with

several soldiers at Quito, assassinated Puelles, and declared for his

majesty. After this exploit, Salazar set out from Quito for Tumbez with

three hundred men, with the intention of joining the president. By these

several events, and others which have been formerly related, almost the

whole of Peru had already returned to obedience before the arrival of

the president in the kingdom.

While these favourable events were going on in Peru, the president

embarked at Panama with about five hundred men, and arrived safely at

the port of Tumbez; one of his ships, commanded by Don Pedro de Cabrera,

being under the necessity of stopping at Buenaventura, whence Cabrera

and his men marched by land to Tumbez. On his arrival in Peru, the

president received letters from all parts of the kingdom, by which the

writers offered him their services and assistance, besides communicating

their sentiments on the situation of the colony, and giving their advice

how best to proceed in reducing it to order; to all of which letters he

replied with great condescension. So many flocked to his standard from

all quarters, that he considered himself sufficiently strong to overcome

all resistance from the remnant of the insurgents, without drawing any

reinforcements from the other Spanish colonies in America; on which

account he sent off messengers to New Spain, Guatimala, Nicaragua, and

St Domingo, informing the governors of these colonies of the favourable

turn of affairs in Peru, and that he should now have no occasion for

the reinforcements which he had formerly thought necessary. Soon after

his arrival, he gave orders to his lieutenant-general, Pedro Alfonzo de

Hinojosa, to march with the troops to form a junction with the royalists

in Caxamarca. In the mean time Polo de Menzes remained in charge of the

fleet, with which he advanced along the coast to the southwards, while

the president, with a sufficient escort, went by the road of the plain

to Truxillo, at which place he received intelligence from all parts of

the country, stating that every thing went on well.

The president had resolved that he would not go to Lima till he had

completed the purposes of his mission, by the final conquest of Gonzalo

and his adherents, and the restoration of peace and order in the kingdom

of Peru; on which account he transmitted orders to all quarters, that

all who had declared for his majesty should meet him in the valley of

Jauja, which he considered to be a convenient situation in which to

assemble the whole loyal force of the kingdom, as in that place

abundance of provisions could easily be procured. For this purpose, he

sent orders to Lorenzo de Aldana, then at Lima, to march with all his

force for Jauja; and joining the army under Hinojosa, now exceeding a

thousand men, he marched for Jauja, all the army expressing the utmost

satisfaction at the prospect of being freed from the tyranny of Gonzalo.

Many of the principal persons who had joined with Gonzalo at the

beginning of the troubles, were now exceedingly offended and displeased

by the cruel murders of so many of their friends and neighbours; above

five hundred men having been put to death, many of whom were persons of

consideration and importance; insomuch that those who still remained

along with him were continually in fear of their lives.

On his arrival at Arequipa, Gonzalo found that city entirely deserted,

as most of the inhabitants had gone to join Diego Centeno after that

officer got possession of Cuzco. Hearing that Centeno was in the Collao,

near the lake of Titicaca, where after his junction with Mendoza, he had

an army of near a thousand men, composed of the troops of Cuzco Las

Charcas and Arequipa, and with which they occupied all the passes

towards the interior, Gonzalo believed it almost impossible to attack

these officers with any probability of success. He waited therefore at

Arequipa about three weeks, expecting the junction of D'Acosta, who at

length arrived, but with very diminished numbers, as already related,

many having abandoned him, and having put many of his followers to death

on suspicion that they intended to desert. After the junction of

D'Acosta, Gonzalo found himself at the head of five hundred men. He now

wrote to Centeno, giving a recital of all the events which had occurred

during the troubles, and dwelt particularly on the favour he had always

shewn him, and particularly instanced the pardon he had granted him when

Gaspard Rodriguez and Philip Guttierrez were executed, though equally

guilty with them, and although all his officers had urged him to put

Centeno to death. In addition, Gonzalo made high offers to Centeno,

promising to accede to every demand he might choose to make, if he would

now join him. He sent this letter to Centeno by a person named Francisco

Vaso, who immediately offered his services to Centeno, to whom he

intimated that Diego Alvarez his standard-bearer was in correspondence

with Gonzalo. Centeno was already informed of this circumstance by

Alvarez himself, who assured him he had entered into this correspondence

for a quite different purpose than that of betraying him or the royal

cause.

Centeno thought proper to send a civil answer to Gonzalo, giving him

many thanks for his offers, and freely acknowledging the favour he had

formerly experienced. That as a mark of his gratitude, therefore, he now

earnestly entreated him to reflect seriously on the present situation of

affairs, to consider the gracious clemency of the king, who had granted

a free pardon to him and all those who had taken any part in the past

troubles. He assured Gonzalo, if he would abandon the insurrection, now

evidently hopeless, and submit to the royal orders, that he would use

his utmost endeavours to procure him an honourable and advantageous

situation, and at the same time endeavoured to convince him that he

would run no risk either in his person or property by following the

present advice. On his return to Gonzalo with this letter, Vaso was met

by the lieutenant-general Carvajal, who made minute inquiry respecting

every thing he had seen and learnt, and gave him strict injunctions not

to let it be known to the followers of Gonzalo that the force of Centeno

exceeded seven hundred men. On being informed that Centeno refused to

join him, Gonzalo disdained to read his letter, and ordered it

immediately to be burnt in presence of several of his officers.

Immediately after this, Gonzalo determined to march into the province

of Las Charcas, and accordingly took the direct road towards the pass

occupied by Centeno and Mendoza. In this march the van-guard was

commanded by the lieutenant-general, who took and hanged more than

twenty persons whom he fell in with during the march. Among these was a

priest named Pantaleon, who carried some letters for Centeno, and whom

Carvajal ordered to be hung up, with his breviary and ink-horn suspended

from his neck. Continuing this march, the scouts of the two armies fell

in with each other on Thursday the 19th of October 1547. Gonzalo

immediately sent one of his chaplains with a message to Centeno,

demanding leave to continue his march through the pass, without being

obliged to give battle[32]. The chaplain was conducted by the bishop of

Cuzco, who happened to be in the army of Centeno, to his tent; and

Centeno gave strict charges to his troops to be on their guard and

always in good order to receive the enemy in case of an attack. For

above a month Centeno had been afflicted by an obstinate fever, for

which he had been six times blooded without any relief, and was not

expected to recover; so that he was quite incapable of acting on the

present emergency, being confined constantly to bed.

[Footnote 32: No consequences seem to have followed from this demand,

which does not appear to have been acceded or even listened to.--E.]

The illness of Centeno was known in the army of Gonzalo, and that his

tent was pitched at some distance from the rest, to avoid the noise and

bustle of the camp. Founding on this intelligence, Juan d'Acosta was

detached with twenty picked men, with orders to approach silently in the

night to the camp of the royalists, and to endeavour to carry off

Centeno. Acosta accordingly drew near with so much caution that he

surprised the centinels that were on guard over Centeno, and had very

near reached his tent when the alarm was given by some negro servants.

Being thus discovered, Acosta ordered his men to fire off their

musquets, and immediately retreated back to the camp of Gonzalo without

losing a man. In the confusion occasioned by this exploit, great numbers

of the royalists hastened towards the tent occupied by Centeno; but on

this occasion several of the soldiers belonging to Valdivia threw away

their arms and fled. Next morning the scouts of both armies approached

each other, followed by the respective armies, which at length came in

sight. The army of Centeno consisted of about a thousand men, two

hundred of whom were cavalry, an hundred and fifty armed with musquets,

and all the rest with pikes. Of this army, Luis de Ribera was

major-general, Pedro de Rios, Jerom Villegas, and Pedro de Ulloa,

captains of cavalry, and Diego Alvarez carried the grand-standard. The

captains of infantry were Juan de Vargas, Francisco Retamoso, Negral,

Pantoia, and Diego Lopez de Zuniga; Luis Garcias being sergeant-major,

or adjutant-general[33]. The army of Gonzalo consisted only of five

hundred men, of which three hundred were musqueteers, and eighty

cavalry, the remainder being armed with pikes. Of this army Carvajal was

lieutenant-general; the licentiate Cepeda and Juan Velez de Guevara were

captains of horse; and Juan d'Acosta, Ferdinand Bachicao, and Juan de la

Torre captains of foot.

[Footnote 33: It is not easy to understand how Mendoza, who had joined

Centeno some time before, happens to be omitted in this enumeration--E.]

Both armies being drawn up in good order, the insurgents advanced, to

the sound of trumpets and other musical instruments, till within six

hundred paces of the enemy, when Carvajal ordered them to halt. The

royalists continued to advance till within a hundred paces less, and

then halted likewise. At this time, forty musqueteers were detached from

the army of Gonzalo, with orders to begin the engagement; and two other

parties of musqueteers, of forty men each, were posted on the wings,

Pizarro taking his station between his cavalry and infantry. Thirty

musqueteers were likewise advanced from the army of Centeno, to skirmish

with those of the insurgents. As Carvajal observed that the royalists

waited the attack in good order, he ordered his troops to advance a few

steps very slowly, in hopes of inducing the enemy to make some movement

or evolution which might occasion confusion in their ranks. This had the

desired, effect, as the royalists, believing that their enemies, though

interior in number, wished to have the honour of making the attack, they

began immediately to advance, and the insurgents by order of Carvajal

stood firm to receive them. When tolerably near, Carvajal gave orders

for a small number of his troops to fire their musquets, on which the

royalists made a general discharge, and marched forwards at a quick step

with levelled pikes, during which the royalist musqueteers made a second

discharge without occasioning any loss to the enemy, as they were still

three hundred paces distant. Carvajal made his men reserve their fire

till the enemy was within about an hundred paces; when, with a few

pieces of artillery, and the whole of his musqueteers, he threw in so

destructive a volley that above an hundred and fifty of the royalists

were slain, among whom were two of their captains. By this terrible

slaughter, the whole infantry of the royalist army was thrown into

disorder, entirely defeated, and took to flight, in spite of every

effort of Captain Retimoso to rally them, who lay wounded in the field.

Notwithstanding the defeat of the infantry, the royalist cavalry made a

brave charge against the insurgents, of whom they killed and wounded a

considerable number. On this occasion Gonzalo had his horse killed and

was thrown to the ground, yet escaped unhurt. Pedro de Rios and Pedro de

Ulloa, captains of cavalry belonging to Centeno, wheeled with their

squadrons round the wing of the insurgent infantry, intending to charge

their flank; but were opposed by the detachments of musqueteers which

were posted on the wings, on which occasion De Rios and several others

were slain. Being thus repulsed, and seeing their own infantry entirely

defeated, the cavalry took likewise to flight and dispersed, every one

endeavouring to save himself as he best could.

Gonzalo Pizarro, having thus gained an easy victory, marched on with his

army in good order to the camp of Centeno, putting every person to death

that came in the way. A considerable number of the dispersed royalists

happened to seek safety in passing by the camp of Pizarro, which they

found entirely deserted, insomuch that they were able to make use of the

horses and mules belonging to the insurgent infantry to facilitate their

flight, and even made a considerable booty in gold and silver. While the

royalist cavalry were engaged vigorously with the insurgents, Bachicao,

one of Gonzalos captains, believing that the royalists would be

victorious, went over to them. After the victory was decided in favour

of Gonzalo, Bachicao, imagining that his conduct had not been observed,

and would remain unknown, or that he would be able to justify himself

under some colourable pretence, returned to his post. But as his

defection was known to Carvajal, he caused him to be instantly hung up,

adding insulting raillery to his cruelty, calling him his dear comrade

and using many other bantering expressions.

During this unfortunate battle, Centeno was so ill that he was carried

on a kind of litter by six Indians, almost in a state of insensibility;

yet, by the care and attention of some of his friends, he was saved

after the defeat of his army. In this bloody engagement, which was

fought near a place called Guarina, above three hundred and fifty men

were slain on the side of the royalists, besides thirty more who were

put to death in the pursuit by the insurgent cavalry. Among these were,

the major-general Luis de Ribera, the captains Retamoso, Diego Lopez de

Zuniga, Negral, Pantoia, and Diego Alvarez, with Friar Gonzalo of the

order of Mercy, and several other persons of condition. The insurgents

lost about an hundred men. After the battle, Carvajal pursued the

fugitives at the head of the insurgent cavalry for several days, on the

road towards Cuzco. He was very anxious to take the bishop of Cuzco,

against whom he was much incensed for having joined Centeno and being

present in the battle. The bishop however made his escape; but Carvajal

gratified his revenge on several royalists whom he got up with, all of

whom he hung up without mercy, among whom were a brother of the bishop

and a Dominican friar. After the return of Carvajal from the pursuit,

Gonzalo made a distribution of lands and Indians among his troops,

engaging to put them into possession at a convenient opportunity. He

likewise took great care of his wounded men, and caused the slain to be

buried. He then sent Bovadilla with a detachment to the city of La Plata

and the mines, to collect all the gold and silver that could be

procured, and dispatched Diego de Carvajal, usually called the _Beau_,

on a similar mission to Arequipa. Juan de la Torre was sent to take

possession of Cuzco, where he put to death Vasquez de Tapia and the

licentiate Martel.

After this favourable turn of affairs, Pizarro issued a proclamation by

which all the soldiers who had served under Centeno were commanded to

join his standard, under pain of death; granting an amnesty for all that

passed, with the exception only of those principal leaders who had

particularly exerted themselves for the royal cause. He then sent Pedro

de Bustincia with a detachment, to oblige the curacas of Andaguaylas and

the neighbouring districts to furnish provisions for his army. A few

days afterwards Gonzalo repaired to Cuzco with about four hundred men,

and used every effort to put himself into a situation for opposing the

president; being so elated by the victory he had gained at Guarina over

such superior numbers, that he and his followers believed themselves

almost invincible.

While these things were going on in the south of Peru, the president

marched by the mountain road for the valley of Jauja, accompanied by

the troops which he had brought from the Tierra Firma, and those of the

captains Diego de Mora, Gomez de Alvarado, Juan de Saavedra, Porcel, and

the others that had assembled in Caxamarca. He sent orders likewise to

Salazar, who now commanded at Quito, to join him with all his men; and

ordered Lorenzo de Aldana to join him from Lima with all the soldiers

from the fleet and those he had drawn together after the flight of

Gonzalo to Arequipa. The president arrived first of all at Jauja with an

escort of an hundred men, where he immediately took the proper measures

for collecting arms and military stores, and provisions. On the same day

he was joined by the licentiate Carvajal and Gabriel de Royas; and soon

afterwards Ferdinand Mexia de Guzman, and Juan Alphonzo Palamino arrived

with their companies. Lorenzo de Aldana remained at Lima with his own

company, it being of great importance to keep possession of that city

and its post. In a short time the president had collected an army of

above fifteen hundred men in Jauja, and employed all the forges and

artists he could procure to fabricate new musquets, to put all the old

ones into good repair, and to provide abundance of pikes and all other

arms, both offensive and defensive. In these preparations he not only

exerted the utmost diligence, but shewed a great deal of intelligence

and knowledge, far beyond what could tare been expected from a person

who had hitherto been entirely occupied in civil and religious pursuits.

He carefully visited his camps, and inspected the workmen who were

employed by his orders, taking at the same time every possible care of

such of his soldiers as were sick, exerting himself to the utmost in

every thing relative to the good of the service, beyond what could have

been expected from any single person, by which means he acquired the

entire confidence and affection of all who were under his command. His

army had always been in hope that their services would not be required,

and even at one time believed that the president would not have had

occasion to assemble an army, as they thought that Centeno was strong

enough to have conquered Gonzalo.

Immediately on receiving intelligence of the victory which Gonzalo had

gained at Guarina, the president sent the captains Lope Martin and

Mercadillo, with a detachment of fifty men, to occupy the passes of

Guamanga, about thirty leagues from Jauja on the way to Cuzco, to learn

the motions of the enemy, and to collect all who might have been able

to escape from Cuzco. While at Guamanga, Lope Martin got notice that

Pedro de Bustincia was in the district of Andahuaylas collecting

provisions for the army of Gonzalo, as formerly mentioned. Accompanied

by fifteen mounted musqueteers, Martin went into that district, where he

unexpectedly attacked Bustincia during the night, and made him and all

his people prisoners. After hanging some of these men, he returned to

Guamanga, bringing all the curacas of the neighbourhood along with him,

by whose means intelligence was conveyed to all parts of the country,

giving notice of the arrival of the president in the valley of Jauja,

and the great preparations he was making in that place.

From Jauja the president sent his lieutenant-general, Alfonzo de

Alvarado, to bring up from Lima all the soldiers that could be spared

from that place, together with some pieces of artillery from the ships,

and clothes and money for the supply of such of the soldiers as were in

want; all of which services were performed by Alvarado in a short time.

The president now mustered his army, of which Pedro Alfonzo de Hinojosa

was lieutenant-general, and the licenciate Bendicto de Carvajal carried

the royal standard, Don Pedro de Cabrera, Gomez de Alvarado, Juan de

Saavedra, Diego de Mora, Francisco Hernandez, Rodrigo de Salazar, and

Alfonzo de Mendoza were captains of cavalry; Don Balthazar de Castillo,

Pablo de Menezes, Hernando Mexia de Guzman, Juan Alfonzo Palomino, Gomez

de Solis, Francisco Mosquera, Don Ferdinand de Cardinas, the adelantado

Andagoya, Francisco d'Olmos, Gomez d'Arias, and three other captains,

Porcel, Pardaval, and Serna, commanded the infantry. Gabriel de Royas

was appointed to command the artillery. Besides the military officers

already mentioned, the president was attended by the archbishop of Lima,

the bishops of Cuzco and Quito, the provincials of the Dominicans and of

the order of Mercy, and by several other ecclesiastics, both priests and

friars. On a general muster and review of the army, it was found to

consist of seven hundred musqueteers, five hundred pikemen, and four

hundred cavalry. Afterwards, on arriving at Xaquixaguana on the march

towards Cuzco, it was augmented to nineteen hundred men, by the junction

of several other detachments, forming the largest and best appointed

array hitherto seen in Peru.

The president, having completed his preparations, began his march from

Jauja in good order on the 19th of December 1547, taking the route of

Cuzco, and especially desirous of crossing the river Abancay[34] in some

safe place. In this part of his march he was joined by Pedro de

Valdivia, the governor of Chili. Valdivia had come by sea to Lima, on

purpose to raise men, and to procure various stores of which he was in

want, with clothing and ammunition, on purpose to enable him to proceed

in the conquest of Chili. On his arrival at Lima, and learning the

situation of affairs in Peru, he determined upon joining the president.

His arrival was considered as an indication of good fortune; for,

although the president had already in his army many officers of merit

and capacity, and of eminent rank and fortune, there was not any one in

Peru who possessed so much experience in the manner of conducting

warlike operations in that country as Valdivia, on which account he was

considered as a fit person to be opposed to the experience and

stratagems of Carvajal, who was much dreaded by every one in the

presidents army, more especially since the late defeat of Centeno, which

was entirely attributed to the talents of Carvajal. About the same time

Centeno joined the president with more than thirty horse, who had

accompanied him ever since the defeat of Guarina. Continuing his march

amid considerable difficulties, owing to the scarcity of provisions, the

president at length reached the province of Andahuaylas, where he judged

it proper to remain during the winter, on account of the violent rains

which fell night and day almost without ceasing, by which the tents were

all rotted. The maize which they procured as food for the troops was all

wet and spoiled, by which a considerable number of the soldiers were

afflicted with dysentery, of which some died, notwithstanding the care

taken of the sick by Francisco de la Rocha, a Trinitarian monk, who

acted as physician to the army. Although there were above four hundred

sick at one time, so great was the care bestowed, that they were as well

attended and as plentifully supplied with medicines as if in a populous

city, insomuch that they almost all recovered.

[Footnote 34: Rather the Pachacamac, near which the town or city of

Abancay is situated, and where probably the president proposed to pass

that river.--E.]

The arrival of Valdivia and Centeno diffused much joy through the army,

which was expressed in frequent feasts and entertainments, with concerts

of music, running at the ring, and similar amusements. During the

continuance of the army in winter quarters at Andahuaylas, the general

Hinojosa with Alfonzo de Alvarado and Valdivia applied themselves

indefatigably to have every thing in the best possible order for taking

the field. On the commencement of spring, and when the rains began

sensibly to diminish, the army broke up from Andahuaylas and marched to

the bridge of Abancay, about twenty leagues from Cuzco, where it halted

until bridges were constructed across the Apurimac at the distance of

twelve leagues from Cuzco[35], as the enemy had broken down all the

bridges over that river, and it was necessary either to construct new

ones, or to make a circuit of more than seventy leagues to get to Cuzco.

On purpose to distract the enemy, the president caused materials for the

construction of bridges to be carried to three different points on the

Apurimac; one on the great road of the Incas[36], a second in the valley

of Cotabamba, about twelve leagues farther up the river, and a third

still farther up the Apurimac, at a village belonging to Don Pedro de

Puertocarrero, where that officer was posted with a hundred men to guard

the passage. For the construction of these bridges cables and ropes were

prepared, after the manner of the native Peruvians as formerly described

in our general account of the country; and beams and pillars were got

ready on which to fix the cables when the army should be collected at

the intended place of passing the river. Had Gonzalo been able to

ascertain the place at which it was intended to pass, he had assuredly

opposed the royalists, and would at least have made it exceedingly

difficult for them to construct a bridge; but as he could not ascertain

the actual point fixed on, he did not consider it safe to divide his

force so as to oppose the royalists at the three points of

demonstration, and satisfied himself therefore by posting spies at the

different places, to bring him immediate notice of the place where the

royalists might begin their operations, that he might know where to

march to oppose them. But the secret was confined to the knowledge of

the president, and the members of his council of war.

[Footnote 35: Abancay on the Pachacamac is not above 14 Spanish leagues

from Cuzco in a straight line. The other bridges mentioned in the text

must have been thrown over the Apurimac Proper, somewhere near the town

or village of Limatambo.--E.]

[Footnote 36: This was probably by Limatambo, as on the great road the

Incas had palaces for lodging in with their attendants, called

_tambos_.--E.]

When all the materials were in readiness, the army began its march for

Cotabamba, at which place it was determined to pass the river. In this

march the army had to encounter very considerable difficulties in

passing through mountains covered with snow. Several of the captains

were of opinion that this was an improper route, and proposed another

place almost fifty[37], leagues higher up; but Lope Martin, who guarded

the pass of Cotabamba, always insisted that the securest passage was to

be had at that place. In consequence of this difference of opinion, the

president sent Valdivia and three other captains to examine the

different places; and on their report that Cotabamba was attended by the

least difficulty and danger, that place was fixed upon. When Lope Martin

got information that the army approached to Cotabamba, he set to work

with the Spaniards and Indians of his detachment, to extend and tighten

the cables and ropes across the river, of which the main support of the

bridge was to be composed. Three of the cables were already fixed, when

the spies employed by Gonzalo came to the place, and cut two of them

without resistance. On this intelligence being communicated to the army,

it gave much concern to the president and his officers, lest Gonzalo

might bring up his forces to dispute the passage before the army could

be able to get over. The president, therefore, accompanied by his

principal officers, Hinojosa Alvarado and Valdivia, hastened to the scite

of the bridge, where he immediately gave orders for some companies of

infantry to pass the river on Peruvian flat boats or rafts, which was

deemed a very hazardous enterprize, both on account of the rapidity of

the current, and because it was believed the enemy might be in some force

on the other side. Among the first who got over was Hondegardo with a

few soldiers, after whom several other captains of infantry got across

with their men, so that before night above four hundred men were got

over, some of whom swam over their horses along with the flat boats,

holding them by the bridles, and having their musquets and other arms

tied to the saddles. Yet so rapid was the current, that above sixty

horses were lost on this occasion, either drowned or dashed against

the rocks.

[Footnote 37: This may probably be an error of the press in the original

for _fifteen_ leagues. Fifty leagues even from Abancay would have

carried the army almost to Arequipa, to turn the head of the Apurimac,

and among the highest mountains of Peru.--E.]

On receiving notice from his spies that a part of the royalists had got

across the river, Gonzalo sent off Juan d'Acosta with two hundred

mounted musqueteers, with orders to give no quarter to any of those who

had passed the river, excepting such as had newly come from Spain. On

the approach of Acosta, as the royalists then on that side of the river

were not numerous, they mounted a considerable number of Indians and

negroes on the horses which had been got over, arming them with lances,

and by that means presented the appearance of a formidable squadron

drawn up on a height, the few Spanish troops who were on that side of

the river being placed in the front rank; insomuch that, when Acosta

went to reconnoitre, they appeared so numerous that he did not venture

to attack; and returned for a reinforcement. In the mean time, the

bridge being got ready with the utmost possible diligence, most of the

royalists passed the river, every one expressing the utmost astonishment

at the negligence of Gonzalo in not being at hand to dispute the

passage, as a hundred men at each of the three places where preparations

had been made for passing, might have rendered the attempt exceedingly

hazardous.

Next day, when all the army with its stores and followers had passed the

river, Don Juan de Sandoval was sent out upon discovery, who reported on

his return that he had advanced three leagues into the country without

seeing any thing of the insurgents. Hinojosa and Valdivia were then

ordered to advance with several companies of infantry to occupy the

passes in the neighbouring mountain, as Gonzalo might have given them

much trouble if he had taken possession of these heights, which were

above a league and a half in ascent; and this order was happily executed

without meeting with any resistance. When Acosta retreated from the

river, in consequence of believing himself too weak to attack those who

had passed, he sent to demand a reinforcement from Gonzalo of a hundred

musqueteers, with the aid of whom he alleged he would be enabled to

defeat the royalist party which had crossed. At this time one Juan

Nunnez de Prado deserted from him to the president, and gave him notice

of the succours which were expected by Acosta. Believing therefore that

Gonzalo would advance with all his forces, the president took post on

the ridge of the mountain with above nine hundred men, both cavalry and

infantry, and remained under arms all night. Next morning, Acosta

advanced with the reinforcement he had demanded, and the scouts of the

president brought notice of his approach. On this intelligence,

believing the whole army of the insurgents at hand, the president sent

his major-general Alfonzo de Alvarado back to the river, to bring up

the artillery and the rest of the army: And as the colours of Pizarro

came in sight, before the return of Alvarado, the president drew up his

nine hundred men in order of battle, giving all the necessary orders in

case of being attacked. But in a short time, it was discovered that

these precautions were unnecessary, as Acosta soon retreated with his

three hundred men, on seeing the greatly superior force of the

royalists.

The president remained two or three days in the position he had taken on

the summit of the mountain, waiting for his artillery and the rest of

his army. While at that place, Gonzalo sent him a message by a priest,

demanding that he should dismiss his army, and refrain from making war

against him till he should receive new orders from his majesty. On this

occasion, the bishop of Cuzco, who was along with the president, ordered

the priest into confinement. A little time before this, Gonzalo had

dispatched another priest, to endeavour to gain over Hinojosa and

Alvarado to his party, But that messenger, being resolved to desert the

party of the insurgents, had taken measures in concert with his brother

to go off in company with all their effects, in which they succeeded. At

this time likewise the president wrote to Gonzalo, as he had repeatedly

done during his march, earnestly entreating him to submit to the orders

of his majesty, and sending him at the same time a copy of the amnesty.

The usual manner in which these dispatches was forwarded to Gonzalo, was

by means of the scouts of the army, who had orders to give them to those

belonging to Gonzalo when they chanced to meet.

When it was known at Cuzco that the president had crossed the river

Apurimac with all his army, and had taken possession of the pass in the

high mountain, Gonzalo Pizarro immediately marched out from that city

with his army and encamped at Xaquixaguana, about five leagues from

Cuzco, in a plain through which the road passed by which the royalists

would have to march on their way from the mountain towards Cuzco. His

army at this time consisted of five hundred and fifty musqueteers, with

six pieces of cannon, and three hundred and fifty cavalry and pikemen.

Gonzalo established his camp in a very strong position, as it was only

accessible in front by means of a very narrow defile, one flank being

secured by a river and morass, the other flank by the mountain, and the

rear by precipitous rocks. During two or three days, that the two

armies remained near each other before the battle, Gonzalo sometimes

detached a hundred and sometimes two hundred men to skirmish with

similar parties of the enemy. As the royalist army was now encamped only

at a short distance from the insurgents, Gonzalo was afraid his troops

might lose courage by noticing the vast superiority of the enemy in

number, and that many of his men might abandon him; for which reason he

always drew up his men under cover of a rising ground near his camp,

pretending that he did so to induce the president to attack him in his

present advantageous post, confiding in his numbers and believing the

insurgents much fewer than they really were.

After the president had passed the mountains and pitched his camp on the

descent towards the plain, within view of the insurgents, Gonzalo drew

up his army in order of battle, and caused some discharges to be made

from his cannon and musquetry. On that day there arose so thick a mist,

that the scouts and spies of the two armies often came against each

other unexpectedly. Seeing that the insurgents were disposed to await

his attack, or even to give battle, the president was inclined to defer

bringing matters to that extremity for some time, in the hope that a

considerable number of the enemy might come over to him if they could

find an opportunity. Yet, as the season was exceedingly cold, even

accompanied with strong frost, and as wood could not be procured for

making fires, and provisions were scarce, it was impossible to remain

long in a state of inaction. The army of Gonzalo was not subject to any

of these inconveniencies, having plenty of provisions brought regularly

from Cuzco, and being encamped in a comfortable and temperate situation

in comparison with the position of the president, whose camp was on the

slope of the mountain, while that of the insurgents was in the plain or

valley below. Such is the difference in the temperature of Peru at very

inconsiderable distances, that on the mountains a severe cold is

experienced, accompanied by frost and snow, while only at eight or ten

miles distance in the valley the inhabitants are obliged to use

precautions to relieve them from excessive heat.

Gonzalo and his lieutenant-general, Carvajal, had formed an arrangement

for a night attack upon the president, intending to have assailed his

camp in three points at the same time; but they were induced to abandon

this project, in consequence of the desertion of one of their soldiers

named Nava, who communicated their intentions to the president. By this

person and some others who had joined him from the army of Gonzalo, the

president was advised to delay coming to battle as long as possible; as

they were certain that many of the followers of Gonzalo would take the

first favourable opportunity of returning to their duty, more especially

those soldiers who had served under Centeno, and who had been

constrained after his defeat to enter into the ranks of the insurgents

to save their lives. In expectation of the proposed attack, the

president kept his army the whole of that night under arms, by which

they suffered, much distress from the extreme coldness of the weather on

the mountain, so that many of the soldiers were hardly able to keep hold

of their arms, and waited impatiently for day. At daylight, a party of

musqueteers belonging to Gonzalo was observed in march to gain

possession of a height in the neighbourhood of the royal camp. Mexia and

Palomino were immediately detached, with three hundred musqueteers, to

dislodge them, and Valdivia and Alvarado advanced in the same direction,

so that the enemy were soon forced to retire. During this skirmish, the

president marched down from the mountain with the main body of his army,

in the direction of Cuzco, under cover of the hill on which the skirmish

had taken place; and, to distract the attention of the enemy, a small

detachment of cavalry and infantry was ordered to advance in view of the

insurgent camp from that hill. On the arrival of Valdivia and Alvarado

at the top of the hill, observing that it was possible to cannonade the

camp of the enemy from that place, they sent orders to Gabriel de Royas

to bring up the artillery. On this occasion, De Royas promised a reward

of five hundred crowns for each ball that should reach the enemy: In

fact he paid that sum about a year afterwards to one of his gunners, who

sent a ball through the tent of Gonzalo, which was exceedingly

conspicuous, by which one of his pages was slain. In consequence of this

incident, Gonzalo ordered all the tents to be struck, that they might

not serve as marks for the cannoneers of the president. He likewise

ordered his own artillery to commence firing, and drew up his army in

order of battle, taking his own station at the head of his cavalry,

which was commanded by the licentiate Cepeda and Juan d'Acosta. Carvajal

was at the head of the infantry, having under him the captains Juan de

la Torre, Diego Guillen, Juan Velasquez de Guevara, Francisco

Maldonado, and Sebastian de Vergara. Pedro de Soria commanded his

artillery. When the insurgent army was drawn up in order of battle, the

numerous Indians that were attached to it quitted the camp, and posted

themselves in view of both armies on the slope of a neighbouring hill.

While the artillery on both sides kept up a constant fire, the royalist

army descended from the mountain without keeping any regular order, and

in all possible haste, the cavalry all on foot leading their horses,

both on account of the ruggedness of the ground and the better to avoid

the cannonade from the enemy, as they had no shelter from the balls.

Immediately on getting down to the plain, the troops were drawn up in

order of battle; the infantry in two battalions in the centre, and the

cavalry on the two wings. The cavalry of the left wing was commanded by

the captains Juan Saavedra, Diego de Mora, Rodrigo Salazar, and

Francisco Hernandez de Aldana. The royal standard was displayed by the

licentiate Carvajal in the right wing, in which likewise were posted the

captains Don Pedro de Cabrera, Alfonso Mercadillo, and Gomez de

Alvarado. The infantry marched between the wings of horse, but a little

farther in advance, under the captains Ramirez, De Castro, De Solis,

Cardenas, Menezes, Mosquera, De la Cerna, Urbina, Aliaga, De Robles, De

Arias, and De Olmos. A little in advance of the infantry, Alfonso de

Mendoza marched with his troop of horse to commence the attack,

accompanied by Centeno, who was determined to exert himself on this

occasion in revenge for his defeat at Guarina. Pedro de Villavicentio

acted as serjeant-major or adjutant-general of the army. The president,

accompanied by the archbishop of Lima, was a little on one side, on the

slope of the mountain, by which the major-general Alvarado and Valdivia

brought down the artillery and the three hundred musqueteers commanded

by Mexia and Palomino. On getting into the plain, this body of

musqueteers divided in two, Mexia marching to the right along the river,

and Palomino keeping to the left along the skirts of the mountain.

While the royalist artillery was coming down the mountain, the

licentiate Cepeda, Garcilasso de la Vega, and Alfonso de Piedra, with

several other persons of rank and some private soldiers, abandoned

Gonzalo to surrender themselves to the president. They were closely

pursued by Pedro Martin de Cicilia and some others of the insurgents,

who wounded several of these deserters. The horse of Cepeda was killed

under him by the thrust of a lance, and himself wounded, and he had

assuredly been either taken or killed unless promptly succoured by order

of the president. In the mean time Gonzalo kept his troops in firm

array, waiting for the enemy, and in expectation that they might attack

him in confusion and be easily defeated, as had happened in the battle

of Guarina. Hinojosa on his side, advanced with the royalists in the

best order and at a slow pace, to within musquet-shot of the insurgents,

where he halted in some low ground, in such a situation that his men

were secure from the cannon-balls of the enemy, which all flew over

their heads, although the gunners used every effort to depress their

guns so as to fire low. At this time the platoons of musquetry on the

wings of both armies kept up a close fire, Alvarado and Valdivia using

every effort to cause their men take good aim, while the president and

archbishop encouraged their gunners to fire quickly and to purpose;

making them often change the direction of their guns, as circumstances

appeared to require.

Observing that several of the soldiers of Gonzalo were endeavouring to

abandon him and were hotly pursued, Centeno and Mendoza advanced with

the cavalry under their command, on purpose to protect all who wished to

come over. All those who quitted the insurgents, urged the commanders of

the royal army not to advance to the charge, as they were certain the

far greater part of the army of Gonzalo would abandon him, so that he

would be easily defeated without any danger to the royalists, and with

little effusion of blood. At this time, a platoon of thirty musqueteers,

finding themselves near the royal army, came over in a body and

surrendered themselves. Gonzalo wished to have these men pursued and

brought back; but the attempt threw his troops into confusion, and his

whole army began instantly to break up, some fleeing towards Cuzco,

while others went over to the president and surrendered themselves. Some

of the insurgent officers were so confounded by this sudden and

universal derout, that they neither had presence of mind to flee or to

fight. On seeing this hopeless turn of his affairs, Gonzalo lost all

courage, and exclaimed in despair, "Since all surrender to the king, so

must I also." It is reported, that Juan d'Acosta endeavoured to

encourage him, saying, "let us rush upon the thickest of the enemy, and

die like Romans;" to which Gonzalo is reported to have answered, "It is

better to die like Christians."

At this time, Gonzalo observing the serjeant-major of the royalists near

him, surrendered to him, giving up a long small sword which he had used

instead of a lance, as he had previously broken his lance upon some of

his own men who were running away. He was immediately conducted to the

president, to whom he used some very imprudent expressions, and by whom

he was committed to the custody of Centeno. About the same time with

Gonzalo, most of his officers were made prisoners. The lieutenant-general

Carvajal endeavoured to save himself by flight, meaning to hide himself

among some tall reeds in a marsh during the night; but his horse stuck

fast in the morass, and he was brought prisoner to the president by some

of his own men. In the pursuit, some of the insurgents were killed,

but most of their officers were made prisoners.

After the entire derout of the enemy, the soldiers of the royal army

pillaged the camp of the insurgents, where they made a prodigious

plunder in gold, silver, horses, mules, and rich baggage, by which many

of them acquired considerable riches, some individuals having acquired

so much as five or six thousand ducats. One of the soldiers happened to

fall in with a fine mule having a load on his back, which seemed to

consist only of clothes, he therefore cut the cords and threw off the

load, carrying off the mule alone; immediately after which three other

soldiers, more experienced in such matters, opened up the pack, which

they found to contain a considerable quantity of gold and silver wrapped

up in Indian cloaks for better concealment, worth five or six thousand

ducats.

As the army was much fatigued by the operations of that day; besides

being under arms all night, the president allowed the men to rest one

day, yet thought it necessary to dispatch the two Captains Mexia and De

Robles with their companies to Cuzco, to prevent those soldiers who had

pursued the fugitives towards that place from entering and plundering

the city and killing a number of the inhabitants; more especially as

many might now feel inclined to act from particular enmity towards such

as had given them offence during the late troubles, under pretence of

following up the victory. Those captains were likewise directed to

secure such of the officers and soldiers of the defeated army as had

fled in that direction. Next day, the president gave orders to the

licentiate Cianca, one of the new oydors, and Alfonzo de Alvarado, his

major-general, to bring the prisoners to trial. No other proof was

requisite against Gonzalo Pizarro than his own acknowledgment and the

notoriety of his having been in open rebellion against the sovereign. He

was condemned to be beheaded, and that his head should be fixed in a

niche or recess on the gibbet at Lima, secured by a trellis or net-work

of iron through which it might be visible, with this inscription above.

"The head of Gonzalo Pizarro, a traitor and rebel, who revolted against

the royal authority in Peru, and presumed to give battle to the army

under the royal standard in the valley of Xaquixaguana." His whole

estates and property of every kind were confiscated; and his house in

Cuzco was ordered to be rased, and salt sown upon its scite, on which a

pillar or monument was to be erected with a suitable inscription to

perpetuate the remembrance of his crime and condign punishment. Gonzalo

was executed on the day of his trial, dying like a good Christian.

While in prison and till his death, Centeno, to whose custody he had

been committed, treated him with much civility, and would not allow any

one to insult his fallen greatness. When about to be put to death,

Gonzalo made a gift of the magnificent dress which he then wore to the

executioner; but Centeno paid its full value to the executioner, that

the body might not be stripped and exposed till carried away for

interment; and next day he had it carried to Cuzco and respectfully

buried. But the head, pursuant to the sentence, was carried to Lima.

On the same day in which Pizarro was beheaded, his lieutenant-general

Carvajal was drawn and quartered, and eight or nine of the insurgent

captains were hanged; and in the sequel several others of the principal

persons concerned in the revolt were punished when taken[38]. On the day

following the president went to Cuzco with all his army, whence he sent

Alfonzo de Mendoza with a detachment into Las Charcas, to make prisoners

of those who had been sent into that district by Gonzalo in quest of

silver, and such as might have fled thither from the battle. On account

of the rich mines in the province of Las Charcas, especially Potosi, it

was supposed that many of the fugitives had taken refuge in that place,

to which Hondegardo was sent as lieutenant-governor and captain-general,

with orders to chastise all those of the inhabitants who had been guilty

either of favouring Gonzalo, or of neglecting to repair to the royal

standard on the summons of the president. Along with Hondegardo,

Gabriel de Royas was sent as receiver of the royal fifth and other

tributes belonging to the king, and of the fines which the governor

might inflict on the disaffected and recusants. As De Royas soon died,

Hondegardo had to discharge the united functions of governor and

receiver of the province, and in a short space of time he amassed

treasure to the amount of 3,600,000 livres[39], which he transmitted to

the president.

[Footnote 38: Yet the Historian of American, II. 392., says that "Gasca,

happy in his bloodless victory, did not stain it with cruelty; Pizarro,

Carvajal, and a small number of the most distinguished or notorious

offenders being punished capitally." The executions seem however to have

been sufficiently numerous, considering that the whole rebel army before

the battle was only nine hundred strong, many of whom went over to the

victor, and all the rest disbanded without fighting.--E.]

[Footnote 39: L.157,000, if French livres are to be understood, and

worth near a million sterling at the present value of money compared

with that period,--E.]

The president remained for some time at Guzco, occupied in punishing the

insurgents according to the greatness of their crimes. Those whom he

deemed most guilty, he condemned to be drawn in pieces by four horses,

others he ordered to be hanged; some to be whipt, and others were sent

to the galleys. He applied himself likewise with much attention to

restore the kingdom to good order. In virtue of the authority confided

to him by the king, he granted pardons to all who, having been in arms

in the valley of Xaquixaguana, had abandoned Gonzalo and joined the

royal standard. These pardons referred to all public crimes of which

they had been guilty during the rebellion of Gonzalo Pizarro, yet

leaving them liable to answer in civil actions for every thing

respecting their conduct to individuals. This battle of Xaquixaguana,

which will be long famous in Peru, was fought on Monday the 9th of April

1548.

When the president had dispatched the most urgent affairs connected with

the suppression of the rebellion, there yet remained an object of great

importance for the quiet of the kingdom, which was surrounded with many

difficulties. This was with regard to the dismissal of the army, in such

a manner that so great a number of soldiers set free from the restraints

of discipline might not occasion troubles similar to those now put an

end to. On purpose to succeed in this delicate affair, the utmost

prudence was requisite, as almost every soldier in the army considered

himself entitled to one of the best of the vacant repartimientos, and as

the number of the troops exceeded 2500 men, while there were only 150

repartimientos to distribute. Hence it was quite obvious, that instead

of being able to gratify every claimant, far the greater part must be

dissatisfied. After a serious deliberation on this important subject,

the president went to a place in the province of Apurimac, about twelve

leagues from Cuzco, accompanied only by the archbishop and one

secretary, on purpose to have leisure for mature reflection at a

distance from the perpetual importunities of the claimants. In this

place, they made the best distribution in their power of the vacant

repartitions, giving sufficient means of living in a respectable manner

to the captains and other persons of consideration, each in proportion

to their respective merits and the services they had been of in

suppressing the late rebellion, giving new repartitions to those who had

none, and increasing those of others. On this occasion it was found that

they had vacant repartitions to distribute to the value of a million of

gold crowns in yearly rent. The greater number of the most valuable and

extensive repartitions had become vacant during the troubles, partly

from their former possessors having been put to death by Gonzalo, either

under pretence of guilt in opposing his rebellion, or in the various

engagements during the troubles. The president had likewise capitally

punished several to whom Gonzalo had given repartitions. It must however

be remarked, that several of these most valuable repartimientos had been

retained by Gonzalo for his own benefit, under pretence of providing for

the expences of the war.

In making the new grants, the president retained the power of granting

pensions upon some of the most extensive repartitions, of three or four

thousand ducats from each, more or less according to their respective

values, on purpose to have the power of dividing the money among such

soldiers as he could not otherwise reward, to enable them to procure

arms, horses, and other necessaries, meaning to send them off in various

directions to discover and subdue the country which was hitherto

unoccupied. Having thus regulated every thing to the best of his power,

the president thought proper to retire to Lima, and sent the archbishop

to Cuzco to publish the regulations and distribution of repartimientos,

and to make payment of the several rewards in money which had been

agreed upon. The arrangement of this affair occasioned much

dissatisfaction among the soldiers, every one believing himself better

entitled to some allotments of lands and Indians than several of those

who had acquired such grants. All the fair speeches and promises of the

archbishop and the principal officers were insufficient to quiet the

murmurs and discontents of the troops, which even produced some

commotions and seditious conspiracies, in which it was proposed to seize

upon the archbishop and the chief officers of the army and government,

and to send the licentiate Cienca with a remonstrance to the president,

demanding of him to recal the repartition which he had decreed, and to

make a new one more favourable to their wishes. They even threatened to

revolt, and to take possession by force of what they considered due to

their services. The licentiate Cienca, who had been appointed chief

justice at Cuzco, had established so excellent a system of police that

he had immediate notice of all these plots and commotions, and was soon

enabled to restore order and tranquillity by arresting and punishing the

principal agitators of these threatened troubles, by which he

effectually checked the spirit of mutiny and insubordination, and

averted at least for the present the danger of a new civil war in the

kingdom.

Before leaving Cuzco, the president had renewed the commission of

Valdivia as governor of Chili, as a reward for the services he had

rendered in the late war against Gonzalo. On purpose to provide the

reinforcements of men, horses, and arms, which were necessary for

defending and extending his conquests in that province, Valdivia went to

Lima as the most convenient situation for procuring what he wanted.

Having completed all his preparations, he embarked all his men and

military stores at the port of Callao, and sent them off for Chili; but

chose to go himself by land to Arequipa, where he proposed to take

shipping in his way back to his government. A report was made to the

president, that Valdivia had engaged some officers and soldiers from

among those who had been sentenced to banishment from Peru, and even

some of those who had been condemned to the galleys, on account of the

share they had taken in the late rebellion. In consequence of this

information, the president sent his lieutenant-general Hinojosa with

orders to bring Valdivia before him to answer for his conduct in these

things which were laid to his charge. As Valdivia was accompanied by a

considerable number of men he believed himself in condition to resist

this mandate, and refused the earnest solicitations of Hinojosa to go

back along with him to the president. But, as Hinojosa observed that

Valdivia took no precautions to prevent his arrest, and had no

suspicions that any force would be used against him, he resolved to

attempt to make him prisoner with the assistance only of six

musqueteers, in which he succeeded without opposition. In this

situation, Valdivia very properly determined to submit with a good

grace, and so satisfactorily explained his conduct to the president,

that he was allowed to resume his voyage, and to take all those people

along with him whom he had engaged.

Every thing in Peru being now reduced to good order, the president gave

permission to all the citizens and other inhabitants of the country, who

had hitherto served in his army, to retire to their homes, to look after

the re-establishment of their private affairs, which had, suffered great

injury from the unavoidable losses experienced during the rebellion, and

their own necessary expences in the field. He likewise sent off several

officers with detachments upon new discoveries, and appointed the

licentiate Carvajal lieutenant-governor of Cuzco, taking up his own

residence at Lima, which was the seat of government. About this time an

hundred and fifty Spaniards arrived at the city of La Plata, having

travelled all the way from the mouth of the Rio Plata under the command

of Domingo de Yrala to that part of the country which had formerly been

discovered by Diego de Royas, and were now come into Peru to solicit the

president to appoint some one to act as governor of the country on the

Rio Plata which they proposed to settle. He accordingly nominated Diego

de Centeno to that new government, with authority to raise as many more

men as he could procure, to enable him to complete the discovery and

conquest of that country. When all their preparations were completed,

and they were on the point of setting out on the march, Centeno died,

and the president appointed another captain in his place.

The Rio Plata, or River of Silver, derives its source from the high

mountains continually covered with snow which lie between the cities of

Lima and Cuzco[40]. From these mountains four principal rivers flow,

which derive their names from the provinces through which they pass. The

Apurimac, Vilcas, Abancay, and Jauja. This last derives its source from

a lake in the province of Bombon[41], the most level and yet the highest

plain in all Peru, where accordingly it snows or hails almost

continually. This lake is quite crowded with small islands, which are

covered with reeds, flags, and other aquatic plants, and the borders of

the lake are inhabited by many Indians.

[Footnote 40: Zarate is extremely erroneous in his account of the

sources of the Rio Plata. All the streams which rise from the Peruvian

mountains in the situation indicated, and for seven or eight degrees

farther south, and which run to the eastwards, contribute towards the

mighty Maranon or River of the Amazons.--E.]

[Footnote 41: This is an egregious mistake; the Rio Jauja rises from the

lake of Chinchay Cocha in the province of Tarma, and runs _south_ to

join the Apurimac. The river Guanuco rises in the elevated plain of

Bombon, and runs _north_ to form the Gualagua, which joins the

Lauricocha or Tanguragua.--E.]

In the late war against Gonzalo Pizarro, the president incurred enormous

expences for the pay and equipment of his troops, for the purchase of

horses, arms, and warlike stores, and the fitting out and provisioning

of the ships which he employed. From his landing in the Tierra Firma to

the day of his final victory over Gonzalo, he had expended on these

necessary affairs more than nine hundred thousand dollars, most of which

he had borrowed from the merchants and other private individuals, as all

the royal revenues had been appropriated and dissipated by Gonzalo.

After the re-establishment of tranquillity, he applied himself to amass

treasure with the utmost diligence, both from the fifths belonging to

the king, and by means of fines and confiscations; insomuch that after

payment of his debts, he had a surplus of above a million and a half of

ducats, chiefly derived from the province of Las Charcas.

In his arrangements for the future government of the country, in

conformity with the royal ordinance, he took much care to prevent the

Indians from being oppressed. In consequence of the fatigues which they

underwent, in the carriage of immense loads, and by numbers of the

Spaniards wandering continually about the country attended by a train of

Indians to carry their baggage, vast numbers of them had perished.

Having re-established the royal audience, or supreme court of justice,

in Lima, he applied earnestly to regulate the tributes which were to be

paid by the Indians to the Spaniards upon fixed principles, which had

not been hitherto done on account of the wars and revolutions which had

distracted the country ever since its discovery and conquest. Before

this new arrangement, every Spaniard who possessed a repartimiento or

allotment of lands and Indians, used to receive from the curaca or

cacique of his district such tribute as he was able or willing to pay,

and many of the Spaniards often exacted larger sums from their Indians

than they were well able to afford, frequently plundering them of their

hard-earned property with lawless violence. Some even went so far as to

inflict tortures on their Indians, to compel them to give up every thing

they possessed, often carrying their cruelty to such a pitch as to put

them to death in the most wanton and unjustifiable manner. To put a stop

to these violent proceedings, the taxes of each province and district

were regulated in proportion to the number of Indian and Spanish

inhabitants which they respectively contained; and, in forming their

arrangements, the president and judges carefully inquired into the

productions of each province; such as its mines of gold and silver, the

quantity of its cattle, and other things of a similar nature, the taxes

on which were all regulated according to circumstances in the most

reasonable and equitable manner.

Having thus reduced the affairs of the kingdom to good order, all the

unemployed soldiers being sent off to different places, some to Chili,

others to the new province on the Rio Plata, and others to various new

discoveries under different commanders, and all who remained in Peru

being established in various occupations by which they might maintain

themselves, according to their inclinations and capacities, mostly in

the concerns of the mines, the president resolved to return, into Spain,

pursuant to the authority he had received from his majesty to do so when

he might see proper. One of his most powerful motives for returning to

Spain proceeded from his anxiety to preserve the large treasure he had

amassed for the king: as, having no military force for its protection,

he was afraid such great riches might excite fresh troubles and

commotions in the country. Having made all the necessary preparations

for his voyage, and embarked his treasure, without communicating his

intentions hitherto to any one, he assembled the magistrates of Lima,

and informed them of his intended voyage. They started many objections

to this measure; representing the inconveniencies which might arise from

his departure, before his majesty had sent out some other person to

replace him, either in the capacity of viceroy or president. He answered

all their objections, stating that the court of royal audience, and the

governors of the different provinces which they were authorized to

nominate, were sufficient to dispense justice and to regulate all

affairs, they at last consented; and immediately embarking, he set sail

for Panama.

Just before he sailed and while on board ship, the president made a new

partition of such lands and Indians as had become vacant since the

former distribution which he made at Cuzco. The number of vacant

repartimientos was considerable, in consequence of the death of Centeno,

De Royas, the licentiate Carvajal, and several other persons of rank;

and as there were many candidates who demanded loudly to be preferred,

he chose to defer the repartition till after he had embarked, as he was

unable to satisfy all the claimants, and was unwilling to expose himself

to the clamours of those whom he was unable to gratify. Having settled

all these distributions, he left the different deeds signed and sealed

with the secretary of the royal audience, with strict injunctions that

they should not be opened until eight days after his departure. Every

thing being finally concluded, he set sail from the port of Callao in

December 1549, accompanied by the Provincial of the Dominicans and Jerom

de Aliaga, who were appointed agents for the affairs of Peru at the

court of Spain. He was likewise accompanied by several gentlemen and

other considerable persons, who meant to return to Spain, carrying with

them all the wealth they had been able to acquire.

The voyage to Panama was prosperous. The president and all who were

along with him immediately landed at that place, and used the utmost

diligence to transport all the wealth belonging to his majesty and to

individuals, to Nombre de Dios, to which place they all went, and made

proper preparations for returning to Spain. Every one treated the

president with the same respect as when he resided in Peru, and he

behaved towards them with much civility and attention, keeping open

table for all who chose to visit him. This was at the royal expence; as

the president had stipulated for all his expences being defrayed by his

majesty, before leaving Spain on his mission to Peru. In this he acted

with much and prudent precaution; considering that the former governors

had been accused of living penuriously in proportion to their rich

appointments, and being satisfied that the administration in Spain would

not allow him a sufficient income to defray the great expences he must

incur in a country where every thing was enormously dear, he declined

accepting any specified salary, but demanded and obtained authority to

take from the royal funds all that was necessary for his personal

expence and the support of his household. He even used the precaution to

have this arrangement formally reduced to writing; and in the exercise

of this permission he employed a person expressly for the purpose of

keeping an exact account of all his expences, and of every thing that

was purchased for his table or otherwise, which were all accordingly

paid for from the royal coffers.

SECTION VII.

_Insurrection of Ferdinand and Pedro de Contreras in Nicaragua, and

their unsuccessful attempt upon the Royal Treasure in the Tierra Firma._

At this period an extraordinary attempt was made to intercept the

president in his passage through the Tierra Firma, and to gain

possession of the royal treasure under his charge, which will require

some elucidation for its distinct explanation. When Pedro Arias de

Avilla discovered the province of Nicaragua, of which he was appointed

governor, he married his daughter Donna Maria de Penalosa to Rodrigo de

Contreras, a respectable gentleman of Segovia. Some time afterwards,

Pedro Arias died, after having appointed his son-in-law to succeed him

in the government, and this appointment was confirmed by the court in

consideration of the merits and services of Contreras, who accordingly

continued governor of Nicaragua for several years. On the appointment of

a royal audience on the confines of Nicaragua and Guatimala, Contreras

was displaced from his government; and, in pursuance of the ordinance

which had occasioned so much commotion in Peru, both he and his wife

were deprived of their repartitions of lands and Indians, and the grants

which had been made to their children were likewise recalled. Contreras

went in consequence to Spain, to solicit a reparation of the injury he

had sustained, representing the services which had been performed to the

crown by the discovery, conquest, and settlement of Nicaragua, by his

father-in-law and himself; but his majesty and the council of the Indies

confirmed the decision of the royal audience, as conformable with the

regulations.

On receiving information of the bad success of their father, Ferdinand

and Pedro de Contreras were much chagrined, and rashly determined to

revolt and seize the government of the province. They persuaded

themselves with being joined by a sufficient force for this purpose,

confiding in the advice and assistance of a person named Juan de

Bermejo, and some other soldiers his companions, who had quitted Peru in

much discontent against the president, for not having sufficiently

rewarded them, in their own opinions, for their services in the war

against Gonzalo. Besides these men, several of those who had fought

under Gonzalo had taken refuge in Nicaragua, having been banished by the

president from Peru, all of whom joined themselves to the Contreras on

this occasion. By these people the young men were encouraged to erect

the standard of rebellion, assuring them, if they, could pass over into

Peru with two or three hundred men, sufficiently armed, that almost the

whole population of the kingdom would join their standards, as all were

exceedingly dissatisfied with the president for not rewarding their

services sufficiently. The Contreras accordingly began secretly to

collect soldiers, and to provide arms for this enterprize; and deeming

themselves sufficiently powerful to set justice at defiance, they

resolved to commence their revolt. As they considered the bishop of

Nicaragua among the most determined enemies of their father, they began

their operations by taking vengeance on him; for which purpose they sent

some soldiers to his house, who assassinated him while playing chess.

After this, they openly collected their followers and displayed their

standard, assuming the title of the _Army of Liberty_; and seizing a

sufficient number of vessels, they embarked on the Pacific Ocean with

the intention of intercepting the viceroy on his voyage from Lima to

Panama, intending to plunder him of all the treasure he was conveying to

Spain. For this purpose they steered in the first place for Panama, both

to gain intelligence of the proceedings of the president, and because

the navigation from thence to Peru was easier than from Nicaragua.

Embarking therefore with about three hundred men, they made sail for

Panama, and on their arrival at that place they learnt that the

president had already disembarked with all his treasure and attendants.

They now believed that every thing was favourable to their intentions,

and that by good fortune their desired prey had fallen into their hands.

Waiting therefore till night, they entered the port as quietly as

possible, believing that the president was still in Panama, and that

they might easily execute their enterprize without danger or resistance.

Their intelligence however was exceedingly defective, and their hopes

ill founded; for the president had left Panama with all his people three

days before, having previously sent off all his treasure to Nombre de

Dios, to which place he was likewise gone. In fact, by this diligence,

the president avoided the impending danger, without having the slightest

suspicion that any such might befal. Immediately on landing, the

brothers were informed that the president had already left the place; on

which they went to the house of Martin Ruiz de Marchena, treasurer of

the province, where they took possession of the money in the royal

coffers, amounting to 400,000 pesos in base silver, which had been left

there by the president in consequence of not having sufficient means of

transporting it to Nombre de Dios along with the rest. After this they

dragged Marchena, Juan de Larez, and some other respectable inhabitants

to the public square, threatening to hang them all unless they gave

immediate notice where the arms and money belonging to the province were

deposited. But all their threats were unable to force any discovery, and

they carried on board their ships all the treasure and other valuable

plunder they had procured.

Believing that the farther success of their enterprize depended on the

diligence they should exert in reaching Nombre de Dios to surprize the

president, before he might have time to embark or prepare for his

defence, they determined to proceed to that place without delay. For

this purpose, it was arranged that Ferdinand de Contreras should march

to Nombre de Dios with the greater part of the troops, while Juan de

Bermejo was to take post with an hundred men on a height near Panama, to

protect the rear of Ferdinand, to prevent pursuit, to be in readiness to

receive the valuable booty they expected, and to intercept such of the

attendants on the president as might escape in that direction from

Nombre de Dios. In the mean time, Pedro de Contreras was to remain on

board with a small number of men to protect the ships. All this was done

accordingly; but matters turned out in quite a different manner from

their expectations. Marchena got some information respecting their plan

of operations, and sent off two confidential intelligent negroes to give

notice to the president of what had occurred in Panama, and of the

ulterior designs of the Contreras. One of these negroes was directed to

travel the whole way by land, and the other to go by way of the small

river Chagre, which route had been taken by the president.

This river has its source in the mountains between Panama and Nombre de

Dios. Its course at first seems tending towards the Pacific Ocean; but

it suddenly makes a turn at a cataract, and after a farther run of

fourteen leagues it falls into the Atlantic; so that by means of a canal

only five leagues in length, from that river to the South Sea, a

navigation might be easily established between the two seas. It is true

that it would be necessary to cut this canal through mountains, and in a

country exceedingly uneven and full of rocks, so that the design has

hitherto appeared impracticable. Hence, in going from Panama to Nombre

de Dios by the river Chagre, it is necessary to travel by land in the

first place to that river below the fall, a distance of five leagues.

After descending to the mouth of the river, there still remains five or

six leagues to go by sea to Nombre de Dios. The messenger who was sent

by this road came up with the president before his arrival at Nombre de

Dios, and gave him an account of the events which had taken place at

Panama. Though much alarmed by this intelligence, he communicated it to

the provincial and the officers who accompanied him without appearing to

be under any apprehensions; but, on embarking on the North Sea, it fell

so dead a calm that they could make no progress, and he could not then

conceal his fears of the event. Still however preserving his presence of

mind, he sent off Hernan Nunnez de Segura by land to Nombre de Dios,

accompanied by some negroes who knew the country, with orders for all

the inhabitants of that place to take up arms for the protection of the

treasure which had been sent there. Segura had a most difficult and

fatiguing journey on foot, having several rivers to cross, some of them

by swimming, and to pass through woods and marshes in a road through

which no person had travelled for a long while. On his arrival at Nombre

de Dios, he found the news already communicated to that place, by the

other negro, and that the inhabitants were already in arms, and had

prepared as well as they were able to defend themselves, having landed

the crews of nine or ten vessels which were in the harbour to give their

assistance in repelling the rebels. The president arrived shortly

afterwards, where he found every thing in order for defence; and

immediately marched out at the head of the armed inhabitants on the road

towards Panama, determined to give battle to Contrera in case of his

approach.

When Ferdinand de Contrera marched for Nombre Dios, and Bermejo took

post on the hill near Panama, as formerly mentioned, Marchena and De

Larez believed they might be able to defeat Bermejo in the divided state

of the rebels. For this purpose they re-assembled all the inhabitants of

Panama, most of whom had taken refuge in the mountains, with whom they

joined a considerable number of negroes who were employed as labourers

in husbandry and in driving mules with goods between Panama and Nombre

de Dios. By these means they assembled a respectable force, which they

armed as well as circumstances would allow. Having thrown up some

intrenchments of earth and fascines in the streets, and leaving some

confidential persons to protect the town against the small number of

rebels left in the ships with Pedro de Contreras, they marched out

boldly against Bermejo, whom they vigorously attacked. After some

resistance, they gained a complete victory, killing or making prisoners

of the whole of that detachment. After this complete success, Marchena

determined immediately to march for Nombre de Dios, believing that the

inhabitants of that city, on learning the late events at Panama, would

have armed for their defence, and would even take the field against

Ferdinand de Contreras, and being more numerous than his detachment,

would oblige him to retire to form a junction with Bermejo. Accordingly,

when Ferdinand de Contreras had proceeded about half way to Nombre de

Dios, he learnt that the president had got notice of the approach of the

rebels, and had marched out against them with a superior force; on which

Ferdinand de Contreras resolved to return to Panama.

While on his return, he took some negroes from whom he got notice of

the entire defeat of Bermejo, and of the advance of Marchena against

himself. He was so disconcerted by this intelligence, that he allowed

all his men to disperse, desiring them to save themselves as they best

might, and to endeavour to get to the shore, where his brother would

take them on board the ships. They all separated, and Ferdinand with

some of his people struck into the woods, avoiding the public road, that

they might escape Marchena. As the country was much intersected with

rivers, and Ferdinand was little accustomed to encounter such

difficulties, he was drowned in an endeavour to pass one of the rivers.

Several of the followers of Ferdinand were made prisoners, and it was

never known what became of the others. The prisoners were carried to

Panama, where they, and those others who were taken at the defeat of

Bermejo, were all put to death.

When Pedro de Contreras, who remained on board the ships, got

intelligence of the miserable fete of his comrades, he was so much

alarmed that he would not take time to hoist anchor and make seal, but

threw himself into a boat with some of his men, leaving the ships at

anchor with all the plunder untouched. He coasted along for a

considerable way to the province of Nata; after which no farther

intelligence was ever received either of him or any of those who were

along with him, but it was supposed they were all massacred by the

Indians of that country. On getting intelligence of the favourable

termination of this threatening affair, the president returned to Nombre

de Dios, giving thanks to God for having delivered him from this

unforseen danger. Had the rebels arrived at Panama only a few days

sooner, they might easily have made him prisoner, and would have

acquired a much larger booty then ever fell into the hands of pirates.

Tranquillity being entirely restored, the president embarked with his

treasure, and arrived safely in Spain. One of his vessels, in which Juan

Gomez de Anuaya was embarked, with part of the royal treasure, was

obliged to put back to Nombre de Dios: But, having refitted at that

port, she likewise arrived in Spain. Immediately on landing at San

Lucar, the president sent Captain Lope Martin into Germany, where the

emperor then was, to inform his majesty of his safe arrival from Peru.

This news was exceedingly agreeable to the court, and occasioned much

astonishment at the prompt and happy termination of the troubles, which

had appeared so formidable and difficult to appease. Soon after the

arrival of the president at Valladolid, he was appointed bishop of

Placentia[42], then vacant in consequence of the death of Don Luis

Cabeza de Vaca; and his majesty sent orders that he should come to

court, to give a minute account of all the affairs in which he had been

engaged. He went there accordingly, accompanied by the provincial of the

Dominicans, and Jerom de Aliaga, the deputies or agents of the kingdom

of Peru, and by several other gentlemen and persons of consideration,

who were in expectation of getting some rewards from his majesty for

their loyal services during the late commotions. The new bishop

accordingly embarked at Barcelona, along with his companions, in some

galleys which were appointed for the purpose; taking along with him, by

order of his majesty, half a million of dollars of the treasure he had

brought from Peru. Shortly afterwards, his majesty appointed Don Antonio

de Mendoza, the viceroy of New Spain, to assume that office in Peru;

sending Don Luis de Velasco, commissary-general of the customs of

Castille, to succeed Mendoza in the viceroyalty of New Spain.

[Footnote 42: In the Royal Commentaries of Garcilasso de la Vega, p.

876, he is said to have been first appointed to the bishopric of

Placentia, and to have been afterwards translated to that of Ciguenza in

1561 by Philip II which he enjoyed till his death in 1577.]

END OF THE DISCOVERY AND CONQUEST OF PERU,

BY AUGUSTINO ZARATE.

* * * * *

CHAPTER VIII.

CONTINUATION OF THE EARLY HISTORY OF PERU, FROM THE RESTORATION OF

TRANQUILLITY BY GASCA IN 1549, TO THE DEATH OF THE INCA TUPAC AMARU;

EXTRACTED FROM GARCILASSO DE LA VEGA.

INTRODUCTION.

Having now given at considerable length the authentic histories of the

discovery and conquest of the two greatest of the European colonies in

the New World, Mexico and Peru, from original and contemporary authors

whose works had not before appeared in any English Collection of Voyages

and Travels, we now propose to give, as a kind of supplement or appendix

to the excellent history of Zarate, an abridged deduction of the

principal events in Peru for some time after the departure of the

president De la Gasca from that kingdom, extracted from the conclusion

of the Royal Commentaries of Peru by Garcilasso de la Vega Inca, Part

II. Book VI. VII. and VIII. Having formerly given some account of that

work, not very favourable to the character of that descendant of the

Incas as a historian, it may only be here mentioned that the events to

be now related on his authority all occurred in his own time, and that

the relation of them which he has left would have been greatly more

valuable if he had been pleased to favour us more frequently with their

dates.

In the present eventful period, while Spain, once the terror of Europe,

seems in danger of sinking under the tyrannical grasp of the usurper of

France, a vast revolution appears about to elevate the Spanish American

colonies into extensive independent states; if the jealous collision of

rights, interests, and pretensions between the various races of their

inhabitants do not plunge them into all the horrors of civil war and

anarchy. The crisis is peculiarly interesting to all the friends of

humanity, and it is to be wished that the present commotions may soon

subside into a permanent state of peace and good government,

advantageous to all the best interests of the colonists, and beneficial

to the commerce and industry of the rest of the world.

Before proceeding to the abridged history of events in Peru, subsequent

to the departure of the president De la Gasca, the following reflections

on the state of manners among the early Spanish settlers in that opulent

region, during the period of which we have already given the history, as

drawn by the eloquent pen of the illustrious Historian of America, have

appeared most worthy of insertion[43].

[Footnote 43: Hist of America, II. p. 393.]

"Though the Spaniards who first invaded Peru were of the lowest order in

society, and the greater part of those who afterwards joined them were

persons of desperate fortune, yet in all the bodies of troops brought

into the field by the different leaders who contended for superiority,

not one acted as a hired soldier or followed his standard for pay. Every

adventurer in Peru considered himself as a conqueror, entitled by his

services to an establishment in that country which had been acquired by

his valour. In the contests between the rival chiefs, each chose his

side as he was directed by his own judgment or affections. He joined his

commander as a companion of his fortune, and disdained to degrade

himself by receiving the wages of a mercenary. It was to their sword,

not to pre-eminence in office or nobility of birth that most of the

leaders whom they followed were indebted for their elevation; and each

of their adherents hoped, by the same means, to open a way for himself

to the possession of power and wealth."

"But though the troops in Peru served without, any regular pay, they

were raised at an immense expence. Among men accustomed to divide the

spoil of an opulent country, the desire of obtaining wealth acquired

incredible force. The ardour of pursuit augmented in proportion to the

hope of success. Where all were intent on the same object, and under the

dominion of the same passion, there was but one mode of gaining men, or

of securing their attachment. Officers of name and influence, besides

the promise of future establishments, received large gratuities in hand

from the chief with whom they engaged. Gonzalo Pizarro, in order to

raise a thousand men, advanced five hundred thousand pesos. Gasca

expended in levying the troops which he led against Pizarro nine hundred

thousand pesos. The distributions of property, bestowed as the reward of

services, were still more exorbitant. Cepeda as the reward of his

perfidy, in persuading the court of royal audience to give the sanction

of its authority to the usurped jurisdiction of Pizarro, received a

grant of lands which yielded an annual income of an hundred and fifty

thousand pesos. Hinojosa, who, by his early defection from Pizarro, and

surrender of the feet to Gasca, decided the fate of Peru, obtained a

district of country affording two hundred thousand pesos of yearly

value. While such rewards were dealt out to the principal officers, with

more than royal munificence, proportional shares were conferred on

those of inferior rank."

"Such a rapid change of fortune produced its natural effects. It gave

birth to new wants, and new desires. Veterans, long accustomed to

hardship and toil, acquired of a sudden a taste for profuse and

inconsiderate dissipation and indulged in all the excesses of military

licentiousness. The riot of low debauchery occupied some; a relish for

expensive luxuries spread among others. The meanest soldier in Peru

would have thought himself degraded by marching on foot; and, at a time

when the price of horses in that country was exorbitant, each individual

insisted on being furnished with one before he would take the field.

But, though less patient under the fatigues and hardships of service,

they were ready to face danger and death with as much intrepidity as

ever; and, animated by the hope of new rewards, they never failed, on

the day of battle, to display all their ancient valour."

"Together with their courage, they retained all the ferocity by which

they were originally distinguished. Civil discord never raged with a

more fell spirit than among the Spaniards in Peru. To all the passions

which usually envenom contests among countrymen, avarice was added, and

rendered their enmity more rancorous. Eagerness to seize the valuable

forfeitures expected upon the death of every opponent, shut the door

against mercy. To be wealthy was, of itself, sufficient to expose a man

to accusation, or to subject him to punishment. On the slightest

suspicions, Pizarro condemned many of the most opulent inhabitants of

Peru to death. Carvajal, without searching for any pretext to justify

his cruelty, cut off many more. The number of those who suffered by the

hand of the executioner, was not much inferior to what fell in the

field; and the greater part was condemned without the formality of any

legal trial."

"The violence with which the contending parties treated their opponents

was not accompanied by its usual attendants, attachment and fidelity to

those with whom they acted. The ties of honour, which ought to be held

sacred among men, and the principle of integrity, interwoven as

thoroughly in the Spanish character as in that of any nation, seem to

have been equally forgotten. Even regard for decency, and the sense of

shame, were totally abandoned. During these dissensions, there was

hardly a Spaniard in Peru who did not abandon the party which he had

originally espoused, betray the associates with whom he had united, and

violate the engagements under which he had come. The viceroy Nunnez

Vela was ruined by the treachery of Cepeda and the other judges of the

royal audience, who were bound to have supported his authority. The

chief advisers and companions of Gonzalo Pizarro in his revolt were the

first to forsake him, and submit to his enemies. His fleet was given up

to Gasca, by the man whom he had singled out among his officers to

entrust with that important command. On the day that was to decide his

fate, an army of veterans, in sight of the enemy, threw down their arms

without striking a blow, and deserted a leader who had often conducted

them to victory. Instances of such general and avowed contempt of the

principles and obligations which attach man to man, and bind them in

social union, rarely occur in history. It is only where men are far

removed from the seat of government, where the restraints of law and

order are little felt, where the prospect of gain is unbounded, and

where immense wealth may cover the crimes by which it is acquired, that

we can find any parallel to the levity, the rapaciousness, the perfidy,

and corruption prevalent among the Spaniards in Peru."

SECTION I.

_Incidents in the History of Peru, from the departure of Gasca, to the

appointment of Don Antonio de Mendoza as Viceroy._

Among those who were dissatisfied with the distribution of the

repartimientos in Peru by the president, was Francisco Hernandez Giron,

to whom De la Gasca granted a commission to make a conquest of the

district called the Cunchos, to the north-east of Cuzco, and beyond one

of the great chains of the Andes, with the title and authority of

governor and captain-general of that country, which he engaged to

conquer at his own expence. Giron was much gratified by this employment,

as it afforded him a favourable opportunity for fomenting and exciting a

new rebellion against the royal authority, which he had long meditated,

and which he actually put in execution, as will be seen in the sequel.

Immediately after the departure of the president from Peru, he went from

Lima to Cuzco publishing the commission which he had received, and

appointed several captains to raise men for his intended expedition in

Guamanga, Arequipa, La Paz, and other places; while he personally beat

up for volunteers in Cuzco. Being a man of popular manners and much

beloved among the soldiers, he soon drew together above two hundred men.

So great a number of the most loose and dissolute inhabitants being

collected together at Cuzco and in arms, they took extreme liberty in

canvassing the late events, and to speak with much licentiousness

respecting the president and the officers he had left in the government

of the kingdom. Their discourse was so open and scandalous, that the

magistrates of the city deemed it necessary to interpose; and Juan de

Saavedra, who was then mayor or regidor of Cuzco, requested Giron to

depart upon his intended expedition without delay, that the peaceable

inhabitants might no longer be scandalized by the seditious discourses

of his soldiers, as most of them were quartered upon the citizens to

whom they behaved with much insolence.

I was then in Cuzco, though a boy, when Giron and his soldiers made

their first disturbance; and I was present also about three years

afterwards at their second mutiny; and, though I had not even then

attained the age of a young man, I was sufficiently able to notice and

understand the observations and discourses of my father on the various

events which occurred; and I can testify that the soldiers behaved in so

proud and insolent a manner that the magistrates were forced to take

notice of their conduct. The soldiers thought proper to be much offended

on this occasion, pretending that no one ought to have any authority

over them except Giron under whose command they had inlisted; and they

carried their mutinous insolence to such a height as to assemble in arms

at the house of their commander to protect themselves against the

magistrates. When this mutiny was known in the city, the magistrates and

citizens found themselves obliged to arm, and being joined by many

soldiers who were not of the faction, they took post in the

market-place. The mutineers drew up likewise in the street where Giron's

house stood, at no great distance from the market-place; and in this

manner both parties remained under arms for two days and nights, always

on the point of coming to action; which had certainly been the case if

some prudent persons had not interposed between them, and prevailed on

the magistrates to enter into a treaty for compromising their

differences. The most active persons on this occasion were Diego de

Silva, Diego Maldonado the rich, Garcilasso de la Vega my father, Vasco

de Guevara, Antonio Quinnones, Juan de Berrio, Jeronimo de Loyasa,

Martin de Meneses, and Francisco Rodriguez. By their persuasions the

regidor Juan de Saavedra and Captain Francisco Hernandez Giron were

induced to meet in the great church, on which occasion the soldiers

demanded four hostages for the security of their commander. In this

conference Giron behaved with so much insolence and audacity, that

Saavedra had assuredly arrested him if he had not been restrained from

respect for the hostages, of whom my father was one. In a second

conference in the evening, under the same precautions, Giron agreed to

remove his soldiers from the city, to give up eight of the most mutinous

of his soldiers to the magistrates, and even to make compearance in

person before the court to answer for his conduct during the mutiny.

On being made acquainted with this agreement, the soldiers were

exceedingly enraged; and if Giron had not pacified them with soothing

words and promises they had certainly attacked the loyal inhabitants,

the consequences of which might have been exceedingly fatal. The

mutineers amounted to two hundred effective well-armed men, of desperate

fortunes, while the loyalists consisted of only eighty men of quality,

all the rest being rich merchants not inured to arms. But it pleased God

to avert the threatened mischief, at the prayers and vows of the

priests, friars and devout women of the city. The mutineers were under

arms all night, setting regular guards and sentinels as in the presence

of an enemy; and in the morning, when Saavedra saw that Giron had not

marched from the city according to agreement, he sent a warrant to bring

him before his tribunal. As Giron suspected that his men might not

permit him to obey the warrant, he walked out in his morning gown, as if

only going to visit a neighbour; but went directly to the house of

Saavedra, who committed him to prison. On this intelligence being

communicated to the soldiers, they immediately dispersed, every one

shifting for himself as he best could. The eight men who were

particularly obnoxious took sanctuary in the Dominican convent, and

fortified themselves in the tower of the church, where they held out for

several days, but were at last obliged to surrender. They were all

punished, but not in that exemplary manner their rebellious conduct

deserved; and the tower was demolished, that it might not be used in the

same manner in future.

After the dispersion of the mutineers and the punishment of the most

guilty, Giron was released on his solemn engagement to make his

appearance before the royal audience at Lima to answer for his conduct.

He went there accordingly, and was committed to prison; but after a few

days was permitted to go out as a prisoner at large, confining himself

to the city of Lima. He there married a young virtuous noble and

beautiful lady, with whom he went to reside at Cuzco, where he

associated with none but soldiers, avoiding all society with the

citizens as much as possible.

About two years afterwards several soldiers residing in Cuzce, entered

into a new plot to raise disturbances in the kingdom, and were eager to

find some proper person to choose as their leader. At length this affair

came to be so openly talked of that it reached the knowledge of

Saavedra, who was required to take cognizance of the plot and to punish

the ringleaders; but he endeavoured to excuse himself, being unwilling

to create himself enemies, alleging that it more properly belonged to

the jurisdiction of the court of audience. When this affair was reported

to the oydors at Lima, they were much displeased with the conduct of

Saavedra, and immediately appointed the marshal Alonzo de Alvarado to

supersede him in the office of regidor or mayor of Cuzco, giving

Alvarado an especial commission to punish the insolence and mutinous

conduct of the soldiers, to prevent the evil from getting to an

unsupportable height. Immediately on taking possession of his office,

Alvarado arrested some of the soldiers; who, to screen themselves,

impeached Don Pedro de Puertocarrero as a principal instigator of their

mutinous proceedings. After a minute examination, Francisco de Miranda,

Alonzo Hernandez Melgarejo, and Alonzo de Barrienuevo were capitally

punished as chief ringleaders in the conspiracy; six or seven others

were banished from Peru, and all the rest made their escape.

Puertocarrero made an appeal to the royal audience, by whom he was set

at liberty.

These new commotions, and others of more importance which shall be

noticed in the sequel, proceeded in a great measure from the imprudent

conduct of the judges themselves, by enforcing the observance of the

obnoxious regulations which had formerly done so much evil during the

government of the viceroy Blasco Nunnez Vela. Just before his departure

from Peru, the president Gasca had received fresh orders from his

majesty to free the Indians from services to their lords: But having

experienced that this had occasioned the most dangerous commotions in

the country, he very wisely commanded before his departure that the

execution of this new order should be suspended. The judges however, saw

this matter in a different light, and circulated their commands over the

whole kingdom to enforce this new royal order; which gave occasion to

the mutinous and disorderly behaviour of the soldiery, who were

encouraged in their rebellious disposition by many persons of

consideration, the possessors of allotments of lands and Indians, who

considered themselves aggrieved.

SECTION II.

_History of Peru during the Viceroyalty of Don Antonio de Mendoza._

About this time Don Antonio de Mendoza, the viceroy of Mexico, was

appointed viceroy of Peru, and landed at Lima, where he was received

with great demonstration of joy and respect. He was accompanied on this

occasion by his son, Don Francisco de Mendoza, afterwards general of the

galleys in Spain. Don Antonio was a nobleman of much sanctity, and had

greatly impaired his health by long abstinence and frequent acts of

penance; insomuch that his natural heat began to fail, and he was

obliged to use violent exercise to keep him warm, even in the hot

climate of Lima. In consequence of his want of health, he deputed his

son Don Francisco to make a progress through all the cities of the

kingdom, from Lima to Las Charcas and Potosi, to bring him back a

faithful representation of the state and condition of the kingdom and

its mines, to be laid before his majesty; and, after his return to Lima,

Don Francisco was sent into Spain in 1552, to communicate an account of

the whole kingdom to the emperor.

About four years before the appointment of the marshal Alonzo de

Alvarado to the mayoralty and government of Cuzco, a party of two

hundred soldiers marched from Potosi towards the province of Tucuman;

most of whom, contrary to the orders of the judges, had Indians to carry

their baggage. On this occasion, the licentiate Esquival, who was

governor of Potosi, seized upon one Aguira, who had two Indians to

carry his baggage; and some days afterwards sentenced him to receive two

hundred lashes, as he had no money to redeem himself from corporal

punishment. After this disgrace, Aguira refused to proceed along with

the rest for the conquest of Tucuman, alleging that after the shame

which he had suffered, death was his only relief. When the period of

Esquivals office expired, he learnt that Aguira had determined upon

assassinating him in revenge for the affront he had suffered. Upon which

Esquival endeavoured to avoid Aguira, by travelling to a great distance,

but all to no purpose, as Aguira followed him wherever he went, for

above three years, always travelling on foot without shoes or stockings,

saying, "That it did not become a whipped rascal to ride on horseback,

or to appear in the company of men of honour." At length Esquival took

up his residence in Cuzco, believing that Aguira would not dare to

attempt anything against him in that place, considering that the

governor was an impartial and inflexible judge: Yet he took every

precaution for his safety, constantly wearing a coat of mail, and going

always armed with a sword and dagger, though a man of the law. At length

Aguira went one day at noon-day to the house of Esquival, whom he found

asleep, and completed his long resolved revenge by stabbing him with his

dagger. Aguira was concealed for forty day in a hog-stye by two young

gentlemen; and after the hue and cry was over on account of the murder,

they shaved his head and beard, and blackened his skin like a negro, by

means of a wild fruit called _Vitoc_ by the Indians, clothing him in a

poor habit, and got him away from the city and province of Cuzco in that

disguise. This deed of revenge was greatly praised by the soldiers, who

said, if there were many Aguiras in the world, the officers of justice

would not be so insolent and arbitrary in their proceedings.

During a long sickness of the viceroy, in consequence of which the

government of the country devolved upon the judges of the royal

audience, they proclaimed in all the cities of Peru that the personal

services of the Indians should be discontinued, pursuant to the royal

orders, under severe penalties. This occasioned new seditions and

mutinies among the Spanish colonists, in consequence of which one Lois

de Vargas, a principal promoter of the disturbances was condemned and

executed; but as many principal persons of the country were found to be

implicated, the judges thought fit to proceed no farther in the

examinations and processes. Even Pedro de Hinojosa was suspected of

being concerned in these seditious proceedings, having been heard to say

to some of the discontented soldiers, that when he came to Las Charcas

he would endeavour to satisfy them to the utmost of power. Though these

words had no seditious tendency, the soldiers who were desirous of

rebellion were willing to interpret them according to their own evil

inclinations. On these slight grounds, and because it was known that

Hinojosa was to go as governor and chief justice of the province of Las

Charcas, as many of the discontented soldiers as were able went to that

country, and wrote to their comrades in various parts of the kingdom to

come there also. Some even of the better sort, among whom were Don

Sebastian de Castilla, son to the Conde de Gomera, with five or six

others of rank and quality went secretly from Cuzco, taking bye-paths

out of the common road to prevent them from being pursued by the

governor of that city. They were induced to this step by Vasco Godinez a

ringleader among the malcontents, who informed Don Sebastian by a letter

in cyphers that Hinojosa had promised to become their general.

During these indications of tumult and rebellion, the viceroy Don

Antonio de Mendoza died, to the great grief and detriment of the

kingdom. On his death, the entire government of the kingdom of Peru

devolved on the judges of the royal audience, who appointed Gil Ramirez

de Avalos, who had been one of the gentlemen of the household to the

viceroy, governor of the city of Lima; and the marshal was sent to

command in the new city of La Paz, in which neighbourhood his lands and

Indians were situated.

SECTION III.

_Narrative of the Troubles in Peru, consequent upon the Death of the

Viceroy Mendoza._.

At this threatening period, all the soldiers and discontented persons of

Peru, flocked to Las Charcas, Potosi, and that neighbourhood,

endeavouring to procure employment about the rich mines of that

district. Disputes continually arose between the soldiers and principal

inhabitants and merchants, and duels were fought almost daily. In some

of these duels, the combatants fought naked from the waist upwards,

while in others they were dressed in crimson taffety waistcoats, that

they might not see their own blood. I shall only mention the particulars

of one of these duels, between two famous soldiers, Pero Nunnez, and

Balthazar Perez, with the former of whom I was acquainted in 1563 at

Madrid, who was then so much disabled in both arms by the wounds he

received in that duel, that he could scarcely use his hands to feed

himself.

They fell out respecting some circumstances of a duel that had happened

a few days before, in which they were seconds. Balthazar Perez had Egas

de Guzman for his second, one of the greatest hectors and bullies of the

time; and Hernan Mexia prevailed on Pero Nunnez to take him for his

second, that he might have an opportunity to fight Guzman, who had

defamed and spoken lightly of Mexia. When Egas de Guzman understood that

Mexia was the person who was to be opposed to him, he sent a message to

Pero Nunnez saying, as the principals were gentlemen of family, he ought

not to debase himself by having a man for his second whose mother was a

_Morisca_ and sold broiled sardinas in the market of Seville. Pero

Nunnez, knowing this to be true, endeavoured to get Mexia to release his

promise, but could not prevail. They accordingly went out to fight in a

field at some distance from Potosi. At the first rencounter of the

principals, Pero Nunnez struck his adversaries sword to one side, and

closing upon Perez threw him to the ground, where he cast dust into his

eyes, and beat him about the face with his fists, but did not stab him

with his dagger. In the mean time the seconds were engaged in another

part of the field. Mexia was afraid to close with Guzman, knowing him to

have great bodily strength, but kept him in play by his superior

agility, leaping and skipping about, yet never coming near enough to

wound him. At length, wearied with this mode of fighting, Guzman darted

his sword at Mexia, who looking anxiously to avoid it, gave an

opportunity to Guzman to close with him, and to give him a wound with

his dagger in the skull, two fingers deep, where the point of the

dagger broke off; Mexia became frantic with his wound, and ran about the

field like a madman; and came up to where the two principals were

struggling on the ground, where, not minding whom he struck, he gave his

own principal a slash with his sword, and ran wildly away. Guzman came

hastily up to the rescue of his own principal, when he heard Nunnez say

that he had been wounded by his own second, and was still continuing to

pummel Perez on the face, and to throw dust in his eyes. Then Guzman,

after harshly reproving Nunnez from bringing such a rascal to the field

as his second, attacked Nunnez with his sword, who defended himself as

he best could with his arms, till he was left all hacked and hewed on

the field, streaming with blood from many wounds. Guzman then helped up

his companion, and taking all the four swords under his arm, took Perez

on his back who was unable to stand, and carried him to an hospital

where he desired them to bury him, after which he took sanctuary in a

church. Nunnez was likewise taken to the hospital, where he recovered of

his wounds, but Mexia died of the wound in his forehead, as the point of

the dagger could not be extracted from his skull.

When Pedro de Hinojosa took possession of his government of Las Charcas

in place of Paulo de Meneses, he found a great number of soldiers in the

country, who were exceedingly troublesome, as there were neither

sufficient quarters nor provisions for so many; on which he took

occasion to reprove Martin de Robles and Paulo de Menezes, alleging that

their quarrels had drawn so many soldiers thither, for which reason they

ought to provide for them, and not allow them to die of famine. So great

was the confusion and disturbance, that many of the principal

inhabitants retired from the city to their estates in the country, to

avoid the violence of the soldiers, who were now come to such a pitch of

insolence, that they held public meetings, openly avowed their cabals

and plots, and upbraided Hinojosa with his breach of promise, alleging

that he had engaged to be their general when he should arrive in Las

Charcas. They even declared themselves ready for an insurrection,

offering to put themselves under his command. Hinojosa endeavoured to

amuse them with hopes, by telling them he expected very soon to receive

a commission from the judges to enlarge their conquests by a new war,

which would give them an opportunity to rise in arms. Although he had

formerly let fall some dubious expressions at Lima, which the soldiers

were disposed to consider as promises of support, he was far from any

intention of complying with their turbulent and rebellions humours.

Being now in possession of his government, with an estate in lands and

Indians worth two hundred thousand dollars a-year, he was desirous to

enjoy his fortune in peace, and not to risk the loss of these riches by

a new rebellion, which he had gained in the former at the loss of

Gonzalo Pizarro.

Disappointed in their expectations from Hinojosa, the soldiers consulted

how to manage their intended rebellion under another leader, and agreed

to kill Hinojosa and to elect Don Sebastian de Castilla as their

commander-in-chief; and their design was carried on with so little

regard to secrecy that it soon became publickly known in the city of La

Plata. Several persons of consideration therefore, who were interested

in the peace of the country, communicated the intelligence to Hinojosa,

advising him to take precautions for his security, and to banish these

people from his government. One Hondegardo a lawyer was particularly

urgent on this occasion; and offered, if Hinojosa would appoint him his

deputy for one month, that he would secure both him and the city from

the threatened danger of insurrection; but Hinojosa had so much

confidence in the power of his office, and the influence of his vast

wealth and reputation, that he despised every thing that he did not see

with his own eyes, and neglected all their warnings. Being unable to

persuade the governor to listen to him, and as the soldiers still

proceeded in their rebellious designs, and threw out many threatenings

against the governor, Hondegardo prevailed on the guardian of the

Franciscan convent to intimate to the governor that he had received

communications respecting these proposed schemes of the soldiers in

confession, and to urge him to make judicial examinations into the

affair and to punish the offenders; yet even this made little impression

on Hinojosa. Notwithstanding these and other intimations of the plot,

Hinojosa obstinately refused to attend to the suggestions of Hondegardo

and others, proudly declaring he had only to hold up his hand to make

the soldiers tremble before him.

Impatient of any longer delay, the conspirators came at length to the

determination of putting the governor Hinojosa to death, and rising in a

general insurrection. The principal ringleaders in this conspiracy were

Don Sebastian de Castilla, Egas de Gusman, Basco Godinez, Balthazar

Velasquez, and Gomez Hernandez, besides several other soldiers of note,

most of whom were then resident in the city of La Plata. Having arranged

their plan of operations, Don Sebastian and seven chosen accomplices

went one morning to the residence of the governor, as soon as his gate

was opened, to execute their vile purpose. The first person they met on

entering the house was Alonzo de Castro, the deputy-governor, who

questioned them on the reason of their present tumultuous appearance, as

they seemed extremely agitated. They immediately put De Castro to death.

Then forcing their way into the apartment of Hinojosa, they were

astonished to find him gone: But after some search he was found in a

retired corner, and dispatched.

After the death of Hinojosa, the conspirators went out to the

market-place, proclaiming aloud, God save the king, the tyrant is dead!

the common watchword in all the rebellions in Peru. Having collected all

their associates, they seized on Pedro Hernandez Paniagua, the person

employed by the late president Gasca to carry his letters to Gonzalo

Pizarro, Juan Ortiz de Zarate, Antonio Alvarez, and all the wealthy

citizens they could lay hold of. Martin de Robles, Paulo de Menezes, and

Hondegardo the lawyer, against whom they were particularly incensed,

made their escape. After this, they made proclamation by beat of drum,

for all citizens and other inhabitants of La Plata, to repair

immediately to the market-place and enrol themselves under their

standard; on which Rodrigo de Ordlana, though then sheriff of the city,

and many others, to the amount of a hundred and fifty-two persons, came

forwards and inlisted, fearing for their lives in case of refusal. Don

Sebastian was elected captain-general and chief-justice, and some days

afterwards he got himself appointed mayor of the city: Gomez Hernandez a

lawyer was appointed recorder; Hernando de Guillado and Garci Tello de

Vega, were made captains; Juan de Huarte serjeant-major, Pedro de

Castillo captain of artillery, Alvar Perez Payaz commissary-general,

Diego Perez high sheriff, and Bartholomew de Santa Ana his deputy.

Rodrigo de Orellana, and many of the citizens, who now joined the

rebels, acted merely from fear of losing their lives if they refused or

even hesitated, though loyal subjects in their hearts.

Immediately after the murder of Hinojosa, intelligence was sent in

various directions of the insurrection, and great numbers of

malcontents flocked to the city of La Plata to join the rebels. Among

these was Basco Godinez, who had been a chief instigator of the

conspiracy, and who seems to have promoted or permitted the elevation of

Don Sebastian to be commander-in-chief merely to use him as an

instrument of his own ambition, and to screen himself in case of failure

at the commencement: For, in a very few days, Don Sebastion was put to

death by Godinez and a few confidential associates; and they immediately

proclaimed their bloody exploit to the rest of the insurgents, by

exclaiming God save the king! the tyrant is slain! He even carried his

dissimulation to such a length, as to erect a court of justice to try

those who had murdered Hinojosa, in the vain hope of covering his own

treasonable conduct, and to make himself and his abettors appear as

loyal subjects. The murder of Hinojosa took place on the 6th of March

1553, and the subsequent slaughter of Don Sebastian on the eleventh of

the same month, only five days after.

Godinez and his associates immediately liberated Juan Ortiz de Zarate

and Pedro Hernandez Paniagua from prison, pretending that their great

purpose in taking arms was to procure their liberty, to deliver the city

from the rebels and traitors who would have ruined it, and to evince

their loyalty to the king. In the next place, he called together Zarate,

Paniagua, Antonio Alvarez, and Martin Monge, the only citizens then

remaining in La Plata, whom he desired to elect him captain-general of

the province, and to grant him the vacant lands and Indians which had

belonged to Hinojosa to enable him to maintain the dignity of that

office. Not daring to refuse any thing in the present situation of

affairs, they acceded to his demands, and Godinez was proclaimed lord

chief-justice, governor, and captain-general of the province, and

successor to Hinojosa in his great estate and rich mines, producing two

hundred thousand dollars of yearly revenue. After this, Gomez Hernandez

the lawyer was appointed lieutenant-general of the army; and Juan Ortiz

and Pedro de Castillo were made captains of foot: pretending on this

occasion to communicate a share in the administration of government to

the citizens, which they were constrained to accept. Balthazar

Velasquez, one of the conspirators, was appointed major-general. Next

day Martin de Robles, Paulo de Meneses, Diego de Almendras, and Diego

Velasquez returned to the city, having fled from some soldiers that had

been sent in search of them by Don Sebastian; and were immediately

enjoined to concur with the other citizens in confirming the appointment

of Godinez.

When intelligence of the insurrection of the soldiers in La Plata

arrived at Cuzco, the citizens put themselves into a posture of defence

against the enemy; and, with the consent of the Cabildo, Diego

Maldonado, commonly called the rich, was elected governor and

captain-general. Garcilasso de la Vega and Juan de Saavedra were made

captains of horse; and Juan Julio de Hojeda, Thomas Vasquez, Antonio de

Quinnones, and another whose name I have forgot, were made captains of

foot. So diligently did these officers apply themselves to raise men,

that in five days Juan Julio de Hojeda marched into the city accompanied

by three hundred soldiers well armed and appointed. Three days

afterwards news came of the death of Don Sebastian, by which they

flattered themselves that the war was ended for the present.

By the end of March intelligence was brought to the judges at Lima of

the rebellion of Don Sebastian and the murder of Hinojosa: Six days

afterwards, news came that Egas de Guzman had revolted at Potosi; and in

four days more advices were brought of the destruction of both these

rebels; on which there were great rejoicings at Lima. On purpose to

inquire into the origin of these commotions and to bring the ringleaders

to condign punishment, the judges immediately appointed Alonzo de

Alvarado chief-justice of Las Charcas, giving him the assistance of Juan

Fernandez the kings attorney-general, for proceeding against the

delinquents. By another commission, Alvarado was nominated governor and

captain-general of Las Charcas and all the neighbouring provinces, with

full power to levy soldiers, and to defray their pay and equipment and

all the necessary expences of the war, from the royal treasury. Godinez

was soon afterwards arrested and thrown into prison at La Plata under a

strong guard by Alonzo Velasquez. Alvarado the new governor, began the

exercise of his authority in the city of La Paz, where he tried a number

of rebel soldiers who had concealed themselves on the borders of the

lake of Titicaca, whence they had been brought prisoners by Pedro de

Encisco. Some of these were hanged, some beheaded, others banished, and

others condemned to the gallies. Alvarado went next to the city of

Potosi, where many of the followers of Egas de Guzman had been committed

to prison, all of whom were treated according to their deserts like

those at La Paz. Among the rebels at Potosi was one Hernan Perez de

Peragua, a knight of the order of St John of Malta, who had taken part

in the rebellion of Don Sebastian. From respect to the order to which he

belonged, Alvarado only confiscated his lands and Indians, and sent him

a prisoner to be disposed of by the grand master of the order at Malta.

It would be tedious to relate the names and numbers of those who were

tried, hanged, beheaded, whipt, and otherwise punished on this occasion:

But, from the end of June 1553, to the end of November of the same year,

the court sat daily, and every day four, five, or six were tried and

condemned, who were all punished according to their sentences next day.

The unthinking people styled Alvarado a Nero, who could thus condemn so

many of a day, yet amused himself afterwards with the attorney-general

in vain and light discourses, as if those whom he condemned had been so

many capons or turkies to be served up at his table. In the month of

October, Basco Godinez was put upon his trial, for many heinous

offences, and was condemned to be drawn and quartered. But a stop was

put to farther proceedings about the end of November, by the news of

another rebellion raised by Francisco Hernandez Giron, as shall be

related in the sequel.

"The Indians of Cuzco prognosticated this rebellion openly and loudly in

the streets, as I heard and saw myself: For the eve before the festival

of the most holy sacrament, I being then a youth, went out to see how

the two marketplaces of the city were adorned; for at that time the

procession passed through no other streets but those, though since that

time, as I am told, the perambulation is double as far as before. Being

then at the corner of the great chapel of our lady of the _Merceds_,

about an hour or two before day, I saw a comet dart from the east side

of the city towards the mountains of the _Antis_, so great and clear

that it enlightened all places round with more splendor than a full moon

at midnight. Its motion was directly downwards, its form was globular,

and its dimensions as big as a large tower; and coming near the ground,

it divided into several sparks and streams of fire; and was accompanied

with a thunder so loud and near as struck many deaf with the clap, and

ran from east to west; which when the Indians heard and saw, they all

cried out with one voice, _Auca, Auca, Auca_, which signifies in their

language, _tyrant, traitor, rebel_[44], and every thing that may be

attributed to a violent and bloody traitor. This happened on the

nineteenth of June 1553, when the feast of our Lord was celebrated; and

this prognostication which the Indians made, was accomplished on the

13th of November in the same year, when Francisco Hernandez Giron began

a rebellion, which we shall now relate[45]."

[Footnote 44: In the language of Chili at least, _Auca_ signifies

_free_, or a _freeman_; it is possible however that in an absolute

government, the same term may signify a rebel, yet it is a singular

stretch of interpretation to make it likewise signify a tyrant.--E.]

[Footnote 45: This paragraph, within inverted commas, is given as a

short specimen of the taste of Garcilasso, and the respectable talents

of his translator, Sir Paul Rycant, in 1688. It gives an account of one

of these singular meteors or fire balls, improperly termed a comet in

the text, which some modern philosophers are pleased to derive from the

moon, and to suppose that they are composed of ignited masses of iron

alloyed with nickel. It were an affront to our readers to comment on the

ridiculous pretended prognostication so gravely believed by Garcilasso

Inca.--E.]

SECTION IV.

_Continuation of the Troubles in Peru, to the Viceroyalty of the Marquis

de Cannete._

On the 13th of November 1553, a splendid wedding was celebrated at

Cuzco, between Alonzo de Loyasa, one of the richest inhabitants of the

city, and Donna Maria de Castilla, at which all the citizens and their

wives attended in their best apparel. After dinner an entertainment was

made in the street, in which horsemen threw balls of clay at each other,

which I saw from the top of a wall opposite the house of Alonzo de

Loyasa; and I remember to have seen Francisco Hernandez Giron sitting on

a chair in the hall, with his arms folded on his breast and his eyes

cast down, the very picture of melancholy, being then probably

contemplating the transactions in which he was to engage that night. In

the evening, when the sports were over, the company sat down to supper

in a lower hall, where at the least sixty gentlemen were at table, the

ladies being by themselves in an inner room, and from a small

court-yard between these apartments, the dishes were served to both

tables. Don Balthazar de Castillo, uncle to the bride, acted as usher of

the hall at this entertainment. I came to the house towards the end of

supper, to attend my father and stepmother home at night. I went to the

upper end of the hall, where the governor sat, who was pleased to make

me sit down on the chair beside him, and reached me some comfits and

sweet drink, with which boys are best pleased, I being then fourteen

years of age.

At this instant some once knocked at the door, saying that Francisco

Hernandez Giron was there; on which Don Balthazar de Castillo, who was

near the door ordered the door to be opened. Giron immediately rushed

in, having a drawn sword in his right hand, and a buckler on his left

arm; accompanied by a companion on each side armed with partizans. The

guests rose in great terror at this unexpected interruption, and Giron

addressed them in these words: "Gentlemen be not afraid, nor stir from

your places, as we are all engaged in the present enterprize." The

governor, Gil Ramirez, immediately retired into the apartment of the

ladies, by a door on the left hand. Another door led from the hall to

the kitchen and other offices; and by these two doors a considerable

number of the guests made their escape. Juan Alonzo Palomino, who was

obnoxious to Giron for having opposed him in a late mutiny, was slain by

Diego de Alvarado the lawyer. Juan de Morales, a rich merchant and very

honest man, was slain while endeavouring to put out the candles. My

father and a number of others, to the number in all of thirty-six, made

their escape by means of a ladder from the court-yard of Loyasa into

that of the adjoining house, in which I accompanied them, but the

governor could not be persuaded to follow them, and was made prisoner by

the rebels. My father and all the companions of his flight agreed to

leave the town that night, and endeavour to escape to Lima.

Having assembled about an hundred and fifty soldiers, Giron assumed the

office of commander-in-chief of the _army of liberty_, appointing Diego

de Alvarado the lawyer his lieutenant-general; Thomas Vasquez, Francisco

Nunnez, and Rodrigo de Pineda captains of horse; the two last of whom

accepted more from fear than affection. Juan de Pedrahita, Nuno

Mendiola, and Diego Gavilan were made captains of foot; Albertos de

Ordunna standard-bearer, and Antonio Carillo serjeant-major; all of whom

were ordered to raise soldiers to complete their companies with every

possible expedition. It being reported through the country that the

whole citizens of Cuzco had concurred in this rebellion, the cities of

Guamanga and Arequipa sent deputies to Cuzco, desiring to be admitted

into the league, that they might jointly represent to his majesty the

burdensome and oppressive nature of the ordinances imposed by the judges

in relation to the services of the Indians. But when the citizens of

Guamanga and Arequipa became rightly informed that this rebellion,

instead of being the act of the Cabildo and all the inhabitants, had

been brought about by the contrivance of a single individual, they

changed their resolutions, and prepared to serve his majesty. About this

time, the arch rebel Giron caused the deposed governor, Gil Ramirez, to

betaken from prison and escorted forty leagues on his way towards

Arequipa, and then set free.

Fifteen days after the commencement of the rebellion, finding himself at

the head of a considerable force, he summoned a meeting of all the

citizens remaining in Cuzco, at which there appeared twenty-five

citizens who were lords of Indians, only three of whom were intitled

from office to sit in that assembly. By this meeting, Giron caused

himself to be elected procurator, captain-general, and chief-justice of

Peru, with full power to govern and protect the whole kingdom both in

war and peace. When news of this rebellion was brought to Lima by

Hernando Chacon, who was foster-brother to Giron, the judges would not

credit the intelligence, believing it only a false report, to try how

the people stood affected to the cause, and therefore ordered Chacon to

be imprisoned; but learning the truth soon afterwards, he was set at

liberty, and the judges began seriously to provide for suppressing the

rebellion, appointing officers and commanders to raise forces for that

purpose. They accordingly sent a commission to Alonzo de Alvarado, then

at La Plata, constituting him captain-general of the royal army against

Giron, with unlimited power to use the public treasure, and to borrow

money for the service of the war in case the exchequer should fail to

supply sufficient for the purpose. Alvarado accordingly appointed such

officers as he thought proper to serve under him, and gave orders to

raise men, and to provide arms and ammunition for the war.

Besides the army which they authorized Alvarado to raise and command in

Las Charcas, the judges thought it necessary to raise another army at

Lima, of which Santillan, one of themselves and the archbishop of Lima

were appointed conjunct generals. Orders were likewise transmitted to

all the cities, commanding all loyal subjects to take up arms in the

service of his majesty, and a general pardon was proclaimed to all who

had been engaged in the late rebellions, under Gonzalo Pizarro, Don

Sebastian de Castilla, and others, provided they joined the royal army

within a certain given time. They likewise suspended the execution of

the decrees for freeing the Indians from personal services, during two

years, and repealed several other regulations which had given great and

general offence to the soldiers and inhabitants, and had been the cause

of all the commotions and rebellions which distracted the kingdom for so

long a time.

While these measures were carrying on against him, Hernandez, Giron was

not negligent of his own concerns. He sent off officers with detachments

of troops to Arequipa and Guamanga, to induce the inhabitants of these

cities to join him, and requiring them by solemn acts of their cabildos

to confirm and acknowledge him in the offices he had usurped. He caused

the cabildo of Cuzco to write letters to the other cities of Peru to

concur in his elevation and to give assistance in the cause, and wrote

many letters himself to various individuals in Las Charcas and other

places, soliciting them to join him. Having collected an army of above

four hundred men, besides the detachments sent to Guamanga and Arequipa,

he resolved to march for Lima, to give battle to the army of the judges,

as he called it, pretending that his own was the royal army, and that he

acted in the service of his majesty. At the first he was undetermined,

whether it might not be better to march previously against Alvarado,

whose party he considered to be the weakest, owing to the great and

cruel severity which that officer had exerted against the adherents of

the late rebellions: And many judicious persons are of opinion that he

would have succeeded better if he had first attacked the marshal, as in

all probability he would have got possession of these provinces, and his

men would not have deserted from him to a person so universally disliked

for his cruelty, as they afterwards did when they marched towards Lima.

He accordingly marched from Cuzco and crossed the river Apurimac;

immediately after which Juan Vera de Mendoza and five others deserted

from him, re-crossed the bridge, which they burnt to prevent pursuit,

and returned to Cuzco, where they persuaded about forty of the

inhabitants to set out for Las Charcas to join the marshal Alvarado.

At this time Sancho Duarte who was governor of the city of La Paz,

raised above two hundred men in the service of his majesty, which he

divided into two companies, one of horse and the other of foot. Giving

the command of his infantry to Martin d'Olmos, he took the command of

the horse himself, and assumed the title of general. With this force he

set out for Cuzco, intending to march against Giron, but not to join the

marshal Alvarado that he might not submit to his superior command. On

his arrival at the bridge over the Rio Desaguadero, he learnt that Giron

had left Cuzco to attack Lima, and proposed to have continued his march

for Cuzco remaining independent of the marshal. But, in consequence of

peremptory commands from Alvarado as captain-general, who highly

disapproved of so many small armies acting separately, he returned to

his own province.

Pursuing his march for Lima, Hernandez Giron learnt at Andahuaylas that

the citizens of Guamanga had declared for his majesty, at which

circumstance he was much disappointed. He proceeded however to the river

Villca[46], where his scouts and those of the royal army encountered. He

proceeded however to the city of Guamanga, whence he sent orders to

Thomas Vasquez to rejoin him from Arequipa. Although the inhabitants of

that place, as formerly mentioned, had written to those of Cuzco

offering to unite in the insurrection, supposing it the general sense of

the principal people; they were now ashamed of their conduct, when they

found the rebellion only proceeded from a few desperate men, and

declared for the king; so that Vasquez was obliged to return without

success. Being now at the head of above seven hundred men, though

disappointed in his expectations of being joined by the citizens of

Guamanga and Arequipa, Hernandez Giron pursued his march for the valley

of Jauja; during which march Salvador de Lozana, one of his officers,

who was detached with forty men to scour the country, was made prisoner

along with all his party by a detachment from the army of the judges.

[Footnote 46: The river Cangallo is probably here meant, which runs

through the province of Vilcas to the city of Guamanga.--E.]

Notwithstanding this unforseen misfortune, Giron continued his march to

the valley of Pachacamac, only four leagues from Lima, where it was

resolved in a council of war to endeavour to surprise the camp of the

royalists near the capital. Intelligence of this was conveyed to the

judges, who put themselves in a posture of defence. Their army at this

time consisted of 300 cavalry, 600 musqueteers, and about 450 men armed

with pikes, or 1350 in all. It may be proper to remark in this place,

that, to secure the loyalty of the soldiers and inhabitants, the judges

had proclaimed a suspension of the obnoxious edicts by which the Indians

were exempted from personal services, and the Spaniards were forbidden

to make use of them to carry their baggage on journeys; and had agreed

to send two procurators or deputies to implore redress from his majesty

from these burdensome regulations.

Two days after the arrival of Giron in the valley of Pachacamac, a party

of his army went out to skirmish with the enemy, on which occasion Diego

de Selva and four others of considerable reputation deserted to the

judges. For several days afterwards his men continued to abandon him at

every opportunity, twenty or thirty of them going over at a time to the

royal army. Afraid that the greater part of his army might follow this

example, Hernandez Giron found it necessary to retreat from the low

country and to return to Cuzco, which he did in such haste that his

soldiers left all their heavy baggage that they might not be encumbered

in their march. On this alteration of affairs, the judges gave orders to

Paulo de Meneses to pursue the rebels with six hundred select men; but

the generals of the royal army would not allow of more than a hundred

being detached on this service. During his retreat, Giron, finding

himself not pursued by the royalists with any energy, marched with

deliberation, but so many of his men left him that by the time he

reached the valley of Chincha his force was reduced to about 500 men.

Paulo de Meneses, having been reinforced, proposed to follow and harass

the retreating rebels; but not having accurate intelligence, nor keeping

sufficient guard, was surprised and defeated by Giron with some

considerable loss, and obliged to retreat in great disorder. Yet Giron

was under the necessity to discontinue the pursuit, as many of his men

deserted to the royalists.

Sensible of the detriment suffered by the royal interests in consequence

of the disagreement between the present generals, Judge Santillan and

Archbishop Loyasa, to which the defeat of Meneses was obviously owing,

these very unfit persons for military command were displaced, and Paulo

de Meneses was invested in the office of commander-in-chief, with Pedro

de Puertocarrero as his lieutenant-general. This new appointment

occasioned great discontent in the army, that a person who had lost a

battle, and rather merited ignominy and punishment for his misconduct,

should be raised to the chief command. The appointment was however

persisted in, and it was resolved to pursue the enemy with 800 men

without baggage.

Hernandez Giron, who retreated by way of the plain towards Arequipa, had

reached the valley of Nasca, about sixty leagues to the southwards of

Lima, before the confusion and disputes in the royal camp admitted of

proper measures being taken for pursuit. At this time, the judges gave

permission to a sergeant in the royal army, who had formerly been in the

conspiracy of Diego de Royas, to go into the enemys camp disguised as an

Indian, under pretence of bringing them exact information of the state

of affairs. But this man went immediately to Hernandez, whom he informed

of the quarrels among the officers and the discontents in the royal

army. He likewise informed him that the city of San Miguel de Piura had

rebelled, and that one Pedro de Orosna was coming from the new kingdom

of Grenada with a strong party to join the rebels in Peru. But to

qualify this favourable news for the rebels, Giron received notice at

the same time that the marshal Alvarado was coming against him from Las

Charcas with a force of twelve hundred men. About this time, on purpose

to reinforce his army, Giron raised a company of an hundred and fifty

negroes, which he afterwards augmented to 450, regularly divided into

companies, to which he appointed captains, and allowed them to elect

their own ensigns, sergeants, and corporals, and to make their own

colours.

In the mean time, the marshal Alonzo de Alvarado, employed himself

diligently in Las Charcas to raise men for the royal service, and to

provide arms, ammunition, provisions, horses, and mules, and every thing

necessary for taking the field. He appointed Don Martin de Almendras,

who had married his sister, lieutenant-general, Diego de Porras

standard-bearer, and Diego de Villavicennio major-general. Pera

Hernandez Paniagua, Juan Ortiz de Zarate, and Don Gabriel de Guzman,

were captains of horse. The licentiate Polo, Diego de Almendras, Martin

de Alarzon, Hernando Alvarez de Toledo, Juan Ramon, and Juan de

Arreynaga, were captains of foot; Gomez Hernandez the lawyer, military

alguazil or judge-advocate, and Juan Riba Martin commissary-general. His

force amounted to 750 excellent soldiers, all well armed and richly

clothed, with numerous attendants, such as had never been seen before in

Peru. I saw them myself a few days after their arrival in Cuzco, when

they made a most gallant appearance. While on his march to Cuzco from

La Plata, Alvarado was joined by several parties of ten and twenty

together, who came to join him in the service of his majesty. On his way

to Arequipa he was joined by about forty more; and after passing that

place, Sancho Duarte and Martin d'Olmos joined him from La Paz with more

than two hundred good soldiers. Besides these, while in the province of

Cuzco, he was joined by Juan de Saavedra with a squadron of eighty five

men of the principal interest and fortune in the country. On entering

Cuzco, Alvarado was above 1200 strong; having 300 horse, 350

musqueteers, and about 530 armed with pikes and halberts. Not knowing

what was become of Giron, Alvarado issued orders to repair the bridges

over the Apurimac and Abancay, intending to pass that way in quest of

the rebels. But receiving intelligence from the judges, of the defeat of

Meneses, and that the rebels were encamped in the valley of Nasca, he

ordered the bridges to be destroyed, and marched by the nearest way for

Nasca, by way of Parinacocha, in which route he had to cross a rocky

desert of sixty leagues.

In this march four of the soldiers deserted and went over to Hernandez

Giron at Nasca, to whom they gave an account of the great force with

which Alvarado was marching against him, but reported in public that the

royalists were inconsiderable in number. Giron, however, chose to let

his soldiers know the truth, and addressed his army as follows.

"Gentlemen, do not flatter or deceive yourselves: There are a thousand

men coming against you from Lima, and twelve hundred from the mountains.

But, with the help of God, if you stand firm, I have no doubt of

defeating them all." Leaving Nasca, Giron marched by way of Lucanas, by

the mountain road, intending to take post on the lake of Parinacocha

before Alvarado might be able to reach that place. He accordingly left

Nasca on the 8th of May[47] for this purpose.

[Footnote 47: Although Garcilasso omits the date of the year, it

probably was in 1554, as the rebellion of Giron commenced in the

November immediately preceding.--E.]

In the mean time pursuing his march, Alvarado and his army entered upon

the desert of _Parihuanacocha_, where above sixty of his best horses

died, in consequence of the bad and craggy roads, the unhealthiness of

the climate, and continued tempestuous weather, though led by hand and

well covered with clothes. When the two armies approached each other,

Alvarado sent a detachment of an hundred and fifty select musqueteers

to attack the camp of Giron, and marched forwards with the main body of

his army to support that detachment. An engagement accordingly took

place in rough and strong ground, encumbered with trees brushwood and

rocks, in which the royalists could make no impression on the rebels,

and were obliged to retire with the loss of forty of their best men

killed or wounded. In the following night, Juan de Piedrahita

endeavoured ineffectually to retaliate, by assailing the camp of

Alvarado, and was obliged to retreat at daybreak. Receiving notice from

a deserter that the rebel army consisted only of about four hundred men,

in want of provisions, and most of them inclined to revolt from Giron

and return to their duty, Alvarado determined upon giving battle,

contrary to the opinion and earnest advice of all his principal officers

and followers. But so strong was the position of the enemy, and the

approaches so extremely difficult, that the royal army fell into

confusion in the attack, and were easily defeated with considerable

loss, and fled in all directions, many of them being slain by the

Indians during their dispersed flight.

On receiving the afflicting news of this defeat, the judges ordered the

army which they had drawn together at Lima to march by way of Guamanga

against the rebels. In the mean time Giron remained for forty days in

his camp at Chuquinca, where the battle was fought, taking care of his

wounded men and of the wounded royalists, many of whom now joined his

party. He sent off however his lieutenant-general towards Cuzco in

pursuit of the royalists who had fled in that direction, and ordered his

sergeant-major to go to La Plaz, Chucuito, Potosi, and La Plata, to

collect men arms and horses for the farther prosecution of the war. At

length Giron marched into the province of Andahuaylas, which he laid

waste without mercy, whence he went towards Cuzco on receiving

intelligence that the army of the judges had passed the rivers Abancay

and Apurimac on their way to attack him. He immediately marched by the

valley of Yucay to within a league of Cuzco, not being sufficiently

strong to resist the royalists; but turned off from that city at the

persuasion of certain astrologers and prognosticators, who declared that

his entrance there would prove his ruin, as had already happened to many

other captains, both Spaniards and Indians.

The army of the judges marched on from Guamanga to Cuzco unopposed by

the rebels, their chief difficulty being in the passages of the great

rivers, and the transport of eleven pieces of artillery, which were

carried on the shoulders of Indians, of whom ten thousand were required

for that service only. Each piece of ordinance was fastened on a beam of

wood forty feet long, under which twenty cross bars were fixed, each

about three feet long, and to every bar were two Indians, one on each

side, who carried this load on their shoulders, on pads or cushions, and

were relieved by a fresh set every two hundred paces. After halting five

days in the neighbourhood of Cuzco, to refresh the army from the

fatigues of the march, and to procure provisions and other necessaries,

the royal army set out in pursuit of the rebels to Pucara[48], where the

rebels had intrenched themselves in a very strong situation, environed

on every side with such steep and rugged mountains as could not be

passed without extreme difficulty, more like a wall than natural rocks.

The only entrance was exceedingly narrow and intricate, so that it could

easily be defended by a handful of men against an army; but the interior

of this post was wide and convenient, and sufficient for accommodating

the rebel army with all the cattle provisions and attendants with the

utmost ease. The rebels had abundance of provisions and ammunition,

having the whole country at their command since the victory of

Chuquinca; besides which their negro soldiers brought in provisions

daily from the surrounding country. The royal army encamped at no great

distance in an open plain, fortifying the camp with an intrenchment

breast-high all round, which was soon executed by means of the great

numbers of Indians who attended to carry the baggage and artillery.

Giron established a battery of cannon on the top of a rising ground so

near the royal camp that the balls were able to reach considerably

beyond the intrenchment: "Yet by the mysterious direction of Providence,

the rebel cannon, having been cast from the consecrated metal of bells

dedicated to the service of God, did no harm to man or beast."

[Footnote 48: Pucara is in the province of Lampa, near the north-western

extremity of the great lake Titicaca.--E.]

After a considerable delay, during which daily skirmishes passed between

the adverse parties, Giron resolved to make a night attack upon the camp

of the royalists, confiding in the prediction of some wise old woman,

that he was to gain the victory at that place. For this purpose he

marched out from his natural fortress at the head of eight hundred foot,

six hundred of whom were musqueteers, and the rest pikemen, with only

about thirty horse. His negro soldiers, who were about two hundred and

fifty in number, joined with about seventy Spaniards, were ordered to

assail the front of the royal camp, while Giron with the main body was

to attack the rear. Fortunately the judges had got notice of this

intended assault from two rebel deserters, so that the whole royal army

was drawn out in order of battle on the plain before the rebels got up

to the attack. The negro detachment arrived at the royal camp sometime

before Giron, and, finding no resistance, they broke in and killed a

great number of the Indian followers, and many horses and mules,

together with five or six Spanish soldiers who had deserted the ranks

and hidden themselves in the camp. On arriving at the camp, Giron fired

a whole volley into the fortifications without receiving any return; but

was astonished when the royal army began to play upon the flank of his

army from an unexpected quarter, with all their musquets and artillery.

Giron, being thus disappointed in his expectations of taking the enemy

by surprise, and finding their whole army drawn up to receive him, lost

heart and retreated back to his strong camp in the best order he could.

But on this occasion, two hundred of his men, who had formerly served

under Alvarado, and had been constrained to enter into his service after

the battle of Chuquinca, threw down their arms and revolted to the

royalists.

Giron made good his retreat, as the general of the royalists would not

permit any pursuit during the darkness of the night. In this affair,

five or six were killed on the side of the judges, and about thirty

wounded; while the rebels, besides the two hundred who revolted, had ten

men killed and about the same number wounded. On the third day after the

battle, Giron sent several detachments to skirmish with the enemy, in

hopes of provoking them to assail his strong camp; but the only

consequence of this was giving an opportunity to Thomas Vasquez and ten

or twelve more to go over to the royalists. Heart-broken and confounded

by these untoward events, and even dreading that his own officers had

conspired against his life, Giron fled away alone from the camp on

horseback during the night after the desertion of Vasquez. On the

appearance of day he found himself still near his own camp, whence he

desperately adventured to make his escape over a mountain covered with

snow, where he was nearly swallowed up, but at last got through by the

goodness of his horse. Next morning, the lieutenant-general of the

rebels, with about an hundred of the most guilty, went off in search of

their late general; but several others of the leading rebels went over

to the judges and claimed their pardons, which were granted under the

great seal.

Next day, Paulo de Meneses, with a select detachment, went in pursuit of

Diego de Alvarado, the rebel lieutenant-general, who was accompanied by

about an hundred Spaniards and twenty negroes; and came up with them in

eight or nine days, when they all surrendered without resistance. The

general immediately ordered Juan Henriquez de Orellana, one of the

prisoners, who had been executioner in the service of the rebels, to

hang and behead Diego de Alvarado and ten or twelve of the principal

chiefs, after which he ordered Orellana to be strangled by two negroes.

"I cannot omit one story to shew the impudence of the rebel soldiers,

which occurred at this time. The very next day after the flight of

Francisco Hernandez Giron, as my father Garcilasso de la Vega was at

dinner with eighteen or twenty soldiers, it being the custom in time of

war for all men of estates to be hospitable in this manner according to

their abilities; he observed among his guests a soldier who had been

with Giron from the beginning of this rebellion. This man was by trade a

blacksmith, yet crowded to the table with as much freedom and boldness

as if he had been a loyal gentleman, and was as richly clothed as the

most gallant soldier of either army. Seeing him sit down with much

confidence, my father told him to eat his dinner and welcome, but to

come no more to his table; as a person who would have cut off his head

yesterday for a reward from the general of the rebels, was not fit

company for himself or those gentlemen, his friends and wellwishers, and

loyal subjects of his majesty. Abashed by this address, the poor

blacksmith rose and departed without his dinner, leaving subject of

discourse to the guests, who admired at his impudence."

After his flight, Hernandez Giron was rejoined by a considerable number

of his dispersed soldiers, and took the road towards Lima, in hopes of

gaining possession of that place in the absence of the judges. He was

pursued by various detachments, one of which came up with him in a

strong position on a mountain; where all his followers, though more

numerous than their pursuers, surrendered at discretion, and the arch

rebel was made prisoner and carried to Lima, where he was capitally

punished, and his head affixed to the gallows beside those of Gonzalo

Pizarro and Francisco de Carvajal. This rebellion subsisted from the

13th of November 1553, reckoning the day on which Giron was executed,

thirteen months and some days; so that he received his well-merited

punishment towards the end of December 1554.

SECTION V.

_History of Peru during the Viceroyalty of the Marquis del Cannete._

Immediately after learning the death of Don Antonio de Mendoza, his

imperial majesty, who was then in Germany, nominated the Conde de Palma

to succeed to the viceroyalty of Peru: But both he and the Conde de

Olivares declined to accept. At length Don Andres Hurtado de Mendoza,

Marquis of Cannete, was appointed to the office. Having received his

instructions, he departed for Peru and arrived at Nombre de Dios, where

he resided for some time for the purpose of suppressing a band of

fugitive negroes, called _Cimarrones_ who lived in the mountains, and

robbed and pillaged the merchants and others on the road between Nombre

de Dios and Panama. Finding themselves hard pressed by a military force

sent against them under the command of Pedro de Orsua, the negroes at

length submitted to articles of accommodation, retaining their freedom,

and engaging to catch and deliver up all negroes that should in future

desert from their masters. They likewise agreed to live peaceably and

quietly within a certain district, and were allowed to have free trade

with the Spanish towns.

Having settled all things properly in the Tierra Firma, the viceroy set

sail from Panama and landed at Payta on the northern confines of Peru,

whence he went by land to Lima, where he was received in great pomp in

the month of July 1557. Soon after the instalment of the new viceroy,

he appointed officers and governors to the several cities and

jurisdictions of the kingdom; among whom Baptisto Munnoz a lawyer from

Spain was sent to supersede my father Garcilasso de la Vega in the

government of Cuzco. In a short time after taking possession of his

office, Munnoz apprehended Thomas Vasquez, Juan de Piedrahita and Alonzo

Diaz, who had been ringleaders in the late rebellion, and who were

privately strangled in prison, notwithstanding the pardons they had

received in due form from the royal chancery. Their plantations and

lordships over Indians were confiscated and bestowed on other persons.

No other processes were issued against any of the other persons who had

been engaged in the late rebellion. But Munnoz instituted a prosecution

against his predecessor in office, my father, on the four following

charges. 1st, For sporting after the Spanish manner with darts on

horseback, as unbecoming the gravity of his office. 2d, For going on

visits without the rod of justice in his hand, by which he gave occasion

to many to despise and contemn the character with which he was invested.

3d, For allowing cards and dice in his house during the Christmas

holidays, and even playing himself, contrary to the dignity becoming the

governor. 4th, For employing as his clerk one who was not a freeman of

the city, nor qualified according to the forms of law. Some charges

equally frivolous were made against Monjaraz, the deputy-governor, not

worth mentioning; but these processes were not insisted in, and no fines

or other punishment were inflicted.

Soon after the viceroy was settled in his government, he sent

Altamirano, judge in the court of chancery at Lima, to supersede Martin

de Robles in the government of the city of La Plata. De Robles was then

so old and bowed down with infirmities, that he was unable to have his

sword girt to his side, and had it carried after him by an Indian page;

yet Altamirano, almost immediately after taking possession of his

government, hanged Martin de Robles in the market-place, on some

pretended charge of having used certain words respecting the viceroy

that had a rebellious tendency. About the same time the viceroy

apprehended and deported to Spain about thirty-seven of those who had

most eminently distinguished their loyalty in suppressing the late

rebellion, chiefly because they solicited rewards for their services and

remuneration for the great expences they had been at during the war, and

refused to marry certain women who had been brought from Spain by the

viceroy as wives to the colonists, many of whom were known to be common

strumpets.

The next object which occupied the attention of the viceroy was to

endeavour to prevail upon Sayri Tupac, the nominal Inca or king of the

Peruvians, to quit the mountains in which he had taken refuge, and to

live among the Spaniards, under promise of a sufficient allowance to

maintain his family and equipage. Sayri Tupac was the son and heir of

Manco Capac, otherwise called Menco Saca, who had been killed by the

Spaniards after delivering them out of the hands of their enemies. After

a long negociation, the Inca Sayri Tupac came to Lima where he was

honourably received and entertained by the viceroy, who settled an

insignificant pension upon him according to promise. After remaining a

short time in Lima, the Inca was permitted by the viceroy to return to

Cuzco, where he took up his residence in the house of his aunt Donna

Beatrix Coya, which was directly behind my fathers dwelling, and where

he was visited by all the men and women of the royal blood of the Incas

who resided in Cuzco. The Inca was soon afterwards baptized along with

his wife, Cusi Huarcay, the niece of the former Inca Huascar. This took

place in the year 1558; and about three years afterwards he died,

leaving a daughter who was afterwards married to a Spaniard named Martin

Garcia de Loyola.

Having settled all things in the kingdom to his satisfaction, by the

punishment of those who had been concerned in the rebellion under Giron,

and the settlement of the Inca under the protection and superintendence

of the Spanish government; the viceroy raised a permanent force of

seventy lancers or cavalry, and two hundred musqueteers, to secure the

peace of the kingdom, and to guard his own person and the courts of

justice. The horsemen of this guard were allowed each a thousand, and

the foot soldiers five hundred, dollars yearly. Much about the same

time, Alonzo de Alvarado, Juan Julio de Hojeda, my lord and father

Garcilasso de la Vega, and Lorenzo de Aldana died. These four gentlemen

were all of the ancient conquerors of Peru who died by natural deaths,

and were all greatly lamented by the people for their virtuous

honourable and good characters. All the other conquerors either died in

battle, or were cut off by other violent deaths, in the various civil

wars and rebellions by which the kingdom was so long distracted.

On the arrival of those persons in Spain who had been sent out of Peru

by the viceroy for demanding rewards for their services, they petitioned

the king, Don Philip II, for redress; who was graciously pleased to give

pensions to as many of them as chose to return to Peru, to be paid from

the royal exchequer in that kingdom, that they might not need to address

themselves to the viceroy. Such as chose to remain in Spain, he

gratified with pensions upon the custom-house in Seville; the smallest

being 80 ducats yearly, to some 600, to some 800, 1000, and 1200 ducats,

according to their merits and services. About the same time likewise,

his majesty was pleased to nominate Don Diego de Azevedo as viceroy of

Peru, to supersede the Marquis of Cannete; but, while preparing for his

voyage, he died, to the great grief of all the colonists of the kingdom.

The Marquis of Cannete was much astonished when those men whom he had

banished from Peru for demanding rewards for their past services, came

back with royal warrants for pensions on the exchequer of that kingdom,

and still more so when he learnt that another person was appointed to

succeed him in the office of viceroy. On this occasion he laid aside his

former haughtiness and severity, and became gentle and lenient in his

disposition and conduct for the rest of his days; so that, if he had

begun as he ended his administration, he would have proved the best

governor that ever commanded in the New World. On seeing this change of

conduct, the heirs of those citizens who had been executed for having

engaged in the rebellion of Giron, laid the pardons obtained by their

fathers before the judges of the royal audience, and made reclamation of

the estates which had been confiscated, and even succeeded in having

their lands and Indians restored, together with all other confiscations

which had been ordered at the first coming over of the viceroy.

At this time likewise, the viceroy gave a commission to Pedro de Orsua,

to make a conquest of the country of the Amazons on the river Marannon,

being the same country in which Orellana deserted Gonzalo Pizarro, as

formerly related. Orsua went to Quito to raise soldiers, and to provide

arms and provisions, in which he was greatly assisted by contributions

from the citizens of Cuzco, Quito and other cities of Peru. Orsua set

out accordingly on his expedition, with a well appointed force of five

hundred men, a considerable proportion of which was cavalry. But he was

slain by his own men, at the instigation of Don Fernando de Guzman and

some others, who set up Don Fernando as their king, yet put him to death

shortly afterwards. Lope de Aguira then assumed the command, but the

whole plan of conquest fell to the ground, and Aguira and far the

greater part of the men engaged in this expedition were slain.

SECTION VI.

_Incidents in the History of Peru, during the successive Governments of

the Conde de Nieva, Lope Garcia de Castro, and Don Francisco de Toledo._

On the death of Don Diego de Azevedo, Don Diego de Zuniga by Velasco,

Conde de Nieva, was appointed to supersede the Marquis of Cannete as

viceroy of Peru, and departing from Spain to assume his new office in

January 1560, he arrived at Payta in Peru in the month of April

following. He immediately dispatched a letter to the marquis informing

him of his arrival in the kingdom as viceroy, and requiring the marquis

to desist from any farther exercise of authority. On the arrival of the

messenger at Lima, the marquis ordered him to be honourably entertained,

and to receive a handsome gratification, to the value of 7000 dollars;

but he forfeited all these advantages, by refusing to address the

ex-viceroy by the title of excellency. This slight, which had been

directed by the new viceroy, so pressed on the spirits of the marquis,

already much reduced by the infirmities of age and the ravages of a

mortal distemper, that he fell into a deep melancholy, and ended his

days before the arrival of his successor at Lima.

The Conde de Nieva did not long enjoy the happiness he expected in his

government, and he came by his death not many months afterwards by means

of a strange accident, of which he was himself the cause; but as it was

of a scandalous nature I do not chuse to relate the particulars. On

receiving notice of his death, King Philip II. was pleased to appoint

the lawyer Lope Garcia de Castro, who was then president of the royal

council of the Indies, to succeed to the government of Peru, with the

title only of president of the court of royal audience and

governor-general of the kingdom. He governed the kingdom with much

wisdom and moderation, and lived to return into Spain, where he was

replaced in his former situation of president of the council of the

Indies.

Don Francisco de Toledo, second son of the Conde de Oropeta, succeeded

Lope Garcia de Castro in the government of Peru, with the tide of

viceroy. He had scarcely been two years established in the government,

when he resolved to entice from the mountains of Villcapampa[49] where

he resided, the Inca Tupac Amaru, the legitimate heir of the Peruvian

empire, being the son of Manco Inca, and next brother to the late Don

Diego Sayri Tupac, who left no son. The viceroy was induced to attempt

this measure, on purpose to put a stop to the frequent robberies which

were committed by the Indians dependent on the Inca, in the roads

between Cuzco and Guamanga, and in hope of procuring information

respecting the treasures which had belonged to former Incas and the

great chain of gold belonging to Huayna Capac, formerly mentioned, all

of which it was alleged was concealed by the Indians. Being unable to

prevail upon the Inca to put himself in the power of the Spaniards, a

force of two hundred and fifty men was detached into the Villcapampa,

under the command of Martin Garcia Loyola, to whom the Inca surrendered

himself, with his wife, two sons, and a daughter, who were all carried

prisoners to Cuzco.

[Footnote 49: The river Quiliabamba, otherwise called Urabamba and

Vilcamayo is to the north of Cuzco, and to the north of that river one

of the chains of the Andes is named the chain of Cuzco or of the rebel

Indians. This is probably the mountainous region mentioned in the

text.--E.]

The unfortunate Inca was arraigned by the attorney-general, of having

encouraged his servants and vassals to infest the roads and to rob the

Spanish merchants, of having declared enmity against all who lived or

inhabited among the Spaniards, and of having entered into a plot with

the Caracas or Caciques, who were lords of districts and Indians by

ancient grants of the former Incas, to rise in arms on a certain day and

to kill all the Spaniards they could find. At the same time a general

accusation was made against all the males of mixed race, born of Indian

mothers to the Spanish conquerors, who were alleged to have secretly

agreed with Tupac Amaru and other Incas to make an insurrection for

extirpating the Spaniards and restoring the native, Inca to the throne

of Peru. In consequence of this accusation, all the sons of Spaniards by

Indian women who were of age sufficient to carry arms were committed to

prison, and many of them were put to the torture to extort confession of

these alleged crimes, for which they had no proof or evidence

whatsoever. Many of them were accordingly banished to various remote

parts of the New World, as to Chili, the new kingdom of Granada, the

West India islands, Panama, and Nicaragua, and others were sent into

Spain.

All the males of the royal line of the Incas, who were in the capacity

of being able to succeed to the throne, to the number of thirty-six

persons, together with the two sons and the daughter of the Inca Tupac

Amaru, were commanded to reside for the future in Lima, where in little

more than two years they all died except three, who were permitted to

return to their own houses for purer air: But even these three were

beyond recovery, and died soon afterwards. One of these, Don Carlos

Paula, left a son who died in Spain in 1610, leaving one son a few

months old who died next year; and in him ended the entire male line of

the Incas of Peru.

Tupac Amaru was brought to trial, under pretence that he intended to

rebel, and had engaged in a conspiracy with several Indians, and with

the sons of Spaniards born of Indian mothers, intending to have

dispossessed his majesty Philip II of the kingdom of Peru. On this

unfounded accusation, and on the most inconclusive evidence, he was

condemned to lose his head. Upon notice of this sentence, the friars of

Cuzco flocked to prison, and persuaded the unfortunate prince to receive

baptism, on which he assumed the name of Don Philip. Though the Inca

earnestly entreated to be sent to Spain, and urged the absurdity and

impossibility that he could ever intend to rebel against the numerous

Spanish colonists who now occupied the whole country of Peru, seeing

that his father with 200,000 men was utterly unable to overcome only 200

Spaniards whom he besieged in the city of Cuzco; yet the viceroy thought

fit to order the sentence to be carried into execution. The Inca was

accordingly brought out of prison, mounted on a mule, having his bands

tied and a halter about his neck, and being conducted to the ordinary

place of execution in the city of Cuzco, his head was cut off by the

public executioner.

After continuing sixteen years in the viceroyalty of Peru, Don Francisco

de Toledo returned into Spain, with a fortune of above half a million of

pesos. Falling under the displeasure of the king, he was ordered to

confine himself to his own house, and all his fortune was laid under

sequestration, which so affected his mind that he soon died of a broken

heart. Martin Garcia Loyola, who made the Inca prisoner, was married to

a coya, the daughter of the former Inca Sayri Tupac, by whom he acquired

a considerable estate; and being afterwards made governor of Chili, was

slain in that country by the natives.

END OF THE EARLY HISTORY OF PERU.

CHAPTER IX.

HISTORY OF THE DISCOVERY AND CONQUEST OF CHILI

INTRODUCTION.

Not having the advantage of any original and contemporary author to lay

before our readers on this occasion, it was at first our intention to

have omitted any notice of Chili in the present division of this work:

But under the existing and important circumstances of the Spanish

American colonies, to which some allusion has been already made in the

introduction to the preceding chapter, it has been deemed proper to

deviate on this occasion from our general principle, and to endeavour to

draw up a short satisfactory account of the Discovery and Conquest of

Chili, and of the early History of that interesting region, the most

distant of all the early European colonies in the New World, and which

presents the singular and solitary phenomenon, of a native nation

inhabiting a fertile and champaign country, successfully resisting the

arts, discipline, and arms of Europeans, and remaining unconquered and

independent to the present day, after the almost perpetual efforts of

the Spaniards during a period of 277 years.

In the composition of this chapter, we have been chiefly guided by the

geographical natural and civil history of Chili, by the Abbe Don Juan

Ignatio Molina, a native of the country, and a member of the late

celebrated order of the Jesuits. On the dissolution of that order, being

expelled along with all his brethren from the Spanish dominions, he went

to reside at Bologna in Italy, where in 1787 he published the first part

of his work, containing the natural history of Chili, and the second

part, or civil history, some years afterwards. This work was translated

and published some years ago in the United States of North America; and

was republished in London in the year 1809, with the addition of several

notes and appendixes from various sources by the English editor. In the

present abridged version of the second part of that work, or civil

history of Chili, we have collated the whole with An Historical Relation

of the Kingdom of Chili, by Alonzo de Ovalle, or Ovaglia, likewise a

native and a Jesuit, printed at Rome in 1649, of which an English

translation is inserted in Churchill's collection of voyages and

travels, Vol. III. p. 1-146. In other divisions of this work, more

minute accounts will be furnished, respecting the country of Chili and

its inhabitants and productions, by means of several voyages to that

distant and interesting country.

SECTION I.

_Geographical View of the Kingdom of Chili._

The kingdom of Chili in South America, is situated on the coast of the

Pacific Ocean or Great South Sea, between 24° and 45° of south latitude,

and between 68° 40´ and 74° 20´ of west longitude from Greenwich; but as

its direction is oblique from N.N.E. to S.S.W. between the Andes on the

east and the Pacific Ocean on the west, the middle of its northern

extremity is in 70°, and of its southern termination in about 73° of W.

longitude. Its extreme length therefore is 1260 geographical, or 1450

statute miles; but its breadth varies considerably, as the Andes

approach or recede from the sea. In the more northern parts, between the

latitudes of 24° and 32° S. the average breadth is about two degrees, or

nearly 140 English miles. Its greatest breadth in lat. 37° S. is about

220 miles; whence it grows again narrower, and the continental part of

the country, opposite to the Archipelago of Chiloe, varies from about 50

to 100 miles. These measures are all assumed as between the main ridge

of the Andes and the sea; but in many places these mountains extend from

60 to 100 miles farther towards the east, and, being inhabited by

natives of the same race with the indigenous Chilese, or confederated

with them, that transalpine region may be likewise considered as

belonging to Chili.

Chili is bounded on the north by Peru, whence its lower or plain

country, between the Andes and the Pacific, is divided by the extensive

and arid desert of Atacama. On the east it is separated by the lofty

chain of the southern Andes, from the countries of Tucuman, Cujo, and

Patagonia, on the waters which run towards the Southern Atlantic.

Through these lofty and almost impracticable mountains, there are eight

or nine roads which lead from Chili towards the east, into the vast

plains which depend upon the viceroyalty of La Plata, all of which are

exceedingly difficult and even dangerous. The most frequented of these

roads is that which leads from the province of Aconcagua in Chili to

Cujo, running along the deep ravines of the rivers Chillan and Mendoza,

bordered on one side by deep precipices overhanging these rivers, and on

the other by lofty and almost perpendicular mountains. Both of these

rivers derive their origin from the Alpine vallies of the Andes, the

former running westwards to the Pacific; while the latter takes a much

longer course towards the Southern Atlantic. This road requires at least

eight days journey to get across the mountain range, and is so narrow

and incommodious, that travellers are obliged in many places to quit

their mules and proceed on foot, and every year some loaded mules are

precipitated from this road into the rivers below. In some places the

road passes over agreeable plains among the mountains, and in these the

travellers halt for rest and refreshment. In these vallies, when the

Incas conquered the northern provinces of Chili, before the coming of

the Spaniards, they caused some _tambos_ or stone houses to be

constructed for the accommodation of their officers. Some of these are

ruined but others remain entire, and the Spaniards have built some more

for the convenience of travellers.

On the west side Chili is bounded throughout its whole extent by the

shores of the Pacific Ocean; and on the south it joins with the southern

land usually called the Terra Magellanica, from the name of the

navigator, Magellan or Magelhaens, who first circumnavigated the

continent of South America, and opened the way by sea from the Atlantic

to the Pacific Ocean, through the Straits which are still known by his

name.

Chili may be considered under three natural divisions. The country of

Chili Proper, between the main ridge of the Andes and the sea: The Andes

themselves, from the main ridge eastwards to the plain country of La

Plata, and the Chilese islands. Chili Proper, or that which lies between

the main ridge of the Andes and the Pacific, is usually distinguished

into the Maritime and Midland countries. The Maritime country is

intersected by three chains of hills, running parallel to the Andes,

between which are many fine vallies which are watered by delightful

rivers. The Midland country consists almost entirely of a uniform plain

of considerable elevation, having a few isolated hills interspersed

which add much to its beauty. The Andes, which are among the loftiest

mountains in the world, are mostly about 120 miles from east to west, in

that part of their course which belongs to Chili, consisting of a vast

number of mountains of prodigious height, as if chained together, and

displaying all the beauties and horrors of the most sublime and

picturesque grandeur, abounding everywhere with frightful precipices,

interspersed with many fine vallies and fertile pastures, watered by

numerous streams and rivers which rise in the mountains. Between the

latitudes of 24° and 33° south, the Andes are entirely desert and

uninhabited; but the remainder as far as 45° S. is inhabited by various

tribes or colonies of the Chilese, called Chiquillanes, Pehuenches,

Puelches, and Huilliches, which are commonly known under the general

appellation of Patagonians.

S1. _Chili Proper._

The political divisions of Chili consist of that part which has been

conquered by the Spaniards, and that which still remains independent in

the possession of the natives. The Spanish portion is situated between

the latitudes of 24° and 37° south, and is divided into thirteen

provinces; of which the following is an enumeration, with a short

account of each, beginning on the north, at the desert of Atacama or

frontiers of Peru. In each of these a _corregidor_, or deputy-governor

resides, to whose command the civil and military officers of the

province are subordinate, and on whom the respective cabildos or

municipal magistracies are dependent.

1. _Copaipo_, is bounded on the north by the great desert of Atacama, on

the east by the Andes, on the south by Coquimbo, and on the west by the

Pacific. It is about 300 English miles long by 120 in breath. It

contains the rivers Salado, Juncal, Chineral, Copaipo, Castagno,

Totoral, Quebradaponda, Guasco, and Chollai. This province abounds in

gold, lapis lazuli, sulphur, and fossile salt, which last is found in

almost all the mountains of the Andes on its eastern frontiers. Copaipo

its capital is in lat. 27° 15´ S. and long. 70° 53´ W. The northern part

of this province, beyond the river Juncal is hardly inhabited, except by

hunters of the Vicugnas, which they catch by means of large palisaded

inclosures. Besides lead mines to the north of the river Copaipo, there

are several silver mines in this province, and some sugar is made in the

valley of the Totoral. This province has five ports, at Juncal,

Chineral, Caldera, Copaipo, and Huasca, or Guasco. The chief town,

Copaipo, situated on the river of the same name, contains a parish

church, a convent of the order of Mercy, and a college which formerly

belonged to the Jesuits. The town of San Francisco della Salva, stands

on the same river about sixty miles farther inland.

2. _Coquimbo_, which is divided from Copaipo by the river Huasca or

Guasco, is the next province towards the south. It is accordingly

bounded on the north by Copaipo, on the east by the Andes, on the

south-east by Aconcagua, on the south-west by Quillota, and on the west

by the Pacific. It is about 135 miles from north to south, and 120 from

east to west. Its principal rivers are the Coquimbo, Tongoi, Limari, and

Chuapa. Its capital is called Coquimbo, or _La Serena_, founded in 1544

by Valdivia at the mouth of the river Coquimbo in lat. 29° 53' S long.

71° 12' W. This city is the residence of several ancient and honourable

families, and is situated in a delightful country and charming climate;

such being the mild temperature of the air, that though rain seldom

falls, the surrounding country is continually verdant. This province is

rich in gold, copper, and iron, and its fertile soil produces grapes,

olives, and other fruits in great abundance, both those belonging to

Europe, and such as are natural to the country.

3. _Quillota_, is bounded on the north by Coquimbo, on the east by the

province of Aconcagua, on the south by Melipilla, and on the west by the

sea. Its chief rivers are the Longotoma, Ligua, Aconcagua, and Limache;

and its territory is among the most populous and most abundant in gold

of any in Chili. The capital, called Quillota or San Martin, stands in a

pleasant valley, in lat. 32° 42' S. and long. 71° W. having three

churches dedicated to the saints Dominic, Francis, and Augustine. The

province likewise contains the cities of Plazza, Plazilla, Ingenio,

Cassablanca, and Petorca; which last is very populous, owing to the

resort of great numbers of miners who work in the celebrated gold mines

in the neighbourhood. Valparaiso, or Valparadiso, the most celebrated

and most commercial harbour in Chili is in this province, from whence

all the trade is carried on with Peru and Spain. The harbour is very

capacious, and so deep that large ships can lie close to the shore. Its

convenience for trade, and the salubrity of its climate, have rendered

this a place of considerable resort; so that besides the city, which is

three miles from the port, there is a populous town along the shore of

the harbour, called Almendral, in which those belonging to the shipping

mostly reside. A deputy-governor or corregidor sent directly from Spain

resides here, who has the command of the civil and military officers of

the city, and is only amenable to the president of Chili.

4. _Aconcagua_, is inclosed between the provinces of Coquimbo, Quillota,

Santiago, and the Andes, being entirely inland and communicating with

the sea through the former province, the same rivers belonging to both.

The celebrated silver mines of Uspalata are in the Andes belonging to

this province, which likewise are productive of excellent copper, and

its lower grounds are fertile in grain and fruit. Aconcagua or San

Filippe, the capital, is in lat. 32° 18' S. and long. 69° 55' W.

5. _Melipilla_, is bounded on the north by Quillota, on the east by

Santiago, on the south by the river Maypo dividing it from Rancagua, and

on the west by the Pacific. Its rivers are the Mapocho and Poangue, and

its territory abounds in wine and grain. Melipilla, or San Joseph de

Logronno, on the river Maypo, in lat 33° 36' S long. 70° 42' W. is the

chief town of the province, and is but thinly inhabited, though in a

beautiful situation and fertile country, as most of the principal

proprietors reside in the neighbouring city of St Jago, the capital of

the kingdom.

6. _St Jago_, or _San Jacopo_, is entirely inland, having the province

of Aconcagua on the north, the Andes on the east, the river Maypo to the

south, and Melipilla to the west. This is a small province, being only

45 miles from east to west, and 36 from north to south. Besides the

rivers Mapocho, Colina, and Zampa, with several other beautiful streams,

it contains the lake of Pudaguel which is about nine miles long. This

province is very fertile, producing abundance of grain and wine, with

fine fruits, especially peaches of exquisite flavour and large size. The

inferior mountains of Caren abound in gold, and in the Andes belonging

to this province there are mines of silver. Tin is likewise said to be

found in the province. The beautiful city of St Jago, the capital of the

province and of the kingdom of Chili, which was founded in 1541 by Pedro

de Valdivia, stands in an extensive and beautiful plain, on the left

bank of the river Mapocho, in lat 33° 16' S. long. 69° 48' W. having the

suburbs of Chimba, Cannadilla, and Renca on the opposite side of the

river. Both sides of the river are guarded by stone quay walls of

considerable height to prevent inundations, and a fine bridge connects

the city with its suburbs. St Jago is about 90 miles from the sea, and

about 20 from the foot of the main ridge of the Andes, whose lofty

summits clad in perpetual snow form a fine contract with the continual

verdure of a beautiful surrounding district. The streets are all in

straight lines, thirty-six feet broad, and intersecting each other at

right angles, and every house is amply supplied with excellent water by

means of several aqueducts. The great square is 450 feet in extent on

all its sides, having a bronze fountain in the centre. The north side of

this square is occupied by the palace of the president and the public

offices, beneath which is the prison. On the south side is the palace of

the Conde dell Sierra-bella. The west side is occupied by the cathedral

and the palace of the archbishop; and the east side contains the palaces

of three noblemen. The other most remarkable buildings are the church of

San Domingo, and that formerly belonging to the college of Jesuits.

Though convenient and handsomely built, the private houses are generally

of one story only, on account of frequent earthquakes. On the south side

of the city, from which it is separated by a street called the Cannada,

144 feet broad, is the large suburb of St Isidore. On a hill in the

eastern part of the city, called Santa Lucia, there formerly stood a

fortress to guard against attacks of the Indians. This city contained in

1770 a population of 46,000 inhabitants, which was rapidly increasing.

Besides the cathedral and three other parish churches, there are two

convents of Dominican friars, four of Franciscans, two of Augustins, two

of the order of Mercy, and one belonging to the brothers of Charity,

with an hospital, seven nunneries, a female penitentiary, a foundling

hospital, a college for the nobility formerly under the direction of the

Jesuits, and a Tridentine seminary. It contains also an university, a

mint for coining gold and silver, and barracks for the soldiers who are

maintained as guards to the president and royal audience.

7. _Rancagua_, is bounded on the north by the river Maypo and by the

Chachapoal on the south, by the Andes on the east, and the Pacific on

the west. Besides the former rivers, it is watered by the Codegua and

Chocalan, and some others of less importance; and contains the lakes of

Aculen and Buccalemu, of no great importance. This province is fertile

in grain, and its chief town, Santa Croce di Trianna, otherwise called

Rancagua, is in lat. 34° 18' S. long. 70° 16' W. Near Alque, a town

recently founded about 24 miles nearer the sea, there is a very rich

gold mine.

8. _Calchagua_, between the rivers Chachapoal and Teno, extends from the

Andes to the sea, its breadth from north to south near the Andes being

about 75 miles, while on the coast of the Pacific it does not exceed 40.

Besides the rivers which form its boundaries, its territory is watered

by the Rio Clarillo, Tinguiririca, and Chimbarongo; and in this province

there are two considerable lakes, named Taguatagua and Caguil, the

former being interspersed with beautiful islands, and the latter

abounding with large clamps[50], which, are much esteemed. This

province, which is fertile in grain, wine, and fruits, and abounds in

gold, is part of the territories of the native tribe of the Promaucians,

whose name is said to signify _the people of delight_, so called from

the beauty and fertility of their country. The chief town San Fernando,

built only in 1742, is in lat. 34° 36' S. long. 70° 34' W.

[Footnote 50: Thus expressed by the translator of Molina, and probably

some fresh water shell-fish.--E.]

9. _Maule_, the next province to the south, is bounded on the east by

the Andes, on the south-east by Chillan, on the south-west by Itata, and

on the west by the Pacific. It is about 176 miles from east to west, and

about 120 from north to south where broadest; and is watered by the

Lantue, Rio Claro, Pangue, Lircai, Huenchullami, Maule, Putagan,

Achiguema, Longavi, Loncamilla, Purapel, and other inferior rivers. It

abounds in grain, wine, fruits, gold, salt, cattle, and fish; which last

are found in great quantities both in the sea and rivers. Its native

inhabitants are brave, robust, and warlike, and are principally

descended from the ancient Promaucians. Talca, or St Augustin, built in

1742 among hills near the Rio-claro, at a considerable distance from the

sea, is in lat. 35° 18' S. long. 70° 48' W. Its population is

considerable, owing to the proximity of rich gold mines, and the

abundance and cheapness of provisions supplied by its territory. From

this last circumstance, several noble families from the cities of St

Jago and Conception, whose finances had become diminished, have retired

to this place, which has in consequence been called the bankrupt colony.

There are several other towns in this province, and many villages of the

native Chilese; among these Laro, near the mouth of the river Mataquito,

contains a numerous population of the Promaucian nation, and is governed

by an _Ulmen_ or native chief.

10. _Itata_, situated on the sea-coast, has Maule on the north, Chillan

on the east, Puchacay on the south, and the Pacific on the west. It

measures 60 miles from east to west, and about 33 from north to south,

and is intersected by the river Itata, from which it derives its name.

The best wine of Chili is made in this province, and being produced on

lands belonging to citizens of the city of Conception, is usually known

by the name of Conception wine. Its chief town named Coulemu, or Nombre

de Jesus, stands on the Rio Jesus, in lat. 35° 58' S. long. 72° 38' W.

and was founded in 1743..

11. _Chillan_, bounded on the north, by Maule, by the Andes on the east,

on the south by Huilquilemu, and by Itata on the west, is entirety an

inland province, about the same size with Itata. Its rivers are the

Nuble, Cato, Chillan, Diguillin, and Dannicalquin. Its territory

consists mostly of an elevated plain, particularly favourable for

rearing sheep, which produce wool of a very fine quality. Its capital,

Chillan or San Bartholomeo, in lat. 35° 54' S. long. 71° 30´ W. was

founded in 1580. It has been several times destroyed by the Araucanians,

and was overthrown by an earthquake and inundation in 1751; since which

it has been rebuilt in a more convenient situation, out of danger from

the river.

12. _Puchacay_, is bounded on the north by Itata, on the east by

Huilquilemu, on the south by the river Biobio, and on the west by the

Pacific. It measures 24 miles from north to south, and 60 from east to

west. This province affords a great quantity of gold, and its

strawberries, both wild and cultivated, are the largest in all Chili.

Gualqui, or San Juan, founded in 1754 on the northern shore of the

Biobio, is the residence of the corregidor; but Conception, named Ponco

in the native language, is the principal city of the province, and the

second in the kingdom of Chili. It was founded by Pedro de Valdivia in a

pleasant vale, formed by some beautiful hills, near the coast, in lat.

36° 42' S. long. 73° 4´ W. After suffering severely in the long wars

with the Araucanians, this city was destroyed in 1730 by an earthquake

and inundation of the sea, and again by a similar calamity in 1751; and

was rebuilt in 1764 in a beautiful situation a league from the sea.

Owing to so many calamities, its inhabitants scarcely exceed 13,000, who

are attracted to this place on the frontiers of the warlike Araucanians,

by the great abundance of gold that is procured in its neighbourhood.

The climate is always temperate, the soil is fertile, and the sea

abounds in fish of all kinds. The Bay of Conception is spacious and

safe, extending above ten miles from north to south, and nearly as much

from east to west. Its mouth is protected by a beautiful and fertile

island, called Quiriquina, forming two mouths or entrances to the bay;

that on the north-east called the _bocca grande_ being two miles wide,

and that on the south-west, or _bocca chica_, little more than a mile.

The whole bay affords safe anchorage, and a port at its south-east

extremity called Talcaguano is chiefly frequented by shipping, as being

not far from the new city of Conception.

13. _Huilquilemu_, commonly called Estanzia del Rei, or the royal

possession, has Chillan on the north, the Andes on the east, the river

Biobio on the south, and Puchacay on the west. This district is rich in

gold, and produces an excellent wine resembling muscadel. To protect

this province against the warlike and independent Araucanians, there are

four forts on the north side of the Biobio, named Jumbel, Tucapel, Santa

Barbara, and Puren; and as the boundary line is to the south of that

river, the Spaniards have likewise the forts of Aranco, Colcura, San

Pedro, Santa Joanna, Nascimento, and Angeles beyond that river.

14. _Valdivia._ This province, or military station rather, is entirely

separated from the other possessions of the Spaniards in Chili, being

entirely surrounded by the territories of the Araucanians. It lies on

the sea-coast, on both sides of the river Valdivia or Callacallas, being

reckoned 36 miles from east to west, and 18 miles from north to south.

It abounds in valuable timber, and affords the purest gold of any that

is found in Chili, and produced great quantities of that precious metal

to Valdivia the original conqueror. But owing to many calamities in the

wars with the Araucanians, it is now of little importance except as a

military station. Valdivia, the capital, in lat. 39° 48´ S. long. 73°

24´ W. is situated at the bottom of a beautiful and safe bay, the

entrance to which is protected by the island of Manzera. As this is a

naval station of much importance for protecting the western coast of

South America, it is strongly fortified, and is always commanded by a

military officer of reputation sent directly from Spain, though under

the direction of the president of Chili. He has always a considerable

body of troops, which are officered by the five commanders of the five

castles which protect the city, with a sergeant-major, commissary,

inspector, and several captains.

From the foregoing short abstract of the geographical circumstances of

Chili Proper, or that part of the kingdom which is possessed by the

Spaniards, it appears to extend from the lat. 24° to 37° both south, or

about 900 English miles in length by about 180 miles in medium breadth,

containing about 162,000 square miles of territory or nearly 104

millions of statute acres, mostly of fertile soil, in a temperate and

salubrious climate, abounding in all the necessaries of life, and richly

productive in gold and other metals. Hence this country is calculated to

support a most extensive population, in all the comforts and enjoyments

of civilized society, and if once settled under a regular government,

will probably become at no great distance of time an exceedingly

populous and commercial nation. The islands belonging to Chili consist

principally of the Archipelago of Chiloé, with that of the Chones, which

is dependent upon the former. The largest of these islands, named

likewise Chiloé, is about 120 miles in extent from north to south, and

about 60 miles from east to west. Between it and the main-land is a vast

gulf or bay, which extends from lat. 41° 32´ to 44° 50´ both S. and lies

between the longitudes of 72° 44´ and 74° 20´ both W. This is called the

gulf of Chiloé, Guaiteca, or Elancud; and besides the great island of

Chiloé, contains eighty-two smaller islands, thinly inhabited by Indians

and a few Spaniards. The land in Chiloé, as in all the smaller islands,

is mountainous, and covered by almost impenetrable thickets. The rains

are here excessive and almost continual, so that the inhabitants seldom

have more than fifteen or twenty days of fair weather in autumn, and

hardly do eight days pass at any other season without rain. The

atmosphere is consequently extremely moist, yet salubrious, and the

climate is exceedingly mild and temperate. Owing to the great humidity,

grain and fruits are by no means productive, yet the inhabitants raise

sufficient grain, mostly barley and beans, for their support, and grow

abundance of excellent flax. The town of Castro, on the eastern shore,

in lat. 42° 44´ S. is the capital of the island, and was founded in

1565, by Don Martino Ruiz de Gamboa, and is built entirely of wood,

containing only about a hundred and fifty inhabitants, yet has a parish

church, a church formerly belonging to the Jesuits, and two convents.

The port of Chaco, near the middle of the northern extremity of the

island, in lat. 41° 53´ S. and about the same, longitude with Castro,

has good anchorage, and enjoys the whole trade with Peru and Chili,

which is not subjected to the duties which are paid in other ports of

Spanish America.

Besides the southern Archipelago of Chiloé, there are a few islands of

no great importance on the coast of Chili, not worth notice. The two

islands likewise of Juan Fernandez are considered as dependencies on

Chili. The larger of these, called Isola de Tierra, is at present

inhabited by a few Spaniards, who have a small fort at La Baya or

Cumberland harbour. The smaller island, or Masafuera, otherwise called

De Cabras or Conejos, is uninhabited.

S2. _The Province of Cujo._

Although the province of _Cujo,_ on the east side of the Andes, be not

strictly within the limits of Chili, yet as dependent on the presidency

of that kingdom, it is proper to take notice of it in this place. Cujo

is bounded on the north by the province of Tucuman, on the east by the

Pampas or desert plains of Buenos Ayres, on the south by Patagonia, and

on the west by the southern chain of the Andes. Being comprehended

between the latitudes of 29° and 35° south, it is about 400 miles in

extent from north to south, but its limits towards the east are

uncertain. In temperature and productions, this province differs

materially from Chili. The winter, which is the dry season, is extremely

cold; and the summer is excessively hot both day and night, with

frequent storms of thunder and hail, more especially in its western

parts near the Andes. These storms commonly rise and disperse in the

course of half an hour; after which the sun dries up the moisture in a

few minutes. Owing to this excessive exsiccation, the soil is extremely

arid, and will neither bear trees nor plants of any kind; unless when

irrigated by means of canals, when it produces almost every vegetable in

astonishing abundance. By these artificial means of cultivation, the

fruits and grains of Europe thrive with extraordinary perfection, and

come a month earlier to maturity than in Chili; and the wines produced

in Cujo are very rich and full-bodied.

This province is intersected by three rivers which have their sources in

the Andes, the San Juan, the Mendoza, and the Tunujan. The two former

are named from the cities which are built on their banks. After a course

of from 75 to 90 miles, these rivers form the great lakes of Guanasache,

which extend above 300 miles from north to south, and their waters are

afterwards discharged by the river Tunujan into the south-eastern desert

Pampas. These lakes abound with excellent fish of several kinds, and

they produce a sufficient quantity of salt to supply the whole province

of Cujo. The eastern part of this province, called La Punta, is watered

by the rivers Contaro and Quinto, and several smaller streams, and is

quite different in its climate and temperature from the western part

near the Andes. The plains of La Punta are covered with beautiful trees

of large size, and the natural herbage grows to such a height in many

places as to conceal the horses and other cattle which roam at large in

these extensive plains. Thunder storms are exceedingly violent and

frequent, continuing often for many hours, accompanied by incessant and

immoderate rain.

Among the vegetable productions of Cujo, one of the most remarkable is a

species of palm, which never exceeds eighteen feet high, putting forth

all its branches so near the ground as to conceal the trunk. The leaves

are extraordinarily hard, and terminate in a point as sharp as a sword.

The fruit resembles the cocoa-nut, yet only contains a few hard round

seeds, with no edible kernel. The trunk of this tree is very large, and

is covered by a coarse outer bark of a blackish colour which is easily

detached. Below this, there are five or six successive layers of a

fibrous bark resembling linen cloth. The first is of a yellowish colour,

and of the consistence and appearance of sail-cloth. The others

gradually decrease in thickness, and become whiter and finer; so that

the innermost is white and fine like cambric, but of a looser texture.

The fibres of this natural cloth are strong and flexible, but harsher to

the feel than those made from flax. This province produces great

abundance of the _opuntia_, a species of the _cactus_, which nourishes

the cochineal insect; but the natives are in use to string these insects

on a thread by means of a needle, by which they acquire a blackish tint.

The fruit of this plant is woolly, about the size of a peach, its

internal substance being glutinous and full of small seeds. It is sweet

and well-flavoured, and is easily preserved by cutting into slices which

are dried in the sun. There are four different trees producing a species

of beans; two of which are good eating, the third is employed as

provender for horses, and ink is made from the fourth. The most singular

vegetable production in this country is called _the flower of the air_,

from having no root, and never growing on the ground. Its native

situation is on the surface of an arid rock, or twining round the dry

stem of a tree. This plant consists of a single shoot, like the stem of

a gilly-flower, but its leaves are larger and thicker, and are as hard

as wood. Each stalk produces two or three white transparent flowers, in

size and shape resembling a lily, and equally odoriferous with that

flower. They may be preserved fresh on their stalks for more than two

months, and for several days when plucked off. This plant may be

transported to almost any distance; and will produce flowers annually,

if merely hung up on a nail.

In the northern parts of Cujo there are mines of gold and copper, but

they are not worked owing to the indolence of the inhabitants. It has

also rich mines of lead, sulphur, vitriol, salt, gypsum, and talc or

asbestos. The mountains near the city of Juan are entirely composed of

white marble, in stratified slabs of five or six feet long by six or

seven inches thick, all regularly cut and polished by nature. From this

the inhabitants prepare an excellent lime, which they use in building

bridges over the streams and canals of irrigation. Between the city of

Mendoza and La Punta, on a low range of hills, there is a large stone

pillar, 150 feet high and 12 feet diameter, called the giant, on which

there are certain marks or inscriptions resembling Chinese characters.

Near the Diamond river there is another stone, having marks which appear

to be characters, and the impression of human feet, with the figures of

several animals. The Spaniards call it the stone of St Thomas; from a

tradition handed down from the first settlers, said to have been

received from the native Indians, that a white man with a long beard,

formerly preached a new religion from that stone to their ancestors, and

left the impression of his feet, and the figures of the animals that

came to hear him, as a memorial of his sanctity.

The aboriginal natives of the province of Cujo are called Guarpes, of

whom there are now very few remaining. They are of a lofty stature, very

thin, and of a brown colour, and speak a quite different language from

that of the Chilese. This people was anciently conquered by the

Peruvians, after having taken possession of the northern part of Chili;

and on the road across the Andes from Cujo to Chili, there still are

some small stone buildings, or tambos, which had been erected for the

accommodation of the Peruvian officers and messengers. The first

Spaniards who attempted to reduce this country were sent by Valdivia,

under the command of Francisco de Aguirre, who returned to Chili after

the death of Valdivia. In 1560, Don Garcia de Mendoza sent a force under

Pedro del Castillo, who subdued the Guarpes, and founded the cities of

San Juan and Mendoza. The latter, which is the capital, is situated on a

plain at the foot of the Andes, in lat 33° 54' S. long. 68° 34' W. This

is supposed to contain about 6000 inhabitants, and is continually

increasing in population, owing to its vicinity to the celebrated silver

mine of Uspallatta, which is worked by the inhabitants to great profit.

This city carries on a considerable commerce in wine and fruits with

Buenos Ayres. The city of San Juan near the Andes, in lat. 31° 40' S.

and long. 68° 34' W. is equally populous with Mendoza, from which it is

about 160 miles due north, and trades with Buenos Ayres in brandy,

fruits, and Vicunna skins. Its pomegranates are greatly esteemed in

Chili, to which they are sent across the Andes. This city is governed by

a deputy from the corregidor of Mendoza, assisted by a cabildo. In 1596,

the small city of La Punta, or San Luis de Loyola, was founded in the

eastern part of Cujo, in lat. 33° 47' S. long. 65° 33' W. Although the

thoroughfare for all the trade from Chili and Cujo to Buenos Ayres, it

is a miserable place with scarcely two hundred inhabitants; but its

jurisdiction is extensive and populous, and is administered both in

civil and military affairs by a deputy of the corregidor of Mendoza.

Besides these three cities, the province of Cujo contains the towns of

Jachal, Vallofertil, Mogna, Corocorto, Leonsito, Caliogarta, and

Pismanta[51], which do not merit particular attention.

[Footnote 51: Besides these, modern maps insert the following, beginning

in the north. Betlen, Rioja la Nueva, Mutinan, San Juan de Jaeban,

Guanachoca, all to the north of Mendoza.--E.]

The Patagonians who border upon Cujo towards the south, and of whose

gigantic stature so much has been said, do not differ materially in this

respect from other men. The Pojas, one of their tribes, are governed by

several petty independent princes. A singular species of polygamy

prevails among this people, as the women are permitted to have several

husbands. As to the Cesari, of whom such wonderful stories have been

reported, and who are supposed to be neighbours of the Chilese, they

have no existence except in the fancies of those who take pleasure in

marvellous stories.

* * * * *

S3. _The Indian Country, or Araucania._

That part of Chili which remains unconquered reaches from the river

Biobio in the north to the Archipelago of Chiloe in the south, or

between the latitudes of 37° and 42' S. This country is inhabited by

three independent nations, the Araucanians, the Cunches, and the

Huìllìches. The territory of the Araucanians, contains the finest plains

in Chili, and is situated between the rivers Biobio and Callacallas,

stretching along the sea-coast for about 186 miles, and is generally

allowed to be the most pleasant and fertile district in the kingdom of

Chili. Its extent from the sea to the foot of the Andes, was formerly

reckoned at 300 miles; but as the Puelches, a nation inhabiting the

western side of the mountains, joined the confederacy of the Araucanians

in the seventeenth century, its present breadth cannot be less than 420

miles, and the whole territory is estimated at 78,120 square miles or

nearly 50 millions of acres.

The Araucanians derive their name from the province of Arauco, the

smallest in their territory, but which has given name to the whole

nation, as having been the first to propose the union which has so long

subsisted among the tribes, or from having at some remote period reduced

them under its dominion. Enthusiastically attached to their

independence, they pride themselves on the name of _auca_, signifying

_freemen_[52]; and by the Spaniards who were sent from the army in

Flanders to serve in Chili, this country has been called Araucanian

Flanders, or the invincible state. Though the Araucanians do not exceed

the ordinary height of mankind, they are in general muscular, robust,

well proportioned, and of a martial appearance. Their complexion is of a

reddish brown, but clearer than the other natives of America, except

the tribe named Boroanes, who are fair and ruddy. They have round

faces, small eyes full of animated expression, a rather flat nose, a

handsome mouth, even white teeth, muscular and well shaped legs, and

small flat feet. Like the Tartars, they have hardly any beard, and they

carefully pluck out any little that appears, calling the Europeans

_longbeards,_ by way of reproach. The hair on their heads is thick,

black, and coarse, is allowed to grow very long, and is worn in tresses

wound around their heads. The women are delicately formed, and many of

them are very handsome, especially the Boroanes. They are generally long

lived, and are not subject to the infirmities of age till a late period

of life, seldom even beginning to grow grey till sixty or severity, or

to be wrinkled till fourscore. They are intrepid, animated, ardent,

patient of fatigue, enthusiastically attached to liberty, and ever ready

to sacrifice their lives for their country, jealous of their honour,

courteous, hospitable, faithful to their engagements, grateful for

services, and generous and humane to their vanquished enemies. Yet these

noble qualities are obscured by the vices which are inseparable from

their half savage state, unrefined by literature or cultivation: Being

presumptuous, entertaining a haughty contempt for other nations, and

much addicted to drunkenness and debauchery.

[Footnote 52: According to Falkner the missionary, _auca_ is a name of

reproach given them by the Spaniards, signifying rebels or wild men;

_aucani_ is to rebel or make a riot, and _auca-cahual_ signifies a wild

horse.--This may be the case in the language of the subjected Peruvians

and northern Chilese, while in that of the independent Araucanians it

may signify _free_; just as republican is an honourable term in the

United States, while it is a name of reproach under a monarchical

government.--E.]

Their dress is manufactured from the wool of the vicunna, and consists

of a shirt, vest, short close breeches, and a cloak or poncho, having an

opening in the middle to admit the head, which descends all round as low

as the knees. This cloak, which leaves the arms at liberty, and can be

thrown back at pleasure, is so convenient for riding, and so excellent a

protection from wind and rain, that it is now commonly adopted by the

Spanish inhabitants of Chili, Peru, and Paraguay. The shirt, vest, and

breeches, are always of a greenish blue, or turquois colour, which is

the uniform of the nation. Among persons of ordinary rank, the _poncho_,

or native cloak, is also of the same national colour; but those of the

higher classes have it of different colours, as white, red, or blue,

with stripes a span broad, on which figures of flowers and animals are

wrought in different colours with much ingenuity, and the borders are

ornamented with handsome fringes. Some of these _ponchos_ are of so fine

a texture and richly ornamented as to sell for 100 or even 150 dollars.

Their only head-dress is a fillet or bandage of embroidered wool, which

they ornament in time of war with a number of beautiful feathers. Round

the waist they wear a long sash or girdle of woollen, handsomely

wrought; and persons of rank have leather sandals, and woollen boots,

but the common people are always bare-footed.

The dress of the women is entirely of wool, and the national greenish

blue colour, consisting of a tunic or gown without sleeves reaching to

the feet, fastened at the shoulder by silver buckles, and girt round the

waist by a girdle; over which gown they wear a short cloak, which is

fastened before by a silver buckle. They wear their hair in several long

braided tresses, flowing negligently over their shoulders, and decorate

their heads with false emeralds and a variety of trinkets. They wear

square ear-rings of silver, and have necklaces and bracelets of

glass-beads, and silver rings on all their fingers.

Like all the other tribes in Chili, before the arrival of the Spaniards,

the Araucanians still continue to construct their houses or huts rather

of a square form, of wood plaistered with clay, and covered with rushes,

though some use a species of bricks; and as they are all polygamists,

the size of their houses is proportioned to the number of women they are

able to maintain. The interior of their houses is very simple, and the

furniture calculated only to serve the most necessary purposes, without

any view to luxury or splendour. They never form towns, but live in

scattered villages along the banks of rivers, or in plains that can be

easily irrigated.

The whole country of the Araucanian confederacy is divided into four

principalities, called _Uthal-mapu_ in their language, which run

parallel to each other from north to south. These are respectively named

_Lauquen-mapu_, or the maritime country; _Lelbun-mapu_, or the plain

country; _Inapire-mapu_, or country at the foot of the Andes; and

_Pire-mapu_, or the country on the Andes. Each principality or

Uthal-mapu is divided into five provinces, called _Ailla-regue_; and

each province into nine districts, termed _regue._ Hence the whole

country contains 4 _Uthal-mapus_, 20 _Ailla-regues_, and 180 _Regues_.

Besides these, the country of the _Cunches_, who are in alliance with

the Araucanians, extends along the coast between Valdivia and the

archipelago of Chiloe; and the _Huilliches_, likewise allies of the

Araucanians, occupy all the plains to the eastward, between the Cunches

and the main ridge of the Andes.

The civil government is a kind of aristocratic republic, under three

orders of hereditary nobility, each subordinate to the other. Each of

the four _Uthal-mapus_ is governed by a _Toqui_. The _Ailla-regues_, are

each under the command of an _Apo-ulmen_; and every one of the _Regues_

is ruled by an _Ulmen_. The four _toquis_ are independent of each other,

but are confederated for the public welfare. The _Apo-ulmens_ govern the

provinces under the controul or superintendence of the respective

_toquis_; and the _ulmens_ of the _regues_ are dependent on the

Apo-ulmens, or arch-ulmens. This dependence is however almost entirely

confined to military affairs. The distinguishing badge of the toqui is a

kind of battle-axe, made of marble or porpyhry. The Apo-ulmens and

Ulmens carry staves with silver heads; the former being distinguished by

the addition of a silver ring round the middle of their staves. The

toqui has only the shadow of sovereign authority, as every question of

importance is decided by an assembly of the great body of nobles, which

is called _Buta-coyog_ or _Auca-coyog_ the great council, or the

Araucanian council. This assembly is usually held in some large plain,

on the summons of the toquis; and on such occasions, like the ancient

Germans as described by Tacitus, they unite the pleasures of revelling

and even drunkenness with their deliberations. By their traditionary

laws, called _Ad-mapu_ or customs of the country, two or more

principalities, provinces, or districts cannot be held by the same

chief. Whenever the male line of the ruling family becomes extinct, the

vassals have the right to elect their own chief; and all the districts

are directed entirely in civil matters by their respective Ulmens. The

people are subject to no contributions or personal services whatever,

except in time of war; so that all the chiefs of every rank or degree

have to subsist on the produce of their own possessions.

The military government is established upon a system of wonderful

regularity. When the great council determines on going to war, they

proceed immediately to elect a commander-in-chief, who is in some

measure the dictator of the country during his continuance in office.

The toquis have in course the first claim to this high dignity, as being

the hereditary generals and stadtholders of the republic; yet,

disregarding all respect for superior rank, the council often entrusts

this supreme power to the most deserving of the Ulmens, or even to an

officer of an inferior class, considering only on this occasion the

talents that are deemed necessary for command. Thus in the war of 1722,

the supreme command was confided to Vilumilla, a man of low origin, and

in that which terminated in 1773, to Curignanca, the younger son of an

Ulmen in the province of Encol. On his elevation to office, the

generalissimo of the republic assumes the title of _toqui_, and the

stone hatchet in token of supreme command; on which the four hereditary

toquis lay aside theirs, as it is not permitted them to carry this

ensign of authority during the continuance of the dictator in office, to

whom all the toquis apo-ulmens and ulmens take the oath of obedience.

Even the people, who during peace are exceedingly repugnant to

subordination, are now entirely submissive to the commands of the

military dictator. Yet he has not the power of putting any one to death,

without the consent of his principal officers; but as all these are of

his appointment, his orders are next to absolute.

It has always happened since the arrival of the Spaniards in Chili, that

the supreme toquis have been elected from among the natives of the

provinces of Arauco, Tucapel, Encol, or Puren; but I know not whether

this may be owing to some ancient law or agreement, or to some

superstitious notion. The supreme toqui appoints his vice-toqui or

lieutenant-general, and the other officers of his staff; who in their

turn nominate the inferior officers. The vice-toqui is almost always

elected from among the Puelches, to gratify the ambition of that valiant

tribe, which forms about a fourth part of the population of the

confederacy. At present the army of the Araucanians is composed both of

cavalry and infantry. Originally it consisted entirely of foot; but in

their first battles with the Spaniards, perceiving the vast advantage

derived by their enemies from the employment of cavalry, they soon

applied themselves to procure a good breed of horses; insomuch that in

1568, only seventeen years after their first encountering the Spaniards,

they had several squadrons of cavalry; and by the year 1585, the

Araucanian cavalry was regularly organized by the toqui Cadeguala. The

infantry is divided into regiments of a thousand men, and these into ten

companies of an hundred men each. The cavalry is divided in a similar

manner; but the numbers in the regiments and troops are not always the

same. Each body of horse and foot has its particular standard; but all

bear a star, which is the national device. The soldiers are not clothed

in uniforms, but all have cuirasses of hardened leather below their

ordinary dresses, with shields and helmets of the same material. The

cavalry are armed with swords and lances; and the infantry with pikes or

clubs pointed with iron. In battle, the cavalry is distributed on the

two wings of the army, while the infantry forms the centre or main body,

divided into its several battalions or regiments, the ranks being

composed alternately of pikemen and soldiers armed with clubs or maces.

The right wing is confided to the vice-toqui, and the left to an

experienced officer next in rank; while the toqui is present wherever

occasion requires, and exhorts his soldiers to fight valiantly for the

liberties of the nation. They formerly employed bows and slings in war;

but taught by experience to avoid the destructive effects of musquetry

in distant fight, they are now eager to close with their enemies.

Impressed with the opinion that to die in battle for their country is

the greatest honour that can be acquired, whenever the signal for battle

is given, they advance with the utmost rapidity, despising the slaughter

produced by the cannon and musquetry, yet preserving the strictest order

and discipline, and often succeed in bearing down the firmest array of

the Spaniards.

One of the first measures of the national council, when war is resolved

upon, is to dispatch messengers to the confederate tribes, and even to

the Indians who live under the Spanish government, to summon them to

make common cause with their countrymen. The credentials of these

messengers are some small arrows tied together by a red string, the

symbol of blood. But if hostilities have been already commenced, the

finger of a slain enemy accompanies the arrows. This embassy is called

_pulchitum_, which signifies to run the arrow, and the messengers are

called _guerquenis_. The toqui or military dictator directs what number

of soldiers is to be furnished by each Uthal-mapu or principality. The

particular toquis regulate the contingencies of the Apo-ulmens; and

these last apportion these among the several Ulmens of their provinces.

The army of the state usually consists of five or six thousand men;

besides which, a body of reserve is always in readiness for particular

occasions, or to replace those who may be killed in battle. Before

taking the field, the general assigns three days for consultation with

his principal officers, during which the plan of the campaign is

maturely deliberated upon, and every one has liberty to offer his

opinion: But the general finally settles the plan of warfare in secret

consultation, with his principal officers. After all is agreed upon, the

army commences its march to the sound of drums, and is always preceded

by several advanced parties, to guard against surprise. During the

march, the infantry as well as the cavalry are on horseback; but on

coming to action, the infantry dismounts and is regularly marshalled in

companies and battalions. All the soldiers have to provide their own

horses arms and provisions; and as all are liable to military service,

no one has to contribute towards the supply of the army. Their

provisions consist chiefly in a small sack of parched meal, which each

soldier carries on his horse; and which, diluted with water, serves them

as food till they can live at free quarters in the enemys country. Being

thus unencumbered with baggage, they are able to move with astonishing

celerity, either to attack or to retreat as may be necessary. They are

extremely vigilant when in presence of the enemy, encamping always in

secure and advantageous situations, strengthening their posts with

entrenchments, and placing sentinels on all sides, every soldier being

obliged during the night to keep a fire burning in front of his tent.

When necessary they protect their posts and encampments with deep

trenches, guarded by abatis or hedges of spinous or thorny trees, and

strew calthrops at all the avenues to repress attacks from the cavalry

of the enemy. In short there are few military stratagems with which they

are unacquainted, and are wonderfully expert in tactics [53].

[Footnote 53: From the singular excellence of the military institutions

of the Araucanians, by which they have been enabled to preserve their

liberties against the superior arms of the Spaniards, down even to the

present day, we have been induced to extend these observations much

beyond our usual limits on such occasions. Such as are inclined to

inquire more minutely into the civil institutions of this wonderful

people, will find them detailed in the work of the Abbé Molina, together

with a minute account of the natural productions of Chili.--E.]

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