THE GERMAN ENIGMA[22]
[22] Georges Bourdon, "L'Enigme Allemande," Librairie Plon,
Paris.
I.
The present investigation into Franco-German relations conducted on
behalf of the _Figaro_ is the work of one of the ablest publicists of
modern France. It is the work of a good European who wishes to put an
end to the senseless competition in armaments, and to the
international distrust and nervousness which are the main causes of
such armaments. The book is also the work of a good Frenchman who
realizes that no settlement can be durable which does not safeguard
the sacred rights of the conquered peoples of Alsace-Lorraine, who are
the first victims of outraged justice. There lies the originality of
the book. It reveals the new direction which public opinion and
political thought are taking in contemporary France. The whole
question of the relations between France and Germany is lifted to a
higher plane. We hear no more of the humiliation of France, of her
pride and dignity, of rancour and revenge. We hear less of the balance
of military force. The main question which is raised is a question of
moral principle and of international right.
II.
The work of Monsieur Bourdon is not only a good book; it is also a
brave deed. Too long has it been the fashion for French publicists to
entrench themselves behind Gambetta's phrase: "N'en parler jamais, y
penser toujours!" Silence may have been the best policy on the morrow
of the catastrophe of 1870, when one single indiscretion might have
set Europe aflame. But after forty-four years, and under entirely
altered conditions, an ostrich policy of reticence, a cowardly policy
of mental reservation, cannot be the best means of bringing about a
settlement.
Monsieur Bourdon has therefore chosen the bolder course, which happens
also to be the wiser course. He has broken down the barrier of fear
and distrust. He has taken the first step. He has gone to Germany in a
spirit of frankness and conciliation. He has tried to get at her
thoughts and afterthoughts. He has cross-examined the German people,
and he has cross-examined them with consummate tact and skill. An
unofficial ambassador of peace, he has revealed all the qualities of a
diplomat, and he has added qualities which the diplomat does not often
possess--outspokenness and uprightness, a loyal regard for truth, and
that moral preoccupation and that delicate sense of international
honour which are generally alien to the official diplomatic mind.
III.
And the result of this searching inquiry is most satisfactory. Quite
apart from the value of the opinions expressed, and of the author's
own opinion, the inquiry in itself is an historical document of prime
importance. Here we have before us at first hand the public opinion of
Germany. Nor is it the irresponsible opinion of anonymous scribblers,
or the opinion of party politicians; it is the deliberate, reasoned
opinion of some of the most distinguished German readers in thought
and action. Statesmen and diplomats, captains of industry and army
captains, editors and financiers, all the professions except the
Church (a significant omission!), are represented in this survey of
German opinion. After reading M. Bourdon's book, no politician will
henceforth be allowed to plead as an excuse that he does not know what
official and unofficial Germany thinks, and what she feels on the
vital questions of foreign policy.
IV.
And perhaps the readers may carry away the impression that Germany
feels more than she thinks; that she is carried away by prejudice, by
currents and cross-currents of emotion, rather than led by general
principles and clear and sober thinking. I had asked one of the most
eminent British publicists living to write an introduction to the
English translation of M. Bourdon's book which is to be published next
month by Messrs. Dent. But my friend answered that he would willingly
have written such an introduction if he could have agreed with the
ideas of the French writer. Unfortunately, he did not see his way to
agree with Monsieur Bourdon. No purpose, he argued, could be served by
cross-examining German opinion, for there was no German opinion. In
vain did Monsieur Bourdon claim to tell us what Germany thinks; the
Germans were not educated to think politically. And there was the rub.
There was no organized public opinion, and even if there were, it
could only express itself, it could not press its demands upon a
despotic Government.
V.
I do not here examine how much truth there may be in my friend's
contention. But one fact must certainly strike the readers of M.
Bourdon's book. The present position is as ominous as it is
bewildering and unintelligible.
Monsieur Bourdon has proved once more the tremendous power of German
militarism. German militarism seems to be bred in the bone of the
Prussians, and has been inoculated into the German people. The army is
the most popular service in the country. It provides an honourable
career to tens of thousands of young men of the middle classes and of
the aristocracy. At the same time, Monsieur Bourdon points out that
from the German point of view it is one thing to be militarist, and
another to be warlike and bellicose. The Germans hold that the most
confirmed militarist may be a convinced pacifist. The father of
Frederick the Great, the greatest militarist of the Hohenzollern
Dynasty, the Sergeant-King, was so attached to his army that he never
employed it in active warfare, he never allowed it to fight a single
battle, for fear of losing or spoiling so perfect an instrument.
But even granting this paradoxical thesis of the pacifism of German
militarists, the situation remains sufficiently contradictory and
distracting to the ordinary mind. Every representative German
consulted by Monsieur Bourdon proclaims that Germany is pacific, that
she wishes for peace, and that she needs peace for her industrial and
commercial expansion. Yet we see her making gigantic preparations for
a possible war. With a restless endeavour, and at tremendous cost, we
see her developing her warlike resources. Every representative German
insists on making platonic professions. Yet we do not hear of a single
statesman daring to take the necessary step or to make the necessary
sacrifices. No one seems to understand that peace demands sacrifices
quite as heroic as war. No Bismarck of peace seems to be strong enough
to-day to put an end to the senseless waste of national resources and
misdirected energies.
VI.
The "German Enigma" of Monsieur Bourdon is mainly an objective,
impartial, and impersonal study, and the author has been careful not
to obtrude his own private views. It is only in the last chapter that
he attempts to draw the lesson and point out the conclusion of his own
inquiry. And his conclusion is an eloquent though restrained plea for
a Franco-German _rapprochement_, and in favour of the only policy
which will bring about that reconciliation. France, he argues, does
not want a revision of the Treaty of Frankfurt. She does not want
compensation or revenge. French history contains a sufficiently
brilliant roll of glorious military achievements that the French
people may afford to forget the reverses and humiliations of 1870. A
French statesman, on the eve of the Treaty of Frankfurt, made the
rhetorical statement that France would never surrender one stone of
her fortresses nor one inch of her territory. Animated by a very
different spirit, modern French statesmen do not claim back to-day one
inch of lost territory. All that the French people demand is that the
claims of justice shall be heard, that Alsace-Lorraine shall cease to
groan under the heel of an arbitrary despot, that Alsace-Lorraine
shall be governed according to her own laws, that the Alsatians shall
be treated as a free people, and not as conquered subjects.
VII.
And that one sole possibly solution is also the only simple solution.
That solution would involve no sacrifice of pride or dignity to either
nation. France would not make any surrender to Germany, and Germany
would not make any concession to France. Both would surrender to the
demands of international justice.
And the solution of the autonomy of Alsace-Lorraine would be in the
interests of all parties concerned, as well as of European
civilization. France and Germany would be delivered from a nightmare
which for forty-four years has paralyzed their activities. One hundred
and ten millions of the two most progressive nations of the Continent
would cease to oppose each other in every quarter of the globe.
Alsace-Lorraine would cease to be the festering wound on the open
frontier of the two countries, but would once more discharge her
historical function of being the connecting link between Latin and
Teutonic peoples.
And the whole of Europe would be delivered from the crushing burden of
military expenditure. Hundreds of millions at present wasted on
armaments would be devoted to productive purposes. Commerce and
industry would receive an impetus which in one generation would renew
the face of Europe. Reaction would collapse with the disappearance of
military predominance, and European Governments could devote
themselves whole-heartedly to the anxious problems clamouring for a
solution, and to the momentous tasks of popular education and social
reform which are waiting to be accomplished.