The result of the earnest and efficient work of all departments of the
Palma administration, in spite of the fact that the employes had much to
learn, and that mistakes were unavoidably made, was that Cuba began
almost immediately to establish herself as a nation worthy of
consideration, and respected among the other nations of the world. Her
commerce and industries were started for the first time on a stable
basis, and the general feeling of confidence, not only in the natural
resources of the island, but in the protection that had been promised
Cuba by her sister republic on the north, all tended to start the new
republic along the right lines. In a very short time after reciprocity
with the United States was secured funds began to accumulate in the
treasury, and by the end of the first Palma administration over
$20,000,000 had accrued to the credit of the country, and a large amount
of constructive work had been undertaken in various parts of the island.
Yet more than $4,000,000 had been spent on public works, and every
village with 25 children had a school.
It was the accumulation of this money in the treasury, and the rapid
success along commercial and other lines that seemed to attend the
republic during President Palma's administration, that served to excite
desire and envy among the more or less restless and unscrupulous
elements, who did not form a part of the Palma government. Some of these
outsiders were men of much ability, and many of them were excellent
orators. All of them were familiar with the methods in Latin American
republics of securing control of the government through revolution,
force and violence. It was then that parties began to be formed,
although these were divided into many groups, each surrounding its own
political hero, who, in these days, was necessarily a man with a
supposed military record. They eventually resolved themselves into two
groups, the Moderado, who were in many respects the parents of the
present Conservative party now in power under President Menocal, and the
Liberal, under the leadership of Dr. Alfredo Zayas, an able lawyer and a
shrewd political leader.
During the Palma administration and especially at the beginning of the
electoral campaign of 1905, another aspirant for presidential honors
suddenly appeared in the person of General José Miguel Gomez, a man with
no very brilliant record as a soldier, although he had taken part in the
Ten Years' War, but who had a strong local following as Governor, under
President Palma, of the Province of Santa Clara. General Gomez was an
astute, clever, farseeing, active politician, with a considerable degree
of originality and ability. Another man intimately connected with the
history of Cuba was Gomez's chief clerk when Governor of the Province of
Santa Clara, Orestes Ferrara, a gentleman of Italian birth, of somewhat
reckless tendencies, who emerged from the War of Independence as a Cuban
patriot, and was recognized as such by the Liberal party. Mr. Ferrara
was a lawyer, a writer, a finely educated diplomat and an excellent
speaker. All of these qualities succeeded in making him an important
factor in influencing the destinies of the republic in its early days.
During the first years of the Palma administration, the Moderado and
Liberal parties gradually shaped themselves into the present
Conservative and Liberal parties; organizations which differ in
political methods rather than in principles; if by principles we mean
fundamental doctrines of political economy or statecraft, such as form
the issues of division between parties in most other countries. They
also differ largely in personnel. Throughout the agricultural regions
the Conservatives prevail. That is because farmers, large and small,
care little for office holding but do care a great deal for that
tranquillity of the country which is essential to progress and
prosperity. They have a material stake in the country's welfare, which
is conserved by constitutional order rather than by revolution. On the
other hand, in the cities may be found the great strength of the Liberal
party; composed of men who own no real estate, and many of whom have no
business or steady occupation of any kind, who have nothing to lose from
economic and social disturbance but on the contrary may gain something
by getting into public employment through a change of government. Such
men are numerous in all cities of all countries, and they become the
facile followers of designing and unscrupulous politicians. In the
United States such men are described as "feeding at the public crib." In
Cuba the corresponding phrase, equally expressive, is "nursing at the
public bottle"--epitomised in the one word, "botella."
It is not to be inferred that all Cuban Liberals are of this class, or
that Conservatives are universally men of substance; but the dominant
elements of the two parties are such as we have described. The restless
and irresponsible Liberal masses have for leaders men of unquestioned
ability, but unfortunately too often of more personal ambition of a
sordid kind than sense of moral responsibility or sincere devotion to
their country's best interests. It will thus be seen that on more than
one occasion men who were intellectually qualified to serve the Republic
in the most efficient manner prostituted their talents to catering to
the passions of the ignorant and idle, and made tools of them for their
own selfish advancement, to the great detriment and greater menace of
the Republic. In this deplorable state of affairs have been the main
springs of most of the troubles which the young Republic has thus far
suffered in its political and governmental affairs.
The Conservative party is confined very largely to the owners of
property, men of good reputation and business standing. In other words,
it consists of men who have nothing to gain through a revolution, and
everything to lose during a period of upheaval which means destruction,
not alone of actual property, but of the assets of the country,
especially its credit and standing in the markets of the world. Small
holders of property in the country districts, farmers, merchants,
planters and stock raisers, are naturally allied with the Conservative
party, or the party of law and order, as are the owners of the big sugar
estates and the mills in which the staples are produced, since the cane
fields become an immediate prey of those elements who wish to depose the
government or bring about an intervention, through which they sometimes
gain in the confusion that follows a change of government. To this party
belong the majority of the professional men, the old Autonomistas, and
those men who have a genuine interest in the welfare of Cuba, not only
in her present, but in her future, and who realize that uprisings,
strikes and all allied movements tend naturally to discourage
investments in property, and to destroy credit and the good name of the
island.
Such, then, in general terms, was the development of political parties
in Cuba which occurred as soon as it was realized that it was worth
while to have them. As long as Cuba was under Spanish domination, there
was no use in parties. So long as there was doubt concerning the
intentions of the United States in Cuba, there was little encouragement
to their formation. But the moment the Stars and Stripes actually went
down from the Palace and from the Morro, the great fact dawned upon the
Cuban mind that what many had scarcely dared to expect or to hope for
was actually achieved. Cuba was independent. For that reason her
political controversies were thereafter to be domestic, and there was
opportunity, even perhaps desirability, of division of the population
into parties.
This indeed was well, in principle. There is nothing more stimulating to
citizenship or more conducive to good government in a republic than a
healthful and amicable division of the citizens into parties, on grounds
of principle. In a monarchy, the opposition party is one of protest and
revolt. In a republic both parties are devoted to the governmental
system, and differ only as to the principles of economics or what not on
which it should be conducted. The lamentable feature of the Cuban case
was that--chiefly, no doubt, because of antecedent conditions, because
of centuries of ruthless repression of all national or civic
aspirations--there had been no development of theories and principles of
government to serve as bases for party division. It could not be said,
for example, that this party was for a protective tariff and that one
was for free trade, that one was for state rights and the other for
national sovereignty. Such distinctions did not exist, and party
divisions without them were therefore on less creditable lines. We have
said that there were no questions of principle. But there was one
supreme question of principle, on which after all the division was made.
But that was a question to which there was only one side for a worthy
political party to take.
At the beginning of Estrada Palma's administration, as we have
indicated, he was not identified with any political party. He was
broad-minded, and conceived himself to be not the leader of a party but
the chief executive of the whole Cuban nation. He selected for his
Cabinet the men whom he thought best fitted for the places, regardless
of their political affiliations. He would probably have been glad to go
through his entire administration as a non-partisan President, occupying
in that respect a position similar to that of a constitutional
sovereign, who traditionally "has no politics." Indeed, he maintained
this independent and impartial attitude until the spring of 1905. Then
he found it impossible to get measures passed by Congress, which he
wanted and which the country needed, unless he affiliated with party
leaders. The result was that he practically associated himself with the
Moderados, or Conservatives as they are now known. This of course gave
great umbrage to the Liberals, which was greatly increased when some of
that party were removed from office because of their unsatisfactory
service and their places were filled with Conservatives. And this was
the beginning of the Liberal insurrection which led to the resignation
and death of Estrada Palma.
In the last days of President Palma's first term of office it was
discovered that José Miguel Gomez had Presidential aspirations. He not
only stated to the Moderate or Conservative party that he wanted to be
President of the Republic of Cuba, but he declared that he proposed to
succeed President Palma as such. This privilege was refused him on the
ground that the President, owing to his fair administration of the
government during the four years of his service, was entitled to a
second term. To this argument, General Gomez replied that if the
Conservative party to which he had pretended to belong would not make
him its Presidential nominee, he would go to the opposition and seek the
nomination. This he at once proceeded to do, and with the assistance of
Mr. Ferrara he persuaded the Liberals that, controlling the votes of the
Province of Santa Clara, he held the balance of power. He also prevailed
upon Dr. Alfredo Zayas to retire as a Presidential candidate, and to
acquiesce in his running for election on the Liberal ticket; promising
at the same time that, no matter what the result of the election might
be, Dr. Zayas should have the nomination and his support four years
afterward. It is interesting to observe that this promise was never
fully kept, and that the two Liberal leaders have ever since been bitter
enemies.
The Presidential nominees of the two parties, in November, 1906, on the
part of the Conservatives, were Estrada Palma, the President of Cuba,
and on the part of the Liberals, José Miguel Gomez, ex-leader of the
Moderados of the Province of Santa Clara. The Liberals, a few days
before the election, feeling apparently that it would go against them,
began the old tactics so prevalent in some South American republics, and
practised by Maso's followers in 1901, of proclaiming proposed election
frauds on the part of their opponents, then in control of the
government, and predicting all manner of illegal practices and
intimidation.
At ten o'clock on the morning of election day, telegrams, announcements,
and orders from Liberal leaders were posted at all voting places in the
various cities and country districts, directing members of that party
to keep away from the polls, on the ground that the election frauds
which had been arranged by the Conservatives could not possibly be
overcome, and that the correct thing to do was to refuse to vote, as a
protest against the government in power. These were obviously issued
with a view of discrediting in advance an election which the Liberals
could not hope to win. The Conservatives, of course, voted, and, as
might be expected under those circumstances, the Palma government
succeeded itself, with a few changes in the Cabinet, and everything
seemed to promise well for the future.
Within a year, however, threats of coming trouble, whispers of
discontent, and reports of incipient uprisings could be heard in the
cafés and public resorts throughout the island, and the agents of the
secret service warned President Palma that a serious crisis was
impending. This the President refused to credit, staging that there
could be no possible reason for a revolution. The island was prosperous,
work was plentiful for all who cared to labor; there were no conditions
present to justify a revolution or uprising, and suspicions of anything
of the kind must therefore be unjustified. In spite of President Palma's
confidence, however, the plotting went on almost openly. His confidence
in the people was known to all the Liberals, and they took advantage of
it. The first real outbreak occurred before the slightest preparation
had been made to deal with it. One night in the month of July, 1905, a
group of thirty armed men suddenly appeared at the barracks of the Rural
Guards, shot a dozen of them to death as they lay sleeping on their
cots, seized their arms, ammunition and horses, and fled into the
country, shouting the cry of "Revolution against the Palma government!"
General Alejandro Rodriguez, a tried veteran of the War of
Independence, and chief of the Rural Guards, gave an immediate order
that they should be captured, dead or alive, and before ten o'clock the
next morning nearly all of them had been taken and confined in the jails
of Havana, where afterwards they were tried and convicted. These men in
their defense claimed that the president of the Senate, Señor Moru
Delgado, a prominent Liberal leader, had promised to meet them at
daylight, on the morning of the assassination, with a body of three
hundred armed and mounted Liberals, who were to start a revolution
against President Palma; but did not fulfill his promise. The men who
had been convicted were permitted to remain in jail until, as is too
often the custom in some Latin American countries, they were freed by a
general amnesty bill which had been forced through Congress by the
Liberal party. The tendency to revolt against the Palma government
apparently subsided with the arrest of these first disturbers, but,
during the following January, 1906, reports of trouble in the extreme
western portion of the island came to the notice of the officials. The
leader was Pino Guerra, who, through his popularity as an accordion
player at country dances, had secured election to the House of
Representatives; and who with his taste for games of chance, at which he
was generally unlucky, had got into debt to the amount of $7,000. His
creditors in these debts were persistent, and this fact was given by him
in a letter to General Fernando Freyre de Andrade, President of the
House of Representatives, as an excuse for the revolution which he
started. Pino Guerra indeed intimated that if someone would extend to
him a little personal loan of $7,000 he would refrain from causing any
trouble to the government. General Freyre de Andrade, being a politician
who believed in compromise and that even a poor end would justify the
means, suggested to Guerra that he knew of $3,000 that had been
appropriated for some purpose and not used, which might possibly be
turned over, if his creditors would take it on account. "General"
Guerra, as he called himself, consulted with his creditors, and they
concluded to accept the offer, if they could get the cash. So the embryo
revolutionist was conducted to the presence of the President, where the
whole matter was explained by General Freyre de Andrade. To their
surprise, President Palma promptly refused to have any of the treasury
funds used to buy--or to pay blackmail to--a revolutionist. So "General"
Guerra retired to nurse his resentment and to plan mischief; until some
six weeks later when he started the uprising that was locally known as
"Mr. Taft's picnic," because the leaders asserted that the capturing of
the Palma government would be nothing more than a picnic, and assured
Mr. Taft on his arrival to straighten out affairs that they really had
not intended to assassinate President Palma, although three or four
distinct plots had been made for that purpose; that they only meant to
capture him, put him on the government yacht, and carry him to some
remote part of the country and give him just a "pleasant picnic."
[Illustration: THE PRESIDENT'S HOME
The new Presidential Palace, which replaces in its functions the old
home of the Spanish Governors, is of striking architecture and
impressive size, affording ample room for many other functions than the
mere housing of the President and his family; and in completeness of its
appointments and beauty of its furnishings and internal decorations must
rank among the finest official residences in the world.]
President Palma was repeatedly warned by the secret service, of which
Pepe Jerez Varona was the chief, that serious trouble was coming through
the propaganda of the Liberal party whose leaders had taken the position
that the late election had been fraudulent and that the Liberals had
been prevented from casting their votes, which they said was sufficient
excuse for the uprising that was imminent. Local bands of the so-called
"Constitutional Army" soon began to make their appearance throughout the
central districts of the island. Each of these was headed by some
prominent Liberal chieftain; among others, those at Havana by General
Loinaz Castillo, in Pinar del Rio by Pino Guerra, and in Santa Clara by
Orestes Ferrara, afterward President of the House of Representatives.
The real promoters, instigators, and chiefs of the movement were General
José Miguel Gomez, afterward President of the Republic; Carlos Garcia,
later Minister to England; and Juan Gualberto Gomez, the trusted agent
of Alfredo Zayas and leader of the negro Liberals of the island.
Convincing proofs, in the form of documents over the signatures of these
men, were found showing their treason to the republic. They did not
actually lead the insurgent bands, because they were arrested and
imprisoned just as they were setting out to do so. President Palma was
advised that they should be tried and executed, but he protested against
the courts taking such action, on the ground that he could not bring
himself to sanction the execution of men, some of whom had in former
days been his companions in arms.
In the meantime, the revolutionary force swept through various parts of
the island, seizing horses, mules, beef cattle and produce, breaking
open groceries and general stores, helping themselves to anything that
suited their fancy, occasionally giving in exchange what was known as
_vale_, or a receipt, to the owner, and if the owner happened to be an
able bodied man, they usually compelled him to join the so-called
"Constitutional Army." Congress at that time happened to have a Liberal
majority, and it refused to consider or vote upon the budget of the
coming year, thus practically compelling President Palma to use as the
basis of expenditures the budget of the preceding year. The Liberals
boasted that they had thus compelled the President technically to
violate the Constitution, and that they were therefore justified in
calling themselves the Constitutional Party and in forcing him out of
the Presidency.
The Cuban republic at this time had an armed force of about two thousand
men, scattered throughout the island. These were the Rural Guards, and
they were efficient, and as a rule loyal to the Palma government; but
they were not sufficient in number to protect the sugar estates, and
other properties. As before, President Palma refused, until the last
moment, to believe that a serious uprising or revolution against his
government was possible, on the ground that Cuba, although a young
republic, had been very prosperous, that money was plentiful, that work
was abundant for any man who cared to occupy himself, and that there was
no real reason that would justify or cause a revolution. He cited the
history and motives of previous revolutions in Cuba, and of those that
had occurred in many other countries, insisting that this uprising could
not be serious, and that the people of Cuba would not support it.
Unfortunately he was not a politician. He had lived too many years in
the safe and sane atmosphere of the United States, and did not realize
the intense desire on the part of some of the people in Latin American
countries to get into office, regardless of their qualifications or the
means employed to accomplish their sordid purposes.
All of this resulted in a sad lack of preparation. President Palma's
Secretary of Finance, Colonel Ernesto Fonts-Sterling, and General Rafael
Montalvo, Secretary of Public Works, realized the threatening dangers
and urged immediate action; and finally against the President's will,
twenty machine guns were ordered from the United States, and shipped to
Cuba, together with 1,000,000 rounds of ammunition. A call for
volunteers was then issued, and in response numerous Americans from
various parts of the island, and others from Texas, New Mexico and
Arizona, in company with patriots of Cuba, came immediately to the side
of the government. But the masses of the Cubans were very tired of war,
and manifested a peculiar reluctance to assume responsibility, and to
act in line with their consciences and best judgment, wherefore the call
was not highly successful. Fourteen hundred veterans of the War of
Independence, under the command of General Pedro Betancourt, of
Matanzas, made response, and presented themselves in Havana for orders.
A machine gun corps was formed, the gunners composed largely of
Americans who had seen service in the war on the Mexican border, and who
soon became excellent marksmen. Many of President Palma's counsellors
urged immediate action to suppress the revolution with a firm hand. But
he hesitated too long, hoping that some other way out of the difficulty
would be discovered.
In this emergency the United States Consul General, Mr. Frank Steinhart,
suggested to President Palma that he should request the assistance of
the United States, and urged that a commission of military men be sent
from Washington, backed by a certain display of naval or military force
sufficient to discourage the revolution and to convince the Liberal
leaders that further wanton destruction of property would not be
tolerated. Mr. Steinhart also assured him that he would see to it that
such a commission would come with a full understanding of the situation,
and with the power and spirit to assist him in maintaining peace and
order. President Palma made this request to which the United States
promptly responded by sending the gunboat _Bancroft_, and a company of
marines who immediately came ashore at Havana. Following the _Bancroft_
came other steamers, one of which brought the Secretary of War, William
H. Taft, Robert Bacon, Assistant Secretary of State, and Major-General
Frederick Funston, with several of his aides.
In fuller explanation of these circumstances some official
correspondence may pertinently be cited. On September 8, 1906, Consul
General Steinhart sent the following confidential telegram to the State
Department:
"Secretary of State, Cuba, has requested me, in name of President Palma,
to ask President Roosevelt to send immediately two vessels; one to
Havana and other to Cienfuegos; they must come at once. Government
forces are unable to quell revolution. The government is unable to
protect lives and property. President Palma will convene Congress next
Friday, and Congress will ask for our forcible intervention. It must be
kept secret and confidential that Palma asked for vessels. No one here
except President, Secretary of State and myself know about it. Very
anxiously awaiting reply."
The State Department at Washington replied to this on September 10th:
"Your cable received. Two ships have been sent, due to arrive Wednesday.
The President directs me to state that perhaps you had not yourself
appreciated the reluctance with which this country would intervene.
President Palma should be informed that in the public opinion here it
would have a most damaging effect for intervention to be undertaken
until the Cuban government has exhausted every effort in a serious
attempt to put down the insurrection and has made this fact evident to
the world. At present the impression certainly would be that there was
no real popular support of the Cuban government, or else that the
government was hopelessly weak. As conditions are at this moment we are
not prepared to say what shape the intervention should take. It is, of
course, a very serious matter to undertake forcible intervention, and
before going into it we should have to be absolutely certain of the
equities of the case and of the needs of the situation. Meanwhile we
assume that every effort is being made by the Government to come to a
working agreement which will secure peace with the insurrectos, provided
they are unable to hold their own with them in the field. Until such
efforts have been made, we are not prepared to consider the question of
intervention at all."
On September 10, Consul-General Steinhart cabled again:
"Your cable received and directly communicated to the President, who
asks ships remain for a considerable time to give security to foreigners
in the island of Cuba and says that he will do as much as possible with
his forces to put down the insurrection, but if unable to conquer or
compromise, Cuban Congress will indicate kind of intervention desirable.
He appreciates reluctance on our part to intervene, especially in view
of Secretary Root's recent statements. Few, however, understand Cuban
situation, and a less number are able to appreciate same. This, of
course, without any reference to superior authority. Palma applied
public funds in public work and public education, and not in purchase of
war materials. Insurrectionists for a considerable time prepared for
present condition, hence government's apparent weakness at the
commencement. Yesterday's defeat of rebels gives Government hope.
Attempts useless from start."
On September 12, Consul-General Steinhart again cabled.
"Secretary of State the Republic of Cuba at 3:40 to-day delivered to me
memorandum in his own handwriting, a translation of which follows, and
is transmitted notwithstanding the previous secret instructions on the
subject. The rebellion is increasing in Provinces of Santa Clara, Habana
and Pinar del Rio, and Cuban Government has no elements to contend with
it, to defend the towns and prevent the rebels from destroying property.
President Estrada Palma asks for American intervention and begs
President Roosevelt to send to Habana with the greatest secrecy and
rapidity 2,000 or 3,000 men to avoid any catastrophe in the capital. The
intervention asked for should not be made public until American troops
are in Habana. The situation is grave and any delay may produce massacre
of citizens in Habana."
The next day, Mr. Steinhart again cabled:
"President Palma, the Republic of Cuba, through me officially asked for
American intervention because he can not prevent rebels from entering
cities and burning property. It is doubtful whether quorum when Congress
assembles next Friday, tomorrow. President Palma has irrevocably
resolved to resign and to deliver the government of Cuba to the
representative whom the President of the United States will designate,
as soon as sufficient American troops are landed in Cuba. This act on
the part of President Palma to save his country from complete anarchy
and imperative intervention come immediately. It may be necessary to
land force of _Denver_ to protect American property. About 8,000 rebels
outside Habana. Cienfuegos also at mercy of rebels. Three sugar
plantations destroyed. Foregoing all resolved in Palace."
On September 14, Consul-General Steinhart finally cabled:
"President Palma has resolved not to continue at head of the government,
and is ready to present his resignation even though present disturbances
should cease at once. The Vice President has resolved not to accept the
office. Cabinet ministers have declared that they will previously
resign. Under these conditions it is impossible that Congress will meet
for the lack of a proper person to convoke same to designate new
President. The consequences will be the absence of legal power, and
therefore the prevailing state of anarchy will continue unless
government of the United States will adopt measures necessary to avoid
this danger."
On that day President Roosevelt wrote to Robert Bacon, the Assistant
Secretary of State, enclosing a letter to Senor Gonzalo de Quesada, the
Cuban minister to the United States for publication in the public press,
in which he begged the Cuban patriots to band together, to sink all
differences and personal ambitions, and to rescue the island from the
anarchy of civil war; closing the letter as follows:
"I am sending to Habana the Secretary of War, Mr. Taft, and the
Assistant Secretary of State, Mr. Bacon, as special representatives of
this Government, who will render such aid as is possible toward these
ends. I had hoped that Mr. Root, the Secretary of State, could have
stopped in Habana on his return from South America, but the seeming
imminence of the crisis forbids further delay."
Messrs. Taft and Bacon reached Cuba on September 19, 1906. Before
leaving the ship they were informed that the Secretary of State and
Justice of President Palma's cabinet would call at their convenience.
They invited him on board at once and had a short talk with him. They
were informed that immediately on publication of the President's
message, President Palma had directed a cessation of hostilities on the
part of the government forces, and that the insurgents had done
likewise. Messrs. Taft and Bacon then called upon President Palma. They
told him that they regarded themselves as intermediaries and Peace
Commissioners, and did not wish to negotiate with rebels in arms without
his permission. He suggested that negotiations be conducted between the
two political parties, rather than between himself and the insurgents,
and suggested that the Vice-President, Mendez Capote, for the Moderate
party, and Senator Alfredo Zayas, head of the Liberal party, be the
negotiators. He added that General Menocal on behalf of the veterans of
the War of Independence had previously attempted, on September 8, to
bring about a compromise, but without avail.
[Illustration: William H. Taft]
President Palma told Mr. Taft very earnestly and somewhat pathetically
of his efforts to teach his people the knowledge of good government
gained from his twenty years of residence in the United States, and his
association with the American people, and called attention to his
successful handling of Cuban finances, to the economy of expenditures of
his government, to the fact that he had at all times encouraged the
investment of foreign capital, and to the prosperity of his four years
as President. He deplored what he regarded as a lack of patriotism on
the part of the leaders of the insurrection, and cited a number of
instances to prove that they were actuated by motives of greed and
desire for office. His demeanor was dignified and earnest, and what he
said made a deep impression.
The Americans then went to the home of the American Minister at
Marianao, a suburb of Havana, where the insurgents had outposts just
across the bridge, about 1,000 yards from the minister's house. There
they conferred, as President Palma had suggested, with Señors Capote and
Zayas, with the Secretary of Government, General Rafael Montalvo, who
had charge of mobilizing the forces of the government; with General
Rodriguez, and with the American Consul General, Mr. Steinhart, who had
been eight years in the island, understood its conditions, and spoke its
language.
It was explained to Mr. Taft that some of the leaders of the revolution
had been apprehended, and at present were incarcerated in the
penitentiary, but that they could be summoned to the home of the
American Minister, if he so desired. He did desire it, and the Liberal
leaders were brought from their prison. They included Jose Miguel Gomez,
Gualberto Gomez, Carlos Garcia, and others of the group. Senator Alfredo
Zayas remained present, and when Mr. Taft asked for a statement from the
prisoners regarding the causes of the revolution and their purposes and
demands, he acted as counsel and spokesman. Dr. Zayas stated that the
election of the President and his government had been absolutely
fraudulent; that armed soldiers had prevented the approach of the
Liberals to the polls; that they had absolute proof that the votes would
never be counted but that the whole proceeding would be a farce, and
that, as a protest against such frauds and miscarriage of justice, they
had deliberately refrained from going to the polls after ten o'clock in
the morning; that the results of the election had been absurd and
ridiculous; that the Liberals were greatly in the majority in the
island, "as every one knew," and that the government, as constituted,
was an imposition on the people, weak, inefficient and corrupt. He added
that he and his compatriots wanted nothing more than that which they
were in a position to enforce, and which they would have enforced had it
not been for the suspension of hostilities which had been acquiesced in
by the Liberals only out of deference to Mr. Taft and his commission.
In other words, Dr. Zayas stated that they wished the immediate
resignation of President Palma, his cabinet, and all members of Congress
who had secured their seats at the last election; and he intimated that
the judges of the courts who had been appointed by the Conservative
party were corrupt and incompetent, and should be replaced by better
men. In fact, they demanded the removal of the entire administration,
and the annulment of the results of the last election.
Against this Mr. Taft protested, stating that Dr. Zayas's suggestions
were decidedly radical; that so far as Estrada Palma was concerned, he
had been elected with at least the moral support of the United States
government; that Washington knew and trusted him and had every reason to
believe him a thoroughly honest man; and that he could not consent to
any move so sweeping as that which Dr. Zayas suggested. Dr. Zayas
immediately withdrew his objection to President Palma, stating that, on
second thought, his retention as President would preserve the republican
form of government, and save the island from a political change that
should be avoided if possible. Therefore, Mr. Palma was more than
welcome to remain as President of the Republic; but every other
condition expressed with reference to Congress, the cabinet and the
courts, must be enforced, and at once. That was the ultimatum given to
Mr. Taft by the leaders of the Liberals.
This ultimatum was conveyed at once to President Palma, together with
the intimation that it was a bad mess all around, and that, since a
force variously estimated at between twelve and twenty thousand men
surrounded the City of Havana, and property was in danger, and since
Orestes Ferrara had already notified the commission that if the demands
were not acquiesced in, three of the large sugar plantations in the
neighborhood of Cienfuegos would be given over to the torch at daylight
the next morning, it was probably best to yield to the demands of the
Liberals, and practically to let them have their way, in the interest of
peace, brotherhood and conservation of the rights of property.
This astounding and unworthy attitude on the part of the Commission
deeply hurt President Palma, who had with good cause expected not only
its moral aid but probably also the military support of the armed force
that came to Cuba, at least as long as the policy of his government
could be justified. This mental attitude was not however indicated by
any word that came from his lips. With unmoved dignity he bowed in
uncomplaining acquiescence, and said that he entirely understood the
situation; that Mr. Taft would receive his resignation as President, by
word of mouth and in writing, as quickly as it could be dictated to his
secretary; and that he would retire at once from the Presidency of Cuba.
Against this action Mr. Taft protested, though he himself had obviously
made it necessary, and explained that arrangements had been made, at his
suggestion, in which Dr. Zayas as leader of the Liberals had acquiesced,
to the effect that Mr. Palma should remain as President of the Republic,
although the Liberals demanded the expulsion of all other members of
the administration. President Palma thanked Mr. Taft for his expression
of faith in him personally, but absolutely refused to consider the
withdrawal of his resignation, stating with impregnable logic, which Mr.
Taft could not refute, that if his cabinet, his Congress and his courts
were fraudulent, or held their positions illegally, he himself, having
been elected at the same time, and in the same manner, was not the real
President of Cuba. Therefore, he refused to remain longer in office. He
added with punctilious courtesy that he would take the liberty of eating
his supper in the palace with his family, since it was prepared, but he
would not remain within its walls another day.
When this attitude of the President was communicated to the members of
the Cuban Congress, a meeting was at once called, at which, after a
great deal of animated discussion, a joint committee was appointed,
consisting of twenty-four men, to wait upon and expostulate with
President Palma, but after several hours of pleading, they were
unsuccessful in persuading him to change his mind.
So came the fall of the Palma government, whereupon Secretary Taft
assumed complete charge and control of the affairs of the Cuban
Republic. The insurgent leaders signed a formal agreement to surrender,
in which they promised to restore to their owners the horses and other
property which they had seized, though as a matter of fact none of them
did so; since, for good measure, perhaps, Mr. Taft through military
decree gave to the rebels an absolute deed of ownership of the horses
they had stolen from the stables and fields of their rightful owners. It
took them nearly two weeks to disarm and disperse. Then Mr. Taft issued
a proclamation granting "a full and complete amnesty and pardon to all
persons who have directly or indirectly participated in the recent
insurrection in Cuba, or who have given aid or comfort to persons
participating therein, for offenses political in their nature and
committed in the course of the insurrection and prior to disbandment."
This amnesty, he added, was to be "considered and construed as covering
offenses of rebellion, sedition or conspiracy to commit the same, and
other related offenses."
Finally, Mr. Taft announced on October 13 the turning over of the
government of the island, with the full power which he himself had
exercised, to Mr. Charles E. Magoon, and on that same date Mr. Magoon
accepted and was installed in the office, thus beginning the second
Government of Intervention. The general feeling of Cubans at that time
was divided. The pessimistic elements rather suspected that the United
States, having been called there a second time, might never leave. On
the other hand, the thinking class, and those who had experienced the
United States government and its various administrations in Cuba,
especially under General Leonard Wood, were confident that it was only a
temporary régime that circumstances had made necessary, and they hoped
that out of it much good would come.
Thus ended the most pathetic and tragic incident in the history of the
Cuban Republic, and the one which was on the whole most discreditable to
the United States. Nothing could have been more deplorable than that a
statesman of the great ability, the lofty ideals and especially the
generally judicial mind of Mr. Taft should thus weakly and illogically
have yielded to a vile conspiracy, manifested through lawless threats
and unproved clamor, against a Chief of State who in validity of title,
in purity of character, in unselfish devotion to the public good, and in
potential efficiency of enlightened administrationship, was not
unworthy to be ranked even in the same category with the great President
under whom Mr. Taft himself held his commission.
Estrada Palma, according to Mr. Taft's intimation, had erred. History
will forever record that he erred chiefly if not solely in assuming, in
his own transparent integrity, that other men were as honest as himself.
He was, his enemies asserted, weak. But intelligence and justice must
discern and declare that his only weakness was in an over-confidence in
the people to whose service he had given all the best of his life and in
whose loyalty and support he imagined that he could securely trust. He
could not, in the greatness of his own soul, bring himself to believe it
possible for men, for men calling themselves Cuban patriots, to do such
things as those which Jose Miguel Gomez and Alfredo Zayas and Orestes
Ferrara and their coparceners did. He was not moved by weakness, but by
a desire to protect Cuba from the ravages of sordid revolution and from
the unscrupulous exploitation of bushwhacking bandits, and to preserve
for the Cuban people and their Republic the good name which had been so
fairly and as he thought fully established during the years of his first
administration. His place in the annals of Cuba is secure. His rank
among the constitutional executives of the world is enviably high. There
has been in Cuba or elsewhere no more honest administration than his,
and none that more intelligently, unselfishly and untiringly strove to
fulfil its every duty to the state. Its untimely fall is not to be
charged against any subjective fault of its own, but to the unscrupulous
malice of sordid foes, the apathy of the people in whom too great
confidence had been reposed, and to the inexplicable betrayal by those
who should have supported and protected it but who instead consented to
its destruction.