CHAPTER XI

The supreme work of the Government of Intervention, from the political

point of view, was to prepare Cuba for complete self-government and then

to relinquish the control of the island to its own people. It was with

that end in view that General Wood filled all possible offices with

Cubans. It was also to the same end that the municipal election was held

in June, 1900, under a new election law. Soon after that election there

came a call for another, of vastly greater importance. On July 25, 1900,

the President of the United States authorized General Wood as Military

Governor of Cuba to issue a call for the election of a Cuban

Constitutional Convention, which should be representative of the Cuban

people and which should prepare the fundamental law of the independent

insular government which was about to be erected.

General Wood issued the call, fixing September 15 as the date of the

election. This call repeated and reaffirmed the Congressional

declaration of April 20, 1898, concerning the purpose of the United

States not to annex Cuba but to "leave the government and control of the

island to its people." It also called upon the people of Cuba, through

their Constitutional Convention, not only to frame and adopt a

Constitution, but also, "as a part thereof, to provide for and agree

with the Government of the United States upon the relations to exist

between that government and the Government of Cuba." That was a most

significant thing. It made it quite clear that the United States

expected and intended that some special relations should exist between

the two countries, apart from those ordinarily provided in treaties.

Comment, criticism and protest were provoked; some temperate, some

intemperate. Most of the unfavorable comments, and by far the most

severe, came from the United States and were obviously animated by

political hostility to the President. In Cuba the chief objection was

based upon the ground that the island was thus required to do something

through a Constitutional Convention which that body was not intended to

do but which should be done by the diplomatic department of the

government; and also to put into the Constitution something which did

not belong there but which should be determined in a treaty. In this

there was obviously much logical and moral force, and that fact was

appreciated by General Wood, and by the government at Washington, with

the result that assurances were presently given that the order would be

satisfactorily modified. On the strength of this assurance, which was

given in undoubted good faith, Cubans generally prepared for the coming

election and for the great work which lay beyond it. They had been so

disturbed by the original form of the order that many had declared that

they would not participate in the election or serve as delegates to the

Convention. The promise of modification mollified them, and thereafter

all went smoothly and auspiciously.

The call for the election was issued on August 11. The qualifications

for suffrage which were prescribed were the same as those in the

preceding municipal election, and were generally accepted as fair and

just. The election was held on September 15, and it passed off in very

much the same fashion as its predecessor. Only a moderate degree of

popular interest was manifested in it, and the vote cast was not a

large one. The candidates were divided among the three parties already

mentioned, but all save one were elected from the two radical

organizations, the Nationals and the Republicans. Just one, Senor Eliseo

Giberga, of Matanzas province, was returned by the Conservative Union

Democrats. There were a few charges of fraud, but they were vague and

general in terms and were not formulated nor pressed, and in the main

the result of the polling was accepted in good part. The number of

delegates from each province had been prescribed in the call for the

election. The roll of the convention comprised the names of many of the

foremost members of the Cuban nation, distinguished in war, in

statecraft and in science, and was well representative of all parts and

parties of the island.

The convention met for the first time on November 5, 1900, at two

o'clock in the afternoon. All the delegates were present, and a great

multitude of the people gathered in and about the palace to witness the

spectacle and to pay honor to the occasion. They were not alone from the

capital, but from all parts of Cuba. Every province and almost every

important municipality was represented. Expectant optimism prevailed.

There was only one note of uncertainty. That was concerning the promised

modification of the order concerning relations with the United States.

The modification had not yet been announced. There were a few who began

to doubt whether it would ever be; but most put faith in the Military

Governor and were sure that he would keep his word.

He did. At the appointed moment, when all were assembled, General Wood

called the Convention to order and addressed it briefly.

"It will," he said, "be your duty, first, to frame and adopt a

Constitution for Cuba, and when that has been done, to formulate what,

in your opinion, ought to be the relations between Cuba and the United

States. The Constitution must be adequate to secure a stable, orderly

and free government. When you have formulated the relations which, in

your opinion, ought to exist between Cuba and the United States, the

Government of the United States will doubtless take such action on its

part as shall lead to a final and authoritative agreement between the

people of the two countries to the promotion of their common good." He

also reminded the Convention that it had no authority to take any part

in the existing government of the island, or to do anything more than

was prescribed in the order for its assembling. In thus speaking he was

in fact reading to the Convention official instructions from Washington;

in which the order concerning Cuban and American relations was

materially modified. There was nothing in the revised version about

making the agreement a part of the Constitution. The Convention was

merely to express its opinion on the subject, to serve as a basis for

further negotiations. General Wood emphasized this point distinctly, and

it was received with entire satisfaction by the Convention and by the

public.

Having thus delivered to the Convention its instructions and having

expressed his personal good will and wishes for its success, General

Wood retired and the Convention was left to its own counsels and

devices. Thereupon Pedro Llorente, the oldest of the delegates, took the

chair by common consent as temporary president, and Enrique Villuendas,

the youngest delegate, similarly occupied the desk of the secretary. A

fitting oath of office was administered to all by the Chief Justice of

the Supreme Court of the island; containing a formal renunciation of

all other citizenship and allegiance than Cuban, because several

delegates had become naturalized citizens of the United States and it

was necessary for them thus to resume their status as Cubans. On the

principle that "What was good enough for us when we were struggling in

the field is good enough for us here," the rules of the Cuban

Revolutionary Congress were adopted to govern the Convention. Finally

Domingo Mendez Capote was elected permanent President of the Convention,

and Alfredo Zayas and Enrique Villuendas permanent Secretaries.

There followed the usual experience of such bodies: Divided counsels,

cross purposes, and what not; all gradually working together toward a

common end. A few public sessions were held, at which there was more

speechmaking than work, but after a few weeks private sessions and a

great deal of committee work became the rule. There was no division on

party lines, and there was a lack of dominant leadership; both favorable

circumstances. Much attention was given to studying and analyzing the

constitutions of all other republics in the world, in order to learn

their good features and to avoid their errors and weaknesses. The

constitution of the United States was of course among those studied, but

rather less regard was paid to it than to others, for two reasons. One

was, a desire to avoid even the appearance of making Cuba a mere

appanage to or imitation of its northern neighbor, and the other was the

very practical thought that the constitutions of Latin republics might

be better suited to the Latin republic of Cuba than that of an

Anglo-Saxon republic.

By January 21 the Constitution was drafted in form sufficiently complete

to permit it to be read to the whole convention in a public session,

and thereafter there were daily discussions of its various provisions.

Differences of opinion ranged from mere verbal form to the substance of

the most momentous principles. There was a characteristic passage of

verbal arms over a phrase in the preamble. That paragraph after stating

the purpose of the Convention and of the Constitution, closed by

"invoking the favor of God." When this was read the venerable Salvador

Cisneros, formerly President of the Republic, moved that the phrase be

stricken out. Manuel Sanguilly made a long and dramatic speech, arguing

with much passion that it really did not matter whether the phrase were

included or not, but that it would best be left in, because that might

please some and could hurt nobody. Then the dean of the convention,

Pedro Llorente, made an impassioned appeal for the retention of the

words, to prove to the world that the Cubans were not a nation of

infidels and atheists. In the end the phrase was retained.

Another animated debate arose over the question of religious freedom and

the relations of church and state, which was ended by the adoption of an

article guaranteeing freedom and equality for all forms of religion that

were in accord with "Christian morality and public order," and decreeing

separation of church and state and forbidding the subsidizing of any

church. The question of suffrage was intensely controversial. There were

those who dreaded the result of giving the ballot to tens of thousands

of ignorant and illiterate men. Yet to disfranchise them would mean thus

to debar thousands who had fought for Cuban independence in the late

war, and it was not unreasonably feared that it would also cause

dissatisfaction and resentment which would culminate in disorder and

insurrection. In the end universal equal suffrage was adopted.

The most bitter debate of all, however, was over the qualifications of

the President of the Republic. A strong and persistent effort was made

to imitate the Constitution of the United States by requiring him to be

a native citizen. But that would have debarred Maximo Gomez, who was

born in Santo Domingo. For that reason the proposed restriction was

passionately opposed by all the friends of Gomez, and also by many who

were not his friends and who would have opposed his candidacy for the

Presidency but who felt that it would be disgraceful to put such a

slight upon the gallant old hero of the two wars. On the other hand, the

restriction was urged chiefly for that very reason, that it would debar

Gomez; for, idolized as he was by the great mass of the Cuban people, he

had a number of unrelenting enemies, especially among these politicians

whom he had opposed and overruled in the matter of the Cuban Assembly

and the payment of soldiers at the end of the war. After several days of

acrimonious discussion the friends of Gomez won by a narrow margin, and

the offensive proposal was rejected.

There were many other controversial points, less personal and more

worthy of debate in such a gathering on bases not of personality but of

principle. The governmental powers of the Provinces gave rise to debates

resembling those over state rights in America. The recognition of Cuban

debts was a momentous matter. The method of electing Senators was also

much discussed, as was the principle which the Military Administration

had adopted of having the state and not the provinces or municipalities

control public education. The right of the government to expel

objectionable aliens was the theme of a long and spirited discussion.

With all the animation, sentiment and rhetoric in which Latin debaters

and orators more freely indulge than do the more phlegmatic

Anglo-Saxons, all of these questions were very seriously considered

according to their merits, and were disposed of on that same basis.

There was no haste, and there was no undue delay; while everything was

done "decently and in order." It took the Federal Convention of the

United States four months of secret sessions to frame its Constitution,

and its career was marked with many violent scenes, including the

withdrawal of the representatives of one of the chief states from the

Convention. The Cuban Convention had no incidents so unpleasant as that,

and it completed its work in three months and a half.

[Illustration: AURELIA CASTILLO DE GONZALEZ

Aurelia Castillo de Gonzalez, poet and essayist, was born in Camaguey in

1842, spent much time in European travel, and then settled in Havana.

She first attracted literary attention by her elegy on "El Lugareno" in

1866, and since that time has been an incessant contributor to Cuban

literature in verse and prose. She is the author of a fine study of the

Life and Works of Gertrudis Gomez de Avellaneda, of a volume of fables,

and a number of satires. Her complete works (to date) were published in

five volumes in 1913.]

February 21, 1901 was the crowning day. Ten days before the draft of the

Constitution, as yet unsigned, had been published in pamphlet form. On

the date named the Convention was to give it validity by signing it. The

public was admitted to view the scene, the consuls of foreign powers

were in attendance as specially invited guests, and a fine military band

discoursed patriotic and classical music. The Constitution, finally

engrossed, was read aloud, and then one by one the delegates marched up

to the President's desk and affixed their signatures. When the last name

was written, all stood while the band played the national anthem of

Cuba. The President of the Convention, Mendez Capote, made a graceful

address of congratulation and good wishes; and the Convention adjourned,

its work well ended.

We have said that at the opening session, immediately after his

introductory address, the American Military Governor left the hall. He

did not revisit it, and neither he nor any American officer was ever

present at any meeting of the Convention; nor was any American

representative present at the closing function of the signing of the

Constitution. The purpose of that abstention was obvious. It was to

avoid so much as the appearance or the suspicion of American meddling or

dictation in the work of the Convention. General Wood had told the

Convention that it had nothing to do with his government of the island.

Conversely he wished to show that he and his government had nothing to

do with the work of the Convention.

The Constitution thus auspiciously brought into existence declares Cuba

to be a sovereign republic. The powers of government are much more

centralized than those in the United States. The six Provinces have no

such rights as have the states of America, though they have a liberal

measure of local governmental power. They are not states or provinces,

however, but mere departments--fractions of the whole instead of

integral units. Each has a Governor and an elected Assembly. So each

city and town has a mayor and a council. Municipalities have the power

to levy taxes for local needs. The control of railroads and telegraphs

is a national function, and the judicial system is also national. There

is freedom of speech, of press and of worship. No prisoner may be held

longer than twenty-four hours without judicial process. Congress

consists of a Senate and a House of Representatives. There are six

Senators from each department, elected by the municipalities for six

years, one third retiring every two years. Representatives are elected

from districts by the people for four years, there being one member to

every 25,000 inhabitants. Senators and Representatives must be

twenty-five years old, and if not native citizens must have been

naturalized eight years. The President and Vice-President are elected

for four years by the people through electoral colleges, with a

provision for minority representation, each citizen voting for only

two-thirds of the number of electors to which his district is entitled.

Justices of the Supreme Court are appointed for life by the President

with the ratification of the Senate. The civil law and constitutional

guarantees can be suspended in case of emergency only by Congress when

it is in session, but by the President when Congress is not in session.

The House of Representatives may impeach the President, when the Senate

may suspend him from office, try him, and upon conviction remove him

permanently. Amendments of the Constitution must be voted by two-thirds

of both Houses and ratified by a popular convention specially called for

the purpose.

There can be no question that this was a highly creditable production,

and one which amply merited the qualified approval which was given to it

by Elihu Root, Secretary of War of the United States, when he said: "I

do not fully agree with the wisdom of some of the provisions of this

Constitution. But it provides for a republican form of government; it

was adopted after long and patient consideration and discussion; it

represents the views of the delegates elected by the people of Cuba;

and it contains no features which would justify the assertion that a

government organized under it will not be one to which the United States

may properly transfer the obligations for the protection of life and

property under international law, assumed in the Treaty of Paris."

The first part of the Convention's work was thus done. There remained

the second part, the expression of Cuban opinion as to what ought to be

the relations between that island and the United States. Over this a

most unfortunate controversy arose, chiefly provoked and fomented,

however, not by Cubans but by the partisan enemies of the President of

the United States and of his policy, who did not scruple to intrigue

against him in the affairs of foreign lands. It will be recalled that

this hatred of him, provoked largely because of his insistence on

fulfilling the pledge of Cuban freedom instead of seeking to serve

certain sordid interests by forcibly annexing the island, culminated in

the assassination of President McKinley at the incitement of his

political foes. The opposition to him and to his policy in Cuba was

continued unabated against his successor, President Roosevelt; and it

was most unfortunate for both countries that the establishment of Cuban

self-government and the determination of her relations to her northern

neighbor, had to be effected in such circumstances.

The United States government had to deal on the one hand with those who

insisted that it should have no more special relations with Cuba than

any other country had; and on the other with those who demanded the

repudiation of the Congressional pledge and the forcible annexation of

the island. In those circumstances it was not strange that many Cubans

were disinclined to make any such arrangement as had been required in

the call for the Convention. They recalled that the United States had

declared that "Cuba is of right and ought to be free and independent,"

and they were not disposed to look beyond that declaration.

Three considerations were too much overlooked on both sides, save by the

thoughtful American and Cuban statesmen who finally solved the problem.

One was that the United States had for nearly a century exercised a

certain degree of protection or supervision over Cuba. It had repeatedly

forbidden European powers to meddle with the island, and had for many

years guaranteed and protected Spain in her possession of it. It was

held to be only reasonable that a similar degree of interest should be

maintained in the island in its independent status. The second point was

that in the Treaty of Paris in 1898 the United States had incurred a

certain moral if not a legal responsibility for the future of Cuba. The

third was the much less specific yet by no means negligible

consideration that the United States had intervened in Cuba to put an

end to conditions which had become intolerably offensive to it, and it

was therefore equitably entitled to take all proper precautions against

a recurrence of such conditions.

In pursuance of the requirements of the call for the Convention, then,

immediately after the signing of the Constitution, a committee was

appointed to draft a project concerning relations with the United

States. It consisted of Diego Tamayo, Gonzalo de Quesada, Juan Gualberto

Gomez, Enrique Villuendas, and Manuel Ramon Silva. These gentlemen

conferred with General Wood, to learn the wishes of President McKinley,

and then drafted a scheme which they presented to the Convention and

which that body adopted on February 27. Unfortunately between the

President's wishes and the committee's project there were radical

differences. The President, through his Secretary of War, Elihu Root,

had on February 9 expressed with much circumstance and detail and a

wealth of argument the relationship which the United States government

regarded as essential. It amounted to this: That the Cuban government

should never make any treaty or engagement which would impair its

independence, nor make any special agreement with any foreign power

without the consent of the United States; that it should contract no

public debt in excess of the capacity of the ordinary revenues of the

island; that the United States should have the right of intervention for

the preservation of Cuban independence and the maintenance of a stable

government; that all the acts of the American Military Administration

should be validated; and that the United States should be permitted to

acquire and to hold naval stations in Cuba at certain points.

The Committee of the Convention reported that in its judgment some of

these conditions were unacceptable, inasmuch as they impaired the

independence of Cuba. So it proposed and the Convention adopted

proposals to this effect: That Cuba should never impair her independence

by any agreement with any power, not excepting the United States; that

she should never permit her territory to be used as a base or war

against the United States; that she accepted the obligations expressed

and implied in the Treaty of Paris; that she should validate the acts of

the Military Government "for the good government of Cuba"; and that the

United States and Cuba should regulate their commercial relations by

means of a reciprocity treaty.

Obviously, there was a wide divergence between the two schemes. It was

unfortunate that the American Congress was about to adjourn, on March

4, and was reluctant to reassemble in special session, and also that the

political passions to which we have referred were raging at so high a

pitch. In more favorable circumstances the matter would have been

settled diplomatically without friction or ill-feeling. There was,

indeed, a very considerable conservative party in Cuba, probably

comprising a majority of the substantial, well informed and orderly

inhabitants, who favored some such scheme of American supervision and

control as that which had been proposed, and if there had been a little

more time for calm deliberation they would probably have won the

Convention and the whole island to their point of view. Unhappily the

government at Washington determined to finish the matter up before

Congress adjourned on March 4, and in the short time which intervened

the passionate voice of faction was much more in evidence man the

thoughtful and measured voice of patriotic counsel.

Senator Orville H. Platt, of Connecticut, one of the ablest and

fairest-minded men in that body, was the Chairman of the Committee on

Relations with Cuba. It was probably he who suggested the modification

which was made in the instructions to the Convention. He now declared

that--which was perfectly true--the United States Congress had no power

to approve, reject, or in any way amend or modify the Cuban

Constitution. Cuba was entitled to establish her own government without

let or hindrance. But he also held that by virtue of the grounds of its

intervention in Cuban affairs the United States possessed certain rights

and privileges in that island above those of other powers, and that it

was in duty bound, for the sake of both Cuba and itself, to provide in

some assured way for the permanent safe-guarding of those special

interests. These views were approved by the best thought of both

countries, and ultimately prevailed.

In accordance with the views thus expressed, Senator Platt prepared as

an addendum to the Army Appropriation bill, on February 25, the historic

measure known as the Platt Amendment. This, consisting of eight brief

paragraphs, embodied the very points which the President had already

made on February 9, with the addition of three more. One of these was,

that the Cuban government should maintain the work of sanitation already

so auspiciously begun, for the protection of its own people and also the

people of the United States from epidemic pestilence; a requirement

which was probably quite superfluous, seeing that the Cubans were as

intent as the Americans upon the elimination of yellow fever and

malaria. The second was, that the Isle of Pines should be omitted from

the proposed constitutional boundaries of Cuba, the title thereto being

left for future adjustment by treaty. This extraordinary demand was a

bad blot upon the measure, and it is difficult to understand how it ever

was permitted to be inserted at the behest of some unscrupulous and

sordid scheme of exploitation. Happily, subsequent treaty agreements and

court decisions defeated its purpose and confirmed Cuba in her title to

the Isle of Pines. The third was the requirement that Cuba should make

this Platt Amendment either a part of her Constitution or an ordinance

under it and appended to it, and should also embody it in a permanent

treaty with the United States.

At this the storm broke. The great mass of the conservative and

thoughtful people of Cuba, while they regretted the need of it,

recognized the necessity of such an arrangement, and earnestly favored

the acceptance of the Platt Amendment, even with the one or two

objectionable features. But the radicals vigorously opposed it, and in

their opposition were greatly encouraged by the factional enemies of the

President in the United States, who broke all bounds of decency, and not

only raged against him there but organized a propaganda in Cuba itself,

to incite Cubans to oppose and resist the United States. In this the

foremost of such agitators were doubly false. They were not only

stirring up a foreign people against their own country, but they were

doing so with the deliberate and malignant hope of precipitating an

armed conflict between the two countries which would result in the

conquest and forcible annexation of Cuba. While pretending to sympathize

with Cuba and to resent the alleged American impairment of her

sovereignty, they were really scheming for the utter destruction of

Cuban independence.

Agitation, discussion, proposals and counter proposals, upon none of

which could the Convention agree, continued week after week. At the end

of March the question arose of sending a Commission to Washington to see

the President. This was opposed violently, chiefly at the incitement of

American emissaries, who busied themselves in Cuba in urging the

rejection of everything that promised a settlement of the controversy.

On April 1 some unscrupulous intriguer caused a message to be

telegraphed from Washington to the effect that if a Commission came it

would not be received; and this was received in Havana just as the

Convention was about to vote to send such a Commission. Naturally, the

Commission was not sent. On April 9, having learned that the message was

unofficial and mischievous, the Convention reconsidered the matter and

by an overwhelming majority voted to send a commission. Again

mysterious dispatches came from Washington, saying that the President

was resolute in refusing to recognize any Cuban envoys, and in

consequence the sending of the Commission was delayed.

Then the proposal was made that the Convention should reject the Platt

Amendment outright, and afterward send a Commission to Washington; and

this was actually carried, though by mistake, some members voting

exactly contrary to the way they intended. Then it was voted to send a

Commission, with special instructions to try to secure the inclusion of

a commercial treaty in the Platt Amendment. With this in view the

Convention on April 15 designated five members of such a Commission.

They were Mendez Capote, the President of the Convention; Diego Tamayo,

Leopoldo Berriel, Pedro Gonzales Llorente, and Rafael Portuondo; but as

Dr. Berriel could not go, General Pedro Betancourt was named in his

place. The Commission sailed for Washington on April 20. General Wood

also sailed on the same day, though on another steamer. The Cubans

reached Washington four days later, and the next day, in contradiction

to the false dispatches which had been sent, they were courteously

received by President McKinley. After a brief interview he introduced

them to the Secretary of War, to whose department Cuban affairs, under a

Military governor, belonged. He received them most cordially. Indeed, he

had strongly wished them to come to Washington for a conference. He told

them frankly that the Platt Amendment must stand, just as it was, and

that it must be accepted and adopted by Cuba before any further steps

could be taken for the establishment of a Cuban government. Then, at

their request, he gave a detailed explanation of what the United States

government conceived to be the meaning, the purpose and the effect of

each of the provisions of that instrument. He especially showed that it

was merely a logical continuation of long established American policy;

that it was intended not for the gain of the United States but for the

protection of Cuba; and that it would in no way interfere with the

domestic self-sovereignty of the Cuban people, or with the rank of Cuba

as an independent nation among the nations of the world.

The Committee returned to Havana and reported to the Convention the

results of its mission, and the Convention resumed consideration of the

American demands in the new light of Mr. Root's exposition of them.

Faction was still furious. Enemies of the President in the United States

went to Cuba or sent word thither, urging the radical element to hold

out to the bitter end against the Platt Amendment, saying that it would

need only a little longer resistance to compel the American government

to abandon it altogether. Counsels were divided in the Convention, and

numerous proposals of substitutes for the Amendment or for parts of it

were made, but upon none of them could the Convention agree. Some of the

most radical members suggested that the Convention adjourn without day.

But on the whole wiser counsels prevailed. The Commission had been much

impressed by Mr. Root's candid and cogent presentation of the case. It

had also become convinced that if the Amendment were adopted a liberal

reciprocity measure would be granted which would be of vast value to

Cuban commerce and industry. Consideration of the subject continued

until the latter part of May. On May 28 the question of adoption of the

Platt Amendment with certain qualifications was presented to the

Convention for a final vote. The Convention divided equally. There were

fourteen ayes and fourteen nays. Thereupon the President, Mendez Capote,

cast the deciding ballot. He voted aye. This caused a renewal of the

storm. Diego Tamayo and Juan Gualberto Gomez were especially outspoken

in their denunciation of all who had voted for the measure, and some of

the former's remarks were so severe that their retraction was required.

The qualified acceptance of the Amendment was not, however, satisfactory

to the Washington government, and the Convention was promptly informed

of that fact. In consequence the matter was reopened, and on June 12,

after a brief and temperate debate, a final vote was taken on

unconditional acceptance and adoption of the Platt Amendment. The result

was sixteen ayes to eleven nays.

That ended the matter. The Amendment had become a permanent addendum to

the Cuban Constitution, and the relations between the island's future

government and the United States was irrevocably determined. There was

little further criticism. The American agitators and speculators who had

been inciting the Cubans to resistance, in order thus to make them

compass their own ruin, abandoned their execrable intrigues for other

ventures elsewhere, while the Cubans who had been their dupes, relieved

of their pernicious influence, soon began to appreciate the

reasonableness of most of the provisions of the Amendment and the very

material benefits which it would bestow upon Cuba.

The History of Cuba, vol. 4 · 第 11 / 20 章