THE VIRGINIA REGIMENT
No literary production of a youth of twenty-one ever electrified the
world as did the publication of the _Journal_ of this dauntless envoy of
the Virginian governor. No young man more instantly sprang into the
notice of the world than George Washington. The journal was copied far
and wide in the newspapers of the other colonies. It sped across the
sea, and was printed in London by the British government. In a manly,
artless way it told the exact situation on the Ohio frontier and
announced the first positive proof the world had had of hostile French
aggression into the great river valley of the West. Despite certain
youthful expressions, the prudence, tact, capacity, and modesty of the
author were recognized by a nation and by a world.
Without waiting for the House of Burgesses to convene, Governor
Dinwiddie's council immediately advised the enlistment of two hundred
men to be sent to build forts on the Monongahela and Ohio rivers. The
task of recruiting two companies of one hundred men each was given to
the tried though youthful Major Washington, since they were to be
recruited from the northern district over which he had been
adjutant-general. His instructions read as follows:
"_Instruct's to be observ'd by Maj'r Geo. Washington, on the Expedit'n
to the Ohio._
"MAJ'R GEO. WASHINGTON: You are forthwith to repair to the Co'ty of
Frederick and there to take under Y'r Com'd 50 Men of the Militia
who will be deliver'd to You by the Comd'r of the s'd Co'ty
pursuant to my Orders. You are to send Y'r Lieut. at the same Time
to the Co'ty of Augusta, to receive 50 Men from the Comd'r of that
Co'ty as I have order'd, and with them he is to join You at
Alexandria, to which Place You are to proceed as soon as You have
rec'd the Men in Frederick. Having rec'd the Detachm't, You are to
train and discipline them in the best Manner You can, and for all
Necessaries You are to apply Y'rself to Mr. Jno. Carlisle at Alex'a
who has my Orders to supply You. Having all Things in readiness You
are to use all Expedition in proceeding to the Fork of Ohio with
the Men under Com'd and there you are to finish and compleat in the
best Manner and as soon as You possibly can, the Fort w'ch I expect
is there already begun by the Ohio Comp'a. You are to act on the
Defensive, but in Case any Attempts are made to obstruct the Works
or interrupt our Settlem'ts by any Persons whatsoever You are to
restrain all such Offenders, and in Case of resistance to make
Prisoners of or kill and destroy them. For the rest You are to
conduct Y'self as the Circumst's of the Service shall require and
to act as You shall find best for the Furtherance of His M'y's
Service and the Good of His Dom'n. Wishing You Health and Success I
bid you Farewell."[3]
The general command of the expedition was given to Colonel Joshua Fry,
formerly professor of mathematics in William and Mary College and a
geographer and Indian commissioner of note. His instructions were as
follows:
"_Instruction's to Joshua Fry, Esqr., Colo. and Com'r-in-Chief of the
Virg'a Regiment._
March, 1754.
"SIR: The Forces under Y'r Com'd are rais'd to protect our frontier
Settlements from the incursions of the French and the Ind's in
F'dship with them. I therefore desire You will with all possible
Expedition repair to Alexandria on the Head of the Poto. River, and
there take upon You the com'd of the Forces accordingly; w'ch I
Expect will be at that Town the Middle of next Mo. You are to march
them to will's Creek, above the Falls of Poto. from thence with the
Great Guns, Amunit'n and Provisions. You are to proceed to
Monongahela, when ariv'd there, You are to make Choice of the best
Place to erect a Fort for mounting y'r Cannon and ascertain'g His
M'y the King of G. B's undoubt'd right to those Lands. My Orders to
You is to be on the Defensive and if any foreign Force sh'd come
to annoy You or interrupt Y'r quiet Settlem't, and building the
Fort as afores'd, You are in that Case to represent to them the
Powers and Orders You have from me, and I desire they w'd
imediately retire and not to prevent You in the discharge of your
Duty. If they sh'd continue to be obstinate after your desire to
retire, you are then to repell Force by Force. I expect a Number of
the Southern Indians will join you on this expedit'n, w'ch with the
Indians on the Ohio, I desire You will cultivate a good
Understanding and Correspondence with, supplying them with what
Provisions and other Necessaries You can spare; and write to Maj'r
Carlyle w'n You want Provisions, who has my Orders to purchase and
Keep a proper Magazine for Your dem'ds. Keep up a good Com'd and
regular Discipline, inculcate morality and Courage in Y'r Soldiers
that they may answer the Views on w'ch they are rais'd. You are to
constitute a Court Martial of the Chief of Your Officers, with whom
You are to advise and consult on all Affairs of Consequence; and as
the Fate of this Expedition greatly depends on You, from the
Opinion I have of Your good Sense and Conduct, I refer the
Management of the whole to You with the Advice of the Court
Martial. Sincerely recommending You to the Protection of God,
wishing Success to our just Designs, I heartily wish You
farewell."[4]
Dinwiddie's expedition was in no sense the result of general agitation
against French encroachment. And, as in Virginia, so it was in other
colonies to which Governor Dinwiddie appealed; the governors said they
had received no instructions; the validity of English title to the lands
upon which the French were alleged to have encroached was doubted; not
one of them wished to precipitate a war through rash zeal.
Before the bill voting ten thousand pounds "for the encouragement and
protection of the settlers on the Mississippi," as it was called, passed
the House of Burgesses, Governor Dinwiddie had his patience well-nigh
exhausted, but he overlooked both the doubts raised as to England's
rights in the West and personal slights, and signed the bill which
provided for the expenses of the expedition of the Virginia Regiment.
Major Washington was located at Alexandria on the upper Potomac in
February, where he superintended the rendezvous of his men, and the
transportation of supplies and cannon. It was found necessary to resort
to impressments to raise the required quota of men. As early as February
19th, so slow were the drafts and enlistments, Governor Dinwiddie issued
a proclamation granting two hundred thousand acres of land on the Ohio,
to be divided among the officers and men who would serve in the
expedition. This had its effect.
By April 20th, Washington arrived at Wills Creek (Cumberland, Maryland)
with three companies, one under Captain Stephen who had joined him on
the way. The day previous, however, he met a messenger sent from Captain
Trent on the Ohio announcing that the arrival of a French army was
hourly expected. And on the day following, at Wills Creek, he was
informed of the arrival of the French and the withdrawal of the
Virginian force under Trent from the junction of the Allegheny and
Monongahela, where they had been sent to build a fort for the protection
of the Ohio Company. Without any delay, he forwarded this information to
the governors of Virginia, Pennsylvania, and Maryland.
Fancy the state of mind of this vanguard of the Virginian army at the
receipt of this news. They were then at the last frontier fort with
eleven companies of troops. Their orders were to push on to the Ohio,
drive off the French army (which was then reported to number a thousand
men), and build a fort there. Before them the only road was the Indian
path, which was hardly wide enough to admit the passage of a packhorse.
A ballot was cast among Washington's captains--the youngest of whom was
old enough to have been his father--and the decision reached was to
advance. The Indian path could at least be widened, and bridges built,
as far as the Monongahela. There they determined to erect a fort and
await orders and reinforcements. The reasons for this decision are
given as follows in Washington's _Journal_ of 1754:[5]
"_1st._ That the mouth of _Red-Stone_ is the first convenient place on
the River Monongahela.
"_2nd._ The stores are already built at that place for the provisions of
the Company, wherein the Ammunition may be laid up, our great guns may
be also sent by water whenever we shall think it convenient to attack
the Fort.
"_3rd._ We may easily (having all these conveniences) preserve our men
from the ill consequences of inaction, and encourage the _Indians_ our
Allies, to remain in our interests."[6]
Thus Washington's march must be looked upon as the advance of a vanguard
opening the road, bridging the streams, preparing the way for the
commanding officer and his army. Nor was there, now, need for haste--had
it been possible or advisable to hasten. The landing of the French at
the junction of the Allegheny and Monongahela already thwarted Governor
Dinwiddie's object in sending out the expedition, "to prevent their
[French] building any Forts or making any Settlem'ts on that river,
[Ohio] and more particularly so nigh us as that of the Logstown [fifteen
miles below the forks of the Ohio]." Now that a fort was building, with
an army of a thousand men (as Washington had been erroneously informed)
encamped about it, nothing more was to be thought of than a cautious
advance.
And so Washington gave the order on the 29th of April, three score men
having been sent ahead to widen the Indian trail. The march was
difficult and exceedingly slow. In the first ten days they covered but
twenty miles. Yet each mile must have been anticipated seriously by the
young commander. He knew not whether his colonel with reinforcements or
the enemy were nearest. Governor Dinwiddie wrote him (May 4) concerning
reinforcements, as follows:
"The Independ't Compa from So. Car. arriv'd two days ago; is compleat;
100 Men besides Officers, and will re-embark for Alex^a next Week,
thence proceed imediately to join Col^o. Fry and You. The two Independ't
Compa's from N. York may be Expected in ab'^t ten days. The N. Car. Men,
under the Com'^d of Col^o. Innes, are imagin'd to be on their March, and
will probably be at the Randezvous ab'^t the 15^{th}. Inst."...
"I hope Capt. McKay who Com'ds the Independ't Compa., will soon be with
You And as he appears to be an Officer of some Experience and
Importance, You will, with Col^o. Fry and Col^o. Innes, so well agree as
not to let some Punctillios ab'^t Com'd render the Service You are all
engag'd in, perplex'd or obstructed."[7]
Relying implicitly on Dinwiddie, Washington pushed on and on into the
wilderness, opening a road and building bridges for a colonel and an
army that was never to come. As he advanced into the Alleghanies he
found the difficulty of hauling wagons very serious, and long before he
reached the Youghiogheny he determined to test the possibility of
transportation down that stream and the Monongahela to his destination
at the mouth of Redstone creek.
May 11th, he sent a reconnoitering force forward to Gist's, on Laurel
Hill, the last spur of the Alleghanies, to locate a French party, which,
the Indians reported, had left Fort Duquesne, and to find if there was
possibility of water transportation to the month of Redstone creek,
where a favorable site for a fort was to be sought.
Slowly the vanguard of the army felt its way to Little Meadows and
across the smaller branch of the Youghiogheny, which it bridged at
Little Crossings. On the 16th, according to the French version of
Washington's _Journal_, he met traders who informed him of the
appearance of French near Gist's and expressed doubts as to the
possibility of building a wagon road from Gist's to the mouth of
Redstone creek. This made it imperatively necessary for the young
lieutenant-colonel to attempt to find a water passage down the
Youghiogheny.
The day following, much information was received both from the front and
the rear, perhaps most vividly stated in the _Journal_ as follows:
"The Governor informs me that Capt. McKay, with an independent company
of 100 men, excluding the officers, had arrived, and that we might
expect them daily; and that the men from New-York would join us within
ten days.
"This night also came two _Indians_ from the _Ohio_ who left the French
fort five days ago; They relate that the French forces are all employed
in building their Fort, that it is already breast-high, and of the
thickness of twelve feet, and filled with Earth, stones, &c. They have
cut down and burnt up all the trees which were about it and sown grain
instead thereof. The _Indians_ believe they were only 600 in number,
although they say themselves they are 800: They expect a greater number
in a few days, which may amount to 1,600. Then they say they can defy
the _English_."[8]
Arriving on the eastern bank of the Youghiogheny the next day, the river
being too wide to bridge and too high to ford, Washington put himself
"in a position of defence against any immediate attack from the Enemy,"
and went straightway to work on the problem of water transportation.
By the 20th, a canoe having been provided, Washington set out on the
Youghiogheny with four men and an Indian. By nightfall they reached
"Turkey Foot" (Confluence, Pennsylvania), which Washington mapped for
the site of a fort. Below "Turkey Foot" the stream was found too rapid
and rocky to admit of any sort of navigation and Washington returned to
camp on the 24th, with the herculean hardships of an entire overland
march staring him in the face. Information was now at hand from Half
King concerning alleged movements of the French; thus the letter read:
"To any of his Majesty's officers whom this May Concern.
"As 'tis reported that the French army is set out to meet M. George
Washington I exhort you my brethren, to guard against them, for
they intend to fall on the first _English_ they meet; They have
been on their march these two days, the Half King and the other
chiefs will join you within five days, to hold a council, though we
know not the number we shall be. I shall say no more; but remember
me to my brethren the English.
Signed, The Half King."
At two o'clock of that same May day (24th) the little vanguard came
down the eastern wooded hills that surround Great Meadows, and looked
across the waving grasses and low bushes which covered the field they
were soon to make classic ground. Immediately upon arriving at the
future battle-field, information was secured from a trader confirming
Half King's alarming letter. Below the roadway, which passed the meadow
on the hillside, the lieutenant-colonel found two natural intrenchments
near a branch of Great Meadows Run, perhaps old courses of the brook
through the swampy land. Here the troops and wagons were placed.
Great Meadows may be described as two large basins, the smaller lying
directly westward of the larger and connected with it by a narrow neck
of swampy ground. Each is a quarter of a mile wide, and the two a mile
and a half in length.
The old roadway descends from the southern hills, coming out upon the
meadows at the eastern extremity of the western basin. It traverses the
hillside south of the western meadow. The natural intrenchments or
depressions behind which Washington huddled his army on this May
afternoon were at the eastern edge of the western basin. Back of him was
the narrow neck of lowland which soon opened into the eastern basin.
Behind him to his left on the hillside his newly made road crept
eastward into the hills. The Indian trail followed the edge of the
forest westward to Laurel Hill, five miles distant, and on to Fort
Duquesne.
On this faint opening into the western forest the little band and its
youthful commander kept their eyes as the sun dropped behind the hills,
closing an anxious day and bringing a dreaded night. How large the body
of French might have been, not one of the one hundred and fifty men
knew. How far away they might be, no one could guess. Here in this
forest meadow the little vanguard slept on their arms, surrounded by
watchful sentinels, with fifty-one miles of forest and mountain between
them and the nearest settlement at Wills Creek. The darkling forests
crept down the hills on either side as though to hint by their
portentous shadows of the dead and dying that were to be.
But the night waned and morning came. With increasing energy, as though
nerved to duty by the dangers which surrounded him, the
twenty-two-year-old commander Washington gave his orders promptly. A
scouting party was sent on the Indian trail in search of the coming
French. Squads were set to threshing the forests for spies. Horsemen
were ordered to scour the country and keep look-out for French from
neighboring points of vantage.
At night all returned, none the wiser for their vigilance and labor. The
French force had disappeared from the face of the earth. It may be
believed that this lack of information did not tend to ease the intense
strain of the hour. It must have been plain to the dullest that serious
things were ahead. Two flags, silken emblems of an immemorial hatred,
were being brought together in the Alleghanies. It was a moment of
utmost importance to Europe and America. Quebec and Jamestown were met
on Laurel Hill; and a spark struck here and now was to "set the world on
fire."
However clearly this may have been seen, Washington was not the man to
withdraw. Indeed, the celerity with which he precipitated England and
France into war made him the most criticized man on both continents.
Another day passed--and the French could not be found. On the following
day Christopher Gist arrived at Great Meadows with the information that
M. la Force with fifty men (whose tracks he had seen within five miles
of Great Meadows) had been at his house on "Mount Braddock," fifteen
miles distant. Acting on this reliable information, Washington at once
dispatched a scouting party in pursuit.
The day passed and no word came to the anxious men in their trenches in
the meadows. Another night, silent and cheerless, came over the
mountains upon the valley, and with the night came rain. Fresh fears of
strategy and surprise must have arisen as the cheerless sun went down.
Suddenly, at eight in the evening, a runner brought word that the French
were run to cover. Half King, while coming to join Washington, had found
La Force's party in "a low, obscure place."
It was now time for a daring man to show himself. Such was the young
commander at Great Meadows.
"That very moment," wrote Washington in his _Journal_, "I sent out forty
men and ordered my ammunition to be put in a place of safety, fearing it
to be a stratagem of the French to attack our camp; I left a guard to
defend it, and with the rest of my men set out in a heavy rain, and in a
night as dark as pitch."
Perhaps a war was never precipitated under stranger circumstances.
Contrecoeur, commanding at Fort Duquesne, was made aware by his Indian
scouts of Washington's progress all the way from the Potomac. The day
before Washington arrived at Great Meadows, Contrecoeur ordered M. de
Jumonville to leave Fort Duquesne with a detachment of thirty-four men,
commanded by La Force, and go toward the advancing English. To the
English (when he met them) he was to explain he had come to order them
to retire. To the Indians he was to pretend he was "traveling about to
see what is transacting in the King's Territories, and to take notice
of the different roads." In the eyes of the English the party was to be
an embassy. In the eyes of the Indians, a party of scouts
reconnoitering. This is clear from the orders given by Contrecoeur to
Jumonville.
Three days later, on the 26th, this "embassy" was at Gist's plantation,
where, according to Gist's report to Washington, they "would have killed
a cow and broken everything in the house, if two _Indians_, whom he
[Gist] had left in charge of the home, had not prevented them."
From Gist's, La Force had advanced within five miles of Great Meadows,
as Gist ascertained by their tracks on the Indian trail. Then--although
the English commander was within an hour's march--the French retraced
their steps to the summit of Laurel Hill, and, descending deep into the
obscure valley on the east, built a hut under the lee of the precipice
and rested from their labors! Here they remained throughout the 27th,
while Washington's scouts were running their legs off in the attempt to
locate them, and the young lieutenant-colonel was in a fever of anxiety
at their sudden, ominous disappearance. Now they were found.
What a march was that! The darkness was intense. The path, Washington
wrote, was "scarce broad enough for one man." Now and then it was lost
completely and a quarter of an hour was wasted in finding it. Stones and
roots impeded the way, and were made trebly treacherous by the torrents
of rain which fell. The men struck the trees. They fell over each other.
They slipped from the narrow track and slid downward through the
soaking, leafy carpet of the forest.
Enthusiastic tourists make the journey today from Great Meadows to the
summit of Laurel Hill on the track over which Washington and his hundred
men floundered and stumbled that wet May night a century and a half ago.
It is a hard walk but exceedingly fruitful to one of imaginative vision.
From Great Meadows the trail holds fast to the height of ground until
Braddock's Run is crossed near "Braddock's Grave." Picture that little
group of men floundering down into this mountain stream, swollen by the
heavy rain, in the utter darkness of that night! From Braddock's Run
the trail begins its long climb on the sides of the foothills, by
picturesque Peddler's Rocks, to the top of Laurel Hill, two thousand
feet above.
Washington left Great Meadows about eight o'clock. It was not until
sunrise that Half King's sentries at "Washington's Spring" saw the
vanguard file out on the narrow ridge, which, dividing headwaters of
Great Meadow Run and Cheat river, makes an easy ascent to the summit of
the mountain. The march of five miles had been accomplished, with great
difficulty, in a little less than ten hours--at the rate of _one mile in
two hours_!
Forgetting all else for the moment, consider the young leader of the
floundering, stumbling army. There is not another episode in all
Washington's long, eventful life that shows more clearly his strength of
personal determination and daring. Beside this all-night march from
Great Meadows to Washington's Spring, Wolfe's ascent to the Plains of
Abraham at Quebec was a pastime. A man in full daylight today can walk
over Washington's five-mile course to Laurel Hill in one-fifth of the
time that little army needed on that black night. If a more difficult
ten-hour night march has been made in the history of warfare in America,
who led it and where was it made? No feature of the campaign shows more
clearly the unmatched, irresistible energy of this twenty-two-year-old
boy. For those to whom Washington, the man, is "unknown," there are
lessons in this little path today, of value far beyond their cost.
Whether Washington intended to attack the French before he reached Half
King, is not known; at the spring a conference was held and it was
immediately decided to attack. Washington did not know and could not
have known that Jumonville was an ambassador. The action of the French
in approaching Great Meadows and then withdrawing and hiding was not the
behavior of an embassy. Half King and his Indians were of opinion that
the French party entertained evil designs, and, as Washington afterwards
wrote, "if we had been such fools as to let them [the French] go, they
would never have helped us to take any other Frenchmen."
Two scouts were sent out in advance; then, in Indian file, Washington
and his men with Half King and a few Indians followed and "prepared to
surround them."
Laurel Hill, the most westerly range of the Alleghanies, trends north
and south through western Pennsylvania. In Fayette county, about one
mile on the summit northward from the Cumberland Road, lies Washington's
Spring where Half King encamped. The Indian trail coursed along the
summit northward fifteen miles to Gist's. On the eastern side, Laurel
Hill descends into a valley varying from a hundred to five hundred feet
deep. Nearly two miles from the spring, in the bottom of a valley four
hundred feet deep, lay Jumonville's "embassy." The attacking party,
guided by Indians, who had previously wriggled down the hillside on
their bellies and found the French, advanced along the Indian trail and
then turned off and began stealthily creeping down the mountainside.
[Illustration: LEDGE FROM WHICH WASHINGTON OPENED FIRE UPON JUMONVILLE'S
PARTY]
Washington's plan was, clearly, to surround and capture the French. It
is plain he did not understand the ground. They were encamped in the
bottom of a valley two hundred yards wide and more than a mile long.
Moreover, the hillside on which the English were descending abruptly
ended on a narrow ledge of perpendicular rocks thirty feet high and a
hundred yards long.
Coming suddenly out on the rocks, Washington leading the right division
of the party and Half King the left, it was plain in the twinkling of an
eye that it would be impossible to achieve a bloodless victory.
Washington therefore gave and received first fire. It was fifteen
minutes before the astonished but doughty French, probably now
surrounded by Half King's Indians, were compelled to surrender. Ten of
their number, including the "ambassador" Jumonville, were killed
outright and one wounded. Twenty-one were taken prisoners. One Frenchman
escaped, running half clothed through the forests to Fort Duquesne with
the evil tidings.
"We killed," writes Washington, "Mr. de Jumonville, the Commander of
that party, as also nine others; we wounded one and made twenty-one
prisoners, among whom were _M. La Force, M. Drouillon_ and two cadets.
The Indians scalped the dead and took away the greater part of their
arms, after which we marched on with the prisoners under guard to the
_Indian_ camp.... I marched on with the prisoners. _They informed me
that they had been sent with a summons to order me to retire._ A
plausible pretence to discover our camp and to obtain knowledge of our
forces and our situation! It was so clear that they were come to
reconnoiter what we were, that I admired their assurance, when they told
me they were come as an Embassy; their instructions were to get what
knowledge they could of the roads, rivers, and all the country as far as
the Potomac; and instead of coming as an Embassador, publicly and in an
open manner, they came secretly, and sought the most hidden retreats
more suitable for deserters than for Embassadors; they encamped there
and remained hidden for whole days together, at a distance of not more
than five miles from us; they sent spies to reconnoiter our camp; the
whole body turned back 2 miles; they sent the two messengers mentioned
in the instruction, to inform M. de Contrecoeur of the place where we
were, and of our disposition, that he might send his detachments to
enforce the summons as soon as it should be given. Besides, an
Embassador has princely attendants, whereas this was only a simple petty
_French_ officer, an Embassador has no need of spies, his person being
always sacred: and seeing their intention was so good, why did they
tarry two days at five miles' distance from us without acquainting me
with the summons, or at least, with something that related to the
Embassy? That alone would be sufficient to excite the strongest
suspicions, and we must do them the justice to say, that, as they wanted
to hide themselves, they could not have picked out better places than
they had done. The summons was so insolent, and savored of so much
Gasconade, that if it had been brought openly by two men it would have
been an excessive Indulgence to have suffered them to return.... They
say they called to us as soon as they had discovered us; which is an
absolute falsehood, for I was then marching at the head of the company
going towards them, and can positively affirm, that, when they first saw
us, they ran to their arms, without calling, as I must have heard them
had they so done."[9]
In a letter to his brother, Washington wrote: "I fortunately escaped
without any wound; for the right wing where I stood, was exposed to, and
received all the enemy's fire; and it was the part where the man was
killed and the rest wounded. I heard the bullets whistle; and, believe
me, there is something charming in the sound." The letter was published
in the _London Magazine_. It is said George II. read it and commented
dryly: "He would not say so if he had been used to hear many." In later
years Washington heard too much of the fatal music, and once, when asked
if he had written such rodomontade is said to have answered gravely, "If
I said so, it was when I was young." Aye, but it is memorials of that
daring young Virginian, to whom whistling bullets were charming, that we
seek in the Alleghanies today. We catch a similar glimpse of his
ardent, boyish spirit in a letter written from Fort Necessity later.
Speaking of strengthening the fortifications, Washington writes: "We
have, with nature's assistance, made a good intrenchment, and by
clearing the bushes out of these meadows, prepared a charming field for
an encounter." Over and above the anxieties with which he was ever
beset, there shines out clearly the exuberance of boyish zest and
valor--soon to be hardened and quenched by innumerable cares and heavy
responsibilities.
Thus the first blow in the long bloody seven years' war was struck by
the red-uniformed Virginians under Washington at the bottom of that
Alleghany valley. He immediately returned to Great Meadows, sent
eastward to the belated Fry for reinforcements, and westward a scouting
party to keep watch of the enemy. On the 30th, the French prisoners were
sent eastward to Virginia and the construction of a fort was begun at
Great Meadows, by erecting "small palisades." This was completed by the
following day, June 1st. Washington, in his _Journal_ under the date of
June 25th, speaks of this fort as "Fort-Necessity."[10] The name
suggests the exigencies which led to its erection: lack of troops and
provisions. On June 2nd, Washington wrote in his _Journal_: "We had
prayers in the Fort;"[11] the name Necessity may not have been used at
first.
On the 6th, Gist arrived from Wills Creek, bringing the news of Colonel
Fry's death by injuries sustained from being thrown from his horse. Thus
the command now devolved upon Washington who had been in actual command
from the beginning. On the 9th, the remainder of the Virginian regiment
arrived from Wills Creek, with the swivels, under Colonel Muse. On the
day following, Captain Mackaye arrived with the Independent Company of
South Carolinians.
The reinforcements put a new face on affairs and it is clear that the
new colonel commanding secretly hoped to capture Fort Duquesne
forthwith. Washington's road was finished to Great Meadows. For two
weeks, now, the work went on, completing it as far as Gist's, on Mount
Braddock. In the mountains a sharp lookout for the French was
maintained, and spies were continually sent to Fort Duquesne to report
all that was happening there. Among all else that taxed the energies of
the young colonel was the management of the Indian question. At one time
he received and answered a deputation of Delawares and Shawanese which
he knew was sent by the French as spies. Yet the answer of this youth to
the "treacherous devils," as he calls them in his private record of the
day, was as bland and diplomatic as that of Indian chieftain bred to
hypocrisy and deceit. He put little faith in the redskins but made good
use of those he had as spies, did all in his power to restrain the
nations from joining the French, and offered to all who came or would
come to him a hospitality he could ill afford.
On the 28th, his road was completed to Gist's and eight of the sixteen
miles from Gist's to the mouth of Redstone creek. On this day the scouts
brought word of reinforcements at Fort Duquesne and of preparations for
sending out an army. Immediately Washington summoned Mackaye's company
from Fort Necessity and the building of a fort was begun by throwing up
entrenchments on Mount Braddock. All outlying squads were called in. But
on the 30th, fresher information being at hand, it was decided at a
council of war to retreat to Virginia rather than oppose the strong
force which was advancing up the Monongahela.
The consternation at Fort Duquesne upon the arrival of the single,
barefoot fugitive from Jumonville's company can be imagined. Relying on
the pompous pretenses of the embassadorship and desiring to avoid an
indefensible violation of the Treaty of Utrecht--though the spirit and
letter were "already infringed by his very presence on the
ground"--Contrecoeur, one of the best representatives of his proud
king that ever came to America, assembled a council of war and ordered
each opinion to be put in writing. Mercier gave moderate advice;
Coulon-Villiers, half-brother of Jumonville, burning with rage, urged
violent recrimination. Mercier prevailed, and an army of five hundred
French and as many, or more, Indians, among whom were many Delawares,
formerly friendly to the English, was raised to march and meet
Washington. At his request the command was given to Coulon-Villiers--_Le
Grand Villiers_, so-called from his prowess among the Indians. Mercier
was second in command. This was the army before which Washington was now
slowly, painfully, retreating from Mount Braddock toward Virginia.
It was a sad hour--that in which the Virginian retreat was ordered by
the daring colonel, eager for a fight. But, even if he secretly wished
to stay and defend the splendid site on Mount Braddock where he had
entrenched his army, the counsel of older heads prevailed. It would have
been better had the army stuck to those breastworks--but the suffering
and humiliation to come was not foreseen.
Backward over the rough, new road the little army plodded, the
Virginians hauling their swivels by hand. Two teams and a few packhorses
were all that remained of horse-flesh equal to the occasion. Even
Washington and his officers walked. For a week there had been no bread.
In two days Fort Necessity was reached, where, quite exhausted, the
little army went into camp. There were only a few bags of flour here. It
was plain, now, that the retreat was ill-advised. Human strength could
not endure it. So there was nothing to do but send post-haste to Wills
Creek for help. But, if strength were lacking--there was courage, and to
spare! For after a "full and free" conference of the officers it was
determined to enlarge the stockade, strengthen the fortifications, and
await the enemy whatever his number and power.
[Illustration: SITE OF FORT NECESSITY]
The day following was spent in this work and famed Fort Necessity was
completed. It was the shape of an irregular square situated upon a small
height of land near the center of the swampy meadow. "The natural
entrenchments" of which Washington speaks in his _Journal_ may have been
merely this height of ground, or old courses of the two brooks which
flow by it on the north and on the east. At any rate the fort was built
on an "island," so to speak, in the wet lowland. A narrow neck of solid
land connected it with the southern hillside, along which the road
ran. A shallow ditch surrounded the earthen palisaded sides of the fort.
Parallel with the southeastern and southwestern palisades rifle-pits
were dug. Bastion gateways offered entrance and exit. The works embraced
less than a third of an acre of land. All day long skirmishers and
double picket lines were kept out and the steady advance of the French
force, three times the size of the army fearlessly awaiting it, was
reported by hurrying scouts.
No army ever lay on its arms of a night surer of a battle on the morrow
than did this first English army that ever came into the West. _Le Grand
Villiers_, thirsting for revenge, lay not five miles off, with a
thousand followers who had caught his spirit. And yet time was to show
that this fiery temper was held in admirable control!
By earliest morning light on Wednesday, July 3, an English sentry was
brought in wounded. The French were then descending Laurel Hill four
miles distant. They had attacked the entrenchments on Mount Braddock the
morning before, only to find their bird had flown, and now were
pressing after the retreating redcoats and their "buckskin colonel."
Little is known of the story of this day within the earthen triangle,
save as it is told in the meager details of the general battle. There
was great lack of food, but, to compensate for this, as the soldiers no
doubt thought, there was much to drink. By eleven o'clock the French and
Indians, spreading throughout the forests on the northwest, began firing
at six hundred yards' distance. Finally they circled to the southeast
where the forests approached nearer to the English trenches. Washington
at once drew his little army out of the fort and boldly challenged
assault on the narrow neck of solid land on the south which formed the
only approach to the fort.
But the crafty Villiers, not to be tempted, kept well within the forest
shadows to the south and east--cutting off all retreat to Virginia.
Realizing at last that the French would not give battle, Washington
withdrew again behind his entrenchments, Mackaye's South Carolinians
occupying the rifle-pits which paralleled two sides of the
fortification.
Here the all-day's battle was fought between the Virginians behind their
breastworks and in their trenches, and the French and Indians on the
ascending wooded hillsides. The rain which began to fall soon flooded
Mackaye's men out of their trenches. But no other change of position was
made all day. And, so far as the battle went, the English doggedly held
their own. In the contest with hunger and rain, however, they were
fighting a losing battle. The horses and cattle escaped and were
slaughtered by the enemy. The provisions were nearly exhausted and the
ammunition was far spent. As the afternoon waned, though there was some
cessation in musketry fire, many guns being rendered useless by the
rain, the smoking little swivels were made to do double duty. They
bellowed their fierce defiance with unwonted zest as night came on,
giving to the English an appearance of strength which they were far from
possessing. The hungry soldiers made up for the lack of food from the
abundance of liquor, which, in their exhausted state had more than its
usual effect. By nightfall half the little doomed army, surrounded by
the French and Indians, fifty miles from any succor, was in a pitiable
condition! No doubt, had Villiers dared to rush the entrenchments, the
English could have been annihilated. Their hopeless condition could not
have been realized by the foe on the hills.
But it all was realized by the sober young colonel commanding. And as he
looked about him in the wet twilight of that July day, what a dismal
ending of his first campaign it must have seemed. Fifty-four of his
three hundred and four men were killed or wounded. The loss among the
ninety Carolinians is not known. At the same rate there were, in all,
perhaps seventy-five killed or wounded in that little palisaded
enclosure. Provisions and ammunition were about gone. Horses and cattle
were lost. Many of the small arms were useless. The army was surrounded
by _Le Grand Villiers_, watchfully abiding his time. And half the
tired men were intoxicated by the only stimulant that could be spared.
What mercy could be hoped for from the brother of the dead Jumonville?
For these four hundred Spartans, a fight to the death, or at
least a captivity at Duquesne or Quebec was all that could be
expected--Jumonville's party having already been sent into Virginia as
captives.
But at eight in the evening the French requested a parley. Washington
refused to consider the suggestion. Why should a parley be desired with
an enemy in such a hopeless strait as they? It was clear that Villiers
had resorted to this strategy to gain better information of their
condition. But the request was soon repeated, and this time for a parley
between the lines. To this Washington readily acceded, and Captain van
Braam went to meet Le Mercier, who brought a verbal proposition from
Villiers for the capitulation of Fort Necessity. To this proposition
Washington and his officers listened. Twice the commissioners were sent
to Villiers to submit modifications demanded by Washington. They
returned a third time with the articles reduced to writing--but in
French. Washington depended upon Van Braam's poor knowledge of French
and mongrel English for a verbal translation. Jumonville's death was
referred to as an assassination though Van Braam Englished the word
"death"--perhaps thinking there was no other translation for the French
_l'assassinat_. And by the light of a flickering candle, which the
mountain wind frequently extinguished, the rain falling upon the
company, George Washington signed this, his _first_ and his _last_,
capitulation. It read as follows:
"ARTICLE 1^{st}. We permit the English Commander to withdraw with
all the garrison, in order that he may return peaceably to his
country, and to shield him from all insult at the hands of our
French, and to restrain the savages who are with us as much as may
be in our power.
"ART. 2^{nd}. He shall be permitted to withdraw and to take with
him whatever belongs to his troops, _except the artillery, which we
reserve for ourselves_.
"ART. 3^{rd}. We grant them the honors of war; they shall withdraw
with beating drums, and with a small piece of cannon, wishing by
this means to show that we consider them friends.
"ART. 4^{th}. As soon as these articles shall be signed by both
parties, they shall take down the English flag.
"ART. 5^{th}. Tomorrow at daybreak a detachment of French shall
lead forth the garrison and take possession of the aforesaid fort.
"ART. 6^{th}. Since the English have scarcely any horses or oxen
left, they shall be allowed to hide their property, in order that
they may return to seek for it after they shall have recovered
their horses; for this purpose they shall be permitted to leave
such number of troops as guards as they may think proper, _under
this condition, that they give their word of honor that they will
work on no establishment either in the surrounding country or
beyond the Highlands during one year beginning from this day_.
"ART. 7^{th}. Since the English have in their power an officer and
two cadets, and, in general, all the prisoners whom they took _when
they murdered Lord Jumonville_, they now promise to send them, with
an escort to Fort Duquesne, situated on Belle River, and to secure
the safe performance of this treaty article, _as well as of the
treaty_, Messrs. Jacob van Braam and Robert Stobo, both Captains,
shall be delivered to us as hostages until the arrival of our
French and Canadians herein before mentioned.
"We on our part declare that we shall give an escort to send back
in safety the two officers who promise us our French in two months
and a half at the latest.
"Copied on one of the posts of our block-house the same day and
year as before.
(Signed.) MESSRS. JAMES MACKAYE, G^c.
G^o. WASHINGTON,
COULON VILLIER."[12]
The parts in italics were those misrepresented by Van Braam. The words
_pendant une année à compter de ce jour_ are not found in the articles
printed by the French government, as though it repudiated Villier's
intimation that the English should ever return. But within sixty-three
hours of a year, an English army, eight times as great as the party now
capitulating, marched across this battle-field. The nice courtesy shown
by the young colonel, in allowing Captain Mackaye's name to take
precedence over his own, is significant, as Mackaye, a king's officer,
had never considered himself amenable to Washington's orders, and his
troops had steadily refused to bear the brunt of the campaign--working
on the road or transporting guns and baggage. In the trenches, however,
the Carolinians did their duty.
And so, on the morning of July 4th, 1753, the red-uniformed Virginians
and king's troops marched out from Fort Necessity between the files of
French, with all the honors of war and _tambour battant_. Much baggage
had to be destroyed to save it from the Indians whom the French could
not restrain. Such was the condition of the men--the wounded being
carried on stretchers--that only three miles could be made on the
homeward march the first day. However glorious later July Fourths may
have seemed to Washington, memories of the distress and gloom and
humiliation of this day ever served to temper his joys. The report of
the officers of the Virginia regiment made at Wills Creek, where they
arrived July 9th, shows thirteen killed, fifty-three wounded, thirteen
left lame on the road, twenty-seven absent, twenty-one sick, and one
hundred and sixty-five fit for duty.
On August 30th, the Virginian House of Burgesses passed a vote of thanks
to "Colonel George Washington, Captain Mackaye of his Majesty's
Independent Company, and the officers under his command," for their
"gallant and brave Behaviour in Defense of their Country." The sting of
defeat was softened by the public realization of the odds of the contest
and the failure of Dinwiddie to forward reinforcements and provisions. A
characteristic scene was enacted in the House when, Colonel Washington
having entered the gallery, the burgesses rose to express their respect
for the young officer who had led the first English army across the
Alleghanies. The colonel attempted to return thanks for the conspicuous
recognition, but, though he had faced unflinchingly the French and the
Indians, he was overcome with embarrassment at this involuntary, warm
tribute of his friends. But the young hero was deeply chagrined at his
being duped to recognize Jumonville's death as an assassination. Captain
van Braam, being held in disrepute for what was probably nothing more
culpable than carelessness, was not named in the vote of thanks tendered
Washington's officers.
But this chagrin was no more cutting than the obstinacy of Dinwiddie in
refusing to fulfill the article of the treaty concerning the return of
the French prisoners. For this there was little or no valid excuse, and
Dinwiddie's action in thus playing fast and loose with Washington's
reputation was as galling to the young colonel as it was heedless of his
country's honor and the laws of war.
Washington's first visit to the Ohio had proven French occupation of
that great valley. This, his second mission, had proven their power.
With this campaign began his military career. "Although as yet a youth,"
writes Sparks, "with small experience, unskilled in war, and relying on
his own resources, he had behaved with the prudence, address, courage,
and firmness of a veteran commander. Rigid in discipline, but sharing
the hardships and solicitous for the welfare of his soldiers, he had
secured their obedience and won their esteem amidst privations,
sufferings and perils that have seldom been surpassed."
The few memorials of this little campaign are of great interest and
value since it marked the beginning of the struggle of our national
independence, and because of Washington's prominence in it. Of the
beginning of Washington's fort on Mount Braddock nothing whatever
remains save the record of it, which should be enough--though it is
not--to silence all who, with gross ignorance of the facts, have imputed
to the young commander a lack of military skill in choosing the site in
Great Meadows for Fort Necessity. Criticisms of Washington on this score
are ridiculous misrepresentations. The fact that Washington chose Mount
Braddock for his fort and battle-ground has, unfortunately, never been
emphasized by historians.
The Great Meadows, sunny and fair, lie quietly between their hills
dreaming even yet of the young hero whose name is indissolubly linked
with their own. The gently sloping hills are now quite cleared of
forests--save on the southeast, where, as in the old days, the forests
still approach nearest the bottom land. For half a century after
Washington capitulated, his roadway from the Potomac was the great
highway across the mountains, and thousands of weary pilgrims to the
great West camped near the spot where the Father of the West fought his
first battle for it. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the
Cumberland Road, the historic highway of America, was built through
Great Meadows, and the northern hill--on which the French opened the
first battle of the French and Indian War on that July morning--over
which the great road was built is named Mount Washington.
On a plateau surrounded by low ground at the western extremity of
classic Great Meadows, Fort Necessity was built, and there may be seen
today the remains of its palisades.
The site was not chosen because of its strategic location, but because,
late in that May day, a century and a half ago, a little army hurrying
forward to find any spot where it could defend itself, selected it
because of the supply of water afforded by the brooks.
From the hill to the east the young commander no doubt looked with
anxious eyes upon this well-watered meadow, and perhaps he decided
quickly to make his resistance here. As he neared the spot his hopes
rose, for he found that the plateau was surrounded by wet ground and
accessible only from the southern side. Moreover the plateau contained
"natural fortifications," as Washington termed them, possibly gullies
torn through it, sometime when the brooks were out of banks.
Here Washington quickly ensconced his men. From their trenches, as they
looked westward for the French, lay the western extremity of Great
Meadows covered with bushes and rank grasses. To their right--the
north--the meadow marsh stretched more than a hundred yards to the
gently ascending wooded hillside. Behind them lay the eastern sweep of
meadows, and to their left, seventy yards distant, the wooded hillside
to the south. The high ground on which they lay contained about forty
square rods, and was bounded on the north by Great Meadows brook and on
the east by a brooklet which descended from the valley between the
southern hills.
When, in the days following, Fort Necessity was raised, the palisades,
it is said, were made by erecting logs on one end, side by side, and
throwing dirt against them from both sides. As there were no trees in
the meadow, the logs were brought from the southern hillside over the
narrow neck of solid ground to their place. On the north the palisade
was made to touch the waters of the brook. Without its embankments on
the south and west sides, two trenches were dug parallel with the
embankments, to serve as rifle-pits. Bastion gateways, three in number,
were made in the western palisade.
The first recorded survey of Fort Necessity was made by Mr. Freeman
Lewis, senior author, with Mr. James Veech, of _The Monongahela of Old_,
in 1816. This survey was first reproduced in Lowdermilk's _History of
Cumberland_;[13] it is described by Mr. Veech in _The Monongahela of
Old_,[14] and has been reproduced as authoritative, by the authors of
_Frontier Forts of Pennsylvania_, published in 1895 by the state of
Pennsylvania.[15] The embankments are described thus by Mr. Veech on the
basis of his collaborator's survey: "It [Fort Necessity] was in the form
of an obtuse-angled triangle of 105 degrees, having its base or
hypothenuse upon the run. The line of the base was about midway, sected
or broken, and about two perches of it thrown across the run, connecting
with the base by lines of the triangle. One line of the angle was six,
the other seven perches; the base line eleven perches long, including
the section thrown across the run. The lines embraced in all about fifty
square perches of land on [or?] nearly one third of an acre."
This amusing statement has been seriously quoted by the authorities
mentioned, and a map is made according to it and published in the
_Frontier Forts of Pennsylvania_ without a word as to its
inconsistencies. How could a triangle, the sides of which measure six,
seven, and eleven rods, contain fifty square rods or one-third of an
acre? It could not contain half that amount.
[Illustration: TWO PLANS OF FORT NECESSITY
[_A, Plan of Lewis's Survey; B, Sparks's Plan_]]
The present writer went to Fort Necessity armed with this two-page map
of Fort Necessity in the _Frontier Forts of Pennsylvania_ which he
trusted as authoritative. The present owner of the land, Mr. Lewis
Fazenbaker, objected to the map, and it was only in trying to prove its
correctness that its inconsistencies were discovered.
The mounds now standing on the ground are drawn on the appended chart
_Diagrams of Fort Necessity_ as lines C A B E. By a careful survey of
them by Mr. Robert McCracken C.E., sides C A and A B are found to be the
identical mounds surveyed by Mr. Lewis, the variation in direction being
exceedingly slight and easily accounted for by erosion. The direction of
Mr. Lewis's sides were N. 25 W. and S. 80 W.: their direction by Mr.
McCracken's survey are N. 22 W. and S. 80.30 W. This proves beyond a
shadow of a doubt that the embankments surveyed in 1816 and 1901 are
identical.
But the third mound B E runs utterly at variance with Mr. Lewis's
figure. By him its direction was S. 59-1/4 E.; its present direction is
S. 76 E. The question then arises: Is this mound the one that Mr. Lewis
surveyed? Nothing could be better evidence that it is than the very
egregious error Mr. Lewis made concerning the area contained within his
triangular embankment. He affirms that the area of Fort Necessity was
fifty square rods. Now take the line of B E for the third side of the
triangle and extend it to F where it would meet the continuation of side
A C. _That triangle contains almost exactly 50 square rods or one-third
of an acre!_ The natural supposition must be that some one had surveyed
the triangle A F B and computed its area correctly as about fifty square
rods. The mere recording of this area is sufficient evidence that the
triangle A F B had been surveyed in 1816, and this is sufficient proof
that mound B E stood just as it stands today and was considered in Mr.
Lewis's day as one of the embankments of Fort Necessity.
[Illustration: DIAGRAMS OF FORT NECESSITY
[_Scale 80 feet to the inch._]]
Now, why did Mr. Lewis ignore the embankment B E and the triangle A F B
which contained these fifty square rods he gave as the area of Fort
Necessity? For the very obvious reason that that triangle crossed the
brook and ran far into the marsh beyond. By every account the palisades
of Fort Necessity were made to extend on the north to touch the brook,
therefore it would be quite ridiculous to suppose the palisades crossed
the brook again on the east. Mr. Lewis, prepossessed with the idea that
the embankments must have been triangular in shape, drew the line B C as
the base of his triangle, bisecting it at M and N, and making the loop M
S N touch the brook. This design (triangle A B C) of Fort Necessity is
improbable for the following reasons:
1. It has not one-half the area Mr. Lewis gives it.
2. It would not include much more than one-half of the high ground of
the plateau, which was none too large for a fort.
3. There is no semblance of a mound B C nor any shred of testimony nor
any legend of its existence.
4. The mound B E is entirely ignored though there is the best of
evidence that it stood in Mr. Lewis's day where it stands today and was
considered an embankment of Fort Necessity. Mr. Lewis gives exactly the
area of a triangle with it as a part of the base line.
5. Loop M S N would not come near the course of the brook without
extending it far beyond Mr. Lewis's estimate of the length of its sides.
6. Its area is only about 5200 square feet which would make Fort
Necessity unconscionably small in face of the fact that more high ground
was available.
In 1759 Colonel Burd visited the site of Fort Necessity. This was only
five years after it was built. He described its remains as circular in
shape. If it was originally a triangle it is improbable that it could
have appeared round five years later. If, however, it was originally an
irregular square, it is not improbable that the rains and frosts of five
winters, combined with the demolition of the fort by the French, would
have given the mounds a circular appearance. Was Fort Necessity, then,
built in the form of an irregular square? There is the best of evidence
that it was.
In 1830--fourteen years after Mr. Lewis's "survey"--Mr. Jared Sparks, a
careful historian and author of the standard work on Washington, visited
Fort Necessity. According to him its remains occupied "an irregular
square, the dimensions of which were about one hundred feet on each
side."[16] Mr. Sparks drew a map of the embankments which is
incorporated in his _Writings of Washington_ (see plate on page 175).
This drawing has not been reproduced in any later work, the authors of
both _History of Cumberland_ and _Frontier Forts of Pennsylvania_
preferring to reproduce Mr. Lewis's inconsistent survey and speculation
rather than Mr. Sparks's more accurate drawing.
It is plain that Mr. Sparks found the embankment B E running in the
direction it does today and not at all in the direction of the line B C,
as Mr. Lewis drew it. By giving the approximate length of the sides as
one hundred feet, Mr. Sparks gives about the exact length of the line B
E in whatever direction it is extended to the brook. The fact that such
an exact scholar as Mr. Sparks does not mention a sign or tradition of
an embankment at B C, only fourteen years after Mr. Lewis "surveyed"
it, is evidence that it never existed, which cannot come far from
convicting the latter of a positive intention to speculate. However, it
is well known how loosely early surveying was done.
Mr. Sparks gives us four sides for Fort Necessity. Three of these have
been described as C A, A B and the broken line B E D. Is there any
evidence of the fourth side such as indicated by the line C D?
There is!
When Mr. Fazenbaker first questioned the accuracy of the map of Fort
Necessity in _Frontier Forts of Pennsylvania_, he believed the fort was
a four-sided construction and pointed to a small mound, indicated at O,
as the remains of the fourth embankment. The mound would not be noticed
in a hasty view of the field, but, on examination proves to be an
artificial, not a natural, mound. It is in lower ground and nearer the
old course of the brook than the remains of Fort Necessity. A mound here
would suffer most when the brook was out of banks, which would account
for its disappearance.
Excavations in the other mounds had been unsuccessful; nothing had been
discovered of the palisades, though every mound gave certain proof of
having been artificially made. But excavations at mound O gave a
different result. At about four and one-half feet below the surface of
the ground, at the water line, a considerable amount of bark was found,
fresh and red as new bark. It was water-soaked and the strings lay
parallel with the mound above and were not found at a greater distance
than two feet from its center. It was the rough bark of a tree's
trunk--not the skin bark such as grows on roots. Large flakes, the size
of a man's hand, could be removed from it. At a distance of ten feet
away a second trench was sunk, in line with the mound but quite beyond
its northwestern extremity. Bark was found here entirely similar in
color, position, and condition. There is little doubt that the bark came
from the logs of the palisades of Fort Necessity, though nothing is to
be gained by exaggerating the possibility. Bark, here in the low ground,
would last indefinitely, and water was reached under this mound sooner
than at any other point. No wood was found. It is probable that the
French threw down the palisades, but bark would naturally have been left
in the ground. If wood had been left, it would not withstand decay so
long as bark. Competent judges declare the bark to be that of oak. An
authority of great reputation expresses the opinion that the bark found
was probably from the logs of the palisades erected in 1754.
If anything is needed to prove that this slight mound O was an
embankment of Fort Necessity, it is to be found in the result of Mr.
McCracken's survey. The mound lies in _exact line_ with the eastern
extremity of embankment C A, the point C being located seven rods from
the obtuse angle A, in line with the mound C A, which is broken by Mr.
Fazenbaker's lane. Also, the distance from C to D (in line with the
mound O) measures ninety-nine feet and four inches--almost exactly Mr.
Sparks's estimate of one hundred feet. Thus Fort Necessity was in the
shape of the figure represented by lines K C, C A, A B, and B E, and the
projection of the palisades to the brook is represented by E D K, E H K,
or L W K (line B E being prolonged to L). Mr. Sparks's drawing of the
fort is thus proven approximately correct, although Mr. Veech boldly
asserts that it is "inaccurate"[17] (the quotation being copied in the
_Frontier Forts of Pennsylvania_),[18] and despite the fact that two
volumes treating of the fort, _History of Cumberland_, and _Frontier
Forts of Pennsylvania_, refuse to give Mr. Sparks's map a place in their
pages. It is of little practical moment what the form of the fort may
have been, but it is all out of order that a palpably false description
should be given by those who should be authorities, in preference to Mr.
Sparks's description which is easily proven to be approximately correct.
Relics from Fort Necessity are rare and valuable, for the reason that no
other action save the one battle of Fort Necessity ever took place here.
The barrel of an old flint-lock musket, a few grape shot, a bullet mould
and ladle, leaden and iron musket balls, comprise the few silent
memorials of the first battle in which Saxon blood was shed west of the
Alleghany Mountains. The swivels, it is said, were taken to Kentucky to
do brave duty there in redeeming the "dark and bloody ground" to
civilization.
On the one hundredth anniversary of the battle of Fort Necessity a
corner-stone for a monument was laid, but that has been displaced and
rifled by vandals. Will the one hundred and fiftieth anniversary pass
without suitable action? Is not the site of the first battle of the
American Revolution worthy of a monument?