It was secured; but not so easily as D’Erlon had hoped. Darmagnac, so

Soult says, engaged himself much more deeply than had been intended.

Finding only Portuguese in his front, he made a fierce attempt to break

through, and was handsomely repulsed. Meanwhile Abbé, groping among

the wooded slopes to find the flank of Fitzgerald’s brigade, missed it

at first, and attacking the 50th and 92nd frontally, saw his leading

battalions thrown back. But he put in more, farther out to the right,

and though the British brigade threw back its flank _en potence_, and

tried to hold on, it was completely turned, and would have been cut

off, but for a fierce charge by the 34th, who came up from the reserve

and held the enemy in check long enough for the rest to retire--with

the loss of only 36 prisoners (two of them officers). The retreat of

the left wing compelled the Portuguese in the centre to give back

also--they had to make their way across a valley and stream closely

pursued, but behaved most steadily, and lost less than might have been

expected--though some 130 were cut off and captured. The right wing

pivoted, in its withdrawal, on an isolated hill held by Da Costa’s 2nd

Line, which was gallantly maintained to the end of the day. The centre

and left lost more than a mile of ground, but were in good enough order

to take up a new position, selected by Hill on a height in front of

the village of Yguaras, where they repulsed with loss a final attack

made by one of Darmagnac’s regiments which pursued too fiercely[992].

D’Erlon was re-forming his troops, much scattered in the woods,

when at 4 p.m. there arrived from Marcalain the head of Campbell’s

Portuguese brigade, followed by Morillo’s and O’Donnell’s Spaniards.

Their approach was observed, and no further attacks were made by the

French. D’Erlon winds up his account of the day by observing, quite

correctly, that he had driven Hill out of his position, inflicted much

loss on him, and got possession of the road to Yrurzun. So he had--the

Allies had lost 156 British and about 900 Portuguese, of whom 170 were

prisoners. The French casualties must have been about 800 in all,

if we may make a rough calculation from the fact that they lost 39

officers--10 in Abbé’s division, 29 in Darmagnac’s[993].

But it is not to win results such as these that 18,000 men attack

8,000, and fight them for seven hours[994]. And what was the use of

such a tactical success, when meanwhile Soult’s main body had been

beaten and scattered to the winds, so that Reille and Clausel were

bringing up 14,000 demoralized soldiers, instead of 30,000 confident

ones, to join the victorious D’Erlon?

This unpleasant fact stared Soult in the face, when he rode back to

Olague to receive the reports of his two lieutenants. It was useless to

think of further attempts on the Tolosa road, or molestation of Graham.

D’Erlon’s three divisions were now his only intact force, capable of

engaging in an action with confidence: the rest were not only reduced

to a wreck in number, but were ‘spent troops’ from the point of view of

morale. The only thing to be done was to retreat as fast as possible,

using the one solid body of combatants to cover the retreat of the

rest. All that Soult afterwards wrote to Paris about his movements of

July 31 being the logical continuation of his design of July 30--‘de

me rapprocher de la frontière pour y prendre des subsistances, avec

l’espoir de joindre la réserve du Général Villatte[995],’ was of course

mere insincerity. He changed his whole plan, and fled in haste, merely

because he was forced to do so.

One strange resolve, however, he made on the evening of July 30. The

safest and shortest way home was by the Puerto de Velate, Elizondo, and

Maya; and Clausel’s and Reille’s troops at Olague and Lanz were well

placed for taking this route. This was not the case with D’Erlon’s men

at Lizaso and the newly won villages in front of it. Instead of bidding

the routed corps hurry straight on, and bringing D’Erlon down to cover

them, the Marshal directed Reille and Clausel to leave the great road,

to cut across by Olague to Lizaso, and to get behind D’Erlon, who would

hold on till they were past his rear. All would then take the route

of the Puerto de Arraiz and go by Santesteban. This was a much more

dangerous line of retreat; so much so that the choice excites surprise.

Soult told Clarke that his reason for taking the risk was that D’Erlon

had got so far west that there was no time to move him back to the

Velate road--which seems an unconvincing argument. For Clausel and

Reille had to transfer themselves to the Puerto de Arraiz road, which

would take just as much time; and D’Erlon could not retreat till they

had cleared his rear. The real explanation would seem to be that Soult

thought that the British column on the Velate road, being victorious,

would start sooner and pursue more vigorously than Hill’s troops, who

had just been defeated. If Reille and Clausel were pressed without

delay, their divisions would go to pieces: D’Erlon, on the other hand,

could be relied upon to stand his ground as long as was needful. If

this was Soult’s idea, his prescience was justified.

SECTION XXXVIII: CHAPTER VI

SOULT’S RETREAT, JULY 31-AUG. 3

When Soult’s orders of the evening of July 29th had been issued,

there was no longer any pretence kept up that the Army was executing

a voluntary strategical movement, _planmässig_ as the German of 1918

would have expressed the idea, and not absconding under pressure of the

enemy.

At 1 o’clock midnight Clausel’s and Reille’s harassed troops at Olague

and Lanz went off as fast as their tired legs would carry them, and

leaving countless stragglers behind. D’Erlon could not retire till the

morning, when he sent off Darmagnac and Maransin to follow the rest of

the army, retaining Abbé’s division as his rearguard, which held the

heights north of Lizaso for some time after their comrades had gone.

Wellington’s orders issued at nightfall[996] were such as suited Soult

fairly well, for the British general had not foreseen that which was

unlikely, and he had been deceived to some extent by the reports which

had come in. The deductions which he drew from what he had ascertained

were that a large body of the enemy had retreated eastward, and would

fall into the Roncesvalles road, but that the main force would follow

the Velate-Elizondo _chaussée_. That Soult would lead all that survived

to him of his army over the Puerto de Arraiz passes, to Santesteban,

had not struck him as a likely contingency. Hence his detailed

orders overnight were inappropriate to the facts which appeared next

morning. He directed Picton to pursue whatever was before him on the

Roncesvalles road--thinking that Foy and Lamartinière would escape in

that direction; but lest they should have gone off by Eugui and the Col

de Urtiaga he directed Pakenham to take the 6th Division from Olague,

when it should have reached that place, across the hills to Eugui, from

whence he could join Picton if necessary. Campbell’s Portuguese were

to turn off in the same direction and make for Eugui and the Alduides.

Unfortunately, Picton was thus set to pursue nothing, while Pakenham

was twelve hours behind Foy, and never likely to catch him.

The main pursuit was to be urged on the _chaussée_ leading by Olague

and Lanz to Elizondo, whither it was supposed that Soult would have

taken the bulk of his army. From Ostiz and the neighbourhood Byng and

Cole were to march in this direction, conducted by Wellington himself,

while from the other side Hill was to lead thither his own four

brigades, and the Spanish reinforcements which had reached him at the

end of the combat of Beunza.

Only Dalhousie and the 7th Division were directed to take the route of

the Puerto de Arraiz, and this not with the object of pursuing the main

French army, but rather as a flanking movement to favour the operation

allotted to Hill. And Dalhousie, unfortunately, was not well placed for

the march allotted to him, since he was near Ostiz, and had to get to

his destination by a cross march via Lizaso.

A separate note for Charles Alten, written at the same time as the rest

of the orders, but not sent out till the following morning, directed

the Light Division to march back to Zubieta where it would be able to

communicate with the column that went by the Puerto de Arraiz, i.e.

that of Dalhousie[997], and be well placed for flank operations against

the retreating enemy.

The net result of all this was to send over half the available

troops--Picton, Pakenham, Campbell, Byng, and Cole--on roads where

no enemy would be found. And Hill’s force would have suffered the

same fate, if it had not been in such close touch with D’Erlon that

it could not help following, when it enemy’s route became evident.

Unfortunately--as Soult had perhaps calculated--Hill had troops

whose ranks had been terrible thinned, and who were tired out by an

unsuccessful action fought on the preceding afternoon.

The day’s work was unsatisfactory. Picton, of course, found out at

Zubiri that everything that had been on the Roncesvalles road--the

small detachment already spoken of[998], and a mass of stragglers--had

turned up toward Eugui and the Alduides on the preceding night. And

Cole discovered that Foy had passed the Puerto de Urtiaga a whole march

ahead of him. Wellington, with the column on the great _chaussée_,

pressed rapidly across the Velate and reached Irurita, with the

exasperating result that he discovered that only 500 to 2,000 French

had passed that way[999]. On the other hand, he had news from the west

that an immense mass of the enemy had gone by the Puerto de Arraiz,

with Hill and Dalhousie after them. There were doubts whether the

pursuing force was not dangerously small--at any rate, it would have

to be cautious. And it was tiresome that the position of the Light

Division was still unknown--it might (or might not) have a chance of

falling on the flank of Soult’s long column, either at Santesteban or

at Sumbilla. Wellington’s own troops had marched far and fast from

Ostiz to Irurita, but there was in the evening enough energy left in

Byng’s brigade for a short push farther. News came in that a great

convoy of food from St. Jean de Luz had just reached Elizondo, where

it had halted under the protection of the regiment which D’Erlon had

left there on the 27th. By a forced march in the evening Byng’s flank

companies surprised and captured the whole--a good supply of bread,

biscuit, and brandy--the escort making off without resistance. The

brigadier had the heads of the brandy casks stove in, before the weary

troops could get at them, ‘it was a sight to see the disappointed

soldiers lying down on their faces and lapping up the liquor with their

hands[1000].’

All this, of course, was unimportant. The real interest of the doings

of July 31st lay on the road from Lizaso to the Puerto de Arraiz. Hill,

as was natural, was late in discovering that the whole of the French

army had passed across his front, since Abbé’s division still lay at

eight in the morning in battle-order blocking his way. But having got

the news of the decisive success won by his chief on the preceding

day, Hill had to attack the hitherto victorious enemy in front of

him, knowing that the general situation was such that they could not

possibly stand. His advance was not made till 10 a.m.--a sufficient

proof of the difficulty of resuming the offensive with tired and beaten

troops. When once, however, it began, the 2nd Division showed that if

its numbers were wasted, its fighting power was still strong. And the

delay in its attack allowed of the arrival of the 7th Division, who

were able to co-operate in a way that would have been impossible if the

fighting had started at daybreak.

On the other hand, the hours between dawn and 10 a.m., during which

his retreat was unmolested, were invaluable to Soult, whose army was

jammed in the passes in a most dangerous fashion. He had taken the

lead himself, with the two cavalry divisions and the baggage, ordering

Reille, whose troops were the most demoralized of all, to follow, with

Clausel in his rear--D’Erlon stopping behind as rearguard to hold back

the enemy. Now cavalry moves slowly in an uphill climb on a narrow

road; while worn-out mules and pack-horses go much slower still, and

are always breaking down and obstructing the route. The result was a

complete block in the defiles: when Reille heard firing commencing in

the rear, he grew so anxious that he ordered his infantry to push on

anyhow, and thrust their way through the baggage by force[1001]. This

naturally made matters still worse. Clausel found a better plan: the

Puerto de Arraiz gives its name to what is really not a single path,

but three parallel ones of various merit, all crossing the same dip in

the main crest of the Pyrenees within a short distance of each other.

They come together again on the north side of the watershed near the

village of Donna Maria, whence some writers call the whole group ‘the

Donna Maria passes.’ Clausel, leaving the best and most obvious track

to the others, crossed by the most eastern of the three, the Puerto de

Arraiz proper, while the cavalry, Reille, and D’Erlon took the western

route which is locally known as the Puerto de Eradi, and comes down

more directly on to Santesteban.

When Hill’s attack began to develop from Lizaso, D’Erlon ordered Abbé’s

division to give ground, before it was too closely pressed, but halted

it for a stand again, on heights by the Venta de Urroz, six miles

farther north, at the foot of the passes. Darmagnac and Maransin were

visible higher up the crest, where they were waiting till the road

should be clear in front of them. It was now nearly two o’clock, and

Dalhousie’s division was nearing the front, and was visible closing

towards Hill’s right. Undoubtedly the proper game was to await its

arrival, and use it to turn Abbé’s flank. But Hill directed his leading

troops to prevent the enemy from withdrawing, and the vanguard was this

day in charge of the reckless William Stewart, who despite his Maya

wound had come back to his troops, and appeared with his damaged leg

strapped to his saddle in a roll of cushions. He ordered Fitzgerald’s

brigade to attack at once frontally: this was really wicked; the three

battalions had lost nearly half their numbers at Maya, and 150 men more

at Beunza on the preceding afternoon. They were a mere wreck--under

1,000 bayonets: the position opposite them was a steep wooded hill,

held by the most intact division of the whole French army, over 7,000

strong. The attack was delivered with great courage, but was hopeless

from the first, and repelled with loss[1002]. Stewart then repeated it,

throwing in Pringle’s brigade as it came up from the rear, to support

Fitzgerald’s, and turning on two guns, which had been brought up with

much difficulty, to shell the woods beside the road. A second attack

was thus delivered with equal want of success. But Dalhousie’s troops

having now come up on the right[1003], a third push was successful,

and Abbé went back, and retired behind Darmagnac, who now took over

the rearguard. The hours gained in this combat had sufficed to clear

the road, and on the further advance of the British, D’Erlon’s corps

gave back rapidly but in good order, and was in full retreat down the

northern watershed when a dense fog came on, and caused Hill to halt

his troops. Stewart’s first wholly unnecessary frontal attack had

resulted in the loss of the acting-brigadier, Fitzgerald, wounded and

a prisoner[1004], and of nearly 200 casualties among his three weak

battalions--91 in the 92nd Highlanders alone, who having put 750 men

in line at Maya on the 25th came out of action on the 31st with only

250 surviving. The 7th Division had 117 casualties distributed between

six English and Portuguese units--and the total loss in the combat was

387, including a score of prisoners. That Stewart himself was again

wounded and sent to the rear, after only twelve hours at the front, was

a testimonial to his courage, but a very fortunate event for the 2nd

Division. The French cannot have lost much over 200 men[1005].

Having thus cleared the passes, Hill thought it was his duty to carry

out Wellington’s original orders of the preceding night[1006], by

closing in towards the main body on the Maya _chaussée_; he did so by

taking a hill track called the Puerto de Sangre, which runs from Arraiz

to Almandoz. Of course this was a grave mistake, as troops were wanted

rather on the Santesteban than on the Elizondo road. Hill must not

be too much blamed, as Wellington might have sent him new orders to

keep to the direction of the enemy’s retreat, and did not. The danger

involved in this move was that only the 7th Division was left to pursue

Soult’s main body, and the force in the upper Bastan was unnecessarily

increased. The responsibility rests with Wellington, who, even after

reaching Irurita in the afternoon and finding practically no traces of

enemy in the Bastan, could not believe that the French had gone off _en

masse_ by the passes to Santesteban. He would make no sweeping changes

in his plan till he got full information. ‘I shall make the troops

dine, and see what is to be done in the evening’ was his message to

Murray[1007]. The evening brought Hill’s news, and by dawn Wellington

was much more clear about the situation--‘as far as I can judge the

enemy have six divisions between Doña Maria and St. Estevan. There are

three divisions certainly about Eugui and Roncesvalles[1008].’ The

distribution of the French was even still misjudged--there were troops

representing eight divisions, not six, in the Central Bastan valley.

And only one division, Foy’s, had passed eastward; though so many lost

detachments and bands of stragglers had followed it, that an impression

of much larger numbers had been produced.

Despite of Wellington’s misconceptions, Soult’s position at Santesteban

that evening was most uncomfortable. His cavalry scouts had brought

him news that there was a heavy British column on his right flank, at

Elizondo in the Upper Bastan (Cole and Byng). His rearguard had been

fiercely attacked by another column (Dalhousie and Hill). There were

large possibilities of the arrival of other foes from the north and

west, if Graham had not been kept employed by Villatte. And it was

growing most obvious that the story which D’Erlon had reported, to

the effect that the Reserve Division had crossed the Bidassoa, and

was advancing, could not be true. For cavalry patrols pushing down

the river towards Vera could not find any signs of friendly troops,

and had been fired on by Spanish outposts--Longa’s men. When Soult

next wrote to Paris he spoke out with much bitterness on the criminal

torpidity of Villatte, who might at least, without risking anything,

have occupied Vera and the gorge of the Bidassoa, and have tried to

get into touch with the army in the field. It must be remembered that

down to the 30th all Soult’s communications with his bases at Bayonne

and St. Jean-Pied-du-Port had been either by Maya or by Roncesvalles.

He had thrown up the latter line when he marched north; the former was

now closed to him by the reported arrival of a large hostile force

at Elizondo. The only way home was by the road down the Bidassoa by

Sumbilla to Echalar; and now it turned out that there was no certainty

that this road might not have been blocked by detachments from

Graham’s army. The situation was anything but hopeful, and a complete

disaster was by no means outside the bounds of possibility. One thing

was certain--the army must get out of the Santesteban cul-de-sac

as soon as possible, and by the only road that was not known to be

intercepted. But prompt flight was rendered difficult by the presence

at head-quarters of two divisions of quite useless cavalry, a convoy of

many thousands of wounded, and the baggage of eight divisions.

At evening on the 31st the Marshal had been so much disturbed by the

news of the presence of the British at Elizondo, from whence they could

descend on Santesteban by following the road along the Bidassoa, that

he had thrown out the whole of Reille’s surviving infantry (perhaps

6,000 men) to cover the road by the river against any attack. But the

enemy did not move that night--Wellington was resting his men and

waiting for news. Dalhousie had halted on the heights by the Puerto de

Arraiz when the fog came down at 5 p.m., and did not follow D’Erlon

down to the valley.

Hence Soult had the power to arrange for a flitting before dawn, on

the only possible route--a gorge twelve miles long where the road

follows the rocky bed of the Bidassoa in all its curves, with the water

on its left and steep wooded hills on its right. The line of march

was headed by one infantry battalion of Reille’s corps to clear the

way[1009], then came Treillard’s dragoons[1010], six regiments, taking

up an intolerable length of road, then the remains of Lamartinière’s

division[1011], then the wounded followed by the baggage train, then

the handful of men that represented the wrecked division of Maucune,

then (apparently) Pierre Soult’s cavalry[1012]. D’Erlon’s corps was to

follow--in the order Abbé, Maransin, Darmagnac, followed by another

mass of baggage. Clausel’s wing was directed to bring up the rear,

with the task of holding back any pursuit either from the direction of

Elizondo or that of the Donna Maria passes. It was certain that there

was danger from both sides--so the start was made early--at 2.30, long

ere dawn. Reille was directed to lead the column along the river as

far as the bifurcation of the routes to Vera and to Echalar, where he

was to take the latter, and turn off from the Bidassoa: for the last

stage into France was to be made over the Puerto de Echalar and not

over the more westerly Puerto de Vera. Apparently D’Erlon was ordered

to branch off at Sumbilla with his infantry alone, and to take a

separate mountain-track to Echalar, which few maps mark. This is, at

any rate, Soult’s statement; but as D’Erlon makes no mention of such

directions, and did not actually go that way (though Clausel did), the

order matters little to the historian.

The unpleasant possibilities of the situation of the French on the

night of July 31st-August 1st seem to have been more clearly discerned

by Soult than by Wellington--as was natural, since the Marshal knew

much better the exact state of his own army. There was a positive

danger that it might be enveloped from all sides on the following

day. But Wellington does not seem to have contemplated so great an

operation, though he had a clear notion that the enemy might be much

incommoded and harassed if all went well. He had hopes that something

might be done by means of the Light Division--whose position was still,

most unluckily, a matter of doubt. He had written on the preceding

afternoon to Charles Alten to say that if he had got back to Zubieta,

he ought to be told that a large body of the enemy was marching by the

Donna Maria passes: ‘it is very desirable that you should endeavour

to head them at St. Estevan. If you should find that you cannot head

them there, you might at Sumbilla, or you might cut in upon their

column of march: they are in the greatest disorder. The head of our

troops is here at Irurita, and others are following the enemy by Doña

Maria. Communicate this to Sir Thomas Graham, via Goizueta[1013].’ It

is quite clear that there is no idea of encirclement in this order,

but only one of molestation. And it is equally obvious that Wellington

had no idea of using any of Graham’s forces to block the gorge of the

Bidassoa. His message to that general on the 31st is, ‘we are going to

act immediately against a column which is retiring by the Doña Maria

road. We have plenty of troops in the proper direction, and if we can

overtake the column, I hope its rear will suffer considerably[1014].’

Graham is asked for no help; and, what is more curious, Wellington in

his last preceding letter had told him that he attached no importance

to keeping possession of Vera, at the actual gorge of the Bidassoa.

‘I have a letter from General Giron, expressing apprehensions of the

consequences to his position of losing Vera. The fact is, that Vera is

no object to anybody. The heights are important for the communication

with Lesaca by the valley of the Bidassoa, and the heights on the other

side open the _débouché_ into France. But the loss of both would not

affect the position of Irun, if the passages through the rocky heights

on the right of Irun are well guarded, for which Longa is allotted:

and that is what it is most important to take care of.’[1015] This, it

is true, was written on the 30th, before Wellington had ascertained

that any French force was to retire by Santesteban. But it coincides

completely with Graham’s contemporary letter to his commander,

expressing exactly the same opinion. ‘General Giron seems anxious, on

hearing of Soult’s being repulsed, to undertake an offensive operation

against the Puerto de Vera, which I could not encourage, being

persuaded that his troops would not succeed, against so strong a post,

and that his failure would be very prejudicial.’

In fact it is clear that Graham and Wellington both discouraged the

idea of sending a considerable force to the gorge of the Bidassoa,

which a day later would have proved of incalculable importance. A

single division placed on the cross-roads to Vera and Echalar by the

bridge of Yanzi would have cut Soult’s only line of retreat. His

infantry, no doubt, or great part of it, could have escaped over the

mountains, but the whole of his cavalry and train, and no doubt many

infantry also, must have been captured. To make matters easy for

the enemy, Soult had placed at the head of his interminable column

useless dragoons, and the smallest and most demoralized of his corps

of infantry. Neither Reille’s wasted divisions nor Treillard’s cavalry

could have cut their way through 5,000 steady troops at the mouth of

the defile. And D’Erlon could not have got up--the road in front of him

for miles being blocked with baggage and helpless horsemen, and his

rear harassed by vigorous pursuit.

Unfortunately, however, when Longa complained that he was too weak on

the heights opposite Vera, and reported that the French were turning

back, and that his post at the bridge of Yanzi would be attacked,

no more was done to strengthen him than the moving of one brigade

of Barcena’s division to the heights by Lesaca, from which a single

battalion was sent down to the Yanzi position. Yet this solitary unit

had no small effect on the events of August 1, caused a panic among the

enemy, and delayed Soult’s march for hours. What would have happened if

Graham and Giron had sent down a solid force (e.g. one British and one

or two Spanish brigades) it is impossible to say with accuracy, but the

results must have been tremendous.

There can be no doubt that the legend according to which Wellington

schemed for the complete encirclement of Soult’s army on the 1st of

August, though early and well supported, is inaccurate. The form which

it takes in Napier[1016], Larpent, and Stanhope’s _Conversations

with the Duke of Wellington_, is that on the evening of the 31st

arrangements were being made for a concentric attack on Soult, but

that they were foiled, under Wellington’s own eyes, by a party of

marauding British soldiers, who strayed near the French camp, and were

taken prisoners. Their appearance from the Elizondo side betrayed,

it is alleged, to Soult that he was outflanked, and caused him to

march in the night instead of at dawn--by which time he would have

been surrounded. Unfortunately for the legend, we have Soult’s own

contemporary dispatch of August 2 to prove that the news of the

presence of the British at Elizondo was brought him by a cavalry

patrol, which reached the village just as it and the convoy in it were

captured by Byng’s brigade. They got away, but could not tell him

whether the convoy-escort had, or had not, escaped. Moreover, much

earlier in the day, Reille had warned the Marshal that the British were

coming up in force on the Velate-Elizondo road--so the whole story

falls through.

Wellington’s limited ambitions of August 1 are made clear by his

dispatch written at 6 in the morning, which says that he is sending

the 4th Division on to Santesteban ‘with the intention of aiding

Dalhousie’s advance, and to endeavour to cut some of them off.’ It

is true that he adds, ‘I sent in triplicate to the Light Division at

Zubieta yesterday, to desire that General Alten should move toward St.

Estevan, and at all events get hold of Sumbilla if he could. But I have

heard nothing of him[1017].’ He was therefore not relying on certain

help from the Light Division, or from Graham or from Longa, though

advices of the situation were sent to all three. Of the troops under

his own hand he only sent the 4th Division to join the hunt. Cole was

directed to push the French on the north bank of the Bidassoa, while

Dalhousie was pressing them on the south bank. Byng was told to remain

stationary, till Hill’s column should come up from Almandoz, ‘when I

shall know better how things are situated on all sides, and how far Sir

Rowland has advanced.’

The 4th Division, starting early despite of its long march on the

preceding day, was attacking the French rear by seven o’clock in the

morning--7th Division diaries would seem to show that Dalhousie was

much later in closing. We have, oddly enough, no good account of

the fight that ensued from any British source[1018]; but Clausel’s

narrative enables us to understand pretty well what happened. At

dawn Vandermaesen’s division had been left as rearguard on the hill

facing Santesteban on the north side of the Bidassoa, with Taupin’s

in support, while Conroux’s was trying to make its way towards

Sumbilla, but found the path blocked by D’Erlon’s baggage in front.

Wherefore Clausel directed his brigadiers to give up any idea of

keeping to the road, and to march along the slopes above it, so long

as was possible. When the British appeared, they attacked with long

lines of skirmishers, keeping to the hillside and attempting to turn

Vandermaesen’s flank on the high ground. The French, therefore, also

extended themselves uphill, but reached the crest only after the enemy

had just crowned it. ‘On this ground, where no regular deployment

could take place, the side which had got to the top first had every

advantage.’ Vandermaesen’s battalions evidently broke up, as we are

told that they got into trouble, ‘continuing a retrograde movement

high up the mountain among horrid precipices,’ and were only rallied

on two of Taupin’s regiments above the gorge of the defile between

Santesteban and Sumbilla, where Clausel had to halt perforce, because

there was a complete block in front of him--Darmagnac’s division of

D’Erlon’s corps was halted there from absolute inability to proceed,

owing to trouble in front. The French narrative then describes an

hour of incoherent fighting on the slopes above Sumbilla, in which

Darmagnac’s troops on the road below were also engaged. It ended with

the retreat of all Clausel’s three divisions across the hills, each

taking its own way by foot-tracks up a different spur of the Atchiola

range, and arriving in succession in the upland valley of Echalar by

separate routes. The British did not follow, but stuck to Darmagnac

and the baggage-train down in the road, whom they continued to press

and persecute. All this reads like a serious fight and a deliberate

retreat--but the critical historian must remark that to all appearances

Clausel is glozing over a complete _débandade_ and a disorderly flight

across the mountains--for that there was no real resistance is shown by

the casualty list of the pursuing British. The 4th Division brigades,

English and Portuguese, lost that day precisely three men killed and

three officers and 42 men wounded among their twelve battalions--i.

e. there can have been no attempt at a stand at any time in the

morning--and from the first moment, when Vandermaesen’s flank was

turned, the enemy must have continued to make off over inaccessible

ground as hard as he could go. If he had tried to hold the pursuers

back, the 4th Division would have shown more than 48 killed and

wounded. The 7th Division had no casualties at all, so evidently did

not get to the front in time to do more than pick up stragglers and

baggage. The same impression of mere flight is produced by the French

lists of officers killed and hurt--six in Vandermaesen’s division, one

in Conroux’s, none in Taupin’s--this should, on the usual proportion

between the ranks, represent perhaps 150 or 160 as the total loss of

Clausel’s corps[1019]. Obviously then, we are facing the record of a

flight not of a fight; and the conduct of these same divisions on the

following morning, when attacked by Barnes’s brigade--of which, more in

its proper place--sufficiently explains the happenings of August 1st.

So much for the chronicle of the rearguard. That of the vanguard is

much more interesting. Reille, as has been before mentioned, was in

charge of the advance, which consisted of one battalion of the 120th

Regiment, followed by Treillard’s dragoon division, the baggage of

the corps, and the main convoy of wounded; the rest of the infantry

was separated by a couple of miles of impedimenta from the leading

battalion. There was no trouble, though progress was very slow, until,

late in the morning, the head of the column arrived near the bridge of

Yanzi, where a by-path, leading down from that village and from Lesaca,

crosses the Bidassoa. The bridge of Yanzi was, as has been mentioned

above--the extreme right point of the long observation line which

Longa’s Spaniards had been holding since July 25th. The village above

it, on the west bank, a mile uphill, was occupied by a battalion of

Barcena’s division of the Galician Army, lent to Longa on the preceding

day--the 2nd Regiment of Asturias[1020]. But there were two companies

of Longa’s own on outlying picket at the bridge, which had been

barricaded but not broken. The road from Santesteban bifurcates a short

distance up-stream from the bridge, the left-hand branch following

the bank of the Bidassoa to Vera, the right-hand one diverging inland

and uphill to Echalar. The route of the French was not across the

bridge, since they were not going to Lesaca or Yanzi, nor past it,

since they were not going to Vera; they had to turn off eastward at

the cross-roads, almost opposite the bridge but a little south of it,

and to follow the minor road which leads up to Echalar along the south

bank of the Sari stream, on which that village stands. When Reille’s

battalion at the head of the marching column came to the cross roads,

it was fired upon by the Spanish post at the bridge. This created some

confusion: the critic can only ask with wonder why Reille, who had six

cavalry regiments under his orders, had not sent out vedettes along the

roads far ahead, and become aware long before of the obstruction in

his front: evidently, however, he had not. After the first shots were

fired, there was a general stoppage all down the column. The battalion

at its head could see that the Spaniards were very few, and prepared

to dislodge them. Meanwhile the dragoons had halted and many of them,

at places where the river was level with the road, walked their horses

into the stream, to let them drink. Suddenly there came a violent

explosion of musketry from the front--the bridge was being attacked and

forced. But to those far down the road, who could not see the bridge,

it sounded as if the enemy was assailing and driving in the solitary

battalion on which the safety of the whole army depended for the

moment. A great part of the dragoons shouted ‘right about turn,’ and

galloped backward up the pass without having received any order[1021],

till they plunged into General Reille and his staff, moving at the head

of Lamartinière’s division, and nearly rode them down. The column of

infantry blocking the road stopped the further progress of the foremost

fugitives, who got jammed in a mass by the impetus of squadrons

pressing behind them. Reille could not make out the cause of the

panic, but filed the 2nd Léger out of the road and sent them past the

dragoons by a footpath on the slope, by which they got to the bridge.

It was found that the Spaniards had been driven from it, and forced

to retire up the west bank of the river, the way to Echalar being

clear. Thereupon the battalion of the 120th, followed by the 2nd Léger,

turned up the road, and after them the leading regiments of dragoons.

The officers in charge at the front forgot that their enemies might

return, and left no one to guard the bridge. Hence, when Reille came

up in person a little later, he was vexed to find that the Spaniards

had reappeared on the rocky farther bank of the river half a mile above

the bridge, and were firing across the ravine at the passing cavalry,

causing much confusion and some loss. Unable to cross the river, which

had precipitous banks at this point, he ordered that the next infantry

which arrived--the 2nd battalion of the 120th--should deploy on the

slopes above the road, and keep down the enemy’s fire by continuous

volleys. He also directed another battalion to cross the bridge, and

work up-stream till they should come on the flank of the Spaniards, and

then to drive them away. This was done, and the rest of the dragoons,

Lamartinière’s infantry, and the head of the column of baggage filed

past the cross-roads and went on towards Echalar--with Reille himself

in their company. He had left a battalion at the Yanzi bridge, with

orders to hold the pass, but had little expectation of seeing it

molested again, taking the enemy for a mere party of guerrilleros.

But worse was now to come. The Spanish companies which had been driven

off were now reinforced by the main body of the regiment of Asturias,

which, coming down from Yanzi village, made a vigorous attack on the

bridge, swept back the French battalion which was holding it[1022],

and began firing into the baggage train which was passing the cross

roads at that moment. The bulk of it turned back in confusion, and

rushed up the defile, soon causing a complete block among the convoy

of wounded and the division of Maucune, which was the next combatant

unit in the line of march. The Spaniards held the bridge for more

than two hours, during which complete anarchy prevailed on the road as

far as Sumbilla, where D’Erlon’s rearguard, the division of Darmagnac,

was now engaged in skirmishing with the British 4th Division. The

real difficulty was that owing to the bad arrangement of the order

of march, it took an inordinate time to bring fresh troops from the

rear up to the head of the column; while Reille, now safely arrived

at Echalar and busy in arranging his troops in position there, does

not seem to have thought for a moment of what might be going on behind

him[1023]. Maucune’s division (a mere wreck) came up at last, thrusting

the baggage and wounded aside: its general confesses that ‘it fought

feebly with the Spaniards at the bridge--its loss was not more than 30

men. The division was so weak, its men so short of cartridges, that

it was necessary to wait for one of Count D’Erlon’s divisions to come

up, before the road could be cleared[1024].’ He does not add--but his

corps-commander[1025] gives us the fact--that ‘the 7th Division ended

by quitting the road and throwing itself into the mountains in order to

avoid the enemy’s fire,’ i. e. it went over the hills in disorder, and

arrived at Echalar as a mob rather than a formed body. Abbé’s troops,

at the head of D’Erlon’s column, at last got up, after a desperate

scramble through the mass of baggage, wounded, and (apparently) cavalry

also, for some of Pierre Soult’s regiments seem to have been marching

after Maucune. ‘Jammed between the river, whose right bank is very

steep, and the mountain, whose slopes are wooded and impracticable, the

soldiers shoved the train aside, upsetting much into the river, and

turning the disorder of the movement to profit by pillaging all that

they could lay their hands upon[1026].’ At last Abbé got four or five

battalions disentangled[1027] and formed them to attack the bridge,

which was carried by the 64th Regiment after a struggle which did the

Asturians much credit--the French units engaged showed a loss of 9

officers, probably therefore of some 200 men[1028]. Leaving a couple of

battalions to guard the bridge and the knoll beyond it, Abbé hurried

the rest of his division towards Echalar, the baggage following as

it could, mixed with the troops that were coming up from the rear.

Thus the greater part of D’Erlon’s corps got through; but there was

still one more episode to come in this day of alarms and excursions.

Darmagnac’s division, at the rear of all, had reached the cross-roads,

and had relieved Abbé’s battalions at the bridge by a covering force

of its own, when a new and furious fire of musketry suddenly broke out

from the slopes above, and a swarm of green-coated skirmishers rushed

down the heights, carried the knoll and the bridge below it, and opened

fire on the passing troops--Darmagnac’s rear brigade--and the mass of

baggage which was mixed with it. This marked the arrival--when it was

too late--of the much tried British Light Division, whose unfortunate

adventures of the last three days it is necessary to explain.

It will be remembered that Wellington had sent orders to Charles Alten,

on the 29th July, that he should move from Zubieta to such a point

on the Tolosa-Yrurzun road as might seem best--possibly Lecumberri.

This dispatch travelled fast, and Alten marched that same night to

Saldias--a short stage but fatiguing, as marches in the dark are prone

to be. Next day--the 30th--the Light Division made an extremely long

and exhausting march by vile mountain roads to Lecumberri, hearing

all day incessant cannonading and musketry fire to their left--this

was the noise of the second battle of Sorauren and the combat of

Beunza. Unfortunately Alten was in touch neither with Hill nor with

Head-Quarters, and though he reached Lecumberri at dark on the 30th,

got no news of what had happened till late on the afternoon of the

31st, when one of Wellington’s aides-de-camp rode in, ‘more dead than

alive from excessive fatigue[1029],’ bearing the order issued late on

the 30th for the return of the division to Zubieta. He brought the

news of Soult’s defeat--but Wellington and every one else had supposed

that the French would go back by the Puerto de Velate, and Alten’s

orders were merely to get into communication with the 7th Division,

sent on the side-operation by the Puerto de Arraiz, which was at the

time of the issue of the order thought comparatively subsidiary[1030].

The Light Division marched that evening to Leyza--eight or nine miles

on a mountain road--not a bad achievement for the dark hours, but

critics (wise after the event) whispered that Alten might have got to

Saldias, eight miles farther, if he had chosen to push the men. It, at

any rate, made a mighty difference to the fate of the campaign that

Wellington’s next orders, those issued from Almandoz at noon on the

31st, found the Light Division not near Zubieta but at Leyza, when they

were handed in during the small hours before dawn on the 1st.

This dispatch, as will be remembered, told Alten that Soult had retired

by the Puerto de Arraiz and Santesteban, and was obviously going

home through the gorge of the Bidassoa, by Vera and Echalar. He was

directed to ‘head off’ the enemy at Santesteban, if that were possible,

if not at Sumbilla seven miles farther north--or at least to ‘cut

in upon their column of march’ somewhere[1031]. All this would have

been quite possible, if Wellington had not on the 29th sent the Light

Division on the unlucky southward march from Zubieta to Lecumberri.

This misdirection was at the root of all subsequent misadventure. We

may add that it would still have been possible, if the dispatch sent

off in the early morning of the 31st to bid the division come back to

Zubieta, had contained any indication that the enemy was retiring by

Santesteban, or that haste was necessary. But it had only directed

Alten to ‘put his division in movement for Zubieta,’ but to keep up his

touch with Lecumberri, and told him that Dalhousie would be marching

by the passes of Donna Maria[1032]. The Almandoz note, which contained

the really important general information and detailed orders, wandered

about for many hours in the sabretache of an aide-de-camp who could not

know where Alten was, and found him after many hours of groping in the

night at Leyza, and not at Zubieta. From the latter place, only six

miles from Santesteban, the operation directed by Wellington would have

been possible to execute in good time--from Leyza (on the other side of

a difficult pass, and many miles farther away) it was not. This simple

fact settled the fate of the Light Division on August 1.

Alten put his men under arms at dawn on that morning, and marched, as

ordered, for Santesteban via Zubieta; having passed the latter place

and got to Elgorriaga, four miles farther on, he received the news

that the enemy had left Santesteban early, and could not be headed off

there. Wellington’s alternative scheme dictated an attempt to break

into Soult’s line of march at Sumbilla, so the Light Division was put

in motion by the very bad country road over the mountain of Santa Cruz

from Elgorriaga to Aranaz and Yanzi. The men had already gone a full

day’s journey, and were much fatigued. They had (it will be remembered)

executed a night march from Lecumberri to Leyza only twelve hours back.

The Santa Cruz path was heart-breaking--officers had to dismount and

walk up to spare their horses: the men went bent double under their

knapsacks: the day was one of blazing August sunshine: the track was

over big stones embedded in deep shale--one sufferer compared his

progress to striding from one stepping-stone to another[1033].

On reaching the crest of the Santa Cruz mountain, opposite Sumbilla,

at four in the afternoon, the Light Division at last came in sight of

the enemy--a dense and disorderly column hurrying along the road from

Sumbilla northward, pressed by the 4th Division, the bickering fire

of whose skirmishers could be seen round the tail of the rearguard.

They were separated from the observer’s point of view by the canon of

the Bidassoa, here very deep and precipitous--the Santa Cruz mountain

is over 3,000 feet high. It would have taken much time to scramble

down the steep path to Sumbilla, and the enemy was already past that

village. Alten, therefore, resolved to push for the bridge of Yanzi,

seven miles farther on, with the hope of cutting off at least the

rearguard of the French.

But this seven miles was too much for men already in the last stages

of fatigue from over-marching and want of food. ‘When the cry was set

up “the enemy,” the worn soldiers raised their bent heads covered with

dust and sweat: we had nearly reached the summit of the tremendous

mountain, but nature was quite exhausted. Many men had lagged behind,

having accomplished thirty miles over rocky roads interspersed with

loose stones. Many fell heavily on the naked rock, frothing at the

mouth, black in the face, and struggling in their last agonies. Others,

unable to drag one leg after the other, leaned on the muzzles of their

firelocks, muttering in disconsolate accents that “they had never

fallen out before”[1034].’

This was a heart-breaking sight for the divisional commander, who could

see both the opportunity still offered him, and the impossibility of

taking full advantage of it. After a short halt the troops, or such of

them as could still keep up, were started off again to shuffle down the

shaly track on the north side of the mountain. At the foot of it, by a

brook near the village of Aranaz, the 2nd Brigade was told to halt and

fall out--it was a trifle more exhausted than the 1st Brigade, because

it had endured more of the dust, and more of the delay from casual

stoppages and accidents, which always happens in the rear of a long

column. Alten carried the survivors--the 1st and 3rd battalions Rifle

Brigade, 1/43rd, and 1st Caçadores--as far as Yanzi, and then turned

them down the road to the Bidassoa, which is screened by woods. The

French were taken wholly by surprise: the Rifle battalions carried the

knoll above the bridge, and the bridge itself, without much difficulty.

The 43rd and Caçadores spread themselves out on the slope to their

right and opened fire on the hurrying mass below them.

‘At twilight,’ wrote a captain of the 43rd whose narrative was quoted

by Napier, but is well worth quoting again, ‘we overlooked the enemy

within a stone’s throw, and from the summit of a precipice: the river

separated us: but the French were wedged in a narrow road, with rocks

enclosing them on one side and the river on the other. Such confusion

took place among them as is impossible to describe. The wounded were

thrown down in the rush and trampled upon: the cavalry drew their

swords and endeavoured to charge up the pass to Echalar[1035], the

only opening on their right flank. But the infantry beat them back,

and several of them, horse and man, were precipitated into the river.

Others fired up vertically at us, while the wounded called out for

quarter, and pointed to the numerous soldiers borne on the shoulders

of their comrades on stretchers composed of the branches of trees,

to which were looped great-coats clotted with gore, or blood-stained

sheets taken from houses to carry their wounded--on whom we did not

fire[1036].’

The officer commanding in the French rear finally got out a battalion

behind a stone wall, whose fire somewhat covered the defiling mass.

All the bolder spirits ran the gauntlet through the zone of fire and

escaped up the road to Echalar[1037]. The weak, the wounded, and the

worn-out surrendered to the leading troops of the 4th Division, who now

closed in on them. About 1,000 prisoners were made, largely soldiers

of the train and other non-combatants, but including stragglers from

nearly every division in Soult’s army. There was no pursuit--the Light

Division troops could not have stirred a step: the 4th Division were

almost as weary after a long day’s hunt. The casualties of both had

been absurdly small--3 officers and 45 men in Cole’s regiments, 1

officer and 15 men in Alten’s. The Spanish battalion engaged in the

afternoon must, of course, have lost on a very different scale during

its highly creditable operations; but its casualties have, unluckily,

not been recorded. The French may have had 500 killed and wounded, and

1,000 prisoners--but this was the least part of their loss--the really

important thing was that thousands of men were scattered in the hills,

and did not rally to their eagles for many days. That night Soult’s

army was not only a demoralized, but a much depleted force.

Wellington was, not unnaturally, dissatisfied with the day’s work.

‘Many events,’ he wrote to Graham, ‘turned out for us unfortunately

on the 1st instant, each of which ought to have been in our favour:

we should have done the enemy a great deal more mischief than we did

during his passage down this valley[1038].’ For one of these things,

Alten’s late arrival, he was himself mainly responsible[1039]: for the

others--Longa’s and Barcena’s strange failure to detach more troops

to help the regiment of Asturias at Yanzi[1040], and Dalhousie’s late

arrival with the 7th Division--which never got into action or lost a

man--he was not.

It must be confessed, however, that Wellington’s intentions on August

1st are a little difficult to follow. One would have supposed that he

would have devoted his main attention to a direct attempt to smash

up Soult’s main body--but he never allotted more than the 4th, 7th,

and Light Divisions to that task--while he had obviously another idea

in his head, dealing with a larger scheme for the destruction of the

enemy. At 9.30, when he had occupied Santesteban, he sent orders to

Byng, then at Elizondo, to bid him to march at once on the Pass of

Maya, and to throw an advanced party into Urdax, on the French side of

the defile. At the same time Hill, at Irurita, is desired to follow

Byng, occupy Elizondo, and--if his troops can bear the strain--advance

even to the Pass of Maya. Should this prove possible, Byng, when

relieved by Hill, should descend into France as far as Ainhoue on the

Nivelle. The 2nd Division, and the Portuguese division attached to it,

would follow him next morning. Hopes are expressed in the dispatch

that Pakenham and the 6th Division--last heard of at Eugui on the

31st--would be in a position to combine their operations with those of

Hill[1041].

This descent into the valley of the Nivelle from the Maya pass must

surely have been imagined with the idea of encircling the whole

French army at Echalar, for Ainhoue was well in Soult’s rear, and

troops placed there could cut him off from the direct road to Bayonne.

On the same evening Wellington was dictating a dispatch to Graham

telling him that he hoped to be at Maya next morning, and beyond the

frontier: Graham was therefore to prepare to cross the Bidassoa and

attack Villatte with his and Giron’s full force, including cavalry

and guns, leaving St. Sebastian blockaded by the necessary minimum

detachment[1042]. Meanwhile Alten, Dalhousie, and Cole were to mass in

front of the enemy’s position at Echalar. The only possible meaning

that can be drawn from these orders, when read together, is that

Wellington had now developed the complete encircling scheme for Soult’s

destruction, which he had _not_ thought out on July 31.

But the scheme was never put into execution. On August 2 Byng was

halted at Maya, Graham received no order to pass the Bidassoa, and

all that was done was to execute an attack on Echalar--attended with

complete success, it is true, but only resulting in pushing Soult back

towards the Nivelle, where there was no intercepting force waiting to

waylay him. Somewhere between 8 p.m. on the 1st and dawn on the 2nd

Wellington, for reasons which he did not avow to his staff or his most

trusted lieutenants, gave up the greater game, which had in it immense

possibilities: for Soult had no longer an army that could fight--as

events at Echalar were to prove a few hours later. Minor causes for

this great piece of self-restraint can be cited. One was that Hill

and Pakenham turned out not to be within easy supporting distance of

Byng, so that the dash into Soult’s rear could not be executed with

a sufficient force. If this operation were not carried out, Graham’s

became useless. Certainly a reflection on the extremely depleted

condition of the 2nd Division, which had suffered such heavy losses at

Maya, Beunza, and the Venta de Urroz, helped to deter Wellington from

using this exhausted force for his main stroke. Writing to Graham two

days later, he mentioned its condition as a cause of delay, along with

a general dearth of musket ammunition and shoes. But the main reason,

as we shall see later, lay rather in the higher spheres of European

politics, and the explanation was reserved for the Minister of War in

London alone. Next morning no general attack was delivered: Wellington

did not go to Maya, but merely joined the 4th and Light Divisions on

the Bidassoa. The great scheme was stillborn, and never took shape.

Soult had gathered the wrecks of his army on the range of mountains

behind Echalar, where the Spanish-French boundary line runs. The

cavalry had been at once packed off to the rear. The infantry took up

a position. Clausel’s three divisions were in the centre--Vandermaesen

holding the village with a company, and with his main body--certainly

not 2,000 men that day--across the road on the slope above. Conroux’s

division was on Vandermaesen’s right: Taupin’s, in reserve to

both the others, on the crest where the frontier runs. Reille’s

corps--still more depleted than Clausel’s, continued the line

westward--Lamartinière’s division next to Conroux’s, as far as the Peak

of Ivantelly: Maucune’s--the most dilapidated unit in a dilapidated

army--holding the ground beyond the Ivantelly, with a flank-guard

out on its right watching the road from Vera to Sarre. D’Erlon’s

divisions--still by far the most intact units of the whole command,

were on Clausel’s left, prolonging the line eastward and holding

a commanding position on the mountain side as far as the Peaks of

Salaberry and Atchuria. It is doubtful whether the Marshal had 25,000

men in line that day in his eight divisions--not because the remainder

were all casualties or prisoners, but because the long retreat, with

its incessant scrambling over mountain sides, had led to the defection

of many voluntary and still more involuntary stragglers. The former

were scattered over the country for miles on every side, seeking for

food and for ‘a day off’--the latter had dropped behind from sheer

exhaustion: there had been no regular distribution of rations since

July 29th, and the first convoy of relief had been captured by Byng at

Elizondo on the 31st.

Wellington had only 12,000 men available in front of a very formidable

position--hills 1,500 or 1,800 feet high, with the peaks which

formed the flank protection rising to 2,100 or 2,300. Under ordinary

circumstances an attack would have been insane. Moreover, his troops

were almost as way-worn as those of Soult: the Light and 4th Divisions

had received no rations since the 30th, and the latter had lost a good

third of its strength in the very heavy fighting in which it had taken

the chief part between the 25th and the 30th. But their spirits were

high, they had the strongest confidence in their power to win, and they

were convinced that the enemy was ‘on the run’--in which idea they were

perfectly right.

The plan of attack was that the 4th and 7th Divisions should assail

the enemy’s centre, on each side of the village of Echalar, while the

Light Division turned his western flank. This involved long preliminary

marching for Alten’s men, despite of their awful fatigues of the

preceding day. They had to trudge from the bridge of Yanzi and Aranaz

to Vera, where they turned uphill on to the heights of Santa Barbara,

a series of successive slopes by which they ascended towards the Peak

of Ivantelly and Reille’s flank. Just as they began to deploy they got

the first regular meal that they had seen for two days: ‘The soldiers

were so weak that they could hardly stand; however, our excellent

commissary had managed to overtake us, and hastily served out half a

pound of biscuit to each individual, which the men devoured in the act

of priming and loading just as they moved off to the attack[1043].’ The

morning was dull and misty--a great contrast to the blazing sunshine

of the preceding day, and it was hard to get any complete view of the

position--clouds were drifting along the hills and obscuring parts of

the landscape for many minutes at a time. This chance put Wellington

himself in serious danger for a moment--pushing forward farther than

he knew, with a half-company of the 43rd to cover him, he got among

the French outposts, and was only saved by the vigilance of his escort

from being cut off--he galloped back under a shower of balls--any

one of which might have caused a serious complication in the British

command--it is impossible to guess what Beresford would have made of

the end of the campaign of 1813.

While the Light Division was developing the flank attack, the front

attack was already being delivered--somewhat sooner than Wellington

expected or intended. The plan had been for the 4th Division to

operate against the French right--the 7th against their centre and

left centre. Cole, however, was delayed in getting forward by the

immense block of French débris along the narrow defile from Sumbilla

to the bridge of Yanzi. ‘For two miles there were scattered along the

road papers, old rugs, blankets, pack-saddles, old bridles and girths,

private letters, hundreds of empty and broken boxes, quantities of

entrenching tools, French clothes, dead mules, dead soldiers, dead

peasants, farriers’ tools, boots and linen, the boxes of M. le Général

Baron de St. Pol[1044] and other officers, the field hospital of the

2nd Division (Darmagnac’s), and all sorts of things worth picking

up--which caused stoppage and confusion[1045].’

Now the 7th Division did not follow the spoil-strewn river road, but

cut across from Sumbilla towards Echalar, over the same hill-tracks

which Clausel’s divisions had taken on the preceding afternoon, when

they escaped from the pursuit of Cole’s skirmishers. Hence it chanced

that they arrived in front of Echalar on a route where the enemy was

keeping no good watch, long before the 4th Division came up from the

bridge of Yanzi and the Vera cross-roads. The mists on the hills had

kept them screened--as Clausel complains in his report. Lord Dalhousie

now carried out a most dangerous manœuvre--a frontal attack on an enemy

in position by a series of brigades arriving at long intervals--without

any co-operation having been sought or obtained from the troops known

to be on his left. ‘Bravery and success,’ as a Light-Division neighbour

observed, ‘certainly far exceeded judgement or utility[1046].’ What

led the commander of the 7th Division to this astounding escapade was

the obvious unpreparedness of the enemy. ‘We caught them,’ he wrote,

‘cooking above, and plundering below in the village. I thought it best

to be at them instantly, and I really believe Barnes’s brigade was

among them before their packs were well on[1047].’

The leading troops, and the only ones which really got into action,

were the three battalions (1/6th, 3rd Provisional[1048], and

Brunswick-Oels) of Barnes’s brigade--led by that same fighting general

who had stopped the rout at Maya with two of these same battalions.

Barnes got his line formed, and attacked uphill against the front of

Conroux’s division, long before Inglis’s brigade was ready to follow,

or Lecor’s Portuguese had even got down from the hill path into the

narrow valley of the Sari stream. With such speed and vigour was the

assault delivered, under a frontal fire from Conroux’s men, and a flank

fire from Vandermaesen’s on the right, that Inglis’s brigade, which was

aiming at the village of Echalar, never had the chance of getting near

its enemy. The advancing line suffered severely as it climbed--nearly

300 casualties--but when it came against the front of Conroux, and

delivered its first volley, the enemy simply melted away[1049]. As

Clausel writes in apology, ‘the resistance ought to have been greater,

and in the ordinary state of the army, that is to say when a better

spirit prevailed, it would never have been possible for the enemy to

establish himself in this fashion on a section of the main chain of

the Pyrenees. This day the morale of the troops was bad[1050].’ It

must be remembered that Conroux’s was the division which had suffered

so heavily in the village of Sorauren both on the 28th and the 30th

of July. Several of its battalions were skeletons--all much thinned.

Still there must have been 3,000 men yet present out of the original

7,000--and they turned and fled before the uphill attack of 1,800 or

less. Nor was this the end of the disaster. Clausel tried to hurry

Vandermaesen’s division to the succour of Conroux’s. But the manœuvre

failed: the French General says that Conroux’s flying troops ran in

upon Vandermaesen’s, that confusion followed, and that he was obliged

to let the whole mass roll back to seek shelter with Taupin’s division

in the reserve line[1050].

At this moment the leading brigade of the 4th Division, that of Ross,

at last appeared on Dalhousie’s left, and began to skirmish with

Lamartinière’s line[1051]: demonstrations began--probably by Lecor’s

Portuguese--against the front of Maransin[1052], D’Erlon’s right-hand

division. But these were of no importance in comparison with the effect

of the turning of Reille’s end of the line by the Light Division. This

was almost as startling in effect as Barnes’s dealings with the French

centre. Having reached the front on the heights of Santa Barbara, below

the Peak of Ivantelly, Alten brushed aside Maucune’s feeble skirmishing

line, and let loose five companies of the Rifle Brigade supported by

four of the 43rd against the dominating peak of the Ivantelly, the

most prominent feature of the French position. Clouds swept down along

the hills at this moment, and the supporting companies lost sight of

the front line. ‘An invisible firing commenced, and it was impossible

to ascertain which party was getting the better of the fight: the

combatants were literally contending in the clouds[1053].’ But when the

43rd came up, they found that the rifle companies had dislodged the

2nd Léger, Lamartinière’s flank regiment, from the precipitous crest,

and were in full possession of it. As they lost only 1 officer and 26

men in taking a most formidable peak, it is clear that the enemy’s

resistance must have been very ineffective[1054].

All was now confusion on the French right wing--Reille speaks

of himself as wandering about in a fog with three battalions of

Lamartinière’s, and meeting no one save the brigadier Montfort, who

was bringing up a mere 200 men to try to reinforce the troops on the

Ivantelly. The soldiers were profiting by the mist to go off to the

rear, and could not be kept together. ‘On se tirailla faiblement, et

nos troupes se retirèrent sur la route de Sarre.’ With his centre

smashed in, and his right dispersed, Soult could do nothing but

retire. The remains of Clausel’s and Reille’s divisions fell back on

the road to Sarre. D’Erlon, who had never been attacked, could not

use this route, but made his way along the crest of the mountains to

Zagaramurdi, Urdax, and Ainhoue. What would have been his fate if he

had found there not the picquet which (by Wellington’s order) Byng had

thrown forward to Urdax, but the whole of Byng’s and Hill’s troops

blocking his retreat--as would have been the case if the great scheme

drawn up on the night of August 1 had been carried out? But the Pass of

Maya had not been utilized that day, and D’Erlon had only to drive away

50 men.

There was no pursuit: if there had been it would seem that the whole

French army would have broken up, for it had shown itself this day

no longer able to fight. ‘The spirit not only of the men but of the

officers,’ wrote Reille next morning, ‘has been very bad during these

last days. The absolute want of food must be the excuse for this

state of things.’ The condition of the army was deplorable--Maucune’s

division showed less than 1,000 men holding together. The 1st Line of

Vandermaesen’s had precisely 27 men with the eagle--yet had lost only

4 officers and 193 men in action--where were the remaining 400? Other

units could show a few hundred men but absolutely or practically no

officers--the 55th Line of Conroux had lost every one of 13 officers,

the 51st Line of Darmagnac 12 out of 17, the 34th Léger of Maucune

30 out of 35; these were exceptionally hard cases, but in all the

divisions save those of Foy and Abbé (the least engaged during the

short campaign), the proportion was appalling. For the infantry of the

whole army it was 420 casualties among 1,318 officers present. Soult

wrote to Clarke on the last day of the campaign: ‘I deceived myself in

the strangest way when I told your Excellency that the troops had their

morale intact, and would do their duty. I mistook the sentiment of

shame for their recent disaster (Vittoria) for that of steadfastness.

When tested, they started with one furious rush, but showed no power of

resistance.... Since I first entered the service I have seen nothing

like this. It reminded me of the behaviour of the levy _en masse_ of

1792. The spirit of these troops must be terribly broken to have

permitted them to behave in this fashion. One general told me that he

had overheard men remarking, when we were near Pampeluna, that they

had better not fight too hard, because it would be preferable to get

back to the frontier rather than to be led off into the middle of

Spain[1055].’ These were cruel and spiteful words--the army had fought

with excellent courage, till after July 30th it had convinced itself

that the Marshal had got wrong with all his calculations, that the

game was up--that they were being taken on a wild goose chase without

rations in the most desolate and rocky region of Europe. But by August

2 Soult was not far out in his statement--on that day the greater part

of his army was a spent force. If Wellington had resolved to pursue

with vigour, he could have pushed it as far as he pleased. Perhaps the

great encircling scheme with which his mind dallied for a few hours on

the night of August 1 might have resulted in its surrender or complete

dispersion.

This was not to be. On August 3 Wellington halted, and commenced to

rearrange his troops on much the same principles, and in much the

same positions, that he had selected before. He wrote to Graham next

day that he was perfectly well aware of the objection to taking up

a defensive position in the Pyrenees, but that an advance was too

risky[1056]. It was not so much the prospect of the wastage of his

troops, even in successful operation, that deterred him, though this

was the point on which he insisted in his letter to Graham, but the

general political situation of Europe. The eternal Armistice of

Plässwitz was still holding up operations in Germany: it was still

possible that the Allied Sovereigns might make a selfish peace

with Napoleon, and permit the Emperor to expand Soult’s army _ad

infinitum_ with sudden reinforcements. What would then become of

the Anglo-Portuguese host, even if it had won its way not only to

Bayonne but to Bordeaux? All this he had considered, and wrote to the

Secretary for War in Whitehall that ‘as for the immediate invasion

of France, from what I have seen of the state of negotiations in the

North of Europe, I have determined to consider it only in reference to

the convenience of my own operations.... If peace should be made by

the Powers of the North, I must necessarily withdraw into Spain.’ No

advance, however tempting the opportunity, should be made until he was

certain that war had recommenced in Saxony[1057]. Meanwhile, ‘Soult

will not feel any inclination to renew his expeditions--on this side at

least.’

So the army settled down to hold once more the line of the Pyrenees,

and to resume the siege of St. Sebastian. On August 3 the Head-quarters

were once more at Lesaca, as they had been on July 25--how many things

had happened in the interval! Hill and the 2nd Division, now rejoined

by the long-missing brigade of Byng, as also Silveira’s Portuguese,

were in the Maya passes once more. The 3rd Division was holding the

Roncesvalles defiles, the 4th and 7th were at Echalar, the 6th in the

Alduides (replacing Campbell’s Portuguese in that remote valley); the

Light Division lay on the heights opposite Vera. Morillo’s Division was

in the Bastan behind Hill, the part of the Army of Reserve of Andalusia

which O’Donnell had carried to the front, when he left the rest before

Pampeluna, was at the moment near the bridge of Yanzi. The remainder

of that army and Carlos de España were continuing the blockade of

Pampeluna.

The total losses of the Allies during the nine days’ ‘Campaign of the

Pyrenees’ had amounted to slightly over 6,400 officers and men for the

English and Portuguese[1058]. The Spanish loss could not add over 600

more--at Sorauren it was 192; Morillo’s casualties at Altobiscar, and

those of the regiment of Asturias at Yanzi bridge are the only unknown

quantities, and can hardly have reached 400. The distribution among

divisions and corps was odd--the 3rd and Light Division had practically

negligible casualties: the former under 120, the latter under 50. The

main stress fell on the 2nd and 4th Divisions, the former with 2,000

British and 350 Portuguese casualties, the latter with 1,400 and 300

respectively. But it must be remembered that the 2nd Division had

(including Byng) four brigades, the 4th Division only three. Every

unit in both was severely tried; the most terrible return was that

of the 1/92nd with its 26 officers and 445 men killed, wounded, and

missing. But this was a strong battalion of 750 bayonets, and I am not

sure that the 284 casualties of the 20th and the 296 casualties of the

3/27th, both in the 4th Division, do not represent almost as great a

proportional loss, as these were both much smaller corps.

The 6th Division was engaged on two days only, at the two battles

of Sorauren, and had the appreciable number of 450 British and 370

Portuguese casualties. The 7th Division fought on three days--at second

Sorauren, at the Combat of the Venta de Urroz, and at Echalar, and

three of its battalions also saved the day at Maya--with a loss in all

of 750 British but only 60 Portuguese. Lastly, we must name the two

Portuguese brigades of Silveira’s division, of which Campbell’s fought

at Sorauren, Da Costa’s at Beunza, with a loss to the former of 350 and

to the latter of 280 men. The general fact emerges that the 2nd and 4th

Divisions lost between them 4,350 men out of the total 7,000--no other

division had so many as 1,000 casualties.

The official list of French losses is not quite complete, as it

includes only the infantry and cavalry units--but such casualties

as may have been suffered by the general staff, the artillery (very

little engaged) sappers, and train can have added comparatively

little to the total, though a good many men of the train were taken

at Yanzi on August 1. The figures given work out to 12,563--1,308

killed, 8,545 wounded, and 2,710 prisoners. The last-named total should

probably be brought up to 3,000 in order to include individuals of the

non-combatant corps captured in the retreat. The divisions suffered

in very unequal measure: Foy and Abbé got off very lightly, because

the one was practically not engaged at first Sorauren, nor the latter

at Maya--they lost respectively only 550 and 750 men. Vandermaesen’s

and Maucune’s Divisions--each a small unit of only 4,000 men, had the

crushing losses of 1,480 and 1,850 respectively, and were dissolved

when the campaign was over, and re-formed to a large extent with

battalions drawn from the Bayonne reserve. Darmagnac and Conroux

each lost well over 2,000 men out of 7,000--their divisions having

been terribly cut up, the one at Maya the other at Sorauren. Maransin

and Taupin each return over 1,000 men lost out of 6,000; Lamartinière

just under 1,000 out of 7,000. The cavalry, barely engaged and quite

useless, had only 67 casualties to report.

But to get at Soult’s fighting strength on the last day of the retreat,

it is not sufficient merely to deduct the 12,563 casualties from the

59,000 which took the field in Navarre. The eight divisions collected

on the 2nd August were short not only of their own casualties, but of

Foy’s division, which had gone off on an eccentric line of retreat, as

had several smaller detachments[1059]. But the great deficit was that

of at least 8,000 or 10,000 stragglers, who rejoined at their leisure

during the next ten days. The cavalry and artillery had all gone to the

rear, and it is doubtful if the last stand at Echalar was made with so

many as 25,000 weary infantry. If the Marshal had been faced with an

opponent who had no political _arrière pensée_ to hold him back, he

would have been doomed to absolute destruction. Only a wreck of his

army would have escaped, and Wellington might have driven the remnants

as far as he pleased--even to the gates of Bordeaux.

But the British General had made his ‘great refusal’ on the night of

August 1st-2nd, and had resolved that the tempting scheme for invading

France, which had flitted before his eyes for a few evening hours,

must be postponed. He would risk nothing till he should get certain

information that the war had begun again in Germany. And as the news

of the rupture of the Armistice did not reach him till September 3rd,

he was condemned to another month of waiting. He turned back to his

old policy of June--St. Sebastian and Pampeluna must be reduced. When

they should have fallen, it would be time enough to see whether the

general European situation had made the invasion of France a feasible

enterprise.

APPENDICES

I

BRITISH LOSSES AT THE SIEGE OF BURGOS SEPTEMBER 20-OCTOBER 21, 1812

Sept. 20th, storm of the Hornwork of St. Michael. Total casualties

421 (of whom the 42nd lost 2 officers and 33 men killed, 5 officers

and 164 men wounded = 204; the 79th lost 5 men killed, 2 officers

and 32 men wounded = 39; the Portuguese lost 3 officers and 17 men

killed, 5 officers and 88 men wounded = 113; the other 67 casualties

were divided among the remaining battalions of the 1st Division).

Sept. 21st, casualties 42; Sept. 22nd, 39; Sept. 23, 158 (of which

76 in the Guards Brigade and 44 in the K.G.L. brigade of the 1st

Division, and 29 among the Portuguese).

Sept. 24th, casualties 39; Sept. 25th, 38; Sept. 26th, 32; Sept.

27th, 53; Sept. 28th, 26; Sept. 29th, 9; Sept. 30th, 29; Oct. 1st,

11; Oct. 2nd, 29; Oct. 3rd, 9; Oct. 4th, 16; Oct. 5th, 224 (of these

224, which really belong to the storm of the outer enceinte on the

evening of Oct. 4th, the 2/24th had 68 casualties, no other battalion

more than 15).

Oct. 6th, casualties (French sortie of night of 5th) 142; Oct. 7th,

33; Oct. 8th (2nd French sortie in which 133 in the K.G.L. Brigade

were killed or wounded), 184; Oct. 9th, 18; Oct. 10th, 61; Oct. 11th,

24; Oct. 12th, 17; Oct. 13th, 9; Oct. 14th, 3; Oct. 15th, 18; Oct.

16th, 12; Oct. 17th, 18; Oct. 18th, 48; Oct. 19th (the last assault),

170 (of whom 85 in the Guards Brigade and 84 in the K.G.L. Brigade of

the 1st Division).

Oct. 20th, 47; Oct. 21st, 9.

GENERAL TOTAL: 24 officers and 485 men killed

68 ” ” 1,445 ” wounded

42 ” missing = 2,064

II

THE FRENCH ARMIES IN SPAIN: OCTOBER 15, 1812

[From the return in the _Archives Nationales_, Paris.]

I. ARMY OF THE SOUTH. MARSHAL SOULT

_Officers._ _Men._

1st Division, Conroux: 9th Léger, 24th, 96th Line

(each 3 batts.): 3 battalions Marine Troops 203 5,615

2nd Division, Barrois[1060]: 8th Line, 16th Léger, 51st,

54th Line (each 3 batts.) 201 4,801

3rd Division, Villatte: 27th Léger, 63rd, 94th, 95th Line

(each 3 batts.) 209 5,888

4th Division, Leval: 32nd, 43rd Line (4 batts. each),

55th, 58th Line (3 batts. each) 259 7,794

5th Division, D’Erlon[1061]: 12th Léger (4 batts.), 45th

Line (3 batts.), 28th Léger, 88th Line (2 batts. each) 202 5,016

6th Division, Daricau: 21st Léger, 100th Line (3 batts.

each), 64th, 103rd Line (2 batts. each) 187 4,308

Cavalry Division, Perreymond: 2nd Hussars, 5th, 10th,

21st, 27th Chasseurs, 7th Lancers (in all, 20 squad.) 144 2,349

Cavalry Division, Digeon: 2nd, 4th, 14th, 17th, 26th,

27th Dragoons (in all, 20 squadrons) 148 2,956

Cavalry Division, Pierre Soult: 5th, 12th, 16th, 21st

Dragoons (14 squadrons) 121 1,712

Artillery, and Artillery Train and Park 122 3,511

Engineers and Sappers 17 851

Gendarmerie and Équipages Militaires 9 592

État-Major 313 --

----- ------

Total present 1,816 45,393

Gross total of Army including 64 officers and 1,904 men

detached, and 60 officers and 6,293 men in hospital: 1,940 53,590

II. ARMY OF THE CENTRE

_Officers._ _Men._

The King’s French Guards: no figures given, but about 2,500

Darmagnac’s Division: 28th and 75th Line (3 batts.

each), 2nd Nassau and Baden (2 batts. each),

Frankfort (1 batt.) 199 5,039

Palombini’s Division: 4th and 6th Italian Line (2 batts.

each), 2nd Italian Léger (3 batts.), Dragoons of

Napoleon and two batteries 142 3,050

Casapalacios’ Spanish Division (3 batts., 3 squadrons) 167 1,263

Treillard’s Cavalry Division: 13th, 18th, 19th, 22nd

Dragoons, Westphalian _chevaux légers_, Nassau

_chasseurs_ 114 1,679

Artillery, Engineers, and Train 12 596

Various detachments 12 403

--- ------

Total present 646 14,530

Gross total of Army, including État-Major 55 officers,

32 officers and 655 men detached, and 14 officers

and 1,900 men sick, is 747 17,075

III. ARMY OF PORTUGAL. GENERAL SOUHAM

_Officers._ _Men._

1st Division, Foy: 6th Léger (1 batt.), 39th, 69th,

76th Line (2 batts. each) 151 3,492

2nd Division, Clausel: 25th Léger, 27th, 50th, 59th

Line (2 batts. each) 130 4,506

3rd Division, Taupin [late Ferey], 31st Léger, 26th,

70th Line (2 batts. each), 47th Line (3 batts.) 184 6,064

4th Division, Sarrut: 2nd and 4th Léger, 36th Line

(2 batts. each) 130 4,000

5th Division, Maucune: 15th, 66th, 82nd, 86th Line

(2 batts. each) 165 5,097

6th Division, Pinoteau [late Brenier]: 17th Léger,

65th Line (2 batts. each), 22nd Line (1 batt.) 87 2,730

7th Division, Bonté [late Thomières]: 1st and 62nd Line

(2 batts. each), 101st Line (1 batt.) 109 2,425

8th Division, Chauvel [late Bonnet]: 118th, 119th,

120th Line (2 batts. each), 122nd Line (3 batts.) 180 4,437

(Each infantry division includes its artillery and train.)

Cavalry Division, Curto: 3rd Hussars, 13th, 14th,

22nd, 26th, 28th Chasseurs 115 2,048

Cavalry Division, Boyer: 6th, 11th, 15th, 25th Dragoons 70 1,303

Horse Artillery and train attached to cavalry 5 292

Artillery Reserve and Park 37 1,822

Engineers 7 274

Gendarmerie and Équipages Militaires 33 1,102

Attached to the Army of Portugal--

Cavalry Brigade, Merlin, of the Army of the North,

1st Hussars, 31st Chasseurs 53 693

Infantry Brigade, Aussenac, detached from the

Bayonne Reserve: 3rd and 105th Line (2 batts.

each), 64th, 100th, 103rd (1 batt. each) 110 3,308

----- ------

Total present 1,566 43,860

Gross total of Army with 150 officers and 4,574 men

detached, and 53 officers and 11,113 men in hospital: 1,769 59,547

--------------

61,316

IV. ARMY OF ARAGON AND VALENCIA. MARSHAL SUCHET

_Officers._ _Men._

1st Division, Musnier: 1st Léger (3 batts.), 114th

Line (2 batts.), 121st Line (3 batts.), Neapolitans

(2 batts.) 180 5,403

2nd Division, Harispe: 7th, 44th, 116th Line (2 batts.

each) 104 4,011

3rd Division, Habert: 14th, 16th Line (2 batts. each),

117th Line (3 batts.) 158 4,817

Cavalry Division, Boussard: 14th Cuirassiers, 24th

Dragoons, 4th Hussars, 1st Neapolitan Chasseurs 91 1,831

Artillery and train 21 858

Engineers 11 411

Gendarmerie and Équipages Militaires 6 529

TROOPS ATTACHED TO THE ARMY OF ARAGON

Reille’s Division: 10th Line (4 batts.), 81st (3 batts.),

9th _bis_ of Hussars, artillery 147 4,393

Severoli’s Division: 1st Italian Line and 1st Italian

Léger (2 batts. each), 5th Léger (French) (1 batt.),

and Italian artillery 151 3,758

Brigade from Catalonia: 3rd Léger, 11th, 20th Line

(2 batts. each), 1st Italian Chasseurs 130 3,719

----- ------

Total present 1,038 30,980

Gross total of Army, including 131 officers and 3,884 men

detached, and 24 officers and 4,287 men in hospital: 1,193 39,151

V. ARMY OF THE NORTH. GENERAL CAFFARELLI

_Officers._ _Men._

Division Abbé: 5th Léger (3 batts.), 10th Léger, 3rd,

52nd, 105th Line (2 batts. each), 20th Dragoons, and

artillery 219 6,378

Division Vandermaesen: 34th Léger (1 batt.), 34th,

40th Line (3 batts. each), 113th, 130th Line (2 batts.

each), 4th Suisse (1 batt.), 6 _bataillons de marche_

= 18 battalions in all 388 12,197

Brigade Dumoustier: 4 batts. Young Guard, and 2 of

National Guards 100 3,976

Cavalry Brigade Laferrière: Lancers of Berg (2 squadrons),

15th Chasseurs (3 squadrons), Gendarmerie (6 squadrons) 37 1,625

Government of Navarre (garrison of Pampeluna) detachments 45 1,644

Government of Biscay, all _régiments de marche_ and

detachments 264 9,431

Government of Castile (garrison of Santoña) detachments 43 1,342

------ ------

Total present 1,151 36,465

Gross total of Army, including 41 officers and 5,176 men

in hospital, is 1,192 41,641

VI. ARMY OF CATALONIA. GENERAL DECAEN

_Officers._ _Men._

Division Quesnel (at Puycerda), 102nd Line (2 batts.),

116th Line (1 batt.), and detachments 123 3,502

Division Lamarque: 60th and 79th Line (3 batts. each),

Regiment of Wurzburg, and detachments 137 3,491

Brigade Petit: 67th Line (3 batts.), 32nd Léger (1 batt.) 66 1,553

Division Maurice Mathieu (Barcelona): 115th Line

(4 batts.), 18th Léger (2 batts.), 1st of Nassau

(2 batts.), and detachments 185 6,180

Garrisons of Figueras, &c.: 60th, 86th Line, and 32nd

Léger (1 batt. each), and detachments 160 3,646

Garrison of Tarragona (Bertoletti): 20th Line (1 batt.),

7th Italian Line (1 batt.) 63 1,451

Garrison of Lerida (Henriod): 42nd Line (3 batts.),

and detachments 70 1,639

Brigade Espert (flying column): 5th Line (3 batts.),

23rd Léger (2 batts.) 89 2,988

Artillery, Sappers, Gendarmes, Équipages Militaires, &c. 55 4,194

--- ------

Total present, under arms 948 28,514

Gross total of Army, including 107 État-Major, 26 officers

and 369 men detached, and 44 officers and 6,045 men

in hospital, is 1,125 34,928

VII. BAYONNE RESERVE

_Officers._ _Men._

All consisting of detachments or _régiments de marche_ 172 7,072

Adding 134 detached and 600 in hospital, gross total is: 7,978

Total Army of Spain, therefore, on October 15 amounts to:

7,516 officers, 206,814 men present with the colours

326 ” 11,520 ” detached

236 ” 35,414 ” in hospital.

GENERAL GROSS TOTAL = 8,185 officers and 253,748 men.

III

STRENGTH OF WELLINGTON’S ARMY DURING AND AFTER THE BURGOS RETREAT

The subjoined statistics show the marching strength of the

Anglo-Portuguese divisions of Wellington’s army at the commencement of

the Burgos Retreat (Oct. 23) and some days after its termination (Nov.

29). There had been, immediately after the army reached Ciudad Rodrigo,

certain transferences of units from one division to another, which are

duly noted. The figures give only rank and file; to get the fighting

strength one-eighth should be added to cover officers, sergeants, and

drummers.

_Present _Present

under arms. under arms.

Oct. 23._ Nov. 29._

1st Cavalry Division 2,827 2,909 (2nd Hussars K.G.L.

has joined.)

2nd Cavalry Division 1,947 1,625 (2nd Hussars K.G.L.

has left.)

1st Division 3,970 4,002 (1st & 3rd battalions

First Guards have

joined, but Stirling’s

brigade has been

transferred to the

6th Division.)

2nd Division 7,915 6,591

3rd Division 4,229 3,860 (2/87th from Cadiz

has joined.)

4th Division 4,487 3,861 (1/82nd has joined.)

5th Division 3,638 3,732 (2/47th from Cadiz

has joined.)

6th Division 3,380 5,228 (The division has been

joined by Stirling’s

brigade and also by

the 1/91st.)

7th Division 4,298 3,358

Light Division 3,428 3,775 (2 companies 3/95th

and the 20th Portuguese

have joined.)

Hamilton’s Portuguese Division 4,719 4,076

Pack’s Portuguese Brigade 1,681 1,105

Bradford’s Portuguese Brigade 1,645 881

------ ------

48,124 45,003

Artillery, Train, Staff Corps, &c. 2,500 2,300

The fall in numbers would have been much greater but for the joining

of Skerrett’s force from Cadiz (3/1st Guards, 2/47th, 2/87th, 20th

Portuguese, and two companies 3/95th) and of the 1/1st Guards and

1/91st from England, and the 1/82nd from Gibraltar--in all, nearly

6,000 men.

It may be worth while to give here the statistics of the Spanish troops

which were acting with Wellington’s and Hill’s armies during this

period. They were by their October morning states:

‘6th Army’ or Galicians (Santocildes):

1st Division (Barcena) 6,810 (5 of the 15 battalions of this

division were not at the front.)

2nd Division (Cabrera) 4,749

3rd Division (Losada) 4,213

Cavalry Brigade (Figuelmonde) 1,356 (5 of the 9 squadrons of this

brigade were not at the front.)

5th Army (Estremadurans and Castilian):

Morillo’s Division 2,371 (Acting with Hill’s Corps.)

Carlos de España’s Division 3,809 (ditto.)

Penne Villemur’s cavalry 992 (ditto.)

Julian Sanchez’s cavalry 1,159 (Acting with Main Army.)

------

Total Spanish troops 25,459

IV

LOSSES IN THE BURGOS RETREAT

The casualties in action between October 23rd and November 19th are

easily ascertainable, and quite moderate. But the loss in ‘missing’ by

the capture of stragglers, marauders, and footsore men, was much higher

than is generally known. I believe that the annexed table, from the

morning state of November 29th, is now published for the first time.

It gives only the _rank and file_ missing, but these are almost the

whole list: officers and sergeants did not straggle or drop behind like

the privates. I believe that the total of officers missing was 25, of

sergeants 56 British and 29 Portuguese: we have also to add 43 British

and 32 Portuguese drummers, &c., to the general list, which runs as

follows:

_British._ _Portuguese._ _Total._

1st Cavalry Division 192 -- 192

2nd Cavalry Division 101 8 109

1st Division Infantry 283 -- 283

2nd Division Infantry 302 260 562

3rd Division Infantry 184 230 414

4th Division Infantry 308 19 327

5th Division Infantry 453 359 812

6th Division Infantry 96 74 170

7th Division Infantry 357 243 600

Light Division Infantry 92 163 253

Portuguese. Hamilton’s Division -- 221 221

Portuguese. Pack’s Brigade. -- 293 293

Portuguese. Bradford’s Brigade -- 514 514

----- ----- -----

Total 2,368 2,374 4,752

The abnormally high totals of the 5th Division and 7th Division are to

be accounted for in different ways. The former had 150 prisoners taken

in action on the day of the combat of Villa Muriel (October 25); the

latter contained the two battalions that always gave a high percentage

of deserters, the foreign regiments of Brunswick-Oels and _Chasseurs

Britanniques_. It will be noted that the 2nd Division has also a high

total, but as it had nearly double the numbers of any other division

(7,500 men to an average 4,000 for the others) it did not lose out of

proportion to its strength. It will be noted that the Portuguese lost

more heavily in relation to their total numbers than the British--their

‘missing’ were about the same as those of the British, but they only

had about 20,000 rank and file in the field as against about 30,000

British. This excessive loss in missing was due entirely to the fact

that the cold and rain of the last ten days of the retreat told much

more heavily upon them. They were not so well clothed or fed as the

British, and fell behind from exhaustion. Bradford’s brigade, though

never seriously in action, lost 500 men out of 1,600 by the roadside,

much the heaviest percentage in the whole army.

The losses in killed and wounded as opposed to ‘missing’ seem to make

up the following moderate figures, to which the heavy fighting about

Venta del Pozo and Villa Muriel during the first days of the retreat

made much the heaviest contribution.

Killed: 9 officers, 189 men. Wounded: 54 officers, 699 men--i. e. the

total of 951. This does not, of course, include the _prisoners_ taken

at Venta del Pozo or Villa Muriel, who are counted among the ‘missing’

reckoned in the prefixed table. The losses in killed and wounded at

Alba de Tormes and San Muñoz are less than might have been expected;

those in the other skirmishes at Valladolid, Tordesillas, &c., quite

negligible.

V

THE CAMPAIGN OF CASTALLA: APRIL 1813

Sir John Murray reports his army to have consisted of the following

elements:

Infantry: British, German, Anglo-Italian, Calabrese 8,274 officers and men

Sicilian ‘Estero’ Regiment 1,136 ” ”

Whittingham’s Spanish Division (6 batts.) 3,901 ” ”

Roche’s Spanish Division (5 batts.) 4,019 ” ”

Cavalry: British, Spanish, and Sicilian 886 ” ”

Artillery, &c. 500 ” ”

------

18,716 ” ”

The units appear to have been brigaded as follows:

Advance Guard, General Adam: 2/27th, 1st Italian Levy, Calabrese Free

Corps, Rifle Companies of 3rd and 8th K.G.L.

J. Mackenzie’s Division: 1/27th, 4th and 6th Line K.G.L., Sicilian

Estero Regiment (2 batts.).

Clinton’s Division: 1/10th, 1/58th, 1/81st, De Roll-Dillon, 2nd

Italian Levy.

Cavalry: 20th Light Dragoon (2 squadrons), Foreign Hussars (1 troop),

1st Sicilian Cavalry, four Spanish squadrons[1062].

Whittingham’s Spaniards: Cordova, Mallorca, Guadalajara, 2nd of

Burgos, 5th Grenadiers, 2nd of Murcia.

Roche’s Spaniards: Volunteers of Aragon, Alicante, Chinchilla,

Volunteers of Valencia, Canarias.

Artillery: British companies of Holcombe, Thompson, Williamson and

Lacy; Portuguese company of Cox, one Sicilian company (three of these

companies were holding the forts of Alicante).

VI

SUCHET’S ARMY AT CASTALLA: APRIL 13, 1813

[RETURN OF APRIL 1.]

_Officers._ _Men._ _Total._

1st Division, General Robert [for Musnier, absent]:

1st Léger (2 batts.) 38 1,443 1,481

114th Ligne (2 batts.) 36 1,498 1,534

121st Ligne (2 batts.) 34 1,252 1,286

3rd Léger (2 batts.)[1063] 16 767 783

--- ----- -----

124 4,960 5,084

2nd Division, General Harispe:

7th Ligne (2 batts.) 31 1,298 1,329

44th Ligne (2 batts.) 26 1,160 1,186

116th Ligne (2 batts.) 35 1,502 1,537

--- ----- -----

92 3,960 4,052

3rd Division, General Habert:

14th Ligne (2 batts.) 42 1,189 1,231

1/16th Ligne[1064] 21 614 635

1/117th Ligne[1064] 27 829 856

--- ----- -----

90 2,632 2,722

Cavalry, General Boussard:

Two squadrons 4th Hussars 21 408 429

13th Cuirassiers 25 523 548

24th Dragoons (2 squadrons) 20 427 447

--- ----- -----

66 1,358 1,424

Artillery: four batteries 10 282 292

--- ----- ------

TOTAL 376 13,192 13,568

VII

BIAR AND CASTALLA LOSSES: APRIL 12-13, 1813

_Killed._ _Wounded._ _Missing._

_Off._ _Men._ _Off._ _Men._ _Off._ _Men._ _Total._

Staff 1 -- 2 -- -- -- 3

Adam’s Brigade:

2/27th Foot -- 18 2 90 -- 2 112

1st Italian Levy 23 3 49 -- 28 103

Calabrese Free Corps -- 8 2 49 -- -- 59

Rifle Companies 3rd & 8th K.G.L. 1 7 2 23 -- 2 35

Mackenzie’s Division:

1/27th Foot -- 2 -- 18 -- -- 20

4th Line K.G.L. -- 3 -- 9 -- -- 12

6th Line K.G.L. -- 1 -- 5 -- -- 6

Sicilian ‘Estero’ Regiment -- 1 -- 8 -- -- 9

Clinton’s Division:

1/58th Foot -- 1 -- 5 -- -- 6

De Roll-Dillon -- 4 1 20 -- 9 34

Whittingham’s Spanish Division:

Cordova, Mallorca, Guadalajara,

2nd Burgos, 5th Grenadiers,

2nd of Murcia 2 73 4 183 -- -- 262

20th Light Dragoons -- -- -- 1 -- -- 1

Sicilian Cavalry -- -- -- -- -- 1 1

R.A. and drivers -- -- -- 5 -- -- 5

Portuguese Artillery -- -- -- 3 -- -- 3

-------------------------------------------------

TOTAL 4 141 16 468 -- 42 671

VIII

WELLINGTON’S ARMY IN THE VITTORIA CAMPAIGN

MARCHING STRENGTH, MAY 25, 1813[1065]

CAVALRY

_Officers._ _Men._ _Total._

R. Hill’s Brigade: 1st & 2nd Life Guards, Horse

Guards 42 828 870

Ponsonby’s Brigade: 5th Dragoon Guards, 3rd &

4th Dragoons 61 1,177 1,238

G. Anson’s Brigade: 12th & 16th Light Dragoons 39 780 819

Long’s Brigade: 13th Light Dragoons 20 374 394

V. Alten’s Brigade: 14th Light Dragoons, 1st

Hussars K.G.L. 49 956 1,005

Bock’s Brigade: 1st & 2nd Dragoons K.G.L. 38 594 632

Fane’s Brigade: 3rd Dragoon Guards, 1st Dragoons 42 800 842

Grant’s Brigade: 10th, 15th, 18th Hussars 63 1,561 1,624

D’Urban’s Portuguese Brigade: 1st, 11th, 12th

Cavalry -- 685 685

6th Portuguese Cavalry (Campbell) -- 208 208

Cavalry Total 354 7,963 8,317

INFANTRY

_Officers._ _Men._ _Total._

1st Division, General Howard:[1066]

Stopford’s Brigade: 1st Coldstream, 1st Scots }

Guards, one company 5/60th 56 1,672 }

Halkett’s Brigade: 1st, 2nd, 5th Line K.G.L., } 4,854

1st & 2nd Light K.G.L. 133 2,993 }

2nd Division, Sir Rowland Hill:

Cadogan’s Brigade: 1/50th, 1/71st, 1/92nd, one }

company 5/60th 120 2,657 }

Byng’s Brigade: 1/3rd, 1/57th, 1st Prov. }

Batt.,[1067] one company 5/60th 131 2,334 } 10,834

O’Callaghan’s Brigade: 1/28th, 2/34th, 1/39th, }

one company 5/60th 122 2,408 }

Ashworth’s Portuguese: 6th & 18th Line, 6th }

Caçadores -- 3,062 }

3rd Division, General Sir Thomas Picton:

Brisbane’s Brigade: 1/45th, 74th, 1/88th, three }

companies 5/60th 125 2,598 }

Colville’s Brigade: 1/5th, 2/83rd, 2/87th, 94th 120 2,156 } 7,437

Power’s Portuguese Brigade: 9th & 21st Line, }

11th Caçadores -- 2,460 }

4th Division, General Sir G. Lowry Cole:

W. Anson’s Brigade: 3/27th, 1/40th, 1/48th, }

2nd Prov. Batt.,[1068] one company 5/60th 139 2,796 }

Skerrett’s Brigade: 1/7th, 20th, 1/23rd, one }

company Brunswick 123 1,926 } 7,816

Stubbs’s Portuguese Brigade: 11th & 23rd Line, }

7th Caçadores -- 2,842 }

5th Division, General Oswald [for General Leith]:

Hay’s Brigade: 3/1st, 1/9th, 1/38th, one company }

Brunswick 109 2,183 }

Robinson’s Brigade: 1/4th, 2/47th, 2/59th, one }

company Brunswick 100 1,961 } 6,725

Spry’s Portuguese Brigade: 3rd & 15th Line, 8th }

Caçadores -- 2,372 }

6th Division, General Pakenham [for General Clinton]:

Stirling’s Brigade: 1/42nd, 1/79th, 1/91st, one }

company 5/60th 127 2,327 }

Hinde’s Brigade: 1/11th, 1/32nd, 1/36th, 1/61st 130 2,288 } 7,347

Madden’s Portuguese Brigade: 8th & 12th Line, }

9th Caçadores -- 2,475 }

7th Division, General Lord Dalhousie:

Barnes’s Brigade: 1/6th, 3rd Prov. Batt.[1069], }

nine companies Brunswick-Oels 116 2,206 }

Grant’s Brigade: 51st, 68th, 1/82nd, Chasseurs }

Britanniques 141 2,397 } 7,287

Lecor’s Portuguese Brigade: 7th & 19th Line, }

2nd Caçadores -- 2,437 }

Light Division, General Charles Alten:

Kempt’s Brigade: 1/43rd, 1st & 3rd/95th 98 1,979 }

Vandeleur’s Brigade: 1/52nd, 2/95th 63 1,399 } 5,484

Portuguese 17th Line, 1st & 3rd Caçadores -- 1,945 }

Silveira’s Portuguese Division:

Da Costa’s Brigade: 2nd & 14th Line -- 2,492 }

A. Campbell’s Brigade: 4th & 10th Line, 10th } 5,287

Caçadores -- 2,795 }

Pack’s Portuguese Brigade: 1st & 16th Line, 4th

Caçadores -- 2,297 2,297

Bradford’s Portuguese Brigade: 13th & 24th Line,

5th Caçadores -- 2,392 2,392

R.H.A. and Drivers 23 780

Field Artillery, Train, Ammunition column, &c. 100 2,722

K.G.L. Artillery 17 335

Portuguese Artillery -- 330

Engineers and Sappers 41 302

Staff Corps 21 126

Wagon Train 37 165

_British._ _Portuguese._ _Total._

Total Cavalry 7,424 893 8,317

” 1st Division 4,854 -- 4,854

” 2nd Division 7,772 3,062 10,834

” 3rd Division 4,977 2,460 7,437

” 4th Division 4,974 2,842 7,816

” 5th Division 4,353 2,372 6,725

” 6th Division 4,872 2,475 7,347

” 7th Division 4,850 2,437 7,287

” Light Division 3,539 1,945 5,484

” Silveira’s Division -- 5,287 5,287

” Pack’s and Bradford’s Brigades -- 4,689 4,689

” Artillery and Train 3,977 330 4,307

” Engineers, Staff Corps, &c. 892 -- 892

------ ------ ------

52,484 28,792 81,276

This is, I believe, the first complete return of Wellington’s army in

the Vittoria campaign ever published. My predecessors in Peninsular

history sought in vain for the ‘morning states’ which should have

accompanied Wellington’s dispatches to Lord Bathurst, and which are

mentioned in those dispatches. In previous years, down to December

1812, they are generally found annexed to the covering letter, in the

bound volumes at the Record Office. I should have fared no better than

other seekers, but for the admirable knowledge of the contents of the

Office possessed by Mr. Leonard Atkinson. He remembered that there

existed some separate packages of ‘morning states’, which had been

divorced from the rest of Wellington’s sendings, and not bound up with

them. When sought, they turned out to be the missing figures of 1813,

tied up unbound between two covers of cardboard. Mr. Atkinson’s happy

discovery enables me to give the prefixed statistics, which permit us

to know Wellington’s exact strength just as the campaign of Vittoria

was starting.

IX

SPANISH TROOPS UNDER WELLINGTON’S COMMAND JUNE-JULY 1813

STATES OF JUNE 1

I. FOURTH ARMY (GENERAL GIRON)

_Officers._ _Men._ _Total._

Morillo’s Division 172 4,379 4,551

Losada’s Galician Division (6 batts.) 295 5,560 5,855

P. Barcena’s Galician Division (7 batts.) 235 4,908 5,143

Porlier’s Asturian Division (3 batts.) 124 2,284 2,408

Longa’s Division (5 batts.) 130 3,000 3,130

Penne Villemur’s Cavalry (7 regts.) 194 2,434 2,628

Julian Sanchez’s Cavalry (2 regts.) 90 1,200 1,290

Artillery 20 400 420

----- ------ ------

Total of June 1 1,263 24,165 25,425

II. LEFT IN CASTILE, REJOINED ON JULY 28

Carlos de España’s division of 4th Army

(5 batts.) 175 3,167 3,342

III. JOINED ON JULY 16

THE ‘ARMY OF RESERVE OF ANDALUSIA’ (CONDE DE ABISPAL)

Echevarri’s Division (7 batts.) 237 6,380 6,617

Creagh’s Division (7 batts.) 273 6,181 6,454

C. G. Barcena’s Cavalry Brigade (2 regts.) 39 789 828

Artillery 10 274 284

--- ------ ------

Total of later arrivals 734 16,791 17,525

The General Total of the Spanish troops which actually joined

Wellington between May 26 and July 28 was therefore 46,292. This does

not include Mina’s irregulars operating in Aragon and Eastern Navarre.

X

THE FRENCH ARMY AT VITTORIA

ARMY OF THE SOUTH. RETURN OF MAY 29, 1813.

[From Paris Archives, lent me by Mr. Fortescue.]

_Officers._ _Men._ _Total._

1st Division, Leval:

Brigade Mocquery: 9th Léger, 24th Line 63 2,516 2,579

Brigade Morgan: 88th Line, 96th Line 43 2,056 2,099

Divisional battery and train 3 163 166

--- ----- -----

Divisional Total 109 4,735 4,844

2nd Division, Cassagne: lent to Army of the Centre.

3rd Division, Villatte:

Brigade Rignoux: 27th Léger, 63rd Line 39 2,539 2,578

Brigade Lefol: 94th Line, 95th Line 50 3,063 3,113

Divisional battery and train 4 179 182

-- ----- -----

Divisional Total 93 5,781 5,874

4th Division, Conroux:

Brigade Rey: 32nd and 43rd Line 78 3,591 3,669

Brigade Schwitter: 55th and 58th Line 47 2,670 2,717

Divisional battery and train 4 189 193

--- ----- -----

Divisional Total 129 6,460 6,589

5th Division, brigade Maransin only:

12th Léger, 45th Line 58 2,869 2,927

6th Division, Daricau:

Brigade St. Pol: 21st Léger, 100th Line 53 2,658 2,711

Brigade Remond: 28th Léger, 103rd Line 45 2,939 2,984

Divisional battery and train 3 237 240

--- ----- -----

Total 101 5,834 5,935

TOTAL 4½ INFANTRY DIVISIONS 490 25,679 26,169

Cavalry:

Pierre Soult’s Division:

2nd Hussars, 5th, 10th, 21st Chasseurs 74 1,428 1,502

One battery H.A. and train 4 165 169

Tilly’s Division:

2nd, 4th, 14th, 17th, 26th, 27th Dragoons 88 1,841 1,929

Digeon’s Division:

5th, 12th, 16th, 21st Dragoons 80 1,612 1,692

One battery H.A. and train 3 174 177

--- ----- -----

Total cavalry 249 6,220 6,469

Artillery Reserve: two batteries and train 5 365 370

Artillery Park: two companies Field Artillery,

one company pontoniers, artificers, train 17 696 713

Engineers: two companies sappers, two miners,

and train 11 619 630

Gendarmerie 4 101 105

Wagon train 2 63 65

--- ----- -----

Total auxiliary troops 39 1,844 1,883

État-Major of the Army and the divisions 115 -- 115

GENERAL TOTAL OF ARMY OF THE SOUTH 893 33,743 34,636

ARMY OF THE CENTRE AT VITTORIA

RETURN OF MAY 29 FOR CASSAGNE’S DIVISION; OF MAY 1 ONLY FOR THE REST,

EXCEPT FOR THE ROYAL GUARDS AND SPANIARDS, AS SEE NOTE.

_Officers._ _Men._ _Total._

1st Division, Darmagnac:

Brigade Chassé: 28th & 75th Line 35 1,759 1,794

Brigade Neuenstein: 2nd Nassau, 4th Baden,

Frankfort 101 2,577 2,678

--- ----- -----

Divisional Total 136 4,336 4,472

2nd Division, Cassagne:

Brigade Braun: 16th Léger, 8th Line }

Brigade Blondeau: 51st Line, 54th Line } 95 5,114 5,209

--- ----- -----

Total Infantry 231 9,450 9,681

Cavalry:

Treillard’s Division: 13th, 18th, 19th,

22nd Dragoons 44 994 1,038

Avy’s Light Cavalry: 27th Chasseurs,

Nassau Chasseurs 22 452 474

--- ----- -----

Total Cavalry 66 1,446 1,512

Artillery (3 batteries) and train 13 488 501

Engineers (1 company sappers) 2 129 131

Wagon train, &c. 3 195 198

--- ----- -----

Total Auxiliary Arms 28 812 830

The King’s Spanish Army:[1070]

Royal Guards, General Guy:

Grenadiers, tirailleurs, voltigeurs

of the Guard 80 2,300 2,380

Hussars and Lancers of the Guard 25 400 425

Line:

Regiments of Castile, Toledo,

_Royal Étranger_ 70 2,000 2,070

Cavalry: 1st & 2nd Chasseurs, Hussars

of Guadalajara 70 600 670

Artillery: one battery 3 90 93

--- ----- -----

Total King’s Army 248 5,390 5,633

TOTAL ARMY OF THE CENTRE 603 17,098 17,691

ARMY OF PORTUGAL

NO RETURN AVAILABLE LATER THAN MAY 1.

_Officers._ _Men._ _Total._

4th Division, Sarrut:

Brigade Fririon: 2nd Léger, 36th Line }

Brigade Menne: 4th Léger, 65th Line } 146 4,656 4,802

Divisional field battery and train }

6th Division, Lamartinière:

Brigade Gauthier: 118th Line, 119th Line 71 2,496 2,567

Brigade Menne: 120th Line, 122nd Line 102 3,866 3,968

Divisional field battery and train 3 173 176

--- ------ ------

Total Infantry Divisions 322 11,191 11,513

Cavalry:

Division Mermet:

Brigade Curto: 13th & 22nd Chasseurs 39 863 902

Brigade ? : 3rd Hussars, 14th &

26th Chasseurs 42 857 899

Division Boyer:

6th, 11th, 15th, 25th Dragoons 67 1,404 1,471

--- ----- -----

Total Cavalry 148 3,324 3,472

Reserve Artillery:

One H.A., four field batteries 11 379 390

One company Pontoniers, train,

artificers, &c. 10 763 773

Engineers: two companies sappers 5 190 195

Gendarmerie 5 169 174

Wagon train, mule train, &c. 35 898 933

--- ----- -----

Total auxiliary arms 66 2,389 2,455

GENERAL TOTAL OF ARMY OF PORTUGAL 536 16,904 17,440

Allowing for wastage May 1 to June 21, there may probably have been

14,000 of all arms at Vittoria--say 9,500 infantry, 2,800 cavalry,

1,700 auxiliary arms.

Adding the totals of the three armies as above, we should get 2,032

officers and 68,231 men. But deductions of course must be made:

(1) For decrease from May 1 to June 21 in the Armies of Portugal and

the Centre, and from May 29 to June 21 in the Army of the South by

normal wastage, and in the two former by drafts sent back to France

in May.

(2) For casualties in action since the campaign opened.

The latter would not be large, only Digeon’s Dragoons and Villatte’s

and Sarrut’s infantry divisions having been seriously engaged during

the retreat. The Burgos explosion cost Villatte over 100 men. We need

not allow more than 1,500 as an ample estimate for casualties in action.

The normal wastage, and the deduction for drafts sent to France in May

are more difficult to calculate, but I think we shall not be far out in

taking 3,000 as an outside allowance for the latter--which affects only

the Armies of Portugal and the Centre, since we have a May 29th Return

for Gazan’s Army, which of course sent nothing away after that date.

And in healthy months, such as May and early June, the deficit from

extra sick would not be large--indeed as many men may have rejoined

as convalescents as went into hospital, since (except Villatte at

Salamanca) the troops had never been pressed or overmarched. It would

be generous to allow 5,000 for ‘wastage’.

If so, the French had 63,000 men at Vittoria, but deducting

non-combatants (train, artificers, &c.) there would be 9,000 horse,

over 46,000 men in the infantry divisions, and about 1,300 gunners with

the field and horse batteries not included in the infantry divisions,

also 1,000 sappers. This makes over 57,000 fighting men actually

available. There must also be a small addition for stray units of the

Army of the North known to have been present--not less than 500 nor

more than 1,000. All attempts to bring down the French force present to

45,000 men (_Victoires et Conquêtes_, vol. xxii) or 39,000 infantry and

8,000 horse (Jourdan) or ‘barely 50,000 men’ (Picard) are inadmissible.