D’Erlon, starting at dawn from Haro, reached Arminion at 10 o’clock

in the morning of the 19th, and pushed up the defile: the head of his

column was just emerging from its northern end when a heavy cannonade

began to be heard in the west. It continued all the time that the

Army of the South was pressing up the defile, and grew nearer. This,

of course, marked the approach of Wellington, driving the covering

force under Reille before him toward the Zadorra. The British

commander-in-chief had slept the night at Berberena near Osma, and had

there drafted a set of orders which considerably modified his original

scheme: probably the change was due to topographical information, newly

garnered up from the countryside. Instead of sending Graham’s column

via Orduña, to cut in on the flank of the _chaussée_ behind Vittoria,

he had resolved to send it by a shorter route, a mere country road

which goes by Luna, Santa Eulalia, and Jocano to Murguia--the village

which it had been ordered on the previous day to reach via Orduña

and the high road. Presumably it had been discovered that this would

save time,--the advantage of using a first-rate track being more than

counterbalanced by the fact that the Orduña road was not only ten miles

longer but crossed and recrossed by steep slopes the main sierra,

which forms the watershed between Biscay and Alava. Or possibly it

was only the discovery that the Luna-Jocano route could be taken by

artillery that settled the matter: if it had been reported useless

for wheeled traffic the old orders might have stood. At any rate, the

turning movement, which was to take Graham into the rear of Vittoria,

was made south of the main mountain chain, and not north of it[532].

Meanwhile, though Graham diverged north-eastward, the rest of the

Army moved straight forward from the valley of the Omecillo to that

of the Bayas in four columns, all parallel to each other, and all

moving by country roads. The 3rd Division was ordered from Berberena to

Carcamo--the 7th followed behind it. The 4th Division with D’Urban’s

cavalry in front, and the Light Division with V. Alten’s hussars in

front, were directed on Subijana and Pobes, keeping in close and

constant communication with each other. Behind them came the cavalry

reserve--R. Hill’s, Grant’s, and Ponsonby’s brigades--also the heavy

artillery. Hill’s column, which had now come up into touch with the

leading divisions, kept to the high road from Osma and Espejo towards

the Puente Lara and the Ebro. But only cavalry reconnaissances went as

far as the river--the mass of the corps turned off eastward when it

had passed Espejo, and moved by Salinas de Añana, so as to come out

into the valley of the Bayas south of the route of the Light Division.

It thus became the right wing of the army which was deploying for the

frontal attack.

It has been mentioned above that a local Spanish force from the

Cantabrian mountains had joined Wellington at Medina de Pomar; this was

the so-called ‘division’, some 3,500 bayonets, of the great guerrillero

of the coast-land, Longa, now no more an irregular but a titular

colonel, while his _partida_ had been reorganized as four battalions

of light infantry. Longa was a tough and persistent fighter--a

case of the ‘survival of the fittest’ among many insurgent chiefs

who had perished. His men were veteran mountaineers, indefatigable

marchers, and skilled skirmishers, if rudimentary in their drill and

equipment. Wellington during the ensuing campaign gave more work to

them than to any other Spanish troops that were at his disposal--save

the Estremaduran division of Morillo, old comrades of Hill’s corps,

to which they had always been attached since 1811. The use which

Wellington now made of Longa’s men was to employ them as a light

covering shield for Graham’s turning force. They had been sent across

the hills from Quincoces[533] on the 17th to occupy Orduña--from thence

they descended on the 19th on to Murguia, thus placing themselves at

the head of the turning column. The object of the arrangement was that,

if the enemy should detect the column, he would imagine it to be a

Spanish demonstration, and not suspect that a heavy British force lay

hid behind the familiar guerrilleros. While Longa was thus brought in

sideways, to form the head of Graham’s column, the other Spanish force

which Wellington was employing was also deflected to join the main

army. Giron’s Galicians, as has been mentioned above, had been sent

by a long sweep through the sierras to demonstrate against Bilbao.

They had reached Valmaseda on the 18th, and their approach had alarmed

all the French garrisons of Biscay. Now, having put themselves in

evidence in the north, they were suddenly recalled, ordered to march by

Amurrio on Orduña and Murguia, and so to fall into the rear of Graham’s

column. The distances were considerable, the roads steep, and Giron

only came up with the Anglo-Portuguese army on the afternoon of the

battle of Vittoria, in which (unlike Longa) he was too late to take

any part. Somewhere on his march from Aguilar to Valmaseda he picked

up a reinforcement, the very small Asturian division of Porlier--three

battalions or 2,400 men--which Mendizabal had sent to join him from the

blockade of Santoña. This raised the Galician Army to a total of some

14,000 bayonets.

The 19th June was a very critical day, as no one knew better than

Wellington. The problem was whether, starting with the heads of

his column facing the line of the Bayas, where Reille had rallied

his three divisions and was standing at bay, he could drive in the

detaining force, and cross the Zadorra in pursuit of it, fast enough to

surprise some part of the French army still in its march up from the

south. And, as an equally important problem, there was the question

whether Graham, marching on Murguia, could reach the upper Zadorra

and cut the great road north of Vittoria, before the French were in

position to cover it. If these operations could be carried out, there

would be a scrambling fight scattered over much ground, rather than

a regular pitched battle. If they could not, there would be a formal

general action on the 20th or 21st against an enemy established in

position--unless indeed King Joseph should choose to continue his

retreat without fighting, which Wellington thought quite possible[534].

Wellington is censured by some critics, including Napier[535], for not

making a swifter advance on the 19th. It is said that a little more

haste would have enabled him to get to Vittoria as soon as the enemy,

and to force him to fight in dislocated disorder on ground which he had

not chosen. This seems unjustifiable. The distance between the camps

of the Allied Army, in front of Osma and Espejo, and Vittoria is some

twenty miles--difficult ground, with the Bayas river flowing through

the midst of it and a formidable position held by 15,000 French behind

that stream. As Reille, conscious how much depended on his gaining

time for the King to retreat from Miranda, was determined to detain

the Allied Army as long as he could, it would have been useless to try

to drive him away by a light attack. The rear of each of Wellington’s

columns was trailing many miles behind the leading brigade. It was

necessary to bring up against Reille a force sufficient to make serious

resistance impossible, and this Wellington did, pushing forward not

only the 4th and Light Divisions, but Hill’s column in support, on the

southern flank. It took time to get them deployed, and the attack was

opened by a cannonade. By the time that a general advance was ordered

Reille had begun to retire--he did so very neatly, and crossed the

Zadorra by the four nearest bridges without any appreciable loss. By

this time the afternoon had arrived, the rest of the French army had

passed the defile of Puebla, and Wellington judged the hour too late

for the commencement of a pitched battle[536]. Moreover, he did not

intend to fight without the co-operation of Graham’s column, and the

latter was not where he would have wished it to be. The day had been

very rainy, the cross roads were bad, and by some error of staff-work

the head of the column had not received the countermarching orders

directing it to march direct on Murguia, but had started in accordance

with the earlier plan on to the Orduña road; the 1st and 5th Divisions

had gone some way upon it before they were recalled and counter-marched

into the right path[537]. Owing to blocks and bad weather they only

reached Jocano, some six or eight miles east of Osma, by six in the

evening. Murguia was still nine miles ahead, the rain was still falling

in torrents, and Graham ordered the divisions to halt and encamp for

the night. The fate of the campaign was not to be fought out that day,

nor on the next, but on the third morning--that of June 21st, 1813.

SECTION XXXVI: CHAPTER VII

THE BATTLE OF VITTORIA. JUNE 21, 1813

(A) THE FIRST STAGE

The plain of Vittoria, into which the French army debouched on the

afternoon of June 19th, is a plain only by comparison with the high

hills which surround it on all sides, being an oval expanse of rolling

ground drained by the swift and narrow Zadorra river, which runs

on its north-eastern side. Only in its northern section, near the

city, does it show really flat ground. It is about twelve miles long

from north-east to south-west, and varies from six to eight miles in

breadth. The Zadorra is one of those mountain streams which twist in

numberless loops and bends of alternate shallows and deep pools, in

order to get round rocks or spurs which stand in the way of their

direct course[538]. At one point seven miles down-stream from Vittoria

it indulges in a complete ‘hairpin-bend’ in which are the bridges of

Tres Puentes and Villodas, as it circles round a precipitous knoll. At

several other spots it executes minor loops in its tortuous course.

The little city of Vittoria stands on an isolated rising ground at its

northern end, very visible from all directions, and dominating the

whole upland with two prominent church spires at its highest point.

The great road from France enters the plain of Vittoria and the valley

of the Zadorra three miles north-east of the city, descending from the

defile of Salinas, a long and difficult pass in which Mina and other

guerrilleros had executed some of their most daring raids on French

convoys. After passing Vittoria the road keeps to the middle of the

upland in a westerly direction, and issues from it by the defile of La

Puebla, where the Zadorra cuts its way through the Sierra de Andia in

order to join the Ebro. There is not much more than room for road and

river in the gorge, which is dominated by the heights of La Puebla,

a spur of the Andia, on the east, and by a corresponding but lower

range, the end of the heights of Morillas on the west.

But the Bayonne _chaussée_ is by no means the only road in the Vittoria

upland. The city is the meeting point of a number of second-class and

third-class routes, debouching from various subsidiary valleys of the

Pyrenees and leading to various towns in Navarre or Biscay. Of these

the chief were (1) the Salvatierra-Pampeluna road, running due east,

and then crossing from the valley of the Zadorra to the upper waters

of the Araquil, by which it descends into Navarre. This was a route

practicable for artillery or transport, but narrow, ill repaired, and

steep--eminently not a line to be taken by a large force in a hurry;

(2) the main road to Bilbao by Villareal and Durango, a coach road, but

very tortuous, and ascending high mountains by long curves and twists;

(3) the alternative coach route to Bilbao by Murguia and Orduña, easier

than the Villareal road in its first section, but forced to cross the

main chain of the Pyrenees by difficult gradients before descending

into Biscay; (4) a bad side road to the central Ebro, going due south

by Trevino and La Guardia to Logroño; (5) a similar route, running due

east from Subijana on the Bayas to the bridges of Nanclares three miles

up-stream from the defile of Puebla. At the opening of the battle of

Vittoria Graham’s column was already across the Murguia-Bilbao road,

and in its earliest advance blocked the Durango-Bilbao road also. Thus

the only route beside the great _chaussée_ available for the French was

that to Salvatierra and Pampeluna. The road to Trevino and Logroño was

useless, as leading in an undesired direction.

In addition to these five coach roads there were several country tracks

running from various points on the Bayas river to minor bridges on the

Zadorra, across the lofty Monte Arrato, the watershed between the two

streams. It was these fifth-rate tracks which Wellington used on the

battle-day for the advance of some of his central columns, while Hill

on the right was forcing the defile of La Puebla, and Graham on the

left was descending from Murguia on to the bridges of the upper Zadorra

north-east of Vittoria.

Having their troops safely concentrated east of the Zadorra on the

evening of June 19, Joseph and Jourdan made up their minds to stand

on the position behind that river, even though Clausel had not yet

come up, nor sent any intelligence as to the route by which he was

arriving. Aides-de-camp were searching for him in all directions--but

nothing had yet been ascertained, beyond the fact that he had started

from Pampeluna on June 15th, marching on Logroño[539]. There was a

high chance that some one of many missives would reach him, and turn

him on to Vittoria. But the idea that Clausel must now be very near at

hand was less operative in compelling Joseph to fight than the idea

that he must at all cost save the vast convoys accumulated around him,

his treasure, his military train, his ministers, and his refugees. He

was getting them off northward by the high road as fast as he could:

one convoy marched on the 20th, under the charge of the troops of the

Army of the North who had formed the garrison of Vittoria, another

and a larger at dawn on the 21st, escorted by the whole of Maucune’s

division. It had with it many of the Old Masters stolen from the royal

palace at Madrid--the pictures of Titian, Rafael, and Velasquez, which

had been the pride of the old dynasty--with the pick of the royal

armoury and cabinet of Natural History[540]. It is almost as difficult

to make out how Joseph, already unequal in numbers to his enemy, dared

to deprive himself of Maucune’s division of the Army of Portugal, as

to discover why Wellington left the 6th Division at Medina de Pomar.

It does not seem that the morale of the unit had been shaken by its

rude experience at San Millan on the 18th, for it fought excellently in

subsequent operations: nor had it suffered any disabling losses in that

fight. A more obvious escort might have been found in Casapalacios’

Spanish auxiliaries, who had already been utilized for similar purposes

between Madrid and Vittoria, or in the scraps of the Army of the North

which had lately joined the retreating host. But they remained for the

battle, while Maucune marched north, with the cannon sounding behind

him all day.

When Jourdan and Joseph first arrayed their host for the expected

battle, it would seem, from the line which they took up, that they

imagined that Wellington would attack them only from the direction

of the Bayas, and paid no attention to Graham’s flanking movement,

though afterwards they wrote dispatches to prove that they had not

ignored it. For they drew up the Army of the South on a short front,

from the exit of the defile of Puebla on the south to the bridge of

Villodas on the north, a front of three miles, with D’Erlon’s two

divisions in second line on each side of the village of Gomecha, two

miles farther back, and the Army of Portugal and the King’s Guards as

a third line in reserve about Zuazo, not far in front of Vittoria,

along with the bulk of the cavalry. This order of battle, as a glance

at the map shows, presupposed a frontal attack from the line of the

Bayas, where Wellington was known to be. It was ill-suited to face an

attack from the north-west on the line of the Zadorra above Villodas,

and still more so an attack from the due north by the roads from Orduña

and Murguia. On the morning of the 20th cavalry reconnaissances went

out to look for the Allied Army--they reported that the camps along

the Bayas above Subijana Morillos did not seem very large, and that

on the Murguia road they had fallen in with and pushed back Longa’s

irregulars, obviously a Spanish demonstration[541]. ‘No indication

being available of the details of a projected attack, and further

information being unprocurable, only conjectures could be made[542].’

It is interesting to know from the narrative of Jourdan himself what

these conjectures were. ‘Wellington,’ he writes, ‘had shown himself

since the start of the campaign more disposed to manœuvre his opponents

out of their positions, by constantly turning their right wing, than to

attack them frontally and force on a battle. It was thought probable

that, pursuing this system, he would march on Bilbao by Orduña, and

from thence on Durango, so as to force them to fall back promptly on

Mondragon[543], in order to retain their communications with France. He

might even hope to force them to evacuate Spain by this move, because

it would be impossible to feed a great army on that section of the

Pyrenees. The King, knowing that Clausel was on the move, had little

fear of the results of a march on Bilbao, for on receiving Clausel’s

corps he would be strong enough to take the offensive himself, and

would strike at Wellington’s communications. It did not escape him

that if the enemy, instead of wasting more time on flank movements,

should attack him before the arrival of Clausel, he was in a perilous

position. For there was little chance of getting the better of an

adversary who had about double numbers, and a lost battle would cut

off the army from the road to France, and force it to retire on

Pampeluna by a road difficult, if not impracticable, for the train

and artillery of a great host. To avoid the risk of an instant attack

from Wellington, ought we to fall back and take up the position above

the pass of Salinas?[544] But to do this was to sacrifice the junction

with Clausel, who was expected on the 21st at latest. And how could

the army have been fed in the passes? The greater part of the cavalry

and the artillery horses would have had to be sent back to France at

once--famine would have forced the infantry to follow. Then the King

would have been accused of cowardice, for evacuating Spain without

trying the fortune of battle. To justify such a retreat we should have

had to be _certain_ that we were to be attacked before the 22nd, and

we considered that, if Wellington did decide to fight, it would be

unlikely that he could do so before the 22nd, because of the difficulty

of the roads which he had taken. After mature consideration of the

circumstance the King resolved to stand fast at Vittoria.’

Putting aside the gross over-estimate of Wellington’s strength--he

fought with a superiority of 75,000[545] to 57,000, not with two to

one--the main point to note in this curious and interesting argument

is its defective psychology. Because Wellington had hitherto avoided

frontal attacks, when flank movements suited him better, was it safe

to conclude that he would do so _ad infinitum_? That he was capable of

a sudden onslaught was obvious to every one who remembered the battle

of Salamanca. Why, if he were about to repeat his previous encircling

policy, should he go by Orduña, Bilbao, and Durango, rather than by

the shorter turn Osma-Murguia-Vittoria? Apparently the French staff

underrated the possibilities of that road, and took the presence of

Longa upon it as a sign that it was only to be used for a Spanish

demonstration[546]. Should not the speed with which Wellington had

traversed the detestable country paths between the Arlanzon and the

Ebro have served as a warning that, if he chose to push hard, he could

cover at a very rapid rate the rather less formidable tracks north

of the Zadorra? In short, the old marshal committed the not uncommon

fault of making false deductions from an imperfect set of premises. It

is much more difficult to say what should have been his actual course

under the existing circumstances of June 20. Napier holds that he might

still have adopted Reille’s old plan of June 12 and June 18, i.e. that

he should have thrown up the line of communication with France by

the high road, have made ready to retreat on Pampeluna instead of on

Bayonne, and have looked forward to making Saragossa his base. After

having picked up first Clausel and then so much of the Army of Aragon

as could be collected, he might have got 100,000 men together and have

started an offensive campaign[547]. This overlooks the impossibility of

getting the convoys and train safely along the bad road from Vittoria

to Pampeluna, and the difficulty of making Saragossa, where there were

no great accumulations of stores and munitions, the base of an army

of the size projected. All communication with France would have been

thrown on the hopelessly long and circuitous route from Saragossa to

Perpignan, for the pass by Jaca was impracticable for wheeled traffic.

Certainly Joseph would have had to destroy, as a preliminary measure to

a retreat via Salvatierra or Pampeluna, the greater part of his train.

And what would have become of his wretched horde of refugees?

Another school of critics--among them Belmas--urge that while it was

perfectly correct to cling as a primary necessity to the great road to

France, Vittoria was not the right point at which to defend it, but the

pass of Salinas. Jourdan’s objection that the cavalry would be useless

in the mountains is declared to have little weight, and his dread of

famine to be groundless. For Wellington could not have remained for

many days in front of the passes--he must have attacked at once a very

formidable position, or Foy and the other troops in Biscay would have

had time to join the King; and with 15,000 extra bayonets the French

would have been hard to dislodge. The danger to Clausel would have

been not very great, since Wellington would not have dared to detach a

force sufficient to crush him, while the main French army was in his

front, intact and ready to resume the offensive. And on the other flank

Biscay, no doubt, would have been exposed to an invasion by Giron’s

Galicians, when Foy had withdrawn its garrisons to join the main army.

But it is improbable that this movement would have been backed by any

large section of the Anglo-Portuguese force; for Wellington, as his

previous action showed, was intending to keep all his own old divisions

in one body. He would not have risked any of his own troops between

the Pyrenees and the sea, by trying to thrust them in on the back of

the French position, to Durango or Mondragon. And if Giron alone went

to Bilbao and Durango, his presence in that direction, and any threats

which he might make on the King’s rear, would be tiresome rather than

dangerous.

Be this as it may, whatever the general policy of Jourdan and Joseph

should have been, their particular dispositions for occupying the

Vittoria position were very faulty. It was as well known to every

practical soldier then as it is now, that a normal river-position

cannot be held by a continuous line of troops placed at the water’s

edge. For there will be loops and bends at which the ground on one’s

own side is commanded and enfiladed by higher ground on the enemy’s

side. If troops are pushed forward into such bends, they will be

crushed by artillery fire, or run danger of being cut off by attacks

on the neck of the loop in their rear[548]. Unless the general who

has to defend a river front is favoured with a stream in front of him

absolutely straight, and with all the commanding ground on his own side

(an unusual chance), he must rather look to arranging his army in such

a fashion as to hold as strong points all the favourable sections of

the front, while the unfavourable ones must be watched from suitable

positions drawn back from the water’s edge. By judicious disposition

of artillery, the occupation and preparation of villages, woods, or

other cover, and (if necessary) the throwing up of trenches, the enemy,

though he cannot be prevented from crossing the river at certain

points, can be kept from debouching out of the sections of the hither

bank which he has mastered. And if he loads up the captured ground

with heavy masses of troops which cannot get forward, he will suffer

terribly from artillery fire, while if he does not hold them strongly,

he will be liable to counter-attacks, which will throw the troops who

have crossed back into the river. The most elementary precaution for

the general on the defensive to take is, of course, to blow up all

bridges, and to place artillery to command all fords, also to have

local reserves ready at a proper distance behind every section where a

passage is likely to be tried[549].

We may excuse Joseph and Jourdan for not entrenching all the weak

sections of their front--hasty field works were little used in the

Peninsular War; indeed the trenches which Wellington threw up on the

second day of Fuentes de Oñoro were an almost unique instance of such

an expedient. But the other precautions to be taken were commonplaces

of contemporary tactics. And they were entirely neglected. The front

liable to attack was very long for the size of the defending army:

whole sections of it were neglected. Bridges and fords were numerous

on the Zadorra: incredible as it may seem, not one of eleven bridges

between Durana to the north and Nanclares to the south was blown up.

The numerous fords seem not to have been known accurately to either

the attacking or the defending generals, but some of the most obvious

of them were ignored in Joseph’s original disposition of his troops.

Several alike of bridges and fords were lightly watched by cavalry

only, with no further precaution taken. What is most astonishing is to

find that bridges which were actually used by French exploring parties

on June 20th, so that their existence was thoroughly realized, were

found intact and in some cases unguarded on the 21st[550]. The fact

would seem to be that the King’s head-quarters staff was dominated

by a false idea: that Wellington’s attack would be delivered on the

south part of the river front, from the defile of Puebla to the bridge

of Villodas; and that the troops discovered on the Murguia road were

Longa’s irregulars only, bound on a demonstration. An acute British

observer remarked that the French position had two main defects--the

more important one was that it faced the wrong way[551]: this was quite

true.

The final arrangement, as taken up on the morning of June 20 was that

the Army of the South arrayed itself so as to block the debouches from

the defile of La Puebla and the bridges immediately up-stream from

it--those of Nanclares and Villodas. Gazan did not occupy the entrance

of the defile of La Puebla--to do so he must have stretched his line

farther south and east than his numbers permitted. But he held its

exits, with some voltigeur companies from Maransin’s brigade, perched

high up on the culminating ground immediately above the river.

From this lofty point on the heights of Puebla his first line stretched

north-eastward along a line of low hills, past the villages of Subijana

(low down and not far from the Puebla heights) and Ariñez (on the high

road, at the spot where it crosses the position), a dominating point

on the sky-line. The right wing nearly reached to the Zadorra at the

spot where it makes the ‘hairpin bend’ alluded to above. But the solid

occupation by formed troops did not extend so far: there were only a

cavalry regiment and three guns watching the bridge of Mendoza[552],

and a single company of voltigeurs watching that of Villodas. The

disposition of the units was, counting from the French left, first

Maransin’s brigade occupying Subijana, next Conroux’s division in a

single line on the slopes to the north of the village of Zumelzu,

with a battalion holding a wood in front on lower ground. Then came

Daricau’s division, one brigade in front line across the high road,

the other brigade (St. Pol’s) in reserve north of the road, and in

rear of Leval’s division, which was deployed on the prominent height

in front of the village of Ariñez, which formed the end of the main

position. Between Leval and the Zadorra there was only Avy’s few

squadrons of light horse, watching the bridge of Mendoza. Nearly a mile

to the rear of the main line Villatte’s division stood in reserve, on

the heights on the other side of Ariñez, and with it Pierre Soult’s

cavalry. The position was heavily gunned, as artillery support went

in those days. Each of the three front-line divisions had its battery

with it--a fourth belonging to Pierre Soult’s cavalry was placed

on a knoll in front of the position, from which it could sweep the

approaches from the bridge of Nanclares. In reserve behind Ariñez was

not only Villatte’s battery, but two others drawn from the general

artillery park, and during the early stage of the battle another pair

of batteries, belonging to the Army of Portugal, were sent to join

Leval’s divisional guns on the north end of the position. Gazan had

therefore some 54 pieces in hand, without counting the half-battery of

horse artillery belonging to Digeon’s dragoons, which was absent far to

his extreme right, by the banks of the upper Zadorra.

Three-quarters of a mile behind Gazan’s reserves, the whole Army of

the Centre was deployed on each side of the high road, Darmagnac’s

division north of it in front of Zuazo, Cassagne’s division south of

it, level with Gomecha. Treillard’s dragoons were behind Cassagne;

Avy’s chasseurs (as has been mentioned above) were watching the Zadorra

on the right.

In the original order of battle of the 20th the Army of Portugal had

been in third line, a mile behind the Army of the Centre, on a level

with the villages of Ali and Armentia. But when Digeon’s dragoons

reported in the afternoon that they had discovered Longa’s column on

the Murguia road, it was decided that a flank guard must be thrown out

in that direction, to cover Vittoria and the high road to France from

possible raids. Wherefore Reille was told that it would be his duty to

provide against this danger. He took out Menne’s brigade of Sarrut’s

division from the line, pushed it over the Zadorra, and established

it in a position level with Aranguiz on the Murguia road, a mile and

more beyond the river. Late at night, apparently on a report from a

deserter that there were British troops behind Longa[553]--(indeed the

man said that Wellington himself was on the Bilbao road)--Reille took

off the other brigade of Sarrut’s division in the same direction, and

sent it with Curto’s regiments of light horse to join Menne. There

remained in front of Vittoria of infantry only Lamartinière’s division,

and the King’s Guards; but there was a very large body of cavalry in

reserve--Tilly’s and Digeon’s dragoon divisions of the Army of the

South, the King’s two Guard regiments of lancers, and the bulk of the

horse of the Army of Portugal, Boyer’s dragoons and Mermet’s chasseurs:

there must have been 5,000 sabres or more in hand.

One further precaution was taken--lest the enemy might be moving

against the high road to France from points even more to the north

than Murguia, a trifling force was sent to cover the exit of the

_chaussée_ from the pass of Salinas; this was the Spanish ‘division’

of Casapalacios belonging to the Army of the Centre, strengthened by

some scraps of the French troops of the Army of the North, which had

come in from minor garrisons during the recent retreat. Casapalacios’

_Afrancesados_, nominally three regiments strong, were under 2,000

bayonets--they had with them five weak squadrons of their own nation,

a half-battery, also Spanish, and an uncertain (but small) French

auxiliary force, which included a battalion of the 3rd Line, part of

the 15th Chasseurs, and a section of guns equipped from the artillery

dépôt of the Army of the North, which had long been established at

Vittoria and had not been sent to the rear[554]. Casapalacios took post

at Durana, covering the bridge of that village, the most northerly one

on the Zadorra: the French battalion was at Gamarra Menor on the other

side of the water.

Wellington spent the 20th in arranging for the general attack, which

he had determined to deliver if Joseph stood his ground. The plan was

ambitious, for the battlefield was far larger than any on which the

Anglo-Portuguese Army had ever fought before, and the numbers available

were 30,000 more than they had been at Salamanca or Bussaco, and more

than double those of Fuentes de Oñoro. Moreover, he intended to operate

with a great detached turning force against the enemy’s flank and rear,

a thing that he had only once done before--at Salamanca--and then only

with a single division. The battle plan was essentially a time-problem:

he had to arrange for the simultaneous appearance of four separate

masses in front of the French position. All started from parallel

points in the valley of the Bayas, but the obstacles in front of them

were of very varying difficulty, and the distances to be covered were

very different.

(1) Hill, with the large 2nd Division (four brigades), Silveira’s

Portuguese division, Morillo’s Spaniards, and V. Alten’s and Fane’s

light dragoons, 20,000 sabres and bayonets in all, was to cross the

Zadorra completely outside the extreme French left wing, to storm the

heights of Puebla, which formed the end of Gazan’s line, and then,

advancing from the defile, to strike at Subijana de Alava with his main

body, while continuing to thrust his flank along the heights above,

which dominated the whole region, and extended far behind the enemy’s

left wing.

(2) Two parallel columns were to march from the camps on the Bayas;

one consisting of the 4th and Light Divisions, R. Hill’s, Grant’s, and

Ponsonby’s cavalry brigades, and D’Urban’s Portuguese horse, was to

advance by the country road from Subijana-Morillas to the two bridges

of Nanclares. Opposite those passages and the neighbouring ones it was

to deploy, and to attack the French centre, when Hill should have got a

footing on the Puebla heights and in the plain by Subijana. The second

column, consisting of the 3rd and 7th Divisions, was to move from Zuazo

and Anda on the Bayas across the high mountain called Monte Arrato by

a country track, and to descend into the valley of the Zadorra at Las

Guetas, opposite the bridge of Mendoza, up-stream from the ‘hairpin

bend’. In this position it would be almost in the rear of Gazan’s right

wing above Villodas: it was to attack at once on reaching its ground,

if the progress of Hill on the south was seen to be satisfactory. ‘The

movement to be regulated from the right: although these columns are to

make such movements in advance as may be evidently necessary to favour

the progress of the two columns on their right, they are not to descend

into the low ground toward Vittoria or the great road.’ The total

strength of the four divisions and cavalry of this section of the army

was about 30,000 sabres and bayonets.

(3) Graham’s column-head was at Olano, three miles in front of Murguia,

and six from the Zadorra. He had in front Longa’s Spanish infantry,

with whom Anson’s light dragoons were to join up when operations should

begin. Behind were the 1st and 5th Divisions, Pack’s and Bradford’s

Portuguese brigades, and Bock’s heavy dragoons. The total force was

about 20,000 men of all nations. As an afterthought on the 20th

Wellington directed Giron, who was to reach Orduña that day, to come

down to the upper Bayas in Graham’s rear, where he would act as a

support if necessary. The object of this order is not quite obvious.

Giron came down too late for the battle, arriving at Murguia only in

the afternoon. It is known from his own dispatches that Wellington

over-estimated Reille’s force, which Graham had to fight, not knowing

of Maucune’s departure[555], and Giron may have been intended to add

weight to the attack in this quarter. His troops would, apparently,

have been more usefully placed if they had been sent from Murguia to

attack the unguarded upper fords of the Zadorra.

The orders issued to Graham gave him a rather perplexing choice of

action. He was (like the 3rd and 7th Divisions) to guide himself by

what was going on upon his right: he must get in touch at once with

the centre columns; he might attack if it was obviously profitable

to the main advance, but he was to avoid letting his whole corps be

drawn into close action in front of Vittoria, for his main object must

be to turn the enemy’s position, by getting round its right wing and

cutting the great road to France. The lack of precise direction in this

order is, no doubt, a testimony to Wellington’s confidence in Graham’s

judgement. But it cast a grave responsibility on him: if he had been

told simply that he was to turn the French right and seize the great

_chaussée_, matters would have been simple. But he is given leave to

attack frontally if circumstances farther down the line seem to make

such a policy desirable: yet he must not attack so heavily as to make

his great turning movement impossible. It must be confessed that the

difficult problem was not well solved that day by the gallant old

general.

The whole day of the 20th was spent in getting the columns into order,

and the arrangements for the attacks synchronized. Wellington took a

survey of all the routes in person, as his wont was. It was not till

late in the afternoon that he became certain from the dispositions of

the enemy that an eleventh hour retreat was not contemplated by the

King[556]. The timing was that Hill, who had a few miles to march,

should attack at eight in the morning, that both Graham and the column

consisting of the 3rd and 7th Divisions should get into position by

the same hour, and make ready to attack, when it was clear that the

flank movement of Hill had already begun and was making good progress.

Meanwhile the other central column, the Light and 4th Divisions, should

cross when Hill had won the defile of Puebla and room to debouch beyond

it, but not before. The rather late hour fixed, in a month when dawn

comes at 4 a.m., was dictated by the fact that Hill had a river to

cross, and the 3rd and 7th Divisions mountain tracks to follow, which

neither could have negotiated in the dark. Some hours of daylight

were needed to get them into position. Even so the brigades of the

left-centre column were several hours late at their rendezvous.

The French commanders, as we have seen, made no move on the 20th, save

to hurry off convoys and to throw back Reille on the north-west flank

of Vittoria, to protect the royal _chaussée_ and the two Bilbao roads.

Jourdan wrote to Clarke that evening a perfectly sensible dispatch

as to the difficulties of the situation, but one which showed that

he was wholly unaware that he might be forced to a general action

within the next twelve hours. All depended, he said, on Clausel’s

prompt arrival: if he should come up on the 21st there was no danger:

if he delayed, the army might have to choose between two tiresome

alternatives--a retreat on the pass of Salinas and one on Pampeluna.

If Wellington, as he suspected, was making a great turning movement by

Orduña and Durango, the army would be forced to take the wretched road

Salvatierra-Pampeluna. ‘The King does not yet know what decision he

will have to make: if General Clausel delays his junction much longer,

he will be forced to choose the retreat into Navarre.’ Of any idea that

Wellington was about to attack next morning the dispatch shows no sign.

Jourdan had been indisposed all that day--he was laid up in bed

with a feverish attack. This caused the postponement of a general

reconnaissance of the position, which he and his King had intended to

carry out together. They rode forth, however, at 6 a.m. on the 21st.

‘No intelligence had come to hand,’ writes Jourdan in his memoirs,

‘which could cause us to foresee an instant attack. We arrived at the

position by Zuazo, from which Count Reille had been recently moved, and

stopped to examine it. Its left rested on the mountain-chain in the

direction of Berostigueta, its right came down to the Zadorra behind

La Hermandad and Crispijana. It is dominating, yet not over steep, and

has all along it good artillery emplacement for many batteries. It

connected itself much better than does the Ariñez position with the

ground about Aranguiz now occupied by Reille, which might be heavily

attacked. Struck with the advantages of this position, the King

appeared inclined to bring back the Army of the South to occupy it, and

to place the Army of the Centre between it and the Army of Portugal.

The three armies would have been closer together, and more able to give

each other rapid assistance; and the eye of the Commander-in-Chief

could have swept around the whole of this more concentrated field

in one glance. This change of dispositions would probably have been

carried out on the 20th if Marshal Jourdan had not been indisposed, and

might perhaps have prevented the catastrophe that was to come. But the

officer sent to call General Gazan to confer with the King came back

to say that the general could not leave his troops, as an attack on

him was developing. It was judged too late to change position. Riding

to the front of Ariñez, to a long hill occupied by Leval’s division,

on the right of the Army of the South, the King saw that in fact the

enemy was on the move. About eight o’clock the posts on the mountain

reported that the Allies had passed the Zadorra above La Puebla: a

strong column was coming up the high road and the defile, a smaller one

had diverged to its right and was climbing the mountain itself. General

Avy, sent on reconnaissance beyond the Zadorra on the side of Mendoza,

reported at the same time that a large corps was coming in on Tres

Puentes behind the rear of General Leval. And he could see signs in the

woods opposite, which seemed to indicate the march of other troops in

the direction of the bridge of Nanclares. No news had yet come in from

Reille, but we prepared ourselves to hear ere long that he, too, was

attacked[557]’.

It is unnecessary to comment on the character of a Head-quarters where

a passing indisposition of the Chief of the Staff causes all movements

to be postponed for eighteen hours, at a moment when a general action

is obviously possible. But it is necessary to point out that the

existing dislocation of the troops left three miles of the Zadorra

front between Reille’s left and Gazan’s right unguarded when the battle

began, and that this had been the case throughout the preceding day.

And during that day who was responsible for the fact that not a single

one of the eleven bridges between the defile of La Puebla and Durana

had been ruined and only three obstructed[558]? Gazan must take a good

deal of responsibility, no less than Jourdan.

At eight o’clock on the morning of the 21st the action commenced, on a

most beautiful clear day, contrasting wonderfully with the heavy rain

of the 19th and intermittent showers on the 20th. Every hill-crest road

and village for twenty miles was visible with surprising sharpness, so

much so that incidents occurring at a great distance were easily to be

followed by the naked eye, still more easily by the staff officer’s

telescope.

The clash began, as Wellington had intended, on the extreme right. Here

Hill’s columns crossed the Zadorra, where it broadened out below the

defile of La Puebla, far outside the French line. The 2nd Division led

up the high road, with Cadogan’s brigade heading the column; but before

they entered the narrows, Morillo’s Spaniards were pushed forward on

their right, through a wood which covered the lower slopes, to seize

the spur of the Puebla heights immediately above the road. Till this

was cleared, it would be impossible to move the 2nd Division forward.

Eye-witnesses describe the deploying of the Spanish column as clearly

visible from the high ground on the Monte Arrato heights: the first

brigade appeared emerging from the woods below, then came stiffer

ground, ‘so steep that while moving up it they looked as if they were

lying on their faces or crawling[559]’ Then the smoke of the French

skirmishing fire began to be visible on the crest, while Morillo’s

second brigade, deployed behind the first, went up the heights in

support. The enemy, who was not in great strength at first, gave way,

and the Estremadurans won the sky-line, formed there, and began to

drive up from the first summit to the next above it. This also they

won, but then came to stand--Gazan had pushed up first one and then

the other of the two regiments of Maransin’s brigade from his left, on

the main position, to support the voltigeur companies which had been

the only troops originally placed on this lofty ground. Hill, seeing

the advance on the mountain stop, sent up, to help Morillo, Colonel

Cadogan, with his own regiment the 71st, and all the light companies of

Cadogan’s and Byng’s brigades. This turned the fight, and after a stiff

struggle for the second summit, in which Morillo was severely wounded,

Maransin’s brigade was turned back and flung down hill: it halted and

re-formed low down on the slope, losing the crest completely.

Having his flank now reasonably safe, Hill turned off the other two

battalions of Cadogan’s brigade to follow the 71st, and then pushed

his second British brigade (O’Callaghan’s) up the defile of La Puebla,

and deployed it on the open ground opposite the village of Subijana de

Alava, which lay near the high road, and was the first obstacle to be

carried if the whole corps was to issue forth and attack the French

left. One battery moved up with the brigade, and got into action on

a slope to its right. The rest of the 2nd Division and Silveira’s

Portuguese issued from the defile, ready to act as reserve either to

Morillo on the heights or O’Callaghan in the open ground. Meanwhile the

enemy could be seen dispatching troops from his reserves, to attack the

spurs of the mountain which had been won by Morillo and Cadogan. For

the heights of Puebla commanded all the left flank of the main French

position, and, if Allied troops pushed along them any further, Gazan’s

line would be completely turned. Jourdan says that his orders were

that Maransin’s brigade should have attacked, with a whole division in

support, but that Gazan took upon him the responsibility of sending in

Maransin alone, and only later, when the latter had been beaten down

from the crest, first Rey’s brigade of Conroux’s division and then St.

Pol’s reserve brigade of Daricau’s division, from the hill on the right

behind Leval. It would seem that Daricau’s two regiments took post on

the slopes behind Subijana, where there was a gap in the line, owing

to Maransin’s departure, while Rey and his brigade went up the Puebla

heights, to try to head off Morillo’s and Cadogan’s attack.

In this it was wholly unsuccessful: after a severe struggle on

the crest, in which Cadogan was mortally wounded[560], the French

reinforcements were checked and routed: the Allied troops began to push

forward again on the heights, and were getting right round the flank

of Gazan’s left wing, while Maransin’s troops on the lower slopes were

being contained by the 92nd and 50th, the rear regiments of Cadogan’s

brigade, and Daricau’s were hotly engaged with O’Callaghan’s three

battalions, which occupied Subijana and then attacked the hillside

above it, but failed for some time to secure a lodgement there.

Jourdan was by this time growing anxious, and not without reason, at

the rapid progress of the Allies on the Puebla heights. He ordered

Gazan to send up at once his only remaining reserve, Villatte’s

division from the height behind Ariñez, to gain the crest at a point

farther east than any that the enemy could reach, and to attack in

mass along it. In order that he might not be forestalled on the

summit, Villatte was told to march by a long détour, through the

village of Esquivel far to the east, where there was a country road

debouching from the _chaussée_. Indeed so perturbed was the Marshal by

the threat to his left, that he suspected further turning movements

in this quarter, and sent orders for Tilly’s dragoons, from the

cavalry reserve, to ride out by Berostigueta to the Trevino road, to

see if there were no British columns pressing in from that quarter.

He also directed D’Erlon to move one of his two infantry divisions,

Cassagne’s, in the same direction, to support Tilly if necessary.

Gazan, if we may credit his long and contentious report on the battle,

suggested to Jourdan that it was dangerous to disgarnish his centre,

and to push so many troops to his left, while it was still uncertain

whether Wellington’s column-heads, visible on the other side of the

Zadorra, were not about to move. Might not Hill’s attack be a feint,

intended to draw off the French reserves in an eccentric direction?

The Marshal, says Gazan, then declared in a loud voice, so that all

around could hear ‘that the enemy’s movements opposite our right are

mere demonstrations, to which no attention should be paid, and that if

the battle were lost it would be because the heights oi the left of

Subijana remained in the enemy’s power[561].’ Then lay the real danger.

Orders were given that when Villatte should have got on the crest of

the mountain, and should be delivering his attack, a simultaneous move

forward was to be made by Conroux, and the brigades of Maransin and St.

Pol, to cast the enemy out of Subijana, as well as off the heights of

Puebla. It is interesting to note that Hill had as yet only engaged two

British brigades, and one small Spanish division, and had succeeded in

attracting against himself a much larger force--the whole of Conroux’s

and Villatte’s divisions, and the two brigades of Maransin and St. Pol.

In the French centre and right there remained now only Leval’s division

and the remaining brigade of Daricau’s, and in reserve there was only

one of D’Erlon’s divisions, since the other had gone off on a wild

goose chase toward the Trevino road. Wellington could have wished for

nothing better.

But by the time that the French counter-attack on Hill’s corps was

developing, matters were beginning to look lively all along the line of

the Zadorra, and the combat on the heights was growing into a general

action. It was now about eleven o’clock, and Wellington had been for

some time established on a high bank above the river, facing the centre

of the French position, to the left of the village and bridges of

Nanclares, from which he could sweep with his glass the whole landscape

from the heights of La Puebla to the bridge of Mendoza. To his left and

right the Light and 4th Divisions lay in two masses, a mile or more

back from the river, and hidden very carefully in folds of the Monte

Arrato, the battalions in contiguous close column lying down in hollow

roads or behind outcrops of rock, and showing as little as possible.

The great mass of cavalry in reserve, four brigades, had not been

brought over the sky-line yet, and lay some distance to the rear. Only

Grant’s hussars were near the Light Division, dismounted and standing

to their horses in covered ground. The French lines were perfectly

visible, ‘unmasked, without a bush to prevent the sweeping of their

artillery, the charging of their cavalry, or the fire of their musketry

acting with full effect on those who should attempt to cross the

bridges in their front, which it was necessary to carry before we could

begin the attack on their centre[562],’ King Joseph and his staff were

conspicuous on the round hill before Ariñez.

Hill’s advance having begun, and made good progress, Wellington was

watching for the two other movements which ought to have coincided with

the attempt to cross the river at Nanclares for the frontal attack.

They had neither of them developed as yet: at least nothing was to be

seen of the 3rd and 7th Divisions on the down-slope of the lofty Monte

Arrato, and there had not yet been any heavy burst of cannonading

from the upper Zadorra (which was not visible from the spot where the

Commander-in-Chief had placed himself), to tell that Graham was engaged.

The reason for the comparative silence in this quarter was undoubtedly

the wording of Wellington’s orders to Graham, which left so much to

the judgement of the commander of the great turning column. He had

been placed, almost from the start of his march, in the presence of a

secondary problem. Reille, as we have seen, had been given on the 20th

the charge of the upper Zadorra and the great road to France. Hoping

that he had only Longa’s Spaniards in front of him, and judging that

it would be well to keep them as far from the road and the river as

possible, the commander of the Army of Portugal had placed Sarrut’s

division and a brigade of Mermet’s light horse in an advanced position

a mile and more in front of the river, on a ridge flanking the main

Bilbao road, above the village of Aranguiz. Lamartinière’s division

and Boyer’s and Digeon’s dragoons had been left on the nearer bank.

When therefore Graham, marching down from Olano, neared Aranguiz,

he found a considerable French force blocking the way. Remembering

his orders to look to the right, to adapt his movements to those of

the troops in that direction, and not to be drawn into unnecessary

fighting, he halted for some time, to see how matters were going on the

critical wing, and meanwhile deployed alongside of Longa’s men in his

front, Pack’s Portuguese brigade and Anson’s light dragoons, with the

5th Division in support, before Sarrut’s position. He also detached

Bradford’s Portuguese to his right, with the idea of getting in touch

with the troops in that direction. Reille, who was present in person

with his advanced guard, saw with dismay the depth of the column

descending upon him, and recognized that he must fall back and hold the

line of the Zadorra, the only possible front on which he could oppose

such an enemy. About midday or a little later Graham ‘thought himself

justified in advancing, in order to draw the enemy’s attention to his

right, and so assist the progress of the army from the side of Miranda

(i. e. Hill’s column), where the enemy seemed to be making an obstinate

resistance in the successive strong positions which the country

afforded[563].’ The very moment that Graham sent forth Longa and Pack

to advance, the French retired by order, not without some skirmishing,

in which the 4th Caçadores stormed the hill just above Aranguiz. But

neither side had any appreciable losses.

Graham could now advance to within a mile of the Zadorra, and was

in command of the plain-ground as far as the villages of Abechuco,

and Gamarra Mayor and Menor. All three are on the northern or right

bank of the river, and Reille had determined to hold them as _têtes

de pont_ covering the bridges. They had been hastily barricaded, and

the artillery of the Army of Portugal had been placed on the opposite

bank in a line of batteries, ready to sweep the open ground over which

an assault on the villages must be launched. Graham had therefore to

deploy for a formal attack on the new position. He sent Longa up-stream

and over the hills, to attack Gamarra Menor and Durana, placed Oswald

and the 5th Division, with a section of Lawson’s battery, over against

Gamarra Mayor, and drew out the 1st Division and the two Portuguese

brigades opposite Abechuco, which would have to be taken before the

bridge of Arriaga could be attacked. Keeping in mind Wellington’s main

purpose, indicated in his orders, of cutting the great road to France,

he told Longa and Oswald on the flank that they might push hard,

while he seems to have acted in a much more leisurely way in front of

Abechuco, where no attack was launched till actual orders had been

received from head-quarters bidding him press harder. But meanwhile

Longa took Gamarra Menor from the French battalion of the 3rd Line,

and then, pushing on, came into collision at Durana bridge with his

renegade compatriots the Franco-Spanish division of Casapalacios.

As the great road to Bayonne actually passes through Durana, and was

now under fire from Longa’s skirmishers, it may be said to have been

blocked for all practical purposes at this early stage of the battle.

It was not till the afternoon, however, that Longa succeeded in

storming the bridge and occupying the village, thus formally breaking

the enemy’s main line of communication with France--to save which King

Joseph had risked his all. Apparently he was hampered by having no

artillery, while the Franco-Spaniards had some four or five guns with

them, bearing on the bridge.

Meanwhile Robinson’s brigade of the 5th Division had stormed Gamarra

Mayor, defended by the French 118th and 119th--Gauthier’s brigade of

Lamartinière’s division. This was a brilliant and costly affair--it

being no light matter to attack in column of battalions the barricaded

streets of a compact village. The British, however, burst in--Colonel

Brooke with the 1/4th being the first to force an entrance: the French

abandoned three guns which had been placed in the barricades, and fell

back in disorder across the bridge. General Robinson endeavoured to

improve the success by instant pursuit, but the French had guns bearing

on the bridge, which swept away the first platoons that tried to cross

it. Very few men reached the other side, and they were shot down before

they could establish a lodgement on the farther bank. It was necessary

to halt, re-form, and bring up more artillery before the attack could

be repeated.

It was now past two o’clock, and the noise of Graham’s attack was

sufficiently audible all down the British line, and was carrying dismay

to French head-quarters. But what of the other column, that of the 3rd

and 7th Divisions, which was to appear on the middle Zadorra opposite

Gazan’s almost unguarded flank, in the direction of the bridge of

Mendoza? It was overdue, now that both the large flanking corps were

seriously engaged, and the attention of the enemy attracted toward

them. But before the missing column came into action, there had been an

unexpected modification of the position in the right centre. At 11.30

Wellington appeared before the Light Division, and told Alten to move

it more to the left, so as to be over and above the bridge of Villodas,

which it would have to attack at the moment of general advance,

leaving the two bridges by Nanclares to the 4th Division and the

cavalry. So rough and wooded was the ground that the division, moving

in a hollow way, was established less than 300 yards from the brink of

the Zadorra and the French line, without attracting the notice of the

enemy. An officer of the 43rd writes: ‘I felt anxious to obtain a view,

and walking leisurely between the trees found myself at the edge of

the wood, in clear sight of the enemy’s cannon, planted with lighted

matches and ready to apply them[564]. Had our attack begun here, the

French could never have stood to their guns, so near were they to the

thicket--our Riflemen would have annihilated them.’ The British bank of

the Zadorra here completely commanded the bridge and the French bank,

which accounts for the fact that the enemy’s artillery did not detect

the approach of such a large body of troops as the Light Division. But

after a time a bickering fire across the river between skirmishers

on both sides broke out at several points, and some voltigeurs even

pressed across Villodas bridge, and had to be cast back again by the

skirmishers of the 2/95th.

There was to be, however, no attempt to pass this bridge as yet by the

British. While Wellington was still with the Light Division, a peasant

came up to him with the astounding intelligence that the bridge of

Tres Puentes, the one at the extreme point of the ‘hairpin-bend’ of

the Zadorra, was not only unoccupied but unwatched by the enemy: he

offered to guide any troops sent to it. The Commander-in-Chief made

up his mind at once to seize this crossing, which would outflank the

French position at Villodas, and told the peasant to lead Kempt’s

brigade of the Light Division to the unwatched point, about a mile and

a half to the left. ‘The brigade moved off by threes at a rapid pace,

along a very uneven and circuitous path, concealed from the observation

of the French by high rocks, and reached the narrow bridge, which

crossed the river to the hamlet of Yruna (part of the scattered village

of Tres Puentes). The 1st Rifles led the way, and the whole brigade

following passed at a run, with firelocks and rifles ready cocked, and

ascended a steep road of fifty yards, at the top of which was an old

chapel. We had no sooner cleared it than we observed a heavy column

of the French on the principal hill, and commanding a bird’s eye view

of us. However, fortunately, a convex bank formed a sort of _tête de

pont_, behind which the regiments formed at full speed, without any

word of command. Two round shots now came among us: the second severed

the head from the body of our bold guide, the Spanish peasant. The

brigade was so well covered that the enemy soon ceased firing. Our post

was extraordinary--we were in the elbow of the French position, and

isolated from the rest of the army, within 100 yards of the enemy[565]

and absolutely occupying part of his position, without any attempt

having been made to dislodge us.... Sir James Kempt expressed much

wonder at our critical position, without being molested, and sent his

aide-de-camp at speed across the river for the 15th Hussars, who came

up singly and at a gallop along the steep path, and dismounted in rear

of our centre. Some French dragoons, coolly and at a slow pace, came

up to within 50 yards of us, to examine, if possible, our strength,

but a few shots from the Rifles caused them to decamp. We could see

three bridges within a quarter of a mile of each other, in the elbow

of the enemy’s position. We had crossed the centre one (Tres Puentes),

while the other two, right and left (Villodas and Mendoza), were still

covered by French artillery[566].’

Expecting to be instantly attacked, and to have to fight hard for the

chapel-knoll on which they had aligned themselves, Kempt’s brigade

spent ‘half an hour of awkward suspense.’ The immunity with which they

had been allowed to hold their position was suddenly explained by a

movement which they had not been able to observe. The missing column of

Wellington’s army had at last come up, and was plunging with headlong

speed into the rear of the troops which were facing Kempt, so that the

French had no attention to spare for the side-issue in the hairpin-bend

of the Zadorra. Instead of being attacked the brigade was about to

become at once an attacking force.

A word is necessary as to the leading of this column. It had been

placed by Wellington under Lord Dalhousie, now commanding the 7th

Division. This was an extraordinary choice, as this officer had been

only a few months in the Peninsula, and had no experience of the

higher responsibilities--though he had commanded a brigade in the

Walcheren expedition[567]. But being as Lieutenant-General slightly

senior to Picton (though they had been gazetted major-generals on

the same day in 1808), he was entitled to take the command over the

head of the war-worn and experienced leader of the 3rd Division. The

latter had been directing one of the great marching columns during the

early stages of the advance, and was not unnaturally sulky at being

displaced. Common report in the army held that he was in disfavour at

Head-Quarters, for intemperate letters complaining of the starving of

his division during the recent march beyond the Ebro[568]. Be this as

it may, Picton was during the forenoon hours of June 21st in one of his

not infrequent rages. For though his column had started early, and the

3rd Division had reached Las Guetas, the villages on the south side of

the Monte Arrato, which were to be its starting-point for the attack on

the line of the Zadorra, Lord Dalhousie refused to advance farther than

the edge of the hills, using apparently his discretion in interpreting

the orders given him ‘to regulate his action from what was going on to

his right and only to move when it should be ‘evidently necessary’ to

favour the progress of the columns in that direction. He was obviously

worried by the fact that the two rear brigades of his own division,

Barnes’s and Le Cor’s, had been hindered by an artillery breakdown in

the steep road behind, and were not yet up, though Cairnes’s battery,

which had delayed them, ultimately overtook the leading brigade[569].

Hence he used his discretion to wait for formal orders from

Head-Quarters, and to do nothing. Picton, who could note the advance of

Hill’s column, and could see that the French were utterly unprepared

for an attack on the middle Zadorra, chafed bitterly at the delay.

We have an interesting picture of him on that morning from

eye-witnesses. He was a strange figure--suffering from inflammation

of the eyes, he had put on not his cocked hat but a broad-brimmed

and tall civilian top-hat--the same that may be seen to-day in the

United Service Museum. ‘During the struggle on the right the centre

was inactive. General Picton was impatient, he inquired of every

aide-de-camp whether they had any orders for him. As the day wore

on, and the fight waxed louder on the right, he became furious, and

observed to the communicator of these particulars, ‘D--n it! Lord

Wellington must have forgotten us.’ It was near noon, and the men were

getting discontented. Picton’s blood was boiling, his stick was beating

with rapid strokes upon the mane of his cob. He rode backward and

forward looking in every direction for the arrival of an aide-de-camp,

until at last one galloped up from Lord Wellington. He was looking for

Lord Dalhousie--the 7th Division had not yet arrived, having to move

over difficult ground. The aide-de-camp checked his horse and asked the

general whether he had seen Lord Dalhousie. Picton was disappointed;

he had expected that he might at least move now, and in a voice which

did not gain softness from his feelings, answered in a sharp tone, ‘No,

Sir: I have _not_ seen his Lordship, but have you any orders for _me_.’

‘None,’ replied the aide-de-camp. ‘Then, pray Sir, what are the orders

that you _do_ bring?’ ‘Why,’ answered the officer, ‘that as soon as

Lord D. shall commence an attack on that bridge,’ pointing to the one

on the left (Mendoza), ‘the 4th and Light are to support him.’ Picton

could not understand the idea of any other division fighting in his

front, and drawing himself up to his full height said to the astonished

aide-de-camp, ‘You may tell Lord Wellington from me, Sir, that the 3rd

Division, under my command, shall in less than ten minutes attack that

bridge and carry it, and the 4th and Light may support if they choose.’

Having thus expressed his intention, he turned from the aide-de-camp

and put himself at the head of his men, who were quickly in motion

toward the bridge, encouraging them with the bland appellation of ‘Come

on, ye rascals! Come on, ye fighting villains[570].’

Ten minutes as the time required to plunge down from the hillside

to a bridge two miles away seems a short estimate. But there is no

doubt that the advance of the 3rd Division was fast and furious--an

eye-witness describes it as shooting like a meteor across the front of

the still-halted column-head of the 7th Division. The military purist

may opine that Picton should have waited till he got formal orders

via Lord Dalhousie to advance. But the moments were precious--Kempt

was across the Zadorra close by, in an obviously dangerous state of

isolation: the French in a few minutes might be sending infantry to

block the bridge of Mendoza, which they had so strangely neglected.

The 7th Division was short of two brigades, and not ready to attack.

Wellington’s orders were known, and the situation on the right was

now such as to justify the permissible advance which they authorized.

Neither Wellington nor Dalhousie in their dispatches give any hint that

Picton’s action was disapproved--complete success justified it.

Picton had directed Brisbane’s brigade of the 3rd Division straight

upon the bridge of Mendoza, Colville’s upon a ford 300 yards farther

up-stream. Both crossed safely and almost unopposed. The only

French troops watching the stream here were Avy’s weak brigade of

cavalry--under 500 sabres--and their three horse-artillery guns

commanding the bridge. But the latter hardly got into action, for on

Picton’s rapid approach becoming visible, General Kempt threw out

some companies of the 1/95th under Andrew Barnard, from his point of

vantage on the knoll of Yruna, who opened such a biting fire upon the

half battery that the officer in command limbered up and galloped off.

Avy’s chasseurs hovered about in an undecided way--but were not capable

either of defending a bridge or of attacking a brigade in position

upon a steep hill. Wherefore Picton got across with small loss, and

formed his two British brigades on the south side of the river. Power’s

Portuguese rapidly followed Brisbane, as did a little later Grant’s

brigade of the 7th Division--Lord Dalhousie’s other two brigades (as we

have already noted) were not yet on the ground. On seeing Picton safely

established on the left bank Kempt advanced from his knoll, and formed

on the right-rear of the 3rd Division. The trifling French detachment

at the bridge of Villodas--only a voltigeur company--wisely absconded

at full speed on seeing Kempt on the move. The passage there was left

completely free for Vandeleur’s brigade of the Light Division, who had

long been waiting on the opposite steep bank.

The British were across the Zadorra in force, and the critical stage of

the action was about to commence: the hour being between 2 and 3 in the

afternoon.

SECTION XXXVI: CHAPTER VIII

BATTLE OF VITTORIA. ROUT OF THE FRENCH

When Picton and the 3rd Division, followed by the one available brigade

of the 7th Division, came pouring across the Zadorra on the side of

Mendoza, while Kempt debouched from the knoll of Yruna, and Vandeleur

crossed the bridge of Villodas, the position of Leval’s division became

desperate. It was about to be attacked in flank by four brigades and

in front by two more, and being one of the weaker divisions of the

Army of the South, only 4,500 bayonets, was outnumbered threefold. Its

original reserve (half Daricau’s division) had gone off to the Puebla

heights hours before: the general army-reserve (Villatte’s division)

had been sent away in the same direction by Jourdan’s last orders. The

nearest disposable and intact French troops were Darmagnac’s division

of the Army of the Centre--two miles to the rear, in position by Zuazo:

the other divisions of that army had (as we have seen) gone off on a

wholly unnecessary excursion to watch the Trevino road. The left wing

and centre of the Army of the South was absorbed in the task of keeping

back Hill, and had just begun the counter-attack upon him which Jourdan

had ordered an hour before.

The sudden change in the situation, caused by the very rapid advance of

Picton and the brigades that helped him, was all too evident to King

Joseph and his chief of the staff, as they stood on the hill of Ariñez.

The whole force of the 3rd division struck diagonally across the short

space between the river and Leval’s position--Brisbane’s brigade and

Power’s Portuguese making for the French flank, while Colville, higher

up the stream, made for the rear of the hill, in the direction of the

village of Margarita. Kempt followed Brisbane in second line, Grant’s

brigade of the 7th Division, when it crossed at Mendoza, came on behind

Colville. So did Vandeleur, from Villodas, after he had pulled down

the obstructions and got his men over the narrow bridge. Nor was this

all--the 4th Division, so long halted on the scrubby hillside opposite

the left-hand of the two Nanclares bridges, suddenly started to descend

the slope at the double-quick, Stubbs’s Portuguese brigade leading.

Jourdan had to make a ‘lightning change’ in all his dispositions.

Leval, obviously doomed if he did not retire quickly, was told to

evacuate his hill and fall back past Ariñez, into which he threw a

regiment to cover his retreat, on to the heights behind it. The two

brigades of Daricau and Conroux, which had stood on the other side of

the high road from Leval, were to make a parallel movement back to

the same line of heights. The other brigades of Daricau and Conroux,

with Maransin--now deeply engaged some with O’Callaghan and others

with the 50th and 92nd--were to abandon the attack which they had just

begun, and which had somewhat pushed back the British advance. They

too must go back to the slopes behind Ariñez. It would take longer to

recall Villatte, who was now far up on the crest of the mountain to the

left, engaged with Morillo’s Spaniards and the 71st. But this attack

also must be broken off. Lastly, to fill the gap between Leval’s new

position and the Zadorra, the Army of the Centre must come forward and

hold Margarita, or if that was impossible, the hill and village of La

Hermandad behind it. But only Darmagnac’s division was immediately

available for this task, Cassagne’s having to be brought back from

the eccentric counter-march toward the Trevino road, to which it had

been committed an hour before. In this way a new line of battle would

be formed, reaching from the Zadorra near Margarita across the high

road at Gomecha, to the heights above Zumelzu on the left. It was

at best a hazardous business to order a fighting-line more than two

miles long, and bitterly engaged with the enemy at several points, to

withdraw to an unsurveyed position a mile in its rear, where there

was practically no reserve waiting to receive it. For on the slopes

above Ariñez there was at that moment nothing but Pierre Soult’s light

horse, and Treillard’s dragoons, with two batteries of artillery[571].

The new front had to be constructed from troops falling back in haste

and closely pursued by the enemy, combining with other troops coming

in from various directions, viz. the two divisions of the Army of the

Centre. And when the line should be re-formed, what was to prevent its

left from being turned once more by the Allied troops on the Puebla

heights, or its right by columns crossing the middle Zadorra behind

it[572]. For there would still be a gap of two miles between Margarita

village and the nearest troops of the Army of Portugal, who were now

engaged with Graham at Abechuco and Arriaga.

To speak plainly, the second French line was never properly formed,

especially on its left; but a better front was made, and a stronger

stand, than might perhaps have been expected, though the confusion

caused by hasty and imperfect alignment was destined in the end to be

fatal.

On the extreme left Villatte had been caught by the order of recall at

the moment when he was delivering his attack on Morillo and the British

71st. He had reached the crest as ordered, had formed up across it, and

then had marched on a narrow front against the Allies. Both British

and Spanish were in some disorder when he came in upon them--they had

now been fighting for four hours, and in successive engagements had

driven first Maransin’s and then St. Pol’s brigades for two miles over

very steep and rocky ground. At the moment when Villatte came upon the

scene, the Allied advance had just reached a broad dip in the crest,

which it would have to cross if its progress were to be continued. The

Spaniards were on the right and the 71st and light companies on the

left, or northern, part of the ridge. It would have been a suitable

moment to halt, and re-form the line before continuing to press forward

over dangerous ground. But the officer who had succeeded Cadogan

in command[573] was set on ‘keeping the French upon the run,’ and

recklessly ordered the tired troops to plunge down the steep side of

the declivity and carry the opposite slope. He was apparently ignorant

that fresh French troops were just coming to the front--several

eye-witnesses say that a column in light-coloured overcoats with white

shako-covers, which had been noticed on the right, was taken for a

Spanish detachment[574]. At any rate, the 71st crossed the dip--four

companies in its centre, the remainder at its upper end--and was

suddenly met not only by a charging column in front, but by an attack

in flank and almost in rear. The first volley brought down 200 men--the

shattered battalion recoiled, and remounted its own slope in utter

disorder, leaving some forty prisoners in the hands of the enemy. These

were the only British soldiers who fell into the hands of the French

that day[575]. Fortunately the 50th, coming up from the rear, was just

in time to form up along the edge of the dip and cover the retreat, and

was joined soon after by the 92nd, who had been facing another separate

French unit lower down the slopes and to the left flank. Seeing their

opponents move off for no visible reason (they had received no doubt

the general order to retire), the Highland regiment had pushed up on to

the crest and joined the 50th and the Spaniards.

Villatte, still ignorant that the whole French army was falling back,

tried to improve his success over the 71st into a general repulse of

the Allied force upon the crest, and ordered his leading regiment

to cross the dip and attack the troops upon the opposite sky-line.

They suffered the same fate as the 71st and from the same cause: the

climb was steep among stones and furze, they were received with two

devastating volleys when they neared the top of the declivity, and

then charged by the 50th and 92nd--the column broke, rolled down hill,

and went to the rear. A second but less vigorous attack was made by

another French regiment, and repulsed with the same ease--the wrecks of

the 71st joining in the defence this time. Villatte then brought up a

third regiment, but this was only a feint--the attack never developed,

and while it was hanging fire the whole division swung round to the

rear and went off--Jourdan’s general order to retreat had at last been

received, and Villatte was falling back to the new line[576]. Cameron

of the 92nd, now in command on the heights, followed him up, as did the

Spaniards. But there was to be no more serious fighting upon the Puebla

mountain: the French gave way whenever they were pressed[577].

Long before Villatte’s fight on the high ground had come to an

end, the engagement at the other end of the French line had taken

an unfavourable turn. The battle in this direction fell into three

separate sections. Close to the Zadorra, Colville, with the left-hand

brigade of the 3rd Division, was pushing up towards Margarita, while

Darmagnac, from the heights of Zuazo, was making for it from the other

side. It had taken some time to file Colville’s battalions across

the ford, and deploy them for the advance, and the French brigade of

Darmagnac’s division got into the village first, and made a strong

defence there, while the German brigade occupied La Hermandad in

its rear. Colville was held in check, suffered heavily, and could

not get forward. But after half an hour’s deadly fighting the enemy

gave way, not only because of the frontal pressure, but because the

troops on his left (Leval’s division of the Army of the South) had

been defeated by Picton and were retiring, thereby exposing the flank

of Darmagnac’s line. D’Erlon drew back Chassé’s much thinned brigade

half a mile, to the better defensive ground formed by the village of

La Hermandad and the height above it, where his German brigade was

already in position: this was an integral part of the new line on which

Jourdan had determined to fight, while Margarita was on low ground, and

too far to the front. Colville’s brigade, like its adversaries much

maltreated[578], was replaced by Grant’s brigade of the 7th Division

in front line[579], while Vandeleur’s of the Light Division followed

in support. They had now in front of them not only Darmagnac’s but

Cassagne’s division, which had come back from its fruitless excursion

to the Trevino road, and had joined the other section of the Army of

the Centre[580], taking up ground in second line.

Meanwhile the really decisive blow of the whole battle was being

delivered by Picton, a thousand yards farther to the south, in and

above Ariñez. The striking force here consisted of Power’s Portuguese

brigade on the left, and of Brisbane’s British brigade on the right,

opposite the village. Kempt’s half of the Light Division had followed

Picton faithfully in his diagonal movement across the slopes, and was

close behind Brisbane. Farther to the right the new front of attack of

Wellington’s army was only beginning to form itself--the 4th Division

had deployed after crossing the upper bridge of Nanclares, and was

now coming on in an échelon of brigades--Stubbs’s Portuguese in the

front échelon, then W. Anson, last Skerrett. They extended from the

high road southwards, and were getting into touch with Hill’s column,

which after the French evacuated the height behind Subijana had also

deployed for the advance--the 2nd division having now thrown forward

Byng’s brigade on its left, with O’Callaghan’s next it, and Ashworth’s

Portuguese in second line. Silveira’s division remained in reserve. The

cavalry of the centre column had crossed after the infantry--R. Hill,

Ponsonby, Victor Alten, and Grant by the upper bridge of Nanclares,

D’Urban’s Portuguese by the lower. They deployed on each side of the

high road east of the river, behind the 4th Division, ground suitable

for horsemen being nowhere else visible. On the heights of Puebla there

still remained Cadogan’s brigade (now under Cameron of the 92nd) and

Morillo’s Spaniards. This detached force, which was hard in pursuit of

Villatte’s retreating column, was decidedly ahead of the rest of the

army, and well placed for striking at the new French flank, but it was

tired and had fought hard already for many hours.

When the 4th Division had passed the upper bridge of Nanclares, and

before the cavalry began to cross the Zadorra, Colonel Dickson had by

Wellington’s orders commenced to bring forward the reserve artillery.

Very few British batteries had yet come into action, the broken nature

of the ground preventing them from keeping close to their divisions.

Hence it came to pass that there was by this time an accumulation of

guns in the centre: during the rest of the battle it was employed in

mass, many divisional batteries joining the artillery reserve, and a

formidable line of guns being presently developed along the heights

which had been the original position of Gazan’s centre and right. Some

of them were to the north of the high road, on Leval’s hill: some to

the south, where Daricau’s front brigade had stood when the action

commenced. As soon as they had come up, they began to pound the French

infantry on the opposite hill. Here General Tirlet had a still more

powerful artillery force in action--all the guns of the front line had

got back in safety save one belonging to the horse artillery battery

which had been placed opposite the bridge of Nanclares[581], and three

batteries from the reserve were already in position. The cannonade on

both sides was fierce--but it was the infantry which had to settle

the matter, and the disadvantage to the French was that their troops,

much hustled and disarranged while retreating into the new position,

never properly settled down into it--especially Conroux’s and Daricau’s

divisions, which had been divided into separate brigades by the way

in which Gazan had dealt with them at the commencement of the action,

never got into regular divisional order again, and fought piecemeal by

regiments.

The decisive point was on the ground at and above Ariñez, which was

held by Leval’s division, with one regiment of Daricau’s (103rd

Line) on their left. The village, low down on the slope, was held by

Mocquery’s brigade--Morgan’s was in support with the guns, higher up

and more to the right. Picton attacked with Power’s Portuguese on his

left, Brisbane’s brigade on his right, and Kempt’s brigade of the Light

Division in support, except that some companies of the 1/95th had been

thrown out in front of Brisbane’s line, and led the whole attack. The

Riflemen rushed at the village, penetrated into it, and were evicted

after a fierce tussle, by a French battalion charging in mass down the

street. But immediately behind came the 88th and 74th. The former,

attacking to their right of the village[582], completely smashed the

French regiment which came down to meet them in a close-fire combat,

and drove them in disorder up the hill, while the latter carried Ariñez

itself and swept onward through it. The 45th, farther to the right,

attacked and drove off the regiment of Daricau’s division which was

flanking Leval. Power’s Portuguese would seem to have got engaged with

Morgan’s brigade, on the left of the village; it gave way before them,

when the 74th had stormed Ariñez and the Connaught Rangers had broken

the neighbouring column. Leval’s routed troops appear to have swept

to the rear rather in a southerly direction, and to their left of the

high road, so as to leave the beginnings of a gap between them and

Cassagne’s division of the Army of the Centre, which was coming up to

occupy the ridge north of Gomecha, in the new position.

The complete breach in the French centre made by Picton’s capture of

Ariñez, and the driving of Leval out of his position above it, had the

immediate effect of compelling Darmagnac’s division to conform to the

retreat, by falling back from Margarita on to La Hermandad and the

hills behind it on the one wing, while the confused line of Daricau’s,

Conroux’s, and Maransin’s troops, on the other hand, had to retire to

the level of Gomecha, though the 4th and 2nd Divisions were not yet far

enough forward to be able to press them. Nearly all the French guns

appear to have been carried back to the new position, which may roughly

be described as extending from Hermandad on the Zadorra by Zuazo and

Gomecha to the hills in front of Esquivel. It was quite as good as the

Margarita-Ariñez-Zumelzu line which had just been forced by Picton’s

central attack.

It took some little time for Wellington to organize his next advance;

the troops which had forced the Ariñez position had to be re-formed,

and it was necessary to allow the 4th and 2nd Divisions to come up

level with them, and to bring forward Dickson’s mass of artillery to

a more advanced line, to batter the enemy before the next infantry

assault was let loose. The only point where close fighting seems to

have continued during this interval was on the extreme left, where

Lord Dalhousie, after the French had left Margarita, was pressing

forward Grant’s brigade of his own division, supported by Vandeleur’s

brigade of the Light Division, against D’Erlon’s new position, where

Neuenstein’s brigade of five German battalions lay in and about La

Hermandad, with Chassé’s dilapidated regiments in reserve behind.

There was a very bitter struggle at this point, rendered costly to the

advancing British by the superiority of the French artillery--D’Erlon

had now at least two batteries in action--Dalhousie only his own six

divisional guns, those of Cairnes. Grant’s brigade, after advancing

some 300 yards under a very heavy fire, came to a stand, and took cover

in a deep broad ditch only 200 yards from the French front. According

to an eye-witness Dalhousie hesitated for a moment as to whether a

further advance was possible[583], and had the matter settled for

him by the sudden charge of Vandeleur’s brigade, which came up at

full speed, carried the 7th Division battalions in the ditch along

with it in its impetus, and stormed La Hermandad in ten minutes. The

German defenders--Baden, Nassau, and Frankfurt battalions--reeled back

in disorder, and retreated to the crest of the heights behind, where

Cassagne’s division, hitherto not engaged, picked them up. D’Erlon

succeeded in forming some sort of a new line from Crispijana near

the Zadorra to Zuazo, where his left should have joined the right

of the Army of the South. It is curious to note that while Grant’s

brigade lost heavily in this combat (330 casualties), Vandeleur’s,

which carried on the attack to success, suffered hardly at all (38

casualties). Their German opponents were very badly punished, having

lost 620 men, including 250 prisoners, in defending La Hermandad

against the two British brigades[584].

While Wellington, after the first breaking of the French line, was

preparing under cover of the cannonade of Dickson’s guns for the

assault on their new position in front of Zuazo and Gomecha, General

Graham was developing his attack on the Army of Portugal and the French

line of retreat, but not with the energy that might have been expected

from the victor of Barrosa.

He had, as it will be remembered, sent Oswald and the 5th Division

against the bridge of Gamarra Mayor, and Longa’s Spaniards against that

of Durana, while he himself remained with the 1st Division, Pack’s and

Bradford’s Portuguese, and the bulk of his cavalry on the high road,

facing the bridge of Arriaga and its outlying bulwark the village

of Abechuco. We should have expected that the main attack would be

delivered at this point, but nothing of the sort took place. When the

noise of Oswald’s heavy fighting at Gamarra Mayor had begun to grow

loud, Graham directed the two Light Battalions of the German Legion

(under Colonel Halkett) to clear the French out of Abechuco. This they

did with trifling loss--1 officer and 51 men, capturing several guns

in the village[585]. But Graham made no subsequent attempt to improve

his success by forcing the bridge behind--as is sufficiently witnessed

by the fact that of his remaining battalions the Guards’ Brigade had

no casualties that day, and the three Line battalions of the K.G.L.

one killed and one wounded. Before drawing up in front of Arriaga he

had sent Bradford’s Portuguese, for a short time, to demonstrate to

his right, toward the bridge of Yurre; but he called them back after a

space, and placed them to the right of Abechuco, continuing the general

line of the First Division. Bradford’s battalions lost precisely 4

men killed and 9 wounded. It is clear, therefore, that Graham never

attacked the Arriaga position at all. Why he massed 4,000 British and

4,000 Portuguese infantry on this front--not to speak of two brigades

of cavalry--and then never used them, it is hard to make out.

We know, it is true, that not only Graham but Wellington himself

over-estimated the strength of Reille’s force. They did not know that

Maucune had gone away in the dark, in charge of the great convoy, and

thought that Foy’s and Taupin’s divisions were the only troops of the

Army of Portugal which had not rejoined. Arguing that he had four

infantry divisions in front of him (though they were really only two),

Graham no doubt did well to be cautious--but he was much more than

that. It was at least his duty to detain and engage as many of the

enemy’s troops as was possible--and he certainly did not do so.

There was opposite him at Arriaga one single infantry

division--Sarrut’s, and he did so little to employ it that Reille

dared--after observing the British movements for some time--to take

away Sarrut’s second brigade (that of Fririon) for use as a central

reserve, which he posted at Betonio a mile back from the river, leaving

Menne’s brigade alone--not much over 2,000 bayonets--opposed to the

whole 1st Division, Bradford, and Pack. It is true that Menne had heavy

cavalry supports--Digeon’s dragoons and Curto’s brigade of Mermet’s

light horse--on one flank, and Boyer’s dragoons not far away on the

other. But cavalry in 1813 were not troops which could defend a bridge

or the line of a river. There was also a good deal of French artillery

present--a more important fact under the existing circumstances. For

Reille had still twenty guns ranged along the river[586], beside those

which were detached on the flank with Casapalacios’ Spaniards. But

Graham had almost as many--the three batteries of Lawson, Ramsay, and

Dubourdieu--and of these the two last, ranged opposite Arriaga bridge,

and pounding the village behind it, quite held their own against the

opposing guns.

It can only be supposed that Graham, in refraining from any serious

attack along the high road, was obeying in too literal a fashion

Wellington’s orders not to commit himself to close fighting in the

low ground, and to regulate his movements by those of the columns on

his right (Picton’s and Dalhousie’s divisions). When these had worked

their way up the Zadorra to his neighbourhood he _did_ advance. But it

was then so late that the enemy in front of him was able to get away,

without any very disastrous losses.

While Graham kept quiet on the high road, Oswald was engaged in a very

different style at Gamarra Mayor, where after his first capture of the

village, he made at least three desperate attempts to force the bridge,

held most obstinately by Lamartinière’s division. The passage was taken

and retaken, but no lodgement on the southern bank could be made. After

Robinson’s brigade had exhausted itself, Oswald put in the 3/1st from

Hay’s brigade and some of his Portuguese[587]. But no success was

obtained, though both sides suffered heavily. The casualty rolls of the

5th Division show a loss of 38 officers and 515 men--those of their

French opponents 38 officers and 558 men. Practically all on both sides

fell in the murderous fighting up and down Gamarra bridge. The forces

were so equally balanced--each about 6,000 bayonets and one divisional

battery--that on such a narrow front decision was impossible when both

fought their best. The only way of attacking the bridge was by pushing

straight down the narrow street of the village from the British side,

and across an open field from the French. Both parties had guns trained

upon its ends, which blew to pieces any column-head that debouched.

There were no fords anywhere near, and the banks for some distance

up-stream and down-stream were lined by the skirmishers of both sides,

taking what cover they could find, and doing their best to keep down

each other’s fire. ‘It plainly appeared this day that the enemy had

formed a sort of determination not to be beat: we never saw them stand

so vigorous before,’ writes a diarist from the ranks, in Robinson’s

brigade[588].

There was an absolute deadlock at Gamarra Mayor till nearly

five o’clock in the afternoon. At Durana things went otherwise:

Longa, though hampered by his lack of guns, ended by pushing the

Franco-Spanish brigade across the bridge, and then for some way down

the south side of the Zadorra. The retreating party then made a stand

behind a ravine and brook some half-mile farther on, where they were

flanked by a brigade of Mermet’s light cavalry, as well as by their own

five squadrons, and supported by the French battalion of the 3rd Line

which had been in their quarter of the field from the first. Longa was

unable to push them farther--probably for fear of lending his flank to

cavalry charges, and gained no further ground till the general retreat

of the French army began. But he had effectively cut King Joseph’s

communication with France by seizing Durana--and this was the governing

factor of the whole fight, since the enemy had now only the Pampeluna

road by which he could retreat. If Joseph had owned some infantry

reserves, he could (no doubt) have driven Longa away; but he had not a

man to spare in any part of the field, and things were going so badly

with the Army of the South that he had no attention to spare for the

Army of Portugal.

It must have been about four o’clock before Wellington, having

rearranged his line and brought up his artillery, determined to renew

the general attack on the French right and centre. Joseph had brought

up to the new position (extending from Crispijana on the left by Zuazo

to the heights in front of Esquivel) the whole of the infantry of the

Armies of the South and Centre, which now formed one rather irregular

line. The only infantry reserve was the six weak battalions of the

Royal Guard--perhaps 2,500 bayonets[589], placed on the high road in

front of Vittoria--there was also a mass of cavalry in reserve, but

this was of as little use for the defence of a hill-position as was

Wellington’s for the assault on it. There were now in line Tilly’s

division of dragoons which had been brought back from its useless

excursion on the Logroño road, and Pierre Soult’s light horse, both

of Gazan’s army, with Treillard’s dragoons, Avy’s Chasseurs, and the

two cavalry regiments of the Royal Guard, all from the Army of the

Centre--in all some 4,500 sabres.

The artillery, however, was very strong, and--deployed in a long line

on both sides of the high road--was already sweeping all the slopes

in front. There were present 46 guns of the Army of the South (all

that it owned save one piece lost at Ariñez and three absent with

Digeon’s dragoons), twelve guns of the Army of the Centre, and 18

from the reserve of the Army of Portugal--76 in all[590]. Dickson

would appear to have brought up against them very nearly the same

number: 54 British, 18 Portuguese, and 3 Spanish guns, when the last

of the reserve batteries had got across the Zadorra and come forward

into line--a total of 75 pieces[591]. The cannonade was the fiercest

ever known in the Peninsula--each side was mainly trying to pound

the enemy’s infantry--a task more easy for the French than the Allied

gunners, since the assailant had to come up the open hillside, and the

assailed was partly screened by woods (especially in front of Gomecha)

and dips in the rough ground which he was holding.

The French line was now formed by Cassagne’s division on the extreme

right, with one regiment (the 16th Léger) in Crispijana, and the others

extending to meet Darmagnac’s much depleted battalions which were in

and about Zuazo. Leval ought to have been in touch with Darmagnac, but

obviously was not, the ground on each side of the high road being held

by guns only, with cavalry in support some way behind. For after losing

Ariñez Leval’s infantry had inclined much to their left. But on the

other flank Villatte had, as it seems, inclined somewhat to the right,

for having lost the heights of La Puebla, he could not prevent Cameron

and Morillo from pressing along their crest and getting behind his new

position: they were edging past his flank all through this period of

the action.

The long front of the British advance started with Colville’s

brigade--now once more in front line--opposite Crispijana, and was

continued southward by those of Grant, Power, Brisbane, Stubbs, Byng,

and O’Callaghan, while Vandeleur, Kempt, W. Anson, Skerrett, and

Ashworth were formed in support, with Silveira’s division and the

cavalry in third line. The missing brigades of the 7th Division were

not yet on the field, possibly not even across the Zadorra, for neither

of them lost a man that day. The advance of the line was a splendid

spectacle, recorded with notes of admiration by many who witnessed it

from the hill of Ariñez or the heights of La Puebla.

The French artillery fire was heavy, and in some sections of the line

very murderous--Power’s and Stubbs’s Portuguese brigades were special

sufferers. But the infantry defence was not resolute: on many parts of

the front it was obviously very weak. The enemy was already a beaten

army, he had been turned out of two positions, the news had got round

that the road to France had been cut, and that Reille’s small force

was in grave danger of losing the line of the Zadorra--in which case

the whole army would find itself attacked in the rear. It is clear

from the French narratives that the infantry did not support the guns

in front line as they should. The reports of the Army of the Centre

speak of being turned on their right by a column which kept near the

river and took Crispijana--obviously Colville’s brigade. As the 16th

Léger in that village only suffered a loss that day of one officer and

26 men, its resistance cannot have been very serious. But D’Erlon’s

divisions were also outflanked on their left--by clouds of skirmishers

drifting in by the wood and broken ground about Gomecha, who turned

on the line of artillery, and began shooting down the gunners from

flank and rear[592]. Obviously there was a gap along the high road,

by which these light troops must have penetrated, and as obviously it

was caused by Leval having sheered off to the south. For the artillery

report of Gazan’s army also speaks of being turned on its right

wing--‘enveloped by skirmishers who had got into Gomecha and were in

rear of the position, which was being also attacked frontally.’ Nor is

this all, ‘the mass on the mountain (Cameron and Morillo) descended on

the left flank and rear of the Army of the South before it had time to

form again: the artillery found itself without support.’ If so, where

were the four and a half divisions of infantry which should have been

protecting it?

The only possible deduction from all our narratives is that Gazan’s

army made no real stand on the Gomecha-Esquivel position, and retired

the moment that the attack drew near. And the person mainly responsible

for the retreat was the Army-Commander himself, whose very unconvincing

account of this phase of the action is that ‘the right flank of the

line was continually being outflanked: I received no further orders

about the taking up of the position of which the King had spoken;

the enemy was getting near the gates of Vittoria (!), and so I had

to continue my movement toward that town, after having taken up a

position by Zuazo, with the intention of covering with my right-hand

division and my guns the retreat of the rest of the army, which without

this help would have been hopelessly compromised. At this time I had

only lost four guns, abandoned on the extreme left of the line: the

artillery was intact, and the army had suffered no greater loss than it

had inflicted on the enemy.’

Reading this artful narrative, we note that (1) Gazan evacuated on his

own responsibility a position that the King had definitely ordered

him to take up--because he had ‘no further orders’; (2) the continued

‘turning of his right’ could only have resulted from the defeat of his

own troops on and about the high road--which was in his sector, not

in D’Erlon’s, Leval was across it when the last phase of the battle

began; (3) D’Erlon held Zuazo and complained that there was nothing on

his left, which was completely turned on the side where Leval _ought_

to have been but was not; (4) Gazan retreated without any serious loss

having compelled him to do so. This is obviously the fact. Villatte’s

whole division had less than 300 casualties, Leval’s under 800,

Daricau’s under 850: the only troops hard hit were Maransin’s brigade,

Rey’s brigade of Conroux’s division, and the 103rd Line in Daricau’s.

Moreover, the 4th and 2nd British Divisions, the troops immediately

opposed to Gazan’s main line, had insignificant losses in this part

of the action, Byng’s brigade under 150, Ashworth’s just 23, Anson’s

90, Skerrett’s 22; the only appreciable loss had been that of Stubbs’s

Portuguese--about 240. For the heavy casualty lists of O’Callaghan’s,

Cadogan’s, and Brisbane’s battalions had all been suffered in the

earlier phases of the fight[593].

The fact is that Gazan went off without orders, and left the King

and D’Erlon in the lurch. Jourdan is telling the exact truth when he

says that ‘General Gazan, instead of conducting his divisions to the

position indicated, swerved strongly to the right, marching in retreat,

so as to link up with Villatte; he continued to draw away, following

the foot-hills of the mountain [of Puebla], leaving the high road and

Vittoria far to his left, and a vast gap between himself and Count

D’Erlon’[594].

No doubt the breach made in the French centre when Picton stormed the

heights behind Ariñez had been irreparable from the first; and no doubt

also the flanking movement of Morillo and Cameron on the mountain must

have dislodged the Army of the South, if it had waited to come into

frontal action with Cole and Hill. But Gazan showed complete disregard

of all interests save his own, and went off in comparatively good

condition, without orders, leaving the King, D’Erlon, and Reille to get

out of the mess as best they might.

Some of the British narratives tend to show that many parts of Gazan’s

line had never properly settled down into the Gomecha-Esquivel

position, having reached it in such bad order that they would have

required more time than was granted them to re-form. An officer

present with the skirmishing line of the 4th Division writes in his

absolutely contemporary diary: ‘From the time when our guns began to

open, and to throw shells almost into the rear of the enemy’s height,

we saw him begin to fall back in haste from his position. We [4th

Division] marched on at a great pace in column. From that moment the

affair became a mere hunt. Our rapid advance almost cut off four

or five French battalions--they made some resistance at first, but

soon dissolved and ran pell-mell, like a swarm of bees, up the steep

hill, from which they began to fire down on us. We disregarded their

fire, and kept on advancing--in order to carry out our main object:

broken troops are easy game. When we found the enemy in this second

position there was heavy artillery fire. Since his left wing was

somewhat refused, we advanced in échelon from the right. When we got

within musketry range, we found he had gone off out of sight. After

that we drove him out of one position after another till at last we

were near the gates of Vittoria[595].’ Several other 4th Division

and 2nd Division narratives agree in stating that after the storming

of Ariñez the French never made anything like a solid stand on the

Gomecha-Esquivel heights. But (as has been said above) the best proof

of it is the British casualty list, which shows that the reserve line

was hardly under fire, and that the front line had very moderate

losses, except at one or two points.

D’Erlon made a more creditable resistance on the French right, but he

was obviously doomed if he should linger long after Gazan had gone

off. After losing Crispijana and Zuazo he made a last stand on the

slopes a mile in front of Vittoria, between Ali and Armentia, to which

the whole of his own artillery and that of the reserve, and perhaps

also some guns of the Army of the South, retired in time to take up a

final position[596]. For some short space they maintained a furious

fire on the 3rd Division troops which were following them up, so as to

allow their infantry to re-form. But it was but for a few minutes--the

column near the Zadorra (Grant, Colville, and Vandeleur) got round

the flank of the village of Ali, and the line of guns was obviously

in danger if it remained any longer in action. Just at this moment

D’Erlon received the King’s orders for a general retreat by the route

of Salvatierra. The high road to France had ceased to be available

since Longa got across it in the earlier afternoon. Any attempt to

force it open would obviously have taken much time, and might well

have failed, since the French were everywhere closely pressed by the

pursuing British. Jourdan judged the idea of reopening the passage to

be hopelessly impracticable, and ordered the retreat on Pampeluna as

the only possible policy, though (as his report owns) he was aware of

the badness of the Salvatierra road, and doubted his power to carry

off his guns, transport, and convoy of refugees by such a second-rate

track. But it was the only one open, and there was no choice.

The orders issued were that the Train and Park should get off at

once, that the Army of the South should retreat by the country paths

south of Vittoria, the Army of the Centre by those north of it. The

Army of Portugal was to hang on to its position till D’Erlon’s troops

had passed its rear, and then follow them as best it could. All the

cross-tracks indicated to the three armies ended by converging on the

Salvatierra road east of Vittoria, so that a hopeless confusion was

assured for the moment when three separate streams of retreating troops

should meet, and struggle for the use of one narrow and inadequate

thoroughfare. But as a matter of fact the chaos began long before that

time was reached, for the road was blocked or ever the three armies

got near it. The order for the retreat of the Park and convoys had

been issued far too late--Gazan says that he had advised Jourdan to

give it two hours before, when the first positions had been abandoned.

But the Marshal had apparently high confidence in his power to hold

the Hermandad-Gomecha-Esquivel line; at any rate, he had given no

such command. The noise of battle rolling ever closer to Vittoria

had warned the mixed multitude of civil and military hangers-on of

the army who were waiting by their carriages, carts, pack-mules,

and fourgons, in the open fields east of Vittoria, that the French

army was being driven in. Many of those who were not under military

discipline had begun to push ahead on the Salvatierra road, the moment

that the alarming news flew around that the great _chaussée_ leading

to France had been blocked. The Park, however--which all day long

had been sending up reserve ammunition to the front, and even one or

two improvised sections of guns--had naturally remained waiting for

orders. So had the immense accumulation of divisional and regimental

baggage, the convoy of treasure which had arrived from Bayonne on the

19th, and the heavy carriages of the King’s personal caravan, stuffed

with the plate and pictures of the palace at Madrid. And of the

miscellaneous French and Spanish hangers-on of the Court--ministers,

courtiers, clerks, commissaries, contractors, and the ladies who in

legitimate or illegitimate capacities followed them--few had dared to

go off unescorted on an early start. There was a vast accumulation

of distracted womenfolk--_nous étions un bordel ambulant_, said one

French eye-witness--some crammed together in travelling coaches with

children and servants, others riding the spare horses or mules of the

men to whom they belonged. When the orders for general retreat were

shouted around, among the fields where the multitude had been waiting,

three thousand vehicles of one sort and another tried simultaneously

to get into one or another of the five field-paths which go east from

Vittoria, all of which ultimately debouch into the single narrow

Salvatierra road. A dozen blocks and upsets had occurred before the

first ten minutes were over, and chaos supervened. Many carriages

and waggons never got off on a road at all. Into the rear of this

confusion there came charging, a few minutes later, batteries of

artillery going at high speed, and strings of caissons, which had been

horsed up and had started away early from the Park. Of course they

could not get through--but the thrust which they delivered, before

they came to an enforced stop, jammed the crowd of vehicles in front

of them into a still more hopeless block. Dozens of carriages broke

down--whereupon light-fingered fugitives began to help themselves

to all that was spilt. Of course camp followers began the game, but

Jourdan says that a large proportion of the French prisoners that day

were soldiers who _s’amusaient à piller_ in and about Vittoria; one

of the official reports from the Army of Portugal remarks that the

retreating cavalry joined in the ‘general pillage of the valuables

of the army,’ and other narrators mention that the treasure-fourgons

had already been broken into long before the English came upon the

scene[597]. Be this as it may, there was no long delay before the

terrors of the stampede culminated with the arrival of several

squadrons of Grant’s hussars, who had penetrated by the gap between

D’Erlon’s and Gazan’s lines of retreat, and had made a short cut

through the suburbs of the town. Of the chaos that followed the firing

of the first pistol shots which heralded the charge of the British

light cavalry, we must not speak till we have dealt with the last fight

of the Army of Portugal, on the extreme French right.

[Illustration: Battle of VITTORIA]

Till Grant’s and Colville’s brigades broke into Crispijana and Ali, the

line of Reille’s gallant defence along the Zadorra had remained intact.

Only artillery fire was going on opposite the bridge of Arriaga,

where the 1st Division and the two Portuguese brigades had halted

by Graham’s orders at some distance from the river, and had never

advanced. The two cavalry brigades were behind them. At Gamarra Mayor

the 5th Division had failed to force a passage, though it had inflicted

on Lamartinière’s troops as heavy a loss as it suffered. Longa was

held up half a mile beyond Durana, though he had successfully cut the

Bayonne _chaussée_. There was considerable cannonade and skirmishing

fire going on, upon a front of three miles, but no further progress

reported. The whole scene, however, was changed from the moment when

Grant’s and Colville’s brigades, turning the flank of D’Erlon’s line

close to the Zadorra, came sweeping over the hills by Ali into the

very rear of Reille’s line. The Army of Portugal had been directed to

hold the bridges and keep back Graham, until the rest of the French

host had got off. But the danger now came not from the front but from

the rear. In half an hour more the advancing British columns would be

level with the bridge of Arriaga and surrounding the infantry that held

it. Reille determined on instant retreat, the only course open to him:

so far as was possible it was covered by the very ample provision of

cavalry which he had in hand. Digeon, who has left a good account of

the crisis, made several desperate charges, to hold back the advancing

British while Menne’s brigade was escaping from Arriaga. One was

against infantry, which formed square and beat off the dragoons with no

difficulty[598]--the other against hussars, apparently two squadrons of

the 15th, which had turned northward from the suburbs of Vittoria and

tried to ride in and cut off the retreat of Menne’s battalions[599].

They were beaten back, and the infantry scrambled off, leaving behind

them Sarrut, their divisional general, mortally wounded as the retreat

began. Moreover, all the guns in and about Arriaga had to be abandoned

in the fields, where they could make no rapid progress. The gunners

unhitched the horses, and escaped as best they could.

Reille had drawn up in front of Betonio the small infantry reserve

(Fririon’s brigade) which he had wisely provided for himself,

flanked by Boyer’s dragoons and Curto’s brigade of light cavalry.

The object of this stand was not only to give Menne’s and Digeon’s

troops a nucleus on which they could rally, but to gain time for

Lamartinière to draw off from in front of Gamarra Mayor bridge, where

he was still hotly engaged with Oswald’s division. This infantry got

away in better order than most French troops on that day, and even

brought off its divisional battery, though that of the cavalry which

had been co-operating with it had to be left behind not far from the

river-bank, having got into a marshy bottom where it stuck fast. The

Franco-Spaniards of Casapalacios and their attendant cavalry escaped

over the hills east of Durana, pursued by Longa, who took many

prisoners from them.

When Lamartinière’s division had come in, Reille made a rapid retreat

to the woods of Zurbano, a mile and a half behind Betonio, which

promised good cover. He was now being pursued by the whole of Graham’s

corps, which had crossed the Zadorra when the bridges were abandoned.

Pack’s brigade, followed by the 1st Division and Bradford, advanced on

Arriaga; they were somewhat late owing to slow filing over the bridge.

At Gamarra Oswald sent in the pursuit of Lamartinière two squadrons of

light dragoons[600] which had been attached to his column; these were

followed by the rest of their brigade, which Graham sent up from the

main road to join them, and also by Bock’s German dragoons. The object

of using the smaller and more remote bridge was that cavalry crossing

by it had a better chance of getting into Reille’s rear than they would

have secured by passing at Arriaga. The much exhausted 5th Division

followed the cavalry.

Having reached the edge of the woods, Reille ordered the bulk of his

troops to push on hard, by the two parallel roads which traverse

them, keeping Fririon’s brigade in hand as a fighting rearguard. The

rather disordered columns were emerging on the east side of the woods,

and streaming into and past the village of Zurbano, when the leading

squadrons of the 12th and 16th Light Dragoons came in upon them.

These squadrons had avoided entangling themselves in the trees till

the French rearguard had passed on, but prepared to charge the moment

they got into open ground, though the main body of the brigade had not

come up. They found opposed to them a regiment of Boyer’s dragoons,

supported by another of hussars, which they charged but did not

break[601]. But on the coming up of the rear squadrons, the attack was

renewed with success. The French cavalry gave way, but only to clear

the front of the 36th Line of Fririon’s brigade, which was in square

outside Zurbano. The British light dragoons swept down on the square,

but were completely repulsed by its steady fire. This gained time for

the rest of Reille’s troops to make off, and the pursuit slackened.

But the bulk of the French went off in such haste that they abandoned

four guns of Lamartinière’s artillery, and took away with them only the

remaining two--the sole pieces that escaped that day of the immense

train of Joseph’s three armies. Some hundreds of stragglers were taken,

but no single unit of the retiring force was cut off or captured whole.

Reille wisely kept his army, so long as was possible, on the side-paths

by Arbulo and Oreytia, before debouching into the main Salvatierra

road, which was seething over with the wrecks of the other armies and

the convoys. Hence he succeeded in escaping the utter confusion into

which the rest fell, and, finally, when he turned into the main track,

was able to constitute himself a rearguard to the whole. Graham’s

pursuit of him seems to have been slow and cautious--no troops indeed

ever came near the retreating columns except the two light dragoon

regiments, the Caçador battalions of Pack and Bradford, and some of

Longa’s skirmishers, who (as Reille mentions) followed him along the

hills on his left, shooting down into the retreating masses, but not

attempting to break in. The 5th Division appears to have followed not

much farther than the open ground beyond the woods of Zurbano, where it

halted and encamped after eight o’clock in some bean-fields. Nor does

it seem that the 1st Division got more than a league or so beyond the

Zadorra[602]. The Caçadores and cavalry, however, did not halt till

they reached El Burgo, four or five miles farther on.

The scene was very different on the other side of Vittoria, where

D’Erlon’s army was pushing its way, in utter disorder, through the

fields and by-paths over which the Parks and convoy were trying in

vain to get off, and Gazan’s (farther to the south) was making a dash

over ground of the most tiresome sort. For in the rugged tract east

of Esquivel and Armentia such paths as there were mostly ran in the

wrong direction--north and south instead of east and west--and it

was necessary to disregard them and to strike across country. Six

successive ravines lay in the way--marshy bottoms in which ran trifling

brooks descending toward the Zadorra--and several woods on the ridges

between the ravines. Hill’s and Cole’s skirmishers were pressing in

the rear, and above, on the heights of Puebla, Morillo’s and Cameron’s

troops could be seen hurrying along with the intention of getting

ahead of the retreating masses. The confusion growing worse every

moment--for companies and battalions each struck out for the easiest

line of retreat without regard for their neighbours--Gazan gave orders

to abandon all the artillery, which was getting embogged, battery after

battery, in the ravines, and gave leave for every unit to shift for

itself--general _sauve-qui-peut_. The horses were unhitched from the

guns and caissons, many of the infantry threw off their packs, and the

army went off broadcast, some in the direction of Metauco and Arbulo,

others by village paths more to the south. The general stream finally

flowed into the Salvatierra road, where it was covered by the Army of

Portugal, which was making a much more orderly retreat[603]. English

eye-witnesses of this part of the battle complain bitterly that no

horsemen ever came up to assist the wearied 2nd Division infantry

in the pursuit, and maintain that thousands of prisoners might have

been taken by a few squadrons[604]. But all the cavalry seems to have

been directed on Vittoria by the high road, and save Grant’s hussar

brigade none of it came into action. This is sufficiently proved by

its casualty lists--in R. Hill’s, Ponsonby’s, Long’s, Victor Alten’s,

and Fane’s brigades that day the total losses were one man killed

and eleven wounded! Only Anson’s Light Dragoons in Graham’s corps

and Grant’s regiments in the centre got into the fighting at all.

The rugged ground, it is true, was unfavourable for cavalry action

in regular order, but it was almost as unfavourable for disordered

infantry escaping over ravines and ditches. Something was wrong here

in the general direction of the mounted arm--perhaps it suffered from

the want of a responsible cavalry leader--the brigadiers dared not act

for themselves, and Bock (the senior cavalry officer) was not only

short-sighted in the extreme, but absent from the main battle all day

in Graham’s corps. One cannot but suspect that Wellington’s thunderings

in previous years, against reckless cavalry action, were always present

in the minds of colonels and brigadiers who had a chance before them.

And possibly, in the end, there was more gained by the avoidance of

mistakes of rashness than lost by the missing of opportunities, if we

take the war as a whole. But at Vittoria it would most certainly appear

that the great mass of British cavalry might as well have been on the

other side of the Ebro for all the good that it accomplished.

It only remains to speak of the chaos in the fields and roads east of

Vittoria. When the general _débâcle_ began King Joseph and Jourdan took

their post on a low hill half a mile east of the town, and endeavoured

to organize the departure of the Park and convoys--a hopeless task, for

the roads were blocked, and no one listened to orders. It was in vain

that aides-de-camp and orderlies were sent in all directions. Presently

a flood of fugitives were driven in upon the staff, by the approach

of British cavalry in full career. These were Grant’s 10th and 18th

Hussars, who had turned the town on its left, and galloped down on the

prey before them. Joseph had only with him the two squadrons of his

Lancers of the Guard, which had been acting as head-quarters escort

all day. It would appear that the Guard Hussars came up to join them

about this time. At any rate, these two small regiments made a valiant

attempt to hold off the hussars--they were of course beaten, being

hopelessly outnumbered[605]. The King and staff had to fly as best

they could, and were much scattered, galloping over fields and marshy

ravines, mixed with military and civil fugitives of all sorts. Some of

the British hussars followed the throng, taking a good many prisoners

by the way: more, it is to be feared, stopped behind to gather the

not too creditable first-fruits of victory, by plundering the royal

carriages, which lay behind the scene of their charge. The French

stragglers had already shown them the way.

Wellington, on reaching Vittoria, set Robert Hill’s brigade of the

Household Cavalry to guard the town from plunder, and sent on the

rest of the horse, and the infantry as they came up, in pursuit of

the enemy. The French, however, had by now a good start, and troops

in order cannot keep up with troops in disorder, who have got rid of

their impedimenta, and scattered themselves. The country, moreover,

was unfavourable for cavalry, as has been said above, and the

infantry divisions were tired out. The chase ended five miles beyond

Vittoria--the enemy, when last seen, being still on the run, with no

formed rearguard except on the side road where the Army of Portugal was

retreating.

If the prisoners were fewer than might have been expected, the material

captured was such as no European army had ever laid hands on before,

since Alexander’s Macedonians plundered the camp of the Persian king

after the battle of Issus. The military trophies compared well even

with those of Leipzig and Waterloo--151 guns, 415 caissons, 100

artillery waggons. Probably no other army ever left _all_ its artillery

save two solitary pieces in the enemy’s hands[606]. There was but one

flag captured, and that was only the standard of a battalion of the

100th Line which had been reduced in May, and had not been actually

borne in the battle[607]. The baton of Jourdan, as Marshal of the

Empire, was an interesting souvenir, which delighted the Prince Regent

when it arrived in London[608], but only bore witness to the fact that

his personal baggage, like that of his King, had been captured. A few

thousand extra prisoners--the total taken was only about 2,000--would

have been more acceptable tokens of victory.

But non-military spoil was enormous--almost incredible. It represented

the exploitation of Spain for six long years by its conquerors. ‘To

the accumulated plunder of Andalusia were added the collections made

by the other French armies--the personal baggage of the King--fourgons

having inscribed on them in large letters “_Domaine extérieur de S.M.

l’Empereur_”--the military chest containing the millions recently

received from France for the payment of the Army, and not yet

distributed--jewels, pictures, embroidery, silks, all manner of things

costly and portable had been assiduously transported thus far. Removed

from their frames and rolled up carefully, were the finest Italian

pictures from the royal collections of Madrid: they were found in the

“imperials” of Joseph’s own carriages. All this mixed with cannon,

overturned coaches, broken-down waggons, forsaken tumbrils, wounded

soldiers, French and Spanish civilians, women and children, dead horses

and mules, absolutely covered the face of the country, extending

over the surface of a flat containing many hundred acres[609].’

The miserable crowd was guessed by an eye-witness to have numbered

nearly 20,000 persons. Spanish and French camp-followers and military

stragglers had already started plunder--on them supervened English and

Portuguese civil and military vultures of the same sort--servants and

muleteers by the thousand, bad soldiers by the hundred: for while the

good men marched on, the bad ones melted out of the ranks and flew to

the spoil, evading the officers who tried to urge them on. In such a

chaos evasion was easy. Nor were the commissioned ranks altogether

without their unobtrusive seekers after gain--as witness the subjoined

narrative by one whom a companion in a contemporary letter describes as

a ‘graceless youth.’

‘As L. and I rode out of Vittoria, we came to the camp in less than a

mile. On the left-hand side of the road was a heap of ransacked waggons

already broken up and dismantled. There arose a shout from a number

of persons among the waggons, and we found that they had discovered

one yet unopened. We cantered up and found some men using all possible

force to break open three iron clasps secured with padlocks. On the

side of the fourgon was painted “Le Lieutenant-Général Villatte.” The

hasps gave way, and a shout followed. The whole surface of the waggon

was packed with church plate, mixed with bags of dollars. A man who

thrust his arm down said that the bottom was full of loose dollars

and boxes. L. and I were the only ones on horseback, and pushed close

to the waggon. He swung out a large chalice, and buckling it to his

holster-strap cantered off. As the people were crowding to lay hold of

the plate, I noted a mahogany box about eighteen inches by two feet,

with brass clasps. I picked out four men, told them that the box was

the real thing, and if they would fetch it out we would see what it

held. They caught the idea: the box was very heavy. I led the way

through the standing corn, six or seven feet high, to a small shed,

where we put it down and tried to get it open. After several devices

had failed, two men found a large stone, and, lifting it as high as

they could, dropped it on the box. It withstood several blows, but at

length gave way. Gold doubloons and smaller pieces filled the whole

box, in which were mixed some bags with trinkets. Just then an Ordnance

store-keeper came up, and said there was no time to count shares: he

would go round and give a handfull in turn to each. He first poured

a double handfull into my holster. The second round was a smaller

handfull. By this time I was reflecting that I was the only officer

present, and in rather an awkward position. I said they might have

the rest of my share,--there was first a look of surprise, and then a

burst of laughter, and I trotted away. I rode eight or ten miles to

the bivouack and found the officers in an ancient church--housed à la

Cromwell. On the 23rd, before we left our quarters, I and ---- went up

into the belfry, and counted out the gold--the doubloons alone made

nearly £400. I remitted £250 to my father, and purchased another horse

with part of the balance[610].’

General Villatte, no doubt, had special facilities in Andalusia--but

every fourgon and carriage contained something that had been worth

carrying off. The amount of hard cash discovered was almost incredible.

Men and officers who had been self-respecting enough to avoid the

unseemly rush at the waggons, had wonderful bargains at a sort of

impromptu fair or auction which was held among the débris of the convoy

that night. Good mules were going for three guineas--horses for ten.

Every one wished to get rid of the heavy duros and five-franc pieces,

which constituted the greater part of the plunder; six and eight

dollars respectively were offered and taken for a gold twenty-franc

piece or a guinea. ‘The camp was turned into a fair--it was lighted

up, the cars, &c., made into stands, upon which the things taken

were exposed for sale. Many soldiers, to add to the absurdity of the

scene, dressed themselves up in uniforms found in the chests. All the

Portuguese boys belonging to some divisions are dressed in the uniforms

of French officers--many of generals[611].’

Wellington had hoped to secure the five million francs of the French

subsidy which had just arrived at Vittoria before the battle. His

expectations were deceived; only one-twentieth of the sum was

recovered, though an inquisitorial search was made a few days later in

suspected quarters. One regiment, which had notoriously prospered, was

made to stack its knapsacks on the 23rd, and they were gone through in

detail by an assistant provost-marshal--but little was found: the men

had stowed away their gains in belts and secret pockets; or deposited

them with quartermasters and commissaries who were known to be honest

and silent.

The only feature in this discreditable scene that gives the historian

some satisfaction is to know that there was no mishandling of

prisoners--not even of prominent Spanish traitors. The only person

recorded to have been killed in the chaos was M. Thiébault, the King’s

treasurer, who fought to defend his private strong-box containing

100,000 dollars, and got shot[612]. The women were particularly well

treated--the Countess Gazan, wife of the Commander of the Army of the

South, was sent by Wellington’s orders in her own carriage to join her

husband--a courtesy acknowledged by several French diarists[613]. The

same leave was given later to many others, and the Commander-in-Chief

wrote to the Spanish Ministry to beg that no vengeance might be taken

on the captured _afrancesados_, and seems to have secured his end in

the main.

The French loss in the battle, according to the definitive report made

from the head-quarters of the three armies after they had got back

into France, was 42 officers and 716 men killed, 226 officers and

4,210 men wounded, and 23 officers and 2,825 prisoners or missing--a

total of 8,091. It is known that of the ‘missing’ some hundreds were

stragglers who rejoined later, and some other hundreds dead men, who

had not got into the list of killed. The total number of prisoners did

not really exceed 2,000. But on the other hand the official returns are

incomplete, not giving any figures for the artillery or train of the

Armies of Portugal and the Centre, or for the Royal Guards (which lost

11 officers and therefore probably 150 to 200 men), or for the General

Staff (which had 35 casualties), or for the stray troops of the Army of

the North present in the battle. Probably the real total, therefore,

was very much about the 8,000 men given by the official return.

The Allied casualties were just over 5,000--of whom 3,672 were British,

921 Portuguese, and 552 Spaniards. A glance at the table in the

Appendix will show how unequally they were distributed. Seven-tenths of

the whole loss fell on the 2nd and 3rd Divisions, with Grant’s brigade

of the 7th, Robinson’s of the 5th, and Stubbs’s Portuguese in the 4th.

These troops furnished over 3,500 of the total loss of 5,158. The 1st

Division (54 casualties), the British brigades of the 4th Division (125

casualties), Hay’s and Spry’s brigades of the 5th (200 casualties),

Barnes’ and Lecor’s of the 7th (no casualties[614]), the Light Division

(132 casualties), Silveira’s Division (10 casualties), the cavalry (155

casualties) had no losses of importance. The 266 men marked as missing

were all either dead or absent marauding, save 40 of the 71st whom the

French took prisoners to Pampeluna. The Spanish loss of 14 officers

and 524 men was entirely in Morillo’s and Longa’s Divisions, and much

heavier among the Estremadurans, who fought so well on the heights of

La Puebla, than among the Cantabrians who skirmished all day at Durana.

Giron’s Galicians were never engaged, having only arrived in the rear

of Graham’s column just as the fighting north of the Zadorra was over.

They encamped round Arriaga at the end of the day.