THE EAST TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN, NOVEMBER 1863, TO APRIL, 1864
Ordered by Bragg to move against Burnside and Knoxville--Our
two divisions--Wheeler's cavalry with artillery--Burnside's
strength--At Sweetwater, November 21st--Disappointed in supplies--The
railway--Pontoons, but no train--Cross Holston at Loudon--Enemy
escapes into Knoxville--Hood's old division--Generals Jenkins
and Law--Siege of Knoxville--Bull Winthrop--McLaws ready for an
assault--Troops ordered to support--General Leadbetter, of Bragg's
staff, orders assault--Brigadiers Wofford, Humphreys, and Bryan
attacked--Repulsed at Fort Saunders--General Longstreet assumes the
blame--Losses.
After a long wait, General Bragg settled on something. He decided
to make a move against Burnside and Knoxville. About November 3,
Longstreet received his instructions. They were about in line with what
the Lieutenant-General wanted instantly after Chickamauga and what
should have been done, but the General-in-Chief could not see it, and,
welcoming the orders even at this late day, we prepared for a hearty
support and active campaign.
The troops of the expedition were to be the two divisions (nine
brigades of infantry) brought from Virginia and Alexander's fine
battalion of artillery, six batteries; also Leyden's artillery, and
Wheeler's powerful body of cavalry (four brigades) and horse artillery.
We were also to take up all the loose bodies of troops to be found
in the wide district to be covered. A force of about 3,000 men was
promised from southwest Virginia.
It was an ill-disciplined body, not well organized, but accomplished
wonders under Wheeler as a screen to the army, and an unceasing menace
to the enemy's communications. He had some able officers with him,
Generals W. J. Martin, John T. Morgan, G. G. Dibbrell, and Thomas
Harrison. When Wheeler left us with instructions for a movement calling
for some night work his cheerful words to his fellows were: "Come,
boys, mount. The War Child rides to-night." That being, it seems, one
of his pet names among the men.
Major-General Wheeler was not long with us, Bragg, to whom his services
were invaluable, having sent for him. I saw him I think but once. He
had reported to Longstreet for orders and was followed by a rather
numerous staff and escort. A small, slight man, very quick and alert
in his movements, quite young, only recently from West Point, he had
justly earned great distinction as the cavalry leader of our Western
army.
Burnside's force south of Knoxville was computed at about 15,000, and
if we could get all the troops Bragg held out to our commander, there
would be enough of us to crush Burnside. But the Federal general had
within reach some five thousand more men than General Bragg estimated.
The expedition, glad to be on the move, set out smartly for Tyner's
Station, where it was to be entrained for Sweetwater, but things went
decidedly wrong. We had brought no transportation from Virginia and
General Bragg's officers supplied us with wagons and teams, but held
themselves under Bragg's order. A most inconvenient disposition then,
and until we parted company with that commander for good.
With these and other difficulties it was November 12th before the
last of our brigades came to Sweetwater. Here there were more
disappointments as to rations, supplies, and transportation. We were
dependent on Bragg's provisions, which cruelly failed us. Not to dwell
too long on these mishaps, I need only add that they beset the entire
campaign.
The cars and railway by which we helped the transportation were almost
comical in their inefficiency. The railroad was of heavy grades and the
engines light-powered. When a hill was reached the long train would
be instantly emptied--platforms, roofs, doors, and windows--of our
fellows, like ants out of a hill, who would ease things by trudging up
the dirt road and catching on again at the top; and so it went on as
far as the railroad would serve us.
A bridge train had been prepared by the engineers, and it had been our
intention to use it across the Little Tennessee, or Halston, above its
confluence and through Marysville. But here again was disappointment;
there were pontoons but no train for hauling.
We were thus forced to throw our bridge across at Loudon, where,
fortunately, the boats could be floated direct from cars without
need of wagons, and there that curious bridge was laid by our worthy
engineers. It was a sight to remember. The current was strong, the
anchorage insufficient, the boats and indeed entire outfit quite
primitive, and when lashed finally to both banks it might be imagined
a bridge; but a huge letter "S" in effect it was with its graceful
reverse curves. But no man should abuse the bridge by which he safely
crosses, and this one took us over, using care and caution. I shall
always love the looks of that queer bridge.
The enemy was well advised as to our movements, and evidently conducted
his retreat with skill and no serious losses. At Lenoir's Station
he was forced to leave nearly a hundred loaded wagons, though the
running-gear had been broken up so as to make them of no immediate use
to us.
I do not give in-detail the various movements of our advance from one
point to another, their character generally not being of the highest
credit to us in rapidity or co-operation of our several commands.
A fine opportunity of crushing Burnside was lost at Campbell's Station.
Burnside's retreat was in time to cover the roads leading into it, and
there he had to make a stand. We should have beaten him badly, but he
escaped and was soon safe in Knoxville. The roads were deep in mud and
caused hard travel and labor, but they were no better for the Union
force.
Campbell's Station cannot be termed a serious battle. It was
principally an artillery fight, in which the gallant Alexander was
tormented by defective ammunition. It should have been a strong and
decisive battle, but things went wrong with the infantry divisions and
an effective co-operation was not secured. Ah! would that we could have
had Hood again at the head of his division.
As it was, the five brigades of this fine command were practically
paralyzed by the differences between the senior brigadier in command,
Jenkins, and his competitor, General E. M. Law. It was a most unhappy
condition of things, but by no fault of Longstreet. When Mr. Davis
visited us at Chickamauga the Lieutenant-General laid the situation
before him and urged the promotion and appointment of Jenkins, to
which Mr. Davis would not listen. He was asked then to appoint Law,
but this also met the Executive's "No," that officer being junior; and
then Longstreet begged the assignment of any good major-general to be
found elsewhere. But none came then; months after one was sent when
irretrievable mischief had been done by the unfortunate condition of
the division. It lasted during all the subsequent operations in East
Tennessee throughout the winter.
Thus it came about that the enemy eluded us at Campbell's Station, and
the next day was behind his works at Knoxville, except his cavalry,
which lingered to retard our march. Our army followed closely, at once
put the enemy's works under fire, and so began what is called the
"Siege of Knoxville."
By many it is thought to have been a serious error on the part of the
Confederate commander, the resorting to so slow a process. "He should
have attacked immediately"; and I am disposed to consider intelligent
statements of Union officers and citizens of Knoxville, long after, as
indicating that an energetic movement, without the slightest delay,
would have carried us into the town and brought Burnside to terms.
On the 18th of November McLaws advanced against some defenses of
skirmishers, but part of his line halted before reaching the crest
of the hill. Captain Winthrop, an Englishman serving with Alexander,
dashed forward, and encouraging the men got through the hill in
handsome style. It was well done by "Bull" Winthrop, as we called him,
and he picked up a nasty wound in the doing of it.
Burnside's strongest defense was Fort Loudon, later called Fort
Saunders, for the gallant officer of that name who fell in its
defense. It was a strong earthwork, closely under McLaws's eye, who
was expected to capture it. Of course he had done much work toward
it--ditches, parallels, and many devices for success. A night attack
was proposed and at one time favored.
On the 22d General McLaws thought the time had come and he was ordered
to prepare his assaulting column, supported by the division. Longstreet
also ordered up other troops for support and following up a success.
Later on McLaws reported that his officers preferred daylight for the
work before them and the movement was for the time deferred. On the 23d
we heard that Bragg had been attacked at Chattanooga. Bushrod Johnson's
division of two brigades was at Loudon moving to us, and our strength
then would be eleven brigades of infantry, Wheeler's cavalry of four
brigades (Wheeler himself had been ordered back by Bragg, leaving
the horse under command of Maj.-Gen. Will T. Martin), Alexander's
artillery, and Leyden's battalion.
On the 25th, Bragg's chief engineer, General Leadbetter, brought orders
from the former to attack immediately. Longstreet was reluctant. Troops
from Virginia were on the march, due with us in eight or ten days,
and with them the investment could be made complete. The enemy was
also said to be on half rations, and an attack now with chances of our
repulse would be all in his favor. But Leadbetter felt that Bragg's
orders were imperative and the assault must be attempted. Minute orders
were then sent to McLaws for the effort. The details are rather lengthy
for the scope of these recollections. It was intended for the 28th, but
because of bad weather put off until the 29th. At the appointed time
the vigorous assault was made in fine form by the brigades of Wofford,
Humphreys, and Bryan in the early gray of the morning. At first we
seemed to be going right ahead, shoving everything aside, but some
stops were made and the wounded men began coming back.
General Longstreet says that when Major Goggin, an old Army man on
McLaws's staff, reported to him that it would be useless to persevere,
that the fort was so surrounded with net-works of wire that no progress
could be made without axes and not an axe was to be found--"Without a
second thought, I ordered the recall." He says later that the accounts
of General Poe, the engineer in charge of the works, convinced him
that the few wires met with were far from being the serious obstacle
reported and that we could have gone in without axes. It also seemed
sure that the fort was nearly ours by the retirement of part of its
garrison, only some two hundred men being kept with the guns.
General Longstreet takes upon himself the failure of the assault.
It seems conclusive to him that it was due to the order for recall.
He had long known Goggin. Some of our men pushed into the fort. One
gallant young officer, Adjutant Cumming, from Augusta, Georgia, leaped
through an embrasure and instantly demanded the surrender of fort and
garrison. The Union troops cheered the feat while making him a prisoner
of war. Almost immediately after the repulse General Longstreet
received a telegram from the President to the effect that "Bragg had
been forced back by numbers and that we were to co-operate with his
army." A euphemism on the part of the President--Bragg had suffered a
severe defeat and was in full retreat. He made for Dalton, which put
out of the question any co-operation by us. Our own safety was to be
considered and how it could be accomplished.
The casualties at Knoxville are thus given: Confederate loss in
assault, 822; Union loss in assault, 673; Confederate loss in campaign,
1,296; Union loss in campaign, 1,481.