THE ENGAGEMENT OF MONTE CRISTO
Cingolo Neck: February 19, 1900.
Not since I wrote the tale of my escape from Pretoria have I taken up my
pen with such feelings of satisfaction and contentment as I do to-night.
The period of doubt and hesitation is over. We have grasped the nettle
firmly, and as shrewdly as firmly, and have taken no hurt. It remains
only to pluck it. For heaven's sake no over-confidence or premature
elation; but there is really good hope that Sir Redvers Buller has
solved the Riddle of the Tugela--at last. At last! I expect there will
be some who will inquire--'Why not "at first"?' All I can answer is
this: There is certainly no more capable soldier of high rank in all the
army in Natal than Sir Redvers Buller. For three months he has been
trying his best to pierce the Boer lines and the barrier of mountain and
river which separates Ladysmith from food and friends; trying with an
army--magnificent in everything but numbers, and not inconsiderable even
in that respect--trying at a heavy price of blood in Africa, of anxiety
at home. Now, for the first time, it seems that he may succeed. Knowing
the General and the difficulties, I am inclined to ask, not whether he
might have succeeded sooner, but rather whether anyone else would have
succeeded at all. But to the chronicle!
Anyone who stands on Gun Hill near Chieveley can see the whole of the
Boer position about Colenso sweeping before him in a wide curve. The
mountain wall looks perfectly unbroken. The river lies everywhere buried
in its gorge, and is quite invisible. To the observer there is only a
smooth green bay of land sloping gently downward, and embraced by the
rocky, scrub-covered hills. Along this crescent of high ground runs--or
rather, by God's grace, ran the Boer line, strong in its natural
features, and entrenched from end to end. When the map is consulted,
however, it is seen that the Tugela does not flow uniformly along the
foot of the hills as might be expected, but that after passing Colenso
village, which is about the centre of the position, it plunges into the
mountainous country, and bends sharply northward; so that, though the
left of the Boer line might appear as strong as the right, there was
this difference, that the Boer right had the river on its front, the
Boer left had it in its rear.
The attack of the 15th of December had been directed against the Boer
right, because after reconnaissance Sir Redvers Buller deemed that, in
spite of the river advantage, the right was actually the weaker of the
two flanks. The attack of the 15th was repulsed with heavy loss. It
might, therefore, seem that little promise of success attended an attack
on the Boer left. The situation, however, was entirely altered by the
great reinforcements in heavy artillery which had reached the army, and
a position which formerly appeared unassailable now looked less
formidable.
Let us now consider the Boer left by itself. It ran in a chain of
sangars, trenches, and rifle pits, from Colenso village, through the
scrub by the river, over the rugged hill of Hlangwani, along a smooth
grass ridge we called 'The Green Hill,' and was extended to guard
against a turning movement on to the lofty wooded ridges of Monte Cristo
and Cingolo and the neck joining these two features. Sir Redvers
Buller's determination was to turn this widely extended position on its
extreme left, and to endeavour to crumple it from left to right. As it
were, a gigantic right arm was to reach out to the eastward, its
shoulder at Gun Hill, its elbow on Hussar Hill, its hand on Cingolo, its
fingers, the Irregular Cavalry Brigade, actually behind Cingolo.
On February 12th a reconnaissance in force of Hussar Hill was made by
Lord Dundonald. On the 14th the army moved east from Chieveley to occupy
this ground. General Hart with one brigade held Gun Hill and Railhead.
The First Cavalry Brigade watched the left flank at Springfield, but
with these exceptions the whole force marched for Hussar Hill. The
Irregular Cavalry covered the front, and the South African Light Horse,
thrown out far in advance, secured the position by half-past eight, just
in time to forestall a force of Boers which had been despatched, so soon
as the general movement of the British was evident, to resist the
capture of the hill. A short sharp skirmish followed, in which we lost a
few horses and men, and claim to have killed six Boers, and which was
terminated after half an hour by the arrival of the leading Infantry
battalion--the Royal Welsh Fusiliers. During the day the occupation was
completed, and the brigades of Generals Wynne, Coke, and Barton, then
joining Warren's Division with the Artillery, entrenched themselves
strongly and bivouacked on the hill. Meanwhile Lyttelton's Division
marched from its camp in the Blue Krantz Valley, east of Chieveley,
along the valley to a position short of the eastern spurs of Hussar
Hill. These spurs are more thickly wooded and broken than the rest of
the hill, and about four o'clock in the afternoon some hundred Boers
established themselves among the rocks and opened a sharp fire. They
were, however, expelled from their position by the Artillery and by the
fire of the advanced battalions of Lyttelton's Division operating from
the Blue Krantz Valley.
During the 15th and 16th a desultory artillery duel proceeded on both
sides with slight loss to us. The water question presented some
difficulty, as the Blue Krantz River was several miles from Hussar Hill
and the hill itself was waterless. A system of iron tanks mounted on ox
waggons was arranged, and a sufficient though small supply maintained.
The heavy artillery was also brought into action and strongly
entrenched. The formidable nature of the enemy's position and the
evident care with which he had fortified it may well have added to the
delay by giving cause for the gravest reflection.
On the afternoon of the 16th Sir Redvers Buller resolved to plunge, and
orders were issued for a general advance at dawn. Colonel Sandbach,
under whose supervision the Intelligence Department has attained a new
and a refreshing standard of efficiency, made comprehensive and, as was
afterwards proved, accurate reports of the enemy's strength and spirit,
and strongly recommended the attack on the left flank. Two hours before
dawn the army was on the move. Hart's Brigade, the 6-inch and other
great guns at Chieveley, guarded Railhead. Hlangwani Hill, and the long
line of entrenchments rimming the Green Hill, were masked and fronted by
the display of the field and siege batteries, whose strength in guns was
as follows:
Guns
Four 5-inch siege guns.......................... 4
Six naval twelve-pounder long-range guns........ 6
Two 4.7-inch naval guns......................... 2
One battery howitzers........................... 6
One battery corps artillery (R.F.A.)............ 6
Two brigade divisions R.F.A ....................36
One mountain battery............................ 6
--
66
and which were also able to prepare and support the attack on Cingolo
Neck and Monte Cristo Ridge. Cingolo Ridge itself, however, was almost
beyond their reach. Lyttelton's Division with Wynne's Fusilier Brigade
was to stretch out to the eastward and, by a wide turning movement
pivoting on the guns and Barton's Brigade, attack the Cingolo Ridge.
Dundonald's Cavalry Brigade was to make a far wider detour and climb up
the end of the ridge, thus making absolutely certain of finding the
enemy's left flank at last.
By daybreak all were moving, and as the Irregular Cavalry forded the
Blue Krantz stream on their enveloping march we heard the boom of the
first gun. The usual leisurely bombardment had begun, and I counted only
thirty shells in the first ten minutes, which was not very hard work for
the gunners considering that nearly seventy guns were in action. But the
Artillery never hurry themselves, and indeed I do not remember to have
heard in this war a really good cannonade, such as we had at Omdurman,
except for a few minutes at Vaal Krantz.
The Cavalry Brigade marched ten miles eastward through most broken and
difficult country, all rock, high grass, and dense thickets, which made
it imperative to move in single file, and the sound of the general
action grew fainter and fainter. Gradually, however, we began to turn
again towards it. The slope of the ground rose against us. The scrub
became more dense. To ride further was impossible. We dismounted and led
our horses, who scrambled and blundered painfully among the trees and
boulders. So scattered was our formation that I did not care to imagine
what would have happened had the enemy put in an appearance. But our
safety lay in these same natural difficulties. The Boers doubtless
reflected, 'No one will ever try to go through such ground as
that'--besides which war cannot be made without running risks. The
soldier must chance his life.
The general must not be afraid to brave disaster. But how tolerant the
arm-chair critics should be of men who try daring _coups_ and fail! You
must put your head into the lion's mouth if the performance is to be a
success. And then I remembered the attacks on the brave and capable
General Gatacre after Stormberg, and wondered what would be said of us
if we were caught 'dismounted and scattered in a wood.'
At length we reached the foot of the hill and halted to reconnoitre the
slopes as far as was possible. After half an hour, since nothing could
be seen, the advance was resumed up the side of a precipice and through
a jungle so thick that we had to cut our road. It was eleven o'clock
before we reached the summit of the ridge and emerged on to a more or
less open plateau, diversified with patches of wood and heaps of great
boulders. Two squadrons had re-formed on the top and had deployed to
cover the others. The troopers of the remaining seven squadrons were
working their way up about four to the minute. It would take at least
two hours before the command was complete: and meanwhile! Suddenly there
was a rifle shot. Then another, then a regular splutter of musketry.
Bullets began to whizz overhead. The Boers had discovered us.
Now came the crisis. There might be a hundred Boers on the hill, in
which case all was well. On the other hand there might be a thousand, in
which case----! and retreat down the precipice was, of course, quite out
of the question. Luckily there were only about a hundred, and after a
skirmish, in which one of the Natal Carabineers was unhappily killed,
they fell back and we completed our deployment on the top of the hill.
The squadron of Imperial Light Horse and the Natal Carabineers now
advanced slowly along the ridge, clearing it of the enemy, slaying and
retrieving one field cornet and two burghers, and capturing ten horses.
Half-way along the Queen's, the right battalion of Hildyard's attack,
which, having made a smaller detour, had now rushed the top, came into
line and supported the dismounted men. The rest of the Cavalry descended
into the plain on the other side of the ridge, outflanking and even
threatening the retreat of its defenders, so that in the end the Boers,
who were very weak in numbers, were hunted off the ridge altogether, and
Cingolo was ours. Cingolo and Monte Cristo are joined together by a neck
of ground from which both heights rise steeply. On either side of Monte
Cristo and Cingolo long spurs run at right angles to the main hill.
By the operations of the 17th the Boer line had been twisted off
Cingolo, and turned back along the subsidiary spurs of Monte Cristo, and
the British forces had placed themselves diagonally across the left of
the Boer position thus:
[Illustration: Plan of position at Monte Cristo.]
The advantages of this situation were to be enjoyed on the morrow.
Finding our further advance barred by the turned-back position the enemy
had adopted, and which we could only attack frontally, the Cavalry
threw out a line of outposts which were soon engaged in a long-range
rifle duel, and prepared to bivouac for the night. Cingolo Ridge was
meanwhile strongly occupied by the Infantry, whose line ran from its
highest peak slantwise across the valley of the Gomba Stream to Hussar
Hill, where it found its pivot in Barton's Brigade and the Artillery.
The Boers, who were much disconcerted by the change in the situation,
showed themselves ostentatiously on the turned-back ridge of their
position as if to make themselves appear in great strength, and
derisively hoisted white flags on their guns. The Colonial and American
troopers (for in the South African Light Horse we have a great many
Americans, and one even who served under Sheridan) made some exceedingly
good practice at the extreme ranges. So the afternoon passed, and the
night came in comparative quiet.
At dawn the artillery began on both sides, and we were ourselves
awakened by Creusot shells bursting in our bivouac. The enemy's fire
was chiefly directed on the company of the Queen's which was holding the
top of Cingolo, and only the good cover which the great rocks afforded
prevented serious losses. As it was several men were injured. But we
knew that we held the best cards; and so did the Boers. At eight o'clock
Hildyard's Brigade advanced against the peak of the Monte Cristo ridge
which lay beyond the neck. The West Yorks led, the Queen's and East
Surrey supported. The musketry swelled into a constant crackle like the
noise of a good fire roaring up the chimney, but, in spite of more than
a hundred casualties, the advance never checked for an instant, and by
half-past ten o'clock the bayonets of the attacking infantry began to
glitter among the trees of the summit. The Boers, who were lining a
hastily-dug trench half way along the ridge, threatened in front with an
overwhelming force and assailed in flank by the long-range fire of the
Cavalry, began to fall back. By eleven o'clock the fight on the part of
the enemy resolved itself into a rearguard action.
Under the pressure of the advancing and enveloping army this
degenerated very rapidly. When the Dutchman makes up his mind to go he
throws all dignity to the winds, and I have never seen an enemy leave
the field in such a hurry as did these valiant Boers who found their
flank turned, and remembered for the first time that there was a deep
river behind them. Shortly after twelve o'clock the summit of the ridge
of Monte Cristo was in our hands. The spurs which started at right
angles from it were, of course, now enfiladed and commanded. The Boers
evacuated both in great haste. The eastern spur was what I have called
the 'turned-back' position. The Cavalry under Dundonald. galloped
forward and seized it as soon as the enemy were seen in motion, and from
this advantageous standpoint we fired heavily into their line of
retreat. They scarcely waited to fire back, and we had only two men and
a few horses wounded.
The spur on the Colenso or western side was none other than the Green
Hill itself, and judging rightly that its frowning entrenchments were
now empty of defenders Sir Redvers Buller ordered a general advance
frontally against it. Two miles of trenches were taken with scarcely any
loss. The enemy fled in disorder across the river. A few prisoners, some
wounded, several cartloads of ammunition and stores, five camps with all
kinds of Boer material, and last of all, and compared to which all else
was insignificant, the dominating Monte Cristo ridge stretching
northward to within an easy spring of Bulwana Hill, were the prize of
victory. The soldiers, delighted at the change of fortune, slept in the
Boer tents--or would have done had these not been disgustingly foul and
stinking.
From the captured ridge we could look right down into Ladysmith, and at
the first opportunity I climbed up to see it for myself. Only eight
miles away stood the poor little persecuted town, with whose fate there
is wrapt up the honour of the Empire, and for whose sake so many hundred
good soldiers have given life or limb--a twenty-acre patch of tin houses
and blue gum trees, but famous to the uttermost ends of the earth.
The victory of Monte Cristo has revolutionised the situation in Natal.
It has laid open a practicable road to Ladysmith. Great difficulties and
heavy opposition have yet to be encountered and overcome, but the word
'impossible' must no longer be--should, perhaps, never have been used.
The success was won at the cost of less than two hundred men killed and
wounded, and surely no army more than the Army of Natal deserves a
cheaply bought triumph.