THE DASH FOR POTGIETER'S FERRY
Spearman's Hill: January 13, 1900.
Secrets usually leak out in a camp, no matter how many people are
employed to keep them. For two days before January 10 rumours of an
impending move circulated freely. There are, moreover, certain signs by
which anyone who is acquainted with the under machinery of an army can
tell when operations are imminent. On the 6th we heard that orders had
been given to clear the Pietermaritzburg hospitals of all patients,
evidently because new inmates were expected. On the 7th it was reported
that the hospitals were all clear. On the 8th an ambulance train emptied
the field hospitals at Frere, and that same evening there arrived seven
hundred civilian stretcher-bearers--brave men who had volunteered to
carry wounded under fire, and whom the army somewhat ungratefully
nicknames the 'Body-snatchers.' Nor were these grim preparations the
only indications of approaching activity. The commissariat told tales of
accumulations of supplies--twenty-one days' packed in waggons--of the
collection of transport oxen and other details, meaningless by
themselves, but full of significance when viewed side by side with other
circumstances. Accordingly I was scarcely surprised when, chancing to
ride from Chieveley to Frere on the afternoon of the 10th, I discovered
the whole of Sir Charles Warren's division added to the already
extensive camp.
This was the first move of the complicated operations by which Sir
Redvers Buller designed to seize the passage of the Tugela at
Potgieter's Ferry: Warren (seven battalions, comprising Coke's and
Woodgate's Brigades and five batteries) from Estcourt to Frere. When I
got back to Chieveley all was bustle in the camp. Orders to march at
dawn had arrived. At last the long pause was finished; waiting was
over; action had begun.
So far as Chieveley was concerned, the following was the programme:
Barton's Brigade to entrench itself strongly and to remain before
Colenso, covering the head of the line of communications, and
demonstrating against the position; Hildyard's Brigade to move westward
at daylight on the 11th to Pretorius's Farm; cavalry, guns, and baggage
(miles of it) to take a more circuitous route to the same place. Thither
also Hart was to move from Frere, joining Hildyard and forming Clery's
division. Warren was to rest until the next day. The force for the
relief of Ladysmith, exclusive of Barton's Brigade and communication
troops, was organised as follows:
_Commander-in-Chief_: SIR REDVERS BULLER
CLERY'S DIVISION Warren's Division
consisting of consisting of
Hildyard's Brigade, Lyttelton's Brigade,
Hart's Brigade, Woodgate's Brigade,
1 squad. 13th Hussars, 1 squad. 15th Hussars,
3 batteries, 3 batteries,
R.E. R.E.
CORPS TROOPS
Coke's Brigade (3 battalions),
1 field battery R.A.,
1 howitzer battery R.A.,
2 4.7-inch naval guns and Naval Brigade,
8 long-range naval 12-pounder guns,
1 squadron 13th Hussars,
R.E., &c.
CAVALRY (DUNDONALD)
1st Royal Dragoons.
14th Hussars.
4 squadrons South African Light Horse.
1 squadron Imperial Light Horse.
Bethune's Mounted Infantry.
Thorneycroft's Mounted Infantry.
1 squadron Natal Carabineers.
1 squadron Natal Police.
1 company K.R.R. Mounted Infantry.
6 machine guns.
Or, to sum the whole up briefly, 19,000 infantry, 3,000 cavalry, and 60
guns.
All were busy with their various tasks--Barton's Brigade entrenching,
making redoubts and shelter pits, or block-houses of railway iron; the
other brigades packing up ready for the march as night closed in. In
the morning we started. The cavalry were responsible for the safety of
the baggage convoy, and with Colonel Byng, who commanded the column, I
waited and watched the almost interminable procession defile. Ox waggons
piled high with all kinds of packages, and drawn sometimes by ten or
twelve pairs of oxen, mule waggons, Scotch carts, ambulance waggons,
with huge Red Cross flags, ammunition carts, artillery, slaughter
cattle, and, last of all, the naval battery, with its two enormous
4.7-inch pieces, dragged by long strings of animals, and guarded by
straw-hatted khaki-clad bluejackets, passed in imposing array, with here
and there a troop of cavalry to protect them or to prevent straggling.
And here let me make an unpleasant digression. The vast amount of
baggage this army takes with it on the march hampers its movements and
utterly precludes all possibility of surprising the enemy. I have never
before seen even officers accommodated with tents on service, though
both the Indian frontier and the Soudan lie under a hotter sun than
South Africa. But here to day, within striking distance of a mobile
enemy whom we wish to circumvent, every private soldier has canvas
shelter, and the other arrangements are on an equally elaborate scale.
The consequence is that roads are crowded, drifts are blocked, marching
troops are delayed, and all rapidity of movement is out of the question.
Meanwhile, the enemy completes the fortification of his positions, and
the cost of capturing them rises. It is a poor economy to let a soldier
live well for three days at the price of killing him on the fourth.[1]
We marched off with the rearguard at last, and the column twisted away
among the hills towards the west. After marching about three miles we
reached the point where the track from Frere joined the track from
Chieveley, and here two streams of waggons flowed into one another like
the confluence of rivers. Shortly after this all the mounted forces
with the baggage were directed to concentrate at the head of the column,
and, leaving the tardy waggons to toil along at their own pace, we
trotted swiftly forward. Pretorius's Farm was reached at noon--a
tin-roofed house, a few sheds, a dozen trees, and an artificial pond
filled to the brim by the recent rains. Here drawn up in the spacious
plain were the Royal Dragoons--distinguished from the Colonial Corps by
the bristle of lances bare of pennons above their ranks and by their
great horses--one squadron of the already famous Imperial Light Horse,
and Bethune's Mounted Infantry. The Dragoons remained at the farm, which
was that night to be the camping place of Clery's division. But all the
rest of the mounted forces, about a thousand men, and a battery of
artillery were hurried forward to seize the bridge across the Little
Tugela at Springfield.
So on we ride, 'trot and walk,' lightly and easily over the good turf,
and winding in scattered practical formations among the beautiful
verdant hills of Natal. Presently we topped a ridge and entered a very
extensive basin of country--a huge circular valley of green grass with
sloping hills apparently on all sides and towards the west, bluffs,
rising range above range, to the bright purple wall of the Drakensberg.
Other valleys opened out from this, some half veiled in thin mist,
others into which the sun was shining, filled with a curious blue light,
so that one seemed to be looking down into depths of clear water, and
everyone rejoiced in the splendours of the delightful landscape.
But now we approached Springfield, and perhaps at Springfield we should
find the enemy. Surely if they did not oppose the passage they would
blow up the bridge. Tiny patrols--beetles on a green baize
carpet--scoured the plain, and before we reached the crease--scarcely
perceptible at a mile's distance, in which the Little Tugela flows--word
was brought that no Dutchmen were anywhere to be seen. Captain Gough, it
appeared, with one man had ridden over the bridge in safety; more than
that, had actually explored three miles on the further side: did not
believe there was a Boer this side of the Tugela: would like to push on
to Potgieter's and make certain: 'Perhaps we can seize Potgieter's
to-night. They don't like having a flooded river behind them.' So we
come safely to Springfield--three houses, a long wooden bridge 'erected
by public subscription, at a cost of 4,300_l_.'--half a dozen farms with
their tin roofs and tree clumps seen in the neighbourhood--and no Boers.
Orders were to seize the bridge: seized accordingly; and after all had
crossed and watered in the Little Tugela--swollen by the rains to quite
a considerable Tugela, eighty yards wide--we looked about for something
else to do.
Meanwhile more patrols came in; all told the same tale: no Boers
anywhere. Well, then, let us push on. Why not seize the heights above
Potgieter's? If held, they would cost a thousand men to storm; now,
perhaps, they might be had for nothing. Again, why not? Orders said, 'Go
to Springfield;' nothing about Potgieter's at all. Never mind--if
cavalry had never done more than obey their orders how different
English history would have been! Captain Birdwood, 11th Bengal Lancers,
glorious regiment of the Indian frontier, now on Lord Dundonald's staff,
was for pushing on. All and sundry were eager to get on. 'Have a dash
for it.' It is very easy to see what to do in the field of war until you
put on the thick blue goggles of responsibility. Dundonald reflected,
reflected again, and finally resolved. _Vorwärts!_ So on we went
accordingly. Three hundred men and two guns were left to hold the
Springfield bridge, seven hundred men and four guns hurried on through
the afternoon to Potgieter's Ferry, or, more properly speaking, the
heights commanding it, and reached them safely at six o'clock, finding a
strong position strengthened by loopholed stone walls, unguarded and
unoccupied. The whole force climbed to the top of the hills, and with
great labour succeeded in dragging the guns with them before night. Then
we sent back to announce what we had done and to ask for reinforcements.
The necessity for reinforcements seemed very real to me, for I have a
wholesome respect for Boer military enterprise; and after the security
of a great camp the dangers of our lonely unsupported perch on the hills
came home with extra force. 'No Boers this side of the Tugela.' How did
we know? We had not seen any, but the deep valleys along the river might
easily conceal two thousand horsemen. I said to myself, the Boer has
always a reason for everything he does. He left the Springfield bridge
standing. It would have cost him nothing to blow it up. Why, then, had
he neglected this obvious precaution? Again, the position we had seized
had actually been fortified by the enemy. Why, then, had they abandoned
it to a parcel of horsemen without a shot fired? I could quite
understand that the flooded Tugela was not a satisfactory feature to
fight in front of, but it seemed certain that they had some devilry
prepared for us somewhere. The uninjured bridge appeared to me a trap:
the unguarded position a bait. Suppose they were, we should be attacked
at daylight. Nothing more than a soldier should always expect; but what
of the position? The line we had to hold to cover the approaches to our
hill-top was far greater than seven hundred men could occupy. Had we
been only cavalry and mounted men we could have fallen back after the
position became untenable, but we were encumbered with four
field-guns--a source of anxiety, not of strength. So I began to long for
infantry. Two thousand good infantry would make everything absolutely
secure. And ten miles away were infantry by thousands, all delighted to
march every mile nearer the front.
We passed a wet and watchful night without food or sleep, and were glad
to find the break of day unbroken by the musketry of a heavy attack.
From our lofty position on the heights the whole country beyond the
Tugela was spread like a map. I sat on a great rock which overhung the
valley, and searched the landscape inch by inch with field glasses.
After an hour's study my feeling of insecurity departed. I learned the
answer to the questions which had perplexed the mind. Before us lay the
'devilry' the Boers had prepared, and it was no longer difficult to
understand why the Springfield bridge had been spared and the heights
abandoned.[2]
The ground fell almost sheer six hundred feet to the flat bottom of the
valley. Beneath, the Tugela curled along like a brown and very sinuous
serpent. Never have I seen such violent twists and bends in a river. At
times the waters seemed to loop back on themselves. One great loop bent
towards us, and at the arch of this the little ferry of Potgieter's
floated, moored to ropes which looked through the field glasses like a
spider's web. The ford, approached by roads cut down through the steep
bank, was beside it, but closed for the time being by the flood. The
loop of river enclosed a great tongue of land which jutted from the
hills on the enemy's side almost to our feet. A thousand yards from the
tip of this tongue rose a line of low kopjes crowned with reddish
stones. The whole tongue was virtually ours. Our guns on the heights or
on the bank could sweep it from flank to flank, enfilade and cross
fire. Therefore the passage of the river was assured. We had obtained
what amounted to a practical bridgehead, and could cross whenever we
thought fit. But the explanation of many things lay beyond. At the base
of the tongue, where it sprang from the Boer side of the valley, the
ground rose in a series of gentle grassy slopes to a long horseshoe of
hills, and along this, both flanks resting securely on unfordable
reaches of the river, out of range from our heights of any but the
heaviest guns, approachable by a smooth grass glacis, which was exposed
to two or three tiers of cross-fire and converging fire, ran the enemy's
position. Please look at the sketch on p. 261, which shows nothing but
what it is meant to.
[Illustration: Plan of Potgieter's Ferry.]
It will be seen that there is no difficulty in shelling the Boers out of
the little kopjes, of fortifying them, and of passing the army on to the
tip of the tongue; but to get off the tongue on to the smooth plateau
that runs to Ladysmith it was necessary to force the tremendous Boer
position enclosing the tongue. In technical language the possession of
the heights virtually gave us a bridgehead on the Tugela, but the
debouches from that bridgehead were barred by an exterior line of hills
fortified and occupied by the enemy.
What will Sir Redvers Buller do? In a few hours we shall know. To cross
and deliver a frontal attack will cost at least three thousand men. Is a
flank attack possible? Can the position be turned? Fords few and far
between, steep banks, mighty positions on the further banks: such are
some of the difficulties. But everyone has confidence in the general.
An officer who had been serving on the Kimberley side came here. 'I
don't understand,' he said, 'how it is you are all so cheerful here
after Colenso. You should hear the troops at Modeler River.' But it is a
poor army that cannot take a repulse and come up smiling, and when the
private soldiers put their faith in any man they are very constant.
Besides, Buller's personality impresses everyone with the idea of some
great reserve of force. Certainly he has something up his sleeve. The
move to Potgieter's has been talked of for a month and executed with the
greatest ostentation and deliberation. Surely something lies behind it
all. So at least we all believe, and in the meanwhile trust
wholeheartedly.
But some part of the army will certainly cross at Potgieter's; and as I
looked down on the smooth smiling landscape it seemed very strange to
think that in a few days it would blaze into a veritable hell. Yet the
dark lines of shelter trenches, the redoubts crowning the hills, the
bristle of tiny black figures busily entrenching against the sky line,
hundreds of horses grazing in the plain, all promised a fierce and
stubborn defence. I turned about. The country to the southward was also
visible. What looked to the naked eye like an endless thin rope lay
streaked across the spacious veldt, and when I looked through the glass
I saw that it was ten or twelve miles of marching men and baggage. The
armies were approaching. The collision impended.
Nothing happened during the day except the capture of the ferry, which
daring enterprise was carried out by volunteers from the South African
Light Horse. Six swimmers, protected by a covering party of twenty men,
swam the flooded Tugela and began to haul the punt back, whereat the
Boers concealed in the kopjes opened a brisk fire at long range on the
naked figures, but did not hit anyone nor prevent them all from bringing
the punt safely to our side: a dashing exploit, of which their
regiment--the 'Cockyolibirds,' as the army, with its customary
irreverence, calls us on account of the cock's feather cockades we wear
in our hats (miserable jealousy!)--are immensely proud.
The falling of the Tugela increased the danger of our position, and I
was delighted when I woke up the next morning, the second of our
adventurous occupation, to find Colonel Sandbach, to whom I had confided
my doubts, outside my tent, saying 'I suppose you'll be happy now. Two
battalions have arrived.' And, sure enough, when I looked southwards, I
saw a steady rivulet of infantry trickling through the gorge, and
forming a comfortable brown inundation in the hollow where our camp lay.
A few minutes later Sir Redvers Buller and his staff rode up to see
things for themselves, and then we knew that all was well.
The General made his way to the great stone we call the observatory, and
lying down on his back peered through a telescope in silence for the
best part of an hour. Then he went off to breakfast with the Cavalry
Brigade staff. A few officers remained behind to take a still more
exhaustive view. 'There'll be some wigs on that green before long.'
'What a wonderful sight it will be from here!' 'What a place to see a
battle from!' Two artillerymen were loitering near. Said one: 'We ought
to have the Queen up here, in her little donkey carriage.' 'Ah, we'd do
it all right then,' replied his comrade. But when I looked at the
peaceful plain and reflected on the storm and tumult presently to burst
upon it, I could not help being glad that no gentle eye would view that
bloody panorama.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] This complaint was not in one respect justified by what followed,
for after we left Spearman's we only saw our tents for a day or two, and
at rare intervals, until Ladysmith was relieved.
[2] _Vide_ map, opposite p. 366, which will be found to illustrate the
subsequent letters.